Given By

Mrs. R. C. Wells
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 35
PROCEEDINGS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
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JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 148

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

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TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT.
Washington, 14 September 1945.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

Subject: Report of investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War, I have conducted the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, mentioned in the public statements of the Secretary of War on 1 December 1944 and 29 August 1945. Copies of these statements and of my orders and some related documents are attached as Exhibit "A".

In the course of this investigation, I travelled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian personnel at the following places:

Berlin, Germany
Blencley Park, England
Boston, Massachusetts
Cannes, France
Casserta, Italy
Frankfurt on Main, Germany
Guam
Honolulu, T. H.
Langley Field, Virginia
Leyte, P. I.
London, England
Luzon, P. I.
Manila, P. I.
Neuenahr, Germany
New York, New York
Paris, France
Potsdam, Germany
Saipan
Versailles, France
Washington, D. C.

Some of these persons were interviewed where they were engaged in combat in active theaters of operation, as the Secretary of War stated in his public statement of 1 December 1944 would be necessary.

Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.
Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I recorded their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are attached as Exhibit "B":

General George C. Marshall
General Douglas MacArthur
Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland
Major General John R. Deane
Major General Charles D. Herron
Major General Sherman Miles
Major General C. A. Willoughby
Major General Ralph C. Smith
Brig. General Thomas J. Betts
Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder
Brig. General Morrill W. Marston
Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop
Brig. General Charles K. Gailey
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft
Colonel George W. Bicknell
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen
Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew
Colonel Joseph K. Evans
Colonel Edward F. French
Colonel Edward W. Raley
Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow
Lt. General Walter B. Smith
Colonel Otis K. Sadler
Colonel Rex W. Minkler
Colonel Harold Doud
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN
Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN
Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
Major Edward B. Anderson
Captain Howard W. Martin
Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane
Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN
Lt. Colonel Leonard T. Gerow
Colonel Otis K. Sadler
Colonel Rex W. Minkler
Colonel Harold Doud
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN
Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN
Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
Major Edward B. Anderson
Captain Howard W. Martin
Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane
Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN

The following persons gave me signed statements which, with some records of my interviews, are also included in Exhibit "B":

Brigadier General C. A. Powell
Colonel O. H. Thompson
Lt. Colonel Byron M. Muerlott
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
Major Edward B. Anderson
Captain Howard W. Martin
Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane
Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN

I also obtained a great deal of additional documentary evidence. A list of this is attached as Exhibit "C" and the documents are presented herewith.

Periodic oral and written reports were heretofore made. The written reports are attached as Exhibit "D".

There are attached as Exhibits "E" and "F" memoranda of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation.

6 Incls
1. Ex. "A"
2. Ex. "B"
3. Ex. "C"
4. Ex. "D"
5. Ex. "E"
6. Ex. "F"
EXHIBIT A

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR; SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to conduct investigations of Pearl Harbor.

2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster, 1 December 1944.

3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation.

4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944, concerning unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army personnel concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.

6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.

7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10 February 1945, in reply to letter 6 February 1945.

8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March 1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen.


10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, 21 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen.

11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen.


13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding Officer, 1504 AAPBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in movement orders of Major Henry C. Clausen.


16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1945, concerning investigation.

17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7 August 1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen.


19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, 29 August 1945.

[Public Law 339—78th Congress]

[Chapter 247—2d Session]

[S. J. Res. 133]

JOINT RESOLUTION

To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor
catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

Approved June 13, 1944.

[7] War Department

BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
PRESS BRANCH

Tel. — RE 6700, Brs. 3425 and 4860

December 1, 1944.

Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR

The following is the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War:

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conclusions as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.
In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based.

**STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS**

I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of the evidence now recorded not to institute further proceedings against any officer of the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a report of June 14, 1944, called attention to certain relationships of Hans Wilhelm Rohl to military construction in Hawaii under the direction of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that this may have contributed to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly, the phases of the Committee report bearing thereon were referred to the Army Pearl Harbor Board for further investigation.

I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy.

As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate General.

Distribution: Aa, Af, B, Da, Dd, Dm, N.
5:00 P. M.

**SECRET**

**WAR DEPARTMENT,**
Washington, 23 November 1944.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information to your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries.

In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary notwithstanding.

HENRY L. STIMSON,

Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Washington 25, D. C.

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can be investigated:
   a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order.
   b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.
   c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington.
   d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor.
   e. Whether Kimmel understood the term “defensive deployments” or wired back for its meaning.
   f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies thereof.
   g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation.
   h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department.

3. Concerning the “magic” intercepts we should ascertain:
   a. The exact date and time of first translation.
   b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some of the most vital messages.
   c. Who got each message, when and in what form.
   d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.
   e. The origin of the “Budapest” intercept.

4. Significant details regarding the “Winds” intercept might be explored:
   a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.
   b. The Navy’s alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford C. 133–135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the transmission was received.
   c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a “War with Britian” message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

5. Whether the partial implementation “War with Britian” was brought to Admiral Stark’s or General Marshall’s attention, it being clear that the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

c. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept?

d. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating "Winds" message?

e. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine?

f. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "Winds" message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.

Myron C. Cramer,
Myron C. Cramer,
Major General, USA,
The Judge Advocate General.

SECRET

[13]

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, 6 February 1945.

Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned:

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him.

Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

SECRET

[14]

6 February 1945.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Some of the additional information which seems to be material is believed to be available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I have instructed Major Clausen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

I will appreciate it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to all pertinent Navy records and information and afford him the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it being understood that he will comply strictly with the instructions I have stated above.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy.

Mo'B.

Hon. James V. Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

hhb/mob
A True Copy.

Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY


DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of 6 February 1945 advising that Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and requesting that he be given access to all pertinent Navy records and information and be afforded the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as necessary, it being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which directed that we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, authorize us to make available to each other information in our respective Departments relevant to our separate investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to comply with your request, and suggest that Major Clausen communicate with Lt. Commander John F. Sonnett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to furnish the specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

HON. HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

3 March 1945.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.

Subject: Request for Orders.

1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War, dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the investigation by Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of Secretary of War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to proceed on or about 12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b) then to Honolulu, T. H., and (c) then return to Washington, D. C., and (d) authority to make such successive trips from Washington, D. C., and to travel to such other place or places, and to make such changes in said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said mission.

3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, rail or any other means of transportation be authorized as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75 pounds be authorized for travel by aircraft.

4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of $7.00 be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while away from Washington, D. C. required to complete this mission, Reference is made to the determination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August 1944, that the thirty day limitation prescribed in War Department Circular 250, 1944, is not applicable in connection with temporary duty enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Officers on duty therewith.

/s/ H. C. CLAUSEN,
H. C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

Approved:

/s/ Harvey H. Bundy,
Harvey H. Bundy, for the Secretary of War.

/s/ Myron C. Cramer,
Myron C. Cramer,
The Judge Advocate General.

A true copy.

H. C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
Subject: Movement Orders.

To: Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD
4731 Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20 March 1945 from Washington, D. C., to San Francisco, California, on temporary duty of approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Fairfield, California, reporting not later than 28 March 1945, to the Commanding Officer, 1504th AAF Base Unit for air transportation to Fort Shafter, T. H. Upon arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501–3 P 432–02, 03, 212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55–120, Changes no. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APR–2–33156–ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, (official documents), is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 290, 1944 apply; outside continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply.

3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the theater as may be necessary for the performance of this mission.

4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamphlet No. 38–6, "Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the port of aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions.

5. Special instructions: Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic plague inoculations will be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated as special official courier.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

E. A. DAVIS, Adjutant General.

[18] 3 Incls.
AG Ltr 4 July 1944
AG Form 43
Travel Book
Distribution:
Officer (10)
Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu.
APS, 4A–514, The Pentagon (2)
Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort Mason, Calif.
Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD, WDGS, 3B–354, The Pentagon
Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E–747, The Pentagon
P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va.
CG, USAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California
Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.
CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Calif. (3)
SECRET

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas.
Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days.

It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

SECRET

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater.
Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days.

It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

WAR DEPARTMENT

ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum: ASF P&O (Maj. Duckett)
1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy attached) as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 28 Mar. 45, be amended to extend said dates respectively to leave Washington, D. C. on or about 26 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4 April 45. Also, if advisable, amend said orders to designate my correct rank.

2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to await certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.

Rm. 4741 Munitions
Ex. 78922
AGPO-A 201–Clausen, Henry C
(27 Mar 45)
AGO Personnel Officers
Room 2323 Munitions
Assignment EAD/laf/fcs/2323

Haevey
27
PP
Washington

Movement
24
To
AK
AGPO-A
War.

Subject:
General,
for
3
Washington,

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.

SECRET

Harvey H. Bundy,
For the Secretary of War.

A true copy.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

RESTRICTED

EAD/lfaf/fcs/2323 Mun
Br. 76520

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington 25, D. C., 25 May 1945

[24]
AGPO-A 201. Clausen, Henry C
(24 May 45)
Subject: Movement Orders
To: #Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD

1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. C. to Headquarters, SHAPE, European Theater of Operations, Versailles, France, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary on temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purposes of conducting an investigation in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of War. He will report to the Commanding Officer, 506th Army Air Forces Base Unit, Air Annex #1, Room 1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for processing and air transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from Washington, D. C. to Versailles, France, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03 212/50425. Travel by air (APR-1-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b (2) AR 55-129, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emerg-
ency war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35-4820, 19 April 1945 apply; outside the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 35-4820, 19 April 1945, apply.

3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the accomplishment of this mission.

4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD Pamphlet No. 38-6, “Itemized Baggage List.” One (1) Pistol, caliber .45 will be issued at the aeral port of embarkation.

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4305, % Postmaster, New York, New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Capt. E. A. Davis, AGO,
Adjoint General.

Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec

[25] 3 Incds:
AG Ltr 4 Jul 44
AG Form #43
Travel Book

Distribution:
Officer (10)
Offs’ Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun
APS, 4A-514, Pentagon
OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)
Lt. Stump, 1C-331, Pentagon
CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt., DC (3)
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun

Destination Commander:

SECRET

[26]

Dear Mr. Secretary: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I wish to thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and interviewed certain Navy personnel.

I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization or action may have had in the disaster.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

A true copy.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

hhb/mob

[27] 7 August 1945.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General:
Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, dated 25 May 1945.
It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth period of temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read “four months.”

Harvey H. Bundy,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.

A true copy.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
AGPO—A 201—Claussen, Henry C.
(7 Aug. 45)
Subject: Amendment of Movement Orders,
To: Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Claussen, O—907613, JAGD.
So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO—A 201 Claussen, Henry C. (21 May 45) Subject: Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Claussen, O—907613, JAGD as reads: "Temporary Duty of approximately two (2) months" be amended to read: "Temporary Duty of approximately four (4) months".

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. A. Davis, Adjutant General.

Distribution:
Officer (10)
Offs' Br Rec Sec AGO, Rm 1528 Mun
APS, Rm 4—A 514, Pentagon
OIC, Emb APO—461 Lexington Ave, NY, NY (2)
Lt. Stump, 1C 391, Pentagon
CO, 503D AAFBU, WPAE, Rm 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Ptd, DC (3)
Judge Advocate General, Rm 2734, Mun.
Destination Commander:

[29] Official Report of the Secretary of War Regarding the Pearl Harbor Disaster

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

On December 1, 1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter as follows:

"This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

"I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

"The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

"So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conclusions as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.
"Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

"In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [30] every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

"Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based."

Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to be taken was correct.

Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I., and others. From these same sources there came to the Government additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan.

The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress the full reports and the record of the testimony.

My conclusions are as follows:

I

The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation. Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local [31] situation and conditions.

Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion
demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese attack.

I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until the latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that he was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared for the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.

I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would have modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan.

I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiaircraft defenses sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded.

This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz: the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.

[32] The underlying cause of this error of judgment was General Short's confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him it must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.

Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27, 1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this
should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others.

But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility of such an attack was his own definite responsibility.

To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.

To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack on that outpost to the opinion of another service.

Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater commander.

I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my statement of December 1, 1944, and in my judgment the additional investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been taken.

II

[33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had specially assigned duties.

The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders.

I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation: that he was warned that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures—the all-important measure to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated, I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty.

There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate.
The information available to the War Department on or before December 7, 1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following: information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by November 25, 1941, later extended to November 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no further; and information available the morning of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1:00 P.M., December 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, was that the War Department had information through secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that officers on General Short’s staff also had this information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that General Short had been [33] fully advised by the War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any time.

The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy’s general plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible.

Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9:00 A.M. on the morning of December 7.

When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Government at 1:00 P.M. and the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message, which in the case of General Short, did not arrive until after the attack.

Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about November 29, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed.
With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department [85] functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event.

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more inclusive comparison of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short’s reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short’s message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division.

Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

III

The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the exercise in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for [36] and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hope-
lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts.

It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such situation in this case. The scattered and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.

IV

The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.

V

In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have prolonged the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board’s comment in this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.

VI

There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed on December 1, 1944, were as follows:

[37] “I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy.”

The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.

I also stated on December 1, 1944, that “as to other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General.” Until those officials are ready to report, I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman.

*This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts; Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney.
EXHIBIT B

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
7. Affidavit of Margaret McKenney, GSC, G-2, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.

20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Hucksins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
26. Statement of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam.
29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
32. Affidavit of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
33. Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas, 8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
34. Affidavit of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany.

38. Affidavit of Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at Casserta, Italy.
41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Deane, USA, 24 July 1945, at Potsdam, Germany.
42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris, France.
43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadler, SC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at Boston, Massachusetts.
46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, 21 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
47. Affidavit of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
51. Affidavit of Miss Mary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.

[44]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,

Memorandum for the files.

Subject: Interview of General Fielder.

Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General Bissell on 8 January 1945, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4D852, Pentagon, on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission and the clearance with General Bissell which permitted General Fielder to answer all my questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was already sworn as a witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the necessity for secrecy with respect to my examination. To many of my questions he answered that it would be necessary for me to review the records at Hawaii and that this would entail considerable research. He gave the following information or answers to the specific points indicated.

1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from Washington since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated that he referred solely to counterintelligence matters and that he had "nothing to do with combat."

2. He stated he was not very well acquainted with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did not know of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and Colonel Edward Ralley. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "L" (called RL).

3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25 October 1944, he stated it was his understanding that these were circulated to the Chief of Staff and General Short.
4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the Washington G-2, 27 November 1941, warning.

5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1 December 1941.

6. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information (Bratton D. 289–291) and that it was “circulated” as something he “used to get.”

7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attaché message of 5–6 December 1941.

8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance.

9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington G-2 message to the Hawaiian Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message, he said he “didn’t remember” the message but that it “might have come in as routine.”

10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he knew that the Navy was interpreting such information, he stated at first that he knew of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and that on this basis he knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes.

Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry were asked.

General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given without recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification already referred to obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and information.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
H. C. C.,  
Major, JAGD,  
Assistant Recorder, APHB.

TOP SECRET

[43] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit at the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily radio intelligence under assignments from the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My unit consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor.

My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of intelligence information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters, and with him and Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my headquarters. Thereafter, including the period to 7 December 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally and frequently, and carried out these arrangements.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was then being done mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of the Navy. On occasions I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit “B.” I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today’s date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It
was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and [44] and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.

[Written:] Note.—This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in accordance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort.

Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this regard is distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning these items of intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, USN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of February 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL MOSES W. PETTIGREW, MIS

Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says:

From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington; that from November 1939 to August 1941 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the Far Eastern Unit, G-2, War Department;

That while performing said duties in G-2, he read various intercepts of diplomatic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies; that these intercepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level Diplomatic, and J19;

That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November 1941, while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by Major Clausen have been identified by affiant with his initials and date, and which are now commonly referred to as the "Winds Code";

That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or about 5 December 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger; that in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now recall, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached.

That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in possession of the same information he had received in Washington; that he reached this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel, whom he does not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had; and, that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving these intercepts and breaking and translating the codes, as well as Washington, in the
interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a subsequent exchange of intercept translations as a check one against the another.

[46] That on 5 December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the secret teleogram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information; that affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram he prepared and has affixed his initials and date on the reverse side thereof; that the initials "RSB" written thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, were written thereon by affiant on 5 December 1941 and affiant also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner; that affiant believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initiated by Lt. Colonel C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room for dispatch;

That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the message was dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing message number which was given only in the ordinary course of procedure when a message was dispatched;

Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of said message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian Department;

That prior to affiant’s aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was from May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; that while in the performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he had been informed that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that time; that the Army had a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the development of this phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to obtain certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel Morril W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in turn was succeeded by Colonel Fielder;

Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview with Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2DS41, Pentagon, Extension 5551, questioning of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and interviews and checking records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal Corps there, especially Colonel Powell. Also, interviews with Colonel C. C. Duisenbury, MID, former assistant to Colonel Bratton and with General Marston.

Moses W. Pettigrew,
Moses W. PETTIcREW,
Colonel, MIS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

[17] Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926

TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Sent No. 519, 12/5

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2, Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram
las
war department, washington.

affidavit of colonel carlise Clyde dusenbury, gsc

colonel carlise clyde dusenbury, gsc, assistant director of intelligence, southeast asia command, kandy, ceylon, on temporary duty in washington, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by major henry c. clauseen, jagd, for the secretary of war, supplementary to the proceedings of the army pearl harbor board, and reminded of his right to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says:

to the best of my recollection i prepared the initial draft of the 5 december 1941 secret cablegram reading:
"sent no. 519, 12/5"

december 5, 1941.

assistant chief of staff headquarters,
62 hawaiian department,
honolulu, territory hawaii:

contact commander rochefort immediately thru commandant fourteen naval district regarding broadcasts from tokyo reference weather.

miles."

i have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on the reverse side thereof. this was prepared either of my volition or following consultation with colonel rufus s. bratton, g-2, chief, far eastern branch, mis. for several months prior to and following 7 december 1941 colonel pettigrew was on duty as executive officer, intelligence group, mid, and was not an active member of the far eastern section when the message of 5 december originated. his duties were administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving outgoing messages. the reason which i recollect for sending the secret cablegram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been received by g-2, especially the "winds code", indicated danger to the united states and also, because there was believed to be lack of confidence by edwin t. layton, navy intelligence officer as to kendall j. fielder, g-2, hawaiian department.

it was believed by me that commander rochefort had these intercepts, including the "winds code" and similar information, available at hawaii, which had been received either at hawaii or from the navy department in washington. i understood the navy had about four or five hundred naval personnel in hawaii doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the japanese diplomatic codes.

[59] during the time in question i was assistant to colonel bratton, having reported to him in august 1940, and continued as his assistant until and after 7 december 1941. for the four or five months immediately following august 1940, colonel bratton received from the signal corps the translated intercepts of japanese diplomatic messages and delivered certain of these to colonel harrison, aide of the secretary of war; john stone, secretary to secretary of state hull; colonel ralph c. smith, executive officer of the assistant chief of staff, g-2, and colonel bedell smith and colonel thomas t. handy or colonel bundy in opd. the procedure followed by colonel bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received except such as were thus distributed, and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who receipted for them. these receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned to colonel bratton or myself as the case might be and the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercepts which was retained by g-2. at the expiration of the four or five months period referred to following august 1940, colonel bratton and i alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about 7 december 1941, although towards the end of this period i handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. no record is now available in g-2 to my knowledge of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top secrecy requirements. while i cannot recollect specifically each message which i delivered i believe that this information can be obtained elsewhere than in the war department. for example, the state department may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. normally, we would receive daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be sorted to about twenty-five for distribution.
I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p.m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteenth parts and I began the distribution of the fourteenth parts comprising this intercept about 9 a.m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities. It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army.

[51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States at 1 p.m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December 1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a.m.

Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury,
Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury,
Colonel, G. S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.

Top Secret

[52] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer.

My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained more cordial and close relations, meeting informally.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have
that following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shiver, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

Joseph J. Rochefort,
JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

AFFIDAVIT OF CLARENCE G. JENSEN, COLONEL, AIR CORPS, AUS

Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (O4758d), presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to instructions, I made diligent search of all War Department pertinent files, and especially those in the possession of Operational Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and its predecessor, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, covering the period 1 July, 1941, to 7 December, 1941, to ascertain whether a Standing Operating Procedure, dated 5 November, 1941, of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had been received in the War Department before 7 December, 1941; that among other things I personally searched or supervised a search of the files of the Adjutant General, the War Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating Procedure, including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, Office of the Adjutant General, and Miss Alice Miller, civilian in charge of the Registered Document Section of Operational Plans Division, WDGS; that this search indicated that no such Standing Operating Procedure was received by the War Department at Washington, D. C., until March of 1942; that I questioned General Dunlop as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing Operating Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941, and he stated that he had no recollection on the subject; that I also questioned General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in Washington with respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division, WDGS, during the months immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would have been likely to remember, whether he had any recollection and he stated he did not; that the net result of my search, therefore, indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Procedure was first received at Washington, D. C., in March, 1942, at the time it was rejected for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy of receipt; that the reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound volume, Register No. 45, Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which contains Standing Operat-
ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and identifies
said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative Standing Operating
Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941; that a letter dated
5 November 1941, attached to said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November,
1941, directs the collection and destruction of all copies of the said Tentative
Standing Operating Procedure; that said Standing Operating Procedure of 5
November, 1941, provides, among other things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16
of Section II, as follows:

[55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3)
Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a De-
partment order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f
(8) below.

14. ALERT NO. 1.—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and
uprising within the islands, with no threat from without.

* * * * * * *

15. ALERT NO. 2.—a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than
Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-
craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

* * * * * * *

16. ALERT NO. 3.—a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations
on outlying islands.

* * * * * * *

Signed: CLARENCE G. JENSEN.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, J AGD.

SECRET

[56]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January 1942.

In reply refer to:
AG 311.5—OHD-41.

WPD-381—Haw Dept (1-20-42)
Auth: CG, Haw Dept
Initials OMM A. G.

Date: 29 Jan 1942

Subject: Operation Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941.
To: War Plans Division, War Department General Staff,
Washington, D. C.

Herewith Register Nos 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941.
Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below.

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

O. M. McDole,

O. M. McDole,

Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Incls: Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41.
March 10, 1942.

J. L. McKee,

J. L. McKee,

Col., G. S. C.

TOP SECRET

[57]

AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET MCKENNEY

Margaret McKenney, civilian clerk in charge, Cable Section, Office of the As-
sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first
duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen,
J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian
clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., which section collects and delivers incoming and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I have read the affidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth appear to my best information and belief to be accurate; that from my experience and knowledge of the customary practice during December, 1941, I believe the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram from General Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, was sent because (1) the yellow copy of the cablegram, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross was returned in the condition as shown on said copy only if the message was sent, (2) the notations of the number 519 thereon indicates that the message was assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it was received from G-2; that the message was then encoded and sent and that then the notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, (3) that the stamp on the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew indicates that it was received in the code room of the Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the numeral "4" in the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates that it is the fourth message that went from G-2 that day and as typed into the outgoing cables receipt book, the page of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, (5) that the said G-2 receipt book, 5 December 1941, shows the outgoing cable messages for that day and that with respect to the cable in question the customary procedure was followed; that in accordance with this procedure the daily serial number 4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the designation, classification, time received in the Code Section, number 32 being Mary L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating officer and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the page from the receipt book shows that the message was receipted for in the Signal Corps code room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that written on the page of the receipt book is the number 519, being the number assigned the message by the Signal Corps under a system to indicate that the message was sent and received by the addressee; (6) that the system indicated by the number 519 tied in with a system of the Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Department in receiving messages must account for the sequence by numbers and if a number were missing would check back with Washington to locate the missing message; that since no check backs were received with respect to number 519, the system shows that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and (7) that I have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [58] of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I assisted in the collection of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts prior to Pearl Harbor and at subsequent intervals and for that reason my memory is clear on the points in which I herein state I have knowledge.

Signed: MARGARET MCKENNEY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen.
Major, J. A. G. D.
at Washington, D. C.

[59]

War Department

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, M. I.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. L. presently assigned to G-2, MIS, Washington, D. C., having been duly sworn and informed of the investigation of Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and informed that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counterintelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General Nolan.
Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th Naval District; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet; the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands.

Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part of November, 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which I was looking.

[60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War Department, Washington, D. C., in substance as follows:

"DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
HONOLULU, TERRITORY HAWAII.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES."

On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was monitoring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers, then FBI Agent In Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which had been given me.

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G-2, Hawaiian Department; G-2, Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G-3, Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth
between pages 3654 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying the pertinent information to interested parties.

In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, and references to "hibiscus" and "poinsettias." My G-2 sense told me that there was something very significant about the message. I know the intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind the other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in execution of the "Winds" code.

I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6 December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I thought it was too important to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in ten minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in ten minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong."

On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action.

As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning the warning. [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection then Lt. Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of February 1945.

George W. Bicknell,
GEORGE W. BICKNELL.
Colonel, M. I.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.
Amendment to Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell

Colonel George W. Bicknell, heretofore examined by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, makes the following amendment to his affidavit of 25 February 1945, concerning the Pearl Harbor investigation:

I wish to state further that prior to 7 December 1941, namely about October 1941, I made and practised, in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elaborate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of war with Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called "A", "B" and "C". They are specifically set forth in memorandum I prepared which should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan "C" was put into execution immediately on the proclamation of martial law.

In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates given to General Short and his Staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October 1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October, 1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian Islands with the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which Gerald Wilkinson of the British Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry Lawson in Honolulu. Those in this file which are marked for me, were received by me on or about the dates set forth on the documents. Included in this group are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 November and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of each document by putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides.

The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941, as well as any pertinent information I received in connection with my G-2 activities, I gave to General Short, promptly, in one form or another. Reference is made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 1941.

George W. Bicknell,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of August, 1945

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

War Department

Washington

Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C.

Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C., presently on duty with the Office of the Transportation Corps, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

My attention has been called to a photostatic copy of a secret telegram dated 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. On the date of this message I was assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department. My immediate superior was the then Major Mcdole. The customary and usual practice with respect to such messages was for them to be sent from the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, to the office in which I was assigned, Office of The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, and by our office to the addressee. Normally the Signal Officer sent two copies to our office. One of these was sent by our office to the action addressee, and if it was returned it was filed in a subject file. The other copy was retained in our office and used for the purpose of checking against the sequence of numbers which was a system in use at the time for assuring that we received all
messages. If a number was missing we would check back with the Signal Office and ascertain the reason why. I cannot recall specifically having seen the message in question dated 5 December 1941, but I do not recall either having occasion at the time to have indications of a missing number.

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel McDole, Chief Warrant Officer Lane, Warrant Officer Knapp, and personnel of the Signal Office, Hawaiian Department. The records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Office, Hawaiian Department, should indicate whether the message was received.

Edward B. Anderson,
Edward B. Anderson,
Major, T. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT H. DUNLOP

Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, presently assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I was Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department from June 1941 to and including December 1941 and thereafter.

I recall the all-out alert which was ordered by General Herron in 1940. So far as I observed, this alert and the action of the Army in pursuance thereof did not materially alarm the civilian population.

My attention has been invited to the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department dated 5 November 1941, a copy of which Major Clausen has shown me, contained in a bound volume, register No. 45, Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, which also contains a copy of a letter dated 5 November 1941, over my signature. I have no recollection of sending any copy of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, or the Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, to Washington, D. C., or having these sent to Washington, D. C., before 7 December 1941.

On 27 November 1941, I was in the office of Lt. General Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, when Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, at about 2:30 p.m. entered the room, excused himself for the interruption, and said that he had come in to show the Commanding General a very important message from General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C., which he had just received. General Short read this message and said in effect that it certainly was a very important message, and, it is my impression that, directing himself to Colonel Phillips told him to put it into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941. At that time the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941 was in effect for the Hawaiian Department. I ascertained then or later that the message from Washington read in general as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be constructed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and [66] other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

73716—46—Ex. 148—4
At 4 p. m. the afternoon of 27 November 1941 I was present at the staff meeting to which I had been called. The message was read to us and Colonel Phillips stated that the Commanding General had ordered into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure. He asked for questions and as I recollect there was only one question put. It concerned the message from General Marshall, but the details of which I cannot now recall. There was no further discussion. There was no mention then or thereafter, to my knowledge up to 7 December 1941, as to what had been the effect upon the civilian population of the alert ordered by General Herron the preceding year to which I have referred. The staff meeting did not last longer than about fifteen minutes.

I have no recollection of having seen the message dated 5 December 1941, the one showed me by Major Clausen, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, but I suggest that a search of the records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, be made since the receipt or non-receipt should have been recorded and the record thereof preserved.

Robert H. Dunlop,
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
Brigadier General.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 28 February 1945.

AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, S. C.

Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, Signal Corps, presently Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, OCSigO, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941 and during the immediately preceding month, I was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytical Unit Signal Intelligence Service, OCSigO, War Department, Washington, D. C. My immediate superior was Major Harold S. Dow who was assistant to Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Chief of the Signal Intelligence Service, who in turn was under Colonel Otis K. Sadler, Chief of the Army Communications Service, and whose superior was the Chief Signal Officer. Colonel Eric Svensson was in charge of the Japanese Diplomatic Solution Activities.

I recall in general the tenor of the various Japanese diplomatic intercepts which had been deciphered and translated, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen. Pursuant to the request of Major Clausen I have attempted to compile from original records presently in the possession of the Signal Corps information concerning the intercepts in said Exhibit "B" as to (1) sources of interception; (2) dates of the messages; (3) dates of interception; (4) dates of translations; (5) whether Honolulu had copies; (6) whether the activating message in pursuance of the "Winds" code message is available in places to which I now have access. Attached hereto is a summary I prepared which refers to various of the intercepts by the Signal Intelligence Service number and gives some of the requested information which I have been able to obtain. My search has not disclosed any "Winds" code activating message, although at the time it was supposed to have been intercepted shortly before 7 December 1941. I recall comments to the effect that it had been intercepted.

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel Doud, Colonel Minckler, Colonel Sadler, Colonel Svensson, Miss Prather, and Mr. Friedman, among others.

Frank B. Rowlett,
FRANK B. ROWLETT,  
Lt. Col., S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.
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Army: 1= Ft. Hancock, 2=San Francisco, 3=San Antonio, 4=Panama, 5=Honolulu, 6=Manila, 7=Ft. Hunt, Va.

[69] WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL RALPH C. SMITH

Major General Ralph C. Smith, presently on duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Washington, D. C. Several months immediately before 7 December 1941, Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dunsebury was assistant to Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Branch, G–2. Up to a few weeks before 7 December 1941, it was customary for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dunsebury to bring to me, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Japanese diplomatic messages which had been intercepted, deciphered, and translated, in a locked pouch to which I had a key. During this time I would open the pouch, glance over the intercepts and then give them to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2. A few weeks before 7 December 1941, pursuant to instructions I relinquished my key to the pouch, gave it to the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, General Miles. Thereafter, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury would bring me the locked pouches but I then did not read the intercepts and gave the locked pouches directly to General Miles. During the period when I was reading the intercepts, or handed the locked pouch to General Miles, as stated, the pouches containing the intercepts were almost always delivered to me by Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recollect specifically whether Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury alternated in bringing me the pouches, I do recall clearly that as a customary practice it was either one, or the other.

I did not receive any such intercepts or pouches after about noon on 6 December 1941. This is clearly fixed in my mind because I entered at about 6 p.m., for Fort Benning preparatory to a refresher course at the Infantry School which I then commenced. I recall as being on the train with me en route to Fort Benning, the evening of 6 December 1941, Colonel C. R. Huebner. I did not, therefore, following the time stated, namely about noon on 6 December 1941, receive any pouch containing intercepts or any intercepts for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or any other person.

Ralph C. Smith.
RALPH C. SMITH. 
Major General.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen, 
HENRY C. CLAUSEN, 
Major, JAGD.
Washington, D. C.

[70]

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY L. ROSS

Mary L. Ross, presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a clerk in the Cable Branch in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington; that in said month of December, 1941, in connection with my duties, I was assigned the number "32" and said number was used in said office to designate me.

That my attention has been called to a secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, a photostatic copy of which is hereto annexed; that I recall the circumstances and my actions with respect to said cablegram; that the yellow copy of said cablegram, of which the attached exhibit is a photostatic copy, was brought to me with a "buck-slip", a photostatic copy of which is attached, and on which at the bottom is written a message in the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I recall that the person who brought me the cablegram also orally informed me that the message was important and its immediate dispatch was urgent; that on receiving the yellow copy and said buck-slip I made the customary entry in the office outgoing cables receipt book, a photostatic copy of the pertinent page of which is also attached hereto; that the entry shown therein as Ser. No. 4 was typed therein by myself as indicated by my number 32 in the column for the clerk; that I put a red priority tag on the copy of the cablegram and took it to the Signal Corps code room, handed it to the clerk who received for it by the initials "DG" written on the page of said receipt book as is indicated by the attached photostatic copy; that thereafter, probably the next day, the yellow copy was returned with the notation thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/3"; that the said number 519 was assigned the message by the Signal Corps and was then written on a page of our receipt book as is indicated on the attached photostatic copy; that the procedure in the Signal Corps code room was to assign a number and then after the message was sent to write on the yellow copy that it was sent as was done on the yellow copy of the message in question as heretofore indicated.

That also attached hereto is a photostatic copy of the paragraph kept in the G-2 office and which has thereon "MAILED G/2 W.D.G.S. DEC 5 1941 32"; that this latter notation on said photostatic copy was placed thereon by me to
indicate that it had been transmitted by the Signal Corps; that the initials in the lower right hand corner thereof, "RSB WP" are in the handwriting of Colonel Pettigrew.

That my memory with respect to the foregoing is clear because soon after Pearl Harbor and at intervals thereafter I was questioned concerning the foregoing and the Office of G-2 assembled pertinent papers among which were the documents, photostatic copies of which there are attached; that I assisted in the assembly of these papers.

Signed: MARY L. Ross.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 1st day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[72]
Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926

SECRET

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Sent No. 519, 12/5

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,
Headquarters G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram

[73]

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH—MISV—WDGS

FROM:
The A. C. of S., G-2
Executive Officer, G-2
Chief, Intelligence Branch
Executive, Intelligence Branch
Administrative
Field Personnel
Drafting and Reproduction
Stenographic Pool
Asst. Chief, Intelligence Branch
Situation
Contact
Dissemination
Air Section
British Empire Section
Central European Section
Eastern European Section
Southern European Section
Western European Section
Far Eastern Section
Latin American Section

TO:
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
Military Attache Section
Foreign Liaison Section
Coordinating Section
Finance Section
Personnel Section
Record Section
Translation Section
Mimeograph Room
Chief Clerk
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
SPECIAL STUDY GROUP
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH
W. D. MAP COLLECTION
FOR Necessary Action
Preparation of reply
Recommendation or remark
Information and guidance
Note and return
Number and return

[Written:] Important—Please put priority tag on Re Service Japanese WD

(The page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables mentioned in the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, supra, will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

SECRET

Secret XX Drafting Officer: RSB.
Cablegram XX No. 519 Sent out Dec. 5, 1941

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES.

[76] Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, presently CO, Langley Field, Va., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:

On 7 Dec 1941 and for about one year preceding I was G2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Comdr. Layton, USN. I told Comdr. Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations with Comdr. Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Comdr. Layton before 7 Dec 1941 was about October 1941.

The information given me by Comdr. Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 Dec. 1941.
Any information I received from Comdr. Layton, I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin.

On 1 Oct 1941 I conferred with Comdr. Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was then Asst. G2, Hawaiian Dept. concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to Gen. Martin. Attached are portions of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 Oct 1941, concerning this conference.

I recall the Gen. Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian population.

EDWARD W. RALEY, Col. AC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Va.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

Last night mother and I had a few people for dinner at the club. We had Commander Layton, who is Fleet intelligence officer; Col. Bicknell, who is on intelligence duty down town; and Major Meehan from the post—and their wives, of course. Wednesday evening is a supper dance evening at the club. We assembled at the house, and the drinking members lifted a few and then we adjourned to the club where we had dinner and danced a bit. We thought a good time was had by all and in your immortal phrase, it “was a good party.”

The reason I was anxious to have these people together was that I was anxious to get Bicknells and Layton's opinion regarding the Far Eastern situation. You might gather from the public prints that United States—Japanese relations had been improving of late, but somehow, I didn't think so. It seems to me that Japanese—U. S. relations never were in a more critical state than they are at this moment. I don't say [79] there necessarily will be a war between the two countries right now, but I do say that never in the past has there been a time when it would be easier to have one.

I thought I'd better speak to the boss about the matter, so I did, and he made me feel extremely foolish. He agreed with the general conclusion and then, in the fewest number of words possible, he summed up the situation in a fashion that was just about perfect. I would have been very proud of myself if I had had the situation as well ordered in my mind and was capable of expressing it as well as he did. I've never heard anything so concisely and comprehensively expressed.

DADDY.

[Hand written:] Letter returned by Joyce Nov. 3, 1942.

EWR.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL CHARLES K. GAILEY

General Charles K. Gailey, presently on duty in the Office of the Operations Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Washington, D. C. With respect to intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been deciphered and translated it was the customary practice for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury, G-2, to bring these to me for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Gerow. They would be given me and I would get them to General Gerow as soon as practicable. I recall that these intercepts were brought to me by either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recall whether they alternated in bringing them I do remember that it was either one or the other as a customary practice.
Specifically, with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941, I do not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other source. In the event General Gerow did not receive any particular intercepts the evening of 6 December 1941, I am certain that they were not delivered to me as, if they had been, I would have given them to him.

Chas. K. Gailey,
CHARLES K. GAILLEY,
Brigadier General.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[81]

WAR DEPARTMENT.
WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL EDWARD F. FRENCH

Colonel Edward F. French, presently on duty with the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division and Signal Center, Washington, D. C.

I have been shown the photostatic copy of the secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. Based on customary practice and procedure, it is my opinion that the message was sent to the addressee for the following reasons: The notations thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519,12/5" indicate that the message was brought to the Signal Corps code room and was assigned the "#519" and that the message was then encoded with the code room sequence number as the first word in the text of message. The coded text message, original and carbon copy, was then sent to the message center. The carbon copy bearing the time stamp of the message center acknowledging receipt was then returned to the code room and checked with the original clear text message. The Signal Center time stamp date was then placed on the original clear text message, which was returned the following morning to the office of origin.

In the Signal Center the original coded text, on receipt after time stamped, was given a Signal Center sequence number (black number) and then the message was word counted and placed at the operating position, where it received a channel sequence number at the time of transmission which was checked off the operators number sheet. After transmission of the message the operator put his initials and time of transmission on the face of the message, which was later collected by a clerk who verified the "black number" by a check off sheet before sending the message to file. This was a further guard to assure the transmission of the message. At midnight these sequence channel numbers were and still are verified with the distant end of the circuit to assure that all messages as transmitted were received. This sequence check was and is known as a "good night service."

Further, had this message been not received, a check would also have been made by the code room of the addressee, as there would be a break in the sequence numbers of the code message numbers. This system of checking sequence numbers of messages was a long time practice to assure and guard against lost messages.

[82] The loss of a coded message is possible but highly improbable. In fact, on recent questioning of personnel in the code room and Signal Center, and from my own experience prior to 7 December 1941, the loss of a coded message could not be recalled.

I have seen the yellow copy of the message "519" in question, now in possession of G-2, and it is the yellow copy of which a photostatic copy is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Pettigrew.
I have also seen the photostatic copy of the G-2 Office outgoing cable receipts book page for 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross. The entry shown thereon bearing serial No. 4 indicates that the clerk in the Signal Corps code room received for the message by the initials “DG”, which I recognize as the handwriting of Dorothy Glaves who was employed as a clerk in the Signal Corps code room on 5 December 1941, and whose duties included receiving for such messages.

Edward F. French,
Edward F. French,
Colonel, S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[83] War Department
Washington

Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans

Colonel Joseph K. Evans, presently on duty in G-2, War Department, as the Pacific Ocean Area Japanese Specialist, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2, Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was Assistant G-2, Philippine Department.

There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between the Army and the Navy at Manila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each Service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted at Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and designated Top Secret, Exhibit “B”. The customary practice of the Army or Navy at Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii of intelligence on Japanese information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to particular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander “Rosie” Mason, USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For example, see Lt. Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Room 3501, 630 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center.

I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States by Army Transport “H. L. Scott”. About two days before I left I received information, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret Intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent, and that large Japanese Naval forces were concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the convoy of which the “H. L. Scott” was a part did not proceed in the usual direct route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through the Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2 matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr. Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of these discussions I told Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information [84] I had received and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received this information and at the same time.

Joseph K. Evans,
Joseph K. Evans,
Colonel, GSC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.
Memorandum to: Lieut. Col. Henry Christian Clausen.
From: Mr. John E. Russell, President
Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H.

You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment to that Territory.

My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. C. V. Bennett, Manager of our San Francisco office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands and to endeavor to stop shipments that were en route there.

I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw a copy of a message dispatched by Col. G. H. Wilkinson (then working secretly for the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorandum, and states that after showing this message to me a copy of it was left with Col. Bicknell, Capt. Mayfield and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records of this incident were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941.

On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders.
It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precautions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one gets at times."

I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating in the light of diplomatic exchanges than taking place. I do not believe that the message said that trouble would begin on December 7th; but as I told you today the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines.

I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw light on this subject; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr. Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject; but I can say that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I have given you herein.

John E. Russell,
President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.

April 10, 1945.
At Honolulu.

CONFIDENTIAL

[87A] URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 1941

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.
cc. Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield

[87B] On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message referred to in memorandum to Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945, which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941.

Harry L. Dawson.
John E. Russell.
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS

Robert L. Shivers, presently Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:

On 7 Dec. 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu, T. H.

During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort, Res., USN, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet. Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Capt. Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell, MID, Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept. This liaison with the foregoing persons continued down to 7 Dec. 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings with Colonel Bicknell and Capt. Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes be present.

I knew on 7 Dec. 1941 and for months preceding that date that Comdr. Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. Comdr. Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 Dec. 1941.

Before 7 Dec. 1941, about 1 Dec. 1941, Capt. Mayfield told me he was aware of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements and break in diplomatic relations; and said to me if I suddenly call you and say I am moving to the East side of the Island (Oahu) or north, south, or west sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in those directions from Japan. I passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell, on that date. At no time did Capt. Mayfield give me the code indicating such movement.

On 3 Dec. 1941 Capt. Mayfield called me, asking if I could verify his information that the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveillance of the Consulate had disclosed this fact, but after 7 Dec 1941 I learned he was referring to information intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and London. This latter information was given me by Comdr. Rochefort after 7 Dec. 1941. About 2 hours after my conversation with Capt. Mayfield on 3 Dec 1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate & a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. This was about noon on 3 Dec 1941 & I immediately gave this information to Capt. Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Capt. Mayfield what use he made of it. Col. Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this information to Gen. Short's Staff at the Staff meeting on 6 Dec. 1941.

On or about 28 Nov. 1941 I received I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the US & Japan were breaking down & to be on the alert at all times as anything could happen. On the same day I gave this information to Capt. Mayfield & Col. Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information from their respective headquarters in Washington, D. C.

About the period 8 Dec. to 12 Dec 1941, Col. Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 Dec 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul General, through which the movement of the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu & Maui.

Robert L. Shivers.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Honolulu
Concerning the paraphrase dispatch to C. G. Haw. Dept., signed Marshall, dated 12 Dec. 1941, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept. I received this information from Col. Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to which it relates. Comdr. Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the Japanese consulate on 7 Dec. 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on 7 Dec. 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message, we got the original from the Mackay Co.

Concerning the Gen. Herron alert [93] of 1940, the civilian population of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way, because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give the impression it created.

Concerning the Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, dated 22 Mar. 1945, I talked with Col. Evans, in company of Col. Bicknell, when Col. Evans arrived in Honolulu from Manila in December, 1941. I do not recall the details of our conversation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the information set forth in paragraph 3 of his affidavit.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 16th day of March, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

Amendment to Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, Who States Further:

Gerald Wilkinson, then manager for the Theo. H. Davies Co., Manila, P. I., called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British government, reporting direct to the British Foreign Office at London; that he had established Mr. Harry Dawson, an English citizen and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as the operative representative of the said SIS in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands, but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertaining to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to Hawaii from Japan; that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, information, thru Dawson, of information received from other SIS operatives in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affecting Japan; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were made for the receipt of such information [95] by the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as proposed during the period from July to and including December, 1941; that the files of the information so furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon which appear my initials.

Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascertained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate, did not in fact cover one line to the Cook's quarters; I therefore covered this line, which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified; that I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December 1941, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December, 1941, at the order of the District [96] Intelligence Officer; that had I known such ONI coverage had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, 20 April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
Japanese Activities Honolulu T. H. Espionage conflict J. Japanese consul general Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.

Official Business.

[98] HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
Subject: Action taken on W. D. information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lt.) C. W. Stevenson, met in conference with Lt. Col. E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area, on 29 November 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with information contained in a Secret Radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department, from the War Department, dated 27 November 1941, which advised that negotiations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activities might be expected.

2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430, 29 November 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the context of the above-referred to radio message, and it was suggested to them that all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage of Air Force installations and equipment.

Byron M. Meurlott,
Byron M. Meurlott,
Lt. Colonel, M.I.

At Honolulu

[99] HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC AREAS

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 958

In reply refer to: 17 April 1945.
Memo:
Subject: Search for WD Radiogram No. 510, 5 Dec 1941.

On April 10, 1945, Lt. Col. Clausen of The Judge Advocate General’s Office requested the assistance of this office in locating a copy, or record of receipt, of secret War Department radio No. 519, dated 5 December 1941. The undersigned instructed Capt. Bosworth, officer in charge of the AG Classified Records Division, to make the search and assist Col. Clausen in every manner possible.

The following is a brief account of the search made:

a. Master files of incoming radio traffic were inspected and it was determined that no master files of radios were kept by the AG until on or about 25 January 1942. This was corroborated by C. W. O. Knapp who was on duty in the division at that time.

b. A search was made of the AG decimal files and no record was found of the subject radio.
e. A check was made with Capt. Stockberger, officer in charge of the Signal Cryptographic Section, to determine whether any permanent record was kept of incoming radio traffic. No such record was kept.

d. As the radio in question originated in G-2, War Department, it was assumed that distribution in this headquarters would be made to G-2. Capt. Bosworth, accompanied by Col. Clansen, went to G-2 and contacted Major Maresh of that section. A thorough search was made of the G-2 Files by Major Maresh, in the presence of Capt. Bosworth, and no record was found of the radio.

e. Col. Clansen was given the telephone numbers of three men who were on duty in the AG CRD at the time.

As a matter of information, it is believed that a thorough search of this headquarters was made for this radio at the time of the Pearl Harbor Investigation Board’s visit and no record was found at that time.

O. N. Thompson,
O. N. Thompson,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

at Honolulu.

[100] AFFIDAVITS OF CAPTAIN THOMAS A. HUCKINS, USN, AND CAPTAIN WILFRED J. HOLMES, USN.

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS, USN, presently on duty with FRUPAC, Pearl Harbor, and Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES, USN, (vet.) presently on duty with JICPOA, Pearl Harbor, each being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Naval personnel and records, and that top secrecy is required, do depose as follows:

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS states that on 7 December 1941 and for several months immediately prior thereto he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHFORT, and was in charge of the radio traffic analysis under Captain ROCHFORT; that his duties included the daily preparation of radio intelligence summaries for distribution by Captain ROCHFORT; that copies of the said radio traffic analysis summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941, taken from the file of FRUPAC entitled “Communication Intelligence Daily Summary”, are attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and made a part hereof; that he did not maintain or conduct any liaison with any Army officer, or exchange any information pertaining to his functions or duties, prior to 7 December 1941, and, that in this regard, he did not maintain or conduct any liaison, or exchange any information with Kendall J. FIELDER, G-2, Hawaiian Department.

Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES states that on 7 December 1941, and for several weeks immediately prior thereto, he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHFORT; that the scope and extent of his duties during said period included only the preparation of plots of positions of U. S. combat and merchant vessels, flights of U. S. trans-Pacific planes and positions of Japanese ships based on call analysis; that these plots were disseminated only to CinCPac. Commander Jack S. HOLTWICK, Jr., USN, on 7 December 1941, and several months immediately prior thereto, was assigned to the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, and has today stated to Captain HOLMES and Lt. Col. CLAUSEN as follows:

That he, Commander HOLTWICK, on 7 December 1941, and for several months immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the I. B. M. machine room, was assistant to the principle cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to Captain Joseph J. ROCHFORT; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts Nos. SIS 27332 and SIS 27432, referred to in the affidavit of Captain Joseph J. ROCHFORT given Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN and dated 20 February 1945, consists of a dispatch dated 28 November 1941 from CinCAF to CinCPac concerning monitoring by British and ComSixteen for a certain Japanese broadcast and, dispatch 20 November 1941 from OpNav [101] to CinCPac concerning Japanese broadcast schedules and, dispatch 1 December 1941 from ComSIXTEEN to CinCPac concerning certain important Japanese news broadcasts which dispatches have been microfilmed and are contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640 and SIS 25787, mentioned in said affidavit.

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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of Captain ROCHFORT, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OpNav to CincPac concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Washington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and by London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila of purple machines, which dispatch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in Outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 26 November 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 November 1941, from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of British consul information that Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941 and, dispatch 6 December 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of opinion that Japanese consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system; that the Communication Intelligence Daily Summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941 are included in Exhibit “A” herewith attached and made a part hereof, and consist of a résumé or evaluation showing the results of traffic analysis based upon intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications only, and were prepared for Captain ROCHFORT with copies thereof disseminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit “A”, only to Captain Edwin T. LAYTON, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer; that on 7 December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said Unit supervised by Captain ROCHFORT did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic radio messages which required the use of a machine and the USN decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the only machine available was one designed by Commander HOLTWICK and covered a Japanese code which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time.

Thomas A. Huckins,
Thomas A. Huckins, Captain, USN.
Wilfred J. Holmes,
Wilfred J. Holmes, Captain, USN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Col., J/A/G/D.
at Honolulu, T. H.
Read and approved.
J. S. Holtwick,
J. S. Holtwick,
Cdr. U. S. N.

[102] Morrill W. Marston, O7626, Brig. Gen., presently G-4, POA, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, repeats and says:
My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated 15 Feb. 45; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2, Hawaiian Department; and had information, that the Navy had a cryptoanalytic unit; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the local (MWM) development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occasions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received (MWM) by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings;
Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observations there was no alarm of the civilian population.

Morrill W. Marston,
Brig. Gen. U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Col. JAGD.
at Honolulu.
[103] Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, presently stationed South Pacific Base Command, A. G. Office, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD for the SW, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning secret message 519, 5 December 1941, I searched for a record of this message by looking carefully through the classified files and journals of incoming messages covering said date; said files and journals being available this date at HQ., POA, Ft. Shafter and consisting, among others, of the following:

Classified, A G Binder 1; 370.2 Battles & Reports of;
Classified, A G Binder 1; 091 Japan;
Classified, A G Binder 1; 283.4 Espionage;
Classified, A G Binder 2; 350.05 Military Information;
Classified, A G Journals (microfilmed) (2) 297 and 298;

no record of the receipt by the Hawaiian Department of this message could be found, although it was the practice to [103] set forth in said journals the War Department numbers of the messages. Such pertinent number in this case, 519, could not be found as having been entered, but the preceding numbers 517 and 518 were found, and the succeeding numbers 520 and 521, pertaining to messages dated during the time in question.

I suggest that inquiry be made of RCA, since I believe from reading the file copy shown me by Colonel Clausen that it came commercial.

Louis R. Lane.
CWO USA.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Honolulu.

[105] Fourteenth Naval District,
District Intelligence Office,
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 22 April, 1945.

Secret

Statement for Proceedings Supplementary to the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board

This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago, and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement.

The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintained by the District Intelligence Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received almost daily transcripts and translations of conversations monitored.

About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO, began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breached by the DIO's having been given information concerning an FBI tap.

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being con-
ducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the morning of 7 December 1941, following the Japanese attack.

It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District Intelligence Office were in any way aware that such surveillances were being conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from gaining any currency in the organization.

Donald Woodrum, Jr.,
Donald Woodrum, Jr.,
Lieutenant, USNR.

25 April 1945.

[107] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, USN

[108] Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation being conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941 and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive, correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to designated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet; to provide Plans and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of current estimates; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the U. S. Pacific Fleet; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of Fleets of potential Allies; to supervise projects concerning aerial photographic reconnaissance.

Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally be effected through established channels, i. e., the Naval shore liaison or representative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the Combat Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Rochefort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Captain Mayfield): Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer and responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-espionage and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communications Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example, I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District, there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies through that officer.

About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Australian Mandated Territories, and any other Pacific Ocean airports and airways information. I furnished him with all the information was possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Airways Guide" and Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he, or his assistant Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency.

By mid-November 1941 a series of Intelligence reports from various sources, including Dutch, British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular Reports, Attaché and Agent Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of
Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-China and South China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Raley and we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every other day.

During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I imparted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret" intelligence from sources that had previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only to his Commanding General, Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro-Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North Mayana, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand, the pro-Japanese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand and an invasion of Malaya.

To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" information that we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic relations or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely, America or Britain or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or received at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic Officials were destroying their Purple Machines [110] in connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to informing Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battleships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. I distinctly recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the special searches being conducted in late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very strict secret.

Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise.

I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied: "We cannot do anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until tomorrow morning."

In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands: Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently, I made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Japanese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very apparent. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Surface and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations.

When the U. S. Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain of the Japanese Mandates in late November 1941, I held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin
(#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and Commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not carried in aircraft. Colonel Raley also requested, and I acquiesced, to sit in on all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This reconnaissance did no materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands. Exhibit “B” is one copy of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin #45-41.

[1/1] I do not specifically recall the term “A, B, C Block” or discussions concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could not permit Jap penetration.

My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel Raley’s quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters pertaining to shore-side business.

From time to time prior to 7 December 1941 when Task Force Commanders returned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief’s office to give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question. I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them. During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location and activity of the Japanese Fleet and Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was known or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated Islands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with particular emphasis on the Marshalls.

I had no official liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel Raley’s remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison that he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate Command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers of the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the War Plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Officer Lt. Burr USN from Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, permanently attached to the Headquarters, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any of the information that I gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941.

I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to at all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts Commission in December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Boards in 1944), I am unable to make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda.

[1/2] I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen, marked TOP SECRET, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of these prior to 7 December 1941 except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 on which I have written my initials and today’s date.

E. T. Layton,
E. T. Layton, Captain, USN,
Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subscribed and sworn before me on this 26th day of April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, J/A/G/D.

At Guam.
Memorandum for: Admiral.
Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands.

1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon at 1430.

2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not be carried in any aircraft.

3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the MARSHALLS, TRUK and PONAPE was stressed with particular reference to JALUIT, ENIWETOK, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP, WOTJE and MALOELAP.

4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning’s conference and is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnaissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium shadow 9-11 a.m. and 2-4 p.m. are considered most advantageous and fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a.m. Consequently, that hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective.

5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive armament and photographic equipment from WAKE on the selected day, departures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installations in the MANDATES it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of the planes JALUIT and TRUK respectively. The JALUIT plane returning via MALOELAP, WOTJE, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP and POKAAKUU. The TRUK plane returning via UJELANG and ENIWETOK. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time.

6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over PONAPE enroute to Port Moresby was assigned UJELANG, PONAPE and KAPINGAMARANGI (Greenwich Island).

7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the MANDATES prior to their takeoff.

/s/ E. T. Layton.

Exhibit "A"

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United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

Secret

Cincpac File No. AA/FF1/(25) Serial 01954

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.
3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the present National Emergency.

P. C. Crosley
P. C. CROSLY,
By direction.

DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41)
List I, Case 3; P., X.
Atlantic Fleet A1;
 Asiatic Fleet A1;
One copy each to:
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.

Exhibit “B”

Confidential

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 45-41

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Japanese Naval Forces in China | 11 and 12 |

(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS, Pages 13 and 14.

- General Situation
- Air Distribution
- Table “A” showing distribution of material and personnel forces in Mandates
- Sketch of PALAO (PELEW)
- Sketch of MALAKAL Harbor, etc.
- Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc.

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.
MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

I. Combined Fleet
   1. First Fleet (Battle Force)
   2. Second Fleet (Scouting Force)
   3. Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport Force)
   4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force)
   5. Fifth Fleet
   6. Sixth Fleet
   7. Carrier Fleet
   8. Combined Air Force

II. Japanese Naval Forces
    in China.
    1. First China Exped. Fleet.

III. Combined Fleet and First Fleet

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

MAGATO, Flagship

FIRST FLEET

Batdiv One
   NAGATO (F)
   MUTSU
   YAMASHIRO

Batdiv Two
   FUSO (F)
   ISE
   HYUGA

Batdiv Three
   HIYEI (F)
   KONGO
   KIRISHIMA
   HARUNA

Crudiv Six
   KAKO (F)
   FURUTAKA
   ABOA
   KINUGASA

Desron One
   ABUKUMA (F)
   Desdiv 1
   IKAZUCHI (F)
   INAZUMA
   SAZANAMI
   HIBIKI
   Desdiv 21
   NENOHI (F)
   HATSUHARU
   HATSUSHIMO
   WAKABA

   Desron One (Cont'd)
   Desdiv 27
   SHIRATSUYU (F)
   ARIAKE
   YUGURE
   SHIGURE

Desron Three
   SENDAI (F)
   Desdiv 11
   FUBUKI (F)
   SHIRAYUKI
   HATSUHARU
   Desdiv 12
   SHIRAKUMO (F)
   SHINONOME
   USUGOMO
   MURAKUMO
   Desdiv 19
   ISONAMI (F)
   SHIKINAMI
   AYANAMI
   * URANAMI

Desdiv 20
   AMAGIRI (F)
   ASAGIRI
   YUGIRI
   SAGIRI

   Total: 10 BB, 4 CA, 2 CL, 27 DD.

*Note: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs.
SECOND FLEET

TAKAO, Flagship

**Crudiv Four**
- TAKAO (F)
- ATAGO
- CHOKAI
- MAYA

**Crudiv Five**
- MYOKO (F)
- NACHI
- HAGURO

**Crudiv Seven**
- KUMANO (F)
- MOGAMI
- MIKUMA
- SUZUYA

**Crudiv Eight**
- TONE (F)
- CHIKUMA

**Desron Two**
- NAKA (F)

**Desron Four**
- KASUMI
- ARARE
- SHIRANUHI

**Desron Five**
- YUDACHI (F)
- MURASAME
- HARUSAIME
- SAMIDARE

**Desron Six**
- ASAGUMO
- YAMAGUMO
- MINEGUMO
- NATSUGUMO

**Desron Seven**
- KAWAKAZE (F)
- YAMAKAZE
- SUZUKAZE
- UMIKAZE

Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.

---

**Note**: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to **Crudiv 5**.

[119]

THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo—Vice Admiral

NAGARA, Flagship

**NORTHERN BLOCADE FORCE**

**CHOGEI** (F)

**Subdiv**
- Subdiv
- Subdiv

**Desron Five**
- NATORI (F)

**Desron Six**
- ASAKAZE
- HARUOAZE
- MATSUKAZE
- HATAKAZE

**Desron Seven**
- SATSUKI
- FUMITSUKI
- MINATSUKI
- NAGATSUKI

2nd **BLOCADE FORCE—Con.**

**Desron Five**

**Desron Six**
- HAKAZE
- AKIKAZE
- YUKAZE

**TACHIKAZE**

1st **BASE FORCE**
- Maru (F)

**Mine Sweeper Division**

**ITSUKUSHIMA**
- AOTAKA
- HATSUTAKA

**Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21**
- AM-1
- AM-2
- AM-3
- AM-4
- AM-5
- AM-6

**Gunboat Division 1**
- 6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing Vessels)
THIRD FLEET—Continued

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE—Con.
SUBCHASER SQUADRON

(Con.)

Subchaser Division 1 and 11
PC-1  PC-7
PC-2  PC-8
PC-3  PC-9

Subchaser Division 21 and 31
PC-4  PC-10
PC-5  PC-11
PC-6  PC-12

27 AP—Names Unknown

2nd BASE FORCE

--- Maru, (F)

Minelayer Division 17
SHIRATA
YAEYAMA
KUNAJIRI

At least 5 other men of war, and 17 merchant ships.

Total: 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6 SS, 6 CM,
12 AM, 6 XPG 12 PC, 46, AP.

FOURTH FLEET

HIRATA—Vice Admiral

KASHIMA, Flagship

Crudix Eighteen
TENRYU (F)
TATSUTA
KASHIMA

Desron Six
YUBARI (F)

Desdiv 29
OITE
HAYATE
ASANAGI
YUNAGI

Desdiv 36
MUTSUKI (F)
KISARAGI
YAYOI
MOCHITSUKI

Subron Seven
JINGEI

Subdiv 26
RO-60
RO-61
RO-62

Subdiv 27
RO-63
RO-64
RO-65
RO-66
RO-67

Subdiv 33
RO-68
RO-69

Subdiv——

8 XPG

4th BASE FORCE

Truk, Headquarters

--- Maru (F)

Guard Division 4

--- Maru (F)

---

4 AP or AK

FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ—TRUK)


5th BASE FORCE

Saipan, Headquarters

SHOEI MARU (F)

Guard Division 5
Composition unknown

Minelayer Division 19
OKINOSHIMA (F)

TOKIWA

Subchapter Division 56

KASHI (F)
XPG 561 (?)
XPG 562 (?)
XPG 563 (?)

Gunboat Division 8
Composition unknown

9 AP or AK

FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ—SAIPAN)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #18.

Tenian Detachment, 5th Defense Force

PAGAN Detachment, 5th Defense Force

Survey and Patrol Division

KOSHU
KATSURtKI (CM)
KOMABASHI (AS)
FOURTH FLEET—Continued

FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE—Con.

Repair and Salvage Division
MATSUEI MARU
NAGAURA (MARU)

3rd BASE FORCE
Palau, Headquarters

——— Maru (F)

Guard Division 3
——— Maru
———
———
———

Subdiv 6
RO-56
RO-57
RO-58
RO-59

Subchaser Division 55
——— Maru (F)
XPG 551 (?)
XPG 552 (?)
XPG 553 (?)
XPG 554 (?)

THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ PALOA)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #16 and TOBI detachment of 4th Defence Force
——— Detach. 4th Def. Force
——— " " " "
——— " " " "
——— " " " 

Estimate these unknown locations to be SOROI, HELEN REEF, ULITHI, YAP and ANGUAR.

6th BASE FORCE
Jahuit, Headquarters
TAKUHAN MARU (F)

FIFTH FLEET

CL———(F)

The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru.

SIXTH FLEET

(Submarine Fleet)

KATORI, Flagship

KITAGAN (F)

Subron One

TAIGEI (F)

Subdiv 1
I-9
I-15
I-16
I-17

Subdiv 2
I-18
I-19
I-20

Subron Two

KITAGANI (F)

Subdiv 7
I-1
I-2
I-3
I-7

Subdiv 8
I-4
I-5
I-6
### FIFTH FLEET—Continued

#### Subron Three
**NAGOYA MARU (F)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdiv 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-75</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Subdiv 12</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-8</td>
</tr>
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<td>I-63</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-69</td>
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<td>I-70</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdiv I-74</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Subron Six
**KINU (F)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdiv 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdiv I-121</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Subron Ten
**KARASAKI (F)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdiv I-53</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-55</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdiv I-56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdiv RO-33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RO-34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS.

*Note: The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.*

### CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)

**CV KAGA Flagship**

**Cardiv 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AKAGI</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KAGA (F)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Desdiv 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>OBORO (F)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USHIO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AKIBONO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AKATSUKI</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cardiv 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SORYU (F)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIRYU</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Desdiv 23**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>UZUKI</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KIKTUSUKI</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIKATSUKI</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YUZUKI</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cardiv 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ZUIKAKU</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHOKANU</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Desdiv 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHOKAZE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAMIKAZE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUMAKAZE</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cardiv 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CV KORYU</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CV KASUGA (MARU)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Desdiv 17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ISOKAZE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>URAKAZE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HAMAKAZE</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 10 CV, 16 DD.

### COMBINED AIR FORCE

*Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hqtrs.*

Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups (e.g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.
Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.

### Ship-Based Squadrons

**Air Ron 6**
- KAMIKAWA MARU (F)
- FUJIKAWA MARU
- KENJO MARU
  (Has been working with the 3rd Fleet)

**Air Ron 7**
- CHITOSE (F)
- CHIYODA
- MIZUHO
  (Has been working with the 1st Fleet)

**Air Ron 24**
- KAMOI (F)
  1 XAV
- Yokohama Air Group
- Chitose Air Group
  (Has been working with the 4th Fleet)

**Patrol Squadron 2**
- NOTORO
  (Formerly with Air Ron 6)

### Shore-Based Air Groups

8th Air Group
10th Air Group
11th Air Group
12th Air Group
14th Air Group
16th Air Group
17th Air Group
18th Air Group
19th Air Group
23rd Air Group
Chichijima
Chinkai
Genzan
Hyakurinbara (or Moribara)
Iwakuni
Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
Kashima
Kasumigaura
Sasebo
Kisarazu
Suzuka
Kure
Takao
Maizuru
Tateyama
Oita
Tsukuba
Ominato
Usa
Omura
Yatabe
Saeki
Yokusuka

**TOTAL:** 5 AV, 3XAV, 35 Air Groups.

### TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

| SHIRETOKO | ONDO | AKASHI |
| SATA | HAYATOMO | MUROTO |
| TSURUMI | NARUTO | OTOMARU |
| SHIRTYA | MAMIYA | SETTSU |
| IRO | ASAHI |

**Total:** 8 AC, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.

### JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

KOGL, Mineichi—Vice Admiral

IZUMO, Flagship

### Shanghai Base Force

**Patrol Division 11—Continued**

| HIRA |
| HOZU |
| TORA |
| ATAMI |
| FUTAMI |
| FUSHIMI |
| SUMIDA |
| HASHIDATE |

**Air Group 10**

Hankow Base Force

**Kiukiang Base Force**

Gunboat Division ?

SHINFUKU MARU (F)

HITONOSE

CHIKUBU

**Total:** 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.
JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA—Continued

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

NIIMI, Wasaichi, Vice Admiral
ISUZU, Flagship

Crudin 15
ISUZU (F)
ASHIGARA

Patrol Division 14
SAGA
AM-17
AM-18

Torpedo Boat Division 1
ATORI
HAYASUSA
HIYOBORI
KASASAGI

Guard Division 15
Guard Division 16
Canton Base Force
Amoy Base Force
Huluan Is. Base Force
13 Special Service Ships
Total: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 2 AM, 13 Misc.

[127] NORTH CHINA FLEET, OR THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

SUGIYAWA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral
IWATE, Flagship

Patrol Division 12
IWATE (F)
MANRI MARU

Torpedo Boat Division 11
HATO
SAGI
KARI
KIJI

Torpedo Boat Division 21
CHIDORI
MANAZURI
TOMOZURU
HATSUKARI
KARUKAYA

Gunboat Division 1
Gunboat Division 2
Gunboat Division 13
Gunboat Division 14
Tachitaa Base Force

SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KASHII (F) (CL)
SHIMBUSU (CM)
AP
Total: 1 OCA, 1 DD, 8 TB, 1 AP.

[128] (B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS,

1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently administers, the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principal Fourth Fleet operating base.

2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defense Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALA0, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels.

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ—YOKOSUKA) Naval District.

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flag-
ship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENSE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.

[129] 6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUITE-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and Patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA; BUTARI-TARI, and BEINU).

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in Table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Includes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airron 24</td>
<td>Marshall Area</td>
<td>(AV) KAMOI (AV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>. . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Air Group</td>
<td>PALAO Area</td>
<td>ex-CHITOSE Air Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Air Group</td>
<td>PALAO Area</td>
<td>ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Air Group</td>
<td>TRUK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Air Group</td>
<td>SAIPAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Air Group</td>
<td>IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Station (and Air Group?) WOTJE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Station (and Air Group?) KWAJALEIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? AIR GROUP</td>
<td>TRUK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62—208 planes.

Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45—41.

(Pages 130, 131, 132, and 133 of Exhibit B consist of Table A showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates, a sketch of Palao, and a sketch of Malakal Harbor. These pages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

[134] Notes to Accompany Sketch of Jaluit

1. Aviation Facilities.—Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June 1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is.

2. Headquarters.—Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bitumina and powdered coral roads.
3. Radio towers.—Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).

4. Shore Batteries—Bases and runnings along the three quarter mile water-front street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Bar-

racks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).

Mobile Batteries—Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10' searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).

5. Government Pier—500 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940).

6. Mole—150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW. cor-

ner of JABOR (1933).

7. Conspicuous red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936).

8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).

9. Two buildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear?—small marine railway?). A gasoline storage lo-

cated near the two buildings. (1936.)

(Page 135 of Exhibit B is a sketch of Jaluit Harbor which will be found reproduced as Item No. 6, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound to-

gether following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

[136]

Exhibit "A"

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT

Box 103—Navy Yard, Navy Number 128 One Two Eight, % Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

18 April 1945.

Received from Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 42 pages covering daily communication intelligence summaries for the period 1 November 1941 through 6 December 1941.

[137]

Communication intelligence summary, 1 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garbile table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this sum-

mary will deal only with general impressions.

Combined Fleet.—The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

Carriers.—The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

Submarines.—Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

Third Fleet.—This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy with Tokyo.

China.—The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.
Communication intelligence summary, 2 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are several alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic despatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

Combined Fleet.—Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined, continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

Third Fleet.—Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by RATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

Air.—A WE address today broke down as “ITIKOKUU KANTAI”. The literal reading of this as “1st Air Fleet” is correct it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOMET) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

Air.—High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDiv Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

Mandates.—The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALOA weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

Submarines.—No activity noted.
[141] Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff Cardivs and TIYA 44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many despatches passing between the two.

Third Fleet.—Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RIS4 and Y0A2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will be long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as “less FUTA SHOTAI” (2nd Section ?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several despatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORSPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAI- HOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Ind China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lient. Condr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Ind China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

[142] Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interferred somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

Takao-Bako Area.—It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that Chin Third Fleet is now en route BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in despatches to Taiwan addresses.

Combined Fleet.—A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

Mandates.—The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units.

[143] Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November, 1941

General.—Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call “All Major Force Flags” on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which at-
tacked is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "Jifu" (authenticator for bona fide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill." Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.

Air.—Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

Fleet.—Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

[144] Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 1941

General.—Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a despatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addresses in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

Fleet.—Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. BatDIV Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with CardIVs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from CardIV Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CardIV Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

Air.—Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of CardIVs, Combined Air Force, First [145] Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CardIV Four, and possibly CardIV Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.
General.—Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval Stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Marianas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

General.—Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

Combined Fleet.—Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC. Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

Third Fleet.—The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit.

Fifth Fleet.—One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.

Air.—The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

General.—Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

Combined fleet.—The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.
Air.—CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

Fifth fleet.—Nothing to report.

Fourth fleet.—The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

China.—The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

[149] Communication Intelligence Summary 13 November 1941.

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders. The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

Combined Fleet.—The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

Third Fleet.—Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with the Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several message were exchanged. He appears to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.

Air.—Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

China.—The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

[150] Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941.

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area in near future.

Third Fleet.—Still in Sasebo area. The CinC, has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

Fourth Fleet.—No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

Submarines.—No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

Air.—One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

[162] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U. E. 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of BatDiv Three flagship.

Combined Fleet.—Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

Third Fleet.—Inactive.

Fourth Fleet.—Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kanol) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

Submarine Force.—Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer
Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.

[153] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941

Air.—Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force. The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

[154] Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 1941

GENERAL.—Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcast on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers—(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle."

2. Resolution of House of Representatives—Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."

First and Second Fleets.—Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airron Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven.

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates. [155] It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been on or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

Third Fleet.—Believed inactive in Sasebo-Kure area.

Fourth Fleet.—FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC. Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NLO 68, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

Fifth Fleet.—Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the com-
position of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.

Submarines.—Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet Commands continues.

[156] Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going to Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.

Combined Fleet.—No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC, Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.

Fourth Fleet.—The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

Air.—The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

China.—Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Talmoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

[157] Communications Intelligence Summary, 18 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches
to him. These form the indication that CinC, Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

Third Fleet.—The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment.

Fourth Fleet.—Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palau is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.

[158] Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There was been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AINavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

Third Fleet.—Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC, Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

Fourth Fleet.—Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palau. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

Fifth Fleet.—Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC, Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

[159] Communication Intelligence Summary, 20–21 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. P. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.
**Combined Fleet.**—Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

| MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) | ENO 7 (Unidentified) |
| TAE 1 (Airon 7) | AKU 8 (Air Unit) |
| KAME 5 (Airon 6) | KITSU 7 (Unidentified) |
| YAWI 6 (Crudiv 5) | SATU SS (Unidentified) |
| KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) | KUNI SS (Unidentified) |
| RESE 4 (Desron 3) | OYU 9 (Unidentified) |
| AKI 9 (Desron 4) | KONA 9 (Unidentified) |
| TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For) | NOTU 6 (Unidentified) |
| SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) | NETE 5 (Unidentified) |
| YOMO 9 (Desron 5) | NSI 3 (Unidentified) |
| REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) | SUTE 1 (Unidentified) |
| KUNO 9 (Erimo) | YAYU 1 (Unidentified) |
| MIMO 3 (Air Unit?) | MARE 5 (Unidentified) |
| TUE 7 (Unidentified) | Plus 11 Marus. |

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out—so far there have been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

[160] **Communication Intelligence Summary, 20–21 November 1941**

**Mandates and Fourth Fleet.**—The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as eastern carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

[161] **Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November, 1941**

**General.**—Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AINav’s and sent two other messages, one to CinC. Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section At Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.
Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet, To: NETE5 (Crudiv?), KO02 (Subrons5) TIXU 66 (CinC, Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC, Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1(?)(at Kure), SATU 8 (?)(at Kure), META 6 (AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33 CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

Third Fleet.—CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from *RIKUGUN SAN-BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU* (at Tainoku). This is translated as “Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC. Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

China.—The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

[162] Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Southern Expeditionary Force.

Precedence

NIKA-WIWI

2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff.

NIKA

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information “SANKUYUTI” at Sama Hainan.

WIWI

4. SUIFITE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NWA 2, Information Tadio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship.

NIKA

5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAIIA Information Kure, Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.

KIU

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch “SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI.”

An unidentified fleet unit (SUITE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

KENU 3—CruDiv 7 Flagship?

HOWI 2—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.

EKE 8—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.

MUSE 5—Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

Combined Fleet.—CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter-
accepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

Air.—Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Palau area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

China.—CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palau area.

[164] Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impresses are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

(a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
(b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

First and Second Fleets.—Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

Third Fleet.—Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet and Mandates.—Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.
**Submarines.**—Comparatively little activity.

**China.**—Comparatively quiet.

**Carriers.**—No definite indications of location.

**Combined Air Force.**—Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.

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**Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 November, 1941**

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizurn. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

**Combined Fleet.**—Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Cruadivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

**Air.**—Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

**Fourth Fleet.**—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

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**Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1941**

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

**Combined Fleet.**—Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet’s dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at its high level.

**Fourth Fleet.**—No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

**Fifth Fleet.**—The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

**Submarines.**—As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETES’s location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven,
General.—Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet Information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.

Combined Fleet.—No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

Third Fleet.—Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:

“DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU” (in Taihoku)
“KOROKUKITISIKI”
“KIZUKEYAMASITABATAI” (in care of RYUJO)
“HEIZEUAIKUNDAIGONREUSETU”

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

Air.—An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

Submarines.—Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

General.—Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NRE0 (the TOKYO D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS.

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chiefs of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Almavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNA PALAO. The IJUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

Combined Fleet.—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander In Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and
DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).

Third Fleet.—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

Fourth Fleet.—Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.

South China.—SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

Submarines.—Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two dispatches there was no submarine activity today.

[169] Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Hokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today’s traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the “163rd Air Group” originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was “JIUTIKOUKUKANTAI” “11th AIR FLEET”. Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

Combined Fleet.—The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of ClnC. Second Fleet:

| CARDIV THREE | DESRON TWO |
| SUBRON FIVE | DESRON FOUR |
| SUBRON SIX | THIRD FLEET |
| CRUDIV FIVE | FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE |
| CRUDIV SEVEN |

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIXEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.
Fourth Fleet.—Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

South China.—CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

**Communication Intelligence Summary, November 30, 1941**

**General.**—Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today’s traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

**Combined Fleet.**—The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).

**Third Fleet.**—Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshall a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

**South China.**—BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

**Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941**

**General.**—All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of despatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting
more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

First Fleet.—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has ceased to operate in a prominent role.

Second Fleet.—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

Third Fleet.—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets, and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

Fourth Fleet.—No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

Fifth Fleet.—Nothing to report.

Submarines.—Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Salipan Flagship somewhere in this general area.

Carriers.—No change.

Combined Air Force.—No change.

[173] Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941

General.—The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

First Fleet.—Despite the lack of positive identification, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets.

Second Fleet.—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.
Third Fleet.—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

Mandates.—Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

Carriers.—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

Combined Air Force.—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same addresses.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on submarines or Carriers.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The CinC. Fourt Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitoise Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).

South China.—Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.
Communication Intelligence Summary, December 5, 1941

General.—Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon.”

Combined Fleet.—Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.

Third Fleet.—In one WE address a “Chief of Staff” sent a message to “Commander Fourteenth Army abroad RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITYOYONGUN SATTI (IRO1 REUZUSU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CINC, Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio and the RNO TAIHOKU and the Commander Second Fleet.

South China.—SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941

General.—Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIKAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.

Yesterday’s high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO’s messages carry prefixes of high priority.

Combined Fleet.—Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

Fifth Fleet.—This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

Submarines.—The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

South China.—Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force.
In reply to:
POSIG—483

Memorandum: To Lt. Col Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

1. With reference to the message sent #519 December 5, 1941, which you handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief there are no copies of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the Signal Center, Fort Shafter. In fact there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the Signal Center prior to 1 July 1944. All coded traffic prior to 1 July 1944 and all clear traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are no records, including the logs, in the Signal Center which would give us any information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter. Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center as to whether this message had been received and they have been negative.

2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to said intercept at the time stated was as follows: Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they were intercepted, I have this to report: There are at this time, no records in the Hawaiian Department to show whether or not these intercepts were made by MS-5. The fact that Washington gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an indication to the contrary.

As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report: Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via air-mail were handled as follows; On the day following the date of intercept each message was given a logsheet number and entered on an index sheet. The entire lot of air-mail traffic for that particular date was then fastened together to await the next scheduled departure of the Clipper. Upon notification of the impending departure of the Clipper all accumulated air-mail traffic together with a letter of transmittal and a classified document receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files section of the Department AGO.

The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately once each week, but this schedule was frequently interrupted because of weather conditions. It is known that this traffic was at times forwarded by ship because of the long delayed departure of a Clipper. The only messages transmitted to Washington by radio were those specially selected in accordance with instructions from the Chief Signal Officer. The message in question was not within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been included in the special instructions.

My search in this regard included:
A search of all Signal Intelligence files including Communication Service, Central Pacific Base Command and Monitor Station #5. Such records as have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station #5 at the time in question show that this station was intercepting traffic between Japan, Asia and Europe.

In this connection I inquired of Washington on 14 April 1945 concerning the originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington, and received this information.

"Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet number 04037 appears on traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Intercept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941."

A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic forwarded are available previous to 1943.

3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did
not monitor the commercial radiotelephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters were used on the Trans-Pacific radiophones circuit between Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. In December 1937 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much more complicated and furnished much more secrecy than the previous old inverters. The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.

Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able to understand the conversation.

[182] Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had just been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell Laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone circuit.

C. A. Powell,
C. A. Powell,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Signal Officer.

At Honolulu

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TOP SECRET

[182] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
RADIO UNIT
COMMANDANT, NAVY 128
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

JSH/rec
EF37/A6(1)
Serial Z-4225
Top Secret

27 April 1945.

Memorandum to Lieut. Colonel H. C. Clausen.

Subject: Information.

1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing.

2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) Comdr. F. R. Biard, USN, Comdr. J. R. Bromley, USN, Comdr. A. Cole, USN, and Comdr. G. M. Slonim, USN. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieutenant Lankford.

3. Comdr. Cole is the only officer currently present and available for questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases, split-phone watches were used.

4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to those scheduled on the hour and half hour, which usually contained weather information.

5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from this monitoring at any time during the period under consideration. The monitoring watch was naturally secured immediately after it became obviously redundant.

J. S. Holtwick, Jr.
J. S. Holtwick, Jr.
Commander, U. S. Navy.
By Direction.

At Honolulu
Theodore Emanuel, USN, presently under orders to CNO, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, deposes and says:

Prior to 7 Dec. 1941, and for over 4 years, I was assigned to the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with Col. George W. Bicknell. When Col. Bicknell was called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941 (TE), I discussed with him and Lt. Col. Muerlott (TE) matters of mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my understanding that Col. Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and activities.

These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originating in and going to (TE) the Japanese Consulate and persons therein (TE) at Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some 5 or 6 lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The translator was Comdr. (TE) Denzel Carr, USNR.

Subscribed & sworn to before me, 17 April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

THEODORE EMANUEL

Chief Ships Clerk, U. S. N.

TOP SECRET

[185] AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD K. SUTHERLAND

Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, presently Chief of Staff, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Areas, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE. I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those relating to the negotiations at Washington, D. C., of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence; other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and, as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, ACoFS, G-2.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE.

Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor. Hq. USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels.

R. K. SUTHERLAND.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD

at Manila, P. I.
TOP SECRET

[186] AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE. I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of May, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.
at Manila, P. I.

[187] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL C. A. WILLoughby

Major General C. A. Willoughby, presently Assistant Chief of Staff, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designed as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before, except isolated fragments of the Kuruma diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any activating or implementing message, nor any notice that such a message had been transmitted or received.

Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appears to have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Major, British Army, who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq. USAFFE, and as such had contact with me and my predecessors, in 1941. (See Appendix A).
Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Army. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a "purple" machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. (See Appendix B). Those which were shown me before 7 December 1941 were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was the Army liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was exclusively a Navy function.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8th day of May 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,

Henry C. Clausen,

Assistant Colonel, J. A. G. D.

at Manila, P. I.

2 Encs.:

Appendix "A" — Re Col G. Wilkinson.  
Appendix "B" — Re Navy Crypto-analysis Service.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

AFFIDAVIT

The British SIA messages, their purport and evolution and the curious role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this investigation, in my opinion.

The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of information and a sort of E. Phillipps Oppenheim international intrigue. Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-law, in Manila, as a sugar broker, for many years; hence, the casual reference to a "Colonel Wilkinson", that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U. S. Law, he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the intelligence material he desired to file with me; they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide; it is still in operation; I employ both SIA and SOE, British, and find them loyal to no one but themselves and the Empire.

My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high — a horse-trading proposition, pure and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents not all of the messages sent; the commercial deductions are obvious; Davies cancelled sugar shipments in the nick of time.
Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His Government gave him a military status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the outbreak of the War, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration.

We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to Wavell and Singapore; he continued to report “home” though his stuff was severely edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell’s Headquarters, as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system; he then made his way deviously to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his “status” with GHQ, USAFFE; he was “promoted” to Colonel and attempted to return to our Headquarters, as a “liaison”; he even had the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side, except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly demoted and attached to duty with the British Office of Information at Washington-New York.

C. A. Willoughby,
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G–2,
General Headquarters, SWPA.

TOP SECRET
AFFIDAVIT
Appendix “B”

[189]

8 MAY 1945.

In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient crypto-analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed an almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue: as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via 7th Fleet D. N. I.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select, and when it suits them. The possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.

The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, interlocking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation.

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or November 20th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

C. A. Willoughby,
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G–2,
General Headquarters, SWPA.

[190]

STATEMENT

Kendall J. Fielder, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
Judge Advocate General Department, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organization of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows: a small administrative section of one officer, two clerks; a public relations section of two officers and three clerks; a combat intelligence section of two officers and several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency; a counter-intelligence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt Col George Bicknell and located in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 Section was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the section was small and the duties varied.

2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest of the world on the War Department, on the local Navy Command, and on interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British S18. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese communications.

3. While the principle mission of the G-2 Section was to safeguard against internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was customary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office where summaries and estimates were prepared. Prior to December 7, 1941, the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department was mostly concerned with subversive matters since there were 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory of Hawaii of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week of November and first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by other Department Staff officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complications should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about friction between local Filipinos and Japanese.

4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned somewhat as a special staff section: the Contact Officer, Lt. Col Bicknell, had direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this subsection of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section". I refer to attempting to obtain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat.

5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings, usually on Saturday morning: at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of information to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 December 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at headquarters and were in contact many times each day.

6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii.

7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated 5 December 1941, sent by G-2 in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broadcast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as, "The Winds" message. I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt Col Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with
Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. The contents and details of "The Winds" message were never made known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferred with Commander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not tell me if he did.

8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which [192] I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt Col Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified primarily to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt Col Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the war started.

9. I have been shown by Lt Col Clausen a file containing information received by Lt Col Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a responsive chord in my memory but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my attention.

10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given to me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt Col Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct.

11. Col Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit "B" which are intercepted Japanese dispatches. I had never seen any of them before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to December 7, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and papers which was related by Col Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 1941. I gave this latter information to General Short the same day. With respect to Top Secret Exhibit "B", had I been given this series of messages prior to December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of No. 1. It is my opinion that if General Short had seen these messages prior to December 7, 1941, he would have ordered Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Commanding General Ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff.

KENDALL J. FIELDER.

[193] Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of May, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.
At Honolulu, T. H.

[194] AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS J. BETTS

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, presently Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the major intelligence problems confronting the Military Intelligence Division and with a reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the War Department.

In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code". I further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been received. I do not recall that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would have remembered it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an implementing message had been received.

THOMAS J. BETTS.

Subscribed and Sworn Before Me This 13th Day of June 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,

HENRY C. CLAUSEN.

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

Frankfort on Main, Germany.

[195] SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

15 JUNE 1945

AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH

Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, presently Chief of Staff, SHAEF, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret information which I later learned included various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff. I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to him at his home when the A. C. of S., G-2, considered the contents urgent. The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters connected with these intercepts, but I do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall specific details.
Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect:

1. On 5 Dec 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving information from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give the Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, "I think they have had plenty of notification." Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me, and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division had acted I did not want to discuss the matter further;

2. Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there, he delivered the pouches to me for delivery to the Chief of Staff;

3. During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown the Chief of Staff without delay;

4. On Dec 6, 1941, before Midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it "may have been one of others.")

My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows:

1. I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province.

2. Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2 delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty Officer.

3. Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of Staff's office as indicated above.

4. To the best of my recollection, I left the office at the usual time on the evening of 6 Dec 41, that is about 7 PM, turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 PM. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which I have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as "Ultra". If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

W. B. Smith,
W. B. Smith,

Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Col., JAGD.

at Frankfort on Main, Germany.
Affidavit of Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow

Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and therefor, as Chief, War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C., some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form of intelligence.

Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, designated Top Secret Exhibit "B." I recall the general substance of some of these messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate dates of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to reports to Tokio on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to the Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coordination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Saddler, SC, informed General Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.

3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843.

My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:

1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.

2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Saddler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive,
prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any sources of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.

3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me.

In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions receive estimates from G-2 sources of which were not borne out by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by the Axis powers.

I wish to state in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle plans and estimates [200] with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for that purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established military practise. I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two commanders at Hawaii.

So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November 1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my understanding that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B."

Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only
a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not the policy of the War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas commanders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible defeats.

L. T. GEROW,


Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

at Cannes, France.

TOP SECRET

[201]

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, SC

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, presently Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence Service, Signal Section, MTUSA, AFHQ, Caserta, Italy, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and decoded and translated.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about the time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B", numbered 25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Francisco intercept station to intercept all plain text Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and reports in to me. To the best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up. I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in Top Secret Exhibit "B" numbered 25340 and 25407, but in which the person at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating breach of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. I think this message also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy." I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2.

As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of my former superior Colonel Minckler; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams.

Robert E. Schukraft,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of June, 1945, at Caserta, Italy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
[202] George W. Renuchard, presently on duty at the American Embassy to the Netherlands Government, London, England, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I have read the attached sworn statement of Mr. John F. Stone dated July 7, 1945 given to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and incorporate therein the allegations thereof as my statement in response to similar questioning.

GEORGE W. RENUCHARD.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at London, 7 July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[203] John F. Stone, presently on duty at the American Embassy, London, England, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, DEPOSES AND SAYS:

During the months of November and December, 1941, and for some time therefores, I was a Foreign Service Officer and a personal assistant to the Secretary of State at Washington, D. C. As such, I received during this period from two United States Army officers named Bratton and Dusenbury, who were then I believe Majors or Lieutenant Colonels, allegedly representing the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., various intercepts of official Japanese messages which had been decrypted and translated, and which were handed to me for submission to the Secretary of State. These messages were also handed occasionally for the same purpose to Mr. C. W. Gray and Mr. George W. Renuchard, who performed similar duties for the Secretary of State, and were at some times handed direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of G-2. The intercepts were, to the best of my recollection, complete translations of the deciphered code texts. I do not recollect that except for possibly a few instances receipts were required when they were of course always given. If, however, delivery was made direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of [201] G-2 written record of the visit to the Secretary of State was normally made in his engagement book. I do not remember that any copies were ever made of the intercepts, which were either read and returned while the alleged representative of G-2 waited or returned to him at the time of a subsequent delivery or call. The irregularity in the delivery of and the volume of the intercepts were such as to prevent my recollection of any specific details regarding any one or several deliveries; I thus cannot state the exact time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when any intercept indicating the possibility of a breach in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States or Great Britain might have been received or called to my attention.

Prior to the servicing of the Secretary of State with the intercepts in question by the alleged representatives of G-2 as mentioned, the function was performed periodically by officers of the United States Navy, presumably of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and it is my recollection that on one or more occasions information of this type was brought to the Office of the Secretary of State by a Naval officer subsequent to the date when as requested United States Army officers undertook the continuous servicing of the Secretary of State. I recollect no statement made to me by any United States Navy Officer prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which I interpreted as indicating the possibility of said attack.

JOHN F. STONE.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 7th day of July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[205]

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE

John R. Deane, Major General, USA, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General Staff;

On 6 December 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch for the Chief of Staff;

On 7 December, 1941, I arrived at the Munitions Building for duty at the same time as Colonel Bratton, which to the best of my recollection, was between 9 and 9:30 a. m.

JOHN R. DEANE,
Major General, USA,

Commanding General, U. S. Mil Mission with U. S. S. R.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Potsdam, Germany.

[206]

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL RUFUS S. BRATTON

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, O-3726, GSC, presently A. C. OF S. G-2, U. S. HQ., BERLIN DISTRICT, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board; and on statements and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, GSC; Moses W. Pettigrew, Colonel; Ralph C. Smith, Major General; Charles K. Gailey, Brig. General; Thomas J. Betts, Brig. General; Walter B. Smith, Lieut. General; Leonard T. Gerow, Lieut. General; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel; John F. Stone and George W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned.

During the month of December, 1941, and for several years prior thereto, as Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, War Department G-2, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C. various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic radio messages for the purpose of screening and distributing to authorized officials such of these intercepts as were matters of military intelligence value. In the period of about October to December, 1941, the volume of these intercepts increased to such an extent that with the permission of General Miles, A. C. of S. G-2, I utilized several of my assistants, such as then Major or Lieut. Colonel Dusenbury, then Major Moore, then Lieutenant Schindel, in processing, assembling and distributing this material. These were distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. This arrangement and method of presentation to the Chief of Staff and other authorized recipients had been prescribed by the Chief of Staff. These recipients during October to December, 1941, authorized by the Chief of Staff, were, so far as G-2 distribution was concerned, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief, War Plans Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By agreement between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the President was served by representatives of the Navy. The normal procedure was to secure receipts by SIS document numbers from the Alde to the Secretary of War, the confidential secretaries of the Secretary of State, and the Executive Officer of the War Plans Division. The material distributed and thus covered by receipts were usually taken from the recipients by the representatives of G-2 mentioned the following day, and were then burned with the
corresponding receipts, which were given to assure the ultimate destruction of the material. During the period October to November, 1941, the G-2 received daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which were sorted to about twenty per cent for distribution, and which twenty per cent represented such of the documents as had intelligence value.

It was necessary to have help in the distribution of this material so that the various recipients would receive their copies simultaneously. I am unable to recall at this time except as may be hereinafter [267] mentioned, and there are no records to show, who delivered what to whom during this period, with any degree of accuracy.

Concerning the so-called Japanese “Winds Code”, I recall a meeting about 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, at which Colonel Sadtler presented information he had received from Admiral Noyes of a possible implementation. There had been several “false alarm” reports to this same effect. In view of an intercept which had already been received and translated, being an order from Tokyo to the embassy of Japan at Washington to destroy their codes, in my opinion an implementation message to the “Winds Code” was superfluous and no longer of importance, since the purpose would be to effect a destruction of the codes. Following receipt of the order mentioned, I verified that the Japanese Embassy at Washington were burning what appeared to be important papers. Colonel Sadtler was, however, directed at the meeting mentioned, to get from Admiral Noyes verification of the purported implementation message in the form of a clear text and in the original Japanese. Colonel Sadtler never, to my knowledge, returned to G-2 with this or any additional information on the subject. I have no knowledge as to whether Colonel Sadtler, after getting the purported implementation message mentioned, went to Walter B. Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, or to Leonard T. Gerow, then Chief of the War Plans Division, and in effect asked that the Hawaiian Department be given more warning. I did not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler’s report, nor do I know that any one else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by reason of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message to the “Winds Code” indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

At no time prior to 7 December 1941, although a thorough alert in this regard was in effect, did I ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the “Winds Code”. In connection with testimony of Captain Safford on this subject to the effect that two copies of such a message was sent by the Navy to the Army, it was the customary practice for the Navy when sending the Army material of this character, to send six copies. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with me several “false alarms”, but no one in the Navy had discussed with me, nor to my knowledge with any one else in G-2, the message supposed to have been received according to the testimony of Captain Safford.

The intercept mentioned from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington, to destroy their codes and ciphers, was processed for distribution to the authorized recipients. The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office. We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o’clock p. m. After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schunkraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients. [268] I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. This was about ten o’clock p. m. The sets of these thirteen parts for the ACoFS, G-2, the Chief WPD, and the Secretary of War were not delivered that night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered the next morning, 7 December 1941, within the fourteenth part. They were not given to General Walter B. Smith, General Leonard T. Gerow, General Galley or General Ralph C. Smith the night of 6 December 1941, nor were they given that night to General Sherman Miles. When I saw the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, he then had the fourteen part message, which I had not given him. About ten o’clock p. m. on 6 December 1941, I took the thirteen parts destined for the
Secretary of State and between ten and eleven p. m. delivered them to the night duty officer at the State Department. I cannot recall who the night duty officer was. I told this officer that it was of the greatest importance that the papers be placed in the hand of the Secretary of State at once. He assured me that this would be done. This was the only delivery I made that night. I then went home to bed and returned to the office the following morning between 7:30 and 8 a. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteenth part of the message came to my desk about the time I reached my office. It was processed at once and about 8:30 a. m. it was sent to be delivered to the authorized recipients. I did not deliver any material that morning except the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver at 1 p. m. /1941, Japan’s reply to the United States, and which intercept I gave to the Chief of Staff between ten thirty and eleven thirty that morning. The last mentioned message was sent to the Secretary of State for delivery by either Colonel Dusenbury or Lieutenant Schindel. In my opinion the fourteen part message mentioned was relatively unimportant, in view of the other messages which preceded it, especially the one ordering the destruction of the Japanese codes and ciphers and the one ordering the delivery of the fourteen part message at one p. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteen part message was merely the formal announcement couched in diplomatic language of a break which, from the evidence, seemed inevitable. I do not recall having discussed the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message with General Sherman Miles the night of 6 December 1941. In further reference to my seeing the fourteen parts on the desk or in the possession of the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, I do not know for certain how they came into his possession.

Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to my statements here, including among other things as to the processing and delivery of material, and to whom and when, should be modified and considered changed in accordance with my statements herein. This affidavit now represents my best recollection of the matters and events set forth, and a better recollection than when I previously testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and is made after having my memory refreshed in several ways and respects.

RUFUS S. BRATTON,
Col., G. S. O.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of July, 1945, at Paris, France,
Henry C. Clausen,

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

[209] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL OTIS K. SADTLER

Colonel Otis K. Sadtlter, SC, assigned to the Army Ground Forces and on duty at Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board pursuant to Joint Resolution of Congress, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Referring to my testimony on 6 October 1944 before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to information of a possible "Winds Code" execute message given me on 5 December 1941 by Admiral Noyes, I wish to add further that following my second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that day, as set forth on page 252, Top Secret Volume D, transcript of proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or any other person the exact wording of the intercept or information which he had conveyed to me, and as far as I know nothing further was done to get further information from Admiral Noyes. I assumed that the basis of the information before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned me was an intercept which would, according to the standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the Army.

I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript mentioned, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2. I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which
Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building, and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory:

"C. G.—P. I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy, Marshall."

I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is now and I made no copy at the time. After I had typed this message I conferred with General Gerow and General Smith, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not [210] show them the warning message I had typed.

I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

General Gerow.—"I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Saddler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Saddler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person’s memory at this time, especially so since so many major events have intervened."

General Smith.—"I do not recall Colonel Saddler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Saddler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province."

I had seen no intercepts and no information came to my attention which pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to 7 December 1941. The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to me. I thought that the Panama Canal would be the surprise attack target.

[Hand written: Other than the persons mentioned, namely Gen. Miles Col. Bratton, Genl. Gerow, Col. Smith, and whoever may have been in Gen. Miles’ office at the time, to the best of my recollection, prior to Dec. 7, 1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.]

[211] I did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department.

I had no time urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders, and I deny the testimony in that regard of Mr. Friedman given to General Carter W. Clarke on 13 July 1945.

I also deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and reiterate that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes.
I further deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the effect that I had collected and had material in a safe deposit box concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster. I have not collected any such material in a safe-deposit box although I thought I had done so. I do have possession of the testimony given by me before General Carter W. Clarke on two occasions, 16 September 1944 and 14 July 1945, which was given to me by General Clarke, and is now in a private box in my home.

Otis K. Sadtler,
Colonel, S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[212] Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron

Major General Charles D. Herron, presently assigned to the Office Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Ltent. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, desposes and says:

Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August 1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General Short to relieve me as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which command I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material relating to the command, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco but that he had not given them much time while en route.

I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This included my giving him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated 17 June 1940, reading as follows: "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnish you shortly. Acknowledge."

[213] I also told him of the relations and cooperation which had existed with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island.

Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii, he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the subject of command and related problems.

Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in 1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise a
WAR DEPARTMENT estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commander may and should take whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the War Department at the earliest possible moment.

Charles D. Herton,
Charles D. Herron.
Major General, U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[214]

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES

MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES, presently Commanding General, First Service Command, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called “Magic”, or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

My testimony mentioned above should be considered in that light, therefore. In the months preceding 7 December 1941, there was available to the War and Navy Departments in Washington, D. C., intercepts of Japanese radio messages to their diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world. These were intercepted, decrypted, decoded and translated by the two services in Washington, D. C., under arrangements for mutual assistance in this regard and for their dissemination. So far as the Army was concerned, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who was the head of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, when I was G-2, War Department, received and reviewed the material received daily from this source. He and his assistants, Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel, screened the material, picking out that which contained information valuable from a military intelligence standpoint. The latter was then distributed by these officers to various officers and persons who had theretofore been authorized to receive them. Those on this authorized list, in the several months immediately preceding 7 December 1941, and to whom deliveries were made by the officers mentioned, included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD. The material was delivered in locked brief cases. The brief cases contained receipts for purposes of assuring the ultimate destruction of the material thus delivered. The cases were returned to Colonel Bratton’s office when they had been read, the receipts they contained having been initialed by the authorized officers. The material and the receipts were then destroyed by burning. This intelligence was distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. I do not believe there are any records which would show what intercepts were delivered to whom, nor the dates of delivery, so far as any particular intercepts are concerned. I do not think that any such records were made at the time.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file of such intercepts, called Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At this late date I am unable to recall having seen, prior to 7 December 1941, any particular messages translated prior to that date, except those bearing Army serial numbers 23570, 23859, 24373, 25522, 24878, 25432, 25138, 25125, 25445, 25496, 25552, 25553, 25554, 25555, 25727, 25545, 25640, 25785, 25836 and 25838. In the latter cases, each of the messages contain something that I recall knowing or seeing at the time. The remainder of the series do not. I do not recall the intercepts, Army serial numbers 25874 and 25577, summaries of which were shown me by Colonel Clausen, nor do I know how these two happened to be omitted from the Top Secret Exhibit “B”, in the
preparation of which I was not in any way concerned. I must add, however, that I believe I saw, prior to 7 December [215] 1941, all the messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", which were translated prior to that date except number 25843. My belief is based on the fact that they were of such importance that my officers would have assured themselves that I had seen them. Those which I do not recall simply do not register in my mind after nearly four years.

Concerning such of the intercepts mentioned as relate to reports by the Japanese consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and inquiries from Tokyo as to ship movements in Pearl Harbor, and the division of Pearl Harbor into districts for such reporting, I would like to point out that such messages were primarily of Naval interest and what might have been expected. Of course the Japanese were following the movements of our major ships, as best they could, as we were doing with regard to their ships. Since I knew that the Navy was getting the messages mentioned also, they did not leave any impression on my mind which has endured four years.

Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", and those which related to joint action by the ABCD Bloc, or members thereof, I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement.

The general contents of the first thirteen parts of the intercepts in the Top Secret Exhibit "B", number 25843, consisting of fourteen parts, were known to me on the evening of 6 December 1941. This came about because I was dining at the home of my opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardsall the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to me.

Concerning the intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my belief in the period preceding 7 December 1941, that the Navy was intercepting, decrypting, decoding and translating this material, consisting of Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, at Hawaii, for use in connection with the fleet. I was given so to understand by Naval sources, but I do not recall who told me.

Referring to testimony as to a meeting I am said to have had with Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler, on 5 December 1941, concerning information received by Colonel Sadtler from Admiral Noyes of a possible "Winds Code" execute message, I cannot specifically recall any such meeting, nor having received the information stated. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of the receipt of such a message, I was prepared to transmit it immediately to the Chief of Staff and to WPD. The Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alert to watch for this message since receiving information of the "Winds Code" set-up. It was considered most important and of vital concern. I have some recollection that there were several messages intercepted which, while thought at first to be the execute message, proved on analysis not to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite acceptance as such. It is my belief that the meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, if it occurred, concerned such a message. It may have resulted in the message to Hawaii about Commander Rochefort, on that date.

As to the meeting the morning of 7 December 1941, with the Chief of Staff, according to my best recollection, refreshed from notes made shortly thereafter, I conferred with the Chief of Staff in his office at the Munitions Building at about 11 a.m.

On the general subject of my being alive to the danger of a possible surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, I would like to refer to my service in the Hawaiian Detachment, during 1929-1932, as Department G-3. It was while so assigned that I [216] prepared and disseminated a General Staff study, afterwards disseminated further by General Wells, on the defense of Oahu. This study emphasized the advantages which an attack on Oahu, particularly by surprise, might give Japan. The usual assumption in war planning during my assignment was that of a surprise attack made with little warning in the nature of strained relations internationally, what was called "out of the blue". I remember one situation we war-gamed, that of an attack "out of the blue" on a Sunday morning.

During my service as G-2, War Department, I caused Colonel Warren J. Clear to be sent to the Far East for undercover work for G-2. He made reports to G-2, War Department, using the name of Knight, through Colonel Brink at Singapore.

My attention has been called to the testimony of William F. Friedman, given to Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, as conducting for the Secretary of the Navy the type of investigation being conducted for the Secretary of War by Colonel Clausen. To my knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department, pertinent to Pearl
Harbor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other person. Specifically, to my knowledge, General Marshall did not ever order destroyed any copies of a possible “Winds Code” execute message. Nor, to my knowledge, were any records of G-2, pertinent to Pearl Harbor and derogatory to the War Department, destroyed. While serving as G-2, I would have known of any destruction of records ordered by any competent authority.

Concerning the question as to whether correct military practise, current in 1941, would have justified a Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, to act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, such as were contained in War Department messages prior to 7 December 1941, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commanding General was responsible for the successful execution of his mission; he could act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, but at his own risk; and that custom and doctrine of command would require him to report his action and the reasons therefore promptly to his superiors.

In my opinion the messages sent by the War Department to General Short, prior to 7 December 1941, especially the ones dated 27 November 1941, were definitive directives that a war alert was required by the situation, and that there was an immediate threat from without as well as danger from sabotage.

SHERMAN MILES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1945, at Boston, Mass.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lieu. Colonel, JAGD.

[217]

Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, presently director of training, Camp Crowder, Mo., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to joint resolution of the Congress, and that TOP SECRECY is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Saddler was my superior. My duties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio messages which had been decrypted and translated.

Regarding the so-called Japanese “Winds Code”, I recall having seen, and at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25482 in Top Secret Exhibit “B”, before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the “Winds Code”. I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were one or two “false alarms”, one of which I think discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message had been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me.

The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies.

Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial numbers 25874 and 25877, which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the Intercepts were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and
translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination.

Rex W. Minckler,
Rex W. MINCKLER.
Colonel, SC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[219]

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, presently Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the voting members of that Board, namely, Lt. General Grumet, Major General Henry D. Russell, and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session with me from 11:10 A. M. to 12:07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indicated on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of information which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called “Magic”. I told them, among other things, that the source of this information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which were decrypted, decoded and translated under the supervision of the Signal Corps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source. This [220] would have meant that our enemies concerned would certainly have changed their systems of communication and would thus have terminated this most vital source of information which has continued to be available up to the present hour. Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised.

I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadlier, officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with “Magic”, prior to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played by “Magic”, it was not until it developed that the “Magic” papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding “Magic” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. On my second appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at length the general problem concerning the method of including “Magic” in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret “Magic” phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the Top Secret Transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose.

[221] Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my understanding in the period preceding 7 December 1941 that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this information from facilities available in his command.

Concerning information sent to General Short or his command prior to 7 December 1941, I find that Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2 at the time for General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen that he was shown, about 3 December 1941, a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, to the Navy at Pearl Harbor, in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume “C” Transcript
of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN, which reads as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that category and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

It is customary and expected that information of this character would be exchanged between the respective Services at Hawaii.

Concerning correspondence which was exchanged between General Short and myself before 7 December 1941, I gave him my estimates in my letters to him dated 7 February 1941 and 5 March 1941 as follows:

[222] "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority."

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority."

Estimates to the same general effect were sent to General Short by the War Department. General Short answered these estimates prior to 7 December 1941 with replies and sent communications to the War Department which indicated that he was then alive to the danger of the possible surprise attack by air against Pearl Harbor. He participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. At no time did General Short inform me of, to my knowledge, anyone else in the War Department that he was not in full agreement with these War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan.

The doctrine of military command required that the Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, must not act contrary to War Department estimates of the character mentioned, unless he believed such action to be dictated by necessity and unless he immediately reported and gave full details and reasons to the War Department.

* George C. Marshall
  George C. MARSHALL,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL HAROLD DOUD

COLONEL HAROLD DOUD, presently with the Allied Translator and Intelligence Service, GHQ, A/FPAC, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese messages which had been intercepted.
Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" I recall seeing at about the time of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432. I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Stafford, USN., to the effect that I may have some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an execute message.

[224] My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6 December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall.

Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the of the Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average time required was at least two days.

I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The translation dates indicated thereon were not always the dates of receipt. Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to show the time required between the dates of receipt and the actual solutions and disseminations.

Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any current Japanese military codes.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of September 1945.

Harold Doud,
Harold Doud,
Colonel.

At Washington, D. C.

[225] AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT

LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

The average length of time required for processing the messages in the Japanese system known by us as PA-K2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which were actually published were included in the data on which the average was calculated.

No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military Attacks previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military system.

a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building. My recollection is that the first call to initiate the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed sometime after six o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by teletype. [226] This preparation required some time because tapes had to be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco.

b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the preliminary
nary discussions in which traffic was requested and also in receipting for the traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and this also tended to impress the matter on my memory.

Frank B. Rowlett,
FRANK B. ROWLETT,
Lt. Colonel, SC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[227] Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin

CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

To the best of my knowledge and remembrance the following facts are true:

At approximately 8:00 p.m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other personnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained copy, as the original traffic had been air-mailed to Washington at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and the hours as given are approximately correct.

[228] I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time.

Howard W. Martin
HOWARD W. MARTIN
Captain, SC

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.

[229] Affidavit of Mary J. Dunning

MARY J. DUNNING, presently with Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 6 December 1941, I left the Munitions Building around 1:00 p.m., the regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 that afternoon, I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office, requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I fix the hour by the length of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by 3:00 p.m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5:00 p.m. instead, since I had made plans to spend the day out of town.
I can't recall being told why we were called back to work, but the general assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japanese Ambassador was in conference with the President.

I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was processed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance) where I had not worked for some time. [230] I think that as I entered the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation of the machine. After that we spent some time practicing.

It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because we joked about my teaching him to operate the teletype. To the best of my knowledge, we were in communication with our intercept station in S. F. not later than 7:00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any traffic for us at that time.

I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a.m. and I recall processing some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, however, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had been asked to deliver [231] traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.

I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941.

Mary J. Dunning
Mary J. Dunning.

Subscribed and sworn to before me the 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.

[232] AFFIDAVIT OF LOUISE PRATHER

Louise Prather, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941.

This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for work at 7:00 a.m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This further served to impress the event on my memory.

Louise Prather.
LOUISE PRATHER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
TOP SECRET

EXHIBIT C

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF
WAR, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The documents referred to in the Report are listed on the inclosed cover sheets to Exhibits “1” through “8”.

[233] Exhibit “1”

a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of sheets 2 and 55, showing that on
7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands were planned for “Y Day 8 December”,
which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time.

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters
and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise noted.
b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941.
c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy Yard,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 20 May 1941.
d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, “Japanese
War Policy”.

e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is
initiated by General Short.
f. Memorandum re “Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan” dated 1 August
1941.
g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report of
Sir George Paisin.
h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General
Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C., dated 6 September 1941.
i. Photostated copy of reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel
in Honolulu Star-Bulletin dated 18 September 1941, obtained from Theo.
H. Davies & Co., Ltd.
j. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 1941,
initiated by General Short.
k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo,
dated 17 October 1941.
l. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of Tairiku, Japanese magazine,
for May 1941.
m. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 1941,
re “Estimate of Japanese Situation”.
n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreign policy.

[235] o. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25
October 1941, initiated by General Short.
p. Letter from Brig General Sherman Miles to Ass’t Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs.
Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding memorandum
containing information received from Orient.
q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 1941,
initiated on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of certain
information in Colonel Wilkinson’s cable.
s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Commander
(I. C.), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from British.
t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November
1941, initiated on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from
Navy.
v. Transcript of telephone conversation, 1 December 1941, obtained from
Navy.
w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from Navy.
x. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI.
y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian department, 27 November 1941.
z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 29 November 1941.
aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., Hawaiian Department, 27 December 1941.
dd. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 December 1941.
cc. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.
dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941.
ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 7 December 1941.
ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 December 1941, “Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by Carrier”.
[i236] hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529.
ik. Statement of Captain William B. Cobb, JAGD, 10 December 1941.
jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 8 December 1941.
ll. Cable from “Colton Acting” to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.
mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
 oo. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to “Radio—Merle Smith”.
qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941.
rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
ss. Paper relating to “WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and destruction of their code machine”.

[237] Exhibit “2”

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.

a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
b. G-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.
c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum, 7 September 1944, to C. G. POA, re Documentary Evidence.
d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Domestic Conditions, 1 December 1941 (2 copies).
e. Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
f. Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.
g. Hawaiian Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 a.m., 7 December 1941, dated 22 December 1941.
h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.
i. Radio from War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese negotiations, 27 November 1941.
j. Informal report re Thailand.
k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asama Maru and conditions in Japan.
l. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 13 November 1941.
m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the “Gendai”, July 1941.
n. Army Contact Office memorandum, 2 May 1941, re Comments on observations of a missionary.
o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26–31 July 1941.
p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941.
q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.
[r38] r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Assistant Naval Attache Shanghai.
s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.
t. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department transmitting letter from F. B. I. re information on Japan's entry into war dated 28 July 1941.
u. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dated 3 November 1941.
w. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).
x. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled “Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico”. (Distribution list and M. A. report attached.)
z. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George Parish (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies).
aa. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re French Indo-China.
bb. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re Formosa.
ll. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 February 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, T. H.
 oo. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Japanese Spy Activities.
 pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate Activities.
rr. Copy of radio “688 12th.”
ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND Report dated 9 February 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at.
tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities, Maui, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.).
vv. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.
ww. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and Kalaheo to observe unusual activities.

xx. Memorandum date 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John Waterhouse house at Kailua.

yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.

zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939—"The Spy Game".

aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Ryoji.

[240]

Exhibit "3"

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K.

a. Army Contact Office memorandum for Colonel Blecknell dated 7 October 1941 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.


d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1941, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to General Short dated 25 July 1941.

e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, w/notes attached.


g. F. B. I, report dated 6 November 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.

h. F. B. I report dated 9 October 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.

i. 14ND report dated 15 February 1943 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.


m. F. B. I. letter, 19 March 1942, re translations made of coded and confidential material from Japanese Consulate.

n. Inter-staff routing slip dated 14 March 1942 re Translation of a Register of Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter of transmittal dated 13 March 1942 and report same subject attached.

[241]

Exhibit "4"

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheet L and M.


b. Inter-staff routing slip dated 2 April 1942 re Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter dated 2 April 1942, same subject.

[242]

Exhibit "5"

The following documents were obtained from the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District, Honolulu.

a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cablegrams from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and numbers of cablegrams in date order: 363, 3 December 1941; 364, 4 December 1941; 365, 4 December 1941; 221, 5 December 1941; 368, 6 December 1941; and 369, 6 December 1941.
b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November 1941 to the following addresses: Shagro, San Francisco; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu; Growsumida, Honolulu; and Shokin, Honolulu.

c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November 1941 to the following addresses: Rev. Hiro Higuchi, Waipahu Community Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.; American Consul, Papeete; Y. Watanabe, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.; and Shokin, Honolulu.

d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 November 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae.


f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941, Japanese time.

g. An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands prepared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND, dated 20 April 1943.

h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg) T. W. Joyce.

[243] Exhibit “6”

The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me 1 through 165, from the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonel Gerald Wilkinson) at Manila to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Honolulu, and were obtained from their respective files.

They comprise reports during the period from June to December 1941.

[244] Exhibit “7”

a. The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941 of radio messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and which were not included in Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

b. The documents following those mentioned in a above are the intercepts which comprise Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred to in their affidavits.

[245] “Exhibit “8”

The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources. They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to 22 December 1941.
TOP SECRET

EXHIBIT D

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

1. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 17 February 1945, concerning investigation of Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
2. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 3 March 1945, concerning investigation of Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
3. Receipt from the District Intelligence Office 14ND of designated material, 19 April 1945.
5. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 23 May 1945, concerning investigation of Lt. Colonel Clausen supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
6. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 1 August 1945, fourth progress report of Colonel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
7. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 12 September 1945, fifth progress report of Colonel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 12 September 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.
Subject: Fifth progress report of Lt. Colonel Clausen's investigations supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. Since 1 August 1945 I have concluded the investigations of the following:
   a. Army Personnel interviewed:
      General George C. Marshall
      Major General Charles D. Herron
      Major General Sherman Miles
      Colonel Otis K. Sadtler
      Colonel George W. Bicknell
      Colonel Rex W. Minckler
      Colonel Harold Doud
      Colonel Harold G. Hayes
      Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
   b. British Army personnel interviewed:
      Colonel Gerald Wilkinson
   c. Civilians interviewed:
      Miss Mary J. Dunning
      Miss Louise Prather
   d. Related conferences:
      Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
      Major General Myron C. Cramer
      Commodore Inglis, ONI
      Brig. General Carter W. Clarke
      Brig. General Thomas North
      Colonel Ernest W. Gibson
      [248] Colonel William J. Hughes
      Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USN
      Mr. John F. Sonnett
      Mr. A. T. Klotz
e. *Affidavit evidence obtained:*
   
   General George C. Marshall
   Major General Sherman Miles
   Major General Charles D. Herron
   Colonel Otis K. Sadler
   Colonel Rex W. Minckler
   Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
   Captain Howard W. Martin
   Miss Mary J. Dunning
   Miss Louise Prather

   **Henry C. Clausen,**
   **Henry C. Clausen,**
   **Lt. Colonel, JAGD.**

   [249]

   Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.

   Subject: Fourth Progress Report of Colonel Clausen's Investigation Supple-
   mentary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

   1. *Activities Reported:* Investigations at Blandford, Blenheim Park, London, 
   England; Cannes, Marseille, Paris, Versaille, France; Casserta, Italy; Berlin, 
   Frankfurt on Main, Potsdam, Germany; and Washington, D. C., were conducted 
   during 15 May to 1 August 1945.

   a. *Army Personnel Interviewed:*
      
      Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow
      Lt. General W. B. Smith
      Maj. General John R. Deane
      Brig. General Thomas J. Betts
      Colonel George W. Bicknell
      Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
      Colonel Warren J. Clear
      Colonel Robert E. Schukraft
      Major Louis Stone

   b. *British Navy Personnel Interviewed:*
      
      Captain Edward Hastings

   c. *Civilians Interviewed:*
      
      Dr. Stanley Hornbeck
      George W. Renchard
      John F. Stone

   d. *Related Conferences:*
      
      Harvey H. Bundy
      General Thomas T. Handy
      Maj. General Myron C. Cramer
      Maj. General Otto Nelson
      Brig. General Carter Clarke
      [250] Brig. General Thomas North
      Brig. General G. Bryan Conrad
      Brig. General Marion Van Voorst
      Colonel C. W. Christenberry
      Colonel R. W. Hauenstein
      Colonel F. W. Hilles
      Captain Wm. T. Carnahan
      Captain Edmund H. Kellogg
      John F. Sonnett
      Admiral Henry K. Hewitt

   e. *Affidavit Evidence Obtained:*
      
      Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow
      Lt. General W. B. Smith
      Maj. General John R. Deane
      Colonel George W. Bicknell
      Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
      Colonel Robert E. Schukraft
      George W. Renchard
      John F. Stone
      Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts
f. Documentary Evidence Obtained:

British radio intelligence material

2. Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed:

(a) Colonel Bratton's Testimony Before APFR: Colonel Bratton admitted to me that his testimony given to the APFR was incorrect on some very important subjects, and should be revised accordingly. These changes include the following points:

1. He previously testified that the top secret radio intelligence material, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

But, in his affidavit to me, he admitted that while his memory was more refreshed, he admitted that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy, and that there were no records to show who delivered what to whom during the period in question.

[257] 2. He previously testified that he personally delivered the top secret radio intelligence material to the officers concerned.

In his affidavit to me, however, he admitted that in addition to himself, deliveries were made by Major or Lt. Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

3. He previously testified that on the evening of 6 December 1941 he delivered to the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Office of the Secretary of State, the thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese reply to the settlement conditions which the Secretary of State had given the Japs on 26 November 1941. He had also testified that he put the thirteen parts of this message on the desk of the Chief of Staff. He had further testified that on 6 December 1941 he had given sets of the thirteen parts to Lt. General W. B. Smith for the Chief of Staff, to Brig. General Galley for Lt. General Gerow, and to Maj. General Miles as G-2, and it was his recollection that these officers received these sets that night. He had also testified that on 6 December 1941 he discussed the thirteen part message with General Miles.

But in his affidavit to me he admitted that the only set of the thirteen parts message he delivered on 6 December 1941 was to the duty officer of the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December 1941 to General Smith, General Gerow or General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December 1941; that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession, although he claimed that he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver it on 6 December 1941 to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury admitted in his affidavit to me that he received the messages on 6 December 1941, but that he did not deliver any until after 9:00 A. M. on the morning of 7 December 1941.

[252] 4. He previously testified that on the morning of 7 December 1941 he arrived at his office about 7:00 or 8:00 A. M. and telephoned the home of the Chief of Staff at about 9:00 A. M., and that the Chief of Staff arrived at his office at 11:25 A. M.

In his affidavit to me, he fixed the time at which the Chief of Staff was in his office on 7 December 1941 as being between 10:30 and 11:30 A. M.

The affidavit of Maj. General Deane fixed the time at which Colonel Bratton arrived at his office on 7 December 1941 as between 9:00 and 9:30 A. M., which also agrees more nearly with the recollection of Colonel Dusenbury.

Affidavits mentioned in previous reports, as well as the new affidavits of Generals Gerow, Smith, Deane, and Messrs. Stone and Renchard, tend to support the revised testimony of Colonel Bratton.

(b) "Winds Code" Message: Investigation at British sources failed to reveal that the British ever intercepted an implementation message. Apparently, the evidence to date of the existence of such an implementation depends primarily on the recollection of certain Navy witnesses, and among whom there is a conflict. Colonel Schukraft claimed to have seen an implementation in a form different from that testified to by the Navy witnesses. On this subject it should be recalled that the action to be taken by the Jap Consular and diplomatic agents on receipt of an implementing message, namely, destruction of codes, actually was ordered by Tokyo in a radio which was intercepted about 4 December 1941. As I previously reported, this information was given to Short prior to 7 December 1941, according to his G-2 and Assistant G-2. Short testified before the Navy Court of
Inquiry, however, that he did not get this information, and that to him it would have been the only important part of the message which the Chief of Staff sent him by radio on 7 December 1941. Assuming that the recollections of Short's two members of his Staff are correct, then Short had received prior to 7 December 1941 the ultimate in available information according to his own statement of what should have been given him for a different alert than that which he had ordered on 27 November 1941.

[253] (c) Sufficiency of War Department Warnings to Short: General Gerow in his affidavit to me sets forth detailed reasons why in his opinion the overseas commanders were given adequate information of impending events. Also why the radio intelligence messages were not sent to the commanders. In this regard, testimony should be recalled to the effect that, for security reasons, the Army was restricted by the Navy from sending these messages, and that representatives of the Navy had stated that the Navy unit at Honolulu was getting the messages from their own facilities.

(d) Conflicts in Testimony: Many of the points heretofore in doubt and hereinbefore mentioned have been sufficiently developed to reach appropriate conclusions. A number of conflicts remain, however, which it is planned to resolve by completion of the investigation.

3. Progress and Objectives: The investigation will be concluded by exploration of the remaining leads and the making of a final and comprehensive report. This will involve:

(a) Interviews with Generals Marshall, Herron and Miles, Colonels Bicknell, Dond, Minkler and Sadltier, Major Bash, Messrs. Roberts, Hoover, Friedman, and Wilkinson, and Misses Adams, Cave, and Prather.

(b) Examinations of the testimony given Admiral Hewitt by Admiral Mayfield Captain McCallum, Commanders Kramer and Mason, and other Navy witnesses if necessary; the engagement book of former Secretary of State Hull; the statement by General Smith; and the recent G-2 examination involving Mr. Friedman, resulting from Navy disclosures.

(c) It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me to send or give me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation, any copies of affidavits made before me and any incidental and related notes or papers which may be in their possession or under their control, they to advise me in writing that this has been done or that there are no such records, and that they be advised that these records will be available in the War Department in the event access thereto is ever required.

Henry C. Clausen.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[254] Top Secret

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:
Subject: Investigation of Colonel Clausen
Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. Activities Reported: Investigations at Honolulu, Guam, Saipan, Leyte, and Luzon were conducted during the period 26 March to 12 May, 1945.

a. Army Personnel Interviewed:
   General Douglas MacArthur
   Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland
   Major Gen. C. A. Willoughby
   Major Gen. Spencer B. Aiken
   Major Gen. C. L. Ruffner
   Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder
   Brig. Gen. C. A. Powell
   Brig. Gen. J. J. Twitty
   Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston
   Colonel O. N. Thompson
   Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott
   Major H. H. Henderson
   Major Maresh
   Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane

War Department,
Washington, 23 May 1945.
b. Navy Personnel Interviewed:
   Captain E. T. Layton
   Captain Harper
   Captain W. J. Holmes
   Captain T. A. Huckins
   Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.
   Commander Burr
   Commander Carr
   Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.
   Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel

   [255] c. Civilians Interviewed:
      D. R. Dawson
      Robert L. Shivers
      Harry L. Dawson
      John E. Russell

d. Related Conferences:
   General Richardson
   Admiral Nimitz
   Admiral McMorris
   Admiral Towers
   Mr. H. H. Bundy
   Gen. Carter W. Clarke
   Gen. Myron C. Cramer
   Commander John F. Sonnett
e. Affidavits and Statements Obtained:
   General Douglas MacArthur
   Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland
   Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby
   Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder
   Brig. C. A. Powell
   Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston
   Colonel O. N. Thompson
   Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott
   Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane
   Captain E. T. Layton
   Captain W. J. Holmes
   Captain T. A. Huckins
   Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.
   Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.
   Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel
   Mr. John E. Russell
   Mr. Robert L. Shivers

f. Documentary Evidence Obtained:
   1. British intelligence material (SIS) consisting of more than 200 reports
      from Gerald Wilkinson at Manila to Honolulu, from July 1941 to and including
      December 1941.
   2. Files of the Hawaiian Department, G-2, Army Contact Office. These are
      set forth on the attached receipt dated 19 April 1945.
   [256] 3. Navy District Intelligence Office files, set forth on the attached
      receipt dated 19 April 1945.
   4. Files of the Hawaiian Department, AG. These include photostats of file
      copies of pertinent communications received before 7 December 1941.
   5. FBI records of telephone intercepts and British SIS reports.

2. Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed:
   a. Short's Defenses: Assumption that Navy knew the whereabouts of the
      Jap fleet: Actually, as could have been ascertained from plots prepared by
      Captain Holmes, USN, and daily Communication Intelligence Summaries prepared by
      Captain Rochefort (see affidavit of Captain Huckins), the Navy did not have such
      information.
   Claim that War Department acquiesced in reply of Short to radio of 27 No-
   vember 1941 signed “Marshall”, and thereafter did not give him additional informa-
   tion: The reply of Short also stated “liaison with Navy.” Attention is invited
   to new evidence of items of intelligence possessed or available to Short.
   Claim that a more effective alert would have interfered with training and
   would have alarmed the civilian population: Evidence shows there was no civilian
   alarm when the Herron all-out alert of 1940 was ordered and Short did not order
the radar into 24 hours operation and did not order any visual lookouts or sound detectors against a possible air attack (See notes on Navy court testimony).

b. Intelligence and Information available to Short: Short and his G-2 testified in effect that they were almost wholly dependent on the War Department for information and that they actually received very little. New evidence indicates that the Hawaiian Department received a great deal more military and diplomatic information than has been previously developed. For example, the British SIS reports (See Russell & Shivers affidavits), the intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Emanuel, Shivers and Woodrum affidavits), some commercial radio traffic in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Mars- ton and Shivers affidavits), information from the Navy District Intelligence Office and the Fleet Intelligence Officer (See files and affidavit of Captain Layton). Much material was gathered from observers, travellers, and Washington sources, and evaluated and disseminated by the Army Contact office.

[257] Various papers dealing with this Intelligence were initialed by Short. For example, see the Inter-Staff Routing Slip, 11 September 1941, concerning information from the Tokyo Naval Attaché as to Japan’s intentions; the Slip, 6 November 1941; the War Department Military Attaché Report, 3 November 1941; the Special Intelligence Report, 17 October 1941; the memo of Colonel Bicknell, 21 November 1941; the War Department G-2 Report, June 1941, regarding the lurking of small submarines in Hawaiian waters preparatory to attacks on Pearl Harbor; the War Department G-2 Report, 28 August 1941, of a warning by one George Paison; the Contact Office Report and Estimate, 25 October 1941; the report 19 June 1941 of Japanese books.

A detailed study of the foregoing and other items of intelligence, in relation to testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, will be made on completion of the investigation.

Incidentally, a special investigation by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, 9 July 1941, reported to General Short many deficiencies of his Command. Among other things, the report set forth that the attitude of mind in the Hawaiian Department, the Hawaiian Air Force and Hickman Field was deficient as to “the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage,” and further “it is found that a considerable portion of the Command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theaters of war and our local sphere of action.” The report further stated that the Command was not alert to:

“(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away. * * *

“(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America’s proposed aid to Russia.”

The report found the cause for this attitude of mind was, among other things, traceable:

“(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.

“(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces. * * *

“(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to Intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions. * * *

[258] “(11) To the lower priority accorded Intelligence in consequence of the above first needs. * * *

“(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.

“(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future.”

The report concluded:

“(a) That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile probilities.”

Under Appreciations, the report stated:

“(a) Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

c. Imminence of War with Japan: Short testified that if this had been known to him he would have ordered a different alert. The affidavit of Fielder and the documentary evidence mentioned shows that Short was so informed. For instance, see the estimates dates 17 October 1941 and 25 October 1941 by Colonel
Bicknell, initiated by Short; the memo of Bicknell, dated 21 November 1941; and the speeches of Short and Kimmel, reported in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 18 September 1941, a copy of which is attached.

d. "Winds Code" Message: Contrary to Short's testimony and the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, this information was given the Army at Honolulu. See the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell. It should be noted that in the documentary evidence is a translation of the Jap Consul's desk pad. He had written thereon several wave lengths of Jap broadcasts on the date the Winds Code was broadcast. No evidence was found however, that the code was implemented (see statement of Holtwick), other than the 3 December 1941 British SIS report to Honolulu, copy of which went to Colonel Bicknell, reading in part:

[335] "(C) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."

Significantly, the date 3 December 1941 agrees with the testimony of Captain Safford as to when he saw an implementing message to the code in similar terms.

e. 5 December 1941, War Department G-2 Message: See affidavits of Fielder, Powell, Thompson and Lane. In view of previous statements recently obtained from Colonel Bicknell and personnel of G-2, it is a reasonable certainty that the message was received by the Army in Hawaii on 5 December 1941.

f. Destruction by Japs of Codes: Short denied receiving this information and claimed that he would have considered it most important, calling for a different alert order. But Fielder states in his affidavit that he gave his information to Short on 6 December 1941. See also the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell.

g. Pearl Harbor as attack target: If the Jap Consul commercial radio traffic, which was available at Hawaii to the Navy especially from the latter part of November 1941, included the reports as to ships in the harbor, then it was similar to that received at Washington. Several messages are contained in the documentary evidence above which are indicative that some such traffic was available at Hawaii before 7 December 1941. Further details are being explored in conjunction with the Navy. The availability of these messages is confirmed by the affidavits of Shivers, Marston, and testimony of Captain Rochefort.

It should be noted that the Jap inquiries as to ships movements included reports at many other places, such as Manila, Seattle, etc. Also, so far as Hawaii specifically was concerned, intercepts of telephone conversations at the Jap Consulate revealed that in 1940 a Jap agent was collecting information on ship movements.

Another item of intelligence which pointed to Pearl Harbor was the 3 December 1941 message from the Jap Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, giving the visual signals devised by Otto Kuhn to report ship movements. This message falls into the category stated as requiring further exploration as to its availability before 7 December 1941.

[360] As to the Army Signal Intelligence Service activities at Hawaii, see the Powell affidavit. Two of the most vital messages, intercepted before 7 December 1941, were sent in to Washington by Hawaii. General Powell, however, states he was not aware of the contents.

In the documentary evidence mentioned there is correspondence from War Department to Hawaii in June 1941 concerning a report of the Military Attache at Mexico City as to the Jap intentions to strike Pearl Harbor with midget submarines at the outbreak of hostilities.

h. Jap Navy Task Force in Marshalls: Short testified that he did not have this information. But, the contrary might well be true in view of the affidavits of Layton, Huckins and Shivers, in addition to the proof previously reported.

i. Sufficiency of War Department warnings: General MacArthur, who received information similar to that received by Short, stated in his affidavit, after reviewing the intercepts, that the War Department warnings were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his Command for war.

Colonel Bicknell told Shivers the Army had been alerted when Shivers mentioned the alert he received from Hoover on 28 November 1941. (Shivers affidavit).

j. Possible alarm to civilian population: The affidavits of Marston and Shivers confirm the lack of ground for Short to fear any such alarm, in view of the experience of the all-out Herron alert of 1940.
3. Miscellaneous: Many rumors relating to Pearl Harbor had been circulated concerning information available to General MacArthur, reports by him to Hawaii, and the War Department warnings to him. These are set at rest by the affidavits of MacArthur, Sutherland and Willoughby.

4. Wyman-Rohl investigation: Concurrent with the foregoing, evidence was obtained at Hawaii and Leyte in exploration of certain leads.

5. Progress and objectives: I propose to complete the interviews of overseas witnesses by going to the ETO to develop some very important and promising leads. Those to be questioned on the Pearl Harbor phases include, among others, General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General T. J. Betts, Colonel Rufus Bratton, Colonel Harold S. Doud, Colonel R. E. Schenk and Colonel W. H. Tetley. This would include an investigation of new matters as well as of [261] those items previously discussed. It is felt desirable to leave as soon as possible in order that interrogation be done before the witnesses are further scattered or are perhaps unavailable later.

Certain overseas witnesses pertinent to the Wyman-Rohl investigation would also be interviewed, thus completing the overseas phase of that investigation also.

I am keeping in touch and cooperating in a reciprocal manner with the Navy on additional investigation.

When my investigation is completed I shall make a comprehensive critique and report of all the new evidence then developed in relation to the Army Pearl Harbor Board Secret and Top Secret Reports.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAG.

[262]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

Memorandum:
Subject: Photostated copies of C. I. D. files.

1. The following photostated copies of C. I. D. files were furnished to Col. Clausen as directed by the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, CPBC:

G-2, Hawn Dept. list Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
G-2, CID memo dtd 9/12/44 re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.
War Dept., Hq Army Pearl Harbor Board memo dtd 9/7/44 to CG, POA re Documentary Evidence.
G-2, Hawn Dept report re Japan, Foreign Relations & Domestic Conditions.
(2 copies) (1 Dec 41)
Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.
Hawn Dept. Summary of the Situation As of 7:30 A. M., 7 December 1941, dtd 12/22/41.
Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.
*Radio from War Dept to G-2, Hawn Dept re Japanese negotiations, 11/27/41.
Informal report re Thailand.
Army Contact Office memo dtd 8/1/41 re Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.
Radio from Short to AG, Wash, dtd 11/13/41.
Brief re Japanese Magazine Translation from the “Gendai”, July 1941,
Army Contact Office memo dtd 5/2/41 re Comments on observations of a missionary.
Memo for Col. Bicknell dated 8/1/41 re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.
Copy of radio received 11/27/41.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.
Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Asst Naval Attache Shanghai.
[263] Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.
War Dept ltr dtd 8/5/41 to G-2, Hwn Dept transmitting ltr from F. B. I. re Info on Japan's entry into war dtd 7/28/41.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Nov. 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dtd 11/3/41.
Army Contact Office memo dtd 11/21/41 re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).
Ltr from Hq. Second Corps Area dtd 11/25/41 re George Palsh (Palshn), w/FBI report same Subject attached. (2 copies.)
M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re French Indo-China.
M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re Formosa.
M. A. Report dtd 8/14/41 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re General Report, Japan and China.
M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australia.
M. A. Report dtd 9/10/41 re Japan and Japanese Relations.
M. A. Report dtd 11/19/41 re Formosa.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 w/14MD report dtd 2/9/42 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Cable re-movements of fleet and return to Japan of members of diplomatic staff.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio #628, 12/12/41 re Japanese Spy Activities.
Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
14ND report dtd 2/3/42 re Espionage Activities at Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.
FBI memo to ONI dtd 1/4/42 re Japanese Consulate Activities.
Ltr dtd 12/3/41 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
Extract from ONI report dtd 12/9/41 re Activities on Maui, Uanai & Molokai, since 7 December 1941.
Memo re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai & Kalama to observe unusual activities.
Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.
Extract from Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39—The Spy Game.
Four coded messages from Togo to Riyoji.
Army Contact Office memo for Col. Bicknell dtd 10/7/41 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure From Honolulu on Talyo Maru.
M. I. D., Wash. ltr of transmittal dtd 9/16/41, w/M. I. D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/ltr from Admiral Bloch to Gen. Short dtd 7/25/41.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book Entitled "Three-Power Alliance and America-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, w/ note attached.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Jul 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Malokai, w/G-2, H. H. D. ltr of transmittal dtd 7/25/41 re Activities of Foreigners in Country-Mexico.

F. B. I. ltr dtd 3/19/42 re translations made of coded & confidential material from Japanese Consulate.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/7/42 re Translation of a Register of Radio-grams sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. ltr of transmittal dtd 3/13/42 and report same subject attached.
Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/14/42 re Translation of a Register of Radio-grams sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. Itr of transmittal to G-2, Wash, dtd 3/7/42 and report same subject attached.

[265] The aforementioned files were furnished to ________________________________ on the ________ day of 1945.

M. H. Sheward
M. H. SHEWARD
2nd Lt., M. I.

Receipt acknowledged.

SECRET

[266]

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 April 1945.

RECEIPT FROM THE DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE 14ND IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED FOR THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL:

1. Five (5) Secret Photostats (one positive and one negative of decoded cablegrams, from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Listed are the dates and numbers of the above cablegrams in date order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Cablegram</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 12/3/41</td>
<td>#363</td>
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<td>(f) 12/6/41</td>
<td>#369</td>
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</table>

2. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 11/27/41, to the following addressees:
   (a) SHAGRO, San Francisco
   (b) Dr. HOLMES, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu
   (c) GROWSUMIDA, Honolulu
   (d) SHOKIN, Honolulu
3. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 11/25/41, to the following addressees.

   (a) Rev. Hiro HIGUCHI, Waipahu Community Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.
   (b) AMERICAN CONSUL, Papeete
   (c) Y. WATANABE, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.
   (d) SHOKIN, Honolulu

4. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 11/19/41, addressed to Inosuke HACHIYAE.

5. Four (4) Confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities, dated as follows:

   (a) 9 February 1942
   (b) 14 February 1942
   (c) 15 June 1942
   (d) 15 February 1943

6. One PHOTOSTAT (positive and negative) of each of the following SECRET intercepts:

   (a) 1-540; 11/30/41 & 12/1/41
   (b) NYK-38; 12/2/41
   (c) 6-1: 10/11/41

7. [267] One Photostat (Positive and Negative) of the following: (Page numbers indicate DIO file page.)

   (1) Wilkinson report dated 18 October 1941—(No. DIO file page number.)
   (6) Cable received from Wellington, 11/25/41, regard Pacific Raider Intelligence, pg. 168A.
   (8) Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 166.
   (9) Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 162.
   (10) Confidential letter to DNI from Com14, dated 10/14/41, Ser. #0065916, Subj.: "Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Agent in Manila—Information received from), pgs. 160-159.
   (13) Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 156.
   (31) Memo by T. W. Joyce, dated 11/5/41. (Notes & Comments), pg. 130.
   (34) 14ND card #1534, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Thai—Japanese Activities in", pg. 120.
(35) 14ND card #1535, dated 9/23/41. Subj.: "Formosa—Heito Airdrome", pg. 120.
(36) 14ND card #1533, dated 9/31/41, Subj.: "Japan—General Intelligence", pg. 119.
(37) 14ND card #1531, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese Fleet Organization", pg. 118.
(38) 14ND card #1532, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Indo-China—Japanese Moves in", pg. 118.
(39) 14ND card #1528, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japan—Ordnance Production", pg. 117.
(40) 14ND card #1530, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Far East Exports to Germany", pg. 117.
(43) 14ND card #1525, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa (Takao)—General Military Intelligence", pg. 115.
(44) 14ND card #1523, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Conscription", pg. 114.
(49) 14ND card #1518, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Travel Restrictions", pg. 112.
(50) 14ND card #1519, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Censorship", pg. 112.
(51) 14ND card #1516, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Mobilization", pg. 111.
(52) 14ND card #1517, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Construction", pg. 111.
(53) 14ND card #1482, dated 9/12/41, Subj.: "Hongkong—Prospective Disorders", pg. 97.
(54) 14 ND card #1468, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy", pg. 95.
(55) 14ND card #1470, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese—Siamese Relations", pg. 95.
(56) 14ND card #1466, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 94.
(57) 14ND card #1467, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy", pg. 94.
(58) 14ND card #1463, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Railways, Buildings, etc.", pg. 93.
(60) 14ND card #1456, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa-Japanese Airplane Movements", pg. 90.
(61) 14ND card #1457, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa-Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 90.
(62) 14NR card #1453, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Naval Ordnance", pg. 89.
(63) 14ND card #1454, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Factory", pg. 89.
(64) 14ND card #1455, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troops in Indo China", pg. 89.
(65) 14ND card #1450, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troop Movement", pg. 88.
(68) 14ND card # (?), dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japanese Aircraft Factory”, pg. 87.
(69) 14ND card #1448, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Spratley Island—Japanese Construction”, pg. 87.
(70) 14ND card #1449, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “German Raiders in Pacific”, pg. 87.
(71) 14ND card #1444, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japan—Kobe Navy Yard”, pg. 86.
(72) 14ND card #1445, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japanese Submarine Construction”, pg. 86.
(73) 14ND card #1446, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japanese Aerial Bomb Factory”, pg. 86.
(74) 14ND card #1442, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japanese National Policy”, pg. 85.
(75) 14ND card #1443, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japan—Airdrome at Kamakura”, pg. 85.
(76) 14ND card #1440, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japan—General Military and Naval Information”, pg. 84.
(77) 14ND card #1441, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Japan—Underground Airdrome at Takarazuka”, pg. 84.
(80) 14ND card #1435, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Dutch East Indies—Japanese Propaganda In”, pg. 82.
(81) 14ND card #1436, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Saigon”, pg. 82.

[270] (82) 14ND card #1437, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Philippine-Japanese Business In”, pg. 82.

(84) 14ND card #1433, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Anti-American Measures by Japanese in Occupied China”, pg. 80.
(85) 14ND card #1431, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Indo-China”, pg. 79.
(86) 14ND card #1432, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: “Formosa”, pg. 79.
(87) Conf. Ltr. to DNI from DIO, 14ND, dated 9/20/41, Subj.: “British Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with”, pg. 78.
(88) Extract #61 for Honolulu, dated 8/8/41, pg. 71.
(89) Extract #59 for Honolulu, dated 8/10/41, pg. 69.
(90) Extract #57 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 67.
(91) Extract #54 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 64.
(92) Extract #52 for Honolulu, dated 8/21/41, pg. 61.
(93) Extract #35 for Honolulu, dated 8/15/41, pg. 42.
(94) Extract #33 for Honolulu, dated 8/16/41, pg. 40.
(95) Extract #27 for Honolulu, dated 8/12/41, pg. 34.
(96) 14ND card #1420, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: “Japanese Repatriation”, pg. 30.
(97) 14ND card #1421, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: “HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr.”, pg. 30.
(98) 14ND card #1417, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: “DAKAR—Military Exercises”, pg. 29.
(99) 14ND card #1418, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: “DAKAR—Attitude of Natives”, pg. 29.
(100) 14ND card #1419, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: “MOROCCO—Outgoing visas from”, pg. 29.
(102) Extract #24, Subj.: “HULL, Amos Tyler”, pg. 21.
(103) Extract #20, dated 8/1/41, Subj.: “German S/S RAMSES”, pg. 19.
(104) 14ND card #1333, dated 8/15/41, Subj.: “JAPANESE MILITARY ARMOR”, pg. 14.
(106) 14ND card #1334, dated (?), Subj.: “Japanese Industrial Management”, pg. 12.
(107) Extract from letter from Manila, dated 7/12/41, pg. 10.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:
Subject: Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. Activities reported: Report is made of my investigation for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, during the period 17 February–3 March 1945, as follows:

a. Army personnel interviewed as leads:
   Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C.
   Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I.
   General Robert H. Dunlop, A. G.
   Colonel Edward F. French, S. C.
   Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C.
   Lt. Ann Long, S. C.
   Miss Margaret McKenney, G–2.
   General Thomas North, OPD
   Miss Mary L. Ross, G–2
   Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.
   Mr. Smith, S. C.
   General Ralph C. Smith, G–2

b. Navy personnel interviewed as leads:
   Captain Joseph J. Rochefort

c. Affidavits obtained:
   Major Anderson
   Colonel Bicknell
   General Dunlop
   Colonel Jensen
   Miss McKenney
   Captain Rochefort
   Miss Ross
   Lt Colonel Rowlett
   General Smith

2. Significant features of additional evidence developed:

a. "Winds" code message: General Short contended and the Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that no information concerning this intelligence was available to General Short in the Hawaiian Department. For example, General Short stated in a letter to the Secretary of War: "Such information was not made available to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islands." But it now appears probable that before 7 December 1941, both his G–2, Colonel Fielder, and his Assistant G–2, Colonel Bicknell, received information of the "Winds"
code, and that his Assistant G–2 took action for the purpose of intercepting an
execution message. If it is a fact that General Short did have available in his
Hawaiian Department the information from the Navy as to intercepts of the
"Winds" code message, this confirms the impression of General Marshall and
Admiral Turner.

b. Destruction by Japanese of codes: General Short also contended that this
information was not available to him. He attached more importance to this than
almost any other intelligence. He testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry
that he received this information he would not have been led to attach much
importance to not alarming the civilian population. In response to a question
as to whether he would have gone into a different alert if he had received by
telephone the 7 December 1941 message from General Marshall, he testified:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about
the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made
much of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code ma-
chines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this
advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving
that out, the code machine would have been very significant, the destruction
of the code machine would have been very significant to me. I would have
been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter."

It now appears probable that both General Short's G–2 and his Assistant G–2
were informed before 7 December 1941 of the destruction by the Japanese of
their secret codes and papers at Washington, London, [27] Hongkong,
Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, and his Assistant G–2 saw the Navy Depart-
ment message which so informed the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It will be rec-
ned that this Assistant G–2 reported to Short's staff on the morning of 6
December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls were destroying their secret papers.
He, also, in the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, brought to the attention
of General Short and his G–2 the fact that the FBI had intercepted a telephone
message between a Japanese agent in Honolulu and a purported newspaper
correspondent in Tokyo referring to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft,
weather conditions, "hibiscus" and "poinsettias" in the Hawaiian Islands. This
information was not given to the War Department. It should be observed that
the "Winds" code was to be implemented by a false weather broadcast as a
signal for the Japanese Consuls and diplomatic agents to destroy codes and
papers. Hence, knowledge of the "Winds" code arrangement, coupled with later
information that the Japanese were destroying their codes and papers, would
indicate that the "Winds" code had been implemented. Colonel Bratton sent
the 5 December 1941 warning wire to the Hawaiian Department because he had
received information of the destruction by the Japanese of their codes. This
was an inferential notice of implementation of the "Winds" code. Since it now
appears probable, subject to additional investigation, that Short's G–2 and his
Assistant G–2 knew of the "Winds" message and of the destruction by the
Japanese of their codes, it follows that there may have been available in the
Hawaiian Department the same information possessed by the War Department.

e. Inquiries and Reports on Ships in Pearl Harbor: These were perhaps the
most telling indications of the Japanese intentions. Two, which were very sus-
picious, dated 2 and 6 December 1941, were intercepted or received by the Army
Signal Corps at Honolulu and mailed to Washington. The message dated 2
December 1941 was not received at Washington until 25 December 1941. Trans-
lations of these were therefore not available in time to be of any use as fore-
warning to Washington. Inquiry will be made at Honolulu as to all the cir-
cumstances, and whether anyone in the Hawaiian Department had prior knowl-
edge of the tenor of these or similar messages. In this connection, I have
discovered evidence that more than a week before 7 December 1941 the Navy
arranged to receive and did receive copies of some commercial cables from the
Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, which tied into the radio intercepts.
Some were decrypted and translated before 7 December. Others, supposed to
be the more suspicious ones, were not decrypted and translated until later.
Copies of these are supposed to be at Honolulu. Short's Assistant G–2 was
aware before 7 December 1941 that the Navy had made arrangements for receiv-
ing these copies.

d. 5 December 1941 message from G–2, War Department: Colonel Fielder de-
nied receiving this message. But it now appears probable that it was sent by
Washington and received in Honolulu on 5 December 1941. The importance of
this fact is that it was the War Department method of informing the Hawaiian
Department of the "Magic" messages.
e. Alarm to civilian population: General Short contended that this caution had been urged upon him by the War Department and was one of his reasons for his No. 1 alert. It now appears that General Short did not inquire of his staff, and ascertain in the experience of those on duty in 1940, as to what effect the Herron alert of 1940 had on the civilian population. Had he done so, he would have learned that the Herron all-out alert did not materially alarm the civilian population.

f. Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November 1941: General Short testified that the War Department had this in Washington when he sent his reply to the 27 November 1941 message from General Marshall. It now appears that the Standing Operating Procedure was not received in Washington until March 1942, and hence the War Department cannot be charged with prior knowledge thereof.

3. Miscellaneous items: Several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl Harbor Board have been coordinated.

4. Wyman-Rohl activities: Exploration of further leads has been held in abeyance pending completion of Washington matters.

5. Progress and objectives: I shall develop some very important and promising leads in Hawaii and elsewhere when the studies in Washington have been completed, which is expected to be within the next two weeks.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[276] Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. Activities reported: During the period 3–17 February 1945, in pursuance of directives, I conducted for the Secretary of War investigations at Washington, D. C., supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as follows:

a. Army personnel interviewed as leads:
   - General Carter W. Clarke, G-2
   - Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, G-2
   - General Charles K. Gailey, Jr., OPD
   - General Thomas T. Handy, D. C. S.
   - General Thomas North, OPD
   - Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, G-2
   - Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.
   - Colonel Eric H. F. Svensson, G-2
   - Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2

b. Navy personnel interviewed as leads:
   - Captain Joseph J. Rochefort

[277] c. Affidavits obtained:
   - Colonel Dusenbury
   - Colonel Pettigrew
   - Captain Rochefort (being completed)

d. Conferences:
   - Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
   - Major Henry A. Correa, JADB
   - General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD
   - Colonel William J. Hughes, Jr., JAGD
   - General H. I. Hodges, G. S. C.
   - Commander John F. Sonnett, USN

2. Significant features of additional evidence developed:

a. Colonel Bratton had testified that he delivered decrypted and translated intercepts to various distributees immediately preceding 7 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit that it was he who, almost exclusively, delivered the intercepts immediately preceding 7 December 1941.
b. Colonel Bratton had testified that he wrote the 5 December 1941 message from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, requesting that Commander Rochefort be contacted regarding a “Winds” broadcast. Colonel Dusenbury and Colonel Pettigrew stated in affidavits that this message was written by them.

c. Colonel Bratton testified that the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to Hull, called by some witnesses a Japanese declaration of war, intercepted 6 December 1941, were delivered by him to the usual distributees on the evening of 6 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in an affidavit that he was on duty and waited that night for the receipt of the parts of this message and that when about half of it had come in, Colonel Bratton left for his home. Colonel Dusenbury further stated that none of the parts were delivered that night and that he, Colonel Dusenbury, delivered them the following morning, 7 December 1941.

d. Colonel Bratton testified that the Japanese message to deliver the Japanese reply to Hull at 1 p.m. on 7 December 1941, was received by him between 8:30 and 9 a.m. on 7 December 1941, and that he then called the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit his impression that this message was received by Colonel Bratton between 9 and 10 a.m., 7 December 1941. This confirms the recollection of the Chief of Staff as to when Colonel Bratton made the telephone call to his quarters. This latter time element is also supported by testimony of Navy witnesses.

e. Colonel Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, stated he had no recollection of receiving the 5 December 1941 message from Washington asking him to communicate with Commander Rochefort regarding the “Winds” message. He stated he did not have any knowledge of the “Winds” message. Commander Rochefort stated to me, and an affidavit to this effect has been prepared and submitted to him for execution, that since the Fall of 1941 he had very close liaison with his opposite number, Colonel Fielder; that he, Commander Rochefort, was monitoring at Hawaii for the implementation of the “Winds” message before 7 December 1941; that since this was of interest to the Army he did, before 7 December 1941, discuss with Colonel Fielder the “Winds” message as well as the destruction by the Japanese of their code and cipher machines in London and in Washington, and of secret papers in Honolulu, and any other important information of that character.

[278] 3. Miscellaneous items:

I have coordinated several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl Harbor Board

Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 6 February 1945 to the Secretary of the Navy requested a copy of the record of the Navy Court of Inquiry and an examination of the record of the Army Board of Investigation. The Secretary of the Navy replied by letter dated 12 February 1945 that the request so far as the Navy Court of Inquiry is concerned should be denied because courts of inquiry and other investigative bodies are convened for the purpose of informing the convening authority or higher authority of facts attending the matter inquired into, and furthermore, that the investigation has not been completed. So far as the Army Board of Investigation is concerned, the Secretary stated that this is a matter over which the Navy Department has no authority.

4 Wyman-Rohl activities:

In conjunction with the foregoing, investigations and conferences have been conducted and held by me on phases involving Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. These do not pertain to responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, but some of the persons to be interrogated are in the same locations as those to be questioned in connection with the foregoing unexplored leads. The Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General have directed that I conduct the appropriate additional investigation, including the development of leads suggested by the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

5. Progress and objectives:

It is intended to complete the examination of the Navy Board of Inquiry proceedings, to interview and confer with such other persons as are available locally, and then to gather such information elsewhere as is essential. When concluded, I shall correlate, digest, and, interpret the additional facts in relation to the Army Pearl Harbor Secret and Top Secret Reports.

Henry C. Clausen,
Henry C. Clausen,
Major, JAGD.
TOP SECRET

EXHIBIT E

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of my investigation.

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington 25, D. C., 14 September 1945.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classified as top secret and consisted of one volume.

I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top Secret Report require modification.

In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and one page 16:

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the 'Do-Don't' message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3.

"This was not done.

"Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and [281] this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert."
"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it." (Pp 1 & 2)

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack." (P 16)

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence. These revisions include the following:

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on page 2:

"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86)"

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document as follows:

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[282] "On the 24th day of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June, 1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things are automatically going to happen."

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian Department.

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our minds."

The Board further found:

"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. (R. 87)" (P 2)

"** * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. R. 123-124) * * **" (P 5)

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123-124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of the information which he mentioned in his testimony to Admiral Hart. He stated he could not then recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" message.

[283] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information reached Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November 1941.
Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese “Winds Code.” He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the execute message. He further testified that his attention was again called to the “Winds Code” when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December 1941, asking that the G-2 Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously refers to the “Winds Code.” Colonel Bicknell further testified that he also received information of the “Winds Code” broadcasts from Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message.

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he gave General Fielder such information as he had received concerning intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties. The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of November, 1941, included the substance of the “Winds Code” intercept.

The Board found:

“* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.” (PP 2 & 3)

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as he read from a summary called “A Summary of Far Eastern Documents” which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as follows:

“G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands.” (P 87)

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December 1941.

[284] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Commander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence attached to Col. Clausen’s Report.)

The Board found:

“On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)” (P 3)

This, again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral Hart Examination. General Russell read from this while questioning Colonel Bratton, as follows:

“General Russell, Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

“Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. * * *” (P 88)

Colonel Clausen’s investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the “Winds Code” message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance of the “Winds Code” intercept and stating that by this means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and
another message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since 1936."

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States.

[285] The Board stated:

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) * * * (P 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department, dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, and gave this information to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came to his attention.

The Board further stated:

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

'The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months.' (R. 243-244)" (P 3)

[286] * * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297)" (P 3)

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen, however, Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying before Colonel Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as were made, the deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be
revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:

“All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board’s report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)”

The reference “(R. 302)” is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he asked [287] General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders and that General Gerow replied, “Sufficient had been sent.” Following this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese “Winds Code.”

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of Staff, in a matter of such importance.

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington during November and December 1941. This included the information already mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any possibility of the United States considering the “proposal” in toto, and that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, negotiations would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be called so, and that “our failure and humiliation are complete” and suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but would be followed by military occupation of the Netherland’s Indies by the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by Colonel Sadler, relative to the “false alarm” execute message to the “Winds Code.”

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of 29 August 1945, analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the information which the War Department sent to General Short.

Colonel Clausen’s investigation also shows that a great deal of additional information was available initially to General Short in the Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and the United States and warnings of war.

The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [288] which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. Once such dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4 December 1941, set forth prophetically:

“Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.”

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese execute message to the “Winds Code,” or some equivalent message.

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Japanese Con-
sulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's report.

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers, travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are initiated by General Short.

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the probable moves of Japan.

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI was most complete. (See Memo, 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6)

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent."

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before Colonel [289] Clausen that this type of information and its source, of necessity, had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short but also all the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the information into too many hands. There has been considerable evidence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified before Colonel Clausen, "... Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised."

The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen, "Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941."

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the War Department, which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "I" before the Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December, were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of 3.5 days.

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attack target in the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [290] that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial traffic sources
shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just what commercial traffic was decrypted and translated by the Navy at Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor.

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese “Winds Code” at pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony of Colonel Sattler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sattler then conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen’s investigation it appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having so informed Colonel Sattler. Colonel Sattler testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercepts which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.

Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese “Winds Code”, and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel Clausen’s investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the “Winds Code” or some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from London to Manila and, in turn, from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen’s query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report.

Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based on the testimony of Colonel Sattler that he asked General Gerow and General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel Sattler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:

“I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

“General Gerow:—I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sattler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of “Magic.” I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese “Winds Code.” If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sattler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person’s
memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

"General Smith:—"I do not recall Colonel Sadler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province."

(P 2 — Affidavit of Colonel O. K. Sadler)

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [292] of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The Board, also on page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5 December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony Colonel Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:

"...I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer: particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important."

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on or about 5 December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds Code."

It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese message from Tokyo to the envys in Washington. The Board concludes:

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p.m., December 6, as follows:

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see the contents. (R. 307)"

"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R. 239-241.) He stated that [293] General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General Miles."

"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Galley, General Gerow's executives in the War Plans Division. (R. 238)"

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. (R. 234, 239)"

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning." (Pp. 11, 12)

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely
known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o’clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Galley, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o’clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State’s duty officer.

“General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows.” (P 16)

These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith or [294] General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home to the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any until after 9:00 a.m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely received.

On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General Miles. From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to General Miles.

The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a.m. the morning of 7 December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1:00 p.m., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his office until 11:25 a.m.

These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which would be in the office of the Chief of Staff “between 10:30 and 11:30 that morning.” Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office at about 11:00 a.m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel Bratton until “after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m.”

The Board further found:

“There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was [295] clear-cut and definite.” (P. 15)

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7
December, It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States, but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6 December of significance, in addition to what had already been transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be delivered at 1:00 p.m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would occur at that time.

The Board further found:

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor." (P 18)

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a statement.

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General Short has since testified was information he should have received. General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7 December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall had given him this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me." (Underlining supplied)

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the Japanese Government held sent orders to various diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain of its codes and important papers.

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Marshall included in his message which read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

My Conclusion:

The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views expressed herein.

Myron C. Cramer,
Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
TOP SECRET

EXHIBIT F

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War, dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation. The previous memorandum mentioned is attached at the end of Exhibit "F."

TOP SECRET

[297]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington 25, 14 September 1945

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation.

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some respects.

The "Winds" Message:

On pages 24-25 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive, the so-called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that

"'In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)', a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

'(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: 'HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
'(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: 'KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
'(3) Japan-British relations: 'NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)'"

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around 20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [298] Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds" message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of the testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division, to the same effect (my Memo. p. 25).
Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel Harold Dond, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941, stated:

"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department." (Affid., Col. Harold Dond)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testified that such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Commander Rochester's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect. (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence Service at the time, stated:

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent." (Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms'", which he discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford.

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time, did not recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24)

General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were several [299] messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2)

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 1941, stated that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning as follows:

"C. G-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1). Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadtler was "purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination and interpretation of 'Magic'" messages (Affid., Gen. Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise had no recollection of Colonel Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been impossible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him. (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)
[309] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message (probably a “false alarm”), he had never seen any execute message to the “Winds Code” and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 3)

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter, denied the receipt of an authentic execute “Winds” message.

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several “false alarm” reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith. Colonel Bratton never brought Colonel Sadtler’s report to the attention of the Chief of Staff. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the “Winds Code.” As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but six copies of such message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several “false alarms” relative to the “Winds” message but no one in the Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the Army according to Captain Safford’s testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton)

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original “Winds” message, [301] he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft)

General Gerow’s and General Bedell Smith’s comment on Colonel Sadtler’s testimony relative to the alleged execute “Winds” message received from Admiral Noyes has already been discussed (See affidavits, Gen. Gerow, p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel Clausen that the source of his information on all “Ultra” (or “Magic”) messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton’s assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the “Winds Code.” He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered it. No other person informed him of any such execute “Winds” message prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).


Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C., at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an
activating “Winds” message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett.)

[302] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the “Winds” message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25 November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any activating or execute “Winds” message was ever received by the War Department. In this connection, General Marshall’s testimony will be recalled, “I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the “Winds” Code had been received by the Navy.” (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, p. 38)

The Rochefort Message:

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton’s testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4 December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he was in no position to override him. Colonel Bratton, however, still feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first “Winds” message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a radiogram be sent to General Short’s G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram, signed “Miles,” which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:

“Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather”

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clasen in his subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short’s G-2, and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2)

As to the likelihood of the “Winds” information being sent to him by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder testified:

[303] “My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii.” (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2)

General Fielder further said:

“No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Haley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn’t know of the liaison until after the war started.” (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8, p. 2)
General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included the "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23) (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very close [304] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General Miles to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the Rochefort message, contains heresay statements to the effect that "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had" (including the "Winds" message), the source of which was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Commander Rochefort's crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently, however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

Mr. Shivers testified:
"Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 December." (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell. [305] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:
"I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct." (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort message. Whether Short received equivalent information will now be considered.

Other Information Possessed by General Short:
I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board, testified that he had gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert, he said:

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"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. ** * I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously." (Italics supplied)

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30), I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was [306] "destroying its codes and burning its papers," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944, p. 19).

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 28 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already received similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6 December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OpNav No. 031590, dated 3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval District, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents." (Top Secret Vol. C. Safford, p. 183)

[307] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent information which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect. (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684-3685) Colonel Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI
on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11). Their reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 'intelligence conscious' and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

"Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, 'Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong.'" (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl Harbor Day by General, Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell, or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people, this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it, judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul was [308] burning his "codes and papers." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying his codes, as distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese-American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme significance.

The Manila Warning Message:

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies & Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu. Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and was secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila. The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3 December read as follows:

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
3. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
4. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu." [309] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to Colonel
Bicknell, Short’s Assistant G–2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit)

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G–2 of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.

Colonel Bicknell, Short’s Assistant G–2 admitted receipt of the Manila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell)

In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short, in one form or another. (Amend. affidavit, Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this information is attached to Colonel Clausen’s report. General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory, but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:

“Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.”

A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information he gave to Short “in one form or another.” (Amend. affidavit, Col. George W. Bicknell)

[310] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G–2, Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its way into Colonel Bicknell’s estimates of the Japanese situation, which he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. affidavit, Col. George W. Bicknell)

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the “Winds Code” message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, he was called to present the intelligence picture to them. (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USN) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him over the entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain Layton and Colonel Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment. This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)
Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I said:

"** * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations."

(P, 30)

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on this subject.

[311] Short's SOP Against Attack:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I stated:

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands 'with no particular threat from without.' It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for 'a surprise hostile attack.'" (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics supplied)

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." Memo, 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo, 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. 5). Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5 November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Department until March, 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:

[312] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this place.

Conclusion:

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall, General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's
investigation. I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions. The statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present memorandum.

Myron C. Cramer,
Myron C. Cramer,
Major General
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Incl
Copy memo from TJAG to S/W, "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board."
EXHIBIT G

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944

TOP SECRET

Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.

You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit hereewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944.

Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:

No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.511 (21 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 530, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information.

Board's Conclusions in General:

The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure of General Short adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations.

It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report is to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions later.

Board's Conclusion As to General Short:

Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed in his duties in the following particulars:

“(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.
"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

"(d) To replace inefficient staff officers." (Rep. 300)

*Short's Defenses:*

General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked: it is a question of the validity of his defenses.

Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 262, 395)

He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only from 4 to 7 a.m. and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297, 4442)

The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr., Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) His failure to provide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong." (Tr., Short 4440)

Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 263; Herron 285; King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throkmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381)

Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 53; Tr., 290, 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 296, 257, 306); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 1, p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 423, 522; Ex. 1, p. 15-18, 54-57)

These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotage, or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the civilian population, or interference with his training program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible air attack.

Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54-56; Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427)

The Board in its conclusion stated:

"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected." (Rep. 300)
General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:

“If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.” (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied)

Secretary Knox further stated that “inherent possibilities of a major disaster” warranted speedy action to “increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *.” The letter proceeded:

“The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire.” (Roberts Report, p. 5)

The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5) Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson’s letter enclosing Secretary Knox’s letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369)

On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter containing the following statement:

“My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.” (Tr., Marshall 17) (Italics supplied)

On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:

“I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority.” (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied)

Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation at length and stating:

“The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack.” (Tr., Marshall 21) (Italics supplied)

Short further stated:

“The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland.” (Tr., Marshall 24)

On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark:

“We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the anti-aircraft defense.” (Tr., Marshall 27) (Italics supplied)

General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for “being on the job.” (Tr., Marshall 27)

On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055)

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands “with no particular threat from without.” It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for prepa-
aration for "a surprise hostile attack." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics supplied)

[319] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, that all such data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)

On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grave situation, that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack those two powers. The radio concluded:

"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan." (Tr., Short 279)

Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278)

Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055)

On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers

"* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed." (Tr. 3688)

[320] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short:

"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent." (Tr., Short 412-413, Main 3307, Gerow 4256, 4264)

Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694)

On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that

"* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in February. * * * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty days. * * *" (Tr., Bratton D. 289-291)

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that

"* * * from all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring." (Tr., Bicknell 1433-1440)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in
Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041)

[321] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that:

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines of Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS II, 12, 13, 14) inform senior navy officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch." (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch 1503–C)

This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059) Short said, "I do not think I ever got the message. * * * I might have seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414)

On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and navals vessels including submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (Tr., Gerow 4259)

The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows:

"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (Tr., Gerow 4250-4259, Short 280-281)

[322] This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 as follows:

"Advisements the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin." (Tr., Gerow 4260) (Italics supplied)

The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy Department, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 40X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spannau informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." (Tr., Gerow 4262)

Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469)

The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27
November. (Tr., Short 422) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage (Tr., Short 294–206).

There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8) Short also received Admiral Kimmel’s Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769–1770) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short’s G-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413–1414) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512–1513) There were two Navy messages on 4 December 1941, the first an information copy to Kimmel of advice to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1614), the second a similar radiogram advising “be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain.” (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187) Another Navy message of 6 December “directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential papers.” (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514)

In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short’s G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broadcasts from Tokyo “that you must obtain” and stating categorically “contact him at once.” This had reference to the important “Winds” intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton B. 62, D. 283) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short’s G-2 staff advised Short’s entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413) Colonel Fielder, Short’s G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986)

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attaché, in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A–2 based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O’Dell 4506–4507) Lieutenant Robert H. O’Dell who was then Assistant Military Attaché in the American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A–2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O’Dell 4511–4512) The message in question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O’Dell 4509) The record does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O’Dell 4510) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.

Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short’s Assistant G–2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and “hibiscus” and “poinsettias” (probably code words). This message evidently had “military significance” as Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415–1416) Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of “air surprise.” (Tr., Short 387–388) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556–D–F) state:

“(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *

“(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start * * *.”
General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388)

General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral Dallery, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929), testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963) Short had at least one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 20 November 1941. (Tr., DeLany 1727)

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance * * *." (Tr., Short 444)

[325] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these messages.

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr. 279-281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 261) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr. 293-294) As Short testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *." (Tr., Short 437)

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during the attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471)

Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr., Short 453)

The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep, 300)

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows:

[326] "* * * This policy should not, repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defenses. * * *" (Tr., Short 280-281)

Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert against threats both from within and from without.

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Short, Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286)

As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred
before Short’s G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 305, 520, Fielder 2902) Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed “Marshall.”

He testified:

“Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn’t meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it.” (Tr., Short 437)

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, “liaison with the Navy” meant, he replied:

“General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.

“General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? [327] “General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff.” (Tr., Short 390)

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message expressly stated:

“This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. . . . Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. . . .” (Tr., Gerow 4262)

The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)

On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. (Tr., Short 416, 460) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating “hostile action possible at any moment” goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 15 (i) of the Plan which provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr., Kimmel 1745)

Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 251, 373, 377-380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only becomes a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676. Short 4437, 4441)

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:

“... A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District.” (Tr., Gerow, 4283-4284)

[328] General Gerow testified further that from Short’s reply “liaison with the Navy” it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that “General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic Plan. . . .” (Tr., Gerow 4289)

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:

“Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.” (Tr., Belligerent 1584)
It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his re-examination of his decision.

Reconnaissance; Means Available:

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiving the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a.m. (Tr., Short 287, 469-470) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 470)

[329] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch 1527; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 1725; Kimmel 1773, 1794-1796; 1802; McMorris 2855; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time * * *." (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel stated:

"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, and a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about 8½ planes, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied.)

How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:

"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told. Of these approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *." (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1508, 1630) (Italics supplied)

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)

[339] According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance, "flying at an interval of five degrees." (Tr., Martin 1872)

"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180." (Tr., Martin 1873)
Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available in Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598, 1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of those could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A-20's, and 54 B-15's. (Tr., Short 251, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as General Martin says, "**They could be used for reconnaissance, but were always recognized as not being a combat ship.**" (Tr., Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress.

Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be taken with some qualifications.

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):

"**Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, constituted but small areas of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles.**

"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack.

"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy."

**Information Not Received By Short; In General:**

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to those commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr., Short 490-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War Department was not informed.
[332] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain intercepted messages. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was that it had possession of information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2085-2096; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 2096) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G-2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr., Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1532-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-283)

The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of these various messages:

24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose.

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.

[333] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October, Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three-Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the above.


5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.


15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week."

16 November, translated 17 November, Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations with the U. S.
18 November, translated 6 December. Kitu, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of eight destroyers entering harbor.

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off."

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.

22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

[334] 26 November, translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering "the proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no progress.

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations"; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements."

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

[335] 30 November, translated 1 December, Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured—broken" and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the most absolute secrecy."

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested, but in Washington only.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for that purpose.

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders then those lower down.

1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinkang. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and American Consular rights would not be recognized.

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramid U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of 26th. Japs convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American proposals.

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and destroy all secret documents.

3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty.

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.

5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine.

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare to present it when directed.

6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap-American war.

7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Jap to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents.

7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: “On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.”

The final message, outside the “Winds” message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. “B”; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day, marked “urgent, very important,” instructs the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)

[337] The Winds Message:

The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that “in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)” a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

“(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
“(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
“(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHINO KAZE KARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)”
When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S. I. S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 125–126)

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25432) The Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. G. of S., G–2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G–2. Discussing Admiral Noyes’ uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252–253) Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied, "I think they have had plenty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G–2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253–254)

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252) According to [338] Colonel Bratton no one in G–2 ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66–67; see also Marshall A. 36–38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38–39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251–252) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy. The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131–132) According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department G–2 testified that there is no record that G–2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr., Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr., Safford C. 133, 136–138, 172) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136–138); the same is true as to its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr., Safford C. 139–140, 152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top
Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S. I. S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p.m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167)

[339] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages to be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commandant-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of various witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:

"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:

'On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.'

"Now, this is on the 4th day of December:

'Admiral Wilkinson approved this message'—

which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely,

—'and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p.m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man."

and so forth." (Tr., Russel A. 33-34)

[340] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows:
"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District, has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D. 283)

In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:

"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations

'Higashi'

"(2) Japan Russia relations

'Kita'

"(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) 'Nishi'"

(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 23392)

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr., 3341) Bratton B. 69-71; Safford C. 120-130; Sadtler D. 250; See also Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 23392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this. (Tr. Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4061)

There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 23392)

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit "B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:

"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government... The officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division." (Tr., Bratton D. 297)

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted—relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions—cannot be regarded as fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209-211)

Discussion of Foregoing Information:

It is obvious that those Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October, from Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu, requesting that the "ships in harbor" [342] report be made twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December, from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in harbor" report even where there were no movements. The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting of 25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November,
translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 20 November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Marshall testified, November 20 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A, 4–5) As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3 December; 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines, and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely, the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with anti-mine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex "B", S. I. S. 27065)

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25350 instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p.m., he sent along a [343] note stating "This means a sunrise attack at Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford of C. 167). Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department.

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received as to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia.

As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's Asst, G–2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get.

As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was the testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14–15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 127–128, 128–129; Sadtler D. 253–254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7–8, 14; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276–277; Russell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep. pp. 18–21)

Comment on Short's Defenses:

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect was a surprise air attack, he cannot now
be heard to say that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious that General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise air attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount to a communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which excluded a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.

As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short continually stressed the possible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from without. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming the civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities of an experienced commander.

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified except in so far as it holds the information which Short had was incomplete and confusing.

I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones, not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.

Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers:

The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep. 74).

A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain witnesses were asked as to their opinion of Phillips as Chief of Staff. Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr., Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified. (Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409). General Burgin considered Phillips "one of General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to confer with subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise—the average, run-of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief
of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he did not "feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-1978)

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this finding is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interference with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, of an air attack, [346] what Phillips considered to be his duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr., Phillips 1134-1144)

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as a Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November 1941, (Tr., Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having him present at important Navy Conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3, or G-4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese Consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about these matters.

The Board also stated that

"While the varous assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short." (Rep. 74)

The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7." (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not justified.

[347] Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.
“(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war.” (Rep. 298-299)

Adequacy of General Marshall’s 27 November Warning Message:

The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed “Marshall” should be regarded as containing all the information concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 107)

The Board’s statement that General Marshall failed “to keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation” (Rep. 298) overlooks the fact that the 27 November message signed “Marshall” pictured the Japanese—United States situation accurately as it appeared from the information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggest the possibility that they may have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of a peaceful settlement.

[348] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and “in carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.” (Top Secret Ex. “B”)

Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo’s drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised, the Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he stated they were doing their best and that negotiations were to continue. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington, suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated:

“Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.” (Top Secret Ex. “B”)

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still continuing. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)

Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of war:

“* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be the result of war. * * * Now the question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war.” (Tr., Grew 4213-4214)

When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. Grew replied:

[349] “I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it; and, not being a defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable, up to the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable.” (Tr., Grew 4199)

With reference to Japan’s decision to go to war, he stated that there were “two Japans.” The Army and Navy were practically independent and reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister.

“I think it is perfectly possible that the cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is—well, I won’t say confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that
Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces me personally that he didn't know. * * *" (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated:

"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far East. They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have relaxed some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it didn't happen." (Tr., Grew 4218)

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November, General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5) It was first thought that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti-Comintern pact. When the time was extended to 29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4) "November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December without anything happening other than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5)

[559] In the light of all information possessed by the War Department at that time the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the Japanese representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it is my opinion that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" was an accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.

**General Marshall's Views on Warning:**

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that "very remarkable things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic relations while still evading an actual act of war." (Tr. Marshall A. 45-46) With respect to other information of the Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and influenced his thinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that while it may have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise. (Tr., Marshall A. 46) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what has happened, * * * the situation might well have been helped by translating that information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of his decision at the time, however, he stated:

"In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later Army Alert, (messages to Short from War Department and Navy Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great responsibility; and in addition to that you must remember that we were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could look at that without realizing that something very critical was in the wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way we were—the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii—without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.

"Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a certain period of time, it would be too late; we would have gained the necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for them to act.

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[351] "All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commercial shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet's resources in providing convoys. Everything was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how—I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous
communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don't know what the explanation of it is, and I myself have never discussed it.” (Tr., Marshall A. 46-47)

As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 27) He also was under the belief in late November and early December of 1941 that Short had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance. In this regard, he testified:

“We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel.” (Tr., Marshall A. 27)

The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A. 26)

The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places on the Japanese front and that “it was by far the best prepared that we had.” (Tr., Marshall A. 25) He stated:

“* * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and matériel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible.” (Tr., Marshall A. 23)

The Chief of Staff continued:

“I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * *” (Tr., Marshall A. 26)

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the over-all supervision which was required of him from a global perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal Department:

[322] “* * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii.” (Tr., Marshall A. 13-14)

General Marshall's 7 December Message:

Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December of an almost immediate break with Japan, the Chief of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated such a break until about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr., Marshall A. 6) He then immediately conferred with appropriate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a message to be transmitted to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew that the time required for coding was "a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to the procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could be expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr., Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr., Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that moment. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of Staff as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply confirmed that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall A. 14)

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the nonoperation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu
it was given to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) [353] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because, in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) The Chief of Staff testified:

"* * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second. * * * And from our own experience, my own experience, even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * * * we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone." (Tr., Marshall A. 13-14)

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message for delivery to the Message Center:

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means, * * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a.m." (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80) (This would be 6:20 a.m. Honolulu time)

Colonel French testified that:

"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination." (Tr., French 196)

Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff is pertinent:

"General Russell. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders a message which would have told them of these recent developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly as to the substance of this message of December [354] 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines?

"General Marshall. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal affairs, can do what in a time of great emergency. It depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff were here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware of this and of the possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to answer, because you are inevitably involved in back-sight regarding a great catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way." (Tr., Marshall C. 211-212)

Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:

As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of which information he had an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to Short of 27 November, considered along with the other messages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military commander was required to take the information contained in this radio from his Chief of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further information or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in the position of carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a subordinate what the situation was for his guidance. The Board's conclusion reduces itself to a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length and in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that there was only a bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment.

So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's Conclusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately pictured
the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity that Short be on the alert against threats from within and from without. The most that can be said is that the War Department did not transmit to Short the Top Secret messages, but these were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the messages actually sent Short over a period of months, wherein the War Department was possessed of more information than Short received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the *qui vive*. That Hawaii had already been sufficiently alerted was [355] the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton D. 78; Gibson D. 270-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Saddler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of General Miles (Tr., Saddler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith (Tr., Saddler D. 253).

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Marshall testified it was apparent that the Navy give Short these messages. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772). The Navy messages of 24 and 27 November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36, D. 306; Short 358, 363) Captain Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed with General Short in person the message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059)

Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear instructions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momentarily expected.

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not alerted his command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a *non sequitur*. But, in addition, there was no testimony before the Board that General Marshall ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though "the presumption would be that I had seen it." (Tr., Marshall 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201) It is significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not initialed by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the corresponding radio from General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39) The reply itself was indicative that Short had taken precautions against sabotage and in stating "liaison with the Navy" was susceptible of the interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that distant reconnaissances would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply, was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissances. It must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissances. The Chief of Staff was entitled to believe that his orders would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." (Tr., Short 380) He also stated that this phrase indicated he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long distance reconnaissances. (Tr., Short 380) General Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption that "General Short was working out reconnaissances and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan, * * *". (Tr., Gerow 4289)

In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no preparations against an outside threat.

[356] In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate by a communication to the Chief of Staff.

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would be a most anomalous situation if a theater commander could be heard to say that because he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had replied with a fragmentary report that *ipso facto* he was relieved of his responsibilities and that these responsibilities were then fastened upon the Chief of Staff.
Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772), the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both those from within and those from without.

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-In-Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Department, with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which occurred.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concerning the over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to the stated fundamental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in preparation for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid his responsibility in the event his organization is ineffective. There is a distinction, however, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the performance of duties by members of his staff.

[357] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt of Short's reply, is not justified.

As to Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan "though there was ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes entirely clear that General Marshall personally did not receive this information until late in the morning of 7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately but failed because of circumstances beyond his control.

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formulated over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander in accordance with the traditional American military policy. General Marshall had seen General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29)

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).

Board's Conclusions as to General Gerow:

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements.

(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to take corrective action."
“(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two services in the manner contemplated.” (Rep. 298)

[358] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy beachhead to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of Staff during the time in question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This Division of the General Staff was charged with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff.

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the situation with the Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under no circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in the messages jeopardize his defense. He was also ordered to establish reconnaissance.

But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G–2, the Board argues that had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make “the ships in harbor report” irregular, and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship movements. (Top Secret Ex. “B”) might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to Short.

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear and concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers to this radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In my opinion this is an erroneous characterization of the message. I fail to take into account the very essence of the situation which then presented [359] itself. Those in authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted at that moment with a most difficult and delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations which had been taking place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese emissaries had practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the Japanese might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month of delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day—27 November 1941—the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United States, urging him to postpone any action that might precipitate war as long as possible because we were not ready. Confronted with this situation, those in authority in the War Department, including the Secretary of War, participated in the preparation of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4059), which were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express as accurately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of the possibility of an attack at any moment and that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that would precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into the language. There was no other course except to present this problem just as
It was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate situation conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because it requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men supposedly qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning "This is a war warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent. (Tr., Gerow 4281-4282)

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short's reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer ground, General Gerow admitted that while it was physically impossible for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered the War Department gave Short adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by assuming that the reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant General of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow 4290-4291) This being so, it follows that he failed also to follow up on the demand in the radiogram of 27 November signed "Marshall", for a report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified:

"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through." (Tr., Gerow 4290)

[360] In fairness to General Gerow is should also be mentioned that Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge of the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291)

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that would have made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans Division is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although its functions are not comparable to those of a commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with specific responsibilities.

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440) General Gerow assumed and had the right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile attack contained in the 27 November message, the two commanders would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., Gerow 4289) or at least such portions thereof as would assure adequate reconnaissance.

On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by G-2 is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified. (Rep. 290) At least it was a precautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board's conclusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in failing to check on Short's reply to the November 27 message signed "Marshall." I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General Gerow in approving the 27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately and adequately picture the situation as it existed and gave definite instructions. I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two commanders would themselves put these plans into effect.

Miscellaneous Statements of Board:

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating my agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider such irrelevant matters in arriving at my conclusions.

[361] Unexplored Leads:

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.
I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

**Recommendations:**

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did, and (c) in not checking on Short’s reply to the 27 November message signed “Marshall.” In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking Short’s reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short’s culpability in the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a) above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered the various alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper alert. The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into consideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other factors such as possible alarm of the civil population does not remove the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. Those mistakes simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert. The fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision to establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the concept of a neglect of duty.

[362] As to whether (b) Short’s failure to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of being a terrible offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now of record, this question is answered by what has been said above. Short’s failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment on his part.

As to the Board’s conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short’s defense would be, as he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such reconnaissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I believe the truer picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly what was apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, that there was literally no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Considering the matter of General Short’s possible trial by court-martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted messages were sent and that information of great military value continues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous witnesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is out of the question.

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his
various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 10, p. 21) There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln’s refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand. (363) As, on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by a trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a recurrent public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review of the Board’s proceedings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.

Myron C. Cramer,  
Major General, The Judge Advocate General.
## EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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<td>8</td>
<td>668</td>
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</table>
EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION Exhibit No. 1

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of sheets 2 and 55, showing that on 7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 December", which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time. The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise noted.

b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941.


d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japanese War Policy".

e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is initialed by General Short.

f. Memorandum re "Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August 1941.

g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report of Sir George Paisn.


i. Photostated copy of reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel in *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* dated 18 September 1941, obtained from Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.

j. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 1941, initiated by General Short.

k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Elki Tojo, dated 17 October 1941.


m. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 1941, re "Estimate of Japanese Situation".

n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreign policy.

o. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25 October 1941, initiated by General Short.

p. Letter from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding memorandum containing information received from Orient.

q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 1941, initiated on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.

r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of certain information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable.

s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Commander (I. C.), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from British.

t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November 1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.

u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from Navy.

v. Transcript of telephone conversation, 1 December 1941, obtained from Navy.
w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from Navy.
x. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI.
y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941.
z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 29 November 1941.
aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., 27 November 1941.
bb. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 December 1941.
c. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.
dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941.
ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 7 December 1941.
ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 December 1941, “Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by Carrier”.
hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529.
ii. Statement of Captain William B. Cobb, JAGD, 10 December 1941.
jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 8 December 1941.
ll. Cable from “Colton Acting” to C. G. Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.
mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
 oo. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to “Radio—Merle Smith.”
qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941.
rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
ss. Paper relating to “WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and destruction of their code machine”.

SECRET

Affixed to 2/1:

Caution on Handling

1. This book will be handled by staff officers, the commanding officers concerned and higher officers.
2. For the benefit of persons directly responsible for communications, supply and related matters, these subjects have been treated.
3. As in the case of code books, care must be taken that the publication does not fall into enemy hands should the ship sink or be damaged.

5 Nov 41
Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet

Page 2/1: COMBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 1

Flagship NAGATO (*1), SAEKI (*2) WAN (TN Bay.)

5 Nov 41
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku (*3)
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet

145 of 700 copies
**Combined Fleet Order**

**Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS** will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume.

SECRET

Page 2/120-124:

Editor's Note: Document pages 2/120-124 inclusive comprise the errata indicated throughout the text in translator's notes. Document pages 2/125-150 duplicate 2/64-94 (G, Supply) and are omitted. Document page 2/151 (Appended Table 5, Organization of Supply Forces of Combined Fleet) follows 2/94.

**Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 2**

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN 7 Nov 41

145 of 600 copies

YAMAMOTO, Osoroku
Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet

First preparations for war
Y Day 8 December

**Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 7**

Flagship NAGATO, off HASHIRA SHIMA (*1)

22 Dec 41
YAMAMOTO, Osoroku
Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet

CONFIDENTIAL

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT SERVICE COMMAND,
KAUAI DISTRICT,
Lihue, T. H., 29 March 1941.

Subject: Japanese attitude on Kauai.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Enclosed is a copy of the English translation of a speech delivered by the Rev. Hisakichi Miyasaki, Buddhist Priest of Lihue, Kauai during a send-off reception for selectees of the Lihue district on March 27, 1941.

2. The sentence inclosed in red brackets has been expurgated in press reports, since it was felt that reactionary Japanese groups would attack Mr. Miyasaki for such a statement.

3. The speech was given first in Japanese and then the English translation was read.

4. The words of Mr. Miyasaki express very well the attitude taken now by the majority of first and second generation Japanese on this Island.

5. It is becoming more and more apparent that as long as the local Japanese population is not antagonized by fools of other races, it will as a whole be loyal and peaceful.

6. The peace in the community and the loyalty of the Japanese are only endangered by persons like Mr. Cedric Baldwin, Manager of McBryde plantation—to mention only the worst offender—who delight in insulting the Japanese people without the slightest provocation.

1. Incl.: Copy of speech

**EUGENE J. FITZGERALD,**

*Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, D. S. C.*
G-2: 2 Exec.
Assistant G-2: ?
Subject: Japanese War Policy.
File: To be filed in #2 safe and noted in "Current Estimate" Japan—in Record Room.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 MAY 1941.

Admiral C. C. Bloch, U. S. N.,
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

My Dear Admiral: In order that you may be acquainted with the steps taken by my command relative to the sabotage matter which you discussed with Colonel Throckmorton this morning I desire to inform you that during the holiday and week-end I have increased the guard over important installations, and have arranged for more detailed inspections of the guard during this period. Every attempt will be made not to bring this action into the limelight so that the community as a whole will not be aware of the increased surveillance.

I believe this will be sufficient to handle the situation as far as the Army is concerned.

With kindest personal regards,
Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHOHT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B & LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement lst accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its Indorsement. Indorsements herein will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

AG 001/2

STATEMENT A.—World tank-ship fleet, Dec. 31, 1945, versus Sept. 1, 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: W. D. Radio #24, 8 July 41 &quot;Japanese War Policy&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE,

WASHINGTON DC 152A July 8 1941

Secret

94 WAR BC 207 WD

CG Hawn Dept Fort Shafter TH:

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future
policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Period. Opinion is that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. Period. Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. Period. They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August. Period. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

ADAMS.
334P/720P/8

Received as a secret communication.
(Strike out two)
Decoded by:

CAPT C J HARRISON SC
818A JULY 9, 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be sent to subordinate commanders.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initiated by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind.</th>
<th>From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Traffic on Burma Road</th>
<th>Indorsements</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind.</td>
<td>Contact Office, 7-18-41</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>To note and return. Subject matter will be included in next foreign intelligence report.</td>
<td>By G. W. B.</td>
<td>Mum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd G-2, 7-18-41</td>
<td>C8</td>
<td>Please note. The increase in traffic and the high freight rates are of considerable interest.</td>
<td>W. D. T.</td>
<td>H. E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ind. C/S, 7-21-41</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Noted. Incl; n/c. Contact office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

1740 FORT STREET, VICTORIA, B. C.

DEAR MR. ANDREW: Herewith a few notes on the arrival of Burma Road trucks. The salt trucks arriving at Kunming originate in China a short distance down the Burma Road, but the figures for the trucks exclusive of salt represent imports from Burma & the steady increase in the average daily arrivals is interesting. Tonnage arriving at Chunking is negligible.

I also enclose a few figures on freight rates which I hope you will be able to follow.

Yours sincerely,

J. K. GORESFIELD.
**BUREAU ROAD TAXES**

1) **Central Government Yunnan highways tax (payable each trip):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Approx. exchange</th>
<th>US $ per ton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lashio/Wanting</td>
<td>$39.00</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>12.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting/Kunming</td>
<td>NC$2.62 per ton</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>112.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunming/Chungking</td>
<td>NC$2.42 per ton</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>111.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungking/Kweiyang</td>
<td>NC$2.06 per ton</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweiyang/Kunming</td>
<td>NC$0.87 per ton</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
1) Rate Wanting/Kunming recently increased from NC$2.12 to NC$2.92.
2) Rate Kunming/Chungking recently increased from NC$2.12 to NC$2.42.
3) Where no return cargo Kunming/Wanting Government rate for "empty despatch" allowance NC$1.62 per ton/Km @ Exchange: US$62.14 per ton.
4) Above rates include Highway Taxes shown on separate list.
5) No recent information regarding rates from Chungking available and rates vary with different types of cargo.
6) Rates shown from Lashio onwards are now paid for lst class cargo e. g., gasoline.

**HONG KONG, 19th June 1941.**

---

**Weight rates Lashio/Wanting/Kunming/Chungking**

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**Burma Road**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Truck arrivals at Kunming</th>
<th>Arrivals at Chungking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Including salt</td>
<td>Excluding salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of trucks</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average per day</td>
<td>carried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/10/40-17/11/40</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/11/40-17/12/40</td>
<td>3112</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/12/40-17/11/41</td>
<td>3815</td>
<td>123</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/3/41-17/2/41</td>
<td>4226</td>
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</tr>
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<td>8/2/41-17/5/41</td>
<td>3958</td>
<td>141</td>
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NUMBER OF TRUCKS PASSING FRONTIER AT WANTING

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<td>April</td>
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</table>

Hongkong, 19th June, 1941.

Memorandum: Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.

The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2:00 P.M., and docked at Pier #8 at 3:30 P.M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles at 9:00 A.M., 1 August 1941.

Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route were as follows: From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them; they were also prevented by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23 July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the 180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog banks; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu; then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours. In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued on into this port.

It is interesting to note that the ship began its actions before the action was taken freezing credits.

Reliable business men report that Japan is very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them; and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even encasing airplane parts and ornamental iron on buildings. Other items reported to be short are high grade cotton; rubber supplies; high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anesthetics.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments; post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but with a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were [sic]
CI

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., August 28, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosures:
201—Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in Hawaii: dtd 8/3/41.

MID 201 (Paisn, George)
Strictly private and confidential.

Aug 3 1941.

Dear Mr. President, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ George Paisn.

The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

8/21/41.

Copies to:
G-3
Haw.
VSR/lge
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA,
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2,
Governors Island, New York, November 28, 1941.

Subject: George Paish (Paish).
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941, there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.
2. This is transmitted for your information and records.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2:

F. J. Pearson,
F. J. Pearson,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G–2.

1 Incl.—(dupl.)
cpy FBI rept.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY OF FBI REPORT

An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact Mr. PAISH at the address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD G. PAISH, that his true name is SIR GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was interviewed, at which time he furnished the following information:

SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay, he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian “Fire Goddess” danced and otherwise entertained the gathering.

SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the “FIRE GODDESS” and during the course of the evening he turned the trend of conversation to any spirit of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the Hawaiians are “a spirited people”. He inferred from this that the possibility exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a Japanese promise of “liberation”.

SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened due to the astute diplomacy of the United States State Department.

SIR GEORGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from “Le Canada” of Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, “The World's Unlimited Emergency”, and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining his publications and ability as a lecturer.

It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that
he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference to pre-World War associations, characters and historical events.
I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 30 September 1941.

In reply refer to:
336.8—(Japanese).
Subject: Letter from George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, New York.

1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your identification, with the request that Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess concerning the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the Japanese Government, and the native Hawaiians.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, CONTACT OFFICE,
215 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,
Honolulu, T. H., 30 September 1941.

Subject: Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.
Summary of Information:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable F. D. ROOSEVELT. /s/ GEORGE PAISN.

-- of source -- of information

X Undetermined X
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HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA,
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Governors Island, New York, October 15, 1941.

Subject: Letter From George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

1. Reference is made to your communication of 30th, September, with above subject title.

2. Before this office can comply with request contained therein to interview the subject, it is requested that this office be supply with Mr. PAISN’S address, inasmuch as there is nothing contained in your communication which would indicate that he is a resident of this Corps Area.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

F. J. PEARSON,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.

1st Ind.

336.8(ACO).

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, CONTACT OFFICER,
214 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,
Honolulu, T. H., 5 November 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqrs. 2d Corps Area, Governors Island, N. Y.

1. Mr. Paisn’s address as shown on his letter to the President was “The Boreas, Blue Ridge, New York State”. This address was inadvertently omitted in S/I of 30 September 1941.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 6 September 1941.

In reply refer to:

350.05 (G-2).

Subject: Summaries of Information.
To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Kendall J. Fielder,
Kendall J. Fielder,
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

(Item I of Exhibit 1 being pages 28E and 29E is a photostatic copy of a portion of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin dated 18 September 1941, relating to reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel. This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 7 and 8, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen Investigation.)
G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation

1. Summary of Situation
a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiation between America and Japan, and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist elements in Japan as a result of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of Japan by the ABCD group.

b. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is available as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the attitude of the cabinet as a whole will be.

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. Conclusions
According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary reasons for such a move or moves are believed to be as follows:

d. Capabilities
1. Desperate economic conditions internally—making it perhaps preferable to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution.

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the Axis—for the time being.

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance—that is, when the strength of the Axis is at its maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized.

4. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block.

b. Probable Moves.—The most likely moves which Japan may make in the near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows:

1. Attack Russia from the east.

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way of military, naval, and air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation.

3. Attack British possessions in the Far East.

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.

5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at whichever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economic advantages.

c. Reasons Justifying These Moves.—The basis for each of the above possible moves are considered to be as follows:

1. Attack on Russia.—(a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power.

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control eastward to the Pacific).

(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known to be in Siberia.

(d) To secure effective control over, or perhaps stamp out, communism in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine.
(e) A possibility that an attack on Russia at this time can be undertaken with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States; and that even the British might not resort to active military action in support of Russia in the Pacific, due to the fact that both the Americans and British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither power has any genuine desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again plague the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism.

(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coordination and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against other Pacific powers.

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the south.

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand.—Pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions of military, naval, or air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia, in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the north is being achieved; and to afford her more and better strategic bases from which she can operate against Chungking’s lines of communication, and/or American and British lines of communications in case it becomes necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also, to secure additional raw materials, food, etc.

3. Attack on British Possessions in the Far East.—Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler—it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possession, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.—While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

3. In Conclusion

Barring unforeseen and untoward incidents, which might set off a conflict in any quarter and invite measures and countermeasures never contemplated, it is believed that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take and the probable sequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will be, as generally predicted, “strongly military” and will support the present demands of the “rightists” elements which were largely responsible for the fall of the Third Konoye cabinet.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. A. G. of S., G–2,
Contact Officer.

Distribution

C/S H. H. D.
G–2, H. H. D.
G–2, H. A. F.
G–2, Sciofield Barracks (3 copies)
G–3, H. H. D.
F. B. I., Honolulu (2 copies)
O. N. I., Honolulu (2 copies)
Subjects: New Japanese Premier

Hideki or Eiki Tojo

Lieutenant General; Director General of Military Aviation. Born December 1884, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1919; Instructor Military Staff College, 1922; Chief of Mobilization Section; Commander Infantry 1st Regiment; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer; Commander 24th Infantry Brigade, 1934-35; Commander Gendarmerie Headquarters and Chief Police Affairs Department of Kwantung Army, 1937; War Vice-Minister, May 1938-December 1938; Minister of War since December 1938.

Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-time cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.

An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Miss Kusuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs who returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conservative among the members of the army clique".

Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article stated that he is a conservative.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.

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JAPANESE POLICY FOR EAST ASIA

An enlightening statement of Japanese policy is contained in an article entitled "The present stage of our great continental policy," written by Takehiko Okubira, an instructor in Keijo Imperial University and published in Tarikku ("Great Continent") Magazine for May, 1941. A summary of the English translation of this article is as follows:

1. The great continental policy of Japan originated with the Korean problem of 1905. It has been consistent from beginning to end and has been guided by a spirit of universal concord. But it is based on the defensive point of view of wiping out any menace from the outside to our national defense.

The continental debouchment of Japan's economic power was first started in Korea. Then it was extended into China. But it was after the Russo-German war that it made its great progress and came to hold an important position in our great continental policy. It has taken a natural course, differing essentially from the agressions of the Western European countries.

It was necessary for Japan to conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy, countries which are facing similar critical situations, due to the political upheaval in the world, and both of whom possess a common world view.

Our great continental policy in the present stage is also our world policy, and is based on the world view harbored by us. For not only does it aim at the expansion and development of our national power, but also signifies our proposal for a world administration.

2. Japan's policy aims at the creation of a new world order and the establishment of a greater East Asia mutual prosperity sphere. It has entered a new stage through the conclusion of the tripartite alliance. These three nations, which occupied opposite seats at the Paris Peace conference, have come to harbor the
same historical mission, the same economic circumstances, and the same political aim. They have banded together against the serious opposition of the nations advocating the maintenance of the status quo. The creation of new orders in Europe and Asia are not only their war aims, but also the guiding principle of the creation of a new world.

The principle acting as the support for the creation of a new world order has been provided by the words, "to regard the acquisition of appropriate territories by each of the nations as the sine qua non (necessity) for lasting peace." This principle is the correct basis for world partition, rather than the recognition of possession as legal from the fact that a nation got there first. The principle advocates the acquisition of appropriate territories by every nation of the world to enable it to exist on earth and not be shut off from space. It sets forth an idea of systematized order in place of the anarchical world order and world partition of today.

Another fundamental support for the creation of a new world order is the mutual recognition of the right of leadership for nations. Leadership as an ideology of order has definitely taken the place of the old idea of balance of power. In Europe, Germany and Italy are carrying on a war to wipe away the influence of Great Britain and put an end to her traditional policy of balance of power. Japan, who is the stabilizing power in East Asia, is showing a resolute determination and power to wipe away America's interference in the changing of the political situation. Their aims are the same.

3. The great continental policy and the Pacific policy are inseparable. It was hoped that America would understand this; but America gradually took over the receding British interests, and after the conclusion of the Tripartite alliance, America denounced the Axis as aggressors and strengthened her aid to Britain. She has been rushing headlong toward war. An agreement has been concluded between Great Britain and America for America to oppose Japan's navy, with quotations from Prof. Fieldhouse of Canada and Prof. Whitney Griswold to prove it. This has brought Japan's sea supremacy to the front. Japan's great continental policy aims to wipe away the intervention of third powers aiming to encircle Japan, dominate the China Seas, and also to terminate the clashes between the races of East Asia and their conquest by Europeans.

4. The Sino-Japanese treaty of Oct. 30, 1940, concluded at Nanking, for the readjustment of relations, failed to bring about complete peace despite the efforts of Wang Ching-Wei. But, as the manifestation of the pro-Japanese centralized government's collaboration toward the establishment of a new order in China, it unfolded a new phase in East Asia. The treaty does not discriminate between the winner and the loser and is based upon equality between Japan and China. It has furthered the formation of the East Asia bloc and strengthened the axis connecting Japan, Manchukuo and China, expanding their defense industries, building up their economy by acquiring and developing natural resources, and formed a union between Japan and China just short of military alliance. During the past half year the Chinese government has made progress by solving her financial problems, monetary system, peace and order problem, cultural problem (establishment of Nanking Central University), and is making great strides toward the resurrection of a new China. There are many obstacles in the path of the Chinese government: to overcome the feeling of dependence upon Britain and America. But the penetration of the great Asiatic principle, proclaimed by Wang Ching-Wei, and the withdrawal of British and American influences, which actually can be seen, will make the people of China realize that they are the descendents of a great and free people.

Chungking has been continuing her resistance, hoping for America's support. But President Roosevelt's special envoy, Carey, must have detected that conditions in Chungking are very different from propaganda sent to America. Her economic power is exhausted, transportation routes are deficient, is in conflict with Chinese Red Army, and estranged from her emigrants abroad. She is being made to dance to the tune of the dying embers of the mistaken nationalism of the intellectual class and America's political expediency of regarding her as a stone of the anti-Japanese cordon.

5. In August of last autumn, the landing of our troops in French Indo-China wrote a new page in the annals of the history of Asia. Loss of French influence led to demands by Thailand for the return of Laos and Cambodia territory. Behind the scene of Thailand and French Indo-China were Britain and America, with threats and warnings, siding with French Indo-China. Their attempts at reconciliation were rejected and America stopped the shipment of airplanes ordered by Thailand. A friendly neutrality agreement was signed between Japan and
Thailand, since which relations have drawn closer, with the opening up of an airway, trade agreements, and use of Japanese technicians. Our country, which is determined to maintain the peace and tranquility of the greater East Asia sphere at all cost, proposed to arbitrate and mediate the clash between Thailand and French Indo-China, and when this was accepted, held the peace conference at Tokyo. After about a month, this resulted in the acceptance of an impartial peace on March 11. This had profound significance, strengthening the tie among the three nations and making Japan’s position of leadership in greater East Asia firmer and uncontested. Moreover, it enhanced the racial consciousness of the oppressed races of Southern Asia and installed in them hope. Thailand was able to push aside Britain’s influence. Thailand is the spear to stab at Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, which are embraced within Japan’s greater East Asia policy, and to the north of Thailand lies Burma, which is the gateway of India, while to the east lies Indo-China, which is an undeveloped treasurehouse and embraces Camranh Bay. All of the races of southern Asia have been robbed of their real eyes by the propaganda of Britain and America. But since they commonly entertain a righteous indignation against the conquerors and oppressors, it is expected that a time will come when they eventually will revolt.

6. The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement and mediation of the Thailand-French Indo-China border clash, which occurred during the past half year, after the conclusion of the tripartite agreement, have made a great stride toward the creation of a new world order. Our relations with the Dutch East Indies are still being negotiated. Our country has decided to break with the status quo of Britain and America and fight resolutely against their antiballistic interference. The most urgent matter for us is to pay strictest attention to changing phases of the International situation and not take our eyes away from the political, economic, and military attacks against the Axis nations. America’s anti-Japanese policy is of an unprecedented positive nature, and is changing from economic oppression to military coercion. Our continental policy should be made the core of our national defense. So long as the execution of our peaceful southward expansion is not threatened, our country will leave their military bases (such as Singapore) alone. More important than anything else is making the western Pacific and the South China sea “our waters”, impregnable to the enemies. We should be aware of the fact that not only does the supremacy of the seas depend upon the actual strength of our fleet, but upon the number of naval bases and their position, our merchant fleet, our production power, and our strategic raw materials. Since that which would likely happen in the event of an emergency is protracted blockade warfare, it is an urgent matter to include the south in the generalized economy plan of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. The first work should be to awaken within the races of East Asia, who are suffering from the exploitation and oppression of the American and Englishman, their racial consciousness as Asians and encourage them to combine and unite.

The consummation of the Sino-Japanese treaty is to Wang Ching-wel like the discovery of a lighthouse. He is advancing along these brilliant rays toward lasting peace. But there are several hundred million people of Asia still wandering about in darkness. But their eyes are fixed on our moves to bring about the creation of a new order in East Asia, even through the smoke screen spread by the Englishman and the American. If a light to which they can really turn is not hung out today, our mission of resurrection of East Asia will become exceedingly difficult. Foreign Minister Komura’s diplomatic plan embraced the resurrection of the races of East Asia. I think the arousing into action of a leader burning with the spirit of an adventurer from the races under bonds is not far away, and I cannot help but look forward to the glorious day of welcoming him.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B & LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff-inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initiated by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: WD Radio, 20 October 1941, “Estimate of Japanese Situation”.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind. AG 20 Oct 41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>1 Ind.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Ind. G-2 21 Oct 41</td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Noted. 1 Ind. N/C</td>
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<td>R. H. D.</td>
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<td>K. J. F.</td>
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</table>

**SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY**

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

8 WWY BC 47 WD WASHIN DC 1234P OCT 20 1941

20th Following War Dept estimate of Japanese situation for your information stop tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent

ADAMS.

1937A

Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: LT G E HAVEN 1150A OCT 20 1941

Answer should be marked “ANSWER to Code Message No. 20th.”

To: Contact office noted by General Short & Col Phillips, new Acting C of S.

C/S HHD

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.

Army Contact Office,

Honolulu, T. H.


**G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation**

1. **Summary of Situation.** Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the International (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no fundamental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the time mentioned; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with contemporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are known to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation. However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this time:

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from “rightest” elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en bloc, and was almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.
c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression"; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.


However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:


b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivostok as a part of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.

f. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new cabinet.

3. Justifications for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as conclusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:

a. New Cabinet. Paragraph 1 a above is the general answer. The only other noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only man considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

b. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals from America and American territories.

c. Rapprochement Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely our enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i.e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously considered.

d. Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. This action on the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also appears fully justified—realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler.

e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two issues are here involved:

(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to face Hitler across the English channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what
Confidential

f. Nomura's report to New Cabinet. This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

Remarks. Everyone is interested in the answer to the question, When will Japan move?—a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worthy of mentioning:

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month are:

   1. The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands.

   2. Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new cabinet.

   3. Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.

   4. Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

   5. A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

   6. Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to convene a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.

b. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.

George W. Bicknell,

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.

Distribution:
C/S H. H. D.
G-2 H. H. D.
G-3 H. H. D.
G-2 Schofield Barracks
G-2 24th Div.
G-2 25th Div.
F. B. I. (2)
O. N. I. (2)
Subject G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation

G-2 IJL
Assistant G-2
C/I DBL
Public Relations HGU
Contact Officer Bofie
File C/S & G-3 Dept. direct.
Remarks Nothing re Hawaii.

G-2, HHD

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.,
Army Contact Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

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2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941. However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:


b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor’s order to permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.

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(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok has been one of the major issues between American and Japan recently, the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in case of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a compromise with the democracies has become inevitable.

f. Nomura's report to New Cabinet. This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word in the American attitude. If this previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

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(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.
(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

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Distribution:

George W. Bicknell
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.

C/S H. H. D.
G-2 H. H. D.
G-3 H. H. D.
G-2 Schofield Barracks
G-2 24th Div.
G-2 25th Div.
F. B. I. (2)
O. N. I. (2)

MID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosures:
336. 1903-41)—MID Summ. of info. re Information received from the Orient; dtd. FMH

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.

Subject: Information Received from the Orient.

Summary of Information:

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is considered reliable:

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific.
All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November.

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Distribution:

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<td>Source: Dr. Cho</td>
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<td>Date of original paper 10/28/41</td>
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<td>I. B. Cognizant</td>
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Urgent Cable Received From Manila Night of Dec. 3, 1941

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

A. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
B. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
C. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
D. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

cc. Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield

Top Secret Ultra

From London, 31st August 1945

Ultra

GOR 682 from GCCS 11279

Following from C. S. S. for Jones.

A. Colonel Wilkinson who was stationed at Manila and is now with 45,000 and temporarily in U. K., was recently approached by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen, of Judge Advocate General's Department U. S. Army, in connection with investigation of General Short and Admiral Kimmel for Pearl Harbour disaster. He carried credentials from Secretary of War.

B. He brought copies of 2 telegrams from Manila to Honolulu, of November 26th and December 2nd, which were as follows:

1. "November 26th, 1941. Most Immediate. Secret Source (usually reliable) reports:
   (a) Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on December 1st without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view getting between Bangkok and Singapore.
   (b) Attacking forces will proceed direct from Malaya and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area valuation for above is number 3 repeat 3 (i. e., only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy). American military and naval intelligence Manila informed."

2. "December 3rd, 1941. Most Immediate."
(a) We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

(I) Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.
(II) Arrival since November 10th of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters medium bombers tanks and guns (75 mm).

(b) Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed to Washington November 31st by American Military Intelligence here.

(c) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and United States. Japan does not intend attack Russia at present but will act in south. You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

C. Colonel C. anxious to know basic source of para. C. of telegram of December 2nd, and in particular, whether this was in "special" category. In point of fact, para C. was based on a B. J. Wilkinson was unaware of source and passed information to Honolulu as he appreciated that I possessed no direct communications.

D. As far as can be judged, the earlier information was based on agent's reports, but Clausen only pressing for origin of para C.

E. You should consult with G-2, as security Ultra at stake if this evidence made public.

Wt 55059/7940 30m 3/45 Wa & Co 51/3

REFERENCE SHEET

From: Commander (I. C.), Admiralty, Dated: 16th July, 1945.
S. W. I.

To: Captain Hastings.

Herewith copies of both messages referred to on the telephone this morning, Monday.

Commander (I. C.)

Secret

IN

From: C. O. I. S. Singapore.

Naval Cypher (D) by W/T


AIDAC

Information received at 2010Z 7th by Hong Kong that severance of Japanese relations? admitted imminent.

2312Z/7

D. N. I. (4)
O. I. C. (3)
D. S. D. 9
File X

Most Secret

IN

From: C. O. I. S. Singapore

Naval Cypher O. T. T. by W/T

Addressed Admiralty (D. N. I.)

Immediate

Personal from Consular Special Intelligence dated 7th December. Tokyo inform all Consulates that relations between Japan and Great Britain and United
States are critical. Comment. Message from codeword from table for warning telegram.

Advance copy sent O. I. C.
D. N. I. (4) Personal
O. I. C. (3) "
D. S. D. 9 "

COPY OF CABLE RECEIVED NOV. 27, 1941

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,
A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthms from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.
B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.
Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i.e. only about 55 to 60 percent probable accuracy).
AMerican Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila, informed.
Copies to: Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell.

SECRET

6-1
SATURDAY, 11 October 1941

2925 i /To KIMURA at P. Hotel, on private line:/ K. and girl. /reception poor/ They are apparently very good friends. Their conversation is about the dispatch of ships to the U. S. K says that X has received a cable re these ships. The Sumitomo Bank and certain other firms will send staff members back. Perhaps TAKAGISHI will go, too. K goes on to say in English that it may happen "at any moment". /She says goodbye and hangs up. He waits quite some time before hanging up. It is apparent that K is drunk and not in full possession of whatever faculties he possesses. There was no lovey-dovey talk, however, as in the case of TAKAGISHI. K is convinced that he may be recalled at any moment and is very sad about it./
END

SECRET

1-540
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30
No activity

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

1000 o to RCA, for messenger
1045 o to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be sent thru X/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. $45.82. They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation but SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation is. (Doubt if S does either!)

1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi dispatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent. First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not had any information from Tokyo to prepare for possible closing (he says). He saw "a few lines" in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self.

1150 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday. This morning /it was set/? at 9:30—no 10. At X? Yes. /This conversation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./
For — to 20
YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the
office. /Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/
for NAKASHIMA. Date with her.
to a girl, NI.
to HBD for NAKURA. Out. When back? 3 or 4. Well then please
/have him call me? First part was missing./
—END—

SECRET

NYK-38
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941

0830 ? Discussion of the difficult situation resulting from the suspension /of
trade?/ Seems to shift to boats or planes. One says something about
"doing it on the 14th" and the other says the Matson sailings of the 5th
and the 19th are out. Also the airways present a financial problem. The
next Matson sailing after is in January. There are no $110 rooms. Some
more talk, most of which I can't get, but I think they are talking about
what to do with special reference to getting away. Part with the admo-
nition by one "not to talk too much about war."

0950 i His girl to YOSHIOKA. Stolen sweets are the best, but the boss came
back in the midst!

1052 i YOSHI. Gives girl number 98471 and name Shizuto NISHI /Mrs. Nishi's
husband/.

1119 i YOSHI from pal. /to play something or do something/ "Not today." 
Tomorrow? OK/

1155 o to girl. This is NYK. Can you come to the office.

1158 o ordering oyako dombun and other food.

1435 o to FUKUDA from YOSHIOKA. Not in /He was !/

1436 i to YOSHIOKA from FUKUDA about insurance. Personal.

1457 i Mr. Lee calling for Mr. Nishi.

At 4 p.m. Honolulu time in the 1941st year of Our Lord, December 2nd
inst. I bade my adieu to my friend of 22 months standing. Darn if
I won't miss you!!
Requiescat in Peace.
Y-1 J-1

FBI files

65-414 phone intercepts 19 Aug-2 Dec 41.
65-414 " " 18 Aug-1 May 41.
65-414 " " 30 Apr 41-2 Dec 40.

2-291—

Monday, November 17, 1941

0045 i KAWAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse re-
actions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K./ K. says /I think/
that previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas propa-
ganda. But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have.
Not in Japanese either.

1117 i FPM. Fragment

1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. $10,000, $12,000 /the amount they
have on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they
figure the taxes, the bond, and all.

1317 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very
brief.

—END—
NYK—82

Monday, November 24, 1941

0847 o YOSHIOKA for ? NYK has received a confidential dispatch. Dictates. Translation of the dispatch was made with further details eked out from the NJ for 11–24–41 as follows.

As soon as preparations are completed, the government has decided to dispatch the Tatsuta Maru to Los Angeles, Balboa and the southern regions, the exact time of departure and other details to be announced later, but the Jiji story says she will sail from Yokohama by the end of the month. The Jiji story mentions the 380 Japanese of Panama who are the "victims" of the shut out policy of the government. Anyway, it is clear that a boat will be sent.

0902 o To RCA from YOSHIOKA—NYK. Mrs. NISHI has left, so if there is any wire after hours, please call Mr. T. YOSHIOKA, 75055. If not home, call T. TAKEI, Makiki Hotel 67692 (private line).

0908 o To Commercial Pacific Cable Co. from YOSHIOKA explaining same thing as above.

0933 o YOSHIOKA to girl in Togawa's office. Mostly friendly chatter, but he cannot talk too much /probably the boss is around!/ What's he going to do? Oh he'll work around. Y. thinks things are going to be all right now since the Tatsuta is coming.

END

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE. Secret

P1 WAR PR TX WASHN DC 611PM NOV 27 1941
CG HAWN DEPT PT SHAFTER TH

472 27th Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaiss and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARBILL
116P/27

Received as Secret communication.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 472 27TH."
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 November 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

Thomas H. Green,
Lt. Col., J. A. G. D.,
Department Judge Advocate.

Sent as Radiogram No. 986—29th.

Approved for Transmission:

O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D C

Re your secret radio four eight two AG 383.4/13 twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty-five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June Nineteen Nineteen Forty One requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June Twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection commas at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

Short.

ENC SEC BY
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
2:45P 29 NOV 41
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:
Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.

Walter C. Phillips,
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Colonel G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

Sent as Radiogram, No. 959—27th.

CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON DC

Reurad four seven two to C/S 27 Nov 41 twentyseventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage Period Liaison with Navy

ENC SEC BY
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
5:40P 27 NOV 41

Secret Routing 4 December 1941.
#1033-4th

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in Agwar four eight four dash twenty eighth colon instructions contained in subject radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received comma and continues to receive detailed and comprehensive attention as result of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July forty one Stop Para

Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram substantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of stations and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December stop Increase in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress Stop This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para

Secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi official agencies Stop Work has actually begun on essential protective fencing and flood lighting projects Stop Para

With reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possible in form of development and expansion of foreword to soldier's handbook comma FM twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citizen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government comma structure of Government comma place of military establishment in the structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to Democratic form Stop Signed Martin End

SHORT.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.
Secret
1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code 79716—46—Ex. 158—15
machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

Received as a secret communication.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th."

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 7 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:
Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.

C. A. Powell, *
Lt. Col.,
Dept. Sig. Off.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1057—7th.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D.C.

Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked Hickam Field
Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop Extensive damage to at least three hangars Wheeler Field three hangars Hickam Field and to planes caught on ground Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over one hour Stop Unconfirmed report that three ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged Stop Marine airfield EWA also badly damaged Stop More details later. End

SHORT.

ENC SECRET URGENT BY
LT G LENNOX SC
950A 7 DEC 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 7 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:
Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.

Earnest Moore,
Major, A. C.,
Acting., Chief of Staff.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1068—7th.

CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON DC

Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor attacked simultaneously by Japa-
nese dive bombers for one hour beginning eight o'clock seventh December damage severe Stop Have left seven repeat seven B dash seventeen comma six repeat six B dash eighteen comma eight repeat eight A dash twenty comma forty repeat forty pursuit Stop Main part ipot destroyed but limited repair and supply facilities remaining Stop Runways Hickam not damaged Stop Request all possible reinforcement heavy bombardment fully equipped Stop Planes to ar-
rive here during hours of darkness Stop Additional ground personnel will be needed as large part of Air Corps troops are being used in close in defense and anti sabotage guards Stop Additional fighters should be immediately dis-
patched by carrier together with such dive bombers as can be made available Stop Spare parts should be furnished for all types as there are no stocks on hand Stop Signed Martin.

SHORT.

ENC SEC BY
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
6:50P 7 DEC 41
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

P 10 WAR HS 70 WD PRIORITY WASHINGTON DC 110p SEC 8 1941.

COMMANDBING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FT SHAFTER T H

3/3 8th TO SHORT FROM ARNOLD ALL REPORTS SHOW THAT IN JAPANESE ATTACKS NUMBERS OF OUR PLANES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ON THE GROUND STOP TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS AT ONCE TO AVOID SUCH LOSSES IN YOUR AREA INCLUDING PROMPT TAKEOFF ON WARNING COMMA DISPERSION TO MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT COMMA AND CONSTRUCTION OF PARAPETS

[Written:] Ans to the radio delivered to M/C CP 11:55 am Dec 10th. for dispatch.

Decoded by: LT. G. E. Haven, 1005P Dec 8 1941.

Received as a secret communication.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 543 8th"

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initiated by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: WD Radio #541, 8 Dec 41</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind.: AG, 9 Dec 41...</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>Radio referred to attached. 2 Incl.: WD Radio #541-8, HHD Radio #1068-7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ind.: C/S, 12/9/41......</td>
<td>A/O</td>
<td>Information ..........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Noted ..................................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Radio WD529 Received Filed at Wash D C 12:18 P M Washington time (or 6:48A Haw time) (ac RCA 1549WS)

Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A M

Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A M not marked priority. Other priority messages handled first

Delivered to decoding officer 2:40 P M decoded and delivered to Col Dunlop 2:50 P M

Delivered to Capt Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P M
Re your five four nine.

Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh parent this time approximate but within five minutes parent Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general HqHawDept two fifty eight, afternoon seventh (received by Chief of Staff HqHawDept three o'clock afternoon seventh all Hawaiian)

'SHORT.

10 Dec 1941.

STATEMENT OF Wm. B. COBB, CAPT. J. A. G. D.

On the evening of Sat. Dec. 6th, 1941, Mrs. Cobb and I had returned from Schofield Bks., about midnight, and were invited to spend the night at Hickam Field, with some friends, Lt. F. O. Brown, and his sister, at their quarters in that post. We were awakened at 7:55 the following morning by the attack by enemy planes on Pearl Harbor and Hickman Field. The attacks continued intermittently thruout the morning, and we assisted in such ways as we could, to care for the dead and wounded, until about noon. At that time, I left Hickam Field and proceeded to Ft. Shafter, reporting upon arrival, to my superior, Col. T. H. Green, Dept. Judge Advocate. Volunteer nurses were needed at Tripler General Hospital, and Col. Green made the arrangements for Mrs. Cobb to help there in that work. After taking her to the hospital, I was directed to report to the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., at Ft Shafter, for duty, which I did at 1:20 P. M., Dec. 7th, 1941.

Upon assuming my duties in the office of the Chief of Staff, I immediately began to keep a personal record of the activities in the office, pursuant to my instructions, and as a matter of ordinary office routine, which record I now have. The telephone system was explained to me, and I was occupied for some time, becoming familiar with the office. The situation was of course, very intense, and numerous officers were calling on the Chief of Staff throughout the afternoon. Col. Green, accompanied by Maj. Hanley, of the Judge Advocate's office were in about 2 P. M. and shortly thereafter, left to go to the Crater, to confer with Gen. Short. Col. Phillips was busy with long distance phone calls to Washington, at least one of which I understood to be completed. Some officer, whose name I do not know, called in person to report to the Chief of Staff on the situation at Hickam Field. At about 3 P. M., a secret radio message was received by the Chief of Staff, which was shown to me, and which was delivered to the fact that the Japanese were serving what amounted to an ultimatum, at one o'clock P. M. that day. We were unable to understand the message, inasmuch as the Japanese had made and concluded their assault on Pearl Harbor and Hickman Field, approximately seven hours previously. In discussing the message with Col. Phillips, he remarked that this "must be the message to which Gen. Marshall was referring, and which he asked me if I had received." As I recall, the message was dated and stamped as having been sent from Washington at 12:18 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941. I am positive that the message was not received by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department before 2:55 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941, at the earliest. Shortly thereafter, I heard the Chief of Staff phone the contents of the message to Gen. Short at the Crater, near Ft. Shafter.

An additional message was prepared by Col. Phillips, the contents of which I do not know, and I was directed to proceed to Pearl Harbor with the secret message and the second message, and deliver both to Admiral Kimmel. I left Ft. Shafter in an official car at 5:42 P. M. and rushed to Admiral Kimmel's headquarters, where I delivered both messages to his Chief of Staff, Capt. Davis, with whom I conversed for some time. There was more discussion about the time of the secret message and we attempted to account for the delay in transmission. Thereafter, Admiral Kimmel wrote, in longhand, a message to Gen. Short, consisting of three pages of notepaper about 5 by 7 inches in size, the last of the three being about one half filled with the writing. This message he showed to two other Admirals who were conferring with him, sealed the same, and delivered to me with instructions to deliver it to Gen. Short at once. Before I left Pearl Harbor, an officer whose name is Delaney, but whose rank I do not
know, as he was in civilian clothes, gave me a message concerning the naval vessels which were to enter the harbor that night, so that our coastal batteries would not fire on them. I then returned, with the three messages—the pink secret message, the Admiral's note, and Delaney's advice, to Ft. Shafter, where I arrived at 4:16 P.M. I delivered the messages to Col. Phillips, who opened the Admiral's note, and after reading it, again sealed it with sealing wax, with the assistance of Mr. Emmons in the office, and directed me to take it to the General in the Crater at once, which I did. After reading the message, Gen. Short called Col. Phillips and told him in substance, "I've read the Admiral's note, and will keep it in my personal possession." He then asked me my name, which I gave him, and he directed me to return to Ft. Shafter. The time of my arrival there was 4:40 P.M., after which my attention was occupied by other matters.

WM. M. CORB, Capt. JAGD., Ft. Shafter.

Signal Corps, United States Army

The following message was received at Radio Station W4J in CODE Secret

103 WAR HS 144 WD WASHIN DC 1123P DEC 8 1941
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

541 8th. Attention General Fred Martin Stop Clarify ground personnel needed as requested in secret radio one zero six eight dated December seven Stop The Commanding General Hawaiian Department has been informed of status of ground reinforcements Stop Close in defense and antisabotage guard should be supplied by Commanding General Hawaiian Department Stop State whether personnel requested is Air Corps or ground personnel Stop It is impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by carrier Stop Additional P dash forty and P dash thirty nine types of aircraft are crated for shipment Stop Final decision reference heavy bombardment for Hawaii is being made this date Stop Notification later.

ADIAMS,
955P/8/8

Received as a secret communication.
Decoded by: S Sgt D L Smith, S Cl 115A 9 December 1941.
Answer should me marked "Answer to Code Message No. 541 8th."

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.

E. Moore,
E. Moore,
E. Moore,
Major, Air Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1078—8th.
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.: 

More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold semicolon command alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dispersion Stop All planes now dispersed comma pursuit in bunkers comma bombers can not be bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint agreement places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for help when thought necessary Stop Of planes in ferry flight all landed Oahu two landed small fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gun fire and one badly damaged Stop Attack was a perfectly executed surprise attack in strict accord with our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bombing was highly
accurate. Every effort made with few bombers left to locate carriers without success. Casualties: dead six officers, two hundred seven enlisted, comma, wounded some seriously, three sixty seven enlisted. Stop. Morale high End Martin.

Enc Sec by
Lt J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B.
526P Dec 8 1941.

Note:

(Handwritten:) RCA-1549 WS. Delivered to Sig Office 11:45 not marked Priority to decoding Officer 246P.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code:

Secret Confidential Restricted

P 3 WAR L 54 WD 1 EXTRA URGENT WASHINGTON DC 219P DEC 9 1941
CG HAWN DEPT FT. SHAFTER TH

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine. Repeat five two nine. December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to Staff and by what staff office received.

COLTON, Acting.

(Handwritten:) 529 delivered to C/S 300 PM 7 Dec—received for by captn Trueman delivered by Mr Hough; 2:58 PM Col Dunlop) 733A Honolulu, T. H. Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910 AM Dec 9 1941. (Handwritten:) LGF (Handwritten:) Filed 12:18 PM Wash or 6:48 Hon time. Received RCA Honolulu 7:33 A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.
Request that the following Secret—Extra Urgent official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
2:00 P.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1087—9th.

Approved for transmission:

U. M. McDole,
U. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D.
Assistant Adjutant General.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, D. C.:
Re your five four nine radio five two nine received Honolulu by RCA seven thirty three morning seventh Stop. This message delivered signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop. Deciphered message received by adjutant general Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh.

Enc. Sec. Extra Urgent by
(Handwritten:) L G F
Lt L G Forbes SC
315P Dec. 9 1941
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,
WALTER C. PHILLIPS, Col., GSC.
Chief of Staff.

Sent as radiogram No. 1094—9th.

Major General H. H. Arnold,
War Department, Washington, D. C.:
Re telephone conversation today with Phillips am satisfied.

Short.

Enc Sec by
Lt G Lennox, S C,
730 p 9 Dec 1941

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,
WALTER C. PHILLIPS, Col., GSC.
Chief of Staff.

Sent as radiogram No. 1112—11th.

The Adjutant General,
War Department, Washington, D. C.:
Reference is made to employment of troops at Christmas comma Canton comma Fiji and New Caledonia Stop. Is the prohibition in Public Resolution number ninety six forbidding the use of units and individuals outside the limits of the United States and possessions thereof rescinded by the declaration of war End.

Short.

Enc Sec by D. E. G.
(Handwritten:) Lt De George SC
1930 11 Dec 41

SECRET

Headquarters Hawaiian Department

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

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will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

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<th>No. of Ind., From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Radio—Merle Smith</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind., AO, 12/11/41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>1. The attached radio recd thru HAF facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ind., C/S, 12/11/41</td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>File</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECRET

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

A-64

1 FSU2 PY IMPORTANT GR231

To: Commanding General Honolulu.
From: Merle Smith 18 11th December.

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy loss and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to the Kota Baru. Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south Kota Baru, Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri Sarawak by order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop RAAF bombed Tobi Helen Reef Stop Nauru bombed again contact lost Kure (Ocean Island) Stop. Reported that the enemy commander in chief combined air force at Saigon comma same of southern expedition force probably Saigon same of combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama same of South China Fleet near Hong Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area.

Slightly garbled.

One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Condor 130 miles South Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat MILID as my 31 MERLE SMITH (garble).

0845 Z / 11

130A

Slightly garbled.

Decoded by AB. Time 815A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 11 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter G. Phillips,
WALTER G. PHILLIPS,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

Sent as radiogram No. 1110—11th.
Message center No. 21.
Time filed 1110.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

Following is Paraphrase of Paper #23 this file radio eleven December Forty one received Quote

A-64

1 FSU2 PY IMPORTANT GR231

To: Commanding General Honolulu.
From: Merle Smith 18 11th December.

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy loss and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to the Kota Baru, Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south Kota Baru, Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri Sarawak by order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop RAAF bombed Tobi Helen Reef Stop Nauru bombed again contact...
lost Kure (Ocean Island) Stop 0845. Reported that the enemy commander in chief
combined air force at Saigon Comma same of southern expedition force prob-
ably Saigon same of combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama Same of South
China Fleet near Hong Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop
Slightly garbled
One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor
130 miles south Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya
Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat
MILD as my 31 Merle Smith (Garble)

130A
Slightly garbled
Unquote end of message.

Enc sec by
Lt. J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B.
150P Dec 11 1951

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP
SECRET

The Inter-StafF Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the
Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be
used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office
to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the
exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Ad-
judant General unless a policy has been established. The staff section origi-
nating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorse-
ment list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently
will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorse-
ments hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in
charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind., Form and Date | To | Subject: WD SEC Radio 529 7th re
Ultimatum by Japanese and destruc-
tion of their code machine. |
|---------------------------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1st Ind. C/S 14 Dec 41... | AG... | For file. 6. Inch. 6. Subject radio. | Walter Phillips, Col-
nel G. S. C., Chief of
Staff. |

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H. 9 July 1941.

In reply refer to:
Subject: Special Report.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted
pursuant to contents of letter AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M from the War De-
partment, Washington, D C., to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, dated March 26, 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installation",
and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the De-
partment and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Depart-
ment Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently
declared unlimited emergency.

2. Estimate of the Situation:
a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and in-
stallations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding
Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field,
that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the priority and expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.

b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickman Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has as yet been ordered, or contravise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered.

[2] c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war With Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.

(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa, of quick movement of all heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such incipient events as:
(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.
(b) Or, of a final break with the German-Italian Axis.
(c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting interests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.
(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America’s proposed aid to Russia.
(e) Or a repercussion in consequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.
(f) Or an occupation of the Galapagos Islands as a result of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador.

(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from which to reenforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the mainland or from which to reenforce Manila with B-19’s and the belief that Hickam will be fully spot-lighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.

(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents acting jointly in support of her tri-parthe pact.

(4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution of secretly prepared plan for sabotage.

[3] (5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reinforcing our far-flung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the the narrow seas that can be employed en mass within tactical times over strategic theatres of 2500 miles extent. (As an illustration of the precept in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 9, 1941.)

d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be preconceived now and receive first consideration over all other types of military field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, air-borne infantry transports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize an immediate state of air readiness and seek first, by any and all means, to destroy the opposing state of air-readiness.
3. General Findings:

a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly
acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to suc-
cessful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently
assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and
Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having
inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, or-
organization and management which are now required to master the present border-
line war situation.

b. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is
faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly
unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training
to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without dis-
rupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city as
Hickam Field.

c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due:
   (1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.
   (2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropi-
cal island garrisoned by large forces.
   (3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peace-time
occupancy instead of war-time security.
   (4) To the relative inattention accorded in peacetime to intelli-
gence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.
   (5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on
sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for
information.
   (6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily in-
creased routine administration.
   (7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air
Force.
   (8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the
quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland
to construct buildings and grounds.
   (9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning
reserve officers to activate new units.
   (10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting
new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.
   (11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the
above first needs.
   (12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new
projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily
post duties.
   (13) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now
existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for
reliability of all civil service employees.
   (14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive
waiting attitude.
   (15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from
which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical
concern for the future.
   (16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of
labor and materials required to meet the needs of all arms and services.

[5]   d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control
has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons,
departments, and daily mass details, due in turn:
   (1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodi-
cally to the mainland.
   (2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve
officers within the past year.
   (3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained
men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead
growth of higher echelons.
   (4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.
   (5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical
school courses at Wheeler and Hickam Fields.
   (6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill
and ground security missions.
(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of several thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks.

(8) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying islands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments in the Department.

(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics.

(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary recruits and technical school training.

(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained specialists from the Service Departments and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police, drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a command that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 separate specialized divisions, departments, and sections.

(12) To the culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and an over-complicated administration of it.

[6] 4 Special Findings:

a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to the effect that every basic unit such as the Air-Squadron must possess a practical working knowledge of each and every man under its immediate legal jurisdiction—this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience, and "trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the present set-up:

(1) Five or more different applications of the War Department's prescribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration centers exist in the Department.

1st—At Schofield, one regiment centralizes separate company personnel units in regimental headquarters.

2nd—Another regiment centralizes composite battalion units in regimental headquarters.

3rd—Another regiment centralizes the separate specialized functions that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.

4th—Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the Wing Headquarters.

5th—Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three Group Headquarters (i.e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the Wing are attached.

(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, payrolls, reports of changes, etc.

(3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.

(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees.

(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.

[7] (6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and who report to Squadron Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters—but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for the changes or exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily emergency dictates.
(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is physically assembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.

(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel functions.

(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security.

(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and the front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the timing of the mass of personnel, operations, materiel, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Department to the Squadron and the Squadron to the Department, the undersigned finds that a standard system of systematic daily coordination throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a necessity.

(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simplified by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uniformly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rearrange existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "operations control office" and "grand security troops" as a basis.

(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in the Air Force for successsive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which the lower echelons have no direct control.

5. Detailed Findings:

a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conjunction with the Inspector General's report.

b. Command Division:

(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the personal attention of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.

(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one necessitating a formal regard for the serious legal consequences involved.

(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, (3) operations intelligence, (4) material intelligence and (5) flight intelligence.

(4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection and report.

(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, under the direct control of the Wing Commander.

(6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged
especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in personnel, operations, and matériel divisions.

(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered morale of the junior officer and private soldier; this in order to separate the effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subversive agents.

c. Personnel Division:

(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the Hawaiian Air Force.

(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detachment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.

(3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men, grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.

(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the recurrence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.

(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "trail" analysis and report to S-2.

(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swimming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program with estimated dates of completion.

(10) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale, Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian Division, and that he give special attention to such items as the acquisition of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now in use, etc.

(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.

(9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purpose to the Hawaiian Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center.

(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, be set up for each service division, department and section of the Base which constitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station whether or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.

(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command, service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency report and the recommendation of the operating departments.

(12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of tours of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the station.

(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably of infantrymen.

(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison-Officer, Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered; also, that officers assigned to guard defense and security wear side-arms.

(15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.

(16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people of either sex when on duty.

(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station.
(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or materiel is permitted to remain over-night on the station.

(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of principal departments be issued pistols.

(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may be taking civilian flying instruction.

(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge carefully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, cane or small fires at a distance beyond quick recall.

(22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young officers for autos and uniforms be re-checked.

(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Exchange and Non-commissioned Officers' Club be re-checked.

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records be returned to the mainland.

(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive increasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be re-checked.

(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.

(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal distribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made the subject of a special study and report with the view of creating a more uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital specialties [12] such as squadron mess, communications, armament, maintenance, without adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for first priority of flying pay.

(28) That S-1 offices, officers and functions be separated organically from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.

(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married non-commissioned officers and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.

d. Operations Division:

(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be re-checked and numbered.

(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked and numbered.

(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to recheck the proposed use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and defense plans to prevent conflict.

(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be re-checked in connection with Plans for Ground Security, Alert Plans and Plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.

(5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally responsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted higher commanders.

(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft be expedited.

(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio operators be reduced to writing.

(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ordnance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at outlying fields and for the safe-guarding [13] of bombsights on overnight stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.
(9) That the storage and shortage of water, and exposed pipelines at outlying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a ground security viewpoint.
(10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and vaults.
(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires between Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and frequent practice.
(12) That the question of developing an auxiliary mobile message center in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, wire and repair men, be considered.
(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal Officer in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-submitted and receive favorable action.
(14) That additional measures, such as voice code, be prescribed and tested to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and that private soldiers be excluded from duty of transmitting important verbal orders of serious purport.

e. Materiel Division:
(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system, to include periodic chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in writing as a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooperation and technical advise, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Hawaiian Air Depot, be solicited.
(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickman Field dock at the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under the dock.
(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all manholes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and communications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.
(4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and prepared by Wing S-4, of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are considered to be “critical”, such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main control cables, the connection of control cables with the servo drums of the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuselage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.
(5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include such a selected list of “critical” items.
(6) That a line limit or priority for the completion of work required of the Engineer Corps in the Wing Plan for screening, lighting and fencing of Hickam Field be prescribed, particularly, by special order.
(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of maintenance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been available to the Engineers; for several months, be put on a prescribed priority list by the Department.
(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.
(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective consideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons.
(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unobstructed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of the Depot.
(11) That all plats and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.
[15] (12) That copies of the detailed findings of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.

(13) That additional measures for night-time security be prescribed to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the shops, hangars and dead-line.

(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, Supply, Fire Department, etc. who control nearly all utilities that can tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance social morale.

(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length of runways on Hickam Field and the Island of Oahu be expedited.

1. Flight Division:

(1) That flight and airplane commanders, especially of B-17 type of bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility of a commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in Army Regulations.

(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally responsible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in flight.

(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally responsible for the related functions of his flight plan, the coordination of flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, dress, discipline, and tactical reports.

6. Conclusions:

a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias, or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities.

b. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is required for the Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organization for the Air Base Group.

[16] c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects for Hickam Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Department Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to insure compliance within prescribed time limits.

7. Recommendations:

That the Department Commander authorize a board of general officers of the Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing emergency.

8. Appreciations:

a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and Major A. W. Meehan, G-3, is acknowledged.

c. The spirit of open honesty and helpfulness displayed by Brigadier General J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the necessary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition, is considered worthy of commendation.

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above, it is appreciated that the present status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense of responsibility is at issue.

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 18th Wing, with a request that he register any difference of facts or opinion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. Burwell,
H. S. BURWELL,
Colonel, A. G.,
Special Inspector.

79716—46—Ex. 148—16
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6
To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect to see if airplanes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

By courier, 1 May 1941.

CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6
To: Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,
O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

AG 383.4 (7-15-41)

24
HQ. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., July 17, 1941.—To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a verbal reply.

For the Commanding General:

Edward Jenkins,
Edward Jenkins,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 August 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6
To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, and follow-up letter 15 July 1941, request that reply be expedited.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department of Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communications.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

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<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Ind. AG 18 Nov 41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>Herewith reports from major echelon Commanders in compliance with 3rd R/S Indorsement C/S to AG, 29 April 41, in file marked “HERE”. 6 Incl. #1-Report General Murray. #2-“Colonel Walsh. #3-“Colonel Capron. #4-“General Gardner. #5-“General Martin. #6-AG file 383.4 (Secret).</td>
</tr>
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<td>1st Ind. Air O, 11/17/41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>There is attached special report on Hickam Field together with comments thereon by the Hawaiian Air Force Staff and General Martin. 1 Incl. Chart showing Burwell Report, General Martin’s Comments and Staff Comments. For the Air Officer: Study and report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ind. C/S 11/18/41, #118</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ind. G-20 16 Jun 42</td>
<td>A. G.1</td>
<td>For file—no report made.</td>
</tr>
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### Comments on Burwell Report

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<th>General Martin's comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Subject: Special Report. To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.</td>
<td>Concur. However, it is believed the condition will be corrected as experience is gained and discipline is improved. Concur.</td>
<td>While this may have been true at the time, this survey was started during the elapsed time since, the lower echelon commanders have become impressed with the need for increased precautions to prevent acts of sabotage. This will always be difficult to prevent but is becoming increasingly more difficult of accomplishment due to the fact that all concerned are indoctrinated with the need for constant vigilance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted pursuant to contents of letter A G 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War Department, Washington, D. C., to the Commanding General, dated March 26, 1941, subject: &quot;Provisions for security of Installations&quot;, and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Department Commanders' policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently declared unlimited emergency. 2. Estimate of the Situation:</td>
<td></td>
<td>As many intelligent men throughout the United States fail to understand the significance of international events, it can not be expected that all members of this command will properly evaluate these events nor is it necessary. Command and staff officers keep informed as to the situation as it affects the Hawaiian Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and installations, the undersigned has found, from the viewpoint of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate. b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickam Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the [9] controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone advent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has as yet been ordered, or contrariwise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered. c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war with Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.</td>
<td></td>
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(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa of quick movement of all heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such incipient events as: [5] (a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.
(b) Or, of a final break with the German Italian Axis.

(c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting interests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.

(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia.

(e) Or a repercussion in sequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.

(f) Or an occupation of the Galapagos Islands as a result of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador.

(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from which to reinforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the mainland or from which to reinforce Manila with '9's and the belief that Hickam will be fully spotlighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.

(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents acting jointly in support of her tri-parte pact.

4. Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution of a secretly prepared plan for sabotage.

(5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reinforcing our farflung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the narrow seas that can be employed en masse within tactical times over strategical theatres of 2,500 miles extent. (As an illustration of the precept in mind see copy of 1-2 map for July 7, 1941.)

6. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be preconceived now and receive first consideration over all other types of military field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, airborne infantry transports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize an immediate state of air readiness and seek first, by any and all means, to destroy the opposing state of air-readiness.

3. General Findings:

a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to [5] successful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently assigned command of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, organization and management which are now required to master the present border-line war situation.

b. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without disrupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city at Hickam Field.

Strongly concur. It is believed that the development of a strong striking force of heavy bombardment aviation in the Hawaiian Department is imperative to the safety of the Hawaiian Islands. It is further believed that a collision of air forces will occur prior to and independent of any activities of defending ground forces.

Concur. The long range bomber is the only offensive weapon available to the Department Commander, it will be first into action and will so remain as long as available. The importance of this weapon dictates every possible protection from all available sources that it may be immune from sabotage.

This statement infers that a change in organization is necessary to meet changed conditions. It is held that the present organization is satisfactory to cope with the existing circumstances.

Concur with Staff Comments.
c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due:
(1) To the ingrained habits of peacetime.
(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces.
(3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peacetime instead of wartime security.
(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peacetime to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.
(5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for information.
(6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily increased administration.
(7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air Force.
(8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland to construct buildings and grounds.
(9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning reserve officers to activate new units.
(10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.
(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequence of the above first needs.
(12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily post duties.
(13) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peacetime law and order now existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for reliability of all civil service employees.
(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.
(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future.
(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of labor and materials required to meet the need of all arms and services.

(16) It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons, departments, and daily mass details, due in turn:
(1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodically to the mainland.
(2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve officers within the last year.
(3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead growth of higher echelons.
(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.
(6) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical school courses at Wheeler Field and Hickam Field.

(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill and ground security missions.

(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of several thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks.

(8) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying islands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments in the Department.

(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics.

(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary recruit and technical school training.

(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained specialists from the Service Department and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police, drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a command that comprises approximately 20 squadrons and over 100 separate specialized divisions, departments, and sections.

(12) To the culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and an over-complicated administration of it.

4. Special Findings:

a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to the effect that every basic unit such as the Air-Squadron must mediate legal jurisdiction—this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience and "trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the present setup:

1) Five or more different applications of the war Department's prescribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration centers exist in the Department.

2) Centralized separate company personnel units in regimental headquarters.

3) Another regiment centralized the separate specialized function that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.

The only duplication is in the clerical course. This duplication is considered necessary in view of the large number of additional clerks required by the expansion.

The requirements for furnishing men for ground defense and security measures has been responsible for this dislocation more than any other factor.

It is believed this condition could be and should be corrected by the establishment of organization messes in mobilization type buildings.

The detachment of any A. C. personnel for other than A. C. duties is objectionable and will reflect on the efficiency of the Air Force.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Absolute uniformity is not regarded as essential.

Infantry instruction in the School of the Soldier is centralize in the Recruit Casual Camps.

A central mess conceived in the interests of economy has, to my knowledge, always been destruction of morale. Separate messes would remove this source of dissatisfaction but the established general mess cannot now be changed. It is a continuing menace to moral the effects of which can be ameliorated by most careful supervision.

Participation in centralized athletics has a decided value as a moral builder and development of Esprit de Corps" Mass athletics should be encouraged for the development of healthy bodies and minds of the command as a whole.
### Comments on Burwell Report—Continued

**Burwell's Report**

1. Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the Wing Headquarters.
2. Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three Group Headquarters (i.e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the Wing are attached.
3. Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, payrolls, reports of changes, etc.
4. Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.
5. Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.
6. The control of absenteeism and a knowledge of the whereabouts during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and who report to Group Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for the changes or exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily emergency dictates.
7. Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is evident that close daily coordination and between intelligence and personnel is physically dismembered through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.
8. This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communication, which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel functions.
9. Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated, regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security, and further that the intelligence and front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the timing of the

**Staff comments**

- No comment.
- No comment.
- No comment.
- Concur.

**General Martin's comments**

Concur. Under the present organization there will always be this conflict between daily emergencies and the training and control of the tactical units.

The solution of this problem lies with the respective squadron commanders. Squadrons must maintain a positive record by name of all men on each detail, regular or special, those on sick report or absent for any cause. Record of changes in status of this personnel is a function of the Personnel Section for the Squadron.

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<td>5th—Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three Group Headquarters (i.e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the Wing are attached.</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, payrolls, reports of changes, etc.</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees.</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
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<td>(6) The control of absenteeism and a knowledge of the whereabouts during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and who report to Group Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for the changes or exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily emergency dictates.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
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<td>(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is evident that close daily coordination and between intelligence and personnel is physically dismembered through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
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<td>(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communication, which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel functions.</td>
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<td>(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated, regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security, and further that the intelligence and front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the timing of the</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
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This paragraph is apparently an introduction to paragraph 11.
mass of personnel, operations, material, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Department to the Squadron and the Squadron to the Department, the undersigned finds that a standard system of systematic daily coordination throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a necessity.

(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simplified by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uniformly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rearrange existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "operations control office" and "ground security troops" as a basis.

(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which the lower echelons have no direct control.

5. Detailed Findings:
   a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conjunction with the Inspector General's report.
   (14) b. Command Divisions:
   (1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of the Commanding General, 18th Wing be brought to the personal attention of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.
   (2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one necessitating a formal regard for the serious legal consequences involved.
   (3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, (3) operations intelligence, (4) material intelligence and (5) flight intelligence.
   (4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished a list of critical items, mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection and report.

   (5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, under the direct control of the Wing Commander.

   (6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and separate sense of control over his Associate Executives who are charged especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in personnel, operations, and material divisions.
   (7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered morale of the junior officer and private soldier; this in order to separate the effects of self-inflicted dissatisfaction from the effects of possible subversive agents.

c. Personnel Division:

   This paragraph implies a fundamental change in the military establishment which should only be considered after a more thorough and exacting study has been made of the ramifications of such reorganization.

   It is not believed that a system involving formal daily reports is required. As stated above, any basic change in the theory of staff organization requires further study.

   No comments.

   It is believed that the question of priorities is being handled in a manner as satisfactory as can be expected under existing conditions. It is being so regarded.

   The subdivision of the entire military function into the 5 classifications noted is subject to a further study.

   It is not believed that the combining of administration and technical inspections into a single agency would serve a useful purpose. As to each of the present inspection branches the statement under discussion substantially, describes existing procedure.

   The recommendation that Plans & Intelligence be combined is not concurred in. A Wing, when it constitutes a component part of a larger unit, is not regarded as a planning echelon.

   The necessity for close staff coordination requires no comment.

   It is the unanimous opinion of the staff officers working on this report that the morale condition at Hickam Field is unsatisfactory.
### Comments on Burwell Report—Continued

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<td>(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the Hawaiian Air Force.</td>
<td>Inasmuch as these units are practically standardized now and will be completely standardized in the near future, this recommendation is taken care of.</td>
<td>Under existing circumstances it is physically impossible to organize separate messes in the existing building. The consolidated mess is now operating as a general mess in accordance with existing Army Regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detachment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.</td>
<td>As previously stated it is recommended that the consolidated mess be discontinued as soon as practicable.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men, grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.</td>
<td>Equipment has been or is being purchased and improvements are now underway.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the reoccurrence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) That all serious illegibilities committed by enlisted men be coordinated with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological “trait” analysis and report to S-2.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swimming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program with estimated dates of completion.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
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<td>(7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale, Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian Division, and that the give special attention to such items as the acquisition of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now in use, etc.</td>
<td>This has been done.</td>
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<td>(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.</td>
<td>All concurs except G-2. G-2 thinks it is entirely useless and invariably inaccurate paper work.</td>
<td>Concur. This can be accomplished by making separate lists containing names of men on specific details. These lists to be prepared from a complete roster of men in the organization.</td>
</tr>
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<td>(9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purpose to the Hawaiian Air Depot which acts as a Material Replacement Center.</td>
<td>Concur. Recruit training is now centralized at Bellows but it is considered impracticable to combine the technical schools with that organization due to lack of suitable housing and buildings. It is further believed that replacements for Hawaii as well as all foreign stations should be graduates of technical schools on the mainland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, be set-up for each service division, department and section of the Base which constitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station whether or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command, service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency report and the recommendation of the operating departments.

(12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of hours of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the station.

(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably of infantrymen.

(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison Officer, Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered; also, that officers assigned to guard and defense wear side-arms.

(15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.

(16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people of either sex when on duty.

(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be furnished distinctive arm bands, or caps, or other means of controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station.

(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and patrols to check all parking plans in order to insures as far as possible that no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or material is permitted to remain overnight on the station.

(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of Principal Departments be issued pistols.

(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may be taking civilian flying instructions.

(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge carefully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, cane or small fires at a distance beyond recall.

(22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young officers for autos and uniforms be re-checked.

(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Exchange and Non-commissioned Officers' Club be re-checked.

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records be returned to the mainland.

(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive increasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be rechecked.

A standard promotion system is now under study in this Headquarters for the Hawaiian Air Force. It is believed that representation should be made to the Chief of the Army Air Forces looking to an established system throughout.

It is fully recognized that a large number of activities have to function at night. It is not believed that this condition has created any erroneous impression.

The tables of organization provide an entirely inadequate force for security and guard. It is strongly recommended that a form of security organization which is capable of providing close-in defense against all forms of attack should be an integral part of all A. C. stations. G-2 concurs except the word units should be substituted for stations.

Recommendations of Infantry Liaison Officer should be considered on their merits when they are submitted.

Recommend this or some other similar system be adopted.

This is covered in the General Orders of all guards.

Concur.

Concur.

Guards should be present at all times on critical points.

Concur.

Concur.

This is being investigated.

Concur.

Concur.

The character of the local population makes this an extremely difficult question to deal with and we believe that the seriousness can not be over emphasized.

Concur in Staff Comments. The security organization be authorized for each station to meet the requirements of that station. This means that there can be no uniformity as to strength and grades and ratings for this organization. A security detachment within units could not properly serve this purpose.

They are not supposed to be enlisted with such a record.
### Burwell's Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff comments</th>
<th>General Martin's comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal distribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made the subject of a special study and report with the view of creating a more uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital specialties such as squadron mess, communications, armament, maintenance, without (11) adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for first priority of flying pay.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(28) That S-1 officers, officers and functions be separated organically from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married noncommissioned officers and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.</td>
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#### Operations Division:

(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be re-checked now and numbered.

(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked and numbered.

(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to re-check the proposed use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and defense plan to prevent conflict.

(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be re-checked in connection with plans for Ground Security, alert plans and plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.

(5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training be interpolated, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the directives and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally responsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted higher commanders.

(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft be expedited.

(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio operators be reduced to writing.

(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ordnance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at outlying fields and for the safeguarding of bomb sights on over-night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.

(9) That the storage and shortage of water and exposed pipelines at outlying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a ground security viewpoint.
[23] (10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and vaults.

(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires between Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and frequent practice.

(12) That the question of developing an auxiliary mobile message center in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, wire and repair men, be considered.

(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal Officer in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-submitted and receive favorable action.

(14) That additional measures, such as a voice code, be prescribed and tested to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and the private soldiers be excluded from the duty of transmitting important verbal orders of serious purport.

e. Material Division:

(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system to include periodic chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in [24], writing as a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safeguards against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that cooperation and technical advice, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Hawaiian Air Depot, be solicited.

(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickam Field dock at the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that will prevent any unauthorized boats from plighting explosives under the dock.

(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man-holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and communications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.

(4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and prepared by Wing S-4 of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are considered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the appurtenances under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main control cables, the connection of control cables with the servo drums of the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuselage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.

[25] (5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include such a selected list of "critical" items.

(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required of the Engineer Corps in the Wing plan for screening, lighting and fencing of Hickam Field be prescribed particularly by special order.

(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of maintenance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry on if and when the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been available to the Engineers for several months, be put on a prescribed priority list by the Department.

(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.

Concur.

It is considered that the possibility of tapping exposed wires is an ever-present danger.

Concur.

The Air Force Signal Officer will be called upon to re-submit any recommendations he may have made and they will be given such consideration as they deserve.

Concur.

It is believed that this should be covered by instructions to the guard supplemented by such standing orders that will insure periodic inspections by the department head concerned.

Concur.

This project is underway.

Concur.

This project is under way and appropriations have been made for the accomplishment of same.

Concur.

This is being cared for by the temporary organization, Maintenance Command.

This paragraph is not understood. It seems to be contradictory. A certain amount of rotation of technical workers is desired that they may acquire knowledge which will permit flexibility in assignment. Such flexibility should operate to prevent interruptions in completion of work orders.
### Comments on Burwell Report—Continued

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective consideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unobstructed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of the Depot.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
<td>Not concurred in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. That all plots and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
<td>Considered unnecessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. That copies of the detailed findings of Hawaiian Air Depot and Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premises be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.</td>
<td>Recommend that personnel concerned be interviewed or otherwise questioned to determine whether or not any dissatisfaction exists with a view to correction thereof.</td>
<td>Concur.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. That additional measures for nighttime security be prescribed to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the shops, hangars and dead-line.</td>
<td>It is considered that this is now in effect but that the allusion to a train commander is hardly pertinent.</td>
<td>This is in effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, supply, fire department, etc. who control nearly all utilities that can tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance social morale.</td>
<td>This is in effect.</td>
<td>This is in effect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited.</td>
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**f. Flight Division:**

1. That flight and airplane commanders especially of B-17 type of bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility of a commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in Army Regulations.

2. That each airplane commander be held directly and legally responsible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in flight.

3. That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally responsible for the related function of his flight plan, the coordination of flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, dress, discipline and tactical reports.

**6. Conclusions:**

a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile procilities.
b. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is required for the [99] Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organization for the Air Base Group.

c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects of Hickam Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Department Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to insure compliance within prescribed time limits.

7. Recommendations:
   That the Department Commander authorize a board of general officers of the Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing emergency.

8. Appreciation:
   a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Blicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers Federal Bureau of Investigation.
   b. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and Major A. W. Meehan, G-3 is acknowledged.

c. The spirit of open honest helpfulness [99] displayed by Brigadier General J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the necessary changes from a peace-time state to a critical border-line war-time condition, is considered worthy of commendation.

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above, it is appreciated that the present status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense of responsibility is at issue.

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 18th Wing, with a request that he register any difference of facts or opinion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

No comment.

H. S. Burwell, Colonel, A. C.,
Special Inspector.
PROVISIONS

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,
Hickam Field, T. H., 17 November 1941.

In reply refer to:
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter AG 588.4/6, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installations", there are inclosed special reports on Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and the Hawaiian Air Depot.

2. These reports have been carefully studied by this headquarters and those deficiencies susceptible of correction have been corrected. Many of the opinions expressed by the inspecting officer are in conflict with established policies and Army organization and as such cannot receive remedial action by local commanders.

3. The vital installations on all Air Force stations are believed to be adequately guarded and all commanders are fully cognizant of their responsibilities.

F. L. Martin,
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 IncIs.
#1—Report on Hickam Field
#2—Report on Wheeler Field
#3—Report on Hawaiian Air Depot

HEADQUARTERS 14TH PURSUIT WING,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Wheeler Field, T. H., 29 July 1941.

Refer to:
Subject: Special Report On Wheeler Field, T. H.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. Authority:
   a. See paragraph 1, attached copy of Special Report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, 9 July 1941.

2. Estimate of the Situation:
   a. See attached report, paragraph 2 a, b, c, and d.

3. General Findings:
   a. See attached report, paragraph 3 a, b, c, also copy of memorandum to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, 10 July 1941.

4. Special Findings:
   a. See attached report, paragraph 4 a (1).

   (Wheeler Field has centralized all squadron units in a Wing Headquarters Personnel Administration Center. Investigation indicates that this set-up may be well employed as a standard.)

5. Detailed Findings:
   a. The following detailed findings contained in attached report apply constructively to the 14th Wing: Paragraph 5 a, paragraph 5 b (1), (2), and (3), paragraph 5 c (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (29); paragraph 5 d (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 e (1), (3), (4) (re P-40s), (5), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 f (1), (2), and (3).

   (In order to instill an adequate attitude of mind throughout the lower echelons of the command on the subject of intelligence, the undersigned finds that all squadron intelligence officers need an intelligence manual composed of specific details
such as those contained in paragraph 5, attached report. The Commanding General and Staff of the 14th Pursuit Wing fully appreciate the desire of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Hawaiian Air Force to effect, quickly, a change from the previous peace-time status to the present borderline war-time status, and have fully cooperated by preparing a detailed plan of action.

(Special attention is invited to the need for continued and increasing daily coordination between the Corps of Engineers at Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.)

(It is believed that there is an urgent security need for “satellite” fields adjacent to in the near vicinity of Wheeler Field.)

6. Conclusions:
   a. See attached report, paragraph 6 b, c.

(Special attention is invited to the need for an organic maintenance command.)

(Special attention is invited to the needs of Wheeler Field for priority consideration and early action on the recommendations of the Commanding General, 14th Wing, in reference to fencing, lighting, facilities at Wright Gate, further military control of the public highway through Wheeler Field, and to required safeguarding of all paint, oil, and gas dumps.

7. Recommendations:
   a. See attached report, paragraph 7 a.

8. Appreciation:
   a. See attached report, paragraph 8 a, b, d, e.

(The spirit of helpfulness extended by the Commanding General and Staff, 14th Wing, to the undersigned, in the preparation of the required changes from a peace-time status to a critical borderline condition, is considered worthy of commendation.)

b. A copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 14th Wing, with a request that he register his concurrence or his difference of opinion, and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. Burwell, 
H. S. BURNWELL, 
Colonel, Air Corps, Special Inspector.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER, 
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 383.4/6
To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDOLE, 
Major, A. G. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE, 
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER, 
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 June 1941.

In reply refer to:
Subject: Special Report.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Pursuant to instructions contained in attached War Department letter the following special report on the Hawaiian Air Depot is submitted:

1. General Comments:
   a. Officers of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force and of the F. B. I. were previously interviewed reference general policy.
b: All commissioned officers and foremen of the Depot were personally interviewed reference their knowledge and familiarity with the names, faces, and reputation of all employees.

c. Headquarters personnel records are inspected for upkeep and statistical data. All warehouses, storerooms, shops and grounds were inspected personally.

d. Critical locations were examined carefully.

2. Judged by standards required in peace time, conditions were found as follows:
   a. Airplanes:
      (1) Officers, superior.
      (2) Crews, competent and trustworthy.
      (3) Planes, excellent condition, locked at night, spot lighted.
      (4) Guards, trustworthy.
      (5) History of aircraft evidenced in Form #41 reveals no evidence of previous untoward instances.
      (6) Technical inspections, complete.
      (7) No cases of carelessness noted.

   b. Buildings and Grounds:
      (1) Offices, superior.
      (2) Chief clerk and superintendent, especially intelligent.
      (3) Foremen, competent and trustworthy.
      (4) Technicians, skilled and conscientious.
      (5) Workers, industrious.
      (6) Shop inspection, thorough.
      (7) Equipment, good condition.
      (8) Buildings, carefully locked at night.
      (9) Guards, trustworthy.
      (10) Machinery, clean.
      (11) Supplies, stored orderly.
      (12) Fire apparatus, good condition.
      (13) No cases of carelessness noted.

   c. Related Factors:
      Badges are being worn. Action being initiated on photo badges. Employees are being check in and out at the main gate. Foremen and workers wear separate, distinctive uniforms. The Depot Commander, the Supply Officer and Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Colonels Hurd, Montgomery and Lewis, respectively, are giving intelligent and commendable attention to local responsibilities concerned on the subject of this survey.

2. Conclusions:
   Based on standards required in time of an unlimited emergency:
   a. That the general opinion of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Hawaiian Air Force, to the effect that the requirements prescribed for guards at the gate, the interior watchman system and the inspection of identification badges, should be progressively increased during the present unlimited emergency and that this conclusion is appreciated by subordinate officers in the Depot who are initiating a plan of action to effect a compliance.
   b. That progressive and increasing attention be given by every foreman to insure a more intimate knowledge of every employee's name, face and characteristics and to this end that his intelligence test, physical test, trade test, experience test and, most importantly, his "trait" test data be systematically compiled and maintained.
   c. That the vital G-2 aspects of the above test-data be increasingly coordinated with the S-1 office.
   d. That the present degree of cooperation between the Depot and the Civil Service, also between the Depot and the F. B. L. are considered to be excellent.
   e. That existing conflicts between the communications plan of organization and operation as contained in the Hawaiian Air Force Field Orders and prescribed degrees of readiness in the security, alert and local defense plans be made the subject of a special survey by a Signal specialist or a technical communications expert, in order to insure a coordinated execution of the plan.
   f. That all anti-sabotage plans carefully separate requirements that are actually on hand and issued, from plans which deal with future or projected needs; or, in other words, that anti-sabotage plans emphasize the need for an organization "in being" with material "on hand" for instant utility at any time.
   g. That increasingly systematic inspection of the aqua system throughout, to include a chemical analysis of both gas and oil, be further intensified.
l. That, during the period of the present unlimited emergency, all employees be further indoctrinated with a semi-military spirit of morale and discipline and to this end that further stress upon social gatherings, restaurant facilities, personal medical attention, and picnics be encouraged. Also that periodical and orderly assemblies such as roll calls, fire calls, etc., be further encouraged.

i. That critical attention be given to selecting critical items.

(1) The electrical fuel pumps on the B-17’s may be considered as a critical item.

(2) The water system and the fire hazard incident to the storage or leakage of gas and oil in the warehouses and store rooms may be considered as critical items in the supply department.

(3) The power, compressed air, water, and sewage lines or connections may be considered as critical items in the engineering shops; also the pollution of lubricating machine oil be considered as critical.

(4) The main highway through the Depot, the isolated engine test stands, the engineer lumber dumps adjacent to the runway and food in the restaurant be considered as critical items in general.

6. Recommendations:

a. That a regularly assigned Depot S-2 and Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed.

b. That a Depot Inspector and an Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed and directed to prepare a combined inspection, security, alert and defense plan for the Depot and that two administrative reserve officers be assigned to the Depot.

c. That a travelling nurse, qualified as a psychologist, be assigned to the Depot and be authorized to attend employees’ families.

d. That the lumber stacked at the end of the main runway be removed on the grounds that it constitutes a flying hazard and furnishes a close-up screen to the edge of the Depot as well as a concealed position from which a saboteur without detection could easily shoot up and hit a plane during its glide, especially at night.

e. That the interior watchman and guard system be increased progressively from the present strength of 21 men to a strength of 42 men and that patrols be instructed to work in units of two men or to keep in regular and frequent contact with each other.

f. That employees in the various shops and warehouses of the new buildings, when completed, be furnished distinctive arm bands, or colored shoulder straps, or caps, to aid in controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel between separate buildings and between separate sections within buildings.

g. That priority of screening, as recommended by the Depot, be approved and that this priority be considered as urgent, especially as it refers to the screening of the motor test stand and a high man-proof screen required between the main depot road and the depot warehouse that contains highly inflammable stores such as gas, oil and chemicals.

h. That written instructions be issued to the guard verifying the present parking plan and verbal orders reference the daily inspection of all cars entering and leaving the Depot, this to insure that no unauthorized personnel or material is hidden in the back of cars, and also to insure that no unauthorized personnel remain hidden overnight in the shops.

i. That the subject of locks and keys which may have been in use for a long time be made the subject of a special survey with the purpose of requiring all locks and keys to be changed periodically, and that all men possessing keys to vital installations be listed and systematically checked.

j. That, in the absence of daytime guards, the civilian chief clerks, superintendents and foremen be issued pistols.

k. That all plats or diagrams of water, electrical, sewage and gasoline systems be checked and numbered.

l. That the Depot Commander maintain a list of all employees who may be taking civilian flying instruction.

m. That a confidential general directive be issued by the Hawaiian Air Force to subordinate commanders to the effect that higher authority reposes special trust and confidence in their employees; that the present “unlimited emergency” requires a quick appreciation of the difference between “peace” and “emergency” conditions; that hostile saboteurs prepare most ingenious plans of fire and destruction and effect them with bold and ruthless determination; that our previous habitual sense of peace and security must be realistically tempered; that local commanders are directly responsible for the preparation and super-
vision of internal security plans which now should be based on the premise that at least a hundred saboteurs might act by criminal intention and stealth at any time, at any hour, even today or tonight; that no matter how far-fetched such a basic premise may seem in peace time or how much it may stretch peace-time credulity, that nevertheless the command responsibility for intelligence requires such a day by day sense of prevention.

H. S. Burwell,
H. S. BURWELL,
Colonel, A. G., Special Inspector.

1 Incl.
Ltr. TAG, 3/26/41
"Provisions for Security of Installations"

1st Ind. (A-1)

Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 June 1941.
To: Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. For careful consideration and recommendation on putting into being each item of paragraph 6 of this report.

2. Paragraph 6 h. to be interpreted that parked cars of employees be maintained under constant surveillance that nothing detrimental to security be removed therefrom or placed therein while these cars are in their parking areas.

By command of Major General MARTIN:
Cheney L. Bertholf,
CHENEY L. BERTHOFL,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 383.4/6
To: Major General Fulton Q. C. Gardner, U. S. A., Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Fort De Russy, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect your installations to see if they are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,
CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, March 26, 1941.

AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M.
To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps Areas, and Air Forces; Chief of the Air Corps; Chief of Ordnance; and The Quartermaster General.

1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic, attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more acute.
2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide adequate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be maintained. The effective functioning of counter-subversive measures pursuant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in the accomplishment of security.

4. Necessary counter-subversive measures are a responsibility of command and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Department and Corps Area Commanders are responsible for the coordination of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.

By order of the Secretary of War:

S/ E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H. 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 383.4/6

To: Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, AG 383.4/6, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installations.")

383.4

1st Ind.


To OG Haw. Dept.

1. As the result of a personal inspection of the installations of this command, the following comments are submitted:

a. In general the nature and the extent of these installations are such as to preclude the practicability of maintaining continuously sufficient guards to assure the protection of all such installations against determined and well organized saboteurs.

b. In my inspection special attention was devoted to the matter of the storage of directors and height finders for antiaircraft artillery batteries. Where fixed seacoast battery emplacements with protected magazines are available (at Fort Kamehameha, Fort DeRussy and Fort Ruger) these instruments are kept stored in the magazines. At Fort Weaver they are stored in one of the concrete magazines. At Fort Barrette they are stored in the protected plotting room. In the case of the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) they are stored in one of the concrete storehouses at the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. At Camp Malakole and at Sand Island, where no protected or fireproof storage is available, they are stored in the barracks.

2. Plans recently submitted in connection with the construction required for the augmentation of the antiaircraft artillery garrison include provision for concrete storehouses for the storage of directors and height finders at Schofield, Barracks, Fort Weaver, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Fort DeRussy, Ulupau, Fort Barrette and at Camp Malakole. Recommendations will be submitted in the near future for the construction of a similar storehouse at Sand Island.
3. In general all fixed batteries and all vital installations are guarded either by sentinels or by local guards quartered at these installations.

4. It is believed that, upon the completion of the concrete store houses referred to in paragraph 2 above reasonably effective security will be provided for all important installations of this command.

Fulton Q. C. Gardner,  
FULTON Q. C. GARDNER,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6  
Subject: Previsions for Security of Installations.
To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

1st Ind.

QM 383.4/6-A  
Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.,  
8 August 1941.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. I have personally inspected the warehouse area of this depot and in order to provide a greater degree of protection I have fenced the entire area with a 9 ft. cyclone fence and increased the lights in this area.
2. The return of this paper has been delayed pending a thorough study of the requirements of the guard detachment of this depot. Recommendations for an adequate guard detachment were submitted August 7, 1941. Favorable action on this request is considered imperative for the proper protection of this installation.

ROLAND WALSH,  
Colonel, Q. M. C.,  
Commanding.

CONFIDENTIAL  
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of, the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notification of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initiated by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

DOO 600.96/13
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6
To: Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 19411941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

Carl Grosse
CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,
Hickam Field, T. H., 13 June 11941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Judged by the new situation and standards required in consequence of the recently declared unlimited national emergency, it is considered that the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Inspector are necessary and cover the question constructively. In this respect and in concurrence with the Commanding General's desires, every effort was made by this Headquarters to assist the Inspector by suggestions and cooperation.
2. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of basic communication are concurred in.

Re para. a and b: Priority action is requested on the assignment of two administrative officers to the Depot for assignment as Intelligence Plans Officer and Depot Inspector, as recommended in paragraph 6 b, basic report. These administrative and supervisory duties are being handled at the present time by Depot officers in addition to a large number of other executive type of duties.

Re para c: The Depot First Aid Station has been expanded with the employment of an additional Nurse in order to allow the former Nurse to act as a Traveling Nurse and thus keep in more intimate and helpful contact with employees and their families.
Re para. d: The lumber stacked at the end of the main run-way #4 has been removed by the District Engineer, which action has removed one of the more serious flying and sabotage hazards.
Re para. e: Due to the lack of available civilian guards and consequent difficulty in employing additional civilian guards of trustworthy character, the Depot has called upon Hickam Field for enlisted guards. It is believed that the Guard Roster may have to be materially increased, even beyond 42 men.

Re para. f: Full compliance with this recommendation will, of necessity, be progressive and will be completed when the Depot is moved into its new buildings. In the meantime, this Headquarters has initiated action on making badges and distinctive colors, which are in the process of procurement and issue.

Re para. g: Prepared plans include the screen fences mentioned in the Inspector's recommendation.

Re para. h: Detailed guard duties governing the parking plan have been prescribed in writing to insure that no unauthorized material is brought into or removed from the shops, also to insure that all personnel, other than the authorized guards, are required to leave the shops and parking area promptly after working hours. This special problem will be simplified upon completion of the proposed fence. Then all personnel en route to and from the parking lot, which will be located outside the fence, will be checked in and out of the new gate, recommended hereinafter in paragraph 3 b.

Re para. i: Survey has been issued to Section offices for use in case of internal riot or disorder.

Re para. k: Action has been initiated.

Re para. l: Action has been initiated.

Re para. m: Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional administrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is recommended.

3. Conclusions: a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the Joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in this respect.

b. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-employed common laborers.

e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the inspector.

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.

Leland C. Hurd
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Commanding.
AG 383.4 (7-15-41)
24

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a verbal reply.

For the Commanding General:

Edward Jenkins,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL
Commanding General Hawaiian Department.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, March 26, 1941.

AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M
Subject: Provisions for security of installations.

To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps Areas, and Air Forces;
Chief of the Air Corps;
Chief of Ordnance; and
The Quartermaster General.

1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic, attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more acute.

2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide adequate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be maintained. The effective functioning of countersubversive measures pursuant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in the accomplishment of security.

4. Necessary countersubversive measures are a responsibility of command and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Department and Corp Areas Commanders are responsible for the coordination of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. Adams,
Major General
The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 13 July 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.,

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,
O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General.
AG 383.4/6

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN QUARTERMASTER DEPOT,
Fort Armstrong, T. H., 16 July 1941.

To: Major O. M. McDole, Asst. Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
Information pertaining to the above subject may be expected on 25 July 1941.
For the Commanding Officer:

B. F. Modisett,
B. F. Modisett,
Major, Infantry, Executive Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6
To: Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General.

By Courier 1 May 1941 CG

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be sent to subordinate commanders.
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AG 383.4/6
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<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
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<td>1st Ind. AG 26 April 41</td>
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<td>Two (2) copies received, one copy retained in AG files. 1 Incl.</td>
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<td>2d Ind. G-2 22 APR 41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>1. For your information. 2. I propose to send ditto copies of this communication to all G-2 and S-2 officers, Hawaiian Department, for information and necessary action, and to check with Commanding Officers of Posts especially with regard to paragraph 4, and report to this office. Incl. No change. M. W. M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Ind C/S 4/29/41</td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>The Department Commander desires that copies of this letter be furnished to General Martin, General Murray, Lt. Colonel Walsh, Q. M. C., General Gardner, and Colonel Capron, Q. D.; a wrapper letter to General Martin, directing him to personally inspect to see if airplanes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to General Murray, directing him to personally inspect the warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Lt. Colonel Walsh directing him to personally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to General Gardner directing him to personally inspect his installations to see if they are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Colonel Capron, directing him to make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded—all to make a report to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department as to the results of their inspections. Incl: N/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Ind AG 1 May 41</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>For notation of action taken and return.</td>
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<td>5th Ind G-2 2 May 41</td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Noted. Incl: N/C.</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

AG 383.4 (3-15-41) M-B

MARCH 10, 1941.

Subject: Investigation of Subversive Activities in the Civilian Conservation Corps.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the enclosed copy of an agreement between the War Department and the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps relative to the responsibility for investigations dealing with espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities within the CCC.

2. The Counter-Subversive system, including the selection and designation of informants within the ranks of the CCC, is being made the subject of further study and will not be placed into effect at this time.

3. Correspondence and reports relative to CCC investigations will be accomplished and distributed in the same manner as currently prescribed for military activities.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Cy., CCC agreement, 2-26-41.

Basic communication received in duplicate, inclosure in single copy, one copy of basic retained in AG files.

1 Incl.

Re para m:

Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional administrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is recommended.

3. Conclusions:

a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and manholes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in this respect.

b. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-employed common laborers.

2nd Ind. to CG HAF 6/13/41

c. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the inspects and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the inspector.

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.

Leland C. Hurd
LELAND C. HURD,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Commanding
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.

a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.

b. G-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.

c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum, 7 September 1944, to C. G., POA, re Documentary Evidence.

d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Domestic Conditions, 1 December 1942 (2 copies).

e. Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.

f. Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.

g. Hawaiian Department Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 a. m., 7 December 1941, dated 22 December 1941.

h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.

i. Radio from War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese negotiations, 21 November 1941.

j. Informal report re Thailand.

k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asama Maru and conditions in Japan.

l. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 13 November 1941.

m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.

n. Army Contact Office memorandum, 2 May 1941, re Comments on observations of a missionary.

o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26–31 July 1941.

p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941.

q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.

r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Assistant Naval Attache Shanghai.

s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.

bb. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department transmitting letter from F. B. I. re information on Japan's entry into war dated 28 July 1941.

t. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dated 3 November 1941.


v. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).

w. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and M. A. report attached.)


aa. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George Puish (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies).

z. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re French Indo-China.

dd. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re Formosa.


dx. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (continued).


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<td>14 August 1941</td>
<td>General for Pacific area: Japan propaganda, general economic, harbors, mandated islands; Australia petroleum; N. E. I., petroleum, airports; Burma Road.</td>
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<td>China, general economic; Formosa harbor defense.</td>
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Reports produced by Army Contact Office, Hq. Haw. Dept., Honolulu
Digest of Contemporary opinions on current topics in the Japanese Press. (Biweekly up to Nov. 5, 1941; final issue, Nov. 29, 1941, covered period Nov. 6-25, 1941.)

Distribution:
G-2 WD, 3.
G-2 24th Div. 1.
G-2 25th Div. 1.
F. B. I. (Hon.) 2.
O. N. I. (Hon.) 2.
File.

G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation.
Last estimates produced were: 17 October 1941, 25 October 1941.
Distribution: same as for Digest, above.
(Extracts from the above are given in Exhibit herewith.)

Military Intelligence Reports (periodic).
(See list and sample copy herewith.)

Counter-Intelligence Estimates. 330.05 at Shafter 1941 to 1942.
No. 7 was issued for period 16 to 30 November 1941.
Distributed to all M. I. Sections of Hawaiian Dept., 10 copies to ONI and 5 to FBI.
Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence

Counter Intelligence Division

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

Memorandum for Major Meurlott:

Total Shinto Shrines—55 (about 12 of these are independent shrines) OK per Capt. Iwai.
Total Shinto Priests

" " Priestesses 49 (about 15 of these individuals were connected with the independent shrines) OK per Capt. Iwai.
" " Asst. Priests 24
82

Total in Custodial Detention 38

Priests
CD on mainland 20
Paroled on mainland 3
Paroled in T. H 2
CD and then repatriated to Japan 4

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29

Priestesses
CD on mainland 3
Paroled in T. H 1
CD and then repatriated to Japan 1
Released 2

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7

Assistant Priests
CD on mainland 1
Paroled in T. H 1

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2

Total deceased 4
Total in Japan Prior to 7 December 1941

12 September 1944.

Memorandum:
To: Commanding General, USAFPOA.
Subject: Documentary Evidence.

1. It is requested that you make available to the Board, named by War Department, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following documents, to wit:
   a. All data in whatever form, relating to the Japanese-American relations received by the Hawaiian Department from the War Department during the period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941; including movements of the Japanese armed forces and probable Japanese actions.
   b. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period from and through the Navy.
   c. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
   d. All reports relating to Japanese activities, both military and civil, made by G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or others for said period, including G-2 summaries.
e. All messages take from the Japanese Consulate on December 7, 1941, or subsequent to said date.

f. Documents captured from Japanese invading forces on or about December 7, 1941.

g. All correspondence or other writings relative to the alert of June 17, 1940.

h. All orders for close-in reconnaissance by aircraft or other agencies for the period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941.

i. Secret report of Colonel Capron describing damage to structures in Honolulu on December 7, 1941.

j. Letter of transmittal to War Department of SOP of November 5, 1941.

k. Report of Colonel Berquist upon his return from school in 1941 in which he discussed air warning service, stations and information centers, and generally the employment of Radar.

l. Memorandum of General Staff asking study of air situation in Hawaii.

m. Pattern of bombings by Japanese.

n. Copy of record of trial against Kuhn in Hawaii.

o. Herron's Field Order #1.


q. Army's A—B lists in 1941.

r. Navy's estimates based on presence of carriers in the Marshalls.

2. It has come to the attention of the Board that an exchange of information by the O. N. I. and G–2, Hawaiian Department was made during said period by means of teletype. Are there any records of these exchanges?

3. Procedure for obtaining the described documents desired to be used as evidence by the Board can be agreed upon.

/s/ George Grunert,

GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieutenant General,
President.

Classification: Confidential

Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G–2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS & DOMESTIC CONDITIONS.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Business men, journalists, and missionaries returning from Far East. Reliability believed good except as indicated.

Summarization of Report

When required:


2. Japan's internal conditions: Tojo cabinet, conditions in Korea, conditions in Japan.

1. FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. With Dutch East Indies. A. D. E. I. officials, en route from Singapore to Dutch West Indies, stated on 26 November that there is a strong feeling against Japanese in D. E. I. and that the attitude on the part of the Japanese has been to "clear out" as quickly as possible. Source is certain that there were about 7,000 Japanese in D. E. I. in October 1941. Early in November 2,000 Japanese were evacuated, principally from Java. In mid-November 1,500 more were preparing to leave. Practically all of the Japanese were "business men", no laborers.

B. With China. American journalist, returning from Far East, reports that there are many military leaders of the Japanese army in China who do not want the "China incident" to end. They are making big money, and this war in China has developed into "the biggest racket the world has ever seen". On the other hand, the navy resents the army's opportunity for graft and is attempting to plug the smuggling holes.
C. With U. S. S. R. Vladivostok is a more important base than Singapore or Manila from which to launch an attack on Japan, according to an American journalist. The Soviets have 110 submarines there. Estimates made in Tokyo gave the Russian forces east of Lake Baikal as about 600,000 men before the start of the Russo-German war. Since then this eastern front steadily has been reinforced until now the number is estimated to exceed one million. Some of these may be recruits replacing withdrawn veterans. But it was believed in Japan that an actual withdrawal of men and planes would have to be made before a Japanese invasion would be practicable. Source believed that the establishment of an American expeditionary force at Vladivostok could change the whole situation.

D. With New Caledonia. Evidence is accumulating to indicate an offer on the part of Japanese to gain a "peaceful" footing in New Caledonia. A Japanese line of freighters is said to be carrying unmelted nickel ore to Japan in spite of a Franco-British agreement that the entire output be sold to Britain. The Japanese consulate in Noumea is believed to be primarily a "listening post". TOKITARU KUROKI in Consul. He is said to have asked the N.Y.N. agent in Honolulu to interest Yuric in Hawaii to move to New Caledonia. In July, 1941, Georges Peloen, chief engineer of a new Calendonia nickel mine, stated that there were about 2,000 Japanese "businessmen" in New Caledonia. Most of them had come as contract laborers, but now were small merchants, etc. "Le Bulletin de Commerce", Noumea, 7 August 1941, estimated the Japanese in New Caledonia to number 1,774 men and 52 women. Of these 316 men and 31 women lived in Noumea. It is believe that French authorities in New Caledonia dare not make reprisals or economic discrimination against Japan because lack of military or naval protection leaves the island open to Japanese attack and occupation.

2. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

A. The Tojo Cabinet. An American journalist from Japan states that the fact that General TOJO did not resign from the army before accepting the premiership is noteworthy. It tends to bring the army out into the open as the real rulers of the government. Now the army itself must be responsible to the people for governmental activities. The problem now is what can TOJO do with the army group. Only a ranking army officer would be able to keep the extremists in hand. TOJO is believed to be more anti-Russian than anti-British and American. Premier Konoye's admission of "blame" for the China Incident was thought to be a well understood hypocritical statement, pointing the finger of blame directly at the army group. Hence, the "tears in the eyes" of the War and Navy ministers.

B. Conditions in Korea. An American missionary, resident of Secul since 1917, gives the following information:

The attitude of Koreans toward the Japanese is one of hopeless acquiescence. They are afraid to talk, even among themselves, as they do not know who may be spies. Japanese surveillance of the schools is very rigid. Once or twice a day an under-cover official would come to the schools to inquire about various matters. Japanese language was stressed as a cultural subject. Teachers were made to reprimand children talking Korean, even on the athletic field. In August 1940, all school children had to have Japanese names. Any meeting that is held must be reported to the police and a permit obtained for even the smallest gathering in a private home. Police representatives always are present.

The position of missionaries has been harder and harder. The pressure is not direct, but upon anyone associating with them. This has made the missionaries realize that they were doing more harm than good to the people they are trying to help. In November, 1941, there were only 12 missionaries left out of several hundred. Permits to missionaries are for one year only, and are not subject to renewal if they do not "play ball" with the Japanese. At times direct pressure has been brought to bear on missionaries. In one instance a woman missionary was "detained" for questioning for about a month in a dark cell. Physical punishment has been occasional, but it is uncommon for Japanese to give punishments which leave marks of any kind.

CONFIDENTIAL

Strict censorship with the outside world prevents word of true conditions from getting through. Source states that it takes mail about three months to get out.

Present conscription by Japan of Korean youths is called "voluntary", but is far from it. In the summer of 1940 the Japanese called for a volunteer regiment, but obtained a bare 200 enlistments.
Source stated that many of the poorer class of Koreans were selling everything they had and were moving north into Manchukuo where they hoped to enjoy a better status as Japanese subjects. From this group the Japanese have been enlisting men to do their "dirty work", such as smuggling, spying, dope peddling, etc.

Source recommended that organization engaged in collecting money in the United States for Korean nationalist programs should be watched carefully, as he believed that the funds fell into private hands and were not being used for purposes for which intended.

C. CONDITIONS IN JAPAN

(1) An American missionary who lived many years in Japan up to last August, reports as follows:

The government does not like to have Japanese soldiers return from China, being afraid they will talk. The few who come back do not talk about the war. None of the seriously wounded soldiers are sent back to Japan. They are sent to Formosa. No casualty lists are posted in Japan. Parents are informed after about three months of the death of a son. Source believes that only about one-third of the parents are so informed. Source stated that many returning soldiers are intolerable and are unable to settle down to normal life. Many of them are diseased.

All telephone calls from city to city have to be carried on in Japanese. One English word would cause the operator to cut in on the line and remind you of the regulations. Even on the streets, if a Japanese person speaks to you in English it is likely that some other person will tell your friend that his language is good enough. Source believed that Germans are handling the censorship, especially of mails.

The average Japanese is said to feel more friendly toward Americans than toward any other foreigners. They dislike the British very much. Germans also are much disliked, especially as they make no pretense of covering up their contempt for the Japanese.

Source believes that food restrictions are handled very well by the government. At such times as New Years, restrictions are eased, so that people forget their hardships and praise the Government. Such relaxing of restrictions builds up morale in the people when it is most needed. Last July no food could be taken from one province to another.

Travel was restricted the latter part of last July. Special permits had to be obtained to get railroad tickets to go from one province to another on business.

The government first gave advice in regard to limiting amusements. When this was not taken seriously, the government issued bans on various amusements, such as dancing, and curtailed the movies. Students at high schools and universities were made to wear their school uniforms at all times. They could attend movies only on Saturdays and Sundays. They were forbidden to go into certain parts of the city, principallyarmament areas.

In Osaka (residence of source) blackouts were staged about twice a year and lasted about two weeks. The city was divided into about ten zones, each further subdivided into smaller units, the smallest being a group of ten houses. Meetings were held frequently amongst the members of this smallest group, the chairman being chosen by representatives of the ten houses. Each house had a bucket of water and box of sand on hand at all times. Each house paid dues, according to their means, to buy fire-fighting equipment. The next larger division, about one or two city blocks, purchased the equipment. Each house has three flags to be hung out in front: a red flag warns that enemy raiders are overhead, red and white that the raid is lessening, and yellow, all clear. This —(copy illegible)—word from house to house if communications break down.

(2) A returning American business man states that Indo-China rice is distasteful to the people of Japan; but the supply is adequate to meet all their needs. The people are willing to let the army have the best food and other supplies, because the army has the popular reputation of being made up of patriots. The people of Japan have little knowledge as to the graft and corruption which exists among Japanese army officers in China.

There have been no new motor cars in Japan since the start of the China incident. Gasoline is so closely guarded that sampan owners are unable to get enough to go fishing, hence, a shortage of fish.

(3) Shortage of gasoline indicated. Master of a tanker reports the conspicuous absence of Japanese fishing vessels, in October, from waters near the
Marshall Islands where on previous voyages he had seen numerous fishing sampans. He believed that it was caused by lack of fuel.

Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to
ONI
FBI
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Report No. 28.
Page —
Date: 1 December 1941.

1. Espionage

a. Agents and Agencies.—In an examination of documents and confidential publications of various government departments, there appears the common declaration that Japanese espionage activities have largely been centralized in the Consular Offices, in addition to the more specialized Army and Navy intelligence functions. There were more than two hundred Japanese Consular Agents strategically located throughout the islands. Potential assistants, agencies, etc., are discussed hereafter in detail.

b. Sources of Information.—Obtaining of information was done mainly through multitudes of observations, reports and studies of thousands of commercial travelers, students, tourists, purchasing commissions, as well as agents in the guise of "priests", hundreds of thousands of photographs, a most comprehensive and minute analysis of practically any subject, and by Japanese Language School principals.

c. Transmission of Information.—Apparently all information of an urgent character was handled through the local Consulate, and transmitted by coded radio to Japan up to and including the evening of December 6, 1941; and it somewhat significant that local Japanese who might have had desirable information were apparently contacted at their homes or places of business by members of the Consulate staff.

2. Analysis of principal sources and type of information.—An analysis of the information available to agents of Japan and which was largely used in the December 7th attack, was obtained through casual observation, publications and periodicals, as well as from various Territorial and Federal published reports. Maps and circulars issued by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, the Chamber of Commerce, Territorial Planning Commission and other similar bodies, furnished accurate and complete details as to roads, public utilities such as water mains, electric power networks, telephone cables, and other such vital data.

High level vantage points on the surrounding hills offered ideal spots for photography which would show. In completed detail, the layout of Pearl Harbor, in complete detail, with the complete berthing arrangements of vessels when the Fleet was in port. Layouts of the principal airfields were equally accessible to photography and sketching operations.

A drive around the island of Oahu afforded full details of beaches, possible landing points, some of the coast defense installations, and landmarks such as prominent buildings, churches and chimneys and other such data.

In summation—other than for details as to technical description of equipment, war plans, and other classified data—an espionage system, as such, was not required to fulfill their needs under existing local conditions.

3. From all of the foregoing, it can be assumed that any trained espionage group, other than that made up of various members of the consulate staff and visiting Japanese officials need not have been organized because of its non-necessity. There was the usual chain of Consular Agents, Shinto priests, language school principals and outstanding alien business leaders upon whom the Consulate could call for such meager details required to fill any gaps in each analysis of geographic, economic, political, or strategic subjects.
The seizure and holding in custody of the group outlined in the foregoing paragraph, in addition to other individuals who were suspected of subversive activities would logically appear to include the majority of possible leaders for such an espionage system. This action has been taken.

2. SABOTAGE AND FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES

As regards the question of planned sabotage or Fifth Column activities, it is significant to note that no local investigational agency has been able to determine any single fact which would definitely indicate that such activities have been planned or existed.

While we see definite, long-term activities and plans in such localities as the Dutch East Indies, which date back to 1913, none of these can be found in similar form here in Honolulu.

There have been but few purely Japanese businesses solely dependent upon the Japanese Government for support here in Honolulu as was the case in the Dutch East Indies. The N. Y. K. [4] had a most legitimate reason to exist here from a commercial transportation angle, the Samitome Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank were also maintained on a somewhat logical economic reason due to the large Japanese population and the heavy trade with Japan. While other alien companies did exist, with some degree of Japanese control through stock ownership, they were relatively unimportant and did not involve large spheres of influence.

Small merchants, businesses and professions were largely of Japanese nature but purely economic in their endeavor. Due to local patronage and the maintenance of large stocks of Japanese foodstuffs and supplies, these did a profitable business.

It is quite true that the Japanese aliens held a large portion of the economic control of such endeavors, but this was largely due to local conditions, their liberties under American ideas of free trade and not through any exercise of control or endeavor on the part of the Japanese government. There was a certain amount of resentment and jealousy directed toward these successful aliens by certain white elements of the business community, but largely because they were successful, knew their rights under American laws and customs and insisted upon exercising them. It is but natural that a white distributor would resent being taken to task by an Oriental retailer, but usually the retailer was right and could force the distributor to acquiesce to his demand. This has resulted in the building up of a certain amount of anti-Japanese feeling [5] but this should not be interpreted as being caused by any disloyal or subversive acts on the part of the Japanese individuals concerned.

There are also certain distasteful businesses which did not attract the local white population but which were profitable and lucrative. To the objectionable features the Japanese took no exception inasmuch as their sense of thrift could see the advantage. An example of this is the hog raising industry. The Japanese saw all of the possibilities and went in to the venture encouraged by the white population. As an adjunct the garbage collection system, to feed the hogs, was built up. The citizens were glad to receive small monthly payments for this waste material, and the City and County was greatly relieved in not having to maintain a large garbage collection department. In a comparatively short time these endeavors became a Japanese monopoly including collection of garbage from Army Posts and Camps. This was a most profitable business but it was not motivated by a Japanese nationalistic plot to obtain military information, as some would have it believed; and because these individuals amassed money and property is no indication of Imperial Government subsidy to cover espionage activities carried on by ignorant, non-English speaking aliens. The possibilities of such, however, is not to be overlooked. It is recognized that the very nature of their work provided potentially good fields for gaining military information, [6] These presumably law abiding and legitimate business structures may be sharply contrasted to the activities of the Japanese Oceanic Bonito and Tunny Fishing Company and other similar Japanese government controlled and operated organizations which arrogantly and openly defied the authorities of the Dutch East Indies. (Attached hereto as Appendix — are copies of reports made by several organizations to the local Japanese Consulate.)

There has been abundant evidence that visiting Japanese vessels have brought individual officials who openly did all possible to maintain nationalistic and cultural ties between the local Japanese and their homeland. Japanese Language
Schools were allowed to flourish with their constant endeavor to impress on the second and third generation their fealty to the Fatherland. Many societies have been expected to aid in Japanese national endeavors, furnish comfort kits to the Army and offer financial aid to the Imperial Government in specific projects. While it is true that all of these activities have had their very objectionable features there appears no likelihood that any such endeavors have been directed toward the organization of Fifth Column elements or sabotage organizations.

[7] a. Japanese Press.—So far as this office has been able to determine, no attempt has ever been made by the Japanese Government to control, financially or through any channels, the publication of local newspapers. No campaigns have been initiated in the local Japanese language papers which would tend to unit the Japanese population against any other portion of the citizenry. There have been expressions of pro-Japanese sentiments and pro-Axis sentiments, as well as some destructive criticisms and anti-American comments, but not in a manner or degree which could be termed a general anti-American attitude.

In specific local cases when it appeared that Japanese nationals or descendants were being discriminated against by proposed laws, regulations or rules these same papers did carry editorials and other comments in protest in much the same manner as would be true with any of the American press organizations.

Speaking generally the attitude of the local Japanese press has been normal, with a considerable amount of pro-Japanese expression as regards the war with China, but this may have been largely due to economic reasons such as the maintaining of a high level of circulation and the sale of advertising space to alien individuals and firms. Their has been no indication however that their policy was controlled financially or otherwise by the Japanese government.

[8] b. Political Control.—There is no substantial evidence of any Japanese attempts to control the local political situation other than such activities which were directed by white politicians and their Japanese or Japanese-descented henchmen. It is true that legislators, supervisors and other officials in office have been elected by the Japanese-descented citizen vote but the actual control of any legislation or selection of officials solely by a Japanese bloc has not been observed during the past years. Election of Japanese candidates solely by their own nationals vote has never occurred and no such candidate running on purely racial lines has ever been elected. In fact the contrary seems the case when Dr. Kurisaki ran for the position of supervisor and solicited the Japanese vote, even to the extent of having the priests speak in Japanese over the radio. He was defeated by a huge vote, losing his own district.

So far, the Japanese citizens have usually preferred to elect a white candidate as they apparently considered him to be “more suitable” as a political leader. Legislators claim that no single Japanese leader or member of the Legislature can obtain enough control to sway legislation even should they make an attempt (which they have never done).

In recent sessions of the legislature, the Japanese opposed the Wages and Hours Act. This was for economic reasons due to its effect through the establishment of a minimum wage which would greatly affect the small merchant, restaurant keeper, etc. They were unable to swing this opposition successfully, [9] hence traded their opposition to the Pier 15 Bill to the Dillingham interests who in return supported their bloc of the Wages and Hours Act.

It is regrettable to state, in connection with this phase of the discussion, that the Japanese vote has in the past greatly influenced the statements, actions and practices of many of the white politicians. While such an undesirable feature, as the continuation of the Japanese language schools, has been a subject of much investigation and proposed legislation, the matter has always been handled most gingerly and with a view toward the effect upon the individual’s political future. It is believed that both protective and advisable precautionary measures have been, in the past, fogged and tabled because of such considerations.

In conclusion, it might be pointed out, that despite the fact that so far there has been no evidence of establishment of Japan’s political bloc control, and no indications of any political influence having been wielded by the Japanese people or officials which was motivated or dictated by the Japanese government, there is a distinct possibility that such may eventuate should Japanese cultural efforts be permitted to thrive without proper American supervision. The economic, political, and social subjugation of these islands could eventually be achieved by first providing an appropriate cultural foundation; and is certainly within the realm of possible long ranged Japanese planning.
At present we must reckon with the fact that there is a certain amount of leadership exercised by the Japanese-descendent political leader over his particular group or supporters, hence they are potential "leaders". Whether such leadership would be subversive or detrimental to the defense of these islands in the event of an invasion is problematic, but a list of these individuals is prepared and they can all be seized immediately if such action would appear desirable to the Department Commander.

c. Japanese Propaganda and Local Japanese.—This office is of the opinion that it is highly significant to note that Japanese official radio propaganda programs, which have been directed solely toward the Japanese in Hawaii, have been free from any actively dangerous propaganda both prior to and since December 7, 1941.

We have observed the "softening" processes effected by this means of propaganda directed toward French Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Burma, India and even Australia. In these instances there has been a definite attempt to drive wedges between the governments of those countries, the Japanese and the local inhabitants. Propaganda directed toward Australia has been designed to create dissention between the Australians and the British by showing how the Australian soldiers were victimized by the Home Government.

Programs directed toward Hawaii have not contained such propaganda. There have been the constant reminders, to the children, of their loyalty to parents and the Emperor, the recitations of Japanese customs and culture, but no attempt to bring any anti-American feeling or active support to Japan. Appreciation of the Japanese soldiers for the comfort kits and letters from the Japanese children of Hawaii has been frequently expressed.

It would seem that no one in Tokyo has thought of the amount of trouble which could be caused by calling the attention of the local-born Japanese to the lack of confidence which his adopted home (Hawaii) has toward him. There is every reason to believe that the war measures which have been put in effect and directed against these local people could form the subject of a radio program which would bring doubt, discord and mistrust more prominently into their minds. The reasons for such an ineffective policy are obscure and may be the result of several logical deductions:

(a) Distrust of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese elements by the Japanese government itself.
(b) Hawaii considered to be outside of the present sphere of the "Greater East Asia" control plans.
(c) That other more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been completed.
(d) The assumption that any such programs would be useless due to restrictions imposed on local short-wave reception.

(e) The knowledge or belief on the part of the Japanese government that the inciting of any dissention, sabotage or subversive activity would immediately result in the seizure and internment of Japanese and Japanese descendant residents of Hawaii.

It seems that the first-mentioned deduction, (distrust of the local Japanese) should be given first consideration. It is most noteworthy to learn that the Japanese government has shown a marked suspicious attitude toward second-generation Japanese who have gone to Japan for a visit. Many of these have returned to Hawaii with stories of surveillance; and their inability to properly speak the homeland tongue, unfamiliarity with customs and irksome practices, have resulted in a loss of any desire to ever again return to Japan.

It must also be realized, by the Japanese government as well as it is by us, that many of the old aliens have no further interests in their land of birth, other than spiritually. Their children have been brought up under American ideals, culture and in association with white children, having only a small portion of their time spent in the language schools and under home influence. Their daily routine has brought them closer to American ways of life, freedom of thought, exposure to the American press and motion pictures, while their sports and recreations have been shared with other American children, hence the preponderance of influence is contrary to the Japanese scheme of life. They have also intermingled freely with young people of the various races common to Hawaii, and thus become far more cosmopolitan and democratic than their parents could ever become.

There is much evidence to show that these old aliens have, in many cases, a genuine desire to provide for the safety and future welfare of their children here in Hawaii and hence have lost all idea of returning to Japan. For many years they have lived under American freedom, they have prospered, their rela-
tives in Japan have died and the only future remaining for them is to see their children secure, and then pass out of the picture themselves. Any subversive action or act of sabotage on their part would bring discredit and disgrace, not to themselves necessarily, but to their children who have the interest of the United States more keenly at heart.

All of the foregoing factors and considerations are quite contrary to those found in French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Burma, where they consider themselves a superior race rather than inferior.

It is therefore quite possible that the Japanese government could, with all propriety, question the 100% loyalty of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese. In other words, perhaps both governments find themselves in the same quandary when attempting to establish probability and degree of loyalty of these subjects.

[11] It can therefore be easily assumed that Japan has little use for Hawaii, at present, in her "Asia for the Asiatics" policy other than that dictated by a purely military or naval point of view.

There is nothing to be found here as compared to the oil and minerals of the Dutch East Indies, or the rubber plantations of Malaya and Burma. Hence, her ideas of domination of Hawaii could be discarded for the present save for its strategic value, which in the military control of the Pacific, is high. Whether this value is rated high enough, at this stage of affairs, to warrant another very costly attack is a question to be decided by the strategists but, from the propaganda point of view, this has not made any strong appearance.

Considering the third reason for the lack of attention to the radio (that other more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been completed), no evidence has been found which conclusively indicates any such plan; and to evaluate the possible existence of any such plans, we must first consider what their objective might be.

Since the start of the war, the Japanese Government has fully realized that no large, alien radio audience would be allowed to listen to language programs emanating in Japan, [15] hence a great portion of the propaganda value of such programs would be wasted. Restrictions as to radio reception, which have been placed upon residents of Japan, have been reported as being severe and rigidly enforced; and it is presumed that the Japanese would anticipate equally stringent regulations to be instituted by the government of the United States.

Current programs from Japan indicate that the Japanese have anticipated a large proportion of their expected audience would be American, as they have been rendered in English with special emphasis on spreading confusion, doubt and misinformation in regard to the efforts made which are in contradiction to the policies of the United States government. The inclusion of personal messages from prisoners of war has been interspersed in an attempt to keep Americans listening to the entire program in order to be sure of hearing a message from a member of the family. There has not been any similar or substitute method for attracting the attention of the alien Japanese, or the American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

[16] It is known that the radio broadcasting channels were to be used to transmit definite indications of decisive actions to come, prior to December 7, but this information was to be picked up only by the Consular staff and there is no reason to believe that any other persons, aliens or citizen, were aware of this secret code arrangement. This would tend to strengthen the supposition that the espionage system was built along lines to cover the situation up to the time when the attack was made but that no elaborate plans had been worked out for the continuation of such acts after the war had definitely begun.

From the point of possible espionage, sabotage or subversive organization, there is no reason to believe that the Japanese government could anticipate the protective action which we might initiate. There has been an abundance of open talk in that respect for many years past of which the entire Japanese population was well aware. Those rumored plans ranged from incarcerating all such citizens on one of the outside islands to evacuation camps located in various valleys of the island of Oahu.

In other words, there always has been great apprehension as to the drastic steps which would be taken against the Japanese in case of war. On this trend of thought we must be sure that the Japanese government was fully informed and therefore would be somewhat in doubt as to the effectiveness of any subversive organization after the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, there are the racial characteristics [17] involved, and no Japanese agent could carry on extensive secret, undercover, activities. With the entire population aroused as to potential sabotage and fifth column activities, the use of Japanese
nationals or descendents would appear to be quite a hazardous undertaking. Because of this line of reasoning we have assumed, at all times, that any great amount of continuing sabotage or espionage activities would involve the use of low-class unprincipled, or traitorous individuals of either American or European antecedents. It is for this reason that especial attention has been directed toward the German, Italian and communistic elements of the local population. Concrete results have been obtained in the case of Otto Kuhn who definitely contacted the Japanese Consulate with subversive intent.

These endeavors are subject to present and future close examination and investigation with a view to ascertaining any connection between the Japanese government and local paid agents.

With regard to the fifth reason for the non-existence of any direct, dangerous radio propaganda, we may safely assume that the Japanese government believes that swift retribution would follow should any revolutionary or concerted subversive action be undertaken by the local Japanese population. This could quite possibly be contrary to the plan of Japanese strategy, as it would seem entirely preferable from the military point of view, especially the Japanese version, to have as many potential assistants, fifth columnists and guerillas available to assist in a landing operation rather than have them inaccessible in concentration or detention camps.

[18] d. Furthermore, the confusion of moving large numbers of Japanese citizens, the inability of troops to differentiate between local Japanese and landed Japanese troops not uniformed would be momentous. Aid and assistance granted to the invaders would be of enormous value and far greater than any organized sabotage efforts made prior to such an invasion. We therefore do not discount this very possible angle and believe it may be one of the principal reasons why the radio propaganda has not been more actively dangerous up to the present time.

Some effects of Japanese Radio Propaganda.—The effect to date of the radio propaganda which has dealt with the Japanese war effort as directed against the Hawaiian Islands has resulted in greatly nullifying its value on local residents of Japanese origin. For example, the Japanese story of the great damage done by the submarine attack on Hilo, Hawaii, was clearly false and the Japanese residents of that city knew this to be a fact. In a comparatively short time these facts also became known to all the residents of other islands of the Hawaiian group. This was also true in the case of the single plane night raid against the island of Oahu, March 4, 1942, when the Tokyo Broadcast falsely claimed extensive damage done at Pearl Harbor. Instances of this type have resulted in causing the local Japanese to greatly discredit propaganda emanating from that source. Hence, it is quite possible that they would seriously consider the authenticity of any effort put forth to initiate a program of subversion in these islands.

[19] c. Japanese Families Divided in Thought.—A further argument against the possible existence of any subversive or sabotage ring among the Japanese, consideration must be turned again toward the second and third generation.

It has been outlined heretofore that these younger members of the race are subjected to strong American influences. There have been large numbers of cases where it is known that open conflict exists within the families due to the fact that the younger members refused to see eye to eye with their parents on matters of Japanese loyalty. A great number of cases are recorded where the second-generation youth refused to file his claim for deferment of military service with the Japanese Consul and the father, or head of the family, has executed this act without the knowledge of the subject. We have also found numerous cases where the parents, or head of the family, have protested when the second-generation son has filed request for expiration of Japanese citizenship.

In other words, we do know of many instances where the second-generation son has thrown his loyalty to the side of the United States, and even tried to sway the older member of the family to invest in American securities, follow American customs and disregard the established Japanese customs and ways of life. It would therefore be necessary that any plots or plans on the part of the older aliens be kept entirely secret from the younger generation which would be relatively quite a problem.

[20] f. Miscellaneous Reasons.—Why no Sabotage?—Much argument has been indulged in as to the significance of there having been no single authenticated report of sabotage or subversive activity on the part of the local Japanese on December 7, 1941, or since that time.
While rumors ran rampant and stories of such actions were widely circulated, nothing has ever been substantiated by any investigative agency. To analyse this particular problem, it is necessary to scan the record of known facts, to piece this out with logical assumptions and apply the positive results of recent investigations.

First of all, we can safely state that the objective of the attack was to cripple the naval and air arms in such manner as to prevent United States interference with Japan's program of attack in the Orient. The success of such a mission depended solely upon the element of surprise which enjoined absolute secrecy on the part of the enemy. Any one individual, Japanese or of any other nationality, who was made cognizant of these plans introduced a serious chance of exposure. Assuming such a case, it would first be necessary to convey the information to such a hypothetical person. Radio, telephone, mail, or cable communication could never be trusted for such an important message (again assuming the fact that the Japanese government would never believe that we were naive enough to allow these channels of communications to continue without surveillance during a period of extremely strained relations). [21] It is most probable that such a message would have to be divulged only by veiled insinuation, special courier or coded data in commercial radio broadcasts emanating in Japan.

We do know that there were messages received in the Japanese consulate which carried thinly veiled warnings that the situation was fast approaching the breaking point but no definite dates were mentioned. It was also apparent that the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu, on November 12, 1941, enroute to Washington held possibilities of personal instructions being conveyed. His progressive engagements, held on the night of his presence in Honolulu, at various locations such as the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the Japanese Consulate, the Sunchoro Tea House, indicate that there was ample opportunity for important matters to be discussed with the Consul; and his constant moving about gave rise to the thought that these matters were being carefully guarded.

The only concrete evidence to the effect that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu had any idea as to when hostilities would begin was to be found in a notation on his private desk calendar under date of December 1, 1941, when he had written in Japanese "within the predictable future". We believe that it is thus safe to assume that he did not know exactly when operations would begin. It was quite possible that he was verbally informed of the general plan of the government but we seriously doubt that he had specific information that the attack on Pearl Harbor would be made at 7:55 a. m. on December 7, 1941. If such were the case, with the highest ranking and [22] most confidential agent of the Japanese government in Hawaii, stories of maids, garbage collectors, small merchants and laborers being aware of this fact can be dismissed as idle talk and the product of fantastic imagination on the part of individuals who knew nothing of all the facts involved.

Many of the above-mentioned facts are a result of investigations made since December 7, 1941. We know from examination of records that the Consulate was fully informed of fleet movements, names of ships, berthing positions and similar data, and that this information was forwarded promptly by radio to Tokyo. This data was obtained, personally, by a member of the Japanese Consulate staff who visited vantage points on Pearl City peninsula to make the necessary observations.

There is also the Mori case where vital military information was exchanged with Tokyo on December 5, 1941, under the guise of a press interview. It is particularly significant that this was via radio telephone. Both radio telephone telegraph and radio telephone traffic could logically have been intercepted by ships of the Japanese fleet between Hawaii and Japan.

The fact that the Japanese Consulate was interested in getting information to ships laying off the Hawaiian Islands by radio, commercial broadcast advertisements, visual signals such as sheets, lights and fires has been made a matter of record through the evidence developed in the Kuhn case. Here we find our suspect German involved with the Consulate espionage system bearing out our previous suspicion of the use of some [23] of these means.

g. Investigation of captured maps and other data bears out the contention that no extensive espionage system, other than that definitely centered in the Consulate Staff and Consular agents, as heretofore outlined, was needed to obtain the material required for their compilation.

Thus far we can see that the tactical plan was complete with no necessity for use of the weapon of sabotage to carry out the objective of the mission.
more, the attack was such a complete surprise, to the Japanese residents themselves, that they were stunned and incoherent for a few days to follow. Casualties included a number of Japanese, property destroyed was not exclusive of that of Japanese ownership. There was no individual act, even fanatical, to indicate the slightest suspicion of any plans to carry out further acts of confusion or sabotage.

The absence of sabotage on December 7, 1941, is not proof that plans for such could not exist but it is evident that there was neither necessity or intention to use this weapon for the objective in view by that particular operation.

Japanese Leadership—Individual initiative Lacking.—In the consideration of any organizations with subversive policy, we invariably come back to the point of leadership. It has been found that the local Japanese inherently look for leadership to some single individual before any marked success is achieved even in peaceful pursuits. Japanese business partnerships hardly ever are successful when the corporations stand much better chance of survival. Here again we find that leadership is required as it is practically impossible for the partners to agree long enough to produce any practicable results.

These fundamentals go back still further in the demonstrated regimentation and control of the lives, fortunes and existence of the millions of poorly educated people in Japan. A fundamental respect for law and authority exists in the minds of every individual Japanese alien. An order issued by the appropriate authority finds more complete and blind acceptance among the alien Japanese than is the case with the other elements of the population of Hawaii. For this reason alone it is necessary to properly explain, translate and interpret any regulations published or issued by the Military Governor.

This characteristic has been exemplified in their choice of white political leaders as mentioned heretofore, where the many Japanese feel that they are better qualified, more experienced and more able to successfully carry on political issues.

An interesting consideration of this element of obedience in the mind of the alien Japanese can be found in the Hira da case on the island of Niihau, where a Japanese officer pilot, who was forced down, armed and equipped, informed Harada, a U. S. citizen Japanese, that he had taken that island, as Japan and the United States were at war. Harada knew nothing of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the final outcome of the engagement and had nothing to indicate to his simple mind any other fact than that the Japanese had landed on Niihau. There was probably no mental reaction, in his mind, of being loyal or disloyal to the United States because of his blind acceptance of the aviator's story and his complete obedience to his commands. There was no fighting, no conflict between forces of the United States and Japan, as far as he could see, hence it can only be said that he was immediately bound to obey Japanese leadership and domination in the form of the Japanese officer, but perhaps no question of loyalty to the United States entered his thoughts.

h. Local Japanese between two fires.—The Japanese, in general, here in the Hawaiian Islands, cannot be said to desire Japanese domination and control of the territory. They have been free in their businesses, life and customs and many have prospered far beyond their expectations. Most of them are fully aware that should the control of the islands pass to the Japanese, all of those freedoms, successes and customs would disappear and they would be as fully controlled and regimented as are the Japanese in Japan. Their fear of personal safety, the safety of their families and children is the predominant feature at present. Some feeling exists that they are between two fires and will suffer either one way or the other in case of an invasion. If they are not harmed by the United States forces, in such an action, they feel very uncertain as to the treatment which they may receive in the hands of the Japanese invading forces. It is also very apparent that such apprehension is rapidly spreading through the Japanese population, hence it is greatly doubted that any organized sabotage system could thrive in such an atmosphere.

3. SOME OF THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN

The daily drive and steady pressure being applied on the local Japanese community, since the war began, also lessens any possible organization of subversive elements. None know exactly when they will be picked up for questioning, their premises searched and careful examination made of the entire family background. Many are questioned and released who are required to return at stated intervals for check and recitation of their experiences, contacts and employment. Others
are placed in custodial detention on the results of these examinations. As a result of this relentless activity there is a wave of doubt growing up among the Japanese as to the loyalty of their neighbors and associates.

When one Japanese is placed in custodial detention, the neighbors remark that the army has caught up with another man whom they did not know was at all dangerous. With this thought in mind they wonder as to the reliability of the man next door, and the one living further down the street. In this manner there is an ever increasing apprehension, among the loyal Japanese citizens, as to how many and where the disloyal ones are located.

[1] Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands through the Eyes of the Press

a. Prior to December 7, 1941.—For several months prior to the treacherous Japanese attack on the Island of Oahu, there was an almost continuous fluxation in both public opinion and official circles on the gravity of the international situation, with specific reference to Pacific relations.

While public opinion varied from a fair state of optimism to a low degree of pessimism, as reflected in the local press, official observers seem to have definitely looked upon the rapidly changing situation as growing extremely grave for a very considerable period, as may now be revealed from official files.

As early as June 24, 1941, an understanding had been reached by the local intelligences, agencies, the M. I. D., O. N. I., and F. B. I., to accept the Digest of Opinion, prepared by the Military Intelligence Office in Honolulu, as the official digest for the three services. This was designed to avoid duplication of efforts.

There isn’t anything that can now be said which will throw more light on the situation in question and at the same time illustrate the accuracy with which the trend of events were being viewed than by the following extracts taken from the "Digest of Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics in the Japanese Press", and other documents, prepared by this office:


June 9, 1941.

"There has been a pronounced pessimism as to the international outlook, during the period 15–31 May. . . . The feeling is general that Japanese-American relations are precarious and that they may even become worse; that the leaders of both countries are fully aware of the futility of war. . . . and that important leaders on both sides are working feverishly to avoid an open break—with slight hope of success.

"The course of action being adopted by the local Japanese seems to be strictly dictated by expediency; and that of the Japanese government, by opportunity."

June 16, 1941.

"The period, June 1 to 10, has been marked by a rapidly worsening of relations between the United States and the Axis elements of Europe. . . . On the other hand, during the same period, there was an ironical complex to local opinion which offered a faint hope for improved understanding between the United States and Japan. That is, despite the increase tension between the two countries, there developed a conviction that diplomatic efforts would triumph and head off any immediate crisis.

"The local situation, which may be affected by the above-mentioned trend, has been distinguished by patriotic declarations and movements by second-generation Japanese for the support of American policies; and, ostensibly, a better attitude shown by other Japanese elements.

"However, these many, and perhaps mostly, sincere patriotic utterances were largely offset by other statements which were definitely destructive criticism of our leaders and policies, and obviously inimical to national interests under present emergency conditions."

June 24, 1941.

"Pro-American, loyalty, and patriotic expressions continue strong from second-generation Japanese in particular, and a favorable attitude of other elements in general. . . .

"The idea of the Japanese remaining here 'irrespective of what might happen between Japan and America', seems to be growing into a fixed policy. There
appears to be a movement to instill in the minds of the Japanese that 'this is their country' as against the idea that they are merely 'hangers-on.'

July 2, 1941.

"Best opinion as expressed in the local press seems to indicate that Japan will continue a watchful-waiting policy until a definite decision has been reached on the outcome of the Russo-German war. . . . The local Japanese press was obviously bewildered for several days following the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia. . . . According to some . . . it is believed that Japan is now confronted with new and serious problems, and that she must soon make decisions of far-reaching importance, possibly involving fundamental changes in her foreign policy. It is further thought by many that these changes will be at least temporarily and perhaps permanently to the advantage of the United States."


"The international situation during the last twenty days has grown gradually more tense, with a deep undercurrent of uneasiness. This is due principally to a feeling in many quarters that a decisive phase in the Russo-German war is about to be reached, and that the immediate results will be a deciding factor as to whether or not—and in what direction—the Japanese will move in the Orient.

"The Local Japanese press, in general, is still decidedly pro-German.

"The movement to encourage Japanese loyalty and cooperation with America in case of an emergency, of whatsoever nature, is being given outward support by most all elements of the Japanese community. The situation is such, however, that a show of anything but loyalty at this time would hardly be logical."

August 7, 1941.

"As reflected in the local Japanese press, the international situation in the Pacific area is extremely tense, delicate, and highly inflammable . . . Only a spark is required to cause an explosion that would set off the long-dreaded War in the Pacific.

"The local Japanese are still being encouraged to be loyal to America, no matter what may happen, and to cooperate in every way in support of the national policy of the United States."

August 21, 1941.

"International relations in the Pacific area have now reached their most critical point in history—where an explosion may be easily set off either by a false diplomatic step or by the rash act of an individual. Major interests, policies, and ideals have now been brought near to the point of physical conflict, gravely threatening the peace of the Pacific. Feeling is growing more bitter day by day as economic and other forms of pressure are being exerted by both sides. An open clash appears inevitable unless pressure is immediately relieved, or one of the opposing forces make some major concessions, or institute major changes in their basic national policies. Little hope is being entertained anywhere for better relations between Japan and other Pacific powers. Local Japanese, both alien and Hawaiian-born, in general, are determined to remain here, and throw themselves on the mercy of the American government and people, and do nothing that might prejudice their standing in the community as desirable residents and good citizens.

"In case of war between Japan and America, trouble with the local Japanese may be either little or great, depending largely on which country is able to dominate the local situation in the course of events, and in what degree; and, while United States domination remains unquestionable, a continuous campaign for tolerance and restraint on the part of all elements, civil and military, seems the best guarantee against local disorders so long as the Japanese are in the present state of mind."


"International relations in the Pacific area, which have continued extremely acute, have now reached the 'turning point'—in which direction, depending upon momentous decisions now in the making. Both Japan and America appear adamant in their determination to pursue their respective basic national policies to a successful conclusion; and each nation feels that it could not turn away from its set course or goal without catastrophic results in the end.

"There is a flurry of opinion in the Japanese press supporting the idea that Japan and America are about to reach an amicable settlement . . . . but, while
this is not beyond the realm of possibility, as yet there is very little tangible evidence to justify such an assumption.

"The local press and influential elements of the Japanese community continue outwardly to encourage and advise both alien and non-alien Japanese to be loyal and give their fullest support to the American government and its national policies, and to strive for racial harmony and unity of purpose in dealing with the present emergency. Local American military and civil officials are also giving very active support to the foregoing with a view to minimizing racial and other disturbances here in case of actual war.

"While the local press shows little evidence of definite propaganda, the tempo of such Japanese radio programs from Tokyo, has been stepped up noticeably. The most flagrant statement recently being 'the reminder to all Japanese that children born to Japanese parents are to be considered as children of the Emperor entrusted to their care'."

September 20, 1941.

"Japan's basic policy of establishing complete hegemony over the greater part of East Asia and adjacent areas of the South Pacific, remains immutable and her course, irrevocable. . . . Japan still continues toward 'total mobilization', and the combined forces which she may ultimately muster will constitute a continual menace to the United States and other democracies so long as said forces are not actively committed against our enemies. Japan has been and still is staunchly sticking to the role of an 'aggressive opportunist.' The future employment of her forces will be governed by the tide of the interwoven struggle now being waged among people of the white race.

"Another Japanese cabinet crisis was apparently avoided as a result of the Emperor making the military directly responsible to His Highness. . . . Tension among local Japanese has been greatly relieved, and there is considerable optimism for some form of adjustment of differences between Japan and America.

"Protestations of loyalty by local Japanese cannot, from the military standpoint, be accepted as being actuated by 'sentiment' because of too many extenuating and compelling circumstances which might be forcing most of them along a course of 'expediency.' Only an acid test will reveal the truth."


"During the last two weeks, the Japanese government has been doing a superb job of fence-sitting and ring-side betting in the arena of international diplomacy—keeping contemporary observers in the dark, confused, and nervously speculative as to which way she might eventually be forced to fall, or choose to jump, in order to safeguard her present winnings or, perhaps, undertake to achieve new prodigious gains. . . . She has been assuming the unique role of 'serving two masters' while 'designing their mutual destruction.' . . . She may be expected to continue to exercise her present balance of power in the Far East to the disadvantage of the democracies, with no good intention toward the Axis, just as long as possible.

October 23, 1941.

"A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. . . . Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies with 'further, intensified aggression'; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democratic states; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham; and forces us into a state of constant vigilance . . . . "The local Japanese continue to outwardly display a determination to support American policies by the purchase of defense bonds and saving stamps, by organizing units to support the major disaster council, and by assisting the drive to collect scrap aluminum."

November 12, 1941.

"Most veteran observers who are in close contact with the situation seem to agree that:

"a. In view of the fact that all diplomatic efforts toward a settlement of outstanding vital issues on the Far East, between America and Japan, now appear to be doomed to failure, both countries have been rushing military and naval preparations to completion to meet what is considered to be an imminent showdown."
"b. Japan's special envoy, Saburo Kurusu, is going to Washington for the purpose of submitting the least and final terms upon which Japan is willing to remain at peace with the American government, and that our government will be expected to accept those terms with no more than nominal modifications. The United States government likewise is presumed to have a set of counter proposals, representing the minimum conditions under which it is ready to reestablish normal relations with Japan, and the Japanese government will be expected to harmonize its policies therewith. . . . . Each country . . . . is manifesting a most favorable disposition for war unless the other country is prepared to sacrifice some major, fundamental policies affecting matters in the Far East. Each state appears SO ADAMANT with regard to its own established basic policies, which are diametrically opposite to, and irreconcilable with, the policies of the other state, that very few observers now dare to venture an opinion that a successful compromise of differences is at all feasible.  

[6] "The local Japanese in general continue to cooperate in the furtherance of the American national policies, and declare their loyalty to the Stars and Stripes. However, there has been recent evidence developed by the questioning of evacuees returning to Japan which plainly shows that the true sentiment of many Japanese here still definitely lies with the mother country. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that unfavorable reactions are likely to flare up occasionally under circumstances attending an American-Japanese conflict."

November 29, 1941. (The last issue of the Digest.)

"While the international situation centering in the Pacific and directly affecting the United States has been somewhat stabilized near the point of explosion during this period (Nov. 6-25), the situation in several other contiguous areas—Thailand, Indo-China, and Eastern Siberia—of strong indirect concern to the United States, has continued to deteriorate.  

"The Japanese government announced on Nov. 5 the appointment of Saburo Kurusu as Special Envoy to Washington for the avowed purpose of making a final diplomatic effort towards a solution of American-Japanese problems and effect an easement of tension in the Pacific. While a certain amount of optimism was expressed in local quarters for the success of the Kurusu mission, the general opinion was indeed pessimistic.  

"The consensus of veteran observers seems to be that Japan had taken such a strong aggressive stand that she could not back down without incurring serious internal trouble; and that the United States, on the other hand, had even less reason to compromise its well-known demands which were diametrically opposite to those of Japan, hence the impending diplomatic talks were doomed to failure before they started. This opinion moreover appears to have been well-founded as subsequent events began to unfold.  

"Concurrent with the conversations in Washington came reports of extensive Japanese military movements in Indo-China, toward Thailand, and elsewhere. The Japanese home press intensified its anti-American attitude. The Japanese Imperial Diet passed a supplementary extraordinary military budget of almost four billion yen with unprecedented speed. Japanese nationals continued to evacuate from potential danger areas (including Hawaii). Total mobilization in Japan proceeded unabated and with an ever increasing tempo—involving even boys and girls down to 14 years of age.  

"The foregoing together with many other reported actions immediately aroused grave doubts as to the sincerity of the Japanese government, and led many to believe that the Japanese were merely aping Hitler's favorite strategem of utilizing peaceful gestures to confuse, disarm, weaken, and otherwise destroy effective opposition to an early contemplated military move.  

[7] "There is no marked change in the local situation. The very nature of the plight of the local Japanese dictates an extreme desire for peace. And while local Japanese commentators keep striking a tune of optimism, their statements are frequently spiked with a note of despair. They appear to feel that an acid test of their attitude is near at hand.  

"It may be well again to emphasize that extreme and eternal vigilance is the only and safest course here in Hawaii."

Let us now turn to a few statements in official documents which represent definite action of this office, taken as a result of the foregoing conclusions backed by certain other information at hand.

"1. a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. . . .

b. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed . . .

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

c. 4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.—While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above (the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler), it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed. An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents."

From a G–2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, this office, 1200
25 Oct. 1941:

"1. a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th Instant. b. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's [8] policies with intensified aggression; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or object of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

2. CONCLUSIONS

c. Rapprochement Negotiations.—Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely our enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i.e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies.

"f. . . . Remarks. b. . . . It seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring."

As it too well know, the great break did come on Dec. 7, 1941, but as clearly shown in the above quotations from the Digest dated Nov. 20, that this office was thoroughly alive to the possibility, but only lacked the tangible evidence which might have been easily obtained by intelligence personnel had they not been handicapped by existing legal restrictions. Had those restrictions not been in existence, it is reasonable to assume that, "tangible" evidence would almost certainly have been obtained that would in all probability changed, if not entirely prevented, the great tragedy of Pearl Harbor.

[7] b. December 7, 1942.—In brief, Army Alert No. 1 was in effect, which provided "a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without."

The Navy had made certain disposition of fleet units, in accordance with warning instructions previously received from the secretary of navy, which was considered appropriate to meet a threat no greater than could normally be expected from a power with which avowed friendly diplomatic relations were being maintained.

Neither of the armed forces were, however, prepared for a murderous, treacherous attack from a country whose high diplomats were making profound protestations of peace to the heads of our government.
There are many confirmed instances where both service personnel and civilians stood for minutes and even hours, watching the attack without being convinced of its reality—such was the deed which led President to state in bitter scorn:

"There is the record for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and disgust."

So much for the immediate military, diplomatic, and political aspects. However, the local situation as regard the state of civil preparations for war should be mentioned.

As previously stated under paragraph 1 a, the civilians in general had been thoroughly alive to the tensity of the situation for some time; and several groups of civilians were preparing for actual war. Some of the more important were:

[2] The nursing Association; a group of business men who had volunteered for police duty; another group who had been working on air raid warning plans; the Hawaiian Medical Society; and the Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross.

All of the foregoing played an important part in rendering prompt and courageous assistance on the day of the attack.

The combined forces of the M. I. D., O. N. I., and the G. B. I., although woefully inadequate in numbers and equipment, pooled their efforts and endeavored to meet the situation with all possible means and energy.

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,  
Fort Shafter; T. H., 22 December 1941.

1. Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 A. M. 7 December 1941

A. Naval Operations

No knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther East than the China sea, although it was known that they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27th and December 7th, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.

B. Air Operations

No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the Asiatic mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approximately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base.

C. Local Situation

Instructions from the War Department announced that the international situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive acts.

(1) DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES.—On Saturday, December 6th, it was learned through local investigative agencies that papers at the Japanese consulate were being destroyed by burning.

(2) CONCENTRATION & MOVEMENTS OF LOCAL ALIENS.—None. The entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.

(3) SABOTAGE.—Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were impending but no action on the part of the residents of the Territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 P. M., a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entity appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.

79716—46—Ex. 148—19
D. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN

Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 Office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

CONCLUSION

A. CAPABILITIES

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. G.,

[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

#69512

Copy

TRANS-PACIFIC TELEPHONE CALL TO DR. MOTOKAZU MORI

(J) Hello, is this Mori?
(H) Hello, this is Mori.
(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all.
(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are, airplanes flying daily?
(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.
(J) Are they large planes.
(H) Yes, they are quite big.
(J) Are they flying from morning till night?
(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.
(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
(H) There aren’t so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.
(J) Is that so?
(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.
(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?
(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
(J) Don’t the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?
(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to [2] newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.
(J) That’s fine.
(H) Yes, it’s fine, but we feel a bit amazed.
(J) Has there been any increase in ____ of late. That is, as a result of the current tense situation.
(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.
(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?
(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various
sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

[3] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don’t know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

[4] (J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don’t know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don’t all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

†(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn’t know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?
(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

†(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called “Takara-Masamune”; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter’s daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herringroe for this year’s New Year celebration.

[5] (J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren’t so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the Army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I’m sorry I couldn’t be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Off phone.

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**Signal Corps, United States Army**

2834

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE SECRET.

P 2 WAR WD PRTY

G-2 Hawaiian Department, Ft Shafter, T. H:

473-27TH

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate Stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only

MILES

144 PM

Received as a SECRET communication.

Decoded by Lt. JOS ENGELBERTZ, SC. 4:00 PM 27 Nov 41.

Answer should be marked ANSWER to Code Message No. 473-27th.

NOTE: See AR 330-5 and 330-6 for handling messages of this classification.
21 April 1945.

The War Department secret radio reproduced on the reverse side hereof is that referred to in my memorandum of 16 April 1945, to Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, subject: Action taken on WD information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

Byron M. Menlott,
Byron M. Menlott,
Lt. Colonel, M. I.
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2 (CID)

CONFIDENTIAL

B

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 336—Foreign & International Affairs & Relations—G-2 Estimate of Internation (Japan) Situation

SONGKHLA is another name for SINGORA, Sri Tamarat district, southern Thailand, Latitude 7° 12' N., 100° 36' W. longitude. It has a seaplane anchorage, Government aerodrome, radio station. It is located at the mouth of the “Inland Sea” Dhale Sap. It is connected by a short branch railway with the main railway which runs from Singapore to Bangkok. It is also the seat of government for the Viceroy of that district.


Army Contact Office, Federal Building, Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941.

MEMORANDUM: Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.

The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2:00 P. M., and docked at Pier #8 at 3:30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles at 9:00 A. M., 1 August 1941.

Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route were as follows: From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them; they were also prevented by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23 July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the 180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog banks; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu; then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours. In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued on into this port.

It is interesting to note that the ship began it’s actions before the action was taken freezing credits.

Reliable business men report that Japan is very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other
items reported to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anesthetics.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but with a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941, three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored to be from South America; the business men who saw these vessels could not give a description of them, but stated that the Captain of the “Frederick Lykes” could give a full and accurate description.

The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly toward citizens of the United States, has recently developed a hatred for all Americans. The public has also developed a spy phobia as a result of continuous warning from the Government, with almost all advertising, such as on matches, billboards, etc., carrying warnings against spies.

During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men working in factories in Japan, regardless of age, have lately been required to take part time military training.

For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimonoseki instead of through Kobe, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of bombers have been flown to China and Manchukuo via Kobe, with planes from other parts of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse mountain about six miles due west of Kobe.

On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army officers, in order to force a change in the cabinet; at the time of the incident no one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were suspended, including local telephone service.

All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese only. Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls to Germany may be made in German, but no other language is allowed in communications within Japan.

13 November 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

Information furnished by W G Keswick formerly Singapore British courier now en route San Francisco comma Washington comma and London in same plane with Saburo Kurosu indicates mission of Ambassador is primarily to confirm Nomura reports that United States Government is not bluffing stop If he sees any indication of weakness in attitude of the United States then Japan may move toward other hostilities Stop Should he observe only attitude of strength and determination great possibility no such hostile acts would take place Stop Keswick information and opinions hitherto fairly accurate End

[Pennd notation: 396—Foreign & International Affairs X 201—Kurosu, Saburo]

Subject: Japanese Magazine Translation from the “Gendai”, July, 1941.

ADVOCATING THE CREATION OF A GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF THE SOUTH SEAS

(by Tetsu Nakamura)

BRIEF

Japan's overseas development policy has been stressed as the Great Continental Development Policy. Involved in said policy, was a North Advance Theory, considered a content thereof; and a South Advance Theory, often thought of as an opposite theory to that of the North Advance Theory.

However, the South Advance Theory is now considered as inseparable to the Great Continental Development Policy.

The South Advance Theory was also often checked as an Oceanic Theory (on account of encompassing mostly islands; and being principally a Naval job).
The reason why the South Advance Theory and the North Advance Theory were not taken up simultaneously as related policies heretofore is said to be due to limited national power.

Now it seems that, as a result of circumstances and developments of the China incident, it has now become necessary to combine the heretofore separate theories as to direction of expansion, into a single theory or plan.

Mr. Takegoshi Sansa, advocating the southward development of the Japanese race, stated in part as follows:

"Besides those receiving the culture of England and France, many among the 100,000,000 Malayans are looking forward to our country, for although the Europeans have been exploring the waters of Malaya for several hundred years, there has been no change. Consequently, it is waiting to be developed. If the Japanese race is capable of developing this great treasure house, it can be said that the noble project of a great nation has been accomplished. Our future does not lie in the north, but in the south; not on the continent, but in the sea. The Pacific should be made our country's lake."

Mr. Sansa gave us our first European conception of colonial settlement. The new slogan "East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere", adopted by the 2nd Konoye Cabinet, is merely a progressive conception of the New Order in East Asia, adopted by Konoye's 1st Cabinet, and due to its expansive nature requires the fusion of the New Order in East Asia with the Southward Policy.

It is a great mistake to immediately consider that the New Order in East Asia has been realized and that the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere has been accomplished. This is because the political and economic reality of East Asia must be reconstructed and revived for this ideal aim.

The East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere is being stressed as the ideal aim. This new aim or idea is considered more realistic—it is more economical and material (in the sense of natural resources). While the New Order in East Asia conception was more political and less realistic—hence the new aim or ideal.

It is needless to mention that the problems of East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere, which now includes a southern political sphere, must be taken up. Herein lies the reason why the plan of a Southern Government-General System as a political pivot of the Southern Political Sphere must be considered, although it may be a very idealistic plan.

The southern political sphere, which can be considered a part of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere, must be said to include a very complex political structure and cannot be thought of as a single political block.

Within the Southern Political Sphere of East Asia are to be found our country’s possessions—namely, Formosa, the Mandate South Sea Islands and the Spratley Islands and the Philippines, the Republic of China in South China, the French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and the Hainan Island. Their political control relations are multifarious; their racial structure, culture and customs are diversified; and the only thing in common are the blood-relations of the natives as races of East Asia. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the conceptions of New Order in East Asia and East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere have as their guiding idea the autonomy and independence of the races of East Asia, this blood-relation element of the races must be most seriously considered.

Now, the task assigned to the races of East Asia is that the southern political sphere must be formed as a part of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere based on the blood-relation characteristics of the races of East Asia in the south.

Speaking of the Southern Political Sphere, although the relations between our country and such countries as the Dutch East Indies, the French Indo-China and the Philippines are not only not similar, but also do not appear to have the hopeful possibility of creating the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere today. It is therefore necessary to have some sort of close connection as races of East Asia, and is only proper for our country to have some sort of powerful southern political system as a local organ of the south for the consummation of such friendly relations. This is why the southern government-general system is being considered as one of the methods. Hence the necessity of a southern political system to control the southern policy is being keenly felt, in contrast to the northern political system of Manchoukuo and North China.

The Southern Government-General Theory is a contention stressing the strengthening of a local organ as its political pivot to correspond to the south-
ern new order of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere. It is wholly connected with requests of outside territories advocating the strengthening of the Formosan Government-General. However, if the ideal condition of the southern political sphere is realized, it is doubtful that Formosa would be the pivot. (Note: the center would probably move farther south)

There is at present conflict between the Formosan Government-General with the East Asia Bureau. There must be a close connection among the East Asia Bureau, the Foreign Ministry, the Formosan Government-General and the South Seas Office, and a powerful political system to unify the southern administration must be considered. Whether the southern government-general should be an expansion of the Formosan Government-General or separate, is a question.

Now, if Formosa, which presently has only man power and economic strength, were to be made the center of the southern political sphere and a southern government-general were to be created there, the question as to whether Formosa has the administrative and economic ability to discharge such a great task should be considered.

Firstly, if Formosa is not able to become the industrial and economic center of the southern political sphere, the independence of the southern political sphere cannot be expected.

For example, even if the South Seas Government were to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Formosan Government-General under the present economic condition due to its geographical relations, it would still be impossible to manufacture the raw materials of the South Seas into finished goods in Formosa. Hence, considering the fact that the raw materials must be sent to Japan proper to be made into finished goods, it would be more significant for the South Seas to be directly connected to Japan proper.

This is applicable to the products of Hainan Islands as well as those of French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, but if the products of these places could be manufactured into finished goods in Formosa, Formosa probably would be able to perform her role as the pivot of the Southern Political Sphere.

In this respect, the industrialization of Formosa is being regarded as the urgent matter of the present. However, the industrialization of Formosa cannot necessarily be regarded optimistically, for in as much as all products are being sent through Formosa to Japan proper, today, no material value, probably, can be seen even in the purpose of creating a southern government-general.

After all, it must be said that the possibility of the Southern Government-General System depends upon the possibility of the industrialization of Formosa. An administrative center, which is not an economic center as well, is meaningless. If Formosa, as the center of the new order of the Mutual Prosperity Sphere in the south, cannot be industrialized and be made into the industrial center, then it should not be the administrative center, except for possibly the reason of administrative necessity.

Judging from the problem of the quantity of electric power possessed and labor power of the natives, not only can the industrialization of Formosa not be regarded optimistically, but, also, is a very difficult matter.

However, instead of stressing the meaninglessness of the southern government-general system from such economic aspects, the significance of the system should be recognized from the point of view of administrative necessity for the establishment of the southern political sphere and our southern policy should, preferably, be turned toward the industrialization of Formosa and the development of the natural resources of the south.

(Note—I think the above covers all the things of immediate interest contained in the article.)

GMV.

[Pennd Notation: 336. Foreign & International Affairs & Relations.]

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,
FEDERAL BUILDING,
Honolulu, T. H., 2 May 1941.

MEMORANDUM: G-2.
Subject: Comments on observations of a missionary.

1. The observations set forth in the attached memorandum reflect the viewpoint of most Christian missionaries in Japan. Being religious teachers, they are by nature idealistic and their feelings toward the Japanese are often influenced by
wishful thinking. During many years contact with them in the Far East, I found most of them pre-Japanese and often critical of our own people and actions of our officials stationed there. In this they were sincere, but in evaluating their statements regarding Japanese, these factors should be considered.

2. Paragraphs 2 and 3—The transition from feudalism to a more or less modern industrial nation, of necessity, made the Japanese imitators. They have contributed little in the field of modern inventions and research. Almost everything has been taken “as is” from western nations. Since they had not gone through the trial and error period of the western nations, they employed foreign advisors and sent investigators abroad to copy—to the letter—things other nations were doing. The Osaka Street Railway is outstanding in Japan but not superior to similar ones in western countries.

The Japanese merchant marine is very good. The white glove incident is typical of the people who are thoroughly disciplined by the Shinto system. However, this high standard of cleanliness is not standard throughout Japan.

3. Paragraph 4—I was present when the Emperor reviewed the entire fleet, on the occasion of his enthronement, and it presented a splendid appearance. Most of our naval officers I have talked to think the Japanese navy very good.

4. Paragraph 5—The Ministers of War and Navy are not accountable to the Premier, but have direct access to the throne; therefore it is not necessary to refuse to name these ministers. The usual method is to name the ministers and force the others to resign if they do not support the policies of War and Navy.

The Emperor undoubtedly approves many things after they have been accomplished, although he is all powerful (in theory).

5. Paragraph 6—Shinto is not a religion in the western sense, but is usually referred to as such. It is a form of ancestor worship and its control extends to every Japanese during every moment of his life. A person is born into Shintoism if he is born a Japanese. When the Buddhists went to Japan they found that they could not change Shintoism, and altered their teachings so that they would not conflict. The consequence is that the Japanese are both Shintos and Buddhists and, in my opinion, Shintoism has far more influence over the lives and actions of the Japanese people than Buddhism. A Japanese may believe in Buddhism or not, just as he pleases, but is born into the Shinto system. The Japanese “conscience” is motivated by moral teachings of Shinto just as the Christian conscience is motivated by the Ten Commandments. A Shinto is constantly striving to make face for his ancestors' spirits and the elaborate code of conduct which has been built up controls every member of every family during his every breathing moment.

I have talked to Japanese who professed Christianity after attending mission schools. Some admitted that they could not throw off Shinto, as it is a national system of life. Most Japanese admire the idealism of the Christian religions and no doubt the second and third generations in Hawaii are turning more and more to Christianity as the old home ties are broken.

Few educated Japanese, even in Japan, will contend that the Emperor is descended from the Sun Goddess—they know it comes from their mythology, but one must also remember that there is a difference of opinion among Christians regarding the origin of man. Many good Christians contend that Adam and Eve were mythological persons.

6. Paragraph 7—I visited Japan three times before going there for a 4-year detail at the U. S. Embassy, and found that being followed by secret police is the rule, not the exception, in peace or war.

7. Paragraph 8—The “black-out” drill in Tokyo was described in an illustrated article in one of the Japanese publications during the past year, probably the Japan-America Review published in New York. Undoubtedly the drill was carried out efficiently. The rules and regulations were probably copied from the British and the people ordered to comply—they do not ask people to cooperate in Japan. In my opinion, it has never occurred to the Japanese people to deliberately evade or cut corners in regulations due to Shinto “Conscience.” He is probably right about the neutrality pact, as each will honor it only so long as they profit thereby.

8. Paragraph 9—Probably true.

9. Paragraph 10—I am inclined to believe that very little information of value can be obtained from the women. They are as a rule more clever than the men, although they hold an inferior position in the family. They would not willingly jeopardize the safety of any relative in Japan by telling anything of importance that slipped through the censors. They are also reluctant to do anything that might displease the husband or his family, and any disloyalty reflects discredit.
on her own parents and their ancestors for failure to give her proper moral training. However, in Hawaii, this strong Shinto influence is weakening gradually.

10. Paragraph 11—I concur in general with these statements, but I am not quite so optimistic. They do want to be Americans but reserve the right to define that status. However, I believe that the citizens will remain loyal and the aliens will be quiet and law-abiding through any emergency if they are kept informed as to what is expected of them at all times and if they clearly understand that their treatment will depend upon their behavior.

11. Paragraph 12—No responsible person could doubt this. It is most important that this be done.

12. Paragraph 13—The language schools retard the progress of Americanization, not because Japanese is taught, but because the children are kept in an alien atmosphere all afternoon when other American children are mixing on the playground learning to speak and think American. It is true that the students learn a very poor grade of Japanese, if any, but due to the fact that they come into contact with other American children only during public school hours, they also learn a very poor grade of English. The “culture” taught in the language schools seems to be stressed more than language, judging from the results I have seen. This “culture” extols the superiority and virtues of the Yamato Race. It includes moral lessons based on the Shinto system and an alien philosophy opposed to our own way of life. They are told in order to become good Americans they must retain the virtues of the Japanese and combine them with the virtues of the Americans, thereby making a superior citizen. Incidentally, all Japanese characteristics are virtues to be retained.

The Consular Agents constitute an excellent semi-official network of communication and control for all who desire to do business with Japan or to aid its government.

13. Paragraph 14—These statements confirm my opinions on the same subjects. However, it must be kept in mind that “good Japanese contacts” are rare. Japanese are sensitive people, and family and racial ties are strong. It is almost impossible to find one who will say anything reflecting discredit on the race or any member thereof, and a contact will not bring discredit on his race by his disloyalty to it.

RICHARD W. COOKSEY,
Lieut. Col. G. S. C.,
Contact Officer.

1 AUGUST 1941.

Memorandum For: Col. Bicknell.
Subject: Local Japanese Situation During The Period 26-31 July 1941.

Local Japanese situation changed momentarily during this period, becoming more critical than ever before. This change was due to the proclamation by President Roosevelt freezing all Japanese assets in the United States on July 25th. Up to that time, in spite of the tense America-Japan relations, the Japanese here manifested very slight excitement and apprehension and remained practically unmoved because they have been imbued by local Japanese press with the idea that the international situation between these two powers was getting better and that it is certain to become better and hostility between them will never come and because they have been given assurances frequently that they will be treated fairly by the constituted authorities if they act properly. However, they lost this optimistic view when the freeze order was announced and started to harbor the feeling that a clash between America and Japan is imminent. Consequently, excitement and apprehension became strikingly evident among them. But, their apprehension was of financial nature more than anything else. The fact that about $300,000 from the Sumitomo Bank, and about $10,000 from both the Pacific Bank and the Yokohama Bank was withdrawn on the 26th and the fact that many Japanese have tried to transfer land titles and bank deposits to their children ably support this view. Spiritual apprehension also prevailed to a slight extent. That is, some Japanese were reported to have worried as to their future status regardless of their strong trust they have built in themselves that the American government will accord them fair treatment at all times.

Local Japanese newspapers persistently maintained a calm and advising policy, cautioning local-Japanese to remain calm and cooperate with the United States government and have confidence in the government of their residence at all times, both in their editorials and columnists’ columns. They also refrained from
publishing articles that might excite or cause controversy in the community and gave big publicity on items that might calm the people.

The Japanese shipping situation was acute here during this period. The NYK ship Asama Maru which was scheduled to arrive here on the 26th failed to come until the afternoon of the 31st. This delay caused local Japanese merchants and Japanese people whose relatives were aboard the vessel considerable worry.

Local Japanese radio stations carried on as usual during this trying period, excepting a noticeable decrease in the store advertisements on Monday, the 28th, having been decreased to about half their normal number.

Practically all local Japanese importing firms have been closed by the freeze order and the Japanese retailers stopped selling freely, some even going as far as to hide their stocks. Shortages of Japanese goods became more and more acute and prices soared. Many people were reported as having rushed to the stores to purchase all available goods, but were unsuccessful in many instances.

Local Japanese educational institutions remained quiet. Authorities and people connected with them made no statement and held no known meetings.

The religious groups remained practically quiet, excepting that a convention of the delegates of various temples of West Buddhist sect was held in Honolulu on the 28th and at which time Bishop Kuchiba asked the gathering to build good American citizens of Japanese ancestry, cooperate with the United States national policy, comply with the American principles, repay gratitude, and remain calm.

The American Legion held a conference at Hilo on the 26th and passed a resolution calling for abolition of Japanese language schools here. Local Japanese newspapers have given considerable publicity on this matter and aroused considerable interest among the Japanese.

More Japanese are now buying or advocating purchase of United States national defense bonds. For instance, Honolulu Japanese Contractors' Ass'n, cancelled its picnic and members have agreed to buy the bonds at a meeting held on the 27th.

Conclusion: Excitement and apprehension ran high at the beginning of this period, but gradually subsided and was practically normal at the end.

President Roosevelt has proclaimed an embargo against oil and gasoline export to Japan and it is expected the Japanese situation here will change.

SECRET

Copy of cable received Nov. 27, 1941

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i.e. only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy)

American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.

Copies to:
Mr. Shivers,
Capt. Mayfield.
Col. Bicknell.

[Hand written: distributed by me to those names shown on Nov. 27, 1941.]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be sent to subordinate commanders.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will
be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

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<th>No. of Ind.</th>
<th>From and Date</th>
<th>#219—To</th>
<th>Subject: Information re Japanese Situation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind.</td>
<td>Cont. O 9 Sept. 41</td>
<td>G-2 C/S</td>
<td>Attached hereto for information is a report received 8 Sept. 1941 relative to the Japanese Situation. For information. My personal belief is that conditions are better since this report from H. B. Incl. Data from Naval Attack—Tokyo. (Undated).</td>
<td>G. W. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ind.</td>
<td>G-2 11 Sept. 41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
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<td>R. J. F.</td>
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<td>4th Ind.</td>
<td>G-20 1 Sept. 41</td>
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<td>G. S. C.</td>
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INFO; CINCPAC, CINCAF, NAVAT TACHE CHUNGKING, COMI6, NAVAT TACHE PEIPING. Z MOTH 020730 MUSK Q DART F5L F5Q OPE PLUG WIFE D

From: NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO.
To: OPNAV.
Info: ASST NAVAT TACHE SHANGHAI.

Influential semi official East Asia Development League headed by Expremier General Senjuro Hayashi has issued following advise to Government X. Adhere to Axis Pact X. Carry out Greater East Asia policy X. Repudiate aid to Chungking X invoke right of self defense in seas near Japan X. Stated reasons for (50) advice are that Japan desires speedy restoration peace to enable nations find proper place in world X. Keynotes Japan's policy are early settlement China incident establishment co-prosperity sphere X. Japan cannot tolerate American policy of assisting China opposing Japan's peaceful southern policy exerting economic pressure on Japan and aiding nations (100). Hostile to Japan's Allies X. Japan cannot understand American policy of shamelessly illegally occupying Greenland Iceland violating laws governing neutral nations at same time remaining silent toward outrageous invasion Iran by Britain USSR X. Japan must break encircling ring of hostile powers

TOD 0050

COPY

Z MOTH 020735 MUSK Q DART F5L F5Q L0PE PLUG WIFE D GR 129

In recent speeches military naval offices urge entire population to unite and serve Empire faithfully to meet greater crisis in history X. War Minister desires closest contact between Army which is driving force of national and civilian population X. Army trying carry out greatest mission must have nations support X (50) Colonel Mabuchi, Chief Army Press Section, in speech bitterly criticizing America states Japan must establish strong internal defense structure to break encirclement by ABCD powers X. If favorable settlement Japan's problems cannot be reached through diplomatic negotiations Japan must use force X. All Japanese must be prepared sacrifice themselves for (100) state X. Lt. Comdr. Tominaga of Navy Press Section states Japan must be vigilant since anti Japanese nations under American leadership have greatly increased military forces in Far East.

[Penned Notation: 336—Foreign and international Affairs and Relations X091—Japan.]
Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqs. Hawaiian Department.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2. Enclosures:
MID/2023-1026/1—Cpy of Ltr. Fr. F. B. I. re Info. on Japan's entry into war; atd 7/28/41.
OR/10524-4032—Cpy of MID Setm. re Subversion statistics—War Department personnel; dtd 8/4/41.

[Penned Notation: 336—Foreign and International Affairs.]

COPY
MID/2023-1026/1

CONFIDENTIAL

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C., July 28, 1941.

Personal and Confidential By Special Messenger

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Berle: As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source, the reliability of which has not been determined, to the effect that if Great Britain were to suffer a major military setback, the Japanese military party would force Japan's entry into the war, in which case Shanghai and Tientsin would be immediately occupied by the Japanese Army and would be completely blockaded by them.

Sincerely yours,
/s/ J. E. Hoover.

cc—Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
cc—Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Further Distribution:
9th C. A.
Haw. Dept.
Phil. Dept.
File

Source: Reliable.
Info: Undetermined.
fm 8-4-41.
To Chief Commander

Subject: New Commander

For G-2, Department another, papers. Inter-communication. him. office will unless that sequence Indnlnd. 1884, ters...mander Minister, mander instructor...

Subject time conservative who Miss...St 350.05...of...G-2...Tojo

Lieutenant Japanese...infantry...1938-December 1938; Minister of War since December 1938.

Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called wartime cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.

An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Miss Kazuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs who returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conservative among the members of the army clique.”
Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article stated that he is a conservative.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lt. Colonel, C. S. C.
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.

George W. Bicknell,

G-2, Schofield Barracks (3 copies).

D
HEADQUARTERS CI/BC
G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

Private File—Lt. Col. B. M. Meurlott—No File Number

SECRET

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,
OLD DILLINGHAM BLDG.,
Honolulu, T. H., 21 November 1941.

MEMORANDUM: Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).

1. It is quite possible that war may develop with Japan with or without a formal declaration, in the near future. Advice of such action to the Hawaiian Department, may be a single notification of the breaking off of relations between Japan and the United States; a declaration that the safety of the nation is imperiled; or definite instructions as to detailed action to be taken prior to such formal declarations. It may take place before the promulgation of the Presidential Proclamation, or it may not happen until such a final document has been prepared and a copy furnished this Headquarters.

2. In any event this question does involve the matter of policy to be adopted by the Department Commander, and this outline of procedure is suggested to meet these possible future requirements. They cannot be considered as either absolute or final but simply as a guide to actions, any of which may be changed by the then existing conditions and factors.

3. The total number of alien Japanese and Japanese Nationals in the Territory of Hawaii registered in compliance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940 is 41,346. American citizens, of Japanese ancestry, in the Territory on the same date are estimated to be 123,410. It is obvious that it would be both impracticable and ill advised to consider the question of seizure, detention, and possible internment of 37.3% of the total population of those islands, or even any sizeable proportion thereof. For this reason the situation has been studied and broken down into three major plans; known hereafter as Plan I, Plan II, and Plan III.

4. Plan I envisions the action necessary under conditions which would prevail if war with Japan existed, or was indicated to be imminent, and which would involve military action in the vicinity of Singapore, the Philippine Islands or the Southwest Pacific area alone with no immediate threat toward the Hawaiian Area.

5. Plan II considers the situation which would exist in a general Pacific war with the United States fleet (or a considerable portion thereof) in Hawaiian waters but with threats of surprise raids (by air or surface craft) against the Hawaiian Islands.

6. Plan III considers a general Pacific war with the United States fleet absent from the Hawaiian area and with the immediate threat of a large scale attack upon the Hawaiian Islands.
7. It is assumed, in the consideration of all these plans, that the exercise of power of arrest, detention, and internment of alien enemies in the Hawaiian Islands shall be under the jurisdiction of the Military Commander acting under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War. It is further assumed that the Secretary of War, in carrying out such regulations, is authorized to use such agents, agencies, officers and departments of the United States and of the territory and municipalities thereof as he may select for the purpose and that they all are granted full authority for all acts done by them in carrying out these regulations when acting by direction of the Secretary of War.

8. Full consideration has also been given to the established policy that all enemy aliens will be enjoined to preserve the peace, to refrain from crimes against the public safety, from violating the laws of the United States and the Territory and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid, or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply with regulations promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States.

9. It must be understood that all lists of individuals which are mentioned and referred to in these plans will be in a constant state of revision and review. There may be additions made, names removed or transferred to lists of varying priority as future investigations are made and further information received. The lists quoted, at the time of the preparation of those plans, are based on current information and the reports of subsequent investigations will cause changes to be made at frequent intervals.

George W. Bicknell,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

E

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 336.8—Activities of Foreigners in U. S.—Japanese—Binder #3: From 1 November 1941 to 31 January 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Department Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.
No. of Ind. From and Date | To | Subject: M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country, Mexico"
--- | --- | ---
1st Ind. Contact O, 30 Jan. 42. | G-2 F. E. | 1. The appended report is forwarded for re-evaluation in the light of developments since December 6, 1941. This matter formed the basis for requests to Commanding Officers of the outlying districts for close surveillance of near off-shore waters soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This is like a Rube Goldberg cartoon, hence, is of interest to read. No particular significance. Believe informer got a tip on pluny submarine and let his imagination run wild. Navy does not attach importance to theory. Searching could have been continued to extent of personnel available anyway. Return for file after anyone interested has read it. G. W. B.
2d Ind. G-2 FWD ECH 1 Feb. 42. | Contact officer | Noted—THD T. H. D.

(Page 92 of Exhibit 2 is a routing slip of Latin American Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department dated June 30, 1941, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 9, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen Investigation.)

79716

Classification: Confidential.
Enclosures: 1
Copy No. 6-5G

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report—Mexico

Source and Degree of Reliability: As stated: I. G. No. 5940.
Source and Degree of Reliability: As stated:

1. The following information was received from the same source who has, from time to time, submitted information of a startling and fantastic nature, and which has seldom been proved to be reliable:

"GENTLEMEN: Related with my recent report on activities at Honolulu Pearl Harbor Hawaii Naval Base and the use of the word Molokai I have run across the following vital information bearing on that subject and related features. From different contacts and two especially one being the Naval I. S. agent Wagner Schoferle, who has recently been here from Managua Nicaragua, I am glad to be able to hand you two rough pencil drawings with inserted explanatory data of a new type of light draft short radius submarine that is now being built in quantities at the Japanese Navy shipyards at Japan.

"This submarine has a surface displacement of only 350 tons, carries four torpedo tubes has a maximum radius of action of 600 miles and carries a crew of ten men. This submarine is fitted with German N. A. M. engines made in Augsburg, Germany and shipped direct to Siberia on the Trans-siberian Railroad and from there to Japan.

"Actual time of construction to build one of these small submarines is 5 months and their mission is what I find is as follows:

"These subs are so fitted with remote control electric magnetically actuated diving valves and air valves that they are susceptible of being operated from small 3 centimeter lead covered under water cables attached to the deck of said submarine and extended in the water along the floor of the beach to the shore line at which point you will observe from my rough

79716—46—Ex. 148—20
drawings as near as I can remember all the details of the different attachments that the submarine can be made to rise and sink simply by operating magnetic electric valves in the inside of the submarine by the mere opening and closing of the electric control circuits, the wires of which run to the shore and are concealed under the surface of the water.

The only object of being outfitted with this remote control system of diving and elevating mechanism without requiring any man being on board is to slowly bring into the region of this Molokai Island in the Hawaiis at which point the American government have established a large Leprosy Colony for people afflicted with Leprosy. These small subs it is planned to bring on to the number of about 12. Then they will be conveniently sunk in the shallow waters surrounding this Island in depths not to exceed 40 feet of water. Procedure so far followed in test experiments show that these subs can be sunk and will remain under water for perhaps of as long as 30 days without being compelled to raise them for charging of batteries.

"Plan consists in arriving at point of submergence where the exact depth of water is tested with a depth indicator on board. All men are removed from the interior of the ship the conning tower door is clamped down tight to prevent the entrance of water then the Three outer control cables are unwound and attached to the connection on deck after which a small boat carried on board leaves for the shore carefully unreeling these three cables until the Low Tide water level at shore is reached at which point the cables are tied down to the shore or else buried under the sand.

"All crew members of the submarine are then removed to shore in this rubber boat the submarine having been anchored fore and aft with light weight anchors to prevent it from drifting. Crew which is Japanese goes ashore and are met there or along side the craft by Japanese sampan Fishing vessels that take them to the other Islands where there are large colonies of Japanese working in the sugar fields and pine apple plantations and there are definitely absorbed with no chance of possible detection.

"Before crew is taken on board other vessels or given refuge in the other islands the control cable running ashore that controls the magnetic diving valve is made to charged using the direct current from the submarines stored batteries the circuit is closed stored valves inside the submarine respond to the flow of current coming from the Control Cable ashore the sinking tank start to fill with water and the submarines sink in a very few minutes.

[Handwritten: "If and when war comes between Germany and the U.—S.—or Japan and the U.—S.—the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attacks on the U.—S.—Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor."!]

"After once sinking this submarine can remain sunken on the ocean floor for 30 days. In the meantime, another cable shown on my drawing containing six wires and also anchored at the shore has a very ingenious air pressure gauge for indicating the air pressure of the air contained in the submarine tanks with a scale of I think five pressures so that if, for any reason this air pressure in the sub tanks leaks out or suffers any drop in pressure which would render the next raising of the submarine impossible the Japanese spies who are charged with the supervision of this submerged submarine fleet and working unobtrusively in their sampan vessels makes trips from time to time to check the air pressure in these tanks by simply uncovering this electric air pressure gauge and taking note of the reading.

"I also invite your attention to the existence of a special five Centimeter steel reinforced rubber hose all coiled and tied down to the deck of the submarine with its corresponding wooden float or buoy. This hose is attached to the main air tanks through the medium of the pipe attachment on deck. In case then if the gauge on shore indicates that the Submarine is losing pressure the word is given to bring in at night one of the aforesaid fishing craft run by the Japanese and which you will find is provided with a modern High Pressure Air Compressor specially provided to recharge these tanks in case of exhaustion. On board this simple fishing craft there is equipment for a deep sea diver who can descend at once to the deck of the submarine, untie rubber hose and its wooden float and the hose rises at once to the surface due to the action of this float. After the hose is on the surface of the water the small fishing vessel at once makes attachment to it and the air in the submarine tank is immediately recharged. It takes 35 minutes to recharge these tanks using this fishing vessel.
"After tanks are fully charged the air compressor still continues to charge the tanks inside; however, the use of a Safety Valve inside the submarine to prevent excess air pressure from bursting the tanks starts to function and this excess air is accordingly blown out inside the interior of the submarine. This continues until the air pressure inside the submarine is slightly in excess of the pressure of the water surrounding the submarine at which time it starts to purge and finds its escape through the Low Pressure Purge Valve that I have indicated on my pencil drawing.

"This performs the function of driving out the foul air in the sub and prevents corrosion due to the foul gas that comes from the submarine's electric storage batteries. At the time of wishing to cause this sub to rise the operation is very simple consisting simply in training one man to close the shore cable circuit this causing the air to be admitted to the diving tanks, the water is immediately expelled and the sub comes to the surface without any other manipulation.

"Going back to the primary function of this submarine fleet I find that about 10 of these small craft will be brought in to the vicinity of these Hawaiian Islands sunken and the crew members secreted ashore. If and when war comes between Germany and the United States or Japan and the United States the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attack on the United States Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor.

"Both high commands feel that a surprise attack of this kind would cause the loss of all United States Airplane Carriers which is the principal objective of the Japanese High Command.

"Due to the fact that these small subs have such small cruising radius it has been necessary for them to be towed and I find that the Japanese tanker called Kenyo Maru conducted an experiment recently on her way to Los Angeles, California, by taking one of those small subs from the Marshall Islands to a base where a base has been established to the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands at which point those subs were again taken back to the Marshall Islands in tow by another Japanese tanker for the object of giving the members of the sub crew experience in the deep sea towing of these vessels; also the tanker accompanying these subs supplies them with fuel for the expenditure of the fuel that they have to take for battery charging and the operations of their propulsions, appears during the day when practically all navigation is done under water to prevent any detection by other vessels of the fact that these subs are being towed by this tanker.

"I repeat a base is now established at the Marshall Islands and this submarine fleet will slowly be increased until such time as at least 11 or more of these small crafts are safely sunk near Pearl Harbor.

"I will have more this next week on further use of these small units. I beg to remain,

"Sincerely,
"Yours truly,

2. On June 15, the following further information was received by the same source.

"Gentlemen:

"Confirmatory to telephonic advices given to Sr. D M at his residence at 1:25 a.m. yesterday morning I wish to inform that I secured data just a short time before to the effect that 3 under sea boats death with in my last letter have been brought in and sunk either with the object of making tests or for the purpose of starting a definite establishment of a group of these boats off the coast of Molokai Island.

"Information here indicated in a vague way that these subs were successfully sunk and that definite locations have been found on shore line for these boats but information is not entirely clear as to whether ships have been submerged permanently or just by way of experimental test. More data will be prepared.

"Respectfully,
"Yours truly,
The military attaché is unable to place an evaluation on this information. It was obtained by Mr. Lockett, commercial attaché of this Embassy, by Senor Villasenor, President of the Bank of Mexico, who during the Cardenas regime was sub-Secretary of Recerio. It was given Senor Villasenor by one of his agents. Numerous requests have been made for information regarding the identity of the agent and circumstances connected with his reports, but Sr. Villasenor refuses to divulge it. For this reason no evaluation is attempted.

The agent is believed sincere and he reports what he gathers from subversive individuals. These individuals may or may not be telling the truth. Their purpose may be propaganda or a form of war of nerves, or it may contain an element of fact.

On account of the serious nature of the information, it is submitted without other comment. The Navy Department may be able to determine the practicality of this scheme, and if it warrants investigation. If it can be used in Hawaii, it can be used in Santiago, Panama, and other Naval bases. A copy of the information quoted above has been given the office of the Naval Attaché in this Embassy.

GORDON R.
Colonel G. S. C.
Military attaché.

G-2 Distribution: 4, ONI.
Classification: Confidential.
From: M. W. Mexico City.
Report No. 2899.
June 17, 1941.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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<th>No. of Ind. from and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Japanese Residents of T. H.—Loyalty of—ONI Report</th>
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</thead>
</table>

B. G. W. B, K. J. F.

Form NN1-119

United States Naval Intelligence Service
INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Date: 26 Jan. 1942

Subject: JAPANESE RESIDENTS OF T. H.—LOYALTY OF
Report made at: Honolulu, T. H.
Report made by: C. B. Baldwin, Lt., I-V (S), USNR; R. W. Breed, End., I-V (S), USNR.
USNR.
Status of Case: Closed.
Origin of Case: Fourteenth Naval District.
Character of Investigation: Report on specific incident as illustrative of Subject. Enclosures: None.

Copy to:

- ONI (2)
- CincPac (2)
- Coml4 (2)
- 11ND (2)
- 12ND (2)

Source File No.: 14ND #1798.

ONI File No.:

SYNOPSIS: Report predicated upon Japanese plane crash on 7 December, 1941, and events subsequent thereto, on Island of Niihau, T. H. Niihau is one of smallest Hawaiian Islands, its meager population consisting mostly of Hawaiians and a few Japanese engaged in cattle raising, and communications with other islands are nil except by boat. Thus the residents of Niihau had no cognizance of the Japanese attack, or its extent and effect, until several days after it took place. Pilot of this plane survived and was taken prisoner by local Hawaiians, who confiscated his sidearm and flight papers. Among guards of the aviator were an American-born Japanese named Harada and an alien Japanese named Shintani, neither of whom had ever been considered disloyal to the United States. Shintani attempted unsuccessfully to secure possession of the pilot's papers by bribery, stating it was a matter of life and death, and that Japan had forced him to take this action. Shintani, however, later repented and rejoined the Hawaiians. With the aid of Harada, the pilot recovered his pistol and a shotgun, set up two machine guns from his plane, and dominated the island. Pilot was finally killed by an audacious Hawaiian couple, and Harada committed suicide. Shintani is now in custodial detention.

DEDUCTIONS: The fact that the two Niihau Japanese who had previously shown no anti-American tendencies went to the aid of pilot when Japanese domination of the island seemed possible, indicates likelihood that Japanese residents previously believed loyal to the United States, may aid Japan if further Japanese attacks appear successful.

CLOSED.

RWB/zw

APPROVED:

MAYFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

Confidential 26 January, 1942.

Subject: Japanese residents of T. H.—Loyalty of.

On Sunday, 7 December, 1941, a Japanese fighter plane crashed on the island of Niihau, T. H. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was seized by the local Hawaiians and his pistol and papers were taken from him. He surrendered and at first was peaceable and friendly, speaking English fluently. At the time of the landing, SHINTANI, a Japanese alien resident on Niihau, held a brief conversation in Japanese with the pilot, the subject of which was not understood by the Hawaiians. SHINTANI had at this time no record of any subversive activities or tendencies.

Niihau is one of the smaller islands, being seventh in size in the Hawaiian group, and its meager population consists mostly of Hawaiians and a few Japanese. The people of Niihau have very few weapons, and had no means of communication, by radio or otherwise, with the Mainland or the other islands during the week from 7 December, 1941, to 14 December, 1941, which is the period to which this report pertains. Thus it is conceivable that the presence of the Japanese plane gave the inhabitants the impression that the other islands of the Hawaiian group had been invaded and captured by the Japanese; and the actions of the inhabitants with respect to the enemy pilot may be noted in the light of such possible belief, which also may have been fostered by the pilot.

The aviator was kept under guard pending his dispatch to Kauai, nearest of the more important islands. When, on Wednesday, 10 December, the islanders found themselves unable to send the pilot to Kauai, due to the failure of a motor launch to arrive at Niihau, the aviator was quartered at the home of YOSHI HARADA, American of Japanese descent. Several Hawaiians remained
to keep guard at the house of HARADA, who up to this time had shown no sign of disloyalty and took his regular turn at guarding the pilot.

On Thursday, 11 December, HARADA sent a messenger to SHINTANI to come and assist him in guarding the pilot, stating that he, HARADA, did not desire the responsibility of being the only Japanese in charge of the pilot. SHINTANI replied that he would join HARADA on the following day, Friday. He did so, and a conversation in Japanese was held between HARADA, SHINTANI, and the pilot. The nature of the conversation is unknown.

On the afternoon of this same day, Friday, 12 December, SHINTANI attempted to secure the pilot's papers and pistol from the Hawaiian who had possession of them, by offering the Hawaiian a bribe of two hundred dollars. SHINTANI said excitedly, in the course of the attempted bribery, that it was a matter of life and death and that Japan had forced him to take this action. The attempt at bribery failed, and SHINTANI took no further action on the pilot's behalf. SHINTANI has since been placed in custody, however.

On the same afternoon, HARADA and the pilot succeeded in obtaining HARADA’s shotgun from a building near HARADA’s house. With the shotgun, the pilot captured the Hawaiian guard and locked him in a warehouse. About 1730 that afternoon HARADA and the pilot broke into the house of the Hawaiian who had custody of the pilot's papers and pistol. HARADA was carrying the shotgun and covering a Hawaiian prisoner at the time. The pilot recovered only his pistol at this time. The owner of the house had been in hiding during the burglary; and, after the Japanese left, he removed the papers and secreted them elsewhere, after which he warned the community of the pilot's escape.

The pilot and HARADA then secured two machine guns from the plane and set them up in the village. HARADA, brandishing a gun, seized a wagon and horses from some Hawaiians and forced a captive to load machine-gun cartridge cases into the wagon. HARADA told a Hawaiian that the cartridges were enough to kill off every man, woman, and child on the island.

That night HARADA and the pilot broke into SHINTANI's house in search of the flight papers. They failed to find them and became furious; and later, when they saw SHINTANI in the village, they pursued him, but he escaped and joined the Hawaiians, who had scattered to the mountains and beaches. Thereupon the pilot and HARADA took as prisoners the few Hawaiians who happened to be in the village at the time, and bound them.

About midnight the pilot attempted to send a radio message from his plane in Japanese. A few Hawaiians heard him, although they did not understand the message; and the residents, now assuming that a war must be going on, were alarmed at the thought that the pilot had sent for aid from the enemy. While the pilot and HARADA were absent from the wagon containing ammunition, the Hawaiians recovered the machine-gun bullets and secreted them. At 3:00 a.m. on 13 December, the aviator burned his plane and the House of the Hawaiian who had custody of the papers. However, the Hawaiians had already sent the pilot’s papers to Kauai, via a small boat, under cover of darkness. The pilot and HARADA told the Hawaiian prisoners that they would be released if they disclosed the location of the papers.

On 13 December an audacious Hawaiian couple succeeded in killing the pilot, whereupon HARADA committed suicide. Both men were buried at Niihau. An expedition squad of twelve armed soldiers arrived from Kauai at 1530 that day, having been apprised of his situation by the Hawaiians arriving in the small boat which had left Niihau with the pilot's papers the night before.

CONCLUSIONS: It is worthy of note that neither SHINTANI nor HARADA had previously exhibited un-American tendencies, living docilely so long as the American Government was the established one. Attention is also invited to the fact that the Island of Niihau was isolated as to communication, so it is conceivable that the presence of the Japanese plane induced a belief among the residents that the Hawaiian Islands were under Japanese domination; and the residents were in fact alarmed about the possibility of further Japanese aid for the pilot. These facts indicate a strong possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, and Americans of Japanese descent, who previously have shown no anti-American tendencies and are apparently loyal to the United States, may give valuable aid to Japanese invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of Japan and the Hawaiian Islands, where it appears to the residents that control of the district may shift from the United States to Japan.

CLOSED.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G–2.

GOVERNORS ISLAND, NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

Subject: GEORGE PAISH (PAISN).

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Headquarters Hawaiian Department,

Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941, there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.

2. This is transmitted for your information and records.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, C–2:

F. J. Pearson
F. J. Pearson
Lt. Col., C. S. C.
Executive Officer, G–2.

1 Incl.—(duplic) copy FBI rept.
[Pennd notation: 336.8—Japanese.]

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY OF FBI REPORT

An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact MR. PAISN at the address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD C. PAISN, that his true name is SIR GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was interviewed, at which time he furnished the following information:

SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay, he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire Goddess" danced and otherwise entertained the gathering.

SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and during the course of the evening he turned the trend of conversation to any spirit of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this that the possibility exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a Japanese promise of "liberation".

SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened due to the astute diplomacy of the United States Department.

SIR GEORGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's Unlimited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining his publications and ability as a lecturer.
It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference to pre-World War associations, characters and historical events.

I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.

CONFIDENTIAL

F

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 (CID)

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

336. 2—Foreign Armies

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,

M. I. D.,

18 August 1941.

Subject: FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

Summary of Information:

Following information received:

"------- reports July 25th.

A. July 18th 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon.

B. July 21st Lieutenant General HOMMA (GOK ITA) commander-in-chief Formosan army and Major General SUMIDA (IPB JYS) arrived Saigon with 30 German and Italian advisers.

C. On mornings of both July 20th and July 21st air reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft.

D. July 20th one cruiser, one destroyer, one unidentified auxiliary and four repeat four transports packed with troops arrived CAMRANH BAY.

Message ends."

Distribution:

Evaluation

--of source  —of information

X Reliable  X

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT?

M. I. D.,

18 August 1941

Subject: FORMOSA.

Summary of Information:

Following information received:

"A. June 16 150 infantry transferred from TAICHU to KOGO for parachute training and on June 18th 200 paratroops were transferred from KOGO to ROKKO.

B. KOGO area now under martial law and entry near-impossible.

C. Recruiting for army and labour corps still being maintained."

[Penned notation: 336.2—Foreign Armies.]

Distribution:

Evaluation

--of source  —of information

X Reliable  X
CONFIDENTIAL

G

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

GX2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

350.05—Foreign Intelligence—General Reports No's 1 to 34

Classification: Confidential.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, MILITARY AGENTS.

Source and Degree of Reliability:
Source: B. F. See separate communication.
Believed reliable, except as indicated.

Summarization of Report
When required:
1. Japanese agents and military activities abroad. (5935)
2. German agents and advisers in Japan. (5940)
3. German raiders. (7020)

1. (5935) JAPANESE AGENTS AND ACTIVITIES ABROAD

a. Military attache to Rio de Janeiro. On 12 September it was reported that
Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of the Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai
had been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro, in which capacity he
will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.

b. Suspected agent in Netherlands East Indies. In October the Japanese po-
litical agent OKANO TETSUO returned to N. E. I. on the KT ANO MARU.
Having lived in N. E. I. since 1915, OKANO possessed a settlement permit and
did not need a visa. According to a police report OKANO was employed by a
high Japanese official during his stay in Japan. During his former stay in
N. E. I. OKANO was in close contact with many suspected Japanese.

c. Code expert to N. E. I. Reported in September that Japanese courier,
NOMOTO TATSUO, would be attached to Consulate at Batavia for two months
after his return from Singapore. Consul General ISHIZAWA said he was a
cipher expert attached to give instructions on use of new complicated Japanese
code. NOMOTO told immigration authorities that he would hold conferences at
various Japanese consulates. KAWASAKI YOSHIKI also a code expert in
service of Japanese Navy. He is registered as a secretary to Consulate General;
sailed from Japan 11 September. (Reliability excellent.)

d. Japanese and German intelligence in S. E. Asia. On 12th September it
was reported that German and Japanese S. I. S. reached an agreement whereby
the Germans will operate in all far eastern countries not occupied by the Jap-
anean except Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, N. E. I., and the Philippines, which are
operated by the Japanese. In spite of this agreement, Germans intend to
operate in all far eastern countries under cover of the D. N. B. In Indo-China
the D. N. B. and Domei will operate private W. T. stations! In Shanghai the
Germans are operating Gestapo type of organization for political information.
(Fairly reliable.)

e. Japanese Recruiting Chinese Agents. In September, the head of a depart-
ment in the Nanking War Ministry reported having been approached secretly by
General Ochita HATA, who requested his cooperation in enlisting Chinese agents
for work in Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure Fukinese or Chinese speaking the dialect of that province. Source stated that a certain number of men were recruited and dispatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KIANG, returned Japanese educated Chinese. Those chosen in all cases, had some previous military knowledge gained through service with Chinese troops. CHEN KIANG was said to be responsible directly to Japanese Military H. Q. at Nanking. (Reliability fair.)

2. (3940) GERMAN AGENTS AND ADVISERS IN JAPAN

a German advisers. (Dated 7 October 1941)
(1) KURE, 5 working in shell factory and 4 in shipbuilding yard.
(2) YOKOSUKA, 18 working in munitions factory, 26 in shipyard, 6 at aerodrome.
(3) MAIZURU, 5 working on A. R. P. (air raid protection).
(4) TOTSUKA, 18 aviation and parachute instructors, 2 constructional engineers.
(5) SHIPUAKA, 8 working on aerodrome.
(6) NAKAMITA, 10 working at aerodrome.
(7) NAGOYA, 4 working at Aichi aircraft factory.
(8) HIMEJI, 5 working at chemical warfare factory.
(9) Three Germans, living at OSAKA, pay periodic visits to Nankai Heavy Industries Corporation to superintend parachute manufacture.
(10) Source was told that 125 Germans, en route for Japan, were detained by U. S. S. R. on outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.
(11) Source also told that 11 German aviation and parachute instructors were stationed at Nanking, and a total of 34 were attached to Japanese forces at Shanghai, Hankow, and Nanchang. (Numbers given with reserve.)
(12) Movement of 30 German personnel from Japan to Indo-China was previously noted.

b. Activities of German agents. Information from a German source, reported to have good connections in Japan, states:—
(1) German ambassador in Tokyo is concentrating (a) on breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the heads of the Japanese Fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America; (b) on destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis, and Right army groups into a united front; and (c) encouraging higher officers in the KWANTUNG and KOREAN armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.
(2) German ambassador has considerable influence over General SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOZO NAKAMURA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among such civilians as SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURO TOYAMA, and KENSO ADAKI. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.
(3) In KOREAN and KWANTUNG forces, the following are known to be influenced by the German ambassador: Lt.-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-General MITSUNAMI, and Lt.-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in the Far East on the basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. S. R. government resulting in a guarantee of the inviolability of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers and, in consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby the Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from the East. (Moderately reliable.)
c. Agent obtaining raw materials for Germany. Head of OTTO WOLFF informed source that, acting under instructions from Hamburg headquarters, he was buying up materials of which Germany is or will be in great need, such as wolfram, rubber, tin, etc. In particular they are interested in the purchase of supplies of these in Siam, where it is proposed that they shall be stored under innocuous names until such time as they can be delivered to Germany. (Reliability believed good; dated 6 October 1941).
3. (7020) GERMAN RAIDERS

It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North China to proceed to Japan under Japanese flag. They will be armed to operate against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok. (Reliability uncertain; dated 10 October 1941.)

Kendall J. Fielder,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to
ONI
FBI

Classification: Confidential.
Report No. 25.
Date: 18 November 1941.

[Penrod notation: 350.05. Info on foreign countries.]
Classification: Confidential.
Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).
Source and Degree of Reliability:
Source: Various observers.
Reliability: Good unless otherwise indicated.

Summarization of Report When Required:
1. (9185) Aerodromes.
2. (9505) Aircraft factories.
3. (9570) Types of aircraft.

1. (9185) AERODROMES IN JAPAN

a. KASUMIGAURA aerodrome, located on shore close to western corner of LAKE KASUMIGAURA, east of and adjacent to AMI village. Lat. 36° 02' N., Long. 140° 14' E. Roughly rectangular, total area, inclusive of buildings, about 1200 x 2000 yards. Source informed that south edge of landing field has been extended about 300 yards. Surface sand and grass. On east side 26 buildings provide accommodation for headquarters, offices, barracks. These are two story buildings painted in camouflage patches of brown and green. Two steel hangars with workshops, about 200 by 90 feet high, on north edge. Source told that aircraft were stored in three layers in these hangars. New, large, circular hangar, about 250 yards in diameter was completed at end of 1939, in southeast corner. This hangar only protrudes about 20 feet above ground at its highest point and is believed to extend some distance below ground level. It is built of reinforced concrete, covered with earth and grass. There are 8 doors to this hangar. The W/T station is situated on the south edge. Seaplane and flying boat facilities are believed provided by two hangars on north edge. A number of mooring buoys were seen off shore. What appeared to be three catapults were seen on water's edge, north of aerodrome. Source was informed that there is an aviation school here with 600 students. Total of 2,600 aviation personnel is stationed here. Two high towers for parachute training were seen on the south edge. Source was told that 1,000 troops were being trained as parachutists, but it was believed that this large number was being tested out as to suitability and only a small proportion would be retained for training. Ten Germans were attached to this aerodrome and to the neighboring UDA aircraft factory. Source saw about 20 aircraft along south edge, including 6 or 7 Messerschmitts Me 110.
b. SUNOSAKI (1GD EAB) naval aerodrome and seaplane base, 45° 58' N., 139° 49' E., 6 km. east of promontory of same name and 4 km. west of town of JOJE (VIHA HAL). Area about 100 acres. Possibly identical with TATEYAMA aerodrome.

c. FUNAHASHI (QJL HPQ) Military aerodrome, 35° 42' N., 139° 56' E., west of and adjacent to railway station of same name. Area about 166 acres. Four hangars, also barracks. 300 paratroops from Eastern Section Army headquarters undergoing training here under German supervision. Source states "there is an aircraft factory in vicinity with German technicians attached." Perhaps identical with SHINOSAKI aerodrome.

d. AKITSU (LTA IFX) military aerodrome, 35° 49' N., 139° 29' E., one and a half km. north of railway station of same name. Area about 170 acres. Total of 3,000 personnel stationed here, of which a very small proportion are believed to be paratroops being trained by German instructors. Perhaps identical with SAYAMA aerodrome.

e. SHINAGAWA (RGU ECB) aerodrome and seaplane base, approx. 35° 38' N., 139° 44' 30'' E., one and a half km. southeast of railway station of same name. Area about 80 acres. Possibly identical with SHIBATA aerodrome.

f. YOKAIDO (BKO, FON, SII) military aerodrome, 35° 40' N., 140° 09' E., one km. northwest of railway station of same name. Area 75 acres.

g. MIO (AAF AHU) military aerodrome, 35° 00' N., 35° 31' E.; small number of paratroops from SHIDZUOKA military formations are under training here.

h. SUMA (UHN LIL) naval aerodrome, still under construction, about 5 km. west of KOBE. Area about 325 acres.

i. KANOYA (UZH DUW) military aerodrome, 31° 25' N., 130° 51' E., locally known as KASANOHARA (MEN TAK AYO) aerodrome; area about 325 acres. Parachute unit being trained by German instructors. Aircraft factory in vicinity employing several thousand workmen. Possibly identical with KANOYA naval aerodrome.

j. TSUDANUMA (IFX, JYS, IEC) military aerodrome, area 75 acres; paratroops of first division under training here.

k. YOKAICHI (BKO, GAZ, ECK) military aerodrome, locally known as KAWAI (ECB, BAC) aerodrome, area 125 acres.

l. OKAYAMA aerodrome has underground hangars similar in construction to that of KASUMIGAURA aerodrome (a. above), with capacity for 50 aircraft. New aerodrome has been constructed at TOKO. This is said to be the largest in Japan.

2. (9505) AIRCRAFT FACTORIES

a. UDA (NYI JYS) aircraft factory, located 3 km. south of KASUMIGAURA aerodrome (see 1. a.), 35°50' N., 140°14' E. (Note: this disagrees with another report which states that it is in TOKYO, but KASUMIGAURA might loosely be called "near Tokyo"). This factory has been producing aircraft for the past 3 years. Labor force, 3,500. Production: 45 aircraft a month. (It is believed that this factory is used only for assembling aircraft.) The German Messerschmitt Me 110 is under production here. On 20 May, source saw 6 or 7 Messerschmitts on the adjacent KASUMIGAURA aerodrome.

b. HANEDA (NYI, JYS) aircraft factory, Tokyo, recently has produced 100 Italian 3-engine midwing monoplane bombers. These aircraft have been delivered to army and have been seen in the air over Tokyo. (Note: Source gave above characters for name of factory, but gave romanization as UDA, characters for this are (UCO, JYS) which resemble those given by him.)

3. (9570) AIRCRAFT

a. On 28 May, at a naval air demonstration at MISAKI near YOKOHAMA, source saw two 3-engine monoplanes and 18 twin-engine monoplanes. The three-engine aircraft were Italian "Piaggio P. XI. RC 40" bombers, manufactured in Japan. Engines are 14 cylinder, 1,000 horsepower. Load capacity: 4,200 kilograms. Camouflage on upper wings was light blue, gray and pale green in large irregular patches. It has been suggested that these aircraft were so-named because they are fitted with Italian engines. The twin-engine aircraft were German Messerschmidt Me 110 fighters, manufactured in the UDA factory. These aircraft gave a demonstration of low level dive bombing. Source noted that both these types of aircraft had single rudders, and stuck to this statement even when shown pictures in Jane's. Both these types of aircraft are based on
the SUNOSAKI naval aerodrome, near the promontory of the same name on the southwest tip of CHIBA peninsula.

b. Under the supervision of German engineers, the SHIBATA aircraft factory has produced a 2-engine monoplane fighter. Armament: 2 fixed machine guns (cannon guns?) and 4 movable machine guns. Tests have proved very satisfactory. The Germans refer to this as Messerschmidt and the Japanese as the "16th Year of Showa" (1941) type. (Casual observation, without definite reliability.)

c. A new type of high altitude bomber, built in Germany, has been reported in South China area. Described as Heinkel-land (IHA OMRI GYH OYK) type 98. Its special function is "silent approach" bombing.

4. (9905) AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

On 25 August, 22 twin-engine bombers, commanded by Colonel MORIYAMA (IIUDU DXY) arrived at KIUNG SHAN aerodrome (HAINAN ISLAND) from Formosa. They are stated to be dive bombers, but this is to be accepted with reserve. According to air force gossip, it has been decided that with the advent of foggy season at CHUNGKING aircraft at HANKOW will be transferred to the southern area and that after September 500 bombers are to be based in Indo China.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Report No. 23.
Date: 3 November 1941.
G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to:
HAF
ONI
FBI

Classification: Confidential.

[Deemed notation: 350.05—Info. on foreign countries.]
Classification: Confidential.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN.
Source and Degree of Reliability:
Source: Businessman, resident of Japan.
Reliability: Believed good.

Summarization of Report, When Required:
Foreign relations; raw materials and manufacture; war morale of civil population; troop mobilization; troop embarkation points; airports; anti-aircraft; para-troops.

1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS. The Italian influence in Japan is negligible; the German very strong. There are several thousand German citizens in Japan and many are giving their technical services to the army and bringing strong political pressure to bear on the government. German successes or defeats in Russia have a marked effect upon political negotiations now going on between America and Japan. A Russian collapse may precipitate a Japanese move against Siberia. The Japanese desire not only to remove the threat of Vladivostock, but to occupy all of the Maritime Provinces. There seems to be doubt in Japanese minds as to whether or not the U. S. fleet would oppose them in the Pacific if they move against the Soviets. Their aggression will continue unless the U. S. makes up its mind to fight. Meantime, while the Japanese people are going through many hardships with unquestioning loyalty, the war machine is not breaking down, their war industries are becoming adjusted to the blockade, and their navy being augmented. Apart from Japan's determination to liquidate the China affair, they are prepared to take advantage of any weakness that may
encourage them to move either north or south. The fact that their plans for expansion are boundless is a reality and not an idle dream. The military still believe that the Germans can win, and that between them they can cause the collapse of the Soviets. A lining up of their armies, supplies, etc. will prove fatal to the cause of the democracies.

2. (4000) ECONOMIC.

a. (4020) National Mobilization is at its maximum and fully supported by the entire nation. Children from the age of 14 up to old men and women of sixty are engaged in munitions in defense industries. The war program has the full support of the people despite their many sacrifices.

b. (4115) Oil and Gasoline. There is an extensive storage of gasoline, under rows of temporary wooden buildings, at YOKOHAMA, at the west end of the harbor, near the Yokohama Yacht Club. At TSURUMI, across the harbor from Yokohama, there are Japanese oil installations, next to those of the Rising Sun and Standard Oil Company.

c. (4120) Iron Ore. Large, high grade deposits of iron ore have been uncovered in Manchukuo, making possible delivery to army and navy of important supplies of special high grade steel (see 4310, below.). The ore itself runs to 54% pure iron, producing 90.4% sponge steel. It is claimed that 100,000,000 tons of ore are near the surface, with at least 200,000,000 tons lying below the surface. The mine is located a short distance east of MUKDEN, with a broad gauge railroad leading to the main line between MUKDEN and DAIREN. Large stocks of crushed ore already have been stored at the steel works and they are being augmented steadily.

d. (4120) Tungsten. Japan is said to be obtaining tungsten and other special metals required in the manufacture of high test steel, from North China and Korea. Source believes that it would be a great mistake to underestimate Japanese capacity to mobilize in the future vast stocks of such raw materials for war purposes.

e. (4200) Rice. The domestic Japanese rice crop this year is estimated to be 10% below normal. However, this shortage will be made up and exceeded by supplies from Indo-China. Only the shortage of shipping bottoms can possibly interfere with adequate rice supplied for the Japanese populace and army.

f. (4240) Rubber. Up until recent months there has been a severe shortage of rubber, but this gradually is being relieved since Japan's occupation of Indo-China. Now sufficient supplies are being received to care for military requirements.

g. (4240) Lamp black. There is a severe shortage of lamp black. Japan urgently requires 9,000 tons for their tire industry. This is being partially met by a very limited domestic production.

h. (4300) Manufactures, general. S. K. F. have for some years supplied Japan with major ball bearing requirements. These supplies have been stopped completely since the Soviet-German war interrupted rail shipments across Siberia. Despite the production of high grade steel in Manchukuo, Japan does not have facilities for manufacturing ball bearings, and unquestionably they are facing a serious shortage. Japan has been dependent on foreign equipment for their heavy industries, but they are working on a comprehensive plan to switch over from light to heavy industries. Sufficient time will enable them to realize this program. They are also concentrating on the tool industry to become independent of foreign countries. At TOTSUKA station, near YAKOBUKA naval base, there are several large, three-storied, wooden military establishments for manufacturing light military equipment, such as clothes, belts, etc. There are two plants adjacent the Bridgestone tire plant at KIHUME, Kyushu (see 4390) and a large one on the rail line at FUKUOKA, all supplying various military supplies to the army, such as shoes, clothing, helmets, etc.

i. (4310) Manufacture, iron and steel.

(1) In JAPAN proper, the great iron and steel foundries are located at KOHURA on the railway running between JOJI and FUKUOKA. They cover a narrow area nine miles long, running parallel to the railroad. This is the heart of Japan's iron and steel industry, and if destroyed would gravely cripple the army and navy.

(2) Manchukuo sponge steel. Large quantities of steel, said to be equal to high grade Swedish steel for tools and armor, are being produced in Manchukuo. The plant is located just outside of the port of DAIREN, on a railroad spur leading directly to the DAIREN-MUKDEN railroad. The grounds cover about 80,000 (662 acres). In March, 1940, two furnaces were in operation, producing 40,000 tons, and a new 30,000 ton plant was just being put in operation. A plant of similar type, capacity 100,000 tons, was being constructed. It was hoped that
this would be completed before the end of 1940, but construction was held up by shortage of building materials. It is believed that priority rights have been granted by army authorities so that it will be completed before the end of 1941. The combined production, upon completion of this, will be over 150,000 tons of this special steel, with twelve sets of electric furnaces in operation. Continuous additions to the plant are being contemplated with a final goal of 1,000,000 tons. It is stated reliably that they are using an entirely new and secret process, requiring neither water, charcoal, coke, nor high grade coal. Only a low grade of ash coal is required, and ample supplies of this are available from their own coal mines in Manchukuo. (Regarding the iron ore, see 4120, above.)

(3) Extensive "heavy industries" operate at FUSHAN, near MUKDEN, independent of Japan, but supported to a large extent by the Japanese armies in Manchukuo.

j. (4330) Motor car manufacture. For years, Ford at TSURUMI, near YOKOHAMA, and General Motors, outside of OSAKA, have dominated the passenger and truck markets of Japan. Today they have shut down entirely. They refuse to bring in parts for assembly, as no dollar exchange is available. Also, the Japanese Government passed the National Automobile Industry law some five years ago to protect and enable them to develop their own industries. During these last five years, they have made considerable progress, especially with trucks, military six-wheelers, and tanks.

The four most prominent factories are as follows:

- Nissan Auto Co. ........................................... Near TSURUMI
- T. E. G. ...................................................... " TOKYO
- Nakajima Iron Foundry ...................................... " "
- Toyoda Auto Co. .............................................. " NAGOYA

All of these plants easily may be detected from the air. Production figures are unknown, but some estimates that total number of trucks produced monthly exceed 1000 units. They are copied after old American models, inferior in quality. They are 4th class compared to American army units, requiring much service, and with very short life, say six months to one year in the field.

The Nissan Automobile Company, leading Japanese automobile company, is located at TSURUMI, east of the Ford Motor Company's assembly plant. They turn out several hundred trucks monthly, modeled after the old 1934 Paige. This plant easily covers two acres of ground, and is the backbone of the army's truck production. Its destruction would seriously cripple the army. It can be located readily from its size and the fact that it lies between the YOKOHAMA-TOKYO highway and the bay. Originally commercial, it has been taken over by the army.

The T. E. G. and Nakajima factories, located in the suburbs of Tokyo, turn out special military trucks (and presumably light tanks), such as large 6 wheelers and scout cars. These are slow, lumbering jobs, but stand up better in the field than the Nisson-Toyoda units. Capacity of the plants unknown, but these two companies and the Nisson-Toyoda supply virtually all requirements.

Toyoda is located on the main railroad between TOKYO and KOBE, near the city of NAGOYA or just east of the city. Covers perhaps 200 acres and also is just east of five high aerial towers. Its trucks are copied after old Chevrolet models, and are considered inferior to the Nisan units. Production about 300 units monthly. Financially bankrupt, but now financed by the army.

K. (4330) Motorcycle manufacture. Within recent years many new military establishments have been erected along the water front between HIROSHIMA and KURE at UJNA, a small village on a short spur railroad out of HIROSHIMA. Here a large military establishment makes motorcycles and important naval equipment. Motorcycle capacity, 400 monthly. Another motorcycle factory is located near SHIMAGAWA (Tokyo). Formerly controlled by Harley Davidson, it now is 100% Japanese. Capacity of factory, 200 motorcycles monthly.

I. (4360) Rubber products. The Yokohama Rubber Co. is located at TSURUMI, east of the Missan factory. It produces 800 truck tires daily, and manufactures miscellaneous military equipment for the army and navy, such as hose, etc. Goodrich formerly owned controlling interest, but has withdrawn, except possibly holding a royalty interest. This company, along with Dunlop, KOBE, and Bridgestone, KURUME, supply all military tires to the army and navy.
Dunlop is on the main railway line as you approach KOBE from OSAKA. It now is controlled by a Japanese Board of Directors, and thus the army. Source, however, believes that Dunlop, England, still controls a large share of the company. They endeavored to sell out, but Japanese were unable to pay in Sterling. They can supply 1200 truck tires daily.

Bridgestone is located at KURUME, KYUSHU, on the river front and also the main railway between FUKUOKA and KUMAMOTO. They can produce 1500 truck tires daily.

Bridgestone also has a factory at TSUIGTAO, China, producing 300 truck tires daily. They also have a new factory at LIAYANG, Manchukuo, about a half hour train journey south of MUKDEN on the main line to Dairen. This is mainly a synthetic rubber plant, but also makes miscellaneous rubber equipment for the army.

**m.** (4380) Concrete. All concrete and structural steel building in Japan has ceased, unless they are for specific military projects. In some cases military plants are built of wood, owing to shortage of construction steel.

3. (5970) WAR MORALE OF CIVIL POPULATION. The masses in Japan are well informed by press and radio, which are filled with highly colored propaganda. Despite restrictions and hardships of all kinds, their unity and their remarkable national spirit drives them forward. No sacrifice is too great, and there is not a chance of revolution in Japan, so long as they continue forward as they are doing. Their blackouts are highly successful, but their ground defenses against bombing are very weak. Source believes that mass bombing attacks would have a devastating effect on the morale of the people.

4. (6315) A TANK PROVING GROUND is located at CHIBA, across the bay from TOKYO.

5. (6510) TROOP MOBILIZATION has continued throughout Japan (up to time of source's departure, Oct. 15, 1941), reportedly to reinforce central China units and to augment forces in Manchuria. Many reserve officers, known to have been held for any special Siberian developments, for which they have been trained for cold climate work in Manchukuo, in recent weeks have been called to the colors. Large forces are available on the Manchukuo border for a possible offensive against Russia should they collapse before the German offensive. Conscript is at its highest peak since the beginning of the China "incident".

A very large number of horses were mobilized all over Japan in June-July period, and reportedly sent to Manchuria for cavalry and horse-drawn units. Source observed many horse concentrations in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA districts as trainloads passed through these cities.

6. (6905) TROOP EMBARKATION POINTS. The principal troop embarkation points observed by source were:
   a. SHINAGAWA, by train. This is the south Tokyo railway station.
   b. NAGOYA, by sea.
   c. KOBE, by sea.
   d. MIABORA, by rail. This is an important rail junction on LAKE BIWA, between NAGOYA and KYOTO. Troops from north and central Japan destined for Manchukuo pass through this junction enroute to TSURUGI, one of the principal embarkation points on the Japan Sea for Manchukuo, SEI SHIN, and VLADIVOSTOK.
   e. The other principal port on the Japan Sea is NIIGATA, with fast steamer service to SEI SHIN. A railway connects with Manchukuo and to the Soviet border. NIIGATA is only eight hours by rail from TOKYO.
   f. Troops from the south embark at SHIMONOSEKI (opposite MOJI) for Fusun garrison enroute to Manchukuo via Korea.
   g. Troops and supplies from KYUSHU island pass through MOJI to SHIMONOSEKI by ferry. A tunnel now is being built between MOJI and SHIMONOSEKI. The pilot tunnel has been completed and the main tunnel should be ready within two years.
   h. There is some troop movement from KYUSHU out of the ports of NAGASAKI and SASEKO, the latter being an important naval base. There are military establishments in KYUSHU at KAGASHIMA, KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, and FUKUHAI.

7. (9185) AIRPORTS. There is a large naval aerodrome and seaplane base connected with the YAKOSUKA naval base. At this point, back of the hills and in the YAKOSUKA-YOKOHAMA highway large aeroplane machine shops are located. There are naval or military aerodromes reported at KAGASHIMA, KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, FUKUHAI, SASEKO, HIROSHIMA, and YOKOHAMA. The large aerodrome behind HIROSHIMA is shut off from view from the railroad by a high plateau.
8. (9840) ANTI-AIRCRAFT. Gradually all principal cities are being protected by anti-aircraft batteries as well as military and munition establishments. These batteries are reported to be limited and defenses relatively weak. Source believes that Japanese have manufacturing facilities for the Swiss gun, but not of the most recent design. Searchlights and listening devices also are being utilized.

9. (9960) PARA-TROOPS were used for the first time during the last of September and early October this year (1941) in the central China area. They particularly were used in the assault against CHANOSHA when plain clothes men were dropped from three different points over the city. The attack was not successful—the Chinese mopped up the para-troops. Hence the report, “Japanese evacuated Changsha”.

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Classification: Confidential.
Report No. 21.
Date 28; October 1941.

[Penned notation: 350.05—Information on Foreign Countries.]
Classification: Confidential.
Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: FORMOSA
Sources and Degree of Reliability:
Diplomatic resident. Reliability good.

Summarization of Report When Required:
Foreign relations; volunteer recruiting of Formosans and their loyalty to Japan; fortifications; air raids; precautions.

1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS.
A. South Formosa closed to foreigners. Since April, 1941, the Province of TAKAO (South Formosa) has been closed to foreigners. Even resident Spanish missionaries have been required to leave. An Italian freighter, which had been at refuge in TAKAO since June, 1940, was ordered by Japanese naval authorities to move to KOBE.

B. Japan's anti-white attitude. The Japanese as a nation are not anti-British or anti-American—they are anti-white. They have no love racially for the Germans, but cannot help themselves. Their intention quite definitely is to try to throw the white man out of the Far East. Germans and Italians are included. Any temporary modification of their program is merely a matter of expediency—a marking time until the moment is ripe. The military will not and cannot give up the program upon which they have embarked.

C. American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Source believes that Canadian and American citizens of Japanese ancestry cannot be trusted. He has definite knowledge of their having betrayed the countries of their citizenship. When caught their excuse is that they were forced by Japanese authorities against their own desires—highly debatable!

2. 6240 VOLUNTEER RECRUITING FOR FORMOSANS. In (?) May, 1941, the Governor General introduced a volunteer system for Formosans. A similar system had been introduced into Korea in 1938 and had met with some success, the young Koreans having become saturated with the fervent nationalism taught in the Japanese army. The nebulous mysticism which is the core of this spirit is essentially Oriental in character and it is a mistake to suppose that a governed people like the Koreans and Formosans, in spite of the subordinate position in which they deliberately are held, regard it as alien and compulsory. In
the hands of the Japanese educationalists, as they have been for a quarter and a half a century respectively, their minds have been conditioned methodically to this doctrine, and the young generation now rising will be a tremendously powerful instrument in the hands of Japanese nationalists unless steps are taken now or very soon to break the Japanese military power and discredit their doctrines in the minds of the young. The jubilation and martial air of the Formosan children, when marching in procession to celebrate the opening of the army ranks to Formosan volunteers, was not assumed to order, although the processions themselves were, of course, organized. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the conditioning of the young for national expansion is older and more fanatical than anything Germany has known, as shown by their school text books and popular literature.

3. (6800) FORTIFICATIONS. The whole of the south half of Formosa has become a military garrison (strength of effective not ascertainable). The beaches are fortified against possible attack. The harbor of TAKAO steadily has been improved for troop embarkations. The transports themselves are based at the PESCADORES, since TAKAO is open to heavy seas throughout the summer months and is not suitable for basing large numbers of transports.

4. (9000) MILITARY AVIATION. Up until the end of July Japanese war planes seen in the sky over North Formosa were of not very modern design and their speed seemed very moderate. From the end of July planes of more modern design and higher speed were seen. Planes based on the northern aerodrome at TAIHOKU were used for bombing the China coast of FUKIEN and CHEKIANG provinces. The main air defense and striking force are concentrated in the south of Formosa, opposite Hongkong. It is presumed that the authorities consider that any hostile air attack would come from the south and that it could be broken up before getting further north.

5. (9840) AIR DEFENSE. Throughout the island there has been almost continuous air raid drill. This consists largely of training the Formosan public to cooperate in extinguishing fires and controlling lights. Anti-aircraft guns have not been visible or audible on any of these occasions, and it is impossible to say if and where they exist. Searchlights have been of antique pattern. There are few air raid shelters in the principal towns, and much publicity has been given to the need for building more. Japanese householders in many cases have been canvassed and ordered to construct one for each group of houses, but these facilities (up to the end of July) were quite inadequate. Experiments were going on for the conversion of drainage water to drinking water in case of emergency. "Emergency" and "preparedness" were the constant cries of the newspapers and the armies.

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Report No. 20,
Date: 23 October 1941.
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN.
Source and Degree of Reliability:
American shipping agent from Kobe enroute to San Francisco. Believed reliable.

1. (3500. Treatment of foreigners.) There is intense anti-American and anti-British feeling in both Kobe and Yokohama. Every obstacle is put in the way of these nationals trying to complete formalities to leave Japan. They have to
stand in line in the streets for hours awaiting their turn for examination by local police or prefecture officials, only to be told to come again next day. Detailed and annoying personal search is made, particularly of British, before they leave.

2. (4115. Petroleum products.) Supplies of lubrication oil and gasoline are stored in valleys at ITOZAKI, near the Naval base, off the Inland Sea. These valleys are dammed at either end with concrete blocks and the whole area covered with soil and planted with grass. A stevedore’s superintendent told source that the Japanese navy had oil reserve for 2 years. The Maruzen Oil Co., Shanghai, is reported to be still importing gasoline and oil from the United States, which is then transshipped to Japan.

3. (6905. Troop movements.) Source reports that about 10 September, 800 trucks assembled in Sports ground and loaded soldiers. He could not state regiments since no civilians allowed near, but he had opportunity to count the trucks. Their destination was supposedly Dairen.

4. (6905. Troops in French Indo-China.) In early September a Frenchman from Saigon told source that the Japanese were bluffing regarding the number of troops in French Indo-China, to divert public attention from the huge numbers being sent to the Siberian front via Dairen. The Frenchman estimated Japanese troops in French Indo-China were only 35,000. Another source gives 40,000.

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Classification: Restricted.
Report No. 15.
Date: 2 October 1941.

Classification: Restricted.
Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: FRENCH INDO-CHINA.
Source and Degree of Reliability:
Saigon business man, believed reliable.

Summarization of Report When Required:
Gloomy picture of present conditions in French Indo-China.

1. The Japanese advance party arrived at Saigon the latter part of July. They picked out and requisitioned both public buildings and private residences, giving occupants but 24 hours notice to vacate. The main body of Japanese troops arrived about August 5. They have continued to arrive, in numbers far in excess of what should be necessary to garrison and “protect” a country like Indo-China. This leads one to believe that invasion of Thailand is contemplated.

2. Business in Indo-China is at a standstill. Imports and exports, other than those controlled by Japanese, practically have ceased. Food materials are being requisitioned by the Japanese, so that it is very difficult for white residents to live. Even the rice and fish of the natives are being curtailed. Payment is made by the Japanese in paper yen, which have very little buying power in circulation.

3. With war supplies greatly diminished as a result of the trouble with Thailand, it was impossible for the government of French Indo-China to resist this invasion by Japan. Prior to the arrival of Japanese forces the sympathy of many Indo-Chinese had been with Japan. As a result of this taste of Japanese aggression, sentiment very largely has swung against Japan. The natives desire a return of previous conditions under the French. The sympathy of the majority of the French is with Britain. They believe that the only solution of their difficulties is the defeat of the Axis.
4. A report from Manila states that steps are being taken by Japanese:
   A. Completely to suppress all pro-Chungking elements in Indo-China.
   B. To encourage Annamite independence movement, which definitely would
      be pro-Japanese and anti-French. Results would create internal domestic
      trouble throughout Indo-China, providing further excuse for expansion of
      Japanese control.

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Report No. 9.
Date: 25 September 1941.

Classification: Restricted.
Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: THAILAND.

Source and Degree of Reliability:
News correspondent returning by clipper to U. S., fairly reliable; and
other sources as indicated.

Summarization of Report When Required:
Japan attempting to dominate Thailand thought, business, and govern-
ment.

1. (2900. Propaganda). Thailand is being overrun by Japanese and their propa-
ganda. They control 3 of 16 newspapers, including the influential Banzhok Times.
Domei news is furnished free of charge to all Thai papers, and its volume far ex-
ceeds Renters and D. N. B. combined. Control of Thai thought is being attempted
by the announcement in Tokio of Thai events and decisions, regardless of facts.
For example, a trade agreement is under discussion. At a critical moment it is
announced to the world from Tokio that Thailand has accepted, although such
may not be the case. This has great nuisance value in embarrassing the Thailand
government. Reading rooms in Thailand clubs are being flooded with Japanese
publications. Italian journals of recent date also are available. But British and
American publications are old or unavailable. Source recommended that "waiver-
ing countries", such as Thailand, should be copiously supplied with well-illustrated
journals displaying the might and power of the United States. Persons in the
Orient listen to Rome, Berlin, and Tokio broadcasts, he said. What he thought
is needed is strong American propaganda "bursting out of Manila", instead of
"canned music and innocuities." American news reels are accepted in Thailand,
but British propaganda films are not accepted in northern Thailand. (This last
from representative of M. G. M.)

2. (3550. Foreign relations). It is reported from Manila that on August 18 the
Japanese Minister to Thailand handed the Prime Minister the following pro-
posals:
A. SATTAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.
B. Six aerodromes in north, south, and west to be leased to Japan, who
would undertake to improve them.
C. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.
D. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
E. Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces.

3. (4000. Economic). Japanese penetration, begun five years ago, is seeking
economic domination of Thailand. Source estimated that there are 3,000 Japa-
nese in Thailand, some well supplied with funds and entertaining extensively.
Thai shops were full of Japanese, who were willing even to pay "upped prices." In 1939 Thailand's foreign trade was 4.7% with U. S., 23% with Hong Kong, and 15.4% with Singapore. Much of remaining trade is with Japan. If Thailand is unable to obtain machinery, electrical, and other equipment from America or Britain, the trade will be forced into Japanese hands. The only raw material exported by Thailand which Japan does not control is tin. Most of this comes from southern Thailand, which is pro-British.

4. (7500. Navy auxiliary.) Investigations were being carried out during August by Japanese Special Service Department agents, as to the number of lighters and their tonnage in the Gulf of Siam. (From Manila, believed reliable.)

5. (8220. Airways.) Dutch air lines continue to operate into Thailand, and there is a line operated by the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. There is daily Japanese plane service out of Bangkok. Passengers carried by this last are said to be Japanese, Germans, and others friendly to the Axis.

6. (9000. Air.) Japanese troops dominate the Thailand-French Indo-China frontier, with extensive air bases near the border and within 250 miles of the Burma Road. Danger of penetration of Thailand by Japanese parachute troops was stressed.

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G-2, HAWN DEPT.
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Classification: Restricted.
Report No. 8.
Date: 25 September 1941.

[Penned notation: 350.05—Foreign Intelligence. X336.2—Foreign Armies. X091—Japan.]

[ ] Classification: Restricted.
Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN AND JAPANESE RELATIONS.
Source and Degree of Reliability:
Various, reliability as indicated.

1. JAPANESE EXPANSION NORTHWARDS

Responsible British source reported that Itagaki favors expansion northwards, and that his appointment as C-in-C in Korea might be interpreted as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria, for which Korea would be the first reserve pool. A technically competent observer in Hong Kong, 21 August, confirmed this view and added that Ushiroya, formerly C-in-C in South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of Japanese forces in China, is of same persuasion. He may be counted on not to neglect the north, however tempting easy gains in the south may be at the moment.

Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc, by a certain date, such as September 15, bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners. The Japanese in the past often have revealed their long term objectives, very seldom have talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them.
2. JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS NORTHWARD

Between July 10 and 17 about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden, proceeding north. They carried full war kit. (No means of checking numbers, which should be accepted with reserve.) During this period a total of 75 troop “specials” passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried [2] artillery and tanks. Japanese station master of South Manchurian railway, Mukden, on July 21 stated that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was short of cars, these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suliuyuan, and Peking-Hankow lines.

On July 20, troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTEE on Peking-Mukden line. Source saw great activity at TANGKU TUN junction.

It was reported August 5 that mobilization and reequipment of troops in Korea, Kwantung, and Manchuria was quietly progressing in preparation for eventual movement against the Soviet.

There has been a “tug of war” between high ranking military officials as to when northward move should be launched, and that question was still unsettled, August 5. It was thought that the only event which would stop the move would be a decisive German defeat at hands of Soviet.

High Japanese official expressed some concern over Japanese anti-aircraft defense and lack of air raid protection, but no further details were mentioned.

3. MANCHURIAN MILITARY RAILWAYS

It was reported, August 8, that the following railways in Manchuria now are regarded as military lines on which the number of passenger trains has been reduced to a minimum:

a. Harbin-Lufa-Tunhara, and to Korea via Tumen.

b. Harbin-Peilan-Heiho.

c. Hsingehiang-Taonan.

d. Taonan-Doekk-Arshan.

e. Tsitsihar-Peian.

f. Tsitsihar-Bukhedu-Mailar and Manchouli.

g. Tumen-Mudaczian.

h. Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi.

i. All railways in Jehol.

Since end of June, 1941, steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang-Harbin by constructing sidings and numerous shall stations for storage.

In Kwangtung leased territories, since 1940, sand bag emplacements guarding bridges, stations, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures.

Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin, and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity demands.

4. JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND HAINAN

On June 8, 12,000 men left French Indo-China. It was rumored that they were bound for Manchuria, but this is given with great reserve. On June 14 the following units of the 11th Division, totalling 3,300 men, left Hainan for unknown destination:

HIROSE (EGZ IRX) Infantry regiment
NAKAMURA (AAW GPA) Medium Artillery battalion
HIRAOKA (EED DYZ) Transport Company
YOSHINO (BAD TAK) and KUNO (COP MZA) Cavalry Squadrons.

5. JAPANESE MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD

A. To SPRATLY ISLANDS. On April 19, two armed merchantmen arrived Kobe and unloaded scrap metal and 1,000 caskets of ashes. They were loaded with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components. The cases measure 8 x 6 feet. 400 men of a naval landing party and 130 coolies who had been segregated until going on board, embarked on April 21. The ships left for Spratly Island on April 21.
B. FORCES IN SANCHO AND KUKOK ISLANDS. Out August 2, 500 naval landing party left SANCHO ISLAND. Total remaining garrison strength, 400 naval landing party and 200 puppets. Stock on hand: 2,000 cases small arms ammunition, 100 cases shells.

At KUKOK ISLAND are 200 KATSIMURA (AUE GPA) naval landing party. 100 having left on July 22.

C. IN FORMOSA AND VICINITY. Between July 7 and 15, about 25 aircraft arrived at OKAYAMA aerodrome nightly from Japan. Aircraft based there July 19 were: 40 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers, 40 twin-engine monoplane medium bombers, 40 single-engine monoplane light bombers, 60 monoplane fighters, 20 reconnaissance, 4 four-engine transports. This is the largest aerodrome in Formosa, being about one mile square.

July 14, 6 fighters arrived at TAIHOKU from QUEMOY ISLAND.
July 10 to 11, 15 fighters arrived at KAGI from Japan.
July 15, 15 monoplane fighters arrived at HEITO from KWANGTUNG.

Aircraft reported at Que moy Island, 12 fighters.
June 6, mines by naval units from Pescadores Islands.
July 11, 200 mines and 120 torpedoes landed at TAKAO from Japan.
July 25 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for HAINAN: 24 twin-engine monoplane heavy bombers. 15 monoplane fighters. 3 reconnaissance bombers.

July 28 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for Indo-China: 6 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers. 9 single-engine monoplane light bombers.

July 26, 27 aircraft, composed mainly of twin-engine monoplane heavy bombers, arrived KAGI from Japan and left July 29 for Indo-China.

August 1, 9 heavy bombers and 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-China.

D. TO AND IN INDO-CHINA. July 29, the following Japanese troops left KAREKO for Indo-China:

- 24,000 TAKAHASHI (URA HOP) infantry, 1,200 ISE (AES AUI) artillery
- 600 KONDO (SOY MRU) and FUKASE (HU IRX) A.F.V. units, with: 16 armored cars, 15 light tanks, 40 motorcycles, 32 field guns.

Paratroops are being trained daily at TOGO aerodrome, 8 aircraft used.

Japanese strength in TONKIN area, August 1, approximately 25,000.

Japanese strength in southern Indo-China, Aug. 12, approx. 36,000.

Collaboration between French and Japanese authorities appears close and it is believed that French troops are to be sent to the YUNAN and KWANGSI borders.

Quantities of railway equipment are being sent to PNOM TENG for the construction of a railway to the THAI border.

July 23 a transport left TOSHIYEN for Indo-China after loading 20 launches, 120 mines, and a quantity of naval ammunition.

August 21, strength in southern Indo-China was about 80,000, composed of units of Guards, 28th Division, 38th Division, Formosan army corps, and naval landing party. (This is given with reserve pending confirmation.)

High commands are:
- Lt. General IIDA, Army
- Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH), air
- Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS), navy.

6. TROOP MOVEMENT IN JAPAN. There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI, and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMAKURA and TOYOHASHI.

Sources state that at end of June there was considerable movement of Japanese sailors from TOKIO to KOSHIRO and TAKAHACHI, and that between June 26 and 28 numerous trainloads of young men arrived at ZUSI. At NUMAZU source observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders and also several howitzers with camouflaged gun platforms, pushed by heavy trucks. At HAMAMOTO he observed 97th, 72d, and 8th Divisions, At WUSHIZU, 22d Division. At OKAYAMA and HIROSHIMA, 2d and 4th Divisions. New oil tanks were in this district, which is very heavily industrialized.

All these observations made at end of June. Agent has had military training, but is newly recruited, and no opportunity to cross examine him.

7. JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS. A. Aerodromes In Japan.—A large aerodrome is under construction near KAMAKURA. (This is believed identical
with TOTSUKA aerodrome.) Overall dimensions: 3,500 by 3,500 yards. Labor force of 8,000, under supervision of 18 German engineers. Aerodrome expected to be completed in August. 3,000 parachute troops are under training there.

Polish refugee journalist in Japan, at end of June, said he had seen great earthworks, indicating underground aerodrome, with planes landing, at TAKARUZUKA. (Observation not considered very reliable.)

[5] Area between KOBE, AWAJI, and SAKAI is heavily fortified.

(Creditable)

B. Oil Tanks in Pescadores Islands.—Ansnn Naval Base has large surface tank, capacity 600 tons; small surface tank, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank at TAISHOKU FORT, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank at Kelmio-U aerodrome, capacity 300 tons. Comment: Fairly reliable; reported August 20, 3MI. It is regretted that source was unable to differentiate between types of oil fuel.

8. JAPANESE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR.

A. Naval.—Floating dock at KOBE, capable of accommodating ships of 16,000 tons, is expected to be transferred to HAINAN. At end of May an "aircraft tender" was under repair in this dock. Total of 2,000 workmen, working day and night shifts, were engaged on aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock. (Casual observation).

In collaboration with German advisers, the construction of 75 submarines is projected in Japan. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 of these jobs, of which the Osaka Iron Works are to build 4. (Casual).

Twenty vessels are under construction at Harima shipyard, OSAKA, with 24-hour day work being done on the jobs in May. Vessels expected to be completed at end of July. Specifications: Displacement 100 tons; dimensions 200 feet x 28 feet x 5 feet (note that these dimensions give a displacement well over that reported, and therefore are given with utmost reservation); speed 30 knots; armament, 6 machine guns. Said that these ships are to be used as troop landing craft in southern expansion.

Hearsay information, given with utmost reserve, states that some old hulks have been emptied of machinery and equipment, and "pocket destroyers" are being constructed within them. As a further aid to secrecy, the position of these hulks are changed by towing from one place to another. This may be an exaggrated account of Japanese tendencies to secrecy, but there may be something in it, and the report is passed on for what it is worth.

B. Ordnance Construction.—Naval guns are being made a OSAKA arsenal under German supervision. May 8, warships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted with guns from this arsenal. (Casual observation.)

C. Aircraft Construction.—Beginning of April, three German engineers arrived at Aichi Aircraft Factory, NAGOYA, from the Dornier Works. Name of one is given as Anderich (DJI IZU DUN). They are supervising construction of a new type of fighter. This is described at K-22 type, twin-engine, two-seater. It is still in the experimental stage. Production aimed at is 50 a month. (Note, this production figure coincides with that given for dive bomber reported as being manufactured in this factory in January.) Labor force 2,600, working day and night.

[6] A shadow factory situated at KAWAGUCHI in Osaka in mid May started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the Aichi Factory, NAGOYA. Labor force: 2,600, working 10 hours a day. Estimated production: wings, etc. for about 100 fighters a month. Three German advisers are attached to this KAWAGUSHI factory.

Aerial bomb factory in HIMEJI, names Nakabe (AAW?SRY) Heavy Industrial Works. Labor force in mid May, 600. Monthly production: 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares. Four German engineers are attached.

9. JAPANESE FOREIGN RELATIONS. A. With Great Britain and the United States.—Admiral NOMURA has been instructed to work for a modification of American embargo policy and to offer readjustment of American-Japanese relations on basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined and recognized as spheres of influence of U. S. A. and British. (Reliability unknown, dated August 5, 1941.)

At a meeting held by High Command at CANTON on July 27 to discuss retaliatory measures on British and American freezing, the following steps were decided upon and forwarded to TOKIO for approval:

1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.
2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of their expulsion.

3. Banning of exports to HONG KONG and tightening of blockades. The ——— government to be forced to cooperate in this measure.

4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces.

5. Unifying of new territories of HONG KONG and KULANGSU to the Puppet Government.

It was reported (August 15, 1941) that as a retaliatory measure for British and American action against Japan, Japanese military authorities discussed with Nanking Government the desirability of blockading International Settlement on lines of TIENTSIN blockade of British concession. Japanese “Business” Shanghai strongly opposed this and sent delegation of four representatives to interview General KAGESA at NANKING. Latter assured delegation that if any steps were taken along lines suggested at any time, every effort would be made to safeguard Japanese interests operating in International Settlement. He further stated that they were not contemplated in the near future as there was no complete accord between Japanese naval and military authorities on these matters.

B. JAPANESE SPONSORED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AT HONG KONG.

(1) Incitement of Disturbances and Riots.—Plans are prepared for the creation of strikes, disturbances, and riots at Hong Kong, when and if Japan breaks with Britain. One of the principal agents for this is JOHN LUI, senior member of Shanghai Tai Ping Insurance Co. One of Lui’s close associates is the son of Chief Detective of Amoy, CHENG SAI HOI. Lui also is believed to have been the founder of Tung Man Alumni Association.

(2) Japanese Agents.—LAM FEL, representative of Wang Ching Wei in Hong Kong, with 45 senior agents, is mainly interested in collecting military intelligence and recruiting questionable characters for subversive activities.

TAKEDA, of Special Service Section, is now attached to Japanese Consulate, Hong Kong, to control the intelligence section there.

TAM KOWK-WA, acts as liaison between Special Service Sections in Macao and Hong Kong.

C. RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES. Japanese business men, including Manila heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank, appeared genuinely to believe, August 18, that present Japanese threats of further southward expansion were merely a “war of nerves” and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight Great Britain or America. (Reasonably reliable.)

A recently selected Sakdal candidate for next political elections states that local (Manila) Japanese agents have been cultivating him closely and volunteering the following information:

1. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on FORMOSA.

2. Attack on PHILIPPINES and SINGAPORE simultaneously will take place about end of August.

3. Campaign in Philippines to begin with uprising in MINDANAO and bombing of MANILA.

4. Attack on SINGAPORE to be overlaid through SIAM, where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.

5. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in HAINAN and SAIPAN.

(Source doubtfully reliable: this looks like a whispering campaign.)

August 9, Manila agents of N. Y. K. received telegram from N. Y. K. Tokio office, stating that all “overseas” service is now suspended. “Overseas” means all sailings except Japan-China ports. (Reliable.)

Manila agents, Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company, instructed by telegram, August 15, from Tokio Office:

1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.

2. To cancel Manila reinsured treaty.

3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.
This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded 260,000 pesos (25,000 pounds). (Reliable.)

D. JAPANESE—THAILAND RELATIONS. Japanese Government reported "considerably perturbed by the insincerity" of the Siamese Government. Japanese Government stated that in spite of military "representations" by Japanese Minister to BANGKOK, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan, and that it is clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence.

Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter.

FEI WEN CHUAN stated Japanese Government, in carrying out its programme in French Indo-China, is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that unless latter changes its attitude toward Japan and her co-prosperity programme, Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into line.

Between July 25 and 29, 12,000 troops left BANGKOK for Indo-China frontier. This is partially confirmed by official Siamese communique which states that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary, and special mission units left for frontier at end of July.

An order has been placed by Thailand with Japanese for delivery in July, 1942, of two warships, probably torpedobots, to replace three vessels sunk by French. 500,000 ticals have been paid on account of this order.

13 August, 1941. (Casual observation.)

E. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IN NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. It was reported 12 July that In Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I., the following was being said:

1. In MENADO: Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be taken off in vessels from PALAU.

2. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from eastwards of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S. arrives.

3. Japanese will not be evacuated, as evacuation would give N. E. I. indication of pending attack.

F. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. Blockade of Vladivostok.—Two separate Chinese sources reported before July 7, that they understood Japan promised Germany, in return for recognition of WANG CHING WEI, to blockade Vladivostok, and that action was likely at an early date.

G. MADAGASCAR. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations, Japanese delegates expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic-Indian Ocean communications. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company of a million yen to start operations around island.

H. JAPANESE CONTROL OF NON-AXIS INTERESTS. It was reported that following the completion of Japanese military occupation in Indo-China, military have been considering possibilities of securing control of [9] TIENTSIN FRENCH CONCESSION through puppet North China administration.

Local (Manila) military circles consider that, if Tientsin venture is accomplished, similar action might be taken through WANG CHING WEI government at other points in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all non-Axis interests. (Aug. 10).

It is reported that paper plans for taking over French Concession in Shanghai have been completed and, provided future developments in the general situation in the Far East do not necessitate change in plans, Nanking Government is expected to assume control in concession before October 10. Committee studying this matter, under chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) and General KAGESA have forwarded their recommendations to Tokio for consideration.

I. RELATIONS WITH GERMANY. Admiral TOYODA has already informed German Ambassador that Japan is ready to readjust its political relations with Reich as prerequisite for closer economic accord upon which will be founded future economic relations between Asia and Europe, according to a report of unknown reliability, dated August 5.

On April 20, 2 of the German vessels lying at Kobe left for KURE. Guns were to be fitted, and the ships will be ready for sea again about the beginning of August.

On July 31, 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in PO ON area for "the German expeditionary engineer corps", and as soon as possible are being sent to Germany.
According to a high puppet official, further recruiting is being carried out.

10. FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The following is from Free French sailors who left SAIGON about August 8:

a. S. S. FRANCOIS LOUIS DRAYFUS is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo". Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Francisco."

b. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel ADMIRAL CHARNER and the submarine PEGASE.

c. S. S. SAGITAIRE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
1st. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. G. of C., G-2.

G-2, HAWN, DEPT.
Copies furnished:
HAF
ONI
Classification: Restricted.
Report No. 7.
Date: 10 September 1941

Classification: Restricted.
Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Military Attaché Report
REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australasia.
Source and Degree of Reliability:

Unusually reliable expert.

Land planes flying from Hawaii to the Dutch East Indies might make use of the following fields:

1. CANTON ISLAND, north rim, undeveloped, but already a possible emergency landing, 1630 sea miles or 1878 land miles from Honolulu. Might be developed at comparatively small expense. Alternate.

HOWLAND ISLAND, a partly developed airfield, 1650 sea miles or 1900 land miles from Honolulu.

(Note: Ums planned to land on south rim of BANNING ISLAND, at Pea.)

Conditions of this landing place not known.)

2. FIJI. There are two airports on VITI LEVU Island. One along the Rewa River, northeast of Suva, present condition not known. Another on the Nandi Plain, near Lautoka, N. W. side, present condition unknown. There is a flight of British patrol planes operating in Fiji at present. Definite information about present airfield conditions doubtless could be had from them through High Commissioner for Western Pacific, Suva. An emergency landing might be made at low water on Nasali Beach, near Suva, where a two mile stretch of compact sand over 100 yards wide is capable of holding up aircraft of medium weight.

3. NEW CALEDONIA. Within 9 months an airdrome will be completed about 30 miles northwest of Noumea. When completed it will have two metalled runways, each 2,000 meters long. It is believed that already work has progressed so that a landing could be made. Low clouds and rain in this vicinity might make landing difficult at times. No other landing place is known on this island.

4. AUSTRALIA. Either Sydney or Brisbane airports could be used for the next hop. At both cities good airfields are available, with adequate repair facilities. Sydney is considered better, because in wet weather the grassy runway at Brisbane might bog large, heavy planes.

5. TRANS-AUSTRALIA. There are several usable airfields on routes across Australia:

a. The shortest route is via Charleville (620 miles from Sydney) and Cloncurry (1200 miles from Sydney) to Darwin (2200 miles from Sydney). At Charleville, in wet weather, the ground is soft off the runways, which are about 50
feet wide. At Cloncurry there are long, well-surfaced runways, 1200-1500 yards in all directions. Fuel may be had at these two airfields, but no repair. In summer, flying conditions may be bad in this region; conditions to be expected at 5,000 feet being found on the ground, at 1000 feet. Darwin has an airfield, with facilities for repair.

b. A southern, drier route is via Broken Hill, N. S. W., Oodnadatta, S. Austr., (with good field), Alice Springs and Daly Waters, N. Terr., at all of which airfields are available. There also are good fields at Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide, and at cities in Western Australia. Wyndham, on Joseph Bonaparte Gulf, northern W. Austr., has airfield which can be used for heavy planes in dry weather.

6. DUTCH EAST INDIES. The best of several airports are at: Koepang, Timor, with good field, fuel, but no repair facilities; Ball, on south coast, west of Denpasar (not the smaller abandoned airfield inland from Denpasar); Soerabaja, N. E. Java, with a modern, first class airport, with repair facilities; Batavia Java, with excellent, new airport; Palembang, Sumatra, good field, but no repair facilities; Makassar, Celebes; Kalikpapan, Borneo; and Tarakan, Borneo.

7. NEW GUINEA. There is a good airport at Port Moresby; and smaller ones at Salamanna and Lae. While these perhaps are too small for large bombers, they are being used by Lockheed "14's". There is an airport at Rabaul, New Britain.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
 Copies furnished
 G-2 HAF
 ONI, 14th Nav. Dist.
Classification: Restricted.
Report No. 4.
Date: 19 August 1941.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initiated by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: General report, Japan and China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind. G-2 19 Aug 41.</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>For Information. This report was forwarded to G-2, War Department, this morning via air mail 1 Ind. Mil. Attache Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ind. G-2 8/27/41.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military Intelligence Division

War Department General Staff

Military Attache Report—Japan and China

REPORTED BY G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: General Report, Japan and China. I. G. No.: See below.

Source and Degree of Reliability:
Various sources, all considered reliable.

1. CHINA 4000 Following is text of order issued 28 July 1941 by K. Oyamada for administrative Commissioner Chinese Maritime Customs:

"Shipments of exportation and interport export for America and England and their colonies, Burma, French Indo China, Hongkong and unoccupied area of China of following goods are temporarily to be referred to me before release:

"Machinery, provisions, oils, chemicals, cereals and fodder, fertilizer, cotton piece goods and yarn:

"Except for Japan and North China:

(Signed) K. OYAMADA."

2. JAPAN 6810 (Formosa) on 16 June 1941 150 infantry transferred from Taibohu to Kogo for parachute training, and on 18 June 1941 200 paratroops were transferred from Kogo to Rokko. Kogo area now under martial law and entry nearly impossible. Recruiting for army and labor corps still being maintained. (End Formosa).

On 8 June 1941 following units of 12th division total strength 6,000 left Hainan for Manchuria:

46th infantry regiment
48th infantry regiment
24th artillery regiment.

On 14 June 1941 "Hirose" infantry regiment of 11th division left Hainan; on 30 June 1941 this unit arrived Dairen and went on to Scheungklang in Manchuria. On 24 June 1941 11th cavalry regiment of 11th division arrived Whampoa from North River area and embarked for Manchuria.

18 July 1941 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon. 21 July 1941 Lieut. General Homma, commander-in-chief Formosan army, and Major General Sumida arrived Saigon with 30 German and Italian advisers. On mornings of 20 and 21 July 1941 air reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft. 20 July 1941 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 unidentified auxiliary, and 4 transports packed with troops arrived Camranh Bay.

G-2, HAWN DEPT.

Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 3.

Date: 10 August 1941.

Military Intelligence Division

War Department General Staff

Military Attache Report—Various

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Business men of experience in the country regarding which they were interviewed. All believed to be fully reliable.

1. JAPAN 2900 The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly toward citizens of the United States, has recently developed a hatred for all Americans. The public has also developed a spy phobia as a result of continuous warning from the Government, with almost all advertising, such as on matches, billboards, etc., carrying warnings against spies.
On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army officers, in order to force a change in the cabinet; at the time of the incident no one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were suspended, including local telephone service.

All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese only. Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls to Germany may be made in German, but no language other than Japanese is allowed in communications within Japan.

4000 Japan is reported to be very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other items reported to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anaesthetics.

Japanese Military Doctors have complained to American Doctors of being short on quinine, atabrin, and plasmochin; all of which are used in combating malaria. Malignant malaria and blackwater fever are prevalent in Hainan, in the marshes along the Burma Road in Yunnan Province, and on the Kwangsi Tonkin border. It was reported that 500,000 Japanese troops went from Hainan to Kwangsi, and that only 50,000 returned, the others being lost account malignant malaria on the Tonkin border.

6810 50,000 Troops were reported to have left Hainan in June 1941, leaving only 3,000 troops, in addition to Navy, at that point. Also reported that large numbers of Chinese guerillas are still active in Hainan.

During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men working in factories in Japan, regardless of age, have lately been required to take part time military training.

For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimoniseki instead of through Kobe, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of bombers have been flown to China and Manchukuo via Kobe, with planes from other parts of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse mountain about six miles due west of Kobe.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but wear a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Many regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored to be from South America; the businessmen who saw these vessels could not give a description of them, but stated Captain Solberg of the S. S. "Frederick Lykes" could give a full and accurate description.

9185 An airport capable of basing 200 planes is located at Hohlow (Halio), concrete roads to the airport and a large barracks have recently been constructed at this point, and that approximately 1,000 new trucks arrived at this point during June 1941. It is also reported that there is an airport at Sama slightly larger than the one at Hohlow. Large amounts of food and ordnance supplies are reported coming into Hohlow and Sama. A large emergency airport has recently been built at Haulang Plain about 20 miles northeast of Noda, and inland about 25 miles from the north coast of Hainan.

2. AUSTRALIA 4115 Australia uses about fourteen million barrels of oil per year, with none produced there; at the present time gasoline is being rationed at two gallons per month per car. A new oil field has been located recently at "Lakes Entrance", about 200 miles east of Melbourne; the field covers about five square miles, with the pool of oil at 1200 feet from the surface; a shaft will be sunk at a 30 degree slope, and it is believed production of 500 barrels per day can be realized within six months; this crude will be good for 70% lubricating oil only.

It is reported that there is a large gassy coal mine under Sydney, from which vapor gas (methene) of an octane rating of 115 can be extracted, with production equivalent of 20,000 gallons of gasoline per day possible. 140 cubic feet of this gas equals 1 gallon of gasoline, and it can be compressed in drums to equal 10 gallons of gasoline which can be carried on an automobile. There is a total of 10 mines in Australia which can be made to produce this gas within two months, and they are also locating additional mines in New Zealand.

Several large deposits of bauxite have been discovered in Australia, and are now being developed, but development is slow due to shortage of power.
3. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. 4115. 40,000 Barrel Refinery at Balekpapen, which is only refinery in area producing lubricating oil, mostly of crude from adjacent areas with small amount from Java, good harbor, 5,000 population, everything owned by Shell Petroleum Company. 45,000 Barrel Refinery at Pladjoe about 20 miles from Palembang, producing 100 octane aviation gasoline and all oil products except lubricating oil, sand bar across harbor limits draft of ships calling there to 18 feet. 45,000 Barrel Refinery operated by Sacony across Moei river from Pladjoe. 15,000 Barrel Refinery named Pangkalan Branden in North Sumatra near Medan, limited to straight run distilling, no cracking, all crude from nearby areas by pipeline, export by sea. 7,000 Barrel Refinery in Tjepoe, Java, about 60 miles west of Sourabaya, only low quality gasoline produced, only Java supplied, crude from nearby areas by pipeline, delivery by tank car.

9185. Complete arrangements have been made for destruction of refineries, pipelines, and wells, with all wiring, switches, etc., in place; lacking only the placing of necessary explosives, which are kept near the points they would be placed.

Arrangements have been made to evacuate Balekpapen, with place already built in interior to care for all personnel. Plenty of underground protection for all persons at all other places.

It is reported that the N. E. I. Army is composed mostly of natives, and that these natives do not see any need for loyalty to the Dutch. Also reported that half castes in the Army are a possible source of trouble.

4. BURMA. 4610. Number of trucks arriving at Kunming, exclusive of those carrying salt, increasing from an average of 58 per day carrying 5,220 tons freight in October 1940, to 162 per day carrying 13,071 tons in June 1941. Arrivals at Chungking during the period October 1940 to June 1941 remained about constant, with arrivals averaging 15 per day carrying 1377 tons. Numbers of trucks passing frontier at Wanting are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Trucks</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>3,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>4,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>6,282</td>
<td>6,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6,194</td>
<td>5,658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Freight rates are as follows:

- Lashio-Wanting $12.23 per ton U. S. Dollars
- Wanting-Kunming 112.01
- Kunming-Chungking 111.32
- Chungking-Kweiyang 40.21
- Kweiyang-Kunming 23.04

Date: 14 August 1941.

G-2, HAWN, DEPT.
Classification: Restricted.
Report No. 2.
Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941 to 9 Feb., 1942.
Status of Case: Pending in 14ND.
Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese
Ambassador, Washington.
Character of Investigation: Espionage.
Enclosures References: (See first page of details.)
Copy to:
ONI (5)
CinCPac (1)
Com14 (1)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)
14ND (3)
Source File No.: 14ND #54A.
ONI File No.:
SYNOPSIS: On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu,
transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights,
cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea,
off the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the de-
parture of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived,
and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer
of the German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship
positions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or
contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at
night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has
been found that KUEHN's signal system ever was employed.
The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as
FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Ef-
forts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be
charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

DEDUCTIONS: Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December,
1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was
Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

APPROVED:

I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/zw

[1]

Confidential
Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.
References:

(a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
(b) Com14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (ONI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
(c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
   LJN, 5-1-41.
(e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (Copy to ONI),
   5-31-41.
(f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
   LJN, 7-17-41.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-
   SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

(A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers,
Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels
in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.
1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1–4 December, 1941. These messages were despatched traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed very important.

3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo
(Secret Military Message No. )
(By Chief of Consulate's Code)
To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.

From: Fuji
Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows:
(1) Code (Following 3 section 8 line table)
Battle Force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—
1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.

6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.

7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.

8.

9.

(2) Signal
1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night—one light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time, indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".
—When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until Noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1" "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen cloth indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 pm to 1 am every hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".

5. "EGMB" want ads advertisements 9:45 am—(a) a Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6". (b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7". (c) Beauty operator wanted—indicates "5" or "8".

In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located
between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala Road which can be watched from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "FXE" this (the following) will be repeated, for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6"; 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "4" or "7"; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8".

5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three Intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3 December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the "dormer window of Kahoma house" probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German suspect, of Kahama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such signals, the three Intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kahama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kahama house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of his family.)

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kahama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the indicated markings.

3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a "Lanikai beach House"; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, Island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paoo, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises which could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kahama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoo, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by Agent McCarthy:

"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoo, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction
of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn's house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or to furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period. [7]

"It was pointed out by many of the residents that had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signaling with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the conclusion that they are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office." [8]

[9] In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following pertinent incident:

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident. "Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing
of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, I.J.N., among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).)

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regarding investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight—actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hanson, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p.m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes. At 8:40 p.m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaeae Bay came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe fire signal seen.

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan—"Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island—where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December, 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a)) referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate this case on Maui, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost
the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by
Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to
scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police
had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There
is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the
information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared
away or else using another point."
11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further
report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in
part:
"... Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was
interviewed.

[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 De-
cember, 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The
subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also
observed a strong light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the
Kula Sanatorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in
line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's
room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont
about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time
was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject
light any matches."
12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the
activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula
Sanatorium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report
being prepared on FURUKAWA.
13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA,
who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but
very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house
high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After
advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on
30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MA-
RUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his
house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous
to Lanikai.
14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as
to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and
could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an obser-
vation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity
on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities."
Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other
person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling
to ships at sea.
15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the
sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is
Ichio FUJI.
[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of
the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that
the only FUJI known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi
FUJI, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from
Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former
clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three in-
tenelligence agencies confirmed this fact.
17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu,
were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJI arrived at Honolulu,
from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of
inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJI was born at
Molliifi, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJI stated that he was taken to
Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJI stated that
he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJI was found in
the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been
discovered.
18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference
to the surname FUJI (or HUZII and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was
made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case is
continuing.
19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:
Miss Kimie DOUE
Takalchi SAKAI
Katsukichi MURAOKA
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO
Kanaye SAHARA
Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJI

22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (1) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival at Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojirō OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work were handled by Takalchi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takalchi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (b), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places," and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why they thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and
KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Ko-kichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.

30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (J), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (K), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, these men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if anyone, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The Interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent In Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss
DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the "hole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".

[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and Allen, is submitted for information:

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNS have owned two homes at Kala ma and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty shop brought in only about $80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kala ma home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for $40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was $6,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was $9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of $10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the $40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an im-
important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 20 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely fictitious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago."

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m.
meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a.m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p.m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had filled by hand the very few forms the Japanese had left at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5, [27] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p.m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p.m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p.m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p.m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p.m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a.m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a.m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a.m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a.m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a.m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a.m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p.m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p.m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p.m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p.m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p.m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p.m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing $500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.
"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representative of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

"I have never been to the island of Mani nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing $14,000.00 in $100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were $14,000 in the package, mostly in new $100 bills, some $20 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kalua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Malanui Avenue, Kalua. KOTO SHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Malanui Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reappeared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalua residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.
47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very familiar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.)

8. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the $14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original $14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, $5,000.00 in new $100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given $2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through, Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following information appeared on the suspect card:

"KUEHN, Otto
Kalua, Oahu
None at present
Formerly (1918) officer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNS had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Government, through the Consulate.

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1–4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)
Pending—14nd

6 February, 1942.

Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22–30 November, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Type of ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BBs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/22</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/23</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/24</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/25</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/26</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/27</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/28</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/29</td>
<td>0800</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/30</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: BB—battleship; CA—heavy cruiser; CL—light cruiser; CV—aircraft carrier; SS—submarine; DD—destroyer; DM—light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD—seaplane tender (destroyer type).

#Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its endorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: WD Radio #238, 12 December 1941 “Japanese Spy Activities”</th>
<th>4837</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind. AG 12 Dec 41.....</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>1 Ind.: Reply sent in Gen. Short’s name....</td>
<td>R. H. N. 12 Dec 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ind. G2RE Cont., #362 19 Feb 42.</td>
<td></td>
<td>For Information</td>
<td>KIF EM.</td>
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</table>
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SB OHUC USG CDE WASHINGTON DC (VIA COMMERCIAL PACIFIC CABLE)

211/210

COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPT.

628 12th For your information and necessary action Colon One Ichiro Fuji on December third arranged following signal system for Japanese fleet upon closure normal means communication Stop Lanikai beach house to show lights between eight PM and midnight and between midnight and four AM with various meanings as to our naval dispositions depending on the hour of display Stop Similarly a star and a roman numeral three at the head of the sail of the quote star boat unquote In Lanikai Bay during daylight Stop Also lights in the attic window of Kalama house parenthesis beach village one mile north west of Lanikai close parenthesis Stop Also advertisements broadcast on KGMB re Chinese rug for sale comma Chic space space Co paren two letters missing end paren farm comma beauty operator and apply PO box One Four Seven Six Stop If above unworkable a signal bonfire to be located on Maui six miles north of Kula Sanitorium at point halfway between lower Kula road and Hakeakala road.

(Signed) MARSHALL.

Received as a SECRET communication.
Decoded by: Lt. G. Lennox SC 850A 12 Dec 1941 LX.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 628."
Note. See A. R. 330-5 and 335-5 for handling messages of this classification.

DECEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum to SAC:
Re: Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.

In accordance with your instructions the district of Kalama was checked as thoroly as possible for houses with dormer windows. Three were found. These are the homes of Otto KUEHN, now in CD, John Waterhouse, and Ensign Bradley, USN, who has living with him a Lieutenant from Bellows Field.

A driving check was made in the district between Kalaheo Drive and the pine grove and none other than the KUEHN place were found here.

On the beach side of Kalaheo Drive we found the John Waterhouse home, which is the first residence encountered on the beach coming from Mokapu. This house has not been occupied, except on Sunday nite, 12-7-41, when John Waterhouse slept there. This was the first occupancy since the first of December. However, there are Japanese living there. These on interview I found to be Waichi Fukui, about 34; his wife, Hatsuiko, 29, and their three children, the eldest 9. Also living with them are Miss Chiyoko TAO, 21, and Jotaro ONISHI, 32. The latter is a brother of Mrs. Fukui. W. Fukui was born in Japan and has lived in Hawaii most of his life. His wife is Hawaiian born but did not regain citizenship. Miss TAO and ONISHI are Hawaiian born. Also living there since the bombing are Isuke KIMURA, 49, his wife and 24 year old son who were machine-gunned on Sunday while on their farm at Mokapu. I learned from W. FUKUI that quite a few persons come about the place to fish and he complained that persons broke into the place frequently by means of the dormer windows. I was also informed by Norman Godbold Jr., Territorial Treasurer that while he lived there in that district, directly behind the quarters occupied by FUKUI that there were a number of persons visiting there at all times.

The house formerly occupied by Godbold is now occupied by Ensign BRADLEY, USN, camera party, and the Lieutenant from Bellows Field and is in the next lot to the WATERHOUSE property. The dormer windows of both places provide quite a good view of the ocean.

A walk along the beach from the Waterhouse property to the Kailua end of the beach failed to show any other houses with dormer windows.

Respectfully submitted.

J. A. BURNS.
MEMORANDUM TO OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

ATTENTION: CAPTAIN I. H. MAYFIELD;

RE: JAPANESE CONSULATE ACTIVITIES—CONFIDENTIAL; ESPIONAGE—J.

During investigations which have been conducted by ONI, G-2 and the FRI, Special Agent F. G. TILLMAN and Lt. GEORGE KIMBALL of ONI have developed the following information which it appears may be of immediate interest to you in defense of these islands.

During the course of an interview with RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHIRODA, a former clerk employed by the Japanese Consul-General at Honolulu, it was developed that TADASI MORIMURA, who is registered with the Secretary of State as the Chancellor of that Japanese Consulate, is without doubt the person charged by the Japanese Government with the collection of military information in the Territory of Hawaii. This is substantiated by the statements of other members of the clerical staff of the Consulate, and by MORIMURA's apparent activity.

KOTOSHIRODA is the only American-born Japanese employed at the Consulate in whom the Consulate placed any confidence in connection with other than routine matters. It has been learned from KOTOSHIRODA that he accompanied MORIMURA on numerous occasions to points on the islands of Hawaii, Maui and particularly in the vicinity of naval establishments on the island of Oahu. These trips were usually made in a Ford sedan owned by KOTOSHIRODA and a taxi owned and driven by an alien Japanese.

It was ascertained that MORIMURA showed unusual interest in the following points on the island of Oahu:

(1) Kailua Beach in the vicinity of the public park which was visited in May, 1941.
(2) Waimanalo Beach in the vicinity of the old sugar wharf which was visited on the same day as the above.

MEMO FOR ONI
1-4-1942

(3) Haleiwa Bay in the vicinity of the public park which was visited three or four times, the last visit being in about the end of October, 1941.

In addition, the entire Consulate staff had picnics at the SAM WOODS' place, Lanikai, the first in January or February, 1941, and the second in March or April of the same year. These picnics appear to have been held in the absence of the owners of the property and by arrangements with the Japanese yardman who is presently being investigated. This place is less than two miles from the Kailua Beach park previously mentioned.

It has also been learned that MORIMURA has contacts at Pearl City; these individuals are now under investigation. He has also visited a point below the home of CHESTER CLARKE at Aiea Heights where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor may be obtained.

The above information is being submitted in the event that it may serve some immediate purpose. The results of this investigation will be outlined fully in a subsequent report.

Very truly yours,

R. L. SHIVERS,
Special Agent in Charge.

RLS: mna
cc: Lt. Col. BICKNELL

signals

638 12th Contents messages as follows quote one twenty five please turn over immediately both items which I requested one twenty eight please wire immediately re the latter part of my one twenty three the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth circular two four siq one please keep the code list until the last moment and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you so please notify us of this fact immediately this message is a precaution circular two four siq siq we are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families therefore wait where you are until I wire you at a later date unquote.
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

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<td>1. For information and return. Encl.—(14ND report re subject dated 2/9/42).</td>
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<td>2 G-2  2/12/42…………………</td>
<td>C/O……………</td>
<td>1. Noted. 2. This is a good report and coincides with our beliefs.</td>
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[1] Fourteenth Naval District
District Intelligence Office
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
Honolulu, T. H.

AJL/ab

14ND A8-5/P9-2/EF37 FEBRUARY 9, 1942.

Confidential

From: The District Intelligence Officer
Fourteenth Naval District

To: The District Intelligence Officer
Third Naval District

Subject: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Fifth Column Activities at
Reference: (a) Letter dated 3 January, 1942 from Commandant 3ND to Chief of Naval Operations, above Subject.

1. Reference (a) suggests that “there be conveyed to all District Intelligence Offices, such information of Fifth Column activities at Pearl Harbor, as may be useful in connection with the operations of all District Intelligence Office activities”.

2. For the purpose of this letter, methods of fifth column activities will be considered to consist of the following:
(a) To conduct accurate espionage work and transmit the results to the enemy.
(b) To demoralize public opinion; to cause panic or confusion; to promote discord and dissatisfaction.
(c) To carry on actual physical sabotage.
(d) To render assistance to invading forces.

3. Referring to Paragraph 2 (a) above, there is no question but that the espionage work of our enemies was carried out in an extremely efficient, thorough and accurate manner. There is also no doubt but that this information was very successfully conveyed to our enemies. The collection of the information was very simple. The geography and topography of the area around Pearl Harbor are such that any one with good eyes (perhaps aided with a pair of field glasses) can observe accurately movements in and out of Pearl Harbor from several highways and roads near Pearl Harbor and also from a great many houses on the heights.
back of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. There is no question but that the enemy did this in a very thorough and efficient manner. It is also true that they were able to transmit [3] this information very effectively and quickly to their forces at sea. This again is easily explained by the fact that there was no censorship of mail, cables or radio; sampans were operating regularly off shore; there may have been (and probably was) communication by private radio; and there may have been other signalling. Unfortunately, under a democratic form of government, it does not seem possible to take necessary action ahead of time to prevent this sort of thing.

4. Referring to Paragraph 2 (b) above, there were numerous rumors of cars zigzagging along highways to slow up traffic, of cars being parked across roads to tie up or block traffic, of shots being fired from ambush or from automobiles, etc. etc., etc. None of these reports were substantiated.

5. Referring to Paragraph 2 (c) above, there were no real cases of actual physical sabotage. This is somewhat hard to understand as the utilities such as the Hawaiian Electric Company, the Honolulu Gas Company, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Company, the plants and storage tanks of the privately owned oil companies all of which are concentrated in a limited area, the City and Navy Yard water supply systems, etc., etc., were not adequately protected. As a matter of fact, a comparatively small group of well trained saboteurs could easily have put them all out of operation in a very short time. This leads to the query as to whether there were no well organized plans to wreck these utilities and services, or whether such plans were and are so well organized that one might assume that instructions had been passed that no action was to be taken at the time as there were no plans to follow up the attack of December 7 with attempts to land and invade the island. This latter assumption may seem to be far fetched, but is being carefully considered and studied. The only real basis for considering it seriously is that there was not a single attempt made to sabotage any of these essential utilities on the morning of December 7.

6. Referring to Paragraph 2 (d) above, there were many reports such as the one about swaths being cut in cane and pineapple fields pointing to important objectives; people signalling enemy planes; etc., etc. All such rumors and reports were checked as expeditiously as possible. None of the cases investigated proved to be authentic.

7. This Subject has been checked thoroughly with the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, whose findings coincide with the above.

I. H. Mayfield,
A. J. Lowrey,
A. J. Lowrey,
By direction.

CC: ONI (2)
COM14 (1)
DIOs in all NDs (1) (except 16ND)
FBI-Hon (1)
MID-HD (1)
Plan (1) "B."

3 December, 1941.

From: ________
To: ________ , Tokyo
(Secret military message No. ——— ) (Chief of Consulate's Code).
To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff
From: FUUI
Re: Signals: I wish to simplify communications as follows:
1. Code (following 3 section 8 line table) ——— battle force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea——
2. All aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
5. All battle force have sailed, 4th-6th dates Inc.
6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)
2. Signal
— light in Lanikai beach house at night ———.
One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1".

When not in accordance with (lights) above 1 full automobile headlight and one half light indicate 1, 2, 3, 4. Two full lights indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour 1 piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates 1, 2, 3, 4. Two pieces linen cloth indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates 1, 2, 3, 4; a star and "III" indicates 5, 6, 7, 8.

4. Light in dormer window of —— house from 7 pm to 1 am every hour indicates 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

5. KGMB Want Ads" advertisements 9:45 am

(A) A chinese rug etc., for sale—apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 3 or 6.

(B) A complete chicken farm etc., apply as above indicates 4 or 7.

(C) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates 5 or 8.

In the event that in accordance with one of 3 items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of KULA Sanatorium and Haleskala road which can be watch from the sea to the south west and south east of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak.

7 pm—9 pm indicates 3 or 6; 9 pm—9 pm indicates 4 or 7.

Extract from O. N. I. report dated 9 December 1941; Subject, Report of activities, Maui, Lanai and Molokai, since 7 December 1941.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanatorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanatorium occupied by SHIGEO FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-2/Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action.

Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

From Katsuro MIHO, attorney-at-Law, It was learned that the subject is a respected surgeon and considered one of the best physicians in town even among the white doctors. He is also alleged to be a cancer specialist and radium expert.

The subject, MIHO stated has lived in the mainland and London and has been in the Territory for the past 20 years.

Subject has a son ISHIRO, an alien and an aviation engineer, who is now here. A daughter MARIKO, a student at the University of Hawaii is married to Daino SUMIDA'S adopted son and heir.

Dr. SAKAMAKI states that Sumida's son got married to avoid the draft. Subject's wife is now alleged to be in Japan.

RICHARD MILLER.

12-12-41.

ONI and FBI to send agents to Lanikei and Kalama to stay there and find out all possible information. Each to send two or more agents. No communication by phone, only by one man coming in by automobile. These groups to communicate with each other—How? How communicate with Army?

MID watch for (1) display of lights, (2) display of cloths (3) Star sail boat.

Army to send plane to Maui with the information. Get Adelson and Hansen on job with Army about house on Haleakala.
MEMO TO SAC

11:30 a.m., December 17, 1941
Re: John Waterhouse House at Kailua

Mr. George Moody, of Grossman-Moody, reports that on returning from horseback rides almost any Wednesday, Saturday, or Sunday afternoon he would notice as many as sixty or seventy Japanese in the Waterhouse house. The servants at this house very seldom had the owners come down and they are also said to have been raising pigeons. Mr. Moody was certain that this house had dormer windows.

R. A. Cooke, Jr.

Memorandum to the SAC:

L. KAHANAMOKU, Sheriff’s Office came in two nights ago and furnished information on the subject.
He stated that about a year ago he rented a house from the subject on Liholiho St. Soon after he rented the house, the subject asked him to take a group of Japanese Naval Personnel out on a canoe ride. He also told KAHANAMOKU that he had to entertain the Navy men at his home that evening.
KAHANAMOKU stated that this incident took place about a year ago upon the visit here of a Japanese Training ship.
The subject’s home on Alewa Heights commands a full view of Pearl Harbor. KAHANAMOKU further stated that the subject is interested in sailing and owns a sailing boat.
Upon checking at the Ala Moana Basin, William NELSON, in charge of the Basin informed that the subject bought a second-hand 38 foot yacht, a very seaworthy craft about three years ago. This boat was sold to Dr. Louis GASPAR by the subject about three months ago.
According to NELSON, the subject was a poor sailor and had a couple of Japanese boys to help him operate the boat whenever he went out.
Extract, Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39.

THE SPY GAME

In the military and naval intelligence service spies are classified as: (1) Stationary agents; (2) mobile agents; and (3) special agents.
The stationary agent has a mission assigned to him to secure information on a specified subject. He established himself in a place conveniently located and generally engages in a small business enterprise to serve as a cloak for his operations. A cafe or restaurant has been found to be one of the best screens, for by serving better food at lower prices he can eventually attract and make friends with people who may unwittingly, or wittingly, for a price, provide him with the information which he seeks. This information he pieces together to attain his final ends. Again these stationary agents may find employment in hotels and clubs, where they come in contacts with guests and members in a casual way and pick up bits of information. Here they also have access to baggage in the absence of its owners and may examine into it. They may also find employment in Governmental or industrial plants which are engaged in the manufacture of war material and thus gain information which they are charged to obtain. Many of these stationary agents are women and they are characterized as the most dangerous of all. This is evidenced by the reappearance in our own Navy Department of a war time warning against them—a sign which reads:
“Beware of female spies. Women are being employed by the enemy to secure information from Navy men, on the theory that they are less liable to be suspected than male spies. Beware of inquisitive women, as well as prying men.”
Stationary agents are also employed as “letter boxes.” These maintain a permanent address where mail to the other spies operating in the district may be addressed, be received and cleared to them.
The mobile agents operate under the guise of tourists, travelers, students or traveling salesmen. There are thousands of them all over the world. They assume the status which is best likely to permit them to accomplish their mission.
The reports of this gentry are pieced together by experts and an accurate picture of certain situations reported upon may be gained.

Special agents are employed on special missions, where more or less skill is required. They are used principally in times of international tension and political crises. Hundreds of them were used in Austria before that country was taken over and in Czechoslovakia during the Sudeten crises, as well as later when that republic was broken up and dismembered. They have been used in the Polish Corridor for months and are now paving the way for a Danzig coup.

All of the great democratic nations are today passing on to their nationals who are employed in activities connected with the national defense, directly or remotely, the warning which France impressed upon her whole body politic during the World War: "Keep your mouths shut. Be on your guard. The ears of the enemy are listening to you."

HU181SN SCDE TOKYO 24 JG 4 816P
RIYOJI HONOLULU
01260 KOKOK UVUBA WWAYY IUH0O PETJJ UMNYH IAHH0 GAUEY VYTIN DYKIE SYSFQ BAUGL EFRAU ALDAI DHIYO MEYHE ATLIE LBUOLEIELI AWUB

HU187SN SCDE TOKYO 30 JG 4 905PM
RIYOJI
HONOLULU
SIKYU 92466 GOGOG PJEEU VUUIY UFDFJG QUEAI JYPGB SUUFX SSEVJ IOCAA ATTIA OTYVA GUU00 GWWDZ AUAUH SUIYD LLAIH ARRLO HEOIA QVEDE TLFRG YATAM EUEXA XWDEI PIDCO TG00X

HU301 CB SCDE TOKIO 18 JG 6 648P
RIYOJI
HONOLULU
SIKYU 01280 KEKEK OQCQ SNAJI UOJUB DDJYI HRBJI EEUGO CHVWO DAANJ OJJKV UUAKH UYDSU QS0RO

HU121SN SCDE TOKYO 29 JG 6 925PM
RIYOJI HONOLULU
KINQY 92461 GOGOG RAWOU UEIYF ZZOFB SAUQY SSEVJ HQYK SOSAB OUIER OESIO OJHUO JLREL OLAYS OOEBY IROFJ HAETC YDSYU OOMDR DIKAM WGVOZ OYFE NUVBD DUIZO JOCQI

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 3

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K.

a. Army Contact Office memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 7 October 1941 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.


d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1941, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to General Short dated 25 July 1941.

e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, w/note attached.

The Taiyo Maru, a NYK ship, under Japanese government requisition arrived here from Japan with 326 Japanese (145 aliens and 181 dual citizens) and 14 others (Americans and Britishers) on the morning of November 1st, docking at Pier 8 at about 9:00 A.M. This was the second NYK vessel to come here from Japan since the suspension of Japanese shipping to the United States; the first one having been the Tatuta Maru of Oct. 24th. The Taiyo Maru was especially assigned to make a round trip from Japan to Hawaii so that the people who have been stranded in Japan and Hawaii may return to their desired homes.

Majority of the passengers that arrived on the Taiyo were local people and few of them were people going to America and Europe. The greater portion of the returning local people went to Japan either in spring or summer of this year for a short visit and they would have returned here earlier if transportation was available; the others have been either studying or working in Japan and would have remained in Japan longer under normal conditions, but the tense situation between United States and Japan more or less forced them to catch the first available ship on hand and come back to Hawaii.

It seemed, judging from interviews with the passengers and from reports by other contacts, every single one of the returning people was very glad to come back here and they were all determined to live here permanently. Moreover, they unanimously seemed to have felt very inconvenient and uncomfortable to live in Japan due to economic pressure although they have not experienced serious shortages in every day necessities. Many people have expressed their feeling that the people in Japan are united solidly and are well controlled by the government and are prepared to meet any eventuality. Many American citizens of Japanese ancestry seemed extremely vexed and expressed hatred toward the Japanese government for a discriminatory action against them; that is, American citizens were given only 10 yen as spending money on the ship while the alien Japanese were allowed to board the ship with 200 yen or more per person.

The baggages of the returning passengers, on the Taiyo were carefully inspected by the Customs officials, but nothing of importance from the military or naval or national defense standpoints was discovered. However, it was interesting to note that these people brought back very little baggages, practically nothing compared to the number of baggages that usually were brought here before during the normal times. The contents of these baggages consisted mainly of old personal effects and there were very small amount of new things; indicating that either these people were out of funds or Japanese government...
was carrying out strict control of outlet of goods from Japan. As far as I could gather, it was mainly due to strict government control of commodities, and lack of fund was secondary.

The inspection of the baggage of the people leaving here for Japan aboard the Taiyo Maru by the Customs Office started at 7:00 A. M., Monday, Nov. 3rd, and lasted till about 7:00 P. M., that night. It was resumed at 7:00 A. M., on the next day and was completed at around 6:30 P. M. About 125 families were inspected on the first day and about 225 families were inspected on the second day. The types of baggages consisted of trunks, suit cases, sacks, boxes, sewing machines, ice boxes, packages, etc. In them were found kitchen utensils, plates, tools, clothes, hats, shoes, books, magazines, and many other household goods and personal effects and some canned goods. One interesting feature of the baggages was that everyone of the families was taking a sewing machine and in one particular instance two sewing machines and that all these machines appeared to have been crafted by the Singer Sewing Machine Co. It seemed all the leaving people were well aware of the government regulations concerning money or monetary certificates and commodities, for outside of a few cases, all compiled studiously with the prescribed regulations.

Wednesday, Nov. 5th, was devoted primarily in checking the leaving people's money and certificates with the licenses that were issued by the local Freeze Order authorities and their passports and searching them and questioning them on matters that might be of interest to some authorities concerned. However, some hand baggages were also inspected on this day. The work for this day started at 7:00 A. M. and was over by 6:30 P. M.

Following information was gathered during the 3 day inspection, search, and questioning:

1. Practically all were going to Japan to visit their sick parents, brothers or sisters, or other relatives and they hope to return sometime later.
2. Some were going back to Japan to remain there permanently. These people did not even take the trouble of obtaining necessary immigration papers for re-entry here. I feel there were about 20 of these families. They seemed to have amassed enough money here to enable them to live comfortably in Japan the rest of their lives.
3. There were few others who were undecided. That is, they may come back to Hawaii if it will be possible, but otherwise they would be satisfied to remain in Japan forever. I guessed perhaps there were from 25 to 50 of these people.
4. There were about 25 Japanese business men and professional men returning to Japan. They were going back because of lack of business or were going back because they have finished their work here.
5. The amount of money carried by these people ranged from about 2,000 yen to 65,000 yen, which were either in the form of bank deposit certificate or drafts or bonds. Amount of American money carried by an Individual ranged from about $100 to $200.

A great many of these people originally had intended to go to Japan a few months ago, but were forced to wait till now due to no shipping.

It is understood that 228 alien Japanese and 210 American citizens of Japanese ancestry have left for Japan on the Taiyo Maru. Three persons, I have been told, have cancelled their reservation since the baggage inspection started on Monday. Also, I understand that about 50 people have cancelled their reservations before they sent their baggages to the pier.

As soon as the final inspection was finished, the people were taken aboard the ship and were not allowed to come ashore. Hence, customary goodbyes were exchanged out in the street and in the park in front of the pier hours before the actual sailing of the ship. The Royal Hawaiian Band played "Aloha" at least 3 hours before the ship sailed. In other words, all the color and gaiety of the past was missing when the ship actually slid away from Pier 8 at 7:30 P. M., Wednesday, Nov. 5th.

Following are some interesting things noted during the 3 days of inspection:

1. Shoyei Kamiya declared that he is going to join the Japanese army. He even wrote it in the diary he carried. His brother is working at 711 S. King St. and his name is Shozen Kamiya.
2. Takunyo, Katsuto, a Buddhist Reverend, was found carrying obscene pictures in his baggage.
3. Uzo Shishido had many maps of East Asia which were published in conjunction with the recent China incident by Japanese magazines as supplements.
4. Several old Japanese were seen holding letter of appreciation from both
the Japanese Army and Navy offices for their contributions toward soldiers relief, defense funds, and comfort bags, and other donations.

5. Kenpei Iuchi was the only man whose family record showed that he had been an ex-Japanese navy man.

6. Rev. Tatsuo Sawai took many old Japanese books and magazines back to Japan. He possessed a scratch paper on which appeared various data concerning the Japanese people in Mt. View, Hawaii, which he claimed he collected for the Japanese consulate in Honolulu while acting as a consular agent.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosures:
201—Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in Hawaii: dtd 8/3/41.

CONFIDENTIAL

MID 201 (Paisn, George)
Strictly private and confidential.

Aug 3 1941

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Should Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left unattended in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health,

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

8/21/41
Copies to:
G-3
Haw.

VSR/enge

/s/ GEORGE PAISN.
Subject: Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

Summary of Information:

Dear Mr. President: I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to cooperate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health,

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

/s/ George Paisn.

Evaluation

— of source — of information
Reliable
Credible
Questionable
X Undetermined X

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 30 September 1941.

In reply refer to: 336.8—(Japanese)

Subject: Letter from George Paisn relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.

To Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, New York.

1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your information, with the request that Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess concerning the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the Japanese Government, and the native Hawaiians.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G–2.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA, 
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, 
Governors Island, New York, October 15, 1941.

Subject: LETTER FROM GEORGE PAISN RELATIVE TO JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN HAWAI'I.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

1. Reference is made to your communication of 30th, September, with above subject title.

2. Before this office can comply with request contained therein to interview the subject, it is requested that this office be supplied with Mr. Paisn’s address, inasmuch as there is nothing contained in your communication which would indicate that he is a resident of this Corps Area.

For the A. C. of S., G-2.

Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.

336.8 (AGO) — 1st Ind.

Intelligence Section, Contact Officer, 214 Dillingham Building, Honolulu, T. H. 5 November 1941—To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs, 2d Corps Area, Governors Island, N. Y.

1. Mr. Paisn’s address as shown on his letter to the President was “The Boreas, Blue Ridge, New York State”. This address was inadvertently omitted in S/1 of 30 September 1941.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2, Contact Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., September 16, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosures: 336.8 San Francisco S-25—MID Summ. of Info. re Alleged exodus of Japanese.

CONFIDENTIAL

MID 336.8 San Francisco 8-26-41

WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.

G-2, NINTH CORPS AREA, August 26, 1941.

7399.42

Subject: Alleged exodus of Japanese.

Summary of Information:

A confidential informant reported to this office that he received information through one SILVER that all Japanese officials of Japanese concerns in San Francisco have received instructions to liquidate their affairs as soon as possible and to leave for Japan. Only three (3) key individuals in each concern are not affected by this.

SILVER is said to be a buyer for a Japanese firm.

/s/ J. H. W.
Evaluation
— of source
X  Credible  X
Reliable
Questionable
Undetermined

Distribution:
G-2, WD
DIO, 12 ND

Further Dist:
G-1  G-3
G-4  WPD
FBI  State
Haw.  Phil.
Intell.  File

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: L/fr Adm Bloch to Gen Short dated 25 July 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind. AS 4 Aug 41</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>This is apparently a G-2 communication. 1 incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ind. G-2 4 Aug 41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>Reference attached note from Chief of Staff: The letter of Admiral Bloch herewith acknowledges receipt of the letter of the Commanding General, 25 July 1941, transmitting a copy of correspondence from the War Department, MID, to A. C. of S., G-2, Hawaiian Department, on the subject of small Japanese Submarines lurking in Hawaiian waters, etc., the communications having originated in Mexico and transmitted to the War Department by Military Attaché, 2 Inds; Mr. Admiral Bloch and Note C/S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d C/S H9 8/5/41</td>
<td></td>
<td>File. For your file. 1 incl L/14ND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Ind. AG 8 Aug 41</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>For your file. 1 incl L/14ND.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
AND YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.,
August 1, 1941.

 Lieutenant General W. C. SHORT, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: This is to acknowledge receipt of your confidential letter 336.81 (C-2) J dated 25 July 1941. Upon the completion of study of the letter by interested members of my staff, in the absence of any instructions from you, we shall file it in our confidential files.

Very truly yours,

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

CCB:kt
CONFIDENTIAL

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Unknown subjects, book entitled “Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War” by Kinosaki Matsuo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M. W. M.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Returned to Contact Officer, 26 Jun 1941. VSW.

RS to CS: F. B. I. Report.

Please note the attached report on the Japanese book. “Three-power alliance and American-Japanese War” not on sale locally, but others of similar nature are advertised and sold here.

Review of “A Thesis on the Final Battle of the World” by Lt. Gen. Kanji Ishihawa:—Ultimate conflict between Japan and United States predicted as inevitable, with prophecies of Buddhism indicating final battle will be fifty years hence.

M. W. M.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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No. of Ind. From and Date | To | Subject: Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near MOLOKAI.
---|---|---
1st Ind. G-2 24 Jul-41 | C/S | 1. Information furnished in MEXICO by source which has seldom proved to be reliable.
| | | 2. Alleged that about 12 special type small subs. will be submerged near MOLOKAI, kept in serviceable condition by Japanese fishing sampans, their crews secreted ashore among plantation workers. Three of these craft are reported to be here now.
| | | 3. Objective: The destruction of naval vessels, particularly plane carriers, at PEARL HARBOR.
| | | 1 incl. Mil. Intel. Div. WD, June 17/41, 1G No. 5940, subj: ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGNERS IN COUNTRY.
3d Ind. G-2 25-Jul-41 | C/S | 1. Herewith draft of letter to Admiral Bloch, as directed in 2d R/S ind, hereon.
| | | 2. If letter is approved and signed, please return to this office, for mailing and further action.
| | | 2 incl. 1 incl. added: Draft of letter to Admiral Bloch, dated 25 July 1941, File 336. 1 (G2)-J.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF SAPP FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 July, 1941.

In reply refer to:
(G-2)336.81-J
Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff,
Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

Reference attached report, the following action has been taken by this office:
Since the subject matter of this report concerns the Navy Department, a copy thereof has been furnished the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

ROBERT T. AITKEN,
1st Lt. MI,
ASST. A. C. OF S., G-2.

1 incl.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS CPBC
G-2 [CID]

BOX 3, APO 456—% Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 201—C. D. Section—Hirayama, Unji

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1. This case originated at Honolulu, T. H. File No. 65-492.
Title: REV. Unji Hirayama
Character of case: Espionage
Synopsis of facts: REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA, Hompa Hongwanji Mission, Lahaina, Maui, T. H., is in charge of that mission and principle of the Language School. He has not been observed engaged in suspicious activities but is said
to be fearful of his position as a Japanese Priest, believing that this group would be the first to be deported or interned in event of war. Names of associates set out.


Details: Confidential Informant M-2 was questioned generally concerning the Japanese organizations and religious groups in the vicinity of Lahaina, Maui, without any particular reference to the Subject UNJI HIRAYAMA on October 23, 1940, at which time he was to obtain statistical information relating to these groups. On October 29, 1940, this Informant advised the writer that he had just come from the home of REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA, from whom he had secured the names of the directors of the LAHAINA HOMPA HONGWANJI MISSION purportedly in connection with his, the Informant’s, usual work.

At this time the Informant stated that UNJI HIRAYAMA was concerned over the present Japanese situation and its reaction upon the [2] alien Japanese and citizens of Japanese ancestry and the plight of the Japanese in Hawaii should there be war between the United States and Japan. HIRAYAMA was said to have expressed the opinion that, should such an event happen, the Japanese priests in Hawaii would be the first group to suffer, that is, be interned or deported. The Subject was said to have had the opinion that preparations or plans had been made to intern such Japanese on the islands of Lanai, Molokai, or Kahoolawe, T. H.

In this connection HIRAYAMA was said to have stated that the various Japanese Priests and School teachers were instructed, probably by the Japanese Consulate, not to express any pro-Japanese sympathies or to do anything which would impair their position in the communities in which they are employed.

The Confidential Informant M-2 stated that it is now the policy of the Japanese Government to replace the older Japanese Priests and School Principals, whom they are calling back to Japan, with younger and more active men who would not be antagonistic to the second-generation Japanese and who would be more able to run the affairs of the Japanese communities. HIRAYAMA was said to be a good mixer and able to drink with, as well as teach and compete in sports with the younger citizens of Japanese ancestry.

REVEREND HIRAYAMA was said to have related to the Informant that a group of American sailors thumbed a ride from him to Lahaina but when they observed his religious robes, refused to ride with him. Although two sailors, in another group, rode with the Subject on the same day, HIRAYAMA used this incident to illustrate to the Informant the precarious position of the Priests and the suspicions in which they are held by this Government. Following the above statement, HIRAYAMA was said to have again stated that he was afraid of future developments and what would happen to him.

There is set out the officers of the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission and the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission Japanese Language School, both groups being identical, as these individuals are probably the Subject’s closest contacts in the community:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Jutaro Ito</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Now in Japan; Vis. Chairman SHINTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DAIJINGU TEMPLE, Lahaina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Mrs. Selichi Shota</td>
<td>Alien</td>
<td>Wife of Asst. Consular Agent Selichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fukumaga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Yasuta Shibao</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Student; now in Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Zeidil Fukumaga</td>
<td>Alien</td>
<td>Active Consular Agent; NIPFU JII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>representative; Vice-Chairman Shinto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dai Jingi, Lahaina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor</td>
<td>Okinu Sasuki</td>
<td>Alien</td>
<td>Pioneer Mill Company, laborer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor</td>
<td>Ishiro Wada</td>
<td>Alien</td>
<td>Pioneer Mill Company, laborer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor</td>
<td>Shozo Tabata</td>
<td>Alien</td>
<td>Owner, S. Tabata Store.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[3] The following are the teachers in the Japanese language school of which HIRAYAMA is principal:

MRS. FUMIE HIRAYAMA, wife of Subject
REV. RINIKO KAMI
MRS. ISUMI KAMI
TADAYASHI KUBOTA
MISS NISAN SHUTA (Citizen)
MISS TOMING KANEISHI
MRS. KOU TAMURA
MRS. FUMIE HIRAYAMA, above mentioned, is also the head of the Lahaina Japanese Women's Club (FUJINKAI). KOOCHI MASUDA, son of GOSAKU MASUDA, a consular agent at Lahaina, is the chairman of the Judo Club of the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission.

Inquiry was made of R. H. WATT, Factory Superintendent, TODD WILLET, Overseer and former American Legion Commander, and HARRY TAYLOR, Assistant Superintendent, Pioneer Mill Company, Lahaina, who advised that there have been no rumors of an espionage nature concerning REVEREND UNJI HIRAYAMA, to their knowledge. In this connection, Mr. WILLET has previously assisted the Army Intelligence and has exhibited an interest in these matters over a period of years.

The Confidential Information advised that REVEREND HIRAYAMA has not acted as a “consular agent,” TURI-TSUGI-NIN, and has not the reputation of being such. He is known to the Confidential Informant as having been a priest at Paia Maui, as set forth in the reference report and in the Informant’s opinion, does not live any better or appear to have a greater income than that usually enjoyed by men in a similar position. It is his opinion that HIRARA-MA is timid, and will return to Japan as soon as he has earned sufficient money for his purposes.

UNDEVELOPED LEAD

THE HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION at Honolulu, T. H., will keep in touch with Confidential Informant J–1 with reference to the contact of REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA with the Japanese Consulate.

Pending.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1. This case originated at Honolulu, T. H. File No. 65–492


Synopsis of facts: Confidential Informant J–1 stated that the local Japanese Consulate, in June of 1940, requested Subject to keep the Consulate informed as to any movement of the U. S. Fleet in the vicinity of Maui, T. H. Investigation reflects Subject to be the Buddhist Priest in charge of the Nishi Hongwanji Temple at Lahaina, Maui, having arrived in the Territory of Hawaii on May 3, 1936 from Japan. Subject is also the director of the Judo Section of the Maui Branch of the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai.

Details: At Honolulu, T. H. Instant investigation is predicated upon information received from Confidential Informant J–1, whose identity is known to the Bureau, that it had come to his attention in June, 1940, that Rev. HIRAYAMA of Lahaina, Maui, had been requested by a member of the local Japanese Consulate, identity unknown, to keep him informed as to the movements of the U. S. Fleet in the vicinity of Maui.

A check of the records of Confidential Informant N concerning Subject resulted negatively. The records of Confidential Informant A reflected that Subject is an alien, born in 1901 in Fukukoka-ken, Japan. He arrived on Maui on May 3, 1936, his occupation being that of Buddhist Priest. He immediately took charge of the Nishi Hongwanji Mission at Paia, Maui. He also became director of the Judo Section of the Maui Branch of the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai, a Japanese organization which apparently is organized merely for [2] the purpose of developing athletic skill in Judo and fencing, but which is believed to be a strictly nationalistic and militaristic organization, the main purpose of which is to instil in young men of Japanese ancestry militaristic and pro-Japanese ideals and principles, as well as to develop their bodies for military service.

Confidential Informant A's records further reflected that on August 7 1939, Subject was transferred to the Hongwanji Buddhist Temple at Lahaina, Maui, where he succeeded RENJO HIROZAWA. Confidential Informant A's report reflected that HIROZAWA had also been Consular Agent and Japanese language school principal at Lahaina and indicated a belief that Subject would take over
these duties. A Confidential Informant of Confidential Informant, A, in commenting on Subject, stated that he was "doing strictly religious work."

F. C. BRYANT, Retail Credit Company, checked his records and ascertained that they reflected that Subject had recently applied for automobile insurance on a 1940 Plymouth sedan. The report indicated Subject's occupation as being a Buddhist Priest in the Hongwanji Mission and a teacher in the Hongwanji Japanese language school, both in Lahaina, Maui. His net worth was ascertained at $5,000 and his annual income as $1,000. He was reported as possessing a good reputation and as having good associates.

Inspector JAMES SLOAN, U. S. Immigration Service, checked that Department's records and ascertained that Subject, whose full name was reflected as being UNJI HIRAYAMA, had entered the Territory of Hawaii from Kobe, Japan on May 3, 1936, at Honolulu, on the SS "Bokuyo Maru" as a non-quota immigrant. He possessed passport #297184 issued by the Japanese Foreign Minister through the Kyoto Prefectural Office and bore non-quota immigration visa #1597 issued on April 10, 1936, by WALTER P. McCONAUGHTY, U. S. Vice Consul at Kobe, Japan. The visa reflected that Subject was born on September 14, 1900 in Fukuoka-ken, Japan. It further reflected that Subject is married to one FUMIE HIRAYAMA and has two children, YASUKO, born in 1932, and KOSHI, born in 1934. Subject's wife and children arrived in Honolulu with him. Subject indicated his occupation was that of Buddhist Priest and that he was entering the Territory of Hawaii as a non-quota immigrant who has been a minister continuously for at least two years prior to the time of application for admission to the U. S.; and that he enters the U. S. solely for the purpose of taking on his vocation as a minister of the Hompa Hongwanji Temple. Subject's visa further indicated that his final destination was Paia, Maui, T. H., where he would be connected with the Hompa Hongwanji Mission. His passage from Japan was paid for by the Hompa Hongwanji Temple, Hyoto, Japan. He indicated he intended to remain in the U. S. for a period of 5 years.

A photograph of Subject appears attached to the immigration visa. Copies of this photograph have been made and are being retained in the files of the Honolulu Field Division.

Undeveloped lead: The HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION at Lahaina, Maui, will make a general [3] investigation for the purpose of ascertaining Subject's reputation in the community, the nature of his activities, his contacts, his income, etc. Will attempt to develop a confidential informant in a position to furnish accurate information as to Subject's activities.

Pending.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

BOX 3, APO 456, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 336.92—Japanese Consulate and Consular Agents

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Fourteenth Naval District

(Confidential)

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.


Report made by: Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR; Ens. Don Woodrum, USNR.


Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: (A) Copy of signed statement of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, dated Oct. 1, 1942, entitled "Trip to Kanai". (Photostat to ONI; copies to others.)
Copy to: ONI (5) Zone III (1)
14ND (3) Zone IV (1)
FBI-Hon (2) CinCPac (1)
[Agts. have copy] MID-HD (2) Com14 (1)
2/27/43
ZONE II (1)

Source File No.: 14ND/54 (c). ONI File No.:
Synopsis: Former clerks and employees of the Japanese Consulate were re-
interviewed and various investigative leads developed therefrom followed.

Review of all known Consulate espionage activity indicates that the Consulate
was concerned only in "legal" espionage; that is, that which could be discovered
by observation (in a broad sense) without entering any restricted arena. Interest
was displayed in U. S. Fleet movements, airports, harbors, Army camps, and
any new construction by the Army or Navy. Interest also was shown in power
plant on Kauai. Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO's trip to Kauai in July,
1941, to collect information for the Consulate, is discussed herein. Trips taken
by Secretary Tadasi MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO appear to have been made
for general survey purposes. There is no evidence that either of these indi-
viduals established contacts on Kauai, Maui, or Hawaii. However, there is evi-
dence that Vice Consul OKUDA maintained a personal espionage agent on Maui.

Other information indicates that the consulate was granted an allowance for
"Korean Intelligence", and was using paid Korean informants to keep close
contact with Korean nationalist movements.

[Stamped:] Feb 23 1943.
Deductions: Approved

By direction
WBS/cop

L. H. MAYFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

[1]
Confidential

FEBRUARY 15, 1943.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, same subject.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Richard
Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Takaichi
SAKAI.
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Katsukichi
MURAOKA.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Kanaye
SAHARA.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject John Yoshiye
MIKAMI.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 2, 1942, subject Shigetaro
MATSUO.
(j) FBI-Honolulu report, file 97-274, dated November 12, 1942, subject
Noah Kwang Won CHO (available at Washington and Honolulu).
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 27, 1942, subject Insuke HORI-
KAWA.
(l) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject Unji Hirayama.
(m) 14ND Investigation Report, dated March 28, 1942, subject Zenichi
KAWAZOE.
(n) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 3, 1942, subject Kenneth
Kilsoo HAAN.
(o) FBI-Honolulu report, file 100-1718, dated November 23, 1942, subject
Kilsoo K. HAAN, with aliases (available in Washington, Los Angeles,
and Honolulu).
(p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 12, 1943, subject Sanji ABE.
(q) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 12, 1942, subject Kikujiro Clifford
KONDO.
(r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 11, 1942, subject Katsuzo SATO.
(s) 14ND Summary Report, dated February 8, 1943, subject Kenju OHTOMO.
(t) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 8, 1941, subject JAPANESE POSTAL EMPLOYEES.
(v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject VISITS OF JAPANESE PUBLIC VESSELS TO THE ISLAND OF OAHU.
(w) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 3, 1942, subject Kimie DOUE.

[2] 1. This report is a continuation and an expansion of the material set forth in references (a), (b), and (c). During September and October, 1942, all former employees of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, who were still available were reinterviewed in the process of a joint investigation conducted by the Army Contact Office (MID), Honolulu; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu; and the District Intelligenece Office. In addition, a number of other individuals who were in a position to supply information concerning the espionage activities of the Consulate were interviewed.

2. The following officers and agents were present at various times during the interrogations which were conducted at the Army Contact Office, Honolulu:

Military Intelligence Division:
Captain Frank O. Blake
Special Agent William T. Hiraoka
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu
Special Agent J. Harold Hughes
Special Employee Larry S. Chiwa
District Intelligence Office
Lieutenant G. P. Kimball
Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson
Ensign Don Woodrum

3. The following individuals were interviewed at the Army Contact Office by representatives of the three agencies:

Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, subject of reference (d).
Joan Kimie KOTOSHIRODO—Wife of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
Takaichi SAKAI—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (e).
Katsukichi MURAOKA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (f).

Yasunuma MURATA—A clerk at the Japanese Consulate until 1938.
Miss Kimie DOUE—Formerly employed as a receptionist at the Japanese Consulate; subject of reference (w).
John Yoshiye MIKAMI—Regular taxi driver for the Consulate, subject of reference (h).
Albert Shuichi HAYASHI—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
Koreshige KUDO—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
Shotaro NIYA, alias Shigetaro MATSUO—Regular taxi driver for Kenzi KIMURA, manager of the Honolulu office of the N. Y. K. line. He is the subject of reference (i).

ICHITARO OZAKI—Consulate chausseur.
Jitsuei TAKAMIYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and Tadasi MORIMURA, a Consulate secretary, on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Maui.

4. The following individuals were interviewed by agents of the Military Intelligence Division alone:

George Masayoshi KAWAMOTO—Relative of KOTOSHIRODO who was visited by KOTOSHIRODO during his stay on the Island of Hawaii.
Toshimasa MINATOYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and his wife on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Kanai.
Namiko FUKUSHIMA—Secretary of a present from Consul General KITA which was delivered by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO to Tetsunosuke SONE, a tortisuginin at Puunene, Maui.
Mrs. Tetsunosuke SONE.—Wife of Tetsunosuke SONE, interviewed in lieu of her husband, who is now interned on the mainland.

5. The following individual was interviewed by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

Noah Kwang Won CHO.—A Korean Christian minister who rendered various services to the Japanese Consulate on Korean matters. CHO is the subject of reference (j).

6. The following individual was interviewed by officers of the District Intelligence Office:

Lawrence NAKATSUKA.—Reporter employed by the Honolulu Star Bulletin who covered the Japanese Consulate as one of his regular assignments.

TRIPS MADE TO VARIOUS PARTS OF OAHU

Pearl Harbor Area

[5] 7. The information set forth in this report concerning the various trips made by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO is intended only to supplement the information thereon already set forth in reference (c). KOTOSHIRODO amplified certain phases of these trips, but he did not contradict his former story except on a few minor points.

8. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip from the Consulate to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor about January, 1941, when he was asked by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA to drive Kobehi SEKI, one of the Consulate secretaries, to Pearl City and Aiea. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that the purpose of these trips was to determine the number and type of ships in Pearl Harbor, and to keep the Consul General informed of the movements of United States Naval vessels. KOTOSHIRODO further stated that to the best of his knowledge, the personnel of the Consulate had begun making these trips either in December, 1940, or in January, 1941. (It should be noted here that there is no evidence that any agent of the Consulate ever entered the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, except upon official invitation.)

9. To the best of KOTOSHIRODO's recollection, it was early in 1941, probably January, that he overheard OKUDA tell SEKI that they (OKUDA and SEKI) should start "motoring around". KOTOSHIRODO also remembered having heard Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, say, about the same time, that all Consulate secretaries should start making Sunday "excursions" to the "public places" such as radio station KGU, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, and the like. KOTOSHIRODO stated that prior to January, 1941, he had never seen any evidence of any secretary's making trips away from the Consulate as he and SEKI and MORIMURA subsequently did.

10. For the first few months, SEKI acted as observer. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having "heard" that SEKI had attended a naval academy in Japan at one time, but had been forced to withdraw before graduation because of his health. However, SEKI was interested in, and had considerable knowledge of, naval matters. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI made a number of trips to Pearl Harbor together.

11. When Tadashi MORIMURA first arrived in March, 1941, SEKI and MORIMURA went to observe the ships in Pearl Harbor together. Occasionally KOTOSHIRODO went along with them. He stated that both secretaries knew how to identify various types of warships, and they would explain various identifying characteristics to KOTOSHIRODO.

12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in 1941 someone from the Consulate went out to look at the ships in Pearl Harbor about twice a week. However, SEKI appears to have been of the opinion that observations should be made more often. [6] 13. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip alone to observe the ships at Pearl Harbor in August, 1941. He claimed not to have stopped anywhere on this particular trip, but to have counted what ships he could see while driving at 25 miles per hour on Kamehameha Highway, just outside the Navy Yard boundaries. Whenever he went to Pearl Harbor, whether alone or with MORIMURA or SEKI, KOTOSHIRODO always was asked to state how many ships he had counted. On some occasions he was told to count only the number of destroyers, while SEKI or MORIMURA would count the other types of ships.

14. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he knew the usual berths and anchorages of the various types of warships in Pearl Harbor. He stated, correctly, that battleships berthed on the Honolulu side of Ford Island; that carriers
berthed on the side of Ford Island nearest the Pearl City landing; that destroyers and cruisers moored in East Loch, off Waialu. He further stated that MORIMURA had pointed out a vantage spot on the Kamehameha Highway between Aiea and Makalapa where the best view of the Submarine Base could be obtained. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not know what a torpedo net was, and he added that he had never heard MORIMURA discuss the subject.

15. KOTOSHIRODO remembered conversations with MORIMURA in which the latter had stressed the strategic importance of the Aiea and Pearl City regions for purposes of observation. MORIMURA had attempted to locate a girl friend in Aiea, presumably to develop her as an informant, and had asked KOTOSHIRODO if he had any close friends in Aiea or Pearl City "who could be trusted". KOTOSHIRODO was unable to say whether MORIMURA had succeeded in this plan.

16. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that occasionally he would board a jitney bus in Honolulu and head for some destination beyond Pearl Harbor. He would get off at Aiea and walk around a bit. On one occasion, according to his story, MORIMURA got off the jitney at Aiea and walked back along the Kamehameha Highway, finally coming a to Navy Yard gate. KOTOSHIRODO was unable to state whether this was the Submarine Base gate or the main gate; however, the former seems more likely. At the gate, MORIMURA inquired about getting employment in the Navy Yard. The sentry referred him to an office downtown. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that he "roamed around" Aiea.

17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI had been driven to Pearl Harbor on a number of occasions by John Yoshiye MIKAMI, the usual Consulate taxi driver. However, MIKAMI, when interviewed, denied ever having driven SEKI on any of the observation trips, although he admitted driving KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA on numerous occasions.

Kaneohe Bay Area

18. About one month after MORIMURA arrived in Honolulu, KOTOSHIRODO drove him (in KOTOSHIRODO's car) over the Nuuanu Pali, thence around the Kokokahi Road. They drove slowly and looked across the bay toward the Kaneohe Naval [7] Air Station. At the Kailua Beach Pavilion, they parked for about five minutes, but did not get out of the car. After leaving Kailua, they drove through Kailua town, without stopping, and proceeded along the highway to Honolulu via Waimanalo. They stopped at Waimanalo beach, near the old pier. This time they got out of the car and walked out on the pier. However, they talked to no one. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he could not see Bellows Field (Army) from the pier. They stayed here for five or ten minutes, and then returned to Honolulu by way of Koko Head. They made no other stops. KOTOSHIRODO cannot remember having heard MORIMURA make any comment about the Naval Radio Station at Wallupe.

19. Shortly after their trip to Maui (early in May, 1941), MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, this time driven by MIKAMI, again went over the Nuuanu Pali. As they approached Kaneohe town, they turned onto the Kokokahi Road, and drove to the Kala Road. While on the Kokokahi Road they had MIKAMI drive slowly. KOTOSHIRODO believes that MORIMURA had field glasses with him on this trip, but he was unable to remember whether MORIMURA had used them. However, he did remember MORIMURA's observing that all the hangars at the air station appeared to have been completed. MORIMURA had no camera with him. (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember seeing MORIMURA with a camera on any occasion.) On the Kala Road, they stopped at a watermelon stand on the side of the road away from the beach. Then they proceeded to the Kailua Tavern, where MIKAMI ate breakfast, and KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA each drank a can of beer. They talked to no one but the waitress at the tavern. From there they returned to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali highway. The whole trip lasted about two and a half hours. KOTOSHIRODO believed that the purpose of this trip was to observe Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

20. Paragraph 34 of reference (c) describes a picnic held by the Consulate at the home of Sam WOODS, at Lanikai Beach, Ohau, about the middle of April, 1941. Ichitaro OZAKI, regularly employed chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled two such picnics, an earlier one having taken place in 1940, while OKUDA was Acting Consul General. On this occasion, the entire Consulate staff attended. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali, and then OKUDA ordered OZAKI to drive
to Lanikai by way of Kaneohe (a considerable detour). They parked at Kaneohe and everyone in the party went sightseeing in a glass-bottomed boat in Kaneohe Bay. Then they drove to Lanikai by way of the Kokokahi Road. On the occasion of the second picnic, described in reference (c), they made no such detour, but proceeded directly to the WOODS home.

21. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to describe again the trip to Kailua which was detailed in paragraph 46 of reference (a). This trip was made in the latter part of October, 1941. (KOTOSHIRODO was unable to remember, however, if this trip was made prior to the arrival of, during the visit of, or after the departure of, the TATUTA MARU, Japanese evacuation ship which was in port October 23–24, 1941.) OKUDA accompanied MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO in the latter's car. This was the only trip on which OKUDA accompanied the other two, and OKUDA appeared to be very nervous. KOTOSHIRODO was given no explanation of the reason for this trip, nor was he told where to go when he left the Consulate. OKUDA merely in—[8] stracted him to "just keep on driving". They proceeded over the Nuuanu Pali and went directly to Kailua. When they reached the Kailua Tavern, OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive straight ahead, toward the ocean, past the tavern to the first or second intersection. There KOTOSHIRODO was directed to stop the car, and MORIMURA got out. Then OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO drove down the road almost to the junction of the Kalama Road, where OKUDA told KOTOSHIRODO to stop the car and wait for MORIMURA, who was to be back in about 15 minutes.

22. KOTOSHIRODO stated that while driving from Honolulu he had glanced in the rear-view mirror and noticed that OKUDA had a money bag folded in such a manner as to indicate that there might be a stack of currency in it. When MORIMURA left the car he wore white trousers and an aloha (sport) shirt. He wore no coat, and his shirt was hanging outside his trousers. He had nothing in his hands. KOTOSHIRODO did not know where MORIMURA went. When the latter filed to return in 15 minutes, KOTOSHIRODO suggested that they return and look for him, but OKUDA said they were to wait instead. After an absence of about 30 minutes, MORIMURA returned. His appearance was the same as it was when he left, except he was carrying a tree branch with him. When he got into the car, MORIMURA told OKUDA, "It's all okay", or something similar, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.

23. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, when interrogated, stated that he had driven MORIMURA over to Windward Oahu some five or six times. KOTOSHIRODO came along on some of these occasions; at other times, MORIMURA was alone. On all occasions he was directed to drive slowly along the Kokokahi Road, which commands an excellent view of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

24. According to the statements made by Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consul, the Consul General's official car was never used for exploring the island. This car was driven only 17,000 miles during the four years it was used by the Consulate. It was used primarily for the Consul General himself, or by OZAKI when he drove around town on errands. The only time it was used for a trip to Windward Oahu was on those occasions when the Consul General escorted some visiting dignitary on a sightseeing tour of the island. The itinerary for these trips was to follow the coast around Koko Head and through Waimanalo, then return to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali.

Other Parts of Oahu

25. The interrogation of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI added little information concerning trips to other portions of Oahu, it being largely a repetition of the information set forth in paragraph 26 of reference (c). However, some miscellaneous items are of interest.

26. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard MORIMURA say that he had made a trip around the island only a day or so after his arrival (March 27, 1941). KOTOSHIRODO believed that MIKAMI had driven MORIMURA on this occasion. KOTOSHIRODO denied ever having made a complete circuit of the island with MORIMURA.

27. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered hearing MORIMURA speak of staying overnight on some Oahu beach, but MORIMURA had added no details, and the time and circumstances under which MORIMURA had done this were unknown to KOTOSHIRODO.
28. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO of meeting a “nice girl” at Wahiawa. Apparently she was a Japanese language school teacher, but MORIMURA did not reveal her name.

29. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA had made only one trip to the Hālēiwa region. On that occasion they went directly to Hālēiwa Park, by the beach, where they stopped the car near a concrete wall. They did not get out of the car, but sat there for five or ten minutes. MORIMURA mentioned that it was a good swimming beach, but did not talk about the reef or any other kindred subject of possible military interest. At the time, KOTOSHIRODO had no idea why MORIMURA made this trip to Hālēiwa.

30. KOTOSHIRODO recalled two trips to Waianae. On the first occasion, they were driven by MIKAMI, and drove to the end of the road, Makua Cave. On the second occasion, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove in the former’s car, and they went as far as Nanakuli Beach.

31. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had never driven the road between Waiālua and Kaena Point.

32. KOTOSHIRODO could remember no significant discussions with MORIMURA concerning military objectives on Oahu. Beaches as potential landing spots for invasion forces were never discussed, he said. Hickam Field and the Kaneohe Naval Air Station were discussed only in a cursory fashion. Other airfields on Oahu were never mentioned. MORIMURA once estimated the air strength on Oahu to be no more than 500 planes. (That this figure was fairly accurate is reflected in the Navy Department communique of December 5, 1942, which revealed that there were 475 Army and Navy planes on Oahu on the morning of December 7, 1941.)

TRIPS TO OTHER ISLANDS

Kauai

33. During the course of the interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he had made a trip to the Island of Kauai for the Consulate during July, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO had not mentioned this trip on the original interrogation. He and his wife made this trip together; they were not accompanied by any other representative of the Consulate.

34. Originally, MORIMURA had been scheduled to make the trip to Kauai with KOTOSHIRODO, and the latter had been so informed by OKUDA about 10 days prior to the prospective date of departure. However, a disagreement arose among [10] OKUDA, MORIMURA, and SEKI. SEKI, who had made none of the trips to the outside islands, wished to make this trip himself, and because of this, friction developed between SEKI and MORIMURA. To settle the argument, OKUDA decreed that neither should go. Instead, he told KOTOSHIRODO to take Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO along as a “front”.

35. Two days before he left, KOTOSHIRODO conferred for about an hour with OKUDA in the latter’s office, and received the following instructions:

(a) OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a rough sketch of the Barking Sands Airport, said by OKUDA to have been taken from a newspaper, and instructed KOTOSHIRODO to note any activity there;

(b) OKUDA also showed KOTOSHIRODO a photograph of Nawiliwili port, taken about 1939, and instructed the latter to note any changes;

(c) OKUDA stated that he had heard a story (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember the source) that the United States Navy was planning to make some use of Hanalei Bay, and KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note evidence, if any, of Naval activity there;

(d) KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note what use was being made of the airport in the old race track at Lihue, and to further note any expansion activity there;

(e) He was further instructed to take a look at the power plant in Wainiha Valley (the only power plant on the Island of Kauai). The Vice Consul showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of Kauai, in English, which showed the location of the power plant, and had transmission lines printed in red. (It is believed that this map was a United States Geological Survey map, edition of 1912.)

OKUDA impressed upon KOTOSHIRODO that the primary rule to be obeyed was caution. He was to tell no one that he was from the Consulate. He was to make no inquiries about the things he was sent to observe. He was to contact no friends or relatives. He was to obtain only such information as he could see
with his own eyes. Before he left, both SEKI and MORIMURA told him to treat the trip as a vacation and have some fun.

36. KOTOSHIRODO and his wife departed for Kauai by airplane on Saturday morning, July 12, 1941. (This has been verified by an inspection of the records of the Inter-Island Airways, Ltd.) Mr. and Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO left their home at 0715 and were driven to the airport in MIKAMI's taxi. At John Rodgers Airport, KOTOSHIRODO learned that he would be unable to return to Honolulu on [11] Sunday afternoon, July 13th, as he had planned, so he decided to return the following morning. He then directed MIKAMI to meet the Monday morning plane. The plane for Kauai departed from Honolulu at 0800 and arrived at Port Allen airport about 0900, on July 12th.

37. A number of taxis were waiting for fares at the Port Allen field when KOTOSHIRODO's plane arrived. However, there was only one Japanese driver, so KOTOSHIRODO approached him. This driver has been identified as Toshimasa MINATOYA. OKUDA had warned KOTOSHIRODO that he should use only Japanese drivers when "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO told MINATOYA that he and his wife were sightseeing on Kauai and wanted to see both sides of the island. They agreed on a price. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he agreed to and paid $25.00. MINATOYA, when interviewed, stated that the price was $35.00. Records of the Nawillwill Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, indicate that the latter figure was the correct one.)

38. From the airport, they drove directly to Waimea Canyon, getting out at the tourists' observation point for 10 or 15 minutes. Then they drove further up the road until they reached Kokee. At MINATOYA's suggestion, they turned back here. They returned to the Waimea Hotel, where MINATOYA and KOTOSHIRODO and his wife made mutual introductions and lunched together. However, KOTOSHIRODO did not tell MINATOYA that he was from the Consulate.

39. They left the Waimea Hotel about 1400 and drove to the Barking Sands. They had postponed this trip until the afternoon because of MINATOYA's information that the Army held bombing practice there in the morning. MINATOYA mentioned that there was a new airport at Barking Sands. They drove as far as a large sand hill, where KOTOSHIRODO and his wife got out of the car and walked to the top of a dune. They saw only sand, sea, and keawe (algaroba) trees. They remained at Barking Sands for about 15 minutes, and then departed in the direction of Lihue about 1530. Enroute to Lihue they stopped at the Spouting Horn for five or ten minutes, and the Ancient Hawaiian Battleground. Both these spots are well known points of tourist interest. They arrived at Lihue about 1730. They registered at the Lihue Hotel under their proper names, and dismissed MINATOYA with instructions to pick them up again the following morning. However, after KOTOSHIRODO and his wife had eaten dinner at the Lihue Hotel, they decided to go to a movie, so they called MINATOYA to drive them. All three went to the Lihue Theater, KOTOSHIRODO paying for the tickets.

40. One of the passengers on the plane on which the KOTOSHIRODOS flew to Kauai was Isuke HORIKAWA, subject of reference (k). HORIKAWA, who was taken into custody in April, 1942, was suspect because he was the owner of the Pensacola Hotel in Honolulu, a suspected Japanese espionage center prior to the war. HORIKAWA was the head cook at the Lihue Hotel, and was one of the wealthiest Japanese on the Island of Kauai. He was identified with a number of pro-Japanese activities on that island prior to the war. KOTOSHIRODO was questioned very closely regarding HORIKAWA's presence on the same plane, but KOTOSHIRODO maintained that this was purely coincidental. He stated that when he met HORIKAWA later at the Lihue Hotel, they merely exchanged greetings as having been fellow travelers earlier that day. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered HORIKAWA from having seen him at the Japanese Consulate on two occasions.

41. On Sunday morning, July 13th, KOTOSHIRODO and his wife ate breakfast at the hotel. At the suggestion of MINATOYA, they had the hotel pack them a picnic lunch, and they left the hotel about 0900 and drove around the east coast of Kauai. They went first to Waialua Falls, then to a grass shack at a heiau (ancient Hawaiian religious site). They visited a number of tourist spots, and finally arrived at Hanalei about noon. They ate their picnic lunch at the Hanalei Park pavilion, while KOTOSHIRODO observed the bay. He noted only that the water in Hanalei Bay was shallow and very calm, and that there was no sign of any construction work going on. About 1245, they drove to Haena where they visited both the wet cave and the dry cave, tourist attractions.
42. From Haena, they drove up Wainiha Valley to a point near the power plant. They turned the car around and parked about 50 or 100 yards below the power plant, and got out of the car to pick guavas. KOTOSHIRODO noted that the power plant was small, and had two lead-in water pipes, each about three feet in diameter. He also noted that the pipes were directly alongside the road, and that the plant was unfenced.

43. On the return journey, they stopped at Kilauea lighthouse, which is off the main highway, and went up into the lighthouse with the keeper. KOTOSHIRODO believed that he had signed his name in the lighthouse log.

44. From Kilauea, they drove directly to Nawiliwili harbor as far as the wharf where Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company steamers docked. He saw at once that there had been no new construction since the picture in OKUDA's possession had been taken (1939), so they left immediately. He did note, however, the Standard Oil Company gasoline tanks there.

45. From Nawiliwili they drove back to the hotel, arriving about 1630. They dismissed MINATOYA. That night they walked to the nearby Aloha Theater and saw a movie.

46. During the course of the afternoon, when they passed the Lihue airport twice, KOTOSHIRODO noted that the only signs of military activity there were some Army tents pitched in camp.

47. The following morning; July 14th, MINATOYA came to the hotel about 0800. The KOTOSHIRODOS checked out of the hotel about 0830, and MINATOYA drove them to the Hanapepe airport. Their plane departed for Honolulu about 0930, and arrived in Honolulu about 1000. MIKAMI was waiting for them, and drove them home. KOTOSHIRODO then drove his wife to her dressmaking shop, and he went back to the Consulate.

48. At the Consulate, OKUDA and MORIMURA had a two-hour conference with KOTOSHIRODO, and took notes while questioning the clerk. KOTOSHIRODO detailed the general lack of activity on Kauai, and MORIMURA finally remarked, "There isn't anything big going on it seems". SEKI was not present at this conference. He merely asked KOTOSHIRODO later if he had had a good time, but also commented that it was "waste time" just to "look from the road for things that were meant to be hidden".

49. On October 1, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO personally typed and signed a statement regarding his Kauai trip. A photostatic copy of his statement is herewith forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence as enclosure (A). Mimeographed facsimile copies thereof are provided for the other disseminates.

50. Toshimasa MINATOYA was interviewed on three occasions by a representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and his story substantiates that given by KOTOSHIRODO. Records of the Lihue Hotel and the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, also bear this out. There is no evidence of prior arrangement between KOTOSHIRODO and MINATOYA. MINATOYA remembered KOTOSHIRODO's having had a camera on this trip. The pictures taken by KOTOSHIRODO on this trip were examined by the interrogating officers and agents, and all proved to be either innocuous scenic views or pictures of Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the only map he took with him on the trip was an ordinary tourist cartograph, which were available at many places throughout the Territory. He made no markings on this map, nor did he make any notes concerning his observations.

51. Prior to his departure, KOTOSHIRODO was given about $100.00 for his expenses by SEKI, out of which he claims he returned about $7.00 or $9.00. However, he stated that his expenses were: $30.00 for the air fare, $20.00 for the hotel bill, and $25.00 for the taxi. (As already mentioned, this last figure actually was $35.00.)

Maui

52. KOTOSHIRODO, upon request, again detailed the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Maui in May, 1941. These details were substantially the same as those set forth in paragraphs 15-18 of reference (c). The only change is that it was reported in reference (c) that KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited a pineapple cannery while on Maui; whereas KOTOSHIRODO stated on re-interview that they had passed a couple of pineapple canneries, but had not visited either.

53. Prior to their departure for Maui, OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of that island. However, he did not tell KOTOSHIRODO what to look for, that
is, what military objectives. OKUDA told MORIMURA, who later told KOTO-
SHIRODO, that the important places to be looked at were:
[44] (a) Puunene Air Field (Navy);
(b) Kahului Harbor;
(c) Lahaina Bay;
(d) National Guard Camp.

54. MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO visited Lahaina, a fleet anchorage off
Maui, on the first day of their visit. However, they saw no ships there. Later
that day they drove to Kahului on the other side of the island, passing Maalaea
Airport, since abandoned, on the way. They drove out on a pier at Kahului.
MORIMURA asked the driver whether Navy ships came into Kahului, and was
told that destroyers and submarines occasionally paid that harbor a visit.
MORIMURA commented on the fact that the water at Kahului was rough com-
pared to that of Lahaina.

55. Sometime during their first day on Maui, MORIMURA discussed making
a trip to the Hana region with their taxi driver. (This trip is long, and neces-
sitates traveling over bad roads.) MORIMURA also asked if there were an air
field there. The driver told them there was a field, but he thought that the road
was too rough and too long for them to make the trip during the limited time
MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO planned to be on Maui.

56. On the following day they drove to the top of Haleakala, and then to Kula
Sanitarium. They got out of the car near the buildings. KOTOSHIRODO
took a picture; MORIMURA commented on being able to see the ocean both on
the Walluku side and the Lahaina side of Puunene Valley. They stayed at
Kula about 10 minutes, seeing no one. In the afternoon they drove to the National
Guard Camp at Wailhee, about 10 minutes out of Wailuku; however, they saw
no troops. They drove along the coast a little farther, and then turned back and
drove to the Puunene Airport where they boarded a plane for Honolulu about
1500.

57. Investigation indicated that the taxi driver on this trip was Kenneth
Jitsuei TAKAMIYA, a Hawaiian-born nisei, 26 years old, who was expatriated
from his Japanese citizenship in 1934. He made only one trip to Japan, that
being when he was 5 years old, and for a stay of only six months. TAKAMIYA,
when interviewed, substantially confirmed KOTOSHIRODO's description of the
trip around Maui. There was no evidence brought forth which would indicate
that TAKAMIYA had any prior knowledge of the visit of the two men from the
Consulate. Apparently the only two contacts made on Maui were with Itsuo
HAMADA, as set forth in paragraph 15-16 in reference (c), and with Tetsunosuke
SONE, as set forth in paragraph 17 of reference (c).

58. Although the contact with Itsuo HAMADA was in itself highly suspicious,
nothing has been brought forth which would indicate that this contact was
anything more than a casual coincidence. However, investigation by representa-
tives of the Military Intelligence Division on Maui have added some details
concerning the contact made with Tetsunosuke SONE. KOTOSHIRODO stated
that they had visited SONE, who was a toritsugumin and principal of the Japanese
language [15] school at Sprecklesville, and had delivered to him a package
sent by Nagao KITA, the Japanese Consul General. This package was to be
given to a Japanese woman (whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not recall)
who lived at Spreckesville. Investigation indicated that the woman in question
was Miss Namiko FUKUSHIMA. Miss FUKUSHIMA, when interviewed, stated
that she had gone to school in Japan from August, 1937 to May, 1938, and during
that period she had become very well acquainted with a Yosuko ISHII, daughter
of a Consul General ISHII, said to be a prominent member of the Japanese
consular corps. After her return to Hawaii in 1938, Miss FUKUSHIMA main-
tained a personal correspondence with Miss ISHII. Apparently Miss ISHII had
requested KITA to take a present to Miss FUKUSHIMA prior to KITA's coming
to Honolulu as Consul General in March, 1941. The present, which Miss FUKU-
SHIMA produced for the interviewing agent, was a Japanese doll and a battle-
dore. She stated that the package had been delivered to her by SONE.

59. A check of hotel registers, and an interview with Mrs. Itsuo HAMADA,
failed to produce any evidence which would contradict KOTOSHIRODO's story.

60. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO carried binoculars on their
trip to Maui. The only map they had was an ordinary tourist map, and the
only mark that MORIMURA made on this map was a small check along the
coastline just below Lahaina. MORIMURA reportedly made this check to indi-
cate that the Lahaina coast was extremely rugged, and thus, presumably, un-
suitable for landings. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO made any written notes. OKUDA talked only to MORIMURA about the trip. Later MORIMURA observed to KOTOSHIRODO that "there wasn't much going on" on Maui. KOTOSHIRODO took a camera along, but made no effort to photograph the places they regarded as "important". The camera was used merely to add to their usual as tourists. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Maui trip had cost between $115.00 and $130.00.

61. According to KOTOSHIRODO, one outgrowth of the Maui trip was the confirmation of a belief held by MORIMURA that OKUDA had a personal agent collecting information for the Consulate on Maui. MORIMURA had expressed this opinion on a number of occasions, although SEKI disagreed with him. SEKI said that such a person would have to be paid well, and OKUDA did not have the funds with which to pay such an agent. (SEKI was Consulate treasurer, and presumably would know of such expenditures, unless OKUDA had a secret personal fund at his disposal.) MORIMURA stated that OKUDA expected him to tell OKUDA every secret, but the Vice Consul was not so "open-hearted" with MORIMURA, especially about the secret of Maui coverage. Since OKUDA and MORIMURA worked so closely together, it irked MORIMURA that OKUDA would not tell him of the Maui agent. The incident that confirmed MORIMURA's suspicions about Maui coverage occurred a few days after their return from that island: Vice Consul OKUDA asked MORIMURA whether he had seen any mooring buoys at Lahaina Roads. MORIMURA said that he had seen none, but OKUDA contradicted him and said that there were some buoys there. MORIMURA then went to KOTOSHIRODO and asked the same question of the clerk, but KOTOSHIRODO could not remember any buoys there either. MORIMURA concluded that OKUDA's personal agent had supplied the contrary information.

[16] 62. Possibly supporting MORIMURA's theory are these facts concerning the Maui trip: MORIMURA conducted that mission very laxly. He did not visit Hana to see for himself the airport facilities allegedly there. He traveled no farther north on the leeward coast than Mala Wharf. On the windward coast, he omitted more than half the road running north from Waialuku. He did nothing to observe the Punaene Naval Air Station field other than pass it going to and coming from the plane. On Hawaii and Kauai, almost every foot of highway along the coastline was traversed. It is believed that OKUDA's contact on Maui may have been Unji HIRAYAMA, a priest of the Honpa Hongwanji who resided at Lahaina, and who was taken into custody on December 7, 1941. It is known that HIRAYAMA, who is the subject of reference (1), was requested on at least one occasion (June, 1940) to keep the Consulate informed of any movements of the United States Fleet at Lahaina, and it is believed that he complied with this request.

Hawaii

63. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to discuss again the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Hawaii in October, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO stated the facts of the trip substantially as they are set forth in paragraphs 19-24 of reference (c). The details KOTOSHIRODO added in his later version principally concerned the various drinking parties in which they indulged while on Hawaii.

64. Before they left Honolulu on the trip to Hawaii, MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he wanted to see:

(a) Hilo harbor;
(b) Kilauea. (Speculating on the reason for their desire to see Kilauea, it should be noted that there was a Hawaii National Guard camp there prior to the war, and also there was some talk of building a new airport in the lava flats);
(c) South Point, where a new airport was actually in the process of construction;
(d) Kohala, where there is an Inter-Island Airways landing field at Upoa.

65. In their trip around the island, they passed the Kilauea Volcano, and MORIMURA asked about the military camp there. They drove down the road toward South Point until they came to a sign "Kapu—Military Reservation". They made no effort to enter the reservation, but instead turned the car around and returned to the main highway. They could see nothing of interest from outside the gate.
66. They stopped at the Kona Hotel that night on the suggestion of the driver. The next day they included Upolu in their itinerary, but they only paused there for a few minutes. They did not get out of the car. While in the Kohala district they also inspected Kawaihae, the landing from which cattle are swum out to the inter-Island steamers.

67. On the fourth day of their visit they drove all around the city of Hilo, seeing Rainbow Falls, the Hilo Hospital, the waterfront, Hilo Country Club, and Puu maile Home (for the tubercular).

68. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA were not sent to contact anyone on the Island of Hawaii; on the contrary, they were strictly enjoined not to do so. However, KOTOSHIRODO made one exception, and made a personal call on his wife's cousin, Mrs. George KAWAMOTO. He brought her candy, and she was greatly surprised to see him. KOTOSHIRODO told her that he was staying at the Naniloa Hotel, but he stayed only a few minutes. However, after he had returned to the hotel, and was drinking in the bar with MORIMURA, George KAWAMOTO came in to see KOTOSHIRODO, having been told by his wife of KOTOSHIRODO's visit. KOTOSHIRODO introduced him to MORIMURA. They had a drink at the bar, and then KAWAMOTO invited them to the Hilo Theater. They saw the show, and then KAWAMOTO went home.

69. A representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, contacted George KAWAMOTO regarding his relationship with KOTOSHIRODO. KAWAMOTO stated that his wife was a cousin of KOTOSHIRODO's wife, and he gave an account of a visit made to Hawaii by KOTOSHIRODO and his wife in 1940. Apparently this trip was merely a vacation. However, there is nothing in the Military Intelligence Division report to indicate that KAWAMOTO was interrogated concerning the trip taken by KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Hawaii.

70. Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Hawaii also interviewed Shingo NARIKAWA, who was taxi driver for MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO while they were on Hawaii. Although interrogated at length, NARIKAWA could remember nothing which was at variance with the story given by KOTOSHIRODO.

Tadashi Morimura

71. From the information that has been collected from the Consular clerks and other persons close to the Consulate, it is apparent that MORIMURA was something of a mystery man. All agreed that he had special privileges. He was frequently drunk, often had women in his quarters overnight, came to work late or not at all, as he pleased, insulted the Consul General on occasions, and generally conducted himself as if he were beyond penalty. This naturally caused much comment among the Consulate secretaries and clerks.

72. Some of the secretaries and clerks believed that MORIMURA was an officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy. According to KOTOSHIRODO, however, SEKI denied this. SEKI said that he knew how Japanese naval officers behaved, and that MORIMURA definitely did not conduct himself as an officer.

[18] 73. It was publicly announced on MORIMURA's arrival that he had been sent to Honolulu to assist in expatriation matters. Takaichi SAKAI, senior clerk at the Consulate, who had been handling the routine of expatriation matters for a number of years, stated that MORIMURA had made a pretense of helping with the work for only the first three or four weeks he was here, but had done none of it personally, and appeared to know nothing about the work.

74. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, who, although uneducated, has given himself an amazing self education in naval matters, had little regard for MORIMURA, and emphatically stated that the secretary lacked the sharp eye and the smart gait of a Japanese military or naval officer.

75. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA was an eighth rank secretary in the Japanese consular service. This is the lowest rank, a first rank secretary being the highest. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard YUGE and Samon TSUKIKAWA, the Consular Secretary in charge of the code room, remark that eighth rank secretaries were usually sent to the least desirable posts in the consular service. The desirability of posts was said to vary according to climate. Most of the less desirable posts were in China. Honolulu, on the other hand, was considered one of the best posts in the Japanese consular service. It was usually given to men with many years of faithful service, and it was unusual for a secretary of the eighth rank to have his initial assignment in
Hawaii. They believed this to be MORIMURA's first assignment abroad, since his name, at the date of his arrival here, had not yet appeared in the consular roster of the Japanese Foreign Office. Because of this, they assumed that he was recently admitted to the foreign service, and had served only an indoctrination period in Tokyo before coming to Honolulu.

76. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA never talked about his past life except of the time he spent in grammar school. However, on one occasion, MORIMURA did refer to Chinese coolies pulling barges on the Yangtze river. He called the coolies the lowest people on earth. This remark led KOTOSHIRODO to believe that MIRMURA had lived in, or had at least visited, China.

77. Ichiitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, supplied one version of MORIMURA's background. He stated that on one occasion he had overheard a conversation between SEKI and YUGE regarding MORIMURA. They had remarked that MORIMURA was the only child of a wealthy family of Eihime-ken on Shikoku, in Japan. His father died when he was rather young, leaving his mother in comfortable circumstances, inasmuch as the family owned considerable land. Prior to his arrival in Hawaii, MORIMURA had been working in the Foreign Office in Tokyo, possibly for as long a period as three years, although it was more likely that he had been there for only two years. On one occasion he had been discharged from the Foreign Office for excessive drinking, but his mother had written to a prominent official about the matter, and through this connection had been able to have MORIMURA reinstated.

78. Whatever his background, MORIMURA was not popular with the rest of the Consulate staff. This was probably due to his youth, his favored position, [19] and the advantage he took of this position. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that SEKI greatly resented MORIMURA. SEKI had done the work of gathering data about ships in Pearl Harbor until MORIMURA came, but then had been relieved of these duties. SEKI openly exhibited professional jealousy, often telling KOTOSHIRODO that MORIMURA did not know what he was doing. The change in plans for the Kauai trip was cited as an example of this dissention. As KOTOSHIRODO put it during one of the interviews, both SEKI and MORIMURA were trying to gain all the credit for the information-gathering work. Further information about MORIMURA's background is to be found on pages 10 and 11 of reference (u).

79. KOTOSHIRODO stated that shortly after MORIMURA's arrival, the new secretary made a point of "making friends" around town. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA spent a lot of time at the offices of the Japanese newspapers, particularly the Nippo Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA had many friends at the Nippo Jiji, but until questioned at length showed no great willingness to "remember" who they were. Finally he admitted that of all the men at the Nippo Jiji, Shigeo FURUKAWA, the advertising manager, was best known to MORIMURA. The significance of this fact is indicated by the information contained in paragraphs 9-11 of reference (a). Paragraph 16 of reference (c) should also be noted in this regard. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA was an excellent Japanese poet. (Other information corroborates this statement.) KOTOSHIRODO was then asked if he would explain the common interest between MORIMURA and FURUKAWA. It was pointed out that FURUKAWA was about 55 years of age, a poet, a family man and a business man, whereas MORIMURA was only about 29, was not a poet, and preferred to spend his leisure in drinking and playing with the geishas. KOTOSHIRODO stated in answer to this that they often played go (Japanese chess) together at the Nippo Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA also knew Zenichi KAWAZOE, subject of reference (m), who covered the Consulate "beat" for the Nippo Jiji. Other Nippo Jiji personnel whom MORIMURA knew were Shoichiru ASAMI, the city editor, and Katsunichi KAWAMOTO, the business manager. All these men have been interned.

80. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA came to the Consulate very rarely. He remembered FURUKAWA's coming there only when he brought Nippo Jiji representatives from the outside islands to introduce them to the Consul General.

81. KOTOSHIRODO stated that another close associate of MORIMURA was Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, chief chemist of the Honolulu Sake Brewery. TAKAGISHI was the subject of an intensive investigation by this office prior to his departure for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on November 5, 1941. TAKAGISHI is the son-in-law of an Admiral HYAKUTAKE of the Imperial Japanese Navy. (There are two admirals of this name, brothers, in the Japanese Navy; this office has been unable to determine which admiral is the father
of TAKAGISHI's wife.) TAKAGISHI was a frequent visitor of the Japanese Consulate, and often played golf with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and Tsunetaro HARADA, manager of the Pensacola Hotel, where TAKAGISHI resided. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he often thought that the friendship of MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI was "funny", because TAKAGISHI loved gold so much and MORIMURA did not play the game. However, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI used to "chase women" together. It was never established that TAKAGISHI actually was engaged in espionage for Japan, although a mass of circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that he was so engaged.

Seki and Morimura Discuss Espionage

82. On many occasions KOTOSHIRODO was present at discussions between MORIMURA and SEKI. On other occasions, they would discuss things with him individually. It should be remembered that KOTOSHIRODO worked as SEKI's assistant while he was inside the office, although he was MORIMURA's assistant in collecting information outside the office. Because of this situation, KOTOSHIRODO was in close contact with both men.

83. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that the Japanese consulates all over the world were supposed to gather all the information they could without doing "illegal things". (This point is considerably amplified in reference (u).) MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that an outside system, which was separate and part from the Consulate, and which worked directly on orders from Tokyo, collected such information as it was necessary to obtain by "illegal" means. This would include, for example, the practice of buying secrets. MORIMURA observed that such an outside system would not report through the Consulate, nor would the Consulate contact the outside system. In all probability, the Consulate would know nothing of this outside system, he said.

84. MORIMURA once asked SEKI if there were any Japanese espionage agents (meaning those outside the Consulate) in the Territory of Hawaii. SEKI replied that he did not know. MORIMURA observed that he did not know what the facts were, but that there must be such a system. However, he did not know the manner in which such an outside system would operate.

85. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA and SEKI discuss espionage coverage on one occasion. SEKI stated that it was necessary for the Consulate to have a "good man" on each island. However, MORIMURA was of the opinion that this requirement would be difficult to meet, since the average Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii lacked the technical knowledge necessary in the work. MORIMURA and SEKI agreed that because of the large number of Japanese in the local population, Hawaii should be "the easiest place" to carry on espionage. However, they believed this advantage to be lost, because the local Japanese were too poorly educated to do this work. MORIMURA was very outspoken on this point, claiming that the toritsuginin (the so-called local consular agents) were no good for the work, and that most Japanese in Hawaii were "just trash" and insufficiently educated. He remarked that the Japanese had come to Hawaii as laborers and were therefore uneducated, whereas the Japanese on the mainland of the United States were much better educated.

86. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA say that throughout the world then (1941), all nations "use other kind of people" (i.e., non-nationals of the country employing them) as espionage agents. MORIMURA believed that Japan sometimes used non-Japanese espionage agents (although KOTOSHIRODO never heard him say whether such agents were operating in Hawaii). MORIMURA once said in KOTOSHIRODO's presence that he had "heard in Tokyo" that Japan had long had a British naval officer acting as an espionage agent in China. (Whether this Britisher was working for Japan only against China, or against both China and Britain, or only against Britain, was not stated). MORIMURA had said that this officer had been so employed "for years". However, he commented on the fact that non-Japanese agents were expensive. He said that the first time such agents submitted information, they submitted a lot of it, but after that the law of diminishing returns began to operate, and eventually the employer would pay the same price for mere driblets. He also stated that it was safer and less costly to use Japanese agents in espionage work. However, more valuable information could be obtained by non-Japanese, although at a greater cost to Japan.

87. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he thought the extra-Consulate espionage system to which MORIMURA referred might be operating in Hawaii.
90. KOTOSHIRODO expressed surprise that such an operation was considered possible, saying, "How can?" The only pertinent fact he could recall in this connection was that MORIMURA once remarked that it would be impossible to use short-wave radio for getting information out of Hawaii after war started because of "a device" the Americans had which enabled them to ascertain the exact location of a radio transmitter. KOTOSHIRODO knew what short-wave radio was, and knew of Radio Tokyo broadcasts, but professed complete ignorance about amateur radio stations. He stated that he had never heard anyone at the Consulate talk about the subject, nor had he and MORIMURA ever stopped to see anyone in town who operated an amateur short-wave radio station.

88. KOTOSHIRODO stated that on another occasion MORIMURA remarked to SEKI that Hawaii would be a fine place from which to watch a Japanese-American war. Either SEKI or MORIMURA observed that there would be no way for a spy to communicate from Hawaii to Japan by radio, referring to the risk of discovery by radio detection equipment.

89. Apparently one of the "legal" methods of collecting information indulged in by the Consulate was the close scrutiny of daily newspapers. Yasumasa MURATA, a clerk at the Consulate until 1938, stated that the local newspapers were clipped daily. He added that the Vice Consul always had charge of this work. The Vice Consul usually would mark such items as he desired and pass them on to MURATA, who would do the actual clipping. Usually two—occasionally three—clippings were secured of each item. One copy was sent to Japan, and one retained at the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he used to receive the first edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin for the Consulate at his home, because the first edition was not delivered to the zone in which the Consulate was located. KOTOSHIRODO's home, two blocks away, was near enough to be included in the delivery zone. Apparently the Consulate wanted to keep close watch on all editions of the paper. Many of the Consulate despatches (reviewed after the outbreak of war) merely contained synopses of press stories.

Security Measures

[22] 90. KOTOSHIRODO said that he was taught at the Consulate that the first rule in "information collecting" was "no get caught". He was told never to go out of his way to get information. Even if he could not see his desired objective from the highway, he was not to ask questions about it, nor leave the highway to view it. If ever he and MORIMURA were stopped by the authorities and questioned, KOTOSHIRODO was to explain that they were merely "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO was to do the necessary talking, because of MORIMURA's poor command of English.

91. He was told never to take pictures of "important places". Although he took a camera to Kauai and Maui, this was merely a "prop" to carry out their pose as sightseers. KOTOSHIRODO expressly denied ever having taken pictures of airfields, harbors, power plants, or other conceivable military objectives. His snapshots were only of the usual scenic places, he said.

92. MORIMURA occasionally carried field glasses on his trips to various parts of Oahu. He never carried them to the outside islands. Even on Oahu he was extremely careful in their use. The field glasses used were bought early in 1941 at SEKI's insistence. Prior to that time, there had been no field glasses at the Consulate. To divert suspicion, the glasses were bought for the Consulate by Toru NISHIKAWA (now interned), an employee of the Nippu Ji Ji. (NISHIKAWA handled certain commercial printing orders from the Consulate.)

93. KOTOSHIRODO could recall no instance in which MORIMURA had made written notes of their observations prior to their returning to the Consulate after "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO likewise denied ever making any notes himself. Instead, he said that his practice was to report verbally what he had seen to MORIMURA or OKUDA, who would make notes, at the Consulate, of KOTOSHIRODO's reported observations.

94. KOTOSHIRODO stated that neither he nor MORIMURA ever carried maps which might attract suspicion. On such occasions as they did use maps, they carried cartographs published by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, and the only occasion upon which notations were made thereon was on the trip to Maui: see paragraph 60, above. However, in earlier interviews, as reported in paragraph 42 of reference (c), KOTOSHIRODO stated that on trips he made alone to the Pearl Harbor region, he had marked the positions of various warships on rough maps drawn by MORIMURA. (Note might be made here of KOTOSHIRODO's
extraordinary powers of perception and memory for details of events which happened months, or years, before. Many of his statements were otherwise known to be true, tending to make KOTOSHIRODO's statements and admissions generally reliable.)

95. KOTOSHIRODO said that when he was first employed at the Consulate (1935), he was told by Vice Consul YAMASAKI that he was not to talk about Consulate business to strangers. When KOTOSHIRODO first began to make trips to Pearl Harbor, SEKI warned him not to mention these trips to his wife.

**Christmas Presents Given by the Consulate**

[23] 96. Takaichi SAKAI stated that every year the Consulate gave Christmas presents to a number of United States Customs inspectors. He stated that he personally delivered gifts to the homes of Customs inspectors Carl E. EIFLER, George W. SPENCE, Anrew A. BUTA, and John OLIVIERA. These gifts usually consisted of merchandise orders of $20.00 to $30.00 drawn on M. McInerny, Ltd., or the Liberty House, both large Honolulu retail stores.

97. The Honolulu harbormaster, James L. FRIEL, and his assistant, Frank J. UNTERMANN, received similar Christmas presents, according to SAKAI.

98. Another recipient was Ernest M. HIRAKAWA, an alien Japanese, foreman of the registry section of the United States Post Office, Honolulu. Comment has been made on HIRAKAWA in reference (t.)

99. Ichitaro OZAKI, regular chauffeur for the Consulate, confirmed the fact that he drove SAKAI around to deliver Christmas presents. Although he was unable to recall all the persons to whom presents had been delivered, he did remember that SPENCE and FRIEL were among the recipients. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered that Christmas presents were given to a number of persons.

**Mikami's Naval Knowledge**

100. The interrogating officers and agents were surprised at John Yoshiye MIKAMI's knowledge of naval matters. MIKAMI is so poorly educated that he speaks both pidgin Japanese and pidgin English. He has been a taxi driver for the greater part of his life. He was detained on January 6, 1942, and since that time has been incarcerated on Sand Island, Honolulu, with other internees.

101. During the course of the interrogation (September 28, 1942), it became apparent that even while interned MIKAMI had been able to keep familiar with current movements of the United States Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor. MIKAMI stated that only a week before a new battleship that he had never seen before, and a carrier that was either the LEXINGTON or the SARATOGA, had arrived at Pearl Harbor. (The SOUTH DAKOTA and the SARATOGA actually had arrived.)

102. He stated that in July, 1942, a large body of United States ships had left Pearl Harbor—for Australia, he presumed. He stated that these ships had recently returned. He then commented on the large number of destroyer movements.

103. MIKAMI commented upon seeing "the same old battleships" return to Pearl Harbor in August (true), and also upon a new carrier he had never seen before which entered Pearl Harbor on the same day. This latter was the WASP, on her first trip to Honolulu. (The Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, was seasonably [24] informed of the knowledge that MIKAMI, an internee, was able to see concerning current ship movements, from the interment camp on Sand Island.)

104. MIKAMI conversed intelligently about naval subjects in general. He mentioned "anti-torpedo nets", knew their purpose, and stated he had never seen them in use on his trips to Pearl Harbor before the war. He also mentioned "anti-airplane balloons" which he thought were impractical for use around Pearl Harbor because they would give away the exact location of the objective. MIKAMI also discussed, the "balance of naval power" theory, and expressed the opinion that the United States-Japanese war began 30 years ago when a naval race between the two powers was started. He also expressed the opinion that the United States would beat Japan only when the had beaten the Japanese Navy.

105. MIKAMI was asked how he had acquired such a broad knowledge of naval subjects. He said that he had been reading American magazines for about three years, naming Our Navy, Life, and the Naval Institute Proceedings. He said he received copies of the latter publication when the Consul threw its old copies
away. He stated that he did not read Japanese naval magazines because "they tell big lies". However, whether MIKAMI actually gained his excellent (though perhaps superficial) knowledge of naval subjects by reading magazines in a language in which he is extremely deficient, or by some other means, remains a matter of conjecture.

KOREAN CONTACTS

106. All the Consulate clerks agreed that the Japanese Foreign Office made a point of keeping stationed in Hawaii one secretary who could speak Korean. There were two reasons for this practice: First, to handle various Korean matters which were a legitimate concern of the Consulate; second, to use the Honolulu Consulate as a "listening post" regarding various Korean nationalist movements. The Japanese apparently regarded Honolulu as an excellent place for keeping in touch with existing or incipient Korean political developments.

107. Takachi SAKAI, former senior clerk at the Consulate, who was employed there from 1927 until the outbreak of war, recalled that during his time secretaries Takeo KASHIMURA, Gishiro MASUO, Tadaaki IIZUKA, and Kyo-nosuke YUGE had spoken Korean and had handled Korean affairs at the Consulate. (For some reason SAKAI "forgot" to mention YUGE, the most recent of these secretaries, until it was brought to his attention at a subsequent interview. All the other clerks were familiar with YUGE's Korean duties having been instructed to refer all Korean callers to YUGE as a matter of office routine.)

108. All the clerks employed at the Consulate prior to 1937 remembered having seen Kilsoo HAAN at the Consulate on a number of occasions. HAAN is the subject of a number of reports by this office, the most recent of which is reference (d). Yasumasa MURATA, who was employed at the Consulate until 1938, stated that he once heard from Tsuko KUROKAWA, who was senior clerk at the Consulate at the time, that the Consulate had been paying money to HAAN.

[25] 109. From a confidential, but reliable source, the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently received the originals, in Japanese, of various papers evidencing the interest of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, in Korean matters. Translations of these papers are set forth in reference (o). One source indicates that up to 1925, the Consulate was allowed $100.00 a month for its Korean Intelligence Fund. From 1926 to 1931, the Consulate appears to have operated on an accumulated surplus in this field. Following that time, the Foreign Office appears to have made special allocations from time to time, as needed. A summary of these translations indicates that the following Korean informants received payment from the Japanese Consulate:

Kwang Won Cho

110. This individual is a Korean priest, mentioned as being a frequent visitor of the Consulate by the various clerks. He is more commonly known by the name, Father Noah CHO. The translations indicate that he received a payment of $37.00 on May 19, 1934, and a payment of $20.00 on August 6, 1934. He is the subject of a Registration Act case by the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a report of which is noted as reference (j), the synopsis of which follows:

"Subject [CHO] born October 21, 1897 in Korea; came to Hawaii in 1923 as Episcopal missionary and has since been associated with St. Luke's Korean Mission, Honolulu. He became priest at the St. Luke's Mission in 1931; however, his entire family, including mother, father, wife and five children presently residing in Korea, have never been in the United States. Confidential source reveals Subject paid $37.00 in May, 1934, and $20.00 in August, 1934, by Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, for informant's services. Signed statement obtained in which Subject admits contact with Consulate, beginning in 1932, and beginning about September, 1933, and extending to April, 1941. He admits having performed work for the Consulate relating to Korean activities; further, that during the latter period approximately $200 was paid him by the Consulate for his services which included obtaining and translation of two Korean newspapers. Subject claims to have performed services for the Japanese Consulate under threat to bring harm to his family in Korea; however, his acceptance of remuneration makes this claim appear questionable. Subject denied receipt of any payments in 1934."

111. A check of the files of this office reveals the additional information that the Reverend CHO returned from a trip to Japan aboard the ASAMA MARU
on August 20, 1940. It is of possible significance that a fellow passenger aboard the ASAMU MARU was Sanji ABE, subject of reference (p), former Territorial senator, now interned, who was returning from a trip to Japan during which he conferred with Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, and also made an overseas broadcast to Hawaii in which he praised Japan’s war effort in China. Other passengers on the same ship were Clifford Kikujirō KONDO, subject of reference (q), now in custody; Katsuo SATO, subject of reference (r), now in custody; and Kenji OHTOMO, subject. [26] of reference (s). OHTOMO, executive secretary of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association, Honolulu, and whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese government, has been classified on numerous occasions by this office as dangerous to internal security. Ten other of Reverend CHO’s fellow passengers are now in custody, and another two, although still at large, have been classified as dangerous by this office. Although it may have been pure chance that these persons traveled on the same ship, the coincidence is being set forth for what it may be worth.

Doo Ok Chung

112. Translation of these papers indicated that CHUNG received $80.00 on May 22, 1933. A review of the files of this office indicates that he is a 54-year-old alien, a tailor by trade, and operates a concession at the Honolulu Army and Navy Y.M.C.A. CHUNG appears to be extremely active in Kilsoo HAAN’s SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE’S LEAGUE. A letter from Dr. Soon HYUN, formerly chairman of the League in Honolulu, to HAAN, dated June 22, 1942, describes CHUNG as one of “the cornerstones of our League”.

113. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that CHUNG was born in Korea in 1889, came to Hawaii in 1903. He has three sons serving in the United States Army. Another son, four daughters, his wife, and his mother all reside in the United States. He has been active in Korean political circles since 1915, when he joined the KOREAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. He withdrew from this and aided in forming the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE, becoming the second president of the latter organization. The KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE has been comparatively inactive since 1929, and eventually he joined the SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE’S LEAGUE. He denied, with seeming sincerity, his ever having had contact with, or accepting money from, the local Japanese Consulate, but there appears to be no other individual in Hawaii of a similar name.

Won Sam Kim

114. The translation indicated that this individual received the following payments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 10, 1933</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28, 1934</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 1934</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10, 1934</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 1936</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 1937</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that KIM was born in Korea in 1879, came to Hawaii in the early 1900s, and was a carpenter by trade. [27] In 1919 he had become a member of the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE. He died on March 14, 1939, in Honolulu, and his widow denied all knowledge of his past activities or relations with the Japanese Consulate.

Sang Ho Lee (Yee)

115. LEE was paid $100.00 on March 31, 1932, and $20.00 on August 19, 1933. Directories of that period indicate that an individual of this name was with the Nahm Choon Furnished Rooms, 339 North Beretania Street, Honolulu. Later directories do not include the name. However, the latest directory lists a Mrs. Sang Ho LEE, 1385 Miller Street, Honolulu.

79716—46—Ex. 148——25
116. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that LEE was born in Korea on November 5, 1879, and first arrived in the United States on February 3, 1905, under the name YE CHONG KUL. He visited China from July, 1922, to May, 1923. He departed from Honolulu bound for Korea on February 16, 1934, and has not re-entered the United States.

Ok Nam Shin

117. The translation indicates that this individual received $50.00 on March 31, 1932, and $3.40 on June 9, 1933. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that SHIN, a groceryman, was born in Korea in 1901, came to Honolulu in 1920, and returned to Korea in 1933. He returned to Honolulu in 1938, but went back to Korea shortly thereafter, and has never returned.

Kylsoo Haan

118. The following is a list of payments received by this individual, who is usually referred to as Kylsoo HAAN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 1936</td>
<td>$60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 1936</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chin Ho Tough

119. On May 22, 1933, TOUGH received the sum of $80.00 from the Consulate. TOUGH (he is known by all the combinations of the above three names) has been the object of suspicion for a considerable period. He entered the Territory in 1931 as a Buddhist priest, but apparently has never practiced his profession. He was educated in Japan. For a while he worked at various military posts as a tailor, and later went into business for himself on the Island of Moloka'i. He has been very active on the UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE. When interrogated, TOUGH stated that he had visited the Consulate on only one occasion, that being upon his arrival in 1931 when it was necessary to have his passport stamped.

[28]

OTHER CONSULATE CONTACTS

Ensei (Enjo) Kobayashi

120. On March 15, 1932, KOBAYASHI received $8.00 from the Consulate. An alien, aged 54, he was a priest of the Jodo sect (Buddhist), a Japanese language school principal, and a tortsugimin at Hawai, Kohala, Hawaii, T. H. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and subsequently was interned. He is reported to be at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, and apparently is planning for repatriation to Japan.

Katsuchi Miho

121. MIHO received the sum of $27.00 from the Japanese Consulate on March 15, 1932. MIHO is a 59-year-old alien. Prior to the war he operated the MIHO HOTEL at Kahului, Maui, T. H., and was a tortsugimin for that district. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be interned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Minoru Murakami

122. MURAKAMI received the sum of $10.00 from the Consulate on March 15, 1932. MURAKAMI, a Japanese alien, formerly employed as a representative for the Nippu Jiji (Honolulu bilingual newspaper), has a long record of pro-Japanese activities and statements. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Apparently he desires to repatriate to Japan.

Masao Sogawa

123. On January 6, 1932, SOGAWA received the sum of $50,000. He was editor and publisher of the Hawaii Shinpo, a Japanese weekly newspaper published in Honolulu until the outbreak of war. This paper was considered highly pro-Japanese in its sentiments. SOGAWA was taken into custody on December 14, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.
124. On August 21, 1935, THAYER reportedly received the sum of $40.00 from the Japanese Consulate. For years, THAYER was attorney for the Japanese Consulate, and was so registered with the Secretary of State. It is not known why this lone entry was found among the expenses of the Korean Intelligence Fund, inasmuch as it is believed that THAYER undoubtedly had some permanent financial arrangement with the Consulate with regard to his legal services.

THE CONSULATE PREPARES FOR WAR

[29] 125. Takaichi SAKAI stated that in the summer of 1941 the Consulate began to burn old documents. All the clerks helped in this work, and about the same time, the clerks were paid bonuses each month. The clerks were told not to talk about the fact that documents were being burned almost daily in the back yard of the Consulate. SAKAI could recall no such burning of papers shortly before the war started, although he did observe that the number of visitors to the Consulate from the N. Y. K. Line and from the Yokohama Specie Bank increased greatly in the last two weeks of peace. These visitors sometimes carried handbags with them.

126. Miss Kinnie DOUE, former receptionist at the Consulate, remembered that about the middle of November, 1941, two Yokohama Specie Bank officials came to the Consulate and went into Consul General KITA’s room, where they stayed for about an hour. One of these men was Nihel MIYAMOTO, sub-manager of the bank. KITA was not present, and the two men were alone in the room. They asked for a typewriter. Miss DOUE believed that MIYAMOTO and his companion wrote a telegram which they sent under the name of the Consulate. She stated that they had probably done their own coding. She added that, to her knowledge, Torataro ONODA, of the Sumitomo Bank, had never done this.

127. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled that in June, 1941, the two yardmen of the Consulate had burned a large number of official appearing books. OZAKI was able to set the month because it was just before his departure for Japan. He was in Japan from June to November, 1941. OZAKI explained that the Consulate was not supposed to keep material longer than 10 years, and every year they accumulated material to burn. OZAKI stated that he helped carry these books from the Vice Consul’s office to the yardmen, who would burn them. He estimated that more than 100 publications were thus burned in 1941. The two yardmen who did this burning, Saburo SUMIDA and Rokuro FUKUSHIMA, were repatriated to Japan in 1942 with the Consulate staff. OZAKI stated that he was in Japan when the United States freeze order against Japanese assets went into effect, but he heard that the Consulate burned a considerable amount of material at that time.

128. OZAKI stated that it was his belief that telegrams received from Japan were burned as soon as they were received, or at least within a week. He stated that in the code room of the Consulate a small brazier, and when papers were burned in this room, he would sometimes notice smoke coming out of the window. He believed that he had seen more smoke coming out of this room after he had returned from Japan (on the last ship, November 1, 1941) than he had prior to his departure. He believed that code room material was burned about once a week. The code room was always cleaned by Saburo SUMIDA. Samon TSUKIKAWA, Consulate secretary in charge of coding, was always present during this operation.

129. On December 6, 1941, at about 1500, the two yardmen went into the coding room of the Consulate and removed a wheelbarrow full of papers and other [30] material. These they burned in a pit in the yard. OZAKI said that he put out this fire about 1900, just before darkness fell. He noted that everything had been burned. OZAKI said that yard rubbish was being burned all the time, so he was unable to state how often code room material was burned. The incident of December 6th was the only time he actually saw them remove the material from the code room.

130. OZAKI stated that the Consul and Vice Consul had an engagement to play golf with Tsunetaro HARADA on the morning of December 7, 1941. He remembered that MIKAMI’s taxi had actually called at the Consulate for the two officials, but by that time guards had been placed around the Consulate. MIKAMI requested the guards to inform OKUDA of his arrival, which they did.
However, OKUDA sent back a message that MIKAMI was not to wait because he, OKUDA, probably would be unable to play golf that day.

131. OZAKI expressed his conviction, based on observations made prior to and subsequent to December 7, 1941, that Consul General KITA had no foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, he insisted that the Consul General had received a telegram from Washington at 0700 on the morning of December 7th. (This was a radiogram from Tokyo, reporting that Japanese-American and Japanese-British relations were strained.) Immediately upon its receipt, KITA had called TSUKIKAWA, who lived at the Kyoraku Kan Hotel, two blocks from the Consulate grounds, and insisted that the latter come to the Consulate immediately to decode this message. OZAKI stated that he heard of this incident from SEKI about a week or two after the attack. OZAKI stated that TSUKIKAWA was at the Consulate at the time of the attack.

132. OZAKI stated that the Consulate staff members were burning papers when the police arrived on the morning of December 7th. He remembered seeing smoke come out of the code room window. After the Consulate staff was repatriated (February, 1942), he went into the code room to clean it. All he saw was a big tub filled with ashes.

133. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he first heard the noise (of battle) about 0900 on the morning of December 7, 1941, so he walked to the Consulate to find out what all the commotion was about. KITA, OKUDA, SEKI, and TSUKIKAWA were all there, and appeared to be worried. MORIMURA dropped in a little later with his hair tousled, clothes wrinkled, and in short sleeves. KOTOSHIRODO heard him remark that it was a "noisy morning". MORIMURA wanted to go up on the heights and see what was going on, but KITA would not allow him to leave the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO left the Consulate about 1000.

CONSULATE DOMESTICS

134. As was reported in paragraphs 47 and 52 of reference (c), three of the domestics at the Consulate secured their positions through one Toyoki FUJITA, a flower grower. FUJITA was interviewed to determine his connection with the [37] Consulate. FUJITA stated that among other retail florist shops to which he sold his blossoms, was the SERVICE FLORIST, operated by one Tetsuo SHINAGAWA. SHINAGAWA supplied the Consulate with flowers. He secured this account because he is a brother-in-law of Ichitaro OZAKI, Consulate chauffeur, who apparently ordered flowers purchased by the Consulate. FUJITA first met OZAKI when he delivered some plants to the Consulate. On one occasion OZAKI asked FUJITA if the latter knew of a girl who would like to cook at the Consulate. FUJITA secured the services of Yoshie KIKKAWA. (Results of an interview with Miss KIKKAWA are set forth in paragraph 52-54 of reference (c).) Because FUJITA was once successful in securing a domestic, OZAKI asked him for assistance in securing help on two other occasions. FUJITA was able to send to the Consulate Sakae TANAKA, whose interview is set forth in paragraphs 55-56 of reference (c), and Kimika ASAKURA, paragraphs 47-51 of reference (c).

JAPANESE NAVY TANKERS

135. Takaichi SAKAI stated that when Japanese naval tankers called at Honolulu, their captain would call at the Consulate and talk for an hour or more with the Consul General or the Vice Consul. Sometimes the captains would leave the Consulate carrying envelopes they did not bring with them. One Ishichi MATSUDA, now in custody, the owner of a grocery store at the old Aala Market, often visited these vessels. He was noted on numerous occasions by representatives of this office to have carried a mail bag onto the boat. SAKAI explained that MATSUDA would pick up mail being held at the post office pending the arrival of the tankers and carry it aboard. Presumably this was a labor of love. SAKAI recalled hearing that Japanese navy men sometimes left the tankers here, then sailed aboard a tanker calling at Honolulu at a future date. However, SAKAI could not recall where he had heard this. He further disclaimed all knowledge of what these officers did while in port, or of where they lived while here. (In connection with this topic, see reference (v), paragraphs 42-43.)

TORITSUGININ

136. Takaichi SAKAI stated that the term soryojikan toritsuginin was not accurately translated as "consular agents". He believed the more correct transla-
tion to be "Consulate General 'go-between' men". He remembered Vice Consul OKUDA's once expressing the opinion that the toritsuginin were not agents of the Japanese government within the meaning of the United States statute requiring such agents to register with the State Department.

337. It should be remembered that the status of the toritsuginin was never clarified by judicial decision. They were "agents" of the Consulate only in a very loose sense of the term. They rarely received remuneration from the Consulate, and their duties apparently were merely routine. Actual military espionage on the part of a toritsuginin has been proven to the satisfaction of this office only in one case, that of Uaji HIRAXAMA, subject of reference (1). Economic espionage has been indicated in a number of other cases. However, the basic motive in placing all toritsuginin in custody immediately after the attack of December 7th was the fact that, as a class, they were extremely pro-Japanese, and there is evidence to indicate that they were chosen to be toritsuginin on the basis of their loyalty to Japan. There is scarcely one who was not engaged in a number of pro-Japanese activities in addition to his duties as toritsuginin.

Pending—14ND.

[copy]

[1]

TRIP TO KAUAIR

One day in the early part of July, 1941, Morimura told me that he and I will be sent on a trip to Kauai in the near future. Sometime after that Seki told me that he wants to see the island by himself. So it seemed to me then that both of them wanted so much to take a trip. I don't really know how the situation was between them. After several days (few days before we left) Morimura suddenly told me that he is not going and said that I will be sent. After hearing that from Morimura, I asked Seki what has happened. And Seki said that they (Morimura and Seki) had some kind of misunderstandings. I told Seki why he (Seki) himself doesn't go since I was told he wanted to go so much. But Seki said he is not going and told me to take my wife with me. He told me to go and have a good vacation. And then Okuda called me to his desk and told me to go to Kauai with my wife and also told me to see Seki about the money. Seki gave me about $100, and the following day I went down to the airway company office to buy our tickets. The day before we left Okuda called me at his desk and gave me the following instructions. (1) See the things that could be seen from the highways; (2) Not to talk to anyone; (3) He said that he knew the air field project at the Barking Sand is going on. He told me to see that if it could be seen from outside; (4) See the Lihue air port if there is any improvements; (5) See the Hanalei bay if anything is being done. He said he saw in a newspaper that the U.S. Navy is planning to use the bay for small boat base; (5) He showed me the geological survey map of Kauai and told me to see the Wainiha power plant. [2] He said that it is the source of power used on Kauai; (6) He showed me a photograph of Port Allen and Nawiliwili harbors. He told me to see any change has been added. He told me to take the usual sightseeing schedule and see what I can see. I called up Mikami on the phone and told him to take us to the airport next morning.

Next morning (I believe it was Saturday in the middle part of July) my wife and I went to the airport in Mikami's car. We left the airport at about 8 a. m. and reached Hanapepe airport at about 9 a.m. I noticed Horikawa was one of the passengers of the same plane. After we reached the Hanapepe airport I happened to see Minatoya (I didn't know him then) and hired him to show us around the island. He said the auto fare will be $25. Then we started out immediately for the Kokee. I asked him if we can see the Barking Sand. He said we cannot go there in the morning because the Army usually practice bombing there. We went up to the place where tourists usually see the canyon. We got out of the car and stayed there for about 15 minutes, and continued our drive to Kokee and we went as far as the place where there were some residences. Since Minatoya said there isn't anything more to see further up we turned back and came back to Waimea. Minatoya suggested to have our lunch at the Waimea Hotel so we went in and all three of us sat at one table. He then introduced himself and said he is working for some transportation company. He talked about his having brother who is a doctor in Honolulu. We, my wife and I, introduced ourselves too, but I didn't say I was from the consulate. Soon after lunch we left the hotel and started for the Barking Sand. We didn't stoped at anywhere on the way and [3] reached the Barking Sand. We got off the car then walked up the sand hill and tried if the sand
On the way back to Lihue, we passed through Kukuiolono park and stopped at the Lawai beach to see the Spouting Horn. And then we rode to Koloa beach where we got off the car and walked around the sandy beach seeing many human skeletons. After staying there about 20 minutes we rode to Lihue without stopping anywhere. It was about 5 p.m. when we reached the Lihue hotel. We registered there and shown to our room. We had our dinner at the dining hall. After dinner my wife and I thought of going to see some movie so we called up Minatoya on the phone and asked him to take us. He came soon after and we went to the Lihue theatre. We three sat together. I remember the title of the picture was “Strawberry Blonde”. After show Minatoya took us back to the hotel.

We stayed in our room until we retired. There was some kind of party at the hotel that night. The following morning Minatoya came to the hotel at about 8 a.m. After breakfast I happened to see Horikawa in the kitchen so I went in just to say hello. I introduced myself and my wife. All he said to us was that “You were on the same plane yesterday morning. Are you on a sightseeing trip?” Minatoya put the lunch in the car and we started out at about 9 a.m. We went to see the Waipoua fall. We didn’t go near to the fall but just saw it far from the hill. Then we went to see the Grass shack where we got off the car and saw some old Hawaiian mats, drums and sandals. From there we went to see the Slippery fall. We got off the car and walked down to the fall. After staying there about 15 minutes we started to Hanalei direction. We didn’t stop anywhere before reaching Hanalei where we had our lunch. We ate our lunch in the pavilion. I didn’t see anything been done at the bay. After staying there about 45 minutes we started to Haena. On the way I asked the driver if we can see the power plant and he suggested of seeing it on the way back. We went in the dry cave in the car and got off the car at the wet cave to see it. On the way back we went up the Wainiha valley and went as far as the power plant was. I expected to see something large but All I saw were two pipes running down and one small power house building. Without stopping the car we just turned back from there and stopped about ½ mile down on the same road and picked some mountain apples. After staying there about 15 minutes we started back and didn’t stopped anywhere before we reached Killean lighthouse. Minatoya suggested of seeing the lighthouse since it is the largest one in the world. The watchman of the lighthouse came and showed us in to the lighthouse. We climbed the stairs and saw the large lens. I remember we signed our names on the visitors’ signature book. From there we started back and didn’t stopped anywhere before reaching Lihue. On the way to Lihue we went down to Nawiliwili harbor. We didn’t got off the car. Minatoya said pointing one office building that was his company office. We reached Lihue hotel at about 5 p.m. After dinner at the hotel my wife and I thought of going to see a Japanese movie and walked to the theatre. (I don’t remember the name of the theatre, it was very near to the hotel). It happened that night was the bank night at the theatre. After seeing the show we went back to the hotel and retired soon. The following morning Minatoya came at about 8 a.m. we checked out the hotel at about 8:30 a.m. I remember I paid $20.00 to the hotel. We went straight to the Hanapepe airport. We left the Hanapepe airport at about 9:30 a.m. and reached Rogers airport at about 10 a.m. Mikami met us there and took us home. I took my wife to her shop and went to the consulate. Seki, Morimura and Okuda asked me how was the trip. They asked me if I enjoyed. I said it was fine but I couldn’t see much. Seki said it’s natural that I didn’t see much. He said many things couldn’t be seen from the highways. Then Okuda called me at his desk and asked me to tell him what I have seen. I told him I didn’t see anything at the barking sand. I told him it was so quiet and I even never seen a plane flying. I told him there wasn’t anything at the Hanalei bay. All I noticed was the sea was calm and it was a large bay. He asked me how was the reef of the bay but I said I couldn’t see any reefs. I told him there were two pipes running down the mountain at the power plant at Wainiha and one building. He asked me anything more so I said none. I told him there wasn’t anything new at the Nawiliwili harbor and Port Allen harbor. I told him at the Lihue airport I didn’t see anything but some army tents. I didn’t tell him that I talked to Horikawa. Morimura never asked me anything about the trip.
When I talked with Okuda Morimura was there too. Morimura just said "There isn't anything big going on it seems".

On the trip I brought along one tourist map. I didn't bring any letter or notes to anybody and I didn't bring back anything from anyone to the consulate.

Oct. 1, 1942.

/s/ RICHARD M. KOTOSHIRODO.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.
Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H. Date: June 15, 1942.
Report made by: Lieut. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, and Ensign Don Woodrum, USNR.
Origin of Case: General investigation of espionage activities of Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu—see reference (a).
Reference: See first page of details.
Character of Investigation: Espionage.
Enclosures: None.
Copy to:
ONI (5)
CinCPac (1)
Com14 (1)
MID-HD (2) Zone II (1)
FBI—Hon (2) Zone III (1)
14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND/#64-A. ONI File No.:

Synopsis.—Questioning of former employees of Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, indicates that Tadasi MORIMURA, Consulate secretary who came to Honolulu in March, 1941, was the chief collector of facts for the Consulate concerning the movements of U. S. Navy vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor.

MORIMURA's coming to Hawaii was accompanied with publicity that he would attend to expatriation matters at Consulate, which work he did not do. His work at the Consulate was done in privacy of Vice Consul OKUDA's office, involving poring over a map of Oahu, but the exact nature of his work is not known. MORIMURA went to his office at hours of his choice. He spent much time away from the office, visiting strategic points on Oahu, such as Pearl City peninsula and Aiea Heights (both commanding a view of Pearl Harbor), Haleiwa beach (a potential landing place), Kanehoe Bay (across from the Naval Air Station), and made flying trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii. On drives around Oahu, he often took with him KOTOSHIRODO, Consulate clerk, and MIKAMI, a regular taxi driver for Consulate, but sometimes sent KOTOSHIRODO alone to count ships in Pearl Harbor, which they last did on December 5, 1941. MORIMURA contacted many persons who have since been interned.

Deductions.—Naval information reported to Tokyo by despatches analyzed in reference (b) was chiefly gathered by, or under the direction of, MORIMURA.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy
District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/cop

References:
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 9, 1942.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 14, 1942.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kimie DOUE, dated February 3, 1942.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Takaichi SAKAI, dated February 3, 1942.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kanaye SAHARA, dated February 3, 1942.
2. Also, background had gone.

3. The Consulate had arrived from Japan on March 27, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, but did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned to a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, and the nature of his work there was unknown to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA often came to work about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and was seldom at his desk in the afternoon. Miss DOUE stated that there was a week during October or November, 1941, when MORIMURA did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi between 1000 and 1100, and she would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the ROYAL TAXI STAND, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu, (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. (The proprietor of this taxi stand, John Yoshiie MIKAMI, subject of reference (i), has been interned.) On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, subject of reference (f), one of the Consulate clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO’s car, and other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

[2] 2. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

3. Takachi SAKAI, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (d), when interrogated corroborated Miss DOUE’s statements about MORIMURA’s failure to concern himself with expatriation matters and his frequent departure from the Consulate during business hours.

4. Another Consulate clerk, Kanaye SAHARA, subject of reference (e), was also interrogated. SAHARA stated that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or the third, cut off at the first joint, but could not remember which hand was without a finger. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA’s departures from the Consulate during business hours with KOTOSHIRODO, adding that KOTOSHIRODO often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day.

5. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they were going to “important places”, and, upon being asked what he meant by that, said “military places.” On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and because neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO would make any mention of where they had gone when they returned to the Consulate. SAHARA added that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he often used on these trips.

6. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA’s background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data on diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years old, and if he is a regular member
of the consular service, he should have been listed, as he could not at his age be a recent college graduate. (MORIMURA is said to have told Sakae TANAKA, a Consulate maid, that he was graduated from Hedai University.)

7. SAHARA added that he believed that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they entered or departed from the office. When asked if he thought this was not strange in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA made the explanation that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy one another's company.

8. In light of these revelations, KOTOSHIRODO was interviewed, and his personal history is set forth in reference (f). (It should be noted that none of the Consulate clerks were interrogated until after they had severed their connections with the Japanese Government.)

9. KOTOSHIRODO stated that his duties at the Consulate were to receive and open local and Japanese mail, and to handle out-going mail. He usually logged in letters from the Foreign Office, Japan, but these letters were actually opened by Kokichi SEKI, one of the secretaries. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he wrote down the date of receipt and the number of each item from the Foreign Office, which was addressed to the Consul-General, but he did not see the actual letters, as these usually came in inner envelopes. SEKI would take this mail in to Vice Consul OKUDA, and from there it would go into the Consul's office. Each letter had a receipt inside the first envelope which was signed and returned to the Foreign Office. Routine letters would come back to SEKI from the Vice Consul, and either SEKI or KOTOSHIRODO would enter the subject of each letter and its date in a record book.

10. SEKI's predecessor at this job was Mitsugi IKETANI, who returned to Japan late in 1940. (It was recently learned that while he was in Hawaii, IKETANI was head of the JAPANESE RED CROSS.)

11. Mail from the Foreign Office, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was of two types—that which pertained to the business of the Honolulu Consulate only, and letters addressed to all Consulates. The former type would carry consecutive numbers. Ordinary mail consisted of domestic matters such as births, deaths, marriages, expatriation, divorce, and adoption. This type of mail, and the circular letters addressed to all Consulates, would arrive by post, and would be picked up at the Consulate's post office box by the chauffeur, or would be delivered by a regular mail carrier. Other mail would arrive by diplomatic courier. This would be opened in the telegraph (or, coding) room by Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary. The couriers would carry the mail in a suitcase, and upon arrival, would go straight into the telegraph room accompanied by the Consul, Vice Consul, and SEKI. KOTOSHIRODO did not remember the same courier ever coming twice, and he added that one would not necessarily arrive every time an N.Y.K. liner called at Honolulu.

12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that letters received from local sources were not logged in at the Consulate. Only those received from the Foreign Office, other Japanese Consulates, and those of especial importance were logged. Most of the local mail came from consular agents, and consisted of letters or routine reports.

13. Office supplies for the Consulate were purchased by SEKI, who also acted as treasurer. KOTOSHIRODO's desk was in SEKI's office, so he was familiar with the purchasing. Most office supplies were purchased from the Honolulu Paper Company, and the remainder from the Hakubundo Book Store. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the persons usually contacted at the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE were Tomoaki NAKAMURA or Minoru FUJUWARA, the manager. NAKAMURA was familiar with everyone in the Consulate. Condential Infor- mant J-1 (rating "A") had previously informed this office that NAKAMURA was one of the most frequent visitors at the Consulate, and although there was no evidence that he had purpose other than that of selling office supplies, it was noted that he treated everyone in the Consulate, from the Consul General down, with insolent camaraderie and general disrespect that was unusual—one might say, unique—coming from a member of the local Japanese community. NAKA-
MURA made frequent trips to all parts of the Island of Oahu in the course of business, but when interviewed, denied that he had ever supplied information of any nature whatsoever to the Consulate. NAKAMURA has been interned.

14. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of his activities with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not altogether frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived
at the Consulate in March, 1941. A week later, KOTOSHIRODO drove the new secretary over Tantalus, a residential district on the heights overlooking Honolulu. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he drove MORIMURA out to Wailuku, a plantation town about a mile equidistant from the northern shores of the Middle Loch and the West Loch of Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA was anxious to visit a tea house called the SHIOYU, which was off the highway to the left below the high school, and which was noted for its baloon fish soup. KOTOSHIRODO had been there before. The Consulate chauffeur, Ichitaro OZAKI, advised that it was impossible to get service there without prior reservation, but MORIMURA insisted. However, at the intersection KOTOSHIRODO said, "Let's not go," and MORIMURA agreed, so they turned around. Following this admission, KOTO- SHIRODO displayed a reluctance to remember any further trips with MORIMURA outside of town, but was finally persuaded to recall trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii.

15. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he was asked to go to Maui by Vice Consul OKUDA. KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA left John Rodgers Airport, Honolulu, at 8:00 a.m. on the morning of May 5, 1941, and arrived at the Maui airport an hour later. They immediately hired a cab and a driver. The driver was a second-generation Japanese who could not converse very well with MORIMURA. MORIMURA spoke little English and had difficulty understanding the local Nisei brand of Japanese. However, they utilized the services of this driver for the two days they were on Maui. From the airport, they proceeded to the TOMOEUDA HOTEL, a Japanese hotel located in Kahului, the east coast port of Maui. KOTOSHIRODO said that this hotel was run by a Japanese with a "funny eye" (elaborated to mean that he couldn't see from it). MORIMURA talked to the owner of the hotel about a Japanese poem, but never introduced himself. (The HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nippu Jiji, a Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated March 10, 1941, described HAMADA as having a left eye that was either injured or made of glass. HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nippon Jiji, a Honolulu bilingual Japanese-English daily newspaper. HAMADA is now in custody.)

16. It is interesting to note that HAMADA was a frequent contact of Shigeo FURUKAWA, the activities of whom were reported in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12 of reference (a). Letters from HAMADA to FURUKAWA at Kula Sanatorium, Maui, were found in FURUKAWA's possession, and it is known that HAMADA visited FURUKAWA at Kula, a number of times. It was also reported that the two men phoned each other on occasions. One of HAMADA's letters was a forceful plea that FURUKAWA dismiss the notion of suicide from his mind. FURU- KAWA, as was shown in reference (a), made two attempts at suicide following the outbreak of hostilities. Another letter talked of Japanese poetry, FURUKAWA being a poet of some small reputation. Before entering Kula Sanatorium, FURUKAWA was advertising manager for the Nippon Jiji, of which HAMADA was the Kahului representative.

[5] 17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA stayed at HAMADA's hotel for two hours. They rested and had breakfast, but did not stay because the hotel looked too dirty. After they left HAMADA, they drove to the Grand Hotel in Wailuku, Maui, not a Japanese hotel. They registered here, and then drove to Lahaina, on the west coast of Maui. Ships of the United States Fleet, when visiting Maui, anchor off Lahaina Roads. They stopped at a fountain shop for a while, then drove back to Wailuku. From here they drove to Sprecklesville, a few miles from Wailuku. There KOTO- SHIRODO went to a Japanese school and met Tetsunosuke SONE. Consul General KITA had requested KOTOSHIRODO to give a package to the person to whom it was addressed, a female. KOTOSHIRODO thought the package contained a gift of some sort. He gave the package to SONE, because the woman to whom it was addressed was supposed to be one of SONE's former pupils. A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated April 11, 1942, states that SONE was the principal of the Japanese language school at Sprecklesville, had served as a Japanese consular agent for 30 years, and had served as a private in the Japanese army for two years. SONE was taken into custody on January 5, 1942, and on January 21, 1942, the Internee Hearing Board in Wailuku, Maui, recommended that SONE be paroled. While KOTOSHIRODO was presenting the package to SONE, MORIMURA stayed in the car. After leaving the school, they saw a pineapple cannery, and then returned to the hotel in Wailuku about 4:00 p.m. After dinner they took a walk.
saw a swimming meet, and about 9:00 p.m. dropped down to the fairgrounds hall where there was dancing. They bought tickets and went inside, but did not dance. They returned to the hotel about 11:00 p.m.

18. The following day, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited Inao Valley, located in Maui's northern range of mountains, back of Wailuku. Then they drove up the summit of Mount Haleakala, a dormant volcano rising 10,000 feet above sea level which is located in the southern half of Maui. They remained at the top about 20 minutes, and on their return from the summit, passed Kula Sanatorium. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they merely drove up to the sanatorium, got out of the car, and surveyed the building. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a photograph of the building which he still has in his album. He insisted that he did not give the print or the negative to MORIMURA, or to anyone else at the Consulate. In the afternoon they drove to the Makawao district, in central Maui, and arrived at the airport about 2:30 p.m. The plane took off at 4:00 p.m. and they arrived in Honolulu about 5:00 p.m. (The fact of MORIMURA's interest in the Kula region should be read in connection with the information reported in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of reference (a).)

19. The second trip, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was made October 13-17, 1941. Again, Vice Consul OKUDA requested that KOTOSHIRODO accompany MORIMURA. They went to Hilo, Island of Hawaii, by plane, arriving in Hilo about 10:00 a.m. on the 13th. They hired a taxi driver, using him during their entire visit. His name was NARIKAWA, employed by the ABC TAXI COMPANY (probably Shigeo NARIKAWA, 1014 Kamehameha Avenue, Hilo), MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO registered at the Naniloa Hotel, operated by the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and were assigned Room 8. After lunch on October 13th, they drove up to Kilansea Volcano, and spent the entire afternoon around the craters. They visited the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO, and purchased photographs of the volcano in eruption and of the lehua flower. (The [7] proprietor of the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO was then Kenzo MAEHARA, subject of reference (j), who has been placed in custodial detention, principally for his association with officers of Japanese naval and other public vessels which used to call at Hilo.) On October 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO drove to the Kona district (west side of Hawaii), via Kilaua Volcano, stopping for lunch at the SHIRAKAWA HOTEL, at Waiohinu. (Of Kayato SHIRAKAWA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the hotel bearing his surname, this office has no derogatory information.) At Kona, they stayed at the KONA HOTEL, at Holualoa, but according to KOTOSHIRODO they did not talk to anyone there. (Jentaro INABA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the KONA HOTEL, has no adverse record in the files of this office.) On the evening of the 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO went to a motion picture show at Kaimalu, about seven miles from Holualoa.

20. Certain facts about the trip to Kona are of interest. Although there are a number of Japanese hotels in Hilo, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO preferred to stay at the Naniloa, which is a new hotel catering to the tourist trade. It is the most expensive hotel in Hilo. The trip from Hilo to Kona can be made in three and one half to four hours by automobile. However, a leisurely trip must have been made, inasmuch as Waiohinu is only a little more than half way between Hilo and Kona. At Kona there is a hotel comparable to the Naniloa, the Kona Inn, also operated by Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and catering to tourists. In Kona, however, they preferred to stay at a Japanese hotel.

21. On October 15th, they departed from Kona and drove to Kawaihae to see cattle shipping. Kawaihae is the port for the immense Parker Ranch, and other smaller ranches in the neighborhood. From here they proceeded to Kapaau, in the Kohala district, and lunched at the NAMBU HOTEL. Here they talked to an old man, whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not remember. The old man told them about the birth and childhood of Kamehameha (probably Kamehameha I, (1758-1819), first king of Hawaii). Directories show the proprietor of this hotel to be one Yoshio HORI. They had lunch at one o'clock and, stopping only to view Akaka Falls, returned to Hilo, arriving there about dark. That night, after dinner, they went to the Hananoya Tea House where they met two Japanese girls. The chauffeur went along with them. They returned to the hotel about 4:00 a.m.

22. The following day, October 16th, they went to see the County Fair at the High School and Intermediate School Building. Later they saw Rainbow Falls, the Country Club golf course, Puumaile Home (county hospital for tubercular patients), and then went to eat Japanese food at the Tokiwatel. They returned
to Hilo about 2:00 p. m. That evening they again visited the Hananoya Tea House, but left at 11:00 p. m.

23. On October 17th, they checked out of the hotel and went directly to the airport, taking the 10:00 a. m. plane for Honolulu. They arrived in Honolulu at 11:45 a. m.

24. KOTOSHIRODO insisted that the two tea house girls, the driver, and the old man at the NAMBU HOTEL at Kapaa were the only persons they contacted on the whole trip. KOTOSHIRODO stated that, on both trips, he handled money which was given to him at the Consulate before they left. On the Maui trip he was given $110.00, and on the Hawaii trip, $300.00. On the latter trip they spent $65.00 at tea houses, while the driver cost them $55.00.

25. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a number of trips to various points on Oahu with MORIMURA. In the early part of April, 1941, about two weeks after MORIMURA's arrival, MORIMURA asked KOTOSHIRODO to take him motoring to the Kaneohe district. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali and turned into the Kokokahi road which runs along Kaneohe Bay (across from Kaneohe Naval Air Station). They followed this road until they reached the Kailua beach pavilion. They got out of the car, and took a stroll in the park on the ocean side of the pavilion. In the car again, they drove past the cattle farm and the Kailua Theater, and then turned left on the road running to the Waimanalo district. Here they stopped near the old wharf on Waimanalo beach. They walked over to the wharf where several people were fishing. About ten minutes, they got back in the car and returned to Honolulu, arriving at the Consulate about 4:00 p. m. In July or August, 1941, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA again made a trip to the Kaneohe district. This time they went in MIKAMI's taxi. Again they followed the Kokokahi road along Kaneohe Bay, and at one point MORIMURA told MIKAMI to slow down. Further along the road they stopped at a roadside stand and purchased two watermelons. This stand was near a pine grove (KOTOSHIRODO evidently mistook ironwood trees for pines), on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the road. They drove on to Kailua Tavern where MIKAMI had breakfast, while MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO each had a can of beer. They were served by a waitress of Portuguese ancestry. After about twenty minutes they returned to the Consulate via the Nuuanu Pali road.

26. On a Japanese holiday in April, the Yasukuni Shrine Extraordinary Ceremony, when the Consulate was closed, MIKAMI drove KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Waianae, on the west coast of Oahu. They drove out beyond Waianae to Makua Cave, where the road ends. They departed from town about ten in the morning and returned about two, having lunched at a Chinese store in Waianae. KOTOSHIRODO admitted making three trips to Haleiwa, on the northwest coast of the island, with MORIMURA. The first trip was made in the latter part of April. They stopped at Haleiwa beach, near a ballground, for about ten minutes. Then they returned to Honolulu. Both the trip to, and 9] the trip from, Haleiwa were made via Wahiawa. The second trip occurred some time in May; the third in July. On neither trip did they get out of the car. KOTOSHIRODO remembered stopping at the mauka-awa (towards the mountain-towards Ewa plantation) corner of the Pearl City intersection for a while, but he could not remember whether MORIMURA talked with anyone on those occasions. (It should be noted that the Waianae and Haleiwa beaches are considered important as the places on Oahu where enemy troops might first attempt landings.)

27. Early in the summer of 1941, MIKAMI drove MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO up on Alea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. No one got out of the car, and KOTOSHIRODO was uncertain whether or not MORIMURA used binoculars. After a few minutes they drove down the hill again. In November they again drove to Alea Heights. This time they drove in KOTOSHIRODO'S car, and they were there about ten o'clock in the morning. MORIMURA directed them to visit a house just off the road, and stated that the person whom he was visiting was a Mrs. MATSUI. He asked KOTOSHIRODO to enter the house, too, so KOTOSHIRODO followed. MORIMURA introduced himself to her, and asked her about the condition of the Japanese school and the Japanese people in that district. Mrs. MATSUI hesitated, and refused to give a definite answer, stating that there were other people in the district who knew more about such matters. She offered to introduce him to other persons, but MORIMURA said that would not be necessary. MORIMURA talked with her for about 20 minutes. Afterwards they drove directly to the Consulate.
28. Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, and Lieutenant G. P. Kimball, USNR, of this office, questioned Mrs. MATSUO concerning MORIMURA's visit. Mrs. MATSUO is a nisei whose husband, now deceased, was a Japanese consular agent during his lifetime. She remembered the visit of MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, although she did not remember their names, and she did not know that they had come from the Consulate. She stated that MORIMURA asked her how the Japanese were being treated. She answered that the Japanese on the plantation (Honolulu Plantation) were being well treated. MORIMURA then asked if they weren't "suspected." Mrs. MATSUO stated that she told him that Americans of Japanese ancestry were not suspected if they were loyal Americans. After they had gone, Mrs. MATSUO wondered if they were agents of the United States. The interrogating agents concluded that MORIMURA was looking for a case of disaffection in Mrs. MATSUO, but found her to be barren soil. From Mrs. MATSUO's house an excellent view can be had of the usual battleship moorings in East Loch.

29. During July or August, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove to the top of Punchbowl about 8:30 a.m. (Punchbowl is a small, extinct crater which overlooks downtown Honolulu.) According to KOTOSHIRODO, they merely looked at the view and drove down again.

[10] 30. All the foregoing information has not been presented precisely as KOTOSHIRODO first told it. Much of it was drawn from KOTOSHIRODO only after several hours of questioning and prompting. Later he was taken to various areas on Oahu where he pointed out the exact spots he had visited with MORIMURA and MIKAMI. Later he typed out and signed a statement of all he had said. The information which KOTOSHIRODO gave has been rearranged in this report to indicate the various areas which he and MORIMURA visited.

31. KOTOSHIRODO finally admitted that he had made about thirty trips to the Pearl City peninsula and vicinity with MORIMURA. Sometimes they went in MIKAMI's taxi, sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car. On the peninsula proper they visited the Pan-American Airways landing, and also the soda water stand belonging to Telsaku ETO, subject of references (g) and (h). However, they did not always visit these two places. ETO is an alien about 67 years old. His soft drink stand is adjacent to the Pearl City Navy landing, and from this spot one may obtain an excellent view of Pearl Harbor.

32. About two days after his arrival, in March, 1941, MORIMURA hired a taxi and went around the Island of Oahu, alone. About a week after his arrival, SEKI accompanied MORIMURA to the Pan-American Airways clipper landing at Pearl City. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he heard this from SEKI.) About a week later, MORIMURA insisted that KOTOSHIRODO drive him to the peninsula in KOTOSHIRODO's car. They got out of the car and bought soft drinks at ETO's stand. MORIMURA talked to the ETOs, both the old man and his wife, about their business. He asked them how long they had been situated in this spot. KOTOSHIRODO did not know whether MORIMURA had a previous introduction to the ETOs, or had merely struck up an acquaintance, KOTOSHIRODO said that he heard SEKI and MORIMURA speak of ETO. They thought him a very common fellow, and thought it amusing that an alien Japanese was permitted to operate his business so close to a naval base.

33. Another Consulate contact in the Pearl City area was a young Japanese who worked at a store on the manuka (towards the mountains) side of the highway at the junction of Kamelameha Highway and Pearl City Road. MORIMURA would talk to this Japanese, while KOTOSHIRODO played the pinball machines. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they visited this place at least six times a month, and sometimes MORIMURA would go there alone. The last time KOTOSHIRODO stopped at this store with MORIMURA was in September, 1941. When KOTOSHIRODO was taken to the Pearl City junction, he identified the PEARL SERVICE STATION as the place MORIMURA had spoken to the young Japanese. However, KOTOSHIRODO has been unable to identify any employee of the PEARL SERVICE STATION or any other person thereat as the person to whom MORIMURA had spoken. This service station was owned and operated by one Nakajiro KURASHIGE.

[11] 34. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in the middle of April, 1941, all the Consulate staff members, together with their wives and children, went on a picnic at the home of Sam WOODS at Lanikai Beach, Oahu. The party went to their destination in four taxis and the official Consulate car. On the way to the WOODS residence, they travelled on the Kalanianaole Highway around Koko Head. They started out about 9:30 a.m. and arrived about 10:30 a.m. They
lunched in the yard, and afterwards played soft ball. They were served coconut juice from nuts picked by an old Japanese man. Also present were a middle-aged Hawaiian couple. At about 3:00 p.m. they left for home, returning to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Fall. They reached the Consulate shortly before 4:00 p.m. It was originally believed that one SAKURADA, yard man for Sam WOODS, had arranged this party. However, investigation indicated that SAKURADA had nothing to do with the affair. MIKAMI, the taxi driver, apparently arranged the outing. MIKAMI had chauffeured for the WOODS on occasions, and also had connections on the windward side of Oahu, where Lanikai is located, through a Mrs. BECKLEY, who arranged luaus (Hawaiian feasts). MIKAMI sometimes would transport the food prepared by Mrs. BECKLEY to its destination. MIKAMI was well acquainted with Mrs. Mary FREITAS, housekeeper for the WOODS. The WOODS were away on the mainland, and MIKAMI arranged the picnic through Mrs. FREITAS.

KOTOSHIRODO also was questioned concerning the existence of maps at the Japanese Consulate. He stated that MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu on his desk, which he saw both MORIMURA and the Vice Consul study at times. KOTOSHIRODO denied that any marks were made on this map, or that any Japanese writing appeared thereon. He was shown a new Geological Survey map of Oahu (1928 edition), and he believed that this was identical to the map which MORIMURA had in his office. KOTOSHIRODO also stated that he had seen MORIMURA working on a map of the Pacific Ocean with a compass and protractor.

In light of the evidence that MIKAMI was a conspicuous member of the KOTOSHIRODO-MORIMURA expeditions, MIKAMI was interrogated on January 6, 1942, by Agent Tillman, Lieutenant Kimball, and Captain F. O. Blake of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. MIKAMI stated that he drove persons from the Consulate to golf, to parties, downtown for shopping, to take the children to school, and to Waikiki for swimming. He added that while driving the Consul's car, he paid bills and did other errands. He had been doing this for the past six or seven years. MIKAMI was extremely reluctant to answer questions, but eventually considerable information was obtained. He admitted driving MORIMURA along the Kokokahi Road, where views were obtained of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station. He said that several times MORIMURA had instructed him to drive slowly so that a better view could be obtained. At one spot they stopped for at least three or four minutes. MIKAMI believed that [12] MORIMURA had binoculars with him, but was unable to say whether MORIMURA had used them or not. KOTOSHIRODO went along with them the second trip only. MIKAMI stated that on one occasion he had driven MORIMURA to Haleiwa, via the windward side of the island. They stopped at “Sato's restaurant” in Haleiwa. (“Sato's restaurant” has been identified as the SEAVIEW INN, owned by Ikuzo SATO, subject of reference (1).) It is known that on many around-the-island automobile trips of visiting Japanese naval officers, a stop was made at the SEAVIEW INN, usually to eat lunch. While such stops might be accounted for by the fact that the SEAVIEW INN is the logical half-way point at which to stop for lunch on such trips, it should be noted that the restaurant is located in plain view of Haleiwa beach, which is considered one of the places on Oahu where enemy troops might attempt a landing.) MIKAMI went on to state that he had driven MORIMURA to Waialua on two occasions. On one of these trips they attempted to enter Schofield Barracks, but the sentry at the gate refused them permission to enter because MIKAMI's taxi did not have proper identification plates. He also stated that on one occasion, he drove Toamoaki NAKAMURA, of the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE (see paragraph 13, above), and someone from the Consulate, to Waipahu. They saw someone there, but MIKAMI could not remember who it was. (When questioned separately, NAKAMURA vigorously denied that he ever made such a trip.) MIKAMI also confirmed the trip to Waianae mentioned by KOTOSHIRODO.

MIKAMI admitted taking MORIMURA to Pearl City many times, and also admitted having stopped at ETO's stand at the end of the Pearl City peninsula. However, he claimed that he did not know ETO's name. He stated that sometimes he saw an old man, and sometimes he saw an old woman. He remembered hearing the old man say the fleet had just come in, or the fleet had just gone out, and that his business prospered when the fleet was in, but fared otherwise when the fleet was out. MIKAMI often played the pinball machines while MORIMURA conversed with ETO. When taken out to ETO's
stand, MIKAMI pointed out a large pile of lumber on the east side of the boat landing. He stated that this occupied a spot to which he and MORIMURA once walked in order to obtain a better view of the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.

38. One day, according to MIKAMI, he drove MORIMURA up the Waimano Road. The agents proceeded along this road with MIKAMI almost two miles to a point where MIKAMI said he, with MORIMURA, had turned around. At this particular point, and in the same general vicinity, there are no houses. The view of Pearl Harbor, where the agents turned around, is not good, which probably accounts for the fact that MORIMURA visited this place only once.

39. The agents also drove MIKAMI to Honolulu. Here MIKAMI indicated a Japanese store, opposite a Standard Oil installation, at which he stated MORIMURA had asked directions. He stated that he had driven MORIMURA [13] to Honolulu only once. Leaving the location of the Standard Oil installation, MIKAMI directed the agents along a dirt road to the main highway, which he stated he had followed back to Honolulu. It was noted that this same highway, if followed in the opposite direction, would lead to Fort Weaver and the West Loch Naval Ammunition Depot docks. However, MIKAMI denied that he had ever driven MORIMURA in that direction.

40. At Aiea, MIKAMI directed the agents up the road to Aiea Heights to a point just below the residence of Mr. Chester Clarke, where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor is obtained. This was the same spot from which the agents had previously been directed by KOTOSHIRODO. MIKAMI stated that he had taken MORIMURA to this spot on two or three occasions, and on at least one occasion, MORIMURA had gotten out of the car and stood about three minutes observing Pearl Harbor.

41. MIKAMI stated that on December 5, 1941, he again drove MORIMURA to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, proceeding along the old road through Fort Shafter and past Red Hill, and returning by the new Kamehameha Highway. MIKAMI stated that he saw two battleships at anchor between 1000 and 1030. Other ships, led by a battleship, were coming into the harbor at that time, but he could not say how many battleships were in the line. However, he remembered that the ship behind the battleship in the lead was almost as large, and the other ships were strung out behind. MIKAMI denied returning to Pearl Harbor that afternoon. (In paragraphs 6 and 8 of reference (b) it is noted that prior to the arrival of the ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA at Pearl Harbor on December 5, 1941, there were five battleships already moored. The ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA, inbound, passed the outer channel buoys of Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, that date, mooring before 1100.)

42. MIKAMI also stated that KOTOSHIRODO began to accompany MORIMURA to ETO's stand about the second or third trip that MORIMURA and MIKAMI made to Pearl Harbor. He added that he had taken KOTOSHIRODO to Pearl City without MORIMURA about four or five times. MIKAMI was asked if, when he took KOTOSHIRODO alone, the latter had ever said anything about his mission, MIKAMI replied that KOTOSHIRODO might have talked about ships. When pressed further, MIKAMI's memory failed him, and he would say only that the purpose of KOTOSHIRODO's trips appeared to be a desire to see the Naval base.

43. In light of the above statement, KOTOSHIRODO was again interrogated. He admitted that he had been to Pearl Harbor in MIKAMI's taxi about four times without MORIMURA, the last time in the latter part of November, 1941. He usually received instructions to make this trip from MORIMURA, who would direct him to go to Pearl Harbor and find out if there had been any [14] change in the number of ships in Pearl Harbor. However, KOTO-

SHIRODO stated that he did not consult with MIKAMI concerning his mission. On this last trip, as well as on certain other occasions when KOTOSHIRODO had gone to Pearl Harbor unaccompanied by MORIMURA, he stated that the latter made a rough sketch of the harbor showing the approximate locations of the usual battleship, cruiser, and carrier moorings. Not much emphasis was placed on the location or presence of destroyers in the harbor. On the last trip KOTOSHIRODO went to the end of the peninsula, turned around without talking to anyone, and returned to the Consulate about 1000. He went to the end of the Pearl City peninsula to see exactly what type of carrier was berthed at Ford Island, for he could see from the highway that there was a carrier at the mooring on the west side of Ford Island. However, he went to the end of the peninsula pursuant to instructions from MORIMURA to "go all the way around."
43. KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his own car, alone, four or five times to check on the number of ships in the harbor. This was also done at the direction of MORIMURA. These trips, and the ones he made with MIKAMI without MORIMURA, were during the period from July to November, 1941. The last trip he made with MIKAMI alone was on November 27 or 28, 1941. The last trip he made with MORIMURA was later in the same week. KOTOSHIRODO denied that he had been to Pearl Harbor at any time during November. However, he stated that he once heard SEKI say that MORIMURA was going out to Pearl Harbor almost every day, and was spending a good deal of money on taxi fares. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Consulate paid all of his gasoline expenses, and bought some of his oil. The greasing and repair bills he paid himself.

44. On several occasions MORIMURA showed KOTOSHIRODO 'Jane’s Fighting Ships.' One of the things he remembers that MORIMURA pointed out was that certain American battleships could be distinguished by their masts, and that MORIMURA had used the word "yagura" /literally, "turrett"/ to describe the cage masts on certain battleships.

45. KOTOSHIRODO stated that when MORIMURA first came to the Consulate, he and Vice Consul OKUDA used to go out together. However, as far as he knows, the time that he took MORIMURA and OKUDA to Kailua, as described in paragraph 46 of reference (a), is the only time they ever contacted anyone outside of the Consulate.

46. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA seemed to know Shigeo SHIGENAGA, proprietor of the VENICE CAFE, Honolulu. MORIMURA took KOTOSHIRODO there one time when Special Envoy KURUSU was on his way to Washington and was detained at Midway Island. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA had talked to some of the waitresses at the VENICE CAFE, and seemed to know them. (The [15] VENICE CAFE drew the largest part of its trade from Naval enlisted personnel. SHIGENAGA, the proprietor, is an alien, about 40 years old. His home, when searched, revealed a quantity of Japanese literature strongly nationalistic in tenor. Also discovered were photographs of high Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in 1939, as well as a photograph of a Japanese Army officer. SHIGENAGA has made several trips to Japan. In October, 1939, he invited Commander John P. Dix, USN, of the Shore Patrol, to visit Admiral Yorio SAWAMOTO aboard H. I. J. M. S. IWATE, flagship of a Japanese naval training squadron then visiting Honolulu. Commander Dix accepted, and SHIGENAGA made all arrangements through the Japanese Consulate. Commander Dix commented on the ease with which SHIGENAGA arranged the visit, and on the fact that SHIGENAGA treated all the Japanese officers present, from the Admiral on down, as equals. SHIGENAGA has been interned for the duration of the war.)

47. On February 9, 1942, Special Agent Tillman, Captain Frank O. Blake, of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and Lieutenant-Kimball interrogated Kimika ASAKURA, who was employed as a maid at the Consul General’s residence from June 16, 1941, to February 9, 1942. Miss ASAKURA is a dual citizen who was born at Aiea, Oahu, on May 18, 1923. Miss ASAKURA stated that a man named FUJITA, first name unknown to her, came to her home on or about June 13, 1941, and asked if she would like to work at the Consulate. She had never seen FUJITA before, but she delivered that he knew her father. She believed that FUJITA was a flower raiser and lived in Pauoa Valley, Honolulu. He drove her to the Consulate on the same day. There she talked to Ichitaro OZAKI, the Consulate chauffeur, and later, to Kokichi SEKI, who engaged her services. Miss ASAKURA’s duties at the Consulate were to clean the Consul General’s living quarters, wait on table, and do his laundry. The Consul General lived upstairs in a building which is on the makai (towards the sea) side of the office building. Miss ASAKURA lived downstairs, sharing a room with Clara Yoshie KIKKAWA, who was the maid for the house in which MORIMURA lived.

48. Miss ASAKURA’s predecessor at the Consul General’s residence was a girl named Sakae TANAKA. Miss ASAKURA stated that Sakae TANAKA had been rather intimate with MORIMURA, according to gossip she had heard from Miss KIKKAWA, and the cook and his wife. Miss TANAKA left the Consul’s employ because she had a quarrel with the cook.

49. Consul General KITA’s most frequent social visitor was MORIMURA. MORIMURA would drop over to visit KITA in the evenings several times a month. Sometimes SEKI would drop in, and she would hear him talking about
treasury matters, money and business, with KITA. She stated that she had never heard MORIMURA discuss business matters with KITA.

50. The residence (with the mountains) residence in the Consulate grounds was occupied by Vice Consul OKUDA and his family. SEKI lived upstairs in the office building. MORIMURA occupied one of the residences facing on Kuakini Street, while Kiyosuke YUGE, another secretary, occupied the other residence on that street. OZAKI, the chauffeur, and his wife, lived above the garage.

51. Miss ASAKURA stated that on December 7, 1941, she called the Consul General about 8:30 a.m. and informed him that breakfast was served. KITA was in bed when he was called. Later he came down and ate his breakfast. Miss ASAKURA did not see KITA having breakfast as the usual way of serving that meal was to set it on the table in the dining room where he could help himself. She was busy with her work and did not see anyone come from the office building to call KITA. Neither did the telephone ring. Later in the morning, reporters came to the residence and asked for KITA. When the maid could not find him at the residence, she suggested to the reporters that he might be at his office. Thereafter, Miss ASAKURA remained at the Consulate and assisted in serving members of the staff, who were all living in the office building. She stated that her services as an interpreter were frequently used by the detectives who were placed on guard duty at the Consulate from and after the morning of December 7th.

52. On February 11, 1942, the agents interrogated Miss Yoshie KIKKAWA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that she had obtained her position at the Consulate through Toyoki FUJITA, who lived next door to the KIKKAWAS and raised flowers. At the Consulate, Miss KIKKAWA did housework for MORIMURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA occupied a house on the Consulate grounds facing Kuakini Street. She confirmed the fact that she shared quarters in the Consul General’s house with Miss ASAKURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA usually got up at nine o’clock in the morning, had breakfast at nine-thirty, and went over to the Consulate office building about ten o’clock. He lunched about twelve, spending about an hour, and returned from the office about three. After that, MORIMURA sometimes played baseball in the grounds with other members of the staff and the clerks. Other times he read, listened to the radio, or went out with friends.

53. Sometimes, however, according to Miss KIKKAWA, MORIMURA would get up about seven in the morning. Often he would leave the Consulate about three in the afternoon with KOTOSHIRODO, and would be gone for several hours, not returning until about seven in the evening. On two occasions, KOTOSHIRODO stayed and had drinks and dinner with MORIMURA. She stated that Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary, once came to see MORIMURA after dinner. Sakae TANAKA, a former maid at the Consulate, came to see MORIMURA several times in the evening after she had left the Consulate. Girls from the Shunchoro Tea House came to MORIMURA’s house several times in the evenings, and remained two or three hours. On eight or nine occasions, after attending tea house parties, MORIMURA slept until noon. Each morning, MORIMURA had to be wakened. In September, 1941, MORIMURA went on quite a drunk. When he awoke, about noon, he was still drunk, and he made considerable commotion. Miss KIKKAWA went to the Consulate office building and informed SEKI, who came over and induced MORIMURA to go back to bed and sleep off his drunken condition. Upstairs, MORIMURA had a study, and in this was a wooden desk which he kept locked. On several occasions, Miss KIKKAWA saw letters written by MORIMURA, but the characters were too difficult for her to read, she said. She once saw a letter written by MORIMURA to a girl at a tea house. This letter she could read; it was a love letter written to a girl named Tomoyoko, (Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball later interviewed “Tomoyoko”, a geisha. She admitted her association with MORIMURA, and told of a golf game she and another geisha once played with MORIMURA and Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, an espionage suspect who left Honolulu for Japan on the Taiyo Maru, November 5, 1941.)

54. On December 7, 1941, Miss KIKKAWA, according to her statement to the agents, left the Consulate about 11:30 a.m. She had set breakfast on the table for MORIMURA about 8:30 a.m. There was a slip of paper on the table directing her to put breakfast on the table and then go home. MORIMURA usually left such messages on Saturday nights. There was nothing noticeably different about his activities just prior to December 7th, she said.

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Miss KIKKAWA emphatically stated that she did not like MORIMURA, that he was "awful" and said "nasty things." MORIMURA told Miss KIKKAWA that he had lost the tip of his finger "on account of love." (It had been noted from several sources that one of MORIMURA's fingers, either the middle or third finger, was cut off at the first knuckle. However, the various observers have been uncertain which hand was mutilated.) Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA was quite friendly with Lawrence K. NAKATSUKA, a reporter for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Occasionally, NAKATSUKA used to telephone MORIMURA, and on one occasion that she knew of, they went to a tea house together.

55. Also on February 11, 1942, Miss Sakae TANAKA was interviewed by the agents. She stated that she lived in Upper Pauoa Valley, Honolulu, with her father, Yokichi TANAKA, a vegetable farmer. She was born in Honolulu on March 28, 1924, and worked at the Consulate from March 13 to June 12, 1941. She did housework in the Consul's residence. Miss TANAKA stated that she had obtained her job at the Consulate through FUJITA and in her own words, "he put me in there to work." She left the Consulate because of a quarrel with the cook, who had recently come from Japan, as to who had left the icebox open. Miss TANAKA denied having had any intimate relations with MORIMURA. She [18] stated that she once had asked him about his finger, but he refused to tell her anything about it. She often went to the house where MORIMURA lived, to see Miss KIKKAWA, who worked there. MORIMURA told her that he could not, and would not, let her go into his study room.

56. One Sunday, MORIMURA took both Miss TANAKA and Miss KIKKAWA over to Kaneohe, where they went out in the glass-bottom boat. This was while Miss TANAKA was still employed at the Consulate. They drove over with MIKAMI in his taxi, and MIKAMI joined them in the glass-bottom boat. After the boat trip, they went to Kailua and had lunch on the beach, returning to Honolulu via Koko Head. While on the boat, MORIMURA asked MIKAMI questions about Coconut Island, in Kaneohe Bay, but Miss TANAKA could not remember any other questions about the bay which MORIMURA asked. While at Kaneohe they drove by Dr. Iga MÔRI's country place and stopped and looked at it. However, Dr. MÔRI was not there, so they did not go into the house. (Dr. MÔRI is an "elder statesman" of the Japanese community of Honolulu, and was an advisor to the Consulate. He was taken into custody following the outbreak of hostilities, but due to his advanced age and enfeebled condition, subsequently was released.) Later, Miss TANAKA stated that prior to going to the Kaneohe district, they had driven up Alea Heights in MIKAMI's taxi.

57. Robert Orton Glover, Cy (AA), USNR, of the office of the Cable and Radio Censor, Honolulu, has reported that he was fairly well acquainted with MORIMURA, having met him through his membership in the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI. Glover has been training in Japanese military arts under the direction of Dr. Henry OKAZAKI at the NIKKO RESTORATION SANATARium, Honolulu, since 1934, and has conducted classes himself since 1937. A kenôdo (fencing) group, of which Glover was a member, began meeting in the summer of 1941. One George HAMAMOTO of Maui, who was a member of this group, declared that the group needed more help with its study. For this purpose, HAMAMOTO introduced MORIMURA to the group, in October, 1941. Glover first met MORIMURA in mid-October, and he was told that MORIMURA was a member of the Japanese Consulate staff, that he had come from Japan only three months before, and that he was an accomplished kenôdo man. In his kenôdo matches and instructing, MORIMURA disapproved of the local style of fencing which, as described by Glover, consists of short, rapid thrusts without much power. MORIMURA stressed the superiority of the heavy chop stroke, stating that the latter had proved best in the China "Incident." Glover said that MORIMURA did not speak English very well, although he was an attentive listener, and appeared to understand the language. MORIMURA showed particular interest in the haôtes (whites) in the kenôdo class, and asked them many questions as to who they were, where they were educated, where they worked, and similar questions. Besides Glover, there were two other whites in the class, Ted Fielding, Y2c, USNR, and Harold Schnack, a [19] junior draftsman, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA once invited Glover and Fielding to join him in one of his wild parties, but the invitation was not accepted.

58. According to Glover, MORIMURA was known to travel a great deal, around Oahu and between the islands. MORIMURA once remarked to Glover that he was interested in Maui, that he had been over there and liked it very much.
MORIMURA also went fishing a great deal, shore-casting and spear-fishing with a glass box. It was not clearly established whether MORIMURA ever went deep sea fishing on sampans.

59. Alice ABE, a waitress at the SUNCHORO TEA HOUSE, Honolulu, whose professional name is "Sadako," also was interviewed by the investigators. She stated that MORIMURA and Rynichi MORIBE, subject of reference (k), once held a private party at that tea house, with only those two men present. It is not known what was discussed at that meeting. (MORIBE, who has been interned, is a prominent alien businessman in the Japanese community of Honolulu. He admitted, among other things, attending a dinner with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and other prominent local Japanese who were close to the Consulate.)

60. A number of undeveloped leads concerning the Consulate and persons who had contacts with it are still under investigation by the local intelligence agencies, and new leads are from time to time uncovered in the investigation of seemingly unrelated cases of individuals being considered for internment. The same will be developed in further reports under the general title of this case, or under individual case titles, as may be appropriate.

Pending—14ND

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.


Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.


Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

ONI (5)

CinCPac (1)

Com14 (1)

FB1-Hon (2)

MID HD (2)

14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A. ONI File No.:

Synopsis. During the period 3–6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.

Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inaccurate as to destroyers.

Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was engaged in this espionage activity.

The despatch of 12/8, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.

Deductions. Despatches of 3–6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to protect battleships in the harbor.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD,

Captain, U. S. Navy.

District Intelligence Officer.
[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject, 2-9-42.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-
SHIRODO, 2-8-42.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIIE MIKAMI, 2-6-42.

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a). It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and (b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.

2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those communications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter described were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December, 1941.

3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor, and their entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consulate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshiie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORI-
MURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, promi-
nently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor area for the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings to the Consulate. The modus operandi of MORIMURA and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:

WYOMING AND TWO SEAPLANE TENDERS DEPARTED THIRD.

(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at 1208 and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.

5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister TOGO by the local Consulate:

USS HONOLULU ARRIVED 1300/4th

From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300, on 23 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the
CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, between 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message was sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 5 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the HONOLULU type and 2 destroyers.

The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One (ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to Tokyo.

7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0755, the same morning.

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore, correct.

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed, before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared the harbor at 1359, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.

11. Assuming that the Consulate’s observer or observers might not have been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLS) and ex-destroyers now used as minelayers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as to all destroyer-type ships are presented: At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon of 5 December, the four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there since 25 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, and at 1612.

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of interest:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the fourth.
There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.

14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington:

On the evening of the fifth the Battleship Wyoming and one sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 17 destroyers; 5 mine sweepers. Ships in dock: 4 light cruisers; 2 destroyers. (CA and CV all ———) PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet.

The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts: The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl Harbor at 1530 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the following are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYOMING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0600, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day—four high-speed mine sweepers (DMs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three seaplane tenders (AVDs)—which to the untrained observer might have appeared also to be destroyers.

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMs) entered at 0830, cleared at 0920, [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the harbor.

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms “moored” and “in dock” were used, meant to differentiate between ships at moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in drydock and those not in drydock.) From Navy Yard operational data, it was determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.

21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 1248, was called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic):

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.
Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further comment thereon is offered.

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen and British men o’war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco:

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.

The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner LURLINE is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo:

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the fourth. About 1100 tons; one stack; and had a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British Consulate.

Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel’s armament or number of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT’s crew went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December, 1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. Paragraphs 4, 14.

C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU. (Paragraph 5.)

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9.)

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it is concluded that:

A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTO-SHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the erroneous reports.)

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane’s Fighting Ships, readily available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her
turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battleships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was surprisingly inaccurate.

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).

Pending.

[1] Enclosure (A): Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other consuls, concerning military and naval subjects

21 MARCH 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.

29 APRIL 1941

(To Tokyo)

The American Army transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

14 MAY 1941

(To Tokyo)

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reinforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Emmons departed San Francisco at 1530 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0538 the 14th.

7 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units [3] of the fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.
13 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)

Reference: San Francisco msg #92:

SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

26 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

27 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Chungking-Burma Road—Trucks.

28 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)

Daniel Arustein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via Clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

8 JULY, 1941

(To Tokyo and Washington)

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin pact of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force: the local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

15 JULY 1941

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the west coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

26 JULY 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

2 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced)
entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

23 SEPTEMBER, 1941
(To Tokyo)

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

18 NOVEMBER 1941
(To Tokyo)

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma Road trucks 3000-2 ton trucks.

The attached copy (of report sent to F.B.I., Washington by Mr. Shivers on 3/25/42 re notes found on desk pad at Japanese Consulate) was furnished Col. Bicknell.

[1] 1941
1/6 (J) Greek ship New year 23 3
Ambassador Nomura, New Year greetings 71. (70)
1/13 (E) Mr. Hemenway. 10:30 A. M. Hawaiian Trust.
Mr. Thayer.
1/15 (E) Lecture on "Chinese Drama" by Reverent Stephen Mark of the Community Church of Honolulu.
7:30 P. M. Jan. 13, at Mrs. John Marks. (?)
1/16 (J) Tsumeda, Memorial pamphlet.
1/16 (E) Annual meeting and election of officers of Chamber of C. of Honolulu.
12 Noon. Jan. 19 at Young Hotel roof. Midkiff child, Bowen Smith
1/17 (E) Ordinary meeting of Japan Chamber of Commerce. 12: Noon.
Mr. Stevenson T. 6303 a lawyer taking care of Greek steamer "Madours Pateras".
1/19 (E) 1; P. M. Judo opening ceremony. Army & Navy Y. M. C. A.
1/22 (E) 6:30 P. M.—Dr. Takahashi.
1/24 (J) ? Wakayama. Ishizaki, Yamamoto.
1/24 (J) Kihoshita. Japanese School
Hilo, Toyonaka city. Umabayashi, To Japan Kunizakuri.
1/24 (E) Grade wind. Trades wind.
1/25 (J) Mr. Kania, head of the purchasing dept. of House of Mitsukoshi.
1/26 (E) Indoor ball. Ceremony time will be fixed later.
1/26 (J) 6:30 Ishi Garage. In front the Consulate.
1/27 (J) ? association (party) Miyoshino (tea house) 6:30 P. M.
1/29 (E) Hanahaholi PTA meeting. 7:30 P. M.
Speaker: Mrs. Sam Reisbord, Mrs. A. E. Steadman, Mrs. Robert Judd.

2/3 (E) Wrote to Consul T. Kuroki (?) about "Snail" (Sooil) or (Siroil).
Lt. Commander Edwin T. Layton intelligent officer.
2/5 (E) Major General Walter C. Short is to arrive aboard Matsonia.
2/6 (E) Mr. & Mrs. Okudzu
5-7 Waialae Golf Club. Reception in honour of Lt. General & Mrs. Herron and Major G. & Mrs. Short.
2/7 (E) By way of comparison.
2/11 (J) Golf, during morning, 9:30
6:30 A. M.
Dr. Mori, Kimura, attend Okumura, Katsuki, Sumida.
2/14 (J) Yokohama Specie 14/2
Consul. Muto. T. & K. 6:00 p. m. Mochizuki (tea house)
Shunchoro (tea house) $6.00
Dinner
2/15 (E) 8.93
2/18 (E) Kamakura. Mr. Shirai Specie Bank depart for Japan 
Successor Ninei Miyamoto.
2/19 (E) Noon Mr. Midkiff.
2/20 (J) To telegram concerning Trade wind (boat).
2/20 (E) Maiden voyage Kathleene Norris 
A Jew in Love Ben Hecht 
For Men Only Beth Proun 
Wife For Sale Kathleene Norris
2/21 (J) Pacific Bank, 6:30 Mochizuki (tea house) 
Tokyo, wind. Ozaki
2/21 (E) Manhattan Love Song Kathleene Norris 
Angel in the Home Kathleene Norris 
O We Too Are Drifting Gale Wilhelm 
Second Hand Wife Kathleene Norris
2/25 (E) Museum Mr. Brian.
2/27 (J) Mochizuki (cancelled) Royal Hawaiian 6:30 
Mr. & Mrs. Iida Mr. & Mrs. Mori.
2/27 (E) Oriental Literature Society 7:30 
Not able to attend.
Mochizuki.
2/28 (J) Asama Maru Washington Suzuki, wife Miyoko
677182
3/3 (J) [3] Sa—? 6:00 Mochizuki Teahouse.
3/4 (E) Midkiff 6:30 Cigar N. D. Edmunds (Edwards?)
3/6 (E) Academy Art, March 4, March 16. Mr. and Mrs. Okuda.
(J) Chamber of Commerce.
3/9 (J) McCully, dress-maker, 9th—1:00 p. m.
3/10 (J) Invitation to the members of the Consulate. 6:30 p. m. Kyushuya 
(hotel)?
3/11 (E) Mr. Sumida.
(J) Soto-ahn (Soto Sect) Pacific branch 
Kogan Yoshizumi 
The Nissel Club Research meeting. 3 persons 
Watanabe excursion party. Son five years. ?
3/14 (E) ? 92262 GS 904
(J) March 6th, reached Yokohama.
Army Colonel, Head of the Bureau of the Personnel Affairs. 
? ? (two names of places ?) attached to embassy.
Arrival of the Consul General.
3/15 (J) Departure of the Astoria, Salt Lake and other six vessels. 
Heavy cruiser Louisville, Light cruiser St. Louis and so forth, docked.
3/16 (J) Nichibei Chuuo Kabushiki Kai sha (Brewery company in Hilo). 
Fujimoto Manager Hayashi Place, 3 persons Teuada, Takehara, Imai.
3/17 (J) Secretary Morimura, leaving on 20th on Tatsuta Maru from Yoko- 
hamma.
(E) Dr. Franco Montanari, Italian Consul; Wade C. Hiberly, Asst. Col. 
Customs.
3/21 (J) Welcome reception for the Consul General, under the auspices of the 
United Japanese Society. Friday the 21st. Natsumoya, 6:00 p. m.
3/22 (J) Welcome reception for the Consul General, United Society (crossed 
out). Army Commander in Chief, General Short.
(E) Return call—Short.
3/24 (E) 7:30 P. T. A., Hanahauoli School.
3/27 (J) Meeting: Thursday luncheon. Concerning the indictment of the 
owner of the Japanese fishing boat.
(E) Saturday (crossed out) meeting.
(E) 4-10 to Ft. Shafter.
3/30 (E) Murata dug (drug?) 1819 Homerule St., Kalibi. (The word “Makiki” 
underlined in ink, written on same page).
3/31 (J) 7 Commerce.
4/4 (J) Kagawa and his party.
Banquet. Y. W. C. A. dinner
Luncheon Japanese Christian Association, Nuuanu Y. M. C. A.
Tea Party, home of Dr. Iga Mori
Consul General
(E) Reception party at Dr. Iga Mori's home from 3 to 8.

4/6 (J) Only Consul General to University Graduates' Club.

4/10 (J) Consul General Reception for the Japanese side. 6 p. m.
(E) Panamean ship "Loidn" (?) "Loida".

4/12 (J) General meeting of the Fujin-kai. Use of the Consulate Building.
Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce.
Newly appointed Wo Fat (chop suey restaurant)
United Japanese Society, rural representatives.
Councillors—about 60 members invited
Consul Member.

4/14 (J) Auspices: The Oahu Branch of the Hawaii Japanese Christian Association; Time: Noon luncheon; Place: Pleasanton Hotel.
Oahu Branch head; Chiyokichi Furuta.

(E) Rotary Club guest. Luncheon, Young Hotel.

4/16 (J) Nitta-maru docks from mainland.
Obata—1 N. Y. K.
Consul Fukushima 3 A. M.

4/17 (J) Yamamoto (to) Yamashiro Hotel.
Japanese food.

(E) Mr. Charles Bishop
Kinney
c/o Bernard Farden, 711 Prospect St., Tel. 4451
6:30 Mr. and Mrs. Kinney
(In brackets): Mr. Kita—Mr. and Mrs. Okuda.

5/18 (J) Yawata-maru
Lunch Fukuda, a clerk
Evening lent to United Japanese Society.

4/20 (E) Captain Charles (?) Hinharoon.

(E) Telephone number: 67907
Policeman, res. parking place
Norman Gay. Tel. 98542—2629 Manoa Rd.

4/23 (J) N. Y. K. invitation, evening. 6:30 Shunchoro (tea house).
(Phone No.) 63885.

4/24 (E) 10:30 (crossed out). Luncheon—Norman Gay.
4/24 (E) Wade Warren Thayer is to leave for mainland by Lurline to attend the National Boy Scout meeting in Washington.

4/27 (J) Fukunuki $25.00 contribution.
$10.00 contribution.

(E) Member (with arrow pointing to $25.00 contribution). 5:00 p. m.

4/28 (E) The number: 3-6-0-0 written thus, and boxed.

4/29 (E) Dr. Arthur L. Dean.
Director of the Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.
(Sato ? Mr. Wallis, M. Alexander)
Walter F. Dillingham (in Jap. characters: "Pres., Oahu Railway Co.")?
Walter F. Frier (spelled "Frier")?
Frank Tremaine? (this is written on separate sheet—reverse side?)

4/30 (E) Party at C. G. Residence for members of the Consulate.

(J) Frank Tremaine, Honolulu United Press correspondent, left on Lurline
Representatives Tasaburo Shimizu and Riichi (?) Yamamichi left on Lurline

5/1 (E) Invited to luncheon, Mr. S. Abe, Senator.
5/2  (J)  Mochuzuki (tea house) 6:00 informal
     (E)  Call on Mr. Strench (?)
5/3  (E)  Evening, Hanahauola; wedding party of Mr. Hadada. (Hanahauola: tea-house).
      Mr.
5/4  (E)  Expected—M. S. Asama Maru in port.
5/6  (J)  Entertainer—a good talker.
       Kokusai Theater—Gunnison—Young man's eye glasses.
     (E)  F. A. Conteur
       Mr. Baker, photographer
       Dr. Robinson, University of New York
       Mr. R. A. Gunnison.

     (E)  Afternoon 2:00 P. T. A. meeting, Hanahauoli School
     Evening 6:30—C. G. Residence; newspapermen
       Sears Roebuck & Co., 8-10.
5/8  (E)  4:15 Doyle's services at Elks Club, Waikiki.
     (Word "tidbits" written in lower left-hand corner).
5/9  (E)  Luncheon 12:00 Junior Chamber of Commerce.
5/10  (E)  Mothers' Day.
5/11  (J)  11:30 a. m., where to: Haloiwa.
       Evening 6:30, Dr. Faus. Port Lock Rd.
5/15  (E)  Monthly Study meeting 7:45 p. m. at Dr. Mori's. Speaker Cons. Gen.
       Kita.
       Kalama ? ?
       P. P. U. (Pan-Pacific Union?) Wade.
5/18  (J)  Okazaki (judo) arena.
     (E)  10:00 am. lessen (?) first ball, finish 12:00
       Midkiff.
5/19  (E)  May 19. 4:30 p. m. Assembly Room, Hanahauoli School.
5/23  (J)  Fujii Hayakawa
     (E)  Tuesday lecture, Richard Lane.
5/24  (E)  Kazukuehn 149 Sei 1476 Wrong 1568 no visit? 1896
       Punahou School 8:00 a. m.
5/25  (J)  Uluma—Ryukyu (Okinawa) word). “Ulu” means SAND; “ma”
       means ISLAND.
     (E)  7:00 p. m. Bartlett & Robertson.
5/26  (J)  Hawai'i Shogyo Sha (Hawaiî Commercial Press).
     (E)  Mrs. Peak; Mr. and Mrs. Jones; Mr. Robertson.
       (Following numbers—phone? 4327-0051.
     (E)  Shunchoro (tenhouse)—Moribe 6:30
5/27  (J)  Y. M. C. A.—6:00 a. m.
[7]  5/30  (J)  9:00 a.m. Moiliili
       Standing Committee: Serizawa, Sasaki, Ogata
       President.
6/3  (J)  Invitation to Meiji University.
6/4  (E)  Mr. F. Midkiff—2739
       3809 Mr. Frazier
6/6  (E)  8:00 p. m. Central Court of the Honolulu Academy of Arts.
6/10  (E)  Ironwood.
6/11  (J)  Yokohama Specie, Matsuda, night
       Time: 6:30
       Place: Halekulani
       Mr. and Mrs. Matsuda; Mr. and Mrs. Mori (Jr.); Takahashi; Mr. and
       Mrs. Soga (Jr.) Kita; Mr. and Mrs. Okuda; Mr. and Mrs. Yuge
6/12  (F)  Mr. Yugen (Eugene?) Turner speaks on China Affairs at Y. M. C. A.,
       noon.
       If there is any problem that you like to have explained, please feel
       free to call upon us.
6/13  (E)  Resterick, Academy of Arts.
       Friel—5439 (tel. no.?)
     (J)  Road—land—will estimate.
6/16 (E) Mr. Judd speaks on “Hawaii as the Pivot on the Pacific” at P. P. U. luncheon. (Lawrence M. Judd?)

6/21 (E) Mr. Arthur E. Goodwin, Tel. 66220—1704 Keemumoku St.

6/23 (E) 3 Masao Moriyu

237 Takashi Yoshida.

6/26 (E) Alfred C. Young, Punahou, speaker, President of the Alumni Ass’n.

6/28 (E) Luau at Punahou School, 6:30 p.m.


6/30 (E) Italian Consulate—3948

7/4 (E) Arriving July 9th, Kamakura—Diplomatic courier, Kajuwo Taki to Customs.

7/7 (J) Italian Consul meets at the Cocktail party.

(E) Carl Armfelt, 2235 Kalia Rd., Tel. 99865—Cocktail party.

7/8 (J) Tour inspection committee to South America, representatives: head—Kohei Hara; Mishimura, ?; Shinohada, Takbaki; Tehara, Kiyoshi; Toda, ?; Secretary. NYK Hirasaki Maru.

[8] 7/11 (J) The opening of the meeting. All Islands Commercial Meeting.

Mochizuki. Mr. & Mrs. 4:30-6:30.

7/22 (J) First 3 months $21.00

From the 4th month $30.00

First Private $36.00

Senior Private $54.00

Corporate $60.00

Special Sergeant $150.00

(food, clothing, board)

7/23 (J) United Society, Shunchoro teahouse 6:00 p.m.

7/27 (J) Contractors Organization, Ishi Garden, 6:00 p.m.

7/29 (E) P. P. U.

8/4 (J) Ukishma, Halekulani.

8/6 (J) Matsubara, invitation 6:30

Kimura, Onoda, Mr. and Mrs. Matsui

8/10 (E) “M” Day—Mobilization day

(J) Jews residing in America 477 ten thousand (4,770,000)

Negroes 1189 ten thousand (11,890,000)

8/11 (J) Ukishima came from the island.

(E) The word “Monday” is written six times and underlined. The figures: $3,200.00 and $2,000.00 are written all over page, and boxed in some cases.

8/14 (J) Honolulu Geisha (girls) organization.

Memorial day, 30 years anniversary; Congratulatory entertainment, Kokusai theater, from the 14th to the 20th.

8/20 (J) French Consul—money?

(E) I see no necessity for denying the statement since it is entirely baseless on the face of it.

8/21 (J) Douye.

(E) Thursday, Pratt.

8/29 (J) Miyoshino (teahouse) Hanafuji (Teahouse girl’s name?) 6:00 p.m.


8/30 (J) Ikezawa—75588 (phone no?)

(E) Vice Consul and Mrs. Otojiru Okuda

JZK 18160 (radio station?)

[19] 8/31 (J) Aug. 31, 1933, at present there are 24 nations in Europe.

According to President Roosevelt, 70 million dollars.

L. B. loaned three million two thousand four hundred dollars.

9/2 (E) 93870 Hanahanoli School.

9/3 (J) 1. Japanese of Shanghai, $8,000 assets (assets) $8,000,000 yen.

2. The Americans say that manufacturing ability of the Japan Army and Navy airplanes are average 250 planes monthly; together with the people-owned planes and Army and Navy, it is 5000 planes.

(70% are attack planes. Year? Airplane School 7?)

9/4 (E) full-fledged American.

Tenement house. (Japanese character meaning same).

9/6 (J) Tanabe—944172 (James T. Tanabe, 1920 Bingham St.)
9/7 (J) From July 1st, 1941 to the end of the year, 1943, there will be: Large ships 1,153 (12,014,000 tons) on the high seas. Battleships and warships. From Jan 1941 to August there will be:
Completed ships—213
Installed ships—436
Ships launched last year:
1 Battlehip
1 Cruiser
8 Submarines
8 Destroyers
Installation:
2 Battlehips
13 Cruisers
18 Submarines
57 Destroyers
1 Plane carrier
9/9 J) Candy. (Tea and cake to be served?)
9:30 a. m. 11:00 a. m.
9/10 (E) 10:00 a. m. Installation of Bishop Sweeney, D. D., at Cathedral of Our Lady of the Peace.
9/13 (E) President Coolidge for Manila and Shanghai.
9/16 (J) Stop-over: Kunichii Ryohara, Department of Justice Secretary
Hamada, Professor of Imperial University
Nishina, Technician
Kuga, Courier
? Watanabe, Representative Nagatani
(E) President Tailor.
9/16 (E) Shaigeta ? up the can (case?).
Penant? (name of the ship). Two Japanese.
9/20 (J) Foliage plant. Like the chrysanthemum, tulip. A plant which the leaves are to be considered.
(E) Single adultery; double adultery; foliage plant
9/23 (E) Miss Caroline Curtis, 6th grade teacher, anaohauoli School.
9/24 (J) Ship bounded for the east, Penant. Expected to dock.
Fujiiwar, Asayoshi or Yoritoshi.
9/28 (J) 1. Tennis - soft ball 8:30 - 12:30
2. 12:30 Fair golf with Harada, list purse? (Fair Golf: Terr. Golf Course, Ala Wai)?
9/30 (J) Sumida family marriage party, at Natsu-no-ya (teahouse) 6:30 p. m.
(E) ? fairway, 1:00 p. m.
10/2 (E) Jitney sale - high jinks.
(J) Boisterous merrymaking.
10/4 (J) Both my feet had gone to sleep - I got to my feet.
(J) Got numb - got numb.
10/6 (E) Dr. Bowels who was Mrs. Carry in Osaka met at P. P. U.
Mr. Harbin, Hiroshima Higher Normal School met at P. P. U.
P. P. U. Straddles, Panama Zone. suave, polite, haggling and bicker-
(J) 2. pm. Yama no Sakaya (name of brewery in town). Note: on reverse side of calendar sheet, up in corner next to the number 6 is the word "coincident" written in English.
10/7 (J) One gallon is: "niso ichigo" (in Japanese measurement.)
One pint is equal to "nigo hassavaku" (in Japanese measurement).
(E) Gulik at home 6:00 p.m. (pencil)
Dr. Gulike (Gullick) 4:00 p.m. ""
1. Dr. Bowels from Japan spoke at P. P. U. (written in pen).
Muffed the fly? (pencil)
(E) Miss ? who was in Hiroshima Elm at King?
Murray CIO leader was at odds with Lewis.
(A person's name, not clear) Yodobashi-ku, Nishi-Ochiai 1-134.
I know how to get up a bridge game. That's would be from frying pan into fire. Volcanic Isle, by Wilfrid Fleisher. (book?)

10/10 (J) San Francisco departure. Ship bound for the east; Berdia (name of ship). Two Japanese.

(E) Addition, as follows:

1. 79
2. 27
3. 06

10/11 (E) 1.00 Unialae Pu?

10/12 (E) Soft ball, Wahiau

(J) Athletic Association.


Consul General Okuda

Yokohama Specie

10/14 (J) Form (in the circle). Japanese returning?

From the beginning, President Pierce from Shanghai docked. Chinese aviation, 100 persons on board.

10/15 (E) Marriage reception of Takabashi's daughters at Royal Hawaiian Hotel, 4-6 p.m.

(J) Resignation of the Kanoe Cabinet.

For once, only once, only this.

Waimanalo air field, or planes I suppose.

10/16 (J) Sakamoto. (Takejiro Sakamoto, 1518-F Hiram Lane, is listed in phone book under the number given, viz.—$429.)

(E) $7.00 for nothing

Tel. numbers as follows: 684292 (crossed out) 8429 (underlined).

10/17 (J) Marine Inspector, Tatsuta-Maru

Department of Communication

Tsuchiya, a clerk

Also, Foreign Department, Maeda, a clerk.

(E) Official quarters discounted to overlook (in Jap) this possibility


Ceremonial Rites of the Yasukuni Shrine (in Japan). Miyumoto.

(E) Holiday.

It's the stove that's getting me down.

10/19 (J) Taiyo Maru. Consul Kaoru Iwanaga

Tomoki Doi. Department of Communication clerk.

Marine Inspector.

10/20 (E) 7:30

10/23 (J) Tatsuta-Maru docked.

10/24 (J) Departure, Tatsuta-Maru.

10/27 (J) Disposition of the income from the freight by the special computation of the consulate.

Get permission from the Freeze Order officer.


Three o'clock, regular staff—403 Portable—88 Extra—200.

Kikuchi (may be the name).

(E) Pier. 2458 (tel. no.?)

11/2 (J) Immigration official

(E) Customs 2

Harbor Master.

11/5 (J) Taiyo-Maru left port. 7:40 p.m.

Mori, Matsuda, Muramoto, Onoda, Soga, Makino, Sato, Ohya.

11/8 (E) 1. Fairway.

pufferfish

with his back to the piano

(J) Ishii Garden

Balloon fish.

11/10 (J) Ambassador Kurosu's arrival, extended. (delayed?)
11/11 (E) 1. Armistic Day. Holiday
(J) 2. Ambassador Kurusu's arrival extended one day.
11/12 (E) Ambassador Kurusu arrived by China Clipper, 4:35 p. m. at Pearl Harbor.
11/13 (J) Ambassador Kurusu left for California by Clipper, 3:00 p. m.
[13] 11/13 (E) Invited Mr. Morris and Mr. F. Tremaine at Ishii Garden (UP).
11/14 (J) Expect Argentina Japan Ambassador "Gandei Ottei".
(E) (Addition as follows:)
4. 49
5. 30
1. 93
11. 72
11/15 (J) The flying power:
2,500 fighting planes, or over
17,000 members Officers (41,000)
180,000 members Flying Soldiers (600,000)
10,000 members Flying cadets (600,000) (this latter figure is crossed out).
11/19 (J) Foreign radio program.
(E) TZI—9535 kc. 10:30 p. m.
15105 News 1:30 p. m.
9535 6:00 p. m.
9535 9535 (this latter is crossed out).
11/23 (E) The word OBSERVE written four different times and underlined in each case. The word LOT also appears several times, same way.
(J) The words SEA and SAILOR appear several times.
12/1 (E) Within the predictable future.
2609000 19,463.14
236 6,635.86
2,499.00 26,099.00
12/2 (E) (Only following figures appear):
23000 24
26,009.00
24,478.25
1,620.75
3.38
1,624.13

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
HONOLULU, T. H., March 19, 1942.

Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Army Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR Sir: There are being forwarded herewith copies of translations made of coded and confidential material obtained from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu. It may be observed that Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" are not included inasmuch as they are messages which were not decoded.

Photographic copies of the originals of all of the foregoing will be furnished you at an early date.

Very truly yours,

R. L. Shivers,
R. L. Shivers,
Special Agent in Charge.

Enclosures.
Translation of a Register of Radiograms

1. Two copies of the translation of radiograms received by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu during 1941 is forwarded to you for your information.

G. W. B.

Encl. (2).

HONOLULU, T. H., March 13, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Washington, D. C.

Re: JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H., CONFILE—ESPIONAGE (J)

Dear Sir: Reference is made to a letter to the Bureau dated March 2, 1942, transmitting a translation of a register of radiograms sent by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu during the year of 1941. This letter indicated that a register of messages received by the Consulate would be translated and forwarded to the Bureau.

In accordance therewith, there are being forwarded copies of a translation of a register of radiograms received by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu during 1941. The synopses of the messages recorded in the enclosures herewith are believed to represent all of the incoming radio activity on the part of the Japanese Consulate.

This register should be considered with the register of radiograms transmitted, which was forwarded to the Bureau by letter dated March 2, 1942, and with the photorecord negatives of this register and other coded material which were forwarded to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

R. L. Shivers,
Special Agent in Charge.

FGT: LT
65-414.

Enclosures—5.

cc: G-2 Honolulu (3 enclosures), ONI Honolulu (3 enclosures).

TRANSLATION OF FORM IN WHICH WEIIE RECORDED THE INCOMING TELEGRAMS TO THE CONSULATE:

INCOMING TELEGRAMS

TELEGRAMS, OFFICIAL MESSAGES
SECRET. ORDINARY
NO. ---
FILE NO. ---
DATED. month. day
RECEIVED. month. day
FROM. ---
TO. ---
ATTACHED TO:
RECEIVED. month. day
SUBJECT: (gist of contents)
CHANNEL OF DISPOSITION:
TO. --- month. day
FROM. --- month. day
TO. --- month. day
FROM. --- month. day
TO. --- month. day
FROM. --- month. day
TO. --- month. day
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FROM. --- month. day
TO. --- month. day
FROM. --- month. day
TO. --- month. day
FROM. --- month. day
TO: THE ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION

TELEGRAM SECTION (X)

PERSON IN CHARGE: ---

REMARKS:


### TYPES OF CODES:

- A. AN (GO)
- B. RYAKU (GO)
- C. HEI (ordinary)

### ABBREVIATIONS:

CG. CONSUL GENERAL
ADS. ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION
TS. TELEGRAM SECTION

1. The letter GO is very similar to another letter, namely, REI, which may mean ORDER (in the sense of issued order), but since the letter — GO or REI — may also be a designation of a certain type of code, this explanation is being attached for reference. This letter appears under columns entitled TELEGRAM NO. & CODE TYPE and CONTENTS.

2. The word GOGAI is presumably a designation to the effect that the radiogram does not belong to any one type of code for the word literally means “outside of number.” However, the word may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

3. The word MU literally means nil or none, but this may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

### TOP SECRET

**FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>5-B</td>
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<td>Ditto. (to the Ambassador #3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-B</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10-B</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2/26</td>
<td>Re date when Consul General Kita will start for his new post.</td>
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<td>11-B</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-B</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>Re Consul General Kita’s companion.</td>
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<td>14-B</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>Re appointment of Secretary (TADASHI) MORIMURA to service in this Consulate.</td>
<td>To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-B</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>3/18</td>
<td>Re starting for new post of Secretary Morimura.</td>
<td>To the CG 3/18, to the TS 3/18.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-A</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-YUGO</td>
<td>127</td>
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<td>Re distribution of code type TSU and AN. (type GO #1 type 9) (dated 3/12)</td>
<td>To the CG 3/31, to the TS 4/1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-B</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-B</td>
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<td>23-B</td>
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<tr>
<td>[6] 28-C</td>
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<td>To the CG 5, to the TS 5/3.</td>
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<td>5/24</td>
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<td>37-C</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>5/31</td>
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<td>238</td>
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<td>To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/4.</td>
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<td>40-C</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>6/7</td>
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<td>254</td>
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<td>Ditto.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>plot of the crew on the battleship &quot;Pennsylvania,&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>300</td>
<td>7/3</td>
<td>Re putting into force the telegraphic code type &quot;TA&quot;:</td>
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<td>301</td>
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<td>321</td>
<td>7/12</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
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<tr>
<td>[8] 53-B</td>
<td>322</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>55-A</td>
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<tr>
<td>56-A</td>
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<td>7/16</td>
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<td>57-B</td>
<td>336</td>
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<td>344</td>
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<tr>
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<td>352</td>
<td>7/24</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
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<tr>
<td>1631-ANOO...</td>
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<td>61-A</td>
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<td>7/29</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
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<td>62-A</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>432</td>
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<td>3/19</td>
<td>Re district under jurisdiction of the sub-Consulate at &quot;HOUSTON.&quot; (from the Minister #1) (dated 3/8) (from Houston)</td>
<td>To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MU-B</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>4/11</td>
<td>Re sensing of hard &quot;tennis balls.&quot; (from Peking)</td>
<td>To the CG 4/12, to the TS 4/12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-ANGO</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>4/19</td>
<td>Re stopping in port of the American, &quot;BOB COOK,&quot; (to the Minister #222) (from Manila)</td>
<td>To the CG 4/19, to the TS 4/21.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-HEI-YU-GO</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>5/8</td>
<td>Re new &quot;Address&quot; of the sub-Consulate at &quot;HOUSTON.&quot; (dated 4/29) (from Houston)</td>
<td>To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-B</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>7/7</td>
<td>Re interpretation of telegram(s) (from Ambassador to Britain) (from Canton)</td>
<td>To the CG 7/8, to the TS 7/10.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No number-A</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>7/7</td>
<td>Delivering message to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU. (separate telegram) (from Canton)</td>
<td>To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-A</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>8/15</td>
<td>Symbol for the Consulate head (from Canton)</td>
<td>To the CG 8/15.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-A</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>8/15</td>
<td>Symbol for the Consulate head (from Canton)</td>
<td>To the CG 8/19.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>9/15</td>
<td>Re recognizances for class #2 of HEISHIKAN (a school) (to the Minister #36) (dated 9/10) (from Vancouver)</td>
<td>To the CG 9/15, to the TS 9/16.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GOAGI-C</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>11/7</td>
<td>Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister GOAGI) (from Manila)</td>
<td>To the CG 11/7, to the TS 11/8.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

FROM: LOS ANGELES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telegram No. &amp; Code</th>
<th>File No.</th>
<th>Date Rec'd</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1/6</td>
<td>Re movements of U.S. warships (to the Minister #230) (dated 12/23)</td>
<td>To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1/6</td>
<td>Ditto (to the Minister #221) (dated 12/27)</td>
<td>To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107-RYAKU-YU-GO</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1/7</td>
<td>Re sending of representatives of the Patriotic Women's Society. (to the Minister #222)</td>
<td>To the CG 1/9, to the TS 1/10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1/14</td>
<td>Movements of U.S. warships (dated 1/8)</td>
<td>To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegram No. &amp; Code Type</td>
<td>File No.</td>
<td>Date Rec'd</td>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>Disposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-(C)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1/16</td>
<td>Re visit to the U. S. by the “Subaru Show” troupe. (To the Minister #7) (dated 1/13)</td>
<td>To the CG 1/16, to the TS 1/17. To the CG 1/23, to the TS 1/24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1/23</td>
<td>Re movements of the U. S. warships. (to the Minister #7) (dated 1/13)</td>
<td>To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1/30</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #9) (dated 1/21)</td>
<td>To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-RYAKU-YU-GO</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>Re parcel post to Japan... (to the Minister #14) (dated 1/26)</td>
<td>To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>Re movements of the U. S. Navy... (to the Minister #15) (dated 1/27)</td>
<td>To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1/23</td>
<td>Re problem of evacuation of the Japanese residents in the U. S. (to the Minister #4) (dated 1/10)</td>
<td>To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[63] 13-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>Movements of U. S. Navy... (to the Minister #17) (dated 2/1)</td>
<td>To the CG 2/12, to the TS 2/13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-A</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3/5</td>
<td>Ditto...</td>
<td>To the CG 3/5, to the TS 3/6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>3/27</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #9)</td>
<td>To the CG 3/28, to the TS 3/28. To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>Re visit to the U. S. by the Representatives, YAMAJI and SHIMIZU. (from the Minister #26) (dated 3/26)</td>
<td>To the CG 4/3 to the TS 4/4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-RYAKU-YU-GO</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>Re visit to the U. S. by delegates of the Japanese Christian Federation. (to the Minister #34) (dated 3/26)</td>
<td>To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>4/15</td>
<td>Movements of the U. S. Navy... (to the Minister #38) (dated 4/8)</td>
<td>To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-AN-YU-GO</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>4/23</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #44) (dated 4/12)</td>
<td>To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-A</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>5/1</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #59) (dated 5/1)</td>
<td>To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.</td>
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</table>

[64] FROM: PORTLAND:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telegram No. &amp; Code Type</th>
<th>File No.</th>
<th>Date Rec'd</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-ANGO</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>5/28</td>
<td>Re movements of the U. S. Navy... (to the Minister #66)</td>
<td>To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9. To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-A</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>6/2</td>
<td>Ditto...</td>
<td>To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3. To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-ANGO</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>6/2</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #83)</td>
<td>To the CG 6/17, to the TS 6/17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-B</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>6/17</td>
<td>Re greeting courier YAMAZAKI at pier.</td>
<td>To the CG 6/20, to the TS 6/21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-RYAKU-YU-GO</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>6/19</td>
<td>Re strike by the employees of the “NORTH AMERICAN” Airplane Company, (to the Minister #87) (dated 6/6)</td>
<td>To the CG 6/19, to the TS 6/21.</td>
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<tr>
<td>34-RYAKU-YU-GO</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>6/23</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #96) (dated 6/11)</td>
<td>To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-A</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>7/9</td>
<td>Re survey of assets of Japanese people living on the mainland U. S.</td>
<td>To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-ANGO</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>Re movements of U. S. Warships... (to the Minister #112)</td>
<td>To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-A</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>7/17</td>
<td>Re resending of telegram(s)...</td>
<td>To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-ANGO</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>9/10</td>
<td>Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #176)</td>
<td>To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegram No. &amp; Code Type</td>
<td>File No.</td>
<td>Date Rec’d</td>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>Disposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>[66] 44-ANGO...........</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>9/20</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #100)</td>
<td>To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/24.</td>
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<tr>
<td>47-ANGO..............</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>10/13</td>
<td>Problem of Japan-U.S. ship communications. (to the Minister #201)</td>
<td>To the CG 10/13, to the TS 10/13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-RYAKUGO...........</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>10/16</td>
<td>Re notices of attainment of military age for year 1942. (to the Minister #200)</td>
<td>To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.</td>
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<tr>
<td>50-ANGO..............</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>10/17</td>
<td>Ditto... (Minister #94)</td>
<td>To the BG 10/17, to the TS 10/20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62-ANGO..............</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>10/20</td>
<td>Movements of U.S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #205)</td>
<td>To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-ANGO..............</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>10/24</td>
<td>Re investigation of Japanese associations by the F.B.I. (to the Minister #207)</td>
<td>To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.</td>
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<tr>
<td>[66] [66].....................</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>10/28</td>
<td>Ditto... (to the Minister #214)</td>
<td>To the CG 10/28, to the TS 10/29.</td>
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<tr>
<td>70-ANGO..............</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>11/4</td>
<td>Re simplifying of procedure for expatriation. (to the Minister #217)</td>
<td>To the CG 11/4, to the TS 11/7.</td>
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<tr>
<td>313-ANGO...............</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>11/20</td>
<td>Re ships requisitioned by the U.S. Army and the Navy. (to the Minister #110)</td>
<td>To the CG 11/29, to the TS 11/2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-RYAKUGO...........</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>12/4</td>
<td>Re procedure for expatriation. (from the Minister #110)</td>
<td>To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/5.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-C</td>
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<tr>
<td>-(C)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Claussen Investigation Exhibit No. 4

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets L and M.


b. Inter-staff routing slip dated 2 April 1942 re Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate, w/ F. B. I. letter dated 2 April 1942, same subject.
JAPANESE CONSULATE & CONSULAR AGENTS—Translation of Japanese Consulate Radio Log Book

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 7 March 1942.

Subject: Translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

1. Attached hereto is the translation of a message log book, as maintained by the staff of the Honolulu Japanese Consulate, which shows the file number, code, date and subject matter of radio messages sent from the Consulate to various points for the year 1941.

2. This information is forwarded for such use as it may serve to your office.

Kendall J. Fielder,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2.

GWB: mkc
1 encl.—Translation as noted.
CC:
Dept. Signal Office, H. H. D. (2)
O. N. I., Honolulu, T. H. (1)
[Handwritten:]
336.92—Consular Representative
333.4—Espionage.

Translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log

1st Ind.

CO DSO

1. Attached hereto is the translation of a log book, as maintained by the staff of the Honolulu Japanese Consulate, which shows the file number, code, date and subject matter of radio messages sent from the Consulate to various points for the year 1941.

2. This information is forwarded for such use as it may serve to your office.

Enclosure: (2)

G. W. B.

Federal Bureau of Investigation.
United States Department of Justice,
Honolulu, T. H., March 2, 1942.

The following is a translation of a form, printed in Japanese, on which radio messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H., were recorded:

Outgoing Messages

Telegrams, official:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secret</th>
<th>Ordinary</th>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
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<tr>
<td>File No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispatched</td>
<td>Month</td>
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<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>To</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Attached to</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

7 March 42.
### OUTGOING MESSAGES—Continued

**Subject**: (gist of contents)

**Disposal and development**:

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<th>To</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Day</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

From The Archives and Document Section.

To The Telegram Section.

**Person in charge**: 

**Remarks**: Entries were not made in all of the spaces provided on the above form. The symbols, A N (cryptogram ?), R Y A K U (code), and H E I (ordinary message), were written over the printed characters for “Official Dispatches” and are represented in the translation by A, B and C, respectively. There were also used in this manner the Japanese characters Y U (pertaining to postal?) and M U (a negative term).

### DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Code ? No.)</th>
<th>File No.</th>
<th>Date, 1941</th>
<th>Synopsis of message</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>Matter re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women’s Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>Matter re Greek Ship heading toward Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-B</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1-11</td>
<td>Report of list of conversation with “ABEND”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-B</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1-11</td>
<td>Conversation on meeting with newly appointed Commander KIMMEL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-A</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1-13</td>
<td>Movements of U. S. Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-B</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1-13</td>
<td>Matter re social expenses for third period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-B</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1-15</td>
<td>Matter re invitation to luncheon for Ambassador NOMURA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-A</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1-16</td>
<td>Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-A</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1-16</td>
<td>Matter re Greek Ship heading toward Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-B</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1-20</td>
<td>Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan. (LACONICUS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-A</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1-22</td>
<td>Matter re visit to Japan by American citizens of Japanese ancestry without passports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-A</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1-23</td>
<td>Matter re movement of U. S. warships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-A</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1-28</td>
<td>Matter re simplifying of clearances of documents carried by Consul General NAKAMURA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-A</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1-29</td>
<td>Matter re proposal of Admiral RICHARDSON to welcome Ambassador NOMURA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-B</td>
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| 1-B          | 15       | 1-17       | Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI and troupe. (request telegram) |
| 2-A          | 18       | 1-21       | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #14) |
| 3-A          | 20       | 1-23       | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #16) |
| 4-B          | 101*     | 4-26       | Departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI. (to San Francisco #1) |
| 5-A          | 175      | 7-16       | Re re-sending of telegram. |

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| 1-B          | 2        | 1-6        | Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship. (to New York #1) |
| 2-B          | 3        | 1-6        | Re date of arrival in and departure from San Francisco of Minister SUMA. |
| (1)-B        | 1        | 1-7 (dup- lication) | Re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's Society. (to the Minister) |
| 3-B          | 9        | 1-11       | Report of gist of conversation with ABEND. (to the Minister #6) |
| 4-A          | 19       | 1-22       | Re trip to Japan without passports by American citizens of Japanese parentage. (to the Minister #10) |
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| 6-B          | 61*      | 3-15       | Re journey of Ambassador TOMII. |
| 7-A          | 83       | 4-7        | Re resending of telegram. |
| 8-A          | 84?      | 4-7        | Re stopping in port of the Japan Christian Federation. (to the Minister #61). |
| 9-(A)        | 85       |            | Re shifting of telegrams. |
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| 11-B         | 101*     | 4-26       | Re departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI. |
| 12-A         | 107*     | 4-30       | Re seizure of crew members of the COLUMBIA by British warship. (to the Minister #73). |
| 13-A         | 109*     | 5-1        | Re seizure of German(s) by British warship. (to the Minister #75). |
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| 15-A         | 132      | 6-6        | Re German boarding the TATUTA MARU. |
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| 18-B         | 185*     | 7-31       | Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU. |
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| 23-B         | 271*     | 10-22      | Re passengers on board the TAIYO MARU. |
| 24-A         | 288      | 10-27      | Re delivery to Secretary MAEDA. |
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| (-C)         | 26       | 1-28       | Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA’s sojourn. (to Secretary OKUMURA). |
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</tbody>
</table>

TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

NR 63
From: Kita.
To: Consul, San Fran.

The following from Ambassador Tomii: I and Ikeoawa, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, secretary to Embassy, expect to arrive your place (San Francisco) on the December Tatuta Maru X Will depart (San Francisco) the same day at 2300 by Santa Fe "Chief" #24 Request that you reserve one double bedroom compartment and one lower berth X Also please reserve same accommodations on the Liberty Limited departing Chicago on the 23rd for Washington.

NR 64
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

When the two Honganji Missionaries: Azakawato Mitaniglin (?) Home address: Shimane Kin, Oti Gun, Kawatomuna (correction Kawatomura) and Okamoto Talyu, home address; Tokio, Suginami Ku, Kamiogikubo (?) #730 request passports from there Tohawaii (from Washington ?) if there is no objection after an examination of their records, please expedite the forwarding of the passports. Both men are coming to fill vacancies.

NR 66
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

(by code in mail to Washington).

* * * According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummins, Tucker, arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland and the destroyer Clark, Cassin, Cunyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit x The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor x It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane x Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" (gaihun) until they arrived. The maintinance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was reported.

NR 72
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

* * * Monimura reported for duty on the 27th (Correction Morimura).

No. 76
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Holcomb has not arrived in the past ten days. Furthermore as the Harrison (steamship) will not return to our country the subject person is the one who is going direct to Manila.

NR 77
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Re passports for sailors on Japanese ships calling at the port of Honolulu and other US ports . . .

R. C. A.

NR 78
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Ref #29 of 7 March

With respect to the request of the client (Irainin) although I realize that . . . is unreasonable, please forward by mail on the Yawata Maru which departs from Yokohama on the 10th of April X I appreciate your special efforts.
R. C. A.

3 April 1941

From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio, Manila Consulate.

Holland's foreign minister, his wife, and the colonial minister (Takumu Gaimudaijin) arrived here from San Francisco on the 2nd via Clipper and departed for Batavia via Manila on the 3rd X. Local newspapers stated that this inspection of the Nei at this time is noteworthy.

R. C. A.

5 April 1941

From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Re charges against the owner of the confiscated fishing boats.

R. C. A.

April ? 1941

From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister.

Later seizure proceeding have been instituted against the other eighteen of the nineteen ships mentioned in my previous dispatch X. After considerable deliberation a court judgment was obtained under which the 1st of the ships was confiscated by the US Government X. Even tho it was to be put up at auction, judging from examples on the mainland, by the time the price is so reduced by sale at auction, the owner gets nothing X. Furthermore the parties concerned get quite a blow from the customs as a result of this seizure X. Already steps are being taken to claim loss from a standpoint of damage to the boats, and in one case authority has been granted for a release from bond X. Later on such steps will be taken in all cases.

R. C. A.

19 April 1941

From: Kita.
To: Consul, San Fran.

Radio industry employee (?) Fukuda departed here the 18th for your city X. Because of his position please use your influence in getting him through customs.

R. C. A.

21 April 1941

From: Kita.
To: Gaimudaijin, Tokio.

President Roosevelt's eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt together with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed for Manila on the 21st X. The local newspapers said that both men said that any statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington X. Perhaps is Chungking.

R. C. A.

26 April 1941

From: Kita.
To: Consul General, San Fran.

For your information Shimizu and Yamazi, members of the Diet, departed here the 25th on the Lurline for Los Angeles X. From Los Angeles they plan to proceed to your city.

R. C. A.

30 April 1941

From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.
Inf: Manila.

Mr. Henry Buse (correction Luce) managing editor and publisher of Time, Fortune, and Life and Claire Booth (pen name) took the Clipper for Manila on the 30th X. They plan to go to Chungking by way of Hongkong X. After a trip of about two months they plan, upon returning to the States, to conduct a series of lectures at various places X. This information from the newspapers.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

Mackay Radio
1 MAY 1941
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Gauss, the newly appointed American Ambassador to China, enroute to his new station put in here on the 30th on the President Garfield. He plans going direct to Chungking.

Mackay Radio
14 MAY 1941
From: Kita.
To: Gaimudaijin, Tokio.

When there is a request for a passport to Hawaii from Kusuda Kakushin missionary bishop ?? of the Higushi (correction Higashi) Honganji (a temple) (Home address: Niigata, Nishibori Dori 7 Bango ??) If there is no objection from the investigation of his record please forward passport at once x He has applied as a successor to Okiji who returned home early November (request message).

Mackay Radio
23 MAY 1941
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Inf: Washington, D. C.

The New Zealand's Minister of Lands Frank Langstone, former Premier J. Gordon Coates and part of eight put in here on the 21st by Clipper enroute to Washington x They plan to discuss problems concerning the protection of British and US territory.

Mackay Radio
24 MAY 1941
From: Kita.
To: Minister, San Francisco.

Code Clerk Taki is heading for your office via the Tatuta Maru your good offices are requested in helping him through customs.

Mackay Radio
27 MAY 1941
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

The Trade Wind left port on the 26th and should arrive Yokohama the end of June.

R. C. A.
3 JUNE 1941
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokio

The Punahou School is extending an invitation to Mr. Tadamichi Taketi, Director of the Taiwan Pottery Company to attend the One Hundred Year Celebration x I have no objections to his attending and request you issue necessary passport.
NR 133
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister Tokio
S Jap nationals sailed the tenth on the Tatsuta (2 stowaways and 6 deportees) having been deported by the immigration authorities bound for Kobe and Yokohama X Yokahama three Japs Kobe three Japs two Koreans.

7 June 1941

NR 134
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio
INF: Ambassador Washington (by mail to San Francisco and Los Angeles and Seattle)
1. On the fourth received work (correction word) from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy no extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.
2. According to an announcement by Navy Dept officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units on the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods X the periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

13 June 1941

NR 140
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio
INF: (have forwarded by mail to San Francisco and Manila)
Ref San Francisco MSG #92
SS Pres Pierce with about nine hundred Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the eleventh and sailed the twelfth.

16 June 1941

NR 143
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio
INF: Minister Washington
Because of return (resignation (?)—recall was probably the word used, though it was a resignation in fact) of honorary German consul I have been requested by Germany Embassy in Washington to handle German affairs here.

17 June 1941

N. 144
From: Kita
To: (Action) Minister Washington
(Info) Foreign Minister, Tokio
Group visas were refused for a Meiji U. Baseball Team Kita is requested that Jap Ambassador use his influence to get the visas authorized.

27 June 1941

No. 147
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokio
Chungking Burma Road—Trucks

26 June 1941

No. 149
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo
Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by Clipper the 25th.
R. C. A.

23 June 1941

No. 152
From: Kita
To: Ryoji Hongkong
Foreign Minister, Tokyo

Daniel Armstein Harold Davis Manco Hellman transportation managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via Clipper for Hongkong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

R. C. A.

30 June 1941

No. 155
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Memo from German Consul he closes shop on the 30th.

Mackay Radio

3 July 1941

No. 159
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Koshi Washington

Continued it has been decided to confiscate 7 ships (total ships 8) (no Kori (?) yu 1 selu no uti (?) 3 vessels have been released under hand and 2 have already gone fishing.

This matter of seizing fishing vessels is of a difficult nature: It is fishing season (?) and as it has a large influence on local food supplies, the authorities concerned are observing it. (Part not clear—seems to be something about outrage against Japanese) there is a movement to buy the confiscated ships (by US. Government) and to release them underhand. At the same time delegate King is making endeavors and those in Washington should make representations.

Mackay Radio

8 July 1941

No. 163
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo—Minister Washington

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin pact of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force the local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his Consulate (largely from local air groups) newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese Military Attaché in Washington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) newspapers or the 5th 200 men have already (toppa senn) gone (?). The Chinese Consul (correction Consul) General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

Mackay Radio

10 July 1941

No. 165
From: Kita #119 of 10th, 20th or 30th (No month shown).
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
Ref: Your Circular 1381 . . .
Strictly secret: 9th one American and one German should have departed by now.

Mackay Radio

11 July 1941

No. 169
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Movements and opinions of Chiang Kai Shek new adviser Latimore.
Mackay Radio 15 July 1941

No. 173
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo

The Italian Consulate was closed on the 10th, the Consul has at last obtained permission to withdraw a portion of the government funds and all of the private funds of the staff members. The Consul and one secretary have ordered the resident civil official to take over the post, and after the Consul has visited his mother who resides in New York he will proceed to his new post on the Tatsuta Maru sailing from San Francisco the 31st (the secretary will proceed on the Yawata Maru sailing here the 18th) no request was made to entrust official or other documents to that office.

Mackay Radio 15 July 1941

No. 174
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

Mackay Radio 26 July 1941

No. 187
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide, will leave Alameda in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane 6 officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

Mackay Radio 22 July 1941

No. 181
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

This office has a request from a Mr. W. R. B. McBain, Manager of the Shanghai firm of George McBain, and his wife Mrs. V. W. K. McBain for a visa to visit Japan. These people spend a good deal of their time in Shanghai, and have been residing here for the past six weeks. They wish to stop over between ships in Japan. And state that they have visited there many times before. They both have on two previous occasions (10 July 1930 and 25 August 1939) obtained visas in Shanghai. They returned to their home country in 1940. Have you any objections to these visas. Answer to that question requested.

Mackay Radio 28 July 1941

No. 189
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Some sort of answer requested.
Mackay Radio  

JULY 30 1941

No. 192
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Since the enforcement of the law freezing Japanese credits in America has been anticipated for a long time, at this office and through the Japanese language newspapers all the residents were warned of the effects upon them in case it was put into force, and even with the enforcement of the law on the 26th the residents did not show any particular disquietude. The methods of application of the law were announced and since the actual restrictions on the residents, remittance to Japan, and importation of Japanese goods were considered quite lenient, they were accepted calmly. The remittances to Japan in anticipation of the freezing order and also the hoarding of U. S. currency has amounted to a considerable sum. Furthermore the United States authorities here have emphasized that although in the midsts of the worst anti-American circumstances the residents have nothing to fear so long as they obey U. S. laws.

Mackay Radio  

30 JULY 1941.

No. 193
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

To Japan Broadcasting Company your new frequencies are lousy for Hawaii. Please go back to 19-25-31 meters.

Mackay Radio  

30 JULY 1941.

No. 194
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Office Tokyo

According to a report in an English language paper on the 30th a telegram has been received by the local Chinese Consul General from a Central American ambassador to the fact that steps are being considered to exempt Chinese diplomatic and consular officials from the application of the freezing order.

31 JULY 1941.

No. 195
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Since the Tatsuta Maru will sail directly from San Francisco to Japan, the arrival and departure of the Abama Maru entering this 31st will be difference from usual. Moreover when the Tatsuta Maru enters this port there will be no loading problem, two hundred and some persons will board, and it has been announced that the local customs authorities will not obstruct the arrival and departure of this ship.

R. C. A.  

2 Aug. 1941.

No. 199
From: Kita
To: Riyoji San Francisco

The Tatsuta Maru will arrive in Honolulu August 1, loaded according to instructions from the N. Y. K.

R. C. A.  

7 Aug. 1941.

No. 207
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Visas were refused in both cases your indulgence is requested.
No. 214
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
$483 for defense fund.

No. 226
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Subsequently, still another boat was adjudged confiscated (total 9 boats) and one other boat was released, as in my earlier telegrams, and after the effective intervention of the Territorial Governor and others, according to information from Washington on the 26th, the Justice Department has decided that seven of the aforementioned boats be sold to United States citizens to satisfy the stipulations of the Department, and that the former owners should pay back 20% of the appraised value plus court costs together with the indebtedness on the boats themselves.

Mackay Radio
No. 229
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
On the 2d an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced) entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

Mackay Radio
No. 232
From: Kita
To: Riyoji San Francisco
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Hayakawa Kiyoshi, a Government official of this country, intended to enter your port in April of this year, if he is still in your city, please register him with the State Department as a foreign Government official. If he has already left your city please investigate and reply by cable giving the year, month, and day of departure and as many other details as possible.

Mackay Radio
No. 245
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
Riyoji Shanghai
Kugami Watawabe Tajima sailing on Tyler for Shanghai welcome

Mackay Radio
No. 246
From: Kita
To: Riyoji Shanghai
Arrival of Katuyama here from Shanghai Oct 1 via Pres. Tyler
Two of the seven fishing boats reported released according to stipulations were sold on the 26th at prices comparable to their appraised values to the Hawaii Canning Company which has a very close connection with the boats, and court proceedings were dispensed with. In connection with the above, the former owners, at the beginning as in my telegrams, must pay to the court out of the selling price 20% of the appraised value ($2,110 for one boat and $1,017 for the other) and also court costs ($178.86 for one and $185.80 for the other). It is expected that the same procedure will be followed in the cases of the other five boats. However, the above being a civil case, a decision is expected, but criminal procedure still remains, but this also is expected to be disposed of with leniency.

Once more on September 30 two other boats were sold, in the same way as explained in my previous telegram, to the Hawaii Canning Company court procedure being followed.

The special session of the Legislature of Hawaii which open from September 15th for the purpose of considering legislation for war time action (M-Ray Bill) passed the aforesaid bill and the Territorial Governor affixed his signature to it on the 3rd. This bill invests far-reaching authority in the Territorial Governor in case of war, chief provisions of which are: the organization of special police and fire fighting forces and medical squads, etc., anti-air preparations, the utilization of community installations and highways, the regulation of food supplies and commodity prices, the control of rumors etc., in order to put the above measures into effect a budget of $500,000 is being appropriated. Details by mail.
According to information in the newspapers delegate King who is here at present says that as for the plan for a revision of the Territorial Nationality Law, the United States wants to settle the problem of dual citizenship, but a complete settlement without negotiating with the interested countries cannot be expected. Consequently after the delegate returns to Washington and has conferred with the War Department, it is his intention to introduce into Congress a resolution requesting provisions for the breaking-off of nationality from the countries concerned.

No. 272
From: Kita
To: Ryoji San Francisco

The State Department has no objection to the landing of Maeda (Jimushokan) at either Honolulu to San Francisco and will omit formalities, according to information received from the American Embassy in Tokyo on the 20th. Please transmit the above information to Maeda upon the arrival of the Tatsuta Maru.

No. 274
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington

Since there is room for 50 first class and 80 second class passengers on the Taiyo Maru, it is suggested that the Tatsuta Maru allotment be made use of and transferred to the Taiyo Maru here. Please reply by telegraph.

No. 275
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington

The passengers on the Taiyo Maru are as follows: (Table below of 5 columns and 6 rows)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1st class</th>
<th>2nd class</th>
<th>3rd class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American of Jap extraction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans ()</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. 276
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington

The Taiyo Maru, requisitioned by the Imperial Government, sailed from Yokohama today the 22nd.

Consul Iwanaga Hiraku (---
and Doi Tomoyoshi (-----)
an official in the communications department were given passage by the kantoku (Doi is qualified as a shipping kantoku).
R. C. A. 24 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
The Foreign Minister is presenting a commemorating gift to the recently
resigned honorary consuls at Philadelphia and San Juan (one cloisonne flower
vase each). These are being sent in two wooden boxes addressed to the embassy
(Washington) in the care of Consul Iwanaga, who is a passenger on the Taiyo
Maru sailing from here on the 22nd. It is requested that arrangements be
made for their clearance through customs and ultimate delivery.

R. C. A. 25 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
Mr. Crichton Colvin an American of the International News Service has re-
quested a visa for a stopover in Japan. He expects to leave here on the Tatuta
Maru sailing November 4th. Instructions requested.

R. C. A. 25 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
Since the time limit for reporting is near, shall this office and its staff report?
Please telegraph immediately instructions and items of the report.

R. C. A. 25 Oct. 1941
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
Re your No. 96 Newman wishes to return to Japan on the Taiyo Maru leaving
here Nov. 4th. After conferring with the head of the department, please let me
know if you have any objections.

Mackay Radio 1 Nov. 1941
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
The Taiyo Maru arrived safely on the first it is being handled by the Americans
in the same manner as was the Tatsuta Maru the above information was received
from both Doi, an official in the office and from the Chief of the Shipping Bureau.

Mackay Radio 4 Nov. 1941
From: Kita
To: Ryoji New York City
Consul Clerk Tokunaga Honolulu to Lisbon via New York extend courtesies.

From: Kita
To: Ryoji Seattle Washington
Foreign Minister Tokyo
The Taiyo Maru departed safely at 7:40 p.m. on the fifth carrying 23 bags
of 3rd class mail.
The above information has been received from both Manager Doi and the
Chief of the Marine Bureau (harbor master?).

Mackay Radio 7 November 1941
From: Kita
To: Ryoji San Francisco
Consul Clerk Tokunaga arrives San Francisco twelfth on Lurline.
Mackay Radio 7 November 1941

No. 310
From: Kita
To: Tokio Foreign Minister

After granting Newman's visa, he informs us that he has cancelled his passage on the Taiyo Maru and will remain here for the present.

Mackay Radio 11 November 1941

No. 316
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

Secretary of War Stimson on the third pointed out to Congress that the aliens in Hawaii amount to one-tenth of the total population and emphasizing the danger of strikes and sabotage he demanded that in case of the existence of an emergency on an attack, the President should be granted the right to declare martial law in Hawaii and also Porto Rico. According to information from Washington on the 4th, Delegate King issued a protesting statement to the effect that the above was an insult to the loyalty and patriotism of the (local) Government and people. The territorial Governor also reported that since the power to declare martial law was already vested in the Governor of the Territory there was no necessity for such legislation. In short, the recent Army proposal was to permit the President to directly order the local military commander to put martial law into effect.

R. O. A. 12 November 1941

No. 321
From: Kita
To: Koshi Washington

Ryoji San Francisco

Following from Ambassador Kurusu: Although I have no objections for various reasons I would like you to take care of Washington's decision in this affair.

Wants some thing forwarded immediately to San Francisco (may be the results of above).

18 November 1941

No. 331
From: Kita
To: Yuoji San Francisco

Koshi Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

Local postal inspections (Yumuven-sakan) announced on the 17th that from now on arrivals and departures of clippers and ships (except for Hawaiian (local) mail ships?) will not be published.

Mackay Radio 18 November 1941

No. 332
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc. Burma Road trucks 3,000 2-ton trucks.

Mackay Radio 24 Nov 1941

No. 341
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Spend $200 ?? ?? ?? ??

Mackay Radio 25 Nov. 1941.

No. 345
From: Kita
To: Koshi, Washington.

Consulate personnel.
No. 362
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo
   Consul San Francisco

URGENT REPORT

1. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on 2nd.
2. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on 3rd.

R. C. A. 3 Dec. 1941

From: Kita
To: FM Tokyo #363

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third

R. C. A.

From: Kita
To: FM Tokyo

PM/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X Approximately 100 tons one stack one four inch gun fwd and aft X fueled?
Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British Consulate

R. C. A. 4 Dec. 1941

No. 365.
From: Kita.
To: FM Tokyo.

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th.

Radiogram R. C. A.

From: Kita.
To: F. M. Tokyo.

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

R. C. A.

From: Kita.
To: Washington—Tokyo.

On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and one sweeper entered port.

Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: BB-9, CL-3, DD-17, am-3.
(CA (cruiser) and CV (carrier) all — — —).
P. S.—CV cannot be found in the fleet (?).
No. 67.
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minisiter, Tokyo.
00490 (Please convey the following) to Sato, non official staff of the Bureau of
American Affairs Please let me know whether the above kokku person has
boarded the Nitta Maru or not ( let me know also) the above name.

No. 68.
From: Consul General Kita.
To: Tadashi Morimura, Nitta Maru.
As you (your ship) reach the wharf please wait at your cabin for Vice Consul
Okuda is to meet you.

No. 74.
From: Nagao Kita.
To: Takao, Fumiko, Comino, Minami-Kanachi-Gun, Osaka, Japan.
Received notice of your uncle's death. I extend my consolation.

No. 80.
From: Consul General Kita.
To: Ambassador Kurusu, Tatsuta Maru.
Wish you bon voyage. Please let me know where to send the doll.

No. 91.
From: Harumo Yoshise, 19 Kasumicho, Azabu-Ku, Tokyo.
Received your wire I am glad I am healthy sky is clear and gay the morning
of the 15th.
Note: Message asked by the Consul General.

No. 106.
From: Consul General Kita.
To: Captain Asama Maru.
Please advise me if Hana Kusanobu is on board your ship.

No. 112.
From: Kita.
To: Consul, New Orleans, La.
(Please convey) the following to Representative Shimizu. I extend my con-
dolence to the death of Representative Yamaji.

No. 127.
From: Consul General Kita.
To: Gaku-Yoo-Do, Canton (is the name of a book store or hotel).
Having seen the death of Mr. Seitaro Mori in the papers. I extend my deep
consolation.
Note in handwriting on face of message: "Message asked by Consul General."
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

RCA

No. 128. 2 JUNE 1941.
From: Nagao Kita.
To: Lady Maki, 167 Kagomachi, Koishikawa-Ku, Tokyo.

Having seen the news of the death of your husband in the papers I really don't know how to extend my consolation.

Note in handwriting on face of message: "Message asked by Consul General."

RCA

No. 135. 7 JUNE 1941.
From: Kita, Consul General.
To: Karafuto Village Head, Tofuchi, Otomari City (Sanchin).

Your letter dated the seventh concerning Masao Mato (you have cited as Asao, but we have no such person with that name) his statement of residence dated February 1 has already been sent to the mayor of Otomari City.

R C A Radiogram 20 JUNE 1941.

No. 145.
From: Kita.
To: Consul Shanghai.

I extend my consolation to Mrs. Councillor Akagi for her husband's death.

Note in handwriting on message: "Message asked by Consul General Kita."

Mackay Radio 11 JULY 1941.

No. 167.
From: Kita.
To: Minister, Washington, D. C.

00340 From Ambassador Shigemitsu to Minister Wakasugi. I thank you very much for your kindness during my stay also convey my thanks to Councilor Iguchi and to Ikashokei (May be Mr. Ikasho) Further convey my best wishes to Obata and Kawakami.

Mackay Radio 11 JULY 1941.

No. 168.
From: Kita.
To: Consul, San Francisco.

00160 From Ambassador Shigemitsu. Received yours. I thank you very much for your hospitality during my stay at your place. Please convey the same thought to your wife.

Mackay Radio 24 JULY 1941.

No. 183.
From: Kita.
To: Koshi (Minister), Washington, D. C.

00400 40177 Concerning the debt of your honor and employee Kusanobu it has been sent by me as dated July ninth number nine.

R C A 2 AUG. 1941.

No. 198.
From: Kita.
To: Consul, Los Angeles, Cal.

Kiyoshi is on Asama Maru He is well Busy in various things Take care.

Handwritten note on message: "Consul General private message."
No. 215
From: Kita.
To: Consul Canton.
I am taking your trouble to convey my words of condolence to the President Chin (may be Chan or Chen) and also to Mrs. Chin Heki (also Chinese name) concerning the death of Mrs. K (name).

R. C. A.

No. 219.
From: Kita.
To: Masaki, interpreter c/o Japanese Consulate General Shanghai.
Please cancel the thing which I asked your favor a few days ago for it has been arranged. Will let you know the details by mail. Give my best regards to your colleagues and to my friends.

Globe Wireless, Ltd.

No. 270.
From: Kita.
To: Maeda, purser Tatsuta Maru.
Please let me know sure whether the ship is planning to refuel with oil here or not.

Globe Wireless, Ltd.

No. 296.
From: Kita.
To: Consul Iwanaga Taiyomaru
Is the ticket in the possession of Secretary and Mrs. Tokumaga a straight ticket to San Francisco or just until Honolulu. Further please let me know whether you have reserved (hotel reservation) and also the number of members.

Mackay Radio

No. 327.
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister. Tokyo.
G000GAI (type of telegram) Please deliver the inclosed letter from Okuda which should have been entrusted to clerk Mori of the personal affairs section by calling out whomsoever is living at Okuda's home (request telegram).

Riyoji Honolulu

01270 Nanatuki hatihizuke kogosangoo noloriwa nanatuki nijuhatihi hatituki rokhizuke nihatilicoo nireihatigoo nimeiwa kyuctuki jungohizuke san tingoo minisan meiwa juukihatihii juutuki sanhizuke san ningoo liyounrei juutuki niro no naninanagoo sawkyummei oyobi doojituzuke sannihatigoo juumeira juutiluki juuhatihi juunituki ithi hizuke saangoyongoo sanreigoomeiwa juunituki yonhuizkenite kokuseki ridatuseri

[Translation]

Riyoji (Consul) Honolulu

The remainder of #53 dated (gazetted) July 8, July 28, August 6. #281, #208 of 2 persons are dated (gazetted) as September 15. #312 of 223 persons are dated (gazetted) as October 8, October 3. #322 of 140 persons are dated (gazetted) as October 2. #3277 of 39 persons are also dated (gazetted) as same date. #326 of 10 persons are dated (gazetted) as November 18, November 1. #3, #4, #30 persons are dated (gazetted) as December 4. And thus were expatriated.

Togo
EXHIBIT "F"

#320
Riyoji San Francisco

[Translation: Riyoji (Consul) San Francisco]

90063 dalate 02160 kurusutaisi clipper engine koshooniyori Midway shuppatsu nihitten juunihi gagogoji bujitootid toochakuseri

KITA

Translation:
Riyoji (Consul) San Francisco
90063 Dalate (?) 02160

Because of engine trouble of the Clipper, Ambassador Kurusu departure from Midway delayed. He arrived here safely on the 10th, 5 p.m.

The same telegram was sent to the following:
Koshi (Minister) Washington, D. C.
Gaimu-Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo.

1941 Nov 12 PM 8 40

#323
Gaimu Jin Tokio
90064 Sookooate

[Translation]
Gaimu-Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo

Ambassador Kurusu left for your place by the California Clipper at 3:00 p.m. on the 13th. Further, (we asked) the United Airlines Company of Honolulu to wire the same company of San Francisco to arrange for reservation of plane leaving San Francisco at 6:45 p.m. on the 14th reaching Washington at 2:50 on the 15th. To make sure, I wish you to ascertain the above. (We also) telegramed to Foreign Minister and to the Ambassador to the U. S.

KITA (Consul General Kita)

The above telegram also sent to the following:
Riyoji, San Francisco (Consul)
Koshi, Washington, D. C. (Minister)

1941 Nov 13 PM 5 52

GAIMUDAIJIN TOKYO

GOOGAI ZINZIKA MORIZOKUTE OKUDAYORI GOIRAISUBEKI FUUSHORUSUTAKU YOBI SASINOUYE OWATA SIKKOU KAKKO IRAIIHOO KAKKO

KITA

[Translation]
Gaimu-Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo

PLEASE HAND OVER THE SEALED LETTER WHICH OKUDA WISHES TO BE FORWARDED TO MORI CLERK OF THE PERSONNEL AFFAIRS BUREAU BY CALLING SOMEONE LIVING AT OKUDA’S RESIDENCE. (REQUEST)

KITA (Consul General Kita)

EXHIBIT "G"

The “register of messages received” maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to the message number 861.

Re: Cancellation of portion of freeze order (?)

Ditto to the Minister #535

The “register of messages received” maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 854:

Re: Transmission by wire of secret expenses for third period and temporarily increased amount.
The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 851:
Re: Ango Fugo (Ango code or cryptograph)

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 863:
Re: Reports of movements, etc., of warships and ships.

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 852:
Re: Sending of families traveling expenses.

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 857:
"Request Telegram"

The following message was decoded at the Honolulu Office as being encoded in Code Type GO-307 (4–1) being that described in enclosure "C":

1941 Dec 7 AM 3 20
No. 864
ZL MRHU68 Tokio JG 19 9PM 6TH
Japanese Consul Honolulu

Relations strained between Japan and the United States and Britain.

The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 367:
Re: Movements of U. S. warships and ships.

The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 366:
"Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU"

The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 360:
To: (?)

**EXHIBIT 3**

These are work sheets for use in decoding messages based on the Japanese "Telegraphic Code Type 'O'."

There are three groups of coding on page one, the last group continuing on page two. The decode of the last group when translated into English is as follows:

(Strictly Confidential)

Of late in Japan the demand for American dollar currency has increased. In view of this, when meijin (the English equivalent of this is master or expert) return to Japan, please arrange so that they will, as far as possible, not bring back money orders but bring with them paper currency in as large amounts as possible.

There are also two radiogram blanks containing 16 and 12 vertical groups respectively of 10 letters which resemble the above-described work sheets.

These work sheets are also similar to the photostatic copies of work sheets found at the Consulate and forwarded to the Bureau by letter dated February 27, 1942.

**EXHIBIT 4**

The following is the special method for using "WA" and "O" (or "WO") code:

1. Special method for using the "WA" code.

This method is to be used for strictly secret telegrams and, similar to the method of use in the past, is an instrument for transposing letters. The following five ways are the methods for using this instrument:

(a) Based on two separate key words such as kanda, kudan with five letters as a unit, we transpose letters alternately. The words shall be composed of five letters of the "alphabet" with one index taken from c, g, and o and placed as the second and the fourth letters with the same vowel (including v) picked at random placed as the first, third, and the fifth letters. For instance, ictoi, eoga, wouou. (Thereonafter where the index is made up of five letters (?) of the "alphabet" is the same in all of the special methods for using "WA" and
"O" (or "WO") codes. Furthermore, since in the index of the special method for using the "WA" code where one vowel picked at random is repeated in the first, third, and the fifth letters is common to all, this will not be indicated severally.

* (kanda, kudan are crossed out with red pencil and in the margin directly overhead is written "revised 6-1, (a) AKASAKA

(b) As in (a), we transpose letters alternately based on two separate key words such as sanso, suiso having five letters as a unit. As index, we place either z, f, or x as the second and the fourth letters. For instance, isisi, ejeje, oxoxo.

* (sanso, suiso are crossed out with red pencil and in the margin directly overhead is written "SEKITAN") 6243715

(c) Based on three separate key words such as Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka with five letters as a unit, we transpose letters alternately. As index we place t and d as second and fourth letters. For instance, atata, ududu.

*Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka crossed out. Inserted in margin is "FUKUOKA." 2637541

(d) We base the transposition of the key word, Otohime with seven letters as a unit. As index we use either b, v, or p.

*Otohime crossed out and AKISAME 1547243 Inserted in margin.

(e) We transpose letters alternately based on two separate key words such as Kumagai, Naozane with seven letters as a unit. As index we use either m or n as the second and fourth letters. For instance, inimi, enene.

2. Special method for using "O" (or "WA") code. This method of use is being established to supplement the SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "WA" CODE, and is the same as (1) when it comes to being based on transposition of letters. However, (c) shall be limited to usage only when communicating in regard to telegraphic code.

(a) Transposition shall be based on the key word, x Tayonoura, having nine letters as a unit. In the case of index of SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "O" CODE, it is the opposite to that of "WA" code. The same uniform consonant shall be placed as the first, third, and fifth letters, and the same vowel picked at random shall be placed as the second and fourth letters. As the first, third, and fifth letters of the index for (a) either t or r shall be used. For instance, lolol, rurur.

x means this was suspended after 7-15.

(b) Transposition shall be based on the key word, x Odanobunaga, having eleven letters as a unit. Either t or d shall be used as first, third, and fifth letters of this index. For instance, totot, didid.

x means this was suspended after 7-15.

(c) Based on key word, Hanayoridango, having thir x teen letters as unit. Either k or f shall be used first, third, and fifth letters of the index. For instance, hahah.

*Hanayoridango is crossed out and following inserted : SOKOKUNOTAMENI

(d) Based on key word, Kinokuniyanunzaomon, having nineteen letters as unit. As index, either k or g is used as first, third, and fifth letters.

(Annotation) When based on this SPECIAL METHOD OF USE, the index of the ordinary method shall absolutely not be attached to either "WA" code or "O" (or "WO") code.

*The following word is inserted in the margin : K I N O K U N I Y A B U N Z A O M O N 7 5 1 0 1 4 8 1 6 1 1 6 1 8 1 3 1 7 1 2 1 9 2 4 9 1 1 1 3

3. Method or arrangement of end of cryptograms (code ?). The following methods should be expressly used in arranging the ends of both SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "WA" CODE and SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "O" (or "WO") CODE.

(a) When transposing based on five letters as a unit, if fillers are necessary for the end words, after using fillers, (on fillers refer to (c)) arrange the five letters of the end word(s) according to day telegram is dispatched in the following manner:

(A) day with 1, 6 54321
(B) day with 2, 7 43215
(C) day with 3, 8 32154
(D) day with 4, 9 21543
(E) day with 5, 10 13432
(b) When transporting with seven or more letters as unit:
(A) When prescribed transposition ends exactly at the end of the cryptograms:
(1) When this ends at the end of one word (five letters), the method in (a) is not necessary.
(2) When this ends in the middle of one word, fillers shall be used to make it into five letters, and the arrangement should be according to the method in (a). Therefore, a portion of the end word shall have twofold transposition.
(B) When at the end of the cryptogram(s) there originates an incomplete number which falls short of filling up the unit:
(1) When the end of the portion with completed transposition comes exactly at the end of one word, an incomplete number will result. In regard to the portion which has incomplete transposition, five letters each shall be arranged according to the method in (a). (When fillers are necessary, use them in the last word.)
(2) When that portion with completed transposition ends in the middle of a word, five letters each shall be arranged according to (a) excepting (in ?) that end portion with transposition completed but not attaining one word (five letters) and that portion which has incomplete transposition. (In other words, the end portion with transposition completed shall be transposed twice. Furthermore, in case of necessity for the use of fillers, using them in the last word is same as in the case of (a).

*This paragraph is unclear even in the original text.—Translator.

(c) For fillers in this SPECIAL METHOD OF USE, the fillers prescribed in the code book(s) are not used at all. Appropriate letters which do not make sense should be selected and used. However, in cases where two or more fillers are necessary, be sure to mix and use vowels and consonants. Moreover, be careful not to repeat the same letter or place it one after another, or use them over and over again, or arrange them in "alphabet" order.

(d) The last word (not the last word in the text of the telegram) of a cryptogram which is arranged in the foregoing manner should always be placed at the beginning of the cryptogram (not at the beginning of the text of the telegram). In other words, place the last word of the cryptogram next to the index. (This can be done easily if at the time of dispatching a telegram, a space for one word is left vacant next to the index and after wording of the cryptogram which begins directly after the space is completed the vacant space is filled.

4. Telegrams based on this method shall all be handled as strictly confidential. Consequently, the word "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL" which in the past was inserted at the beginning of the cryptogram or at the end shall be omitted from this method of usage.

*In the right hand corner of first page is inscribed the date "1939."

**Exhibit 5**

Received: May 13, 1939
From: Minister ARITA
To: Consul-General MIZUSAWA
Re: RECORDING OF CERTIFICATES OF CUSTODY. CATALOGUES OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENTS. CATALOGUES OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY BURNING.
Code type: (AN)-YU-GO-#5

In the past the names of codes and numbers on telegraphic codes, certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning, have been written as is and transmitted. Since this is very unsatisfactory from the standpoint of protection of the codes when such official messages are opened and detected, hereafter you should revise the method for recording certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning and also the method for recording official messages pertaining to the foregoing as designated below.
1. The following names of countries will be attached to the various codes presently in possession:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Type</th>
<th>Name of country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (as in JIM)</td>
<td>BRITAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HO</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEN</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>SOVIET RUSSIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU (or DO)</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RU</td>
<td>POLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O (or WO)</td>
<td>TURKEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YO</td>
<td>CHINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REN</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>HOLLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KE</td>
<td>SIAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>CANADA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J (as in DIME)</td>
<td>CUBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>MEXICO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>PERU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>CHILE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>MANCHUKUO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>EGYPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In the case of numbers of the codes, instead of numbers designate them by using katakana (simplest Japanese letters) as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Se</th>
<th>Ka</th>
<th>Ni</th>
<th>Wa (or Ha)</th>
<th>Wo</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Na</th>
<th>He</th>
<th>Ru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example: #127 ka-i-no (or kaina)

3. Pursue the following procedure when designating “from .... to ....”:
Select any letter out of the word, KASUMI, and place it between the numbers which will be recorded according to (2) above.

Example: from #306 to #309 4 copies
NisetoSniseru
(number of copies will not be indicated)

Code type NU, from #98 to #103
BELGIUM-ruheMkaseni 6 copies

4. Certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning will have no indices to indicate that they are such. Name of the code and the number is to be recorded as illustrated in (3) above. Phrases such as “custody,” “transfer,” and “destroyed by burning” will not be recorded at the end. Only, the date (month, day, year) and the official title and name of the custodian shall be recorded and their private seals impressed. (In case of transfer of documents, the official titles and names of the former custodian and his successor shall be jointly recorded.)

5. In deliveries of certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning, the name of the subject (RE:) will be recorded as “1999-IU-00-#5.”
[3] **** Remarks:
1. In the upper margin on page 1 is a rectangular enclosure within which is inserted the word, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
2. The following are notes recorded in upper margin of page 3:
   Code type TSI.-------------------------------------------------------------- COLUMBIA
   #1 RULES FOR USAGE OF SAME (?) MATSU.--------- NICARAGUA
   #2 RULES FOR USAGE OF SAME.------------------------------------------------ COSTA RICA
   (this portion appears in the upper margin (directly overhead section 1 of foregoing translation.—Translator.)
3. Refer to Telegram from the Minister YU-GO—#260 dated 8-17-40) (the above note appears in the upper margin on page 3 following that of (2) directly above.—Translator.)

CONFIDENTIAL

File 236.92

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.


EXHIBIT 6

[1] CATALOGUE OF TELEGRAPHIC CODES

(Connected with Foreign Office)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of code</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. NE</td>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I (eye)</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I (sit)</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>189 to 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. HO</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. HEN</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>129 to 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. O</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>232 to 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. YO</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. NU (or DO)</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>363 to 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Revised-L</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>55 to 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. SO</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. TSU</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[2] 25. RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU" (MATSU)-#1
      NICARAGUA
   172 kanai                                     1

29. RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU" (MATSU)-#2
      COSTA RICA
   172 kanai                                     1

30. TO NICARAGUA
   195 to 196 karuwoKkaruto                       2
   195 to 196 karuwoS karuto                      6

32. X 34, 35 for general use—2 copies
   195 to 196 karuwoKkaruto                       2
### Catalogue of Telegraphic Codes—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of code</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38. Rules for Usage of &quot;TSU&quot;—Revised Edition #2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>kaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Z. Afghanistan</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>hehe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. TA Venezuela</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>kani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. DEI Panama</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>kakah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Special Communication Number Table-1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Numbers Chart-1</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Numbers Chart-1</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. U(punt) Uruguay</td>
<td>176 to 177</td>
<td>kahato Kkanena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. HATO (former name: Code Book &quot;RO&quot; for Joint Use by Foreign Office, War Ministry and Navy Ministry)</td>
<td>12 (old number: 35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Rules for Use of Above (HATO)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Explanation of Rules for Use of Above</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Mixed Numbers Table for Above (HATO)-1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Mixed Numbers Table for Above-2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Mixed Numbers Table for Above-3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. H. Norway</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>beka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Encoding and Decoding Table Attached to Above</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Attached Encoding and Decoding Table for Telegraphic Code &quot;TA&quot; Paraguay</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>keni</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Exhibit 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This sheet is identical with the foregoing one except that alongside PERU is "wowo Kwoto". The second sheet is also identical with the foregoing one except that alongside PERU is "wowo."

### Exhibit 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1-ni-l (or inil)</td>
<td>Nagao Kita, Consul-General at Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>wo-wo (or wowo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The word “three copies” is inserted in the upper right hand margin.

### Exhibit 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page 1:</th>
<th>Page 2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXHIBIT 10

Costa Rica  kanai  Honduras  kaha
New Guinea  karumoKkaruto  Afghanistan  hehe
New Zealand—1  karuwoSkaruto  Venezuela  kani
New Zealand—2  karuwoMkaruto  Panama  kakaha
New Zealand—3  karuwoUkaruto
Special Communication Number Table—1  #76  1 copy
Numbers Table—1  #114  1 copy
Numbers Table—2  #114  1 copy
Uruguay  kanatoKkanana
Telegraphic Code Type “Kato”  #12

EXHIBIT 11

Afghanistan  hehe
Venezuela  kani
Panama  kakaha
Special Communication Number Table—1  #76  1 copy
Numbers Table—1  #114  1 copy
Numbers Table—2  #114  1 copy
Uruguay  kanatoKkanana
Telegraphic Code Type “Hato”  #12
Rules for Usage of Same  #12
Examination of Rules for Usage of Same  #12
Mixed Numbers Table of Same—#1  #12
Mixed Numbers Table of Same—#2  #12
Mixed Numbers Table of Same—#3  #12
Norway  heka
Attatched Encoding and Decoding Table  #81  1 copy
Paraguay  kani

(Nagao Kita

Consul-General at Honolulu

EXHIBIT 12

Holland  hehe  Italy  kaseruUkakase
Canada  kahana  Turkey  iniiSininha
Cuba  kahana  China  hase
Peru  kahato  United States  kaheiseIkaheka
Chile  kaito  Belgium  nitoniSnitowo
Britain  kaheruMkaruka  Peru  wowoKwoto
France  woha  Spain  kanahe
Germany  kairuKkanise  Portugal  kanihe
Soviet Russia  kakashAkakaka
9-8-39

(Kosaku Mizusana, Consul-General

Binjiro Kudo, Acting Consul-General

EXHIBIT 13

Holland  hehe  Italy  kaseruUkakase
Canada  kahana  Turkey  iniiSininha
Cuba  kahana  China  hase
Peru  kahato  United States  kaheiseIkaheka
Chile  kaito  Belgium  nitoniSnitowo
Britain  kaheruMkaruka  Peru  wowoKwoto
France  woha  Spain  kanahe
Germany  kairuKkanise  Portugal  kanihe
Soviet Russia  kakashAkakaka
12-31-39

Binjiro Kudo, Acting Consul-General

Note: Writing on upper right hand corner of margin on page 1 reads: “three copies.”
Exhibit 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>hehe</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>kaseruUkakase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>kahana</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>iniiSiniha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>kahana</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>hase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>kahato</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>kaheseIkaheka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>kaito</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>nitoniSnitowo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>kaheruMkaruka</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>wowoKwoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>woha</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>kanaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>kairuKkanise</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>kanihe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Russia</td>
<td>kakaseAkakaka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-13-40

Acting Consul-General: Binjiro Kuro

Exhibit 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>hehe</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>iniiSiniha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>kahana</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>hase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>kahana</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>kaheseIkaheka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>kahato</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>nitoniSnitowo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>kaito</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>wowoKwoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>kaheruMkaruka</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>kanaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>woha</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>kanihe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>kairuKkanise</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>kanai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Russia</td>
<td>kakaseAkakaka</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>kanai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>kaseruUkakase</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>kanai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9-11-40

Kichichi Gunji, Consul-General

Ottojiro Okuda, Acting Consul-General

Exhibit 16

[1] Holland     | Belgium       | kahana      | wowoKwoto       |
| Canada        | Peru          | kahana      | kanaha          |
| Cuba          | Spain*        | kahato      | kaniha          |
| Peru          | Portugal      | kaito       | kanai           |
| Chile*        | Colombia      | kaheruMkaruka| kanai          |
| Britain       | Nicaragua     | woha        | kanai           |
| France        | Costa Rica    | kairuKkanise| karuwoKkaruto   |
| Germany       | New Guinea    | kakaseAkakaka| karuwoSkaruto  |
| Soviet Russia | New Zealand-1 | kaseruUkakase| karuwoMKaruto  |
| Italy*        | New Zealand-2 | iniiSiniha  | karuwoUKaruto  |
| Turkey        | New Zealand-3 | hase        | kara           |
| China         | Honduras      | kaheseIkaheka| nitoniSnitowo  |
| United States*| hehe          |             |                 |


Consul-General: Kichichi Gunji [seal]*

Acting Consul-General: Ottojiro Okuda [seal]

*Indicates that these are crossed out.

Exhibit 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>hehe</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>wowoKwoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>kahana</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Kenihe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>kahana</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>kanai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>kahato</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>kanai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>kaheruMkaruka</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>kanai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>woha</td>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>karuwoKkaruto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>KairuKkanise</td>
<td>New Zealand-1</td>
<td>karuwoSkaruto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>iniiSiniha</td>
<td>New Zealand-2</td>
<td>karuwoMKaruto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>hase</td>
<td>New Zealand-3</td>
<td>karuwoUKaruto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>nitoniSnitowo</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>kara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-14-41

Acting Consul-General: Ottojiro Okuda [seal]

Consul-General:

79716-46-Ex.148—31

Otojiro Okuda [seal]

Nagao Kita [seal]
Exhibit 18

Rules for use of same  
Explanation of rules for use of same  
Mixed numbers table #1 of same  
Mixed numbers table #2 of same  
Mixed numbers table #3 of same  
Norway  
Attached encoding and decoding table  
Paraguay  

466  

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Exhibit 19

Plans for emergency disposition of telegraphic business

1. Cryptographic code
   (a) Burn in case of emergency.
   (b) Draw up a CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE beforehand.
   (c) Things to be left to the last and brought home to this Ministry:
   (1) 3 copies of CATALOGUE OF TRANSFER OF BUSINESS dated 3-14-41.
   (2) 3 copies of Records of Transfer of Secret Books in 1941.
   (3) 3 copies each of CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE,

Exhibit 20

Catalogue of manuscripts destroyed by fire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of book</th>
<th>Military secrets—</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping (A)</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#145</td>
<td>2435</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Code Book “S”</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#155</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book “S”—#1</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—confidential #25</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book “S”—#1</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—confidential #26</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book “S”—#2</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—confidential #27</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Usage “S” for Navy</td>
<td>Strict military secrets</td>
<td>4547</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Code Book “S”—C</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#197</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book “S”—C (1)</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#202</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The foregoing were burned Dec. 2, 1941.

A letterhead in red in lower left hand corner reads: Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu.

12-2-41

(from) Nagao Kita, Consul-General at Honolulu

(to) Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry

Printed words in red in lower left hand corner reads: Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu

This manuscript appears to be the rough draft of “CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE” the translation of which has already been completed. However, since no names were mentioned in the translation, a translation is herewith made of the second page as it might supplement the completed translation.

The foregoing were burned (Month) (Day) (Year)

KAGAO KITA, Consul-General at Honolulu.

to: the Aide-de-camp—Navy Ministry.
## Exhibit 21.

**Record of transfer of secret books for the year 1940**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of book</th>
<th>Military secrets—#</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping...</td>
<td>Strictly secret—Navy—#25...</td>
<td>1475</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Code Book</td>
<td>Military secrets—Navy—#25...</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations for Usage of Overseas Code Book</td>
<td>Military secrets—Navy—#539-A...</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encoding and Decoding Table for Overseas Code Book</td>
<td>Military secrets—Navy—#539-B...</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Code Book “S”...</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—confidential #25...</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book “S”—#1...</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—confidential #26...</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book “S”—#1...</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—confidential #27...</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book “S”—#2...</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#117...</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book “S”—#1...</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#118...</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notification of above is hereby made.

3–13–40

Former custodian: Bynjirō Kudo, Acting Consul-General

New custodian: Kyōichi Gunji, Consul-General

Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu

To: the AIDE-DE-CAMP

Navy Ministry

**Remarks**

1. The scribbling at the upper right hand corner of the page reads, “four copies”.
2. The last work in the title, 1939, is changed with ink to 1940, and this date is the one inserted in the translation.
3. Also in the title, the words “presently in possession” are crossed out and changed to “transfer of” which term is used in the translation.
4. The date at the end of the record, namely 12–31–39, is crossed out and changed to read 3–13–40, and this is inserted in the translation.

## Exhibit 22.

**Record of transfer of secret books for year 1939**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of book</th>
<th>Military secrets—No.</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(This portion is identical with the one above.)

Notification of above is hereby made.

9–8–39.

**Former custodian:** KOSAKU Mizusawa, Consul-General

**New custodian:** Bynjirō Kudo, Acting Consul-General

To: the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.
### Exhibit 23

**Certificate of custody**

Naval code book “S”-B (strict military secret—Navy Ministry—#197) — #647

Mixed numbers table of naval code book “S”-B (strict military secret—Navy Ministry—#202) — #647

The foregoing are being preserved. S-2-41.

**Custodian:** NAGAO KITA [PRIVATE SEAL], Consul General at Honolulu.

### Exhibit 24

**Certificate of custody**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. #1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book “S” (#1) (Navy Ministry—Confidential #27).
5. #2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book “S” (#1) (Strict Military Secrets—Navy Ministry—#118).

The foregoing are being held by this office.

**KOSAKU MIZUSAWA,** Consul-General at Honolulu.

To: the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.

### Exhibit 25

**Record of secret books in hand for year 1938**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of book</th>
<th>Military secrets</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping.</td>
<td>Strictly Secret—Navy—#25.</td>
<td>1475</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Code Book</td>
<td>Military Secrets—Navy—#25.</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations for Usage of Overseas Code Book.</td>
<td>Military Secrets—Navy—#539-A</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encoding and Decoding Table for Overseas Code Book.</td>
<td>Military Secrets—Navy—#539-B</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notification of above is hereby made.

12-31-38

**Custodian:** KOSAKU MIZUSAWA, Consul General, Honolulu.

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry.

**Record of transfer of secret books for the year 1939**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Book</th>
<th>Military Secret</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret Telegraphic Regulations for Shipping (A).</td>
<td>Strict Military Secret Navy Ministry—#154.</td>
<td>2435</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Code Book</td>
<td>Military Secrets—Navy—#25.</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for Usage of Above.</td>
<td>Military Secrets—Navy—#539-A</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encoding and Decoding Table for Same.</td>
<td>Military Secrets—Navy—#539-B</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Code Book “S”</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—Confidential #26.</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for Usage of Same—#1.</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—Confidential #26.</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1 Mixed Numbers Table for Same—1.</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—Confidential #27.</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for Usage of Same—#2.</td>
<td>Strictly Military Secret—Navy Ministry—#117.</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 Mixed Numbers Table for Same—1.</td>
<td>Strict Military Secret—Navy Ministry—#118.</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Usage “S” for Navy.</td>
<td>Strict Military Secrets.</td>
<td>4647</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notification of foregoing is hereby made.

9–11–40

**Former custodian:** Kiighi Gunji,  
**Consul General**

**New custodian:** Otojiro Okuda,  
**Acting Consul-General**

**Japanese Consulate-General at Honolulu**

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry

**EXHIBIT 27**

Record of secret books of 1940 presently in possession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of book</th>
<th>Military secrets—</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret telegraphic regulations on shipping (A)</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#154.</td>
<td>2435</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas code book</td>
<td>Military secrets—Navy #525</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for usage of overseas code book</td>
<td>Military secrets—Navy—#539-A</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encoding and decoding table for overseas code book</td>
<td>Military secrets—Navy—#539-B</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval code book “S”</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—Confidential #25</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for usage of naval code book “S”—#1</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—Confidential #26</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1 mixed numbers table of naval code book “S”—#1</td>
<td>Navy Ministry—Confidential #27</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for usage of naval code book “S”—#2</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#177</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 mixed numbers table of naval code book “S”—#1</td>
<td>Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#118</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary usage “S” for Navy</td>
<td>Strict military secrets</td>
<td>4547</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notification of above is hereby made.

12–31–40

**Otojiro Okuda,**  
**Acting Consul-General**  
**Japanese Consulate General At Honolulu**

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry

**EXHIBIT 28**

Record of transfer of secret books in 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Book</th>
<th>Military Secrets—#</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(this portion is identical with the one above)

Notification of above is hereby made.

3–14–41

**Person formerly in charge:** Otojiro Okuda,  
**Acting Consul-General**

**Person presently in charge:** Nagao Kita,  
**Consul-General, Japanese Consulate, General, Honolulu**

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry
Exhibit 29

[1] The margin bears the date 9-21-40 written in ink with the 9-21 crossed out with pencil and the date 12-31 inserted with pencil adjacent to the crossed out date.

Transfer of business catalogue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;NE&quot;</td>
<td>#88 (hehe)</td>
<td>Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;G&quot;</td>
<td>#147 (kahana)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I&quot;</td>
<td>#147 (kellena)</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;L&quot;</td>
<td>#146 (kahato)</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;O&quot;</td>
<td>#126 (kaito)</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;T&quot;</td>
<td>#180 to #191</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;H&quot;</td>
<td>#54 (woba)</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;HEN&quot;</td>
<td>#129 to #130</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;RI&quot;</td>
<td>#110 to #111</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The word Chile is crossed out with red pencil and in the margin above is inserted the words “burned 11-26”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I&quot;</td>
<td>#100 to #110</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;O&quot;</td>
<td>#232 to #234</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Y&quot;</td>
<td>#40 (hase)</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;WA&quot;</td>
<td>#180 to #181</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;NU&quot;</td>
<td>#365 to #365</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;R&quot;</td>
<td>#55 to #56</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;REN&quot;</td>
<td>#174 (kanaha)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This whole line is crossed out with red pencil.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;SO&quot;</td>
<td>#138 (kanpei)</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[2] 6 copies of "TSU" code (MATSU, UME, SAKURA, FUJI, HAGI, KIKU) 
#172 (kanai) Colombia
1 copy of "TSU" code (MATSU) Use regulations #1 #172 (kanai) 
Nicaragua
1 copy of "TSU" code (MATSU) Use regulations #2 #172 (kanai) 
Costa Rica
2 groups of "YO" code—code for use in relaying telegrams #195 to #196 (karuwoSkaruto) New Guinea
2 groups of "X" code—telegraphic code #195, #196 (karuwoSkaruto) 
(karuwoMkaruto) New Zealand 1, 2, 3
1 copy of "TSU" code—revised regulations #2 for use of telegraphic code Honduras

(Signed) OTOJIRO OKUDA, Acting Consul-General, Honolulu.

[3] The page with writing in ink crossed out in pencil reads:

The above transfer of business has been completed.

9-11-40

Person transferring business:

ZENICHI GUNJI, Consul General.

OTOJIRO OKUDA, Acting Consul-General.
Transfer of duties catalogue (3-14-41)

| "NE" code   | (Holland) | 88 | 1 |
| "G" code    | (Canada)  | 147 | 1 |
| "I" code    | (Cuba)    | 147 | 1 |
| "J" code    | (Peru)    | 146 | 1 |
| "H" code    | (Britain) | 189 to 191 | 3 |
| "P" code    | (France)  | 54 | 1 |
| "H" code    | (Germany) | 129 to 130 | 2 |
| "O" (or "HO") code | (Turkey) | 232 to 234 | 3 |
| "TO" code   | (China)   | 40 | 1 |
| "NU" code   | (Belgium) | 363 to 365 | 3 |
| "RE" code   | (Peru)    | 55 to 56 | 2 |
| "SU" code (MATSU, UME) | (Colombia, SAKURA, FUJI, HAGI, KIKU) (1 copy each) | 172 | 6 |
| "TSU" code (MATSU REGULATIONS FOR USE#1) | (Nicaragua) | 172 | 1 |
| "TSU" code (MATSU REGULATIONS FOR USE#2) | (Costa Rica) | 172 | 1 |
| "TO" code—code for relaying telegrams | (New Guinea) | 195 to 196 | 2 |
| "K" code    | (New Zealand) | 195 to 196 | 6 |

"I" as in sit; Japanese pronunciation.

[5] "TSU" code Regulations for use of telegraphic code—#2—revised (Honduras) 14 1
The above transfer of business has been completed.
3-14-41
Person transferring business:

OTOJIRO OKUDA,
Acting Consul-General.

Person taking over business:

NAGAO KITA,
Consul-General.

Codes destroyed by burning

Telegraphic code “O” #126 (kaito) (Chile) 1 copy
Telegraphic code “WA” #109 to #110 (kaseraAkaKase) (Italy) 8 copies
Telegraphic code “RI” #110 to #111 (kakaseKakakak) (Soviet Russia) 2 copies
Telegraphic code “WA” #180 to #181 (kaheseWkaKeK) (U. S.) 8 copies
Telegraphic code “REN” #174 (Kenaha) (Spain) 1 copy

(Signed) OTOJIRO OKUDA,
Acting Consul-General, Honolulu.

EXHIBIT 30

Telegraphic code survey chart

Note: The following is a translation of the first column on the left reading from top to bottom.

1940
End of July
End of August
September 11 (Transfer)
End of September
End of October
End of November
End of December
End of January 1941
End of February 1941

March 14 (Transfer)
Last day of March
Last day of April
Last day of May
Last day of June
Last day of July
Last day of August
Last day of September
Last day of October

Note: The word in the upper right corner of the chart is "TOTAL."
EXHIBIT 31

Page 1—Drafted January 4, 1941
Confidential
Re: Official Orders YU-GO—#5 1939

Please examine the three enclosures we are submitting in reference to this matter.

Page 2
Re: SUBMISSION OF RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and also RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME.

Since 2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and 4 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME is herewith submitted as follows, . . . . (following page missing).

Pages 3 and 4—Drafted January 4, 1941
Confidential
To: Minister
Re: SUBMISSION OF RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and also RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME

1. 2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR YEAR 1940 IN POSSESSION
2. 2 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SECRET BOOKS 3-13-40
3. 2 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SECRET BOOKS 9-11-40

EXHIBIT 32

Date: 12-2-41
From: Foreign Minister Togo
To: Consul General Kita
Re: Burning of code books.
Code type: (AN)—GO—2445
(Strictly confidential)

Be careful so that outsiders will not find out (?) and immediately take the following steps:
1. Leave one each of code type O (or WO) and RYAKU (type L) and burn all telegraphic codes (including code books used in common by the three Ministries and code books connected with the Navy).
2. Simultaneous with the burning, telegraph the one word, HARUNA.
3. Burn all secret documents containing records of incoming and outgoing telegrams.
4. After taking precautions so that no outside suspicion will not fall, dispose of all secret documents in the same manner.

Since the foregoing measures are in preparation for and in consideration of an emergency, keep this matter to your Consulate alone, and we hope that you will hereafter carry out your duties with calmness and care.

This letter bears the seal of NAGAO KITA and the name OKUDA (the Vice-Consul OTOJIRO OKUDA).

(Note): Register of messages transmitted reflects that message #359 is in "re burning of codes".

EXHIBIT 33

The following translation was prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Honolulu
19 November, 1941
From: Consul General Muto
To: /not stated/
Subject: Overseas broadcasts in the event of international crisis involving Japan
Order #297 (Memorize)

Foreign Minister Order No. 2253 (19—__). Code for chief of consulate/legation, &c.

As a result of pressure of international situation when we may reach the most critical condition at any moment—in such circumstances, because it is a time when telegrams between Japan and opposing countries will be stopped
when an international crisis is near, in our overseas radio broadcasts directed
to all points in the middle and at the end of Japanese language news a weather
report will be made:

1. If concerning America-Japanese relations: "Kigashi no kaze, ame".
2. If concerning Japan-Russian relations: "Kita no kaze, kumori".
3. If concerning Japan-English relations (including invasion of Thailand,
   Singapore, Malay, N.E.I., Eastern India) : "Nishi no kaze, hare".
   By repeating these (phrases) as shown above, it is desired that you make
   suitable disposition of books and codes.
   It is desired that you handle this with the greatest secrecy. It is desired
   that you, according to this information /pass this news along immediately/ ?.

EXHIBIT 34

11-2-41
From: Foreign Minister
To: Consul General Kita
RE: Disposition of ANGO (type of code). Code type L (AN)—Urgent—
  #118 Handler (handling?) of code of head of Consulate

In reference to your telegram, #252, the instructions of the transmitted
telegram GO-#255 do not mean that the ANGO (type of code) should be
burned immediately. The point of the broadcast of this matter is than when
the worst is about to come about the opposing nation is expected to suspend
communication by means of coded telegrams and this (broadcast) is aimed at
informing the diplomatic establishment in that nation about this situation
without recourse to telegrams. Regardless of what the actual situation is at
the place you are stationed, do not dispose of the ANGO unqualifiedly. As far
as the real situation permits, preserve it to the very last.

Note: The following are inserted in the margin on page 1:
   1. Seal of Consul General KITA.
   2. Signature of Vice-Consul OKUDA.
   3. The number 827 in the upper left margin.

EXHIBIT 35
[1]
Date: 11-27-41
From: Consul General Muto at San Francisco
To: Consul General Kita
Re: Method of communication (on matters) pertaining to the situation.
Code Type: (AN)—GO-307 4-1
Telegram from the Minister to this Consulate #GO-2409 (4-1) 27th, P. M.

Very urgent

Handler of Kanoh Fugo (code of head of establishment):

At a time when the situation is tense, we are going to use IMMEI DEMPO
(telegrams in which names are mentioned, which names are to have certain
meanings) in the following manner as method of communication to cope with
the critical situation. We hope you will understand.

Since we shall use the names on the left column and compose an appropriate
ordinary telegraphic message (plain wording) in order to telegraph contents on
the column at the right, we hope that there will be no mistakes in operation (of
the code).

Illustration:
"Japanese and Russian troops clashed." This message will be dated the 15th
and will read as follows: "Secretaries HIZIKATA and KUBOTA have been
ordered to service at your Consulate STOP"

Telegrams in the future which will be based on this method shall always have
the word, STOP, inserted at the end of the telegraphic wording so as to dis-
tinguish them from the rest of the telegrams. (Consequently, the last word will
not be used in other telegrams.)

[2] Date: 11-27-41 P. M.
From: Consul General MUTO at San Francisco
To: Consul General KITA
Code type: GO-307 (4-1)
Telegram from the Minister #2400 (very urgent)

Arimura code communication prohibited
Asai communicate by means of "Radio" broadcasts.
Asakura listen carefully since communication will be done by means of "radio" broadcasts.

Asikaga unable to listen on the overseas broadcasts due to interferences.

Azum make preparations to entrust protection of Japanese rights and interests to appropriate foreign representative (Consul).

Hanabusu diplomatic relations between Japan and _______ severed.

Hanazono relations between Japan and _______ imperilled.

Hatakeyama send reply telegram on forecast of severance of diplomatic relations with Japan by the country in which you are serving.

Hattori are you in receipt of matter pertaining to ________?

Ibaragi am in receipt of matter pertaining to ________

Inagaki started positive action against ________

Kashiwagi suspend altogether (granting of) entry and transit visa to ________

Kobayakawa


Kodama

Komiyama

Koyahagi

Kubota

Kuribara

Kusunoki

Matutani

Date: 11-27-41 P.M.
From: Consul General in San Francisco
To: Consul General KITA
Code type: (AN)–GO-307 (4-3)
(very urgent)
Telegram from the Minister GO-2409

Hizikata Japanese troops and _______ clashed.

Hosino Japan and _______ are about to start full-scale war.

Minami United States

Miwata Canada

Miyazaki Mexico

Morokoshi Brazil

Motizuki Panama

Nakazato Thailand

Nango French Indo-China

Nogi (Teigi?) Netherlands East Indies

Okawa Malay

Okumura Australia

Onizuka South African Union

Onodera enemy nation

Otani today

Onisi year

Siboya next year

Simamaka this year

Sakakibara month

Sigenori? day

Sanzyou? hour

Ichiro 1

Nisaku 2

Santaro 3

Yoichi 4

Goroo 5

Masaroku 6

Simetaro 7

Yasokiti 8

Hisamatsu 9

Atumi 0
THE FOLLOWING TRANSLATION WAS PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, HONOLULU

158 16 -36
To: CONSUL GENERAL MUTO, SAN FRANCISCO
From: CONSUL GENERAL KITA, HONOLULU

Matters relating to ( ) telegram indicators (authenticators).
(memorize, confidential?)

Paraphrase:
Instruction by mail #148.
Telegram #383 from the Ambassador.
Telegram #1586 from the Minister (of Foreign Affairs?)

In the future, on The Telegrams originated by this Department, the indicator Konjo should be placed in front of the beginning number of urgent telegrams, and the indicator Hynja in front of the beginning number of routine (ordinary) telegrams. At the end, in urgent Telegrams, use the indicator Takao and for ordinary Telegrams use Atago at the end.

/Can't decipher all the last line, but it may be—Circular telegram should be like Ordinary reports (information).

EXHIBIT 37

From Consul-General Muto at San Francisco.
To Consul-General Kita
(Subject) Matter concerning revision of handling urgent wire.
"AN" (designation used for a certain class of wire—probably cryptograph)
GO #509
Wire order #2040 from the Minister (20th, P. M.)
(strictly secret)

Although there are reasons for sending outgoing wire GO-#1767, recently the number of outgoing and incoming wires have finally decreased. For instance, today's incoming wires have reached a point where it was possible to make a general interpretation. Consequently, henceforth, when attaching "urgent" or "very urgent", give consideration to its content and its urgency. In case very urgent action or reply wire is necessary due to misuse of an urgent report (telegram?), care should be taken so as not to cause important error in its disposition. In this connection, also with the idea of economizing the telegraphic fees in mind, following revision in the handling of urgent and very urgent wires has been made and it has been decided to put it into practice from October 1. Hence, please follow out the above.

NOTE

1. Emergency wire. (Japanese word used is KINKYU, giving sense of emergency) Matter that requires immediate disposition in spite of the fact that it is late in the night (the word "urgent" should be written on the wire draft). The work KINQU (urgent) should be written at the very beginning of the text.

2. Very urgent wire. (Japanese word used is SHIKYU, giving sense not as urgent as KINKYU). In case a matter is received late in the night and could be taken care of early the next morning.
The word DAIQU (very urgent) should be written at the head of the text.

3. Urgent wire (Japanese word used is SHIKYU, giving a sense that it should be taken care of as soon as possible. In other words, it is urgent, but its urgency is not as strong as when the word KINKY, mentioned in Note 1 is used.)

Matter that should be disposed of according to priority without regard to the order of the prefix.
The word SIKYU (urgent) should be written at the head of the text.
Please notify immediately with special wire as informed.
The above letter bears the seal of NAGAO KITA, the Consul-General and the name of OKUDA (OTAIJIRO OKUDA, the vice-Consul).
Exhibit 38

April 26, 1941. Out.
May 8, 1941. In.

From: Consul Nakauchi at Los Angeles.
To: Consul-General Kita.

(Subject)

Concerning attendance of representatives of the National Christian Council of Japan at the special meeting of the Federal Council of Churches in America. "AN" (designation for a certain class of wire). (code Type) YU-GO #23.

To: The Minister, Number 53 (26th, P.M.)

Regarding your message "25"
The meeting ended as scheduled and the gist of it is as follows:

1. The main subjects of discussion were: the question of uniting the Christian churches of Japan; the Shinto temple question in Korea; and the question of improving the America-Japan relations.
2. Furthermore, a change was made to extend the meeting about a month and dividing the group into four branches, such matters as concrete plan of improving America-Japan relations which are now confronting them, the religious questions relating to the United States and Japan, and the measures that should be taken by the churches as churches will be studied by a conference of mixed group consisting of the Japanese and Americans.
3. A joint communiqué will be issued by this Council within a few days.
4. A consultation will be held at New York on May 13 and the last meeting will be held in Chicago for 3 days, starting from May 29.

Furthermore, the party, with the exception of KAGAWA, is scheduled to leave for Japan on June 5.

Above has been sent by "AN" (certain type of wire) to the Ambassador in America and other offices in America.

The above letter bears the seal of Nagao Kita, Consul General and the name OKUDA (OTOJIRO OKUDA, Vice-Consul).

Exhibit 39

Translator's note: The red stamp is KITA's seal. ODUDA.

From: Consul Nakauchi of Los Angeles
To: Consul-General Kita

(Subject) Matter concerning strike by employees of North American Aircraft Plant "a--"

"RYAKU" (designation used for a certain class of wire—probably code) #33.

To: Minister. #32 (9th, P.M.)

Regarding the outgoing wire #67.

(JORD—probably means information A)

Later developments of the strike is as follows:

1. At the big meeting (general meeting) held in the afternoon on the 8th by the employees, FRANKENSTEIN who was sent by the AUW headquarters read of MURRAY, CIO president, THOMAS, UAW president, and PERKINS, Secretary of Labor, to return to work and urged to quit the strike, but he was forced to get down from the platform in the midst of his speech and the employees decided to continue the strike.

2. Against this measure, the head of the air corps in the western division, Lt. Colonel BRANSHAW, receiving an order from Washington, declared that "By virtue of the authority of the President and by order of the Secretary of War, the Army will take over the said plant and its business." Simultaneously, leading 3,500 armed soldiers, aided by 500 policemen equipped with tear-gas broke up the picket lines and declared that the plant will be reopened immediately under the Government control.

Special wire was sent to the Ambassador in American and code wires were sent to other offices.
Page 1
6-17-41
From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To: Consul General KITA
Re: Meeting courier YAMAZAKI
Code type: (RYAKU) - #5
Request member of Consulate to meet courier YAMAZAKI, passenger on board
the NITTA MARU which sailed from here on the 17th, since papers (letters) to
your Consulate have been entrusted in his care.
*In the margin are the following:
1. Seal of NAGAO KITA (the Consul-General)
2. Signature of OKUDA (the Vice-Consul)
3. Scribbling which reads:
   a. Mr. YUGE please go to meet the boat.
   b. TAKEO YAMAZAKI (?) arrives in port 6-26.
4. #259

Page 2
7-9-41
From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To: Consul General KITA
Re: SURVEY OF ASSETS OF JAPANESE IN CONTINENTAL UNITED
STATES
Code type: (AN) - #6
In reference to your telegram GO-#12, in accordance with the annual business
survey, survey is being conducted through organizations.
*In margin are the seal of Consul General KITA and the signature of Vice-Consul
OKUDA. Also the number, 515.

Pages 3, 4, 5
Dispatched: 6-6-41
Received: 6-19-41
From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To: Consul General KITA
Re: STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES OF "NORTH AMERICAN" AIRCRAFT COM-
PANY.
Code Type: (RYAKU) - YU-GO - #32
To the Minister #87 (the 6th, P.M.)
(Report A)
Concerning the threatened strike for higher wages (raising of minimum wages
from 50¢ to 75¢ or a uniform increase of 10¢ in wages) by 9,000 employees of
the local "North American" Aircraft Company who are also members of the
"United" Automobile Workers' Union of the CIO, negotiations have been going
on through the good offices of the National Defense Mediation Board in Wash-
ington for the past two months. However, since the board is believed to be
working in league with the company and deliberately postponing settlement, the
strike was started early on the morning of the 5th with a "picket" line posted, and
work by all employees numbering 12,000 has been stopped. Because of this, the
Army Air Corps at "March Field" has taken out 8 completed B-25 bombers (5
more planes were taken out on the 6th) and 21 AF6A training planes. The local
AFL intends to wire the Office of Production Management that the majority of
the majority of the workers are being victimized by the radical element of the
CIO. (Concerning the relation between the AFL and the CIO, refer to CONFI-
DENTIAL—#454 dated 5-10.)
The company at present, putting those of the United States and Britain to-
gether, has orders for warplanes amounting to $200,000,000 and produces monthly
225 planes, and is said to manufacture 25% of the total production of planes in
the United States.
This report has been wired to the Ambassador and has been sent by coded
telegrams to the various diplomatic establishments in the United States.
(Note: In the margin is inserted the number, 263, and also the seal of Consul
General KITA and the signature of Vice-Consul OKUDA.)
Pages 6, 7
Dispatched: 6-11-41
Received: 6-23-41
From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles
To: Consul-General KITA
Re: STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES OF "NORTH AMERICAN" AIRCRAFT COMPANY.

Code type (RYAKU)-YU-GO-%34
To the Minister #95. (11th; P. M.)
Reference: Outgoing telegram #92
(Report A)

The Military took over the factory and the strike ended on the night of the 10th. From the 10th to the 11th the major portion of the employees returned to their work and began day and night production. During the strike there was a decrease in production of about forty planes. Armed troops guarded the inner and outer premises of the factory, and not only did they give personal protection to the workers, but also it is reported that three of the strike leaders have been fired and seven others are being held.

Details will be reported by mail.

The Ambassador is in receipt of this relayed telegram and the various diplomatic establishments have been notified by coded messages.

**EXHIBIT 41**

The head of the office—KITA's seal. Person in Charge—OKUDA.

Written—July 5, 1941.
To: San Francisco
To: Los Angeles
From: Consul-General KITA.
Subject—Investigation of the assets of the Japanese in America.

"AN" (designation used for a certain type of wire) Order #12.

Regarding order #599, strictly secret to America, from the Minister, in view of the times there are reasons which make investigation of this matter by this office within its jurisdiction considerably difficult and delicate. So, please send a return wire informing this office as to how the matter is being handled in your office.

This wire is addressed to San Francisco and Los Angeles.

**EXHIBIT 42**

Head of Office—KITA's seal. Person in Charge—OKUDA.

Written—May 12, 1941.
To: Consul ITO at New Orleans.
From: Consul-General KITA.
Subject—Mourning for Representative YAMAJI's death.

"HEI" (designation used for a certain class of wire—probably ordinary wire) #2.
To: Representative SHIMIZU, as follows:

We sincerely express our condolence over the death of Representative YAMAJI.

**EXHIBIT 43**

The writing in red pencil reads:

MATTER PERTAINING TO CENSUS REGISTRATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAME.

1. Curtsey to gathering (Greeting to assembly).
2. In accordance with orders of the Japanese Government . . .
3. All came according to official orders; thank them for their assistance and cooperation.
4. Personally thank all for their friendship (the consular staff and their families.)
5. Not to visit each island.
6. Have self-confidence that Japan has been right in her acts.
a. In the Far-Eastern problem leading up to the present situation.
b. In the origin of the Chinese Incident.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

7. Actual abilities (power). (Words erased read: Power of Japan.)

8. "Ricki Daiho" (meaning now known) Represent interests (of Japan?).

Note: (by D.C.) Ricki daihyo refers to the representation of Japanese interests here after the breakoff of relations with the United States. It developed later that Sweden took over the representation of Japanese interests in the islands while Spain assumed this function in the rest of the United States.

9. Request take custody of Consulate.

10. United States understanding. (Probably "with understanding of the U. S." meant.)

11. Emergency committee.

12. United Japanese Association, Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Japanese?).

13. Census registration.


15. Development of perseverance and independence (sympathy towards first and second generation Japanese.)

a. In comparison with Japanese residents of China.

b. Avoid unnecessary friction.

16. Do not blacken the Japanese name (would lower the position of the Japanese.)

17. Thank all officials and the public.

18. Pray for health.

19. Families in Japan will be protected.

20. Instructions to consular staff.


CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 (CID)

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

FILE 004.5—PHOTOGRAPHY.

Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate

1st Ind Contact Office D. S. O. 2 Apr 42.

1. Transmitted herewith are 156 photographs composing a complete copy of the "Register of Incoming Messages" and 124 photographs of a "Register of Messages Received", maintained by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.

Encls: as noted.

G. W. B.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 206 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,

Honolulu, T. H., April 2, 1942.

Lt. Col. George W. Bicknell,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Army Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.

Re: Japanese Activities, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: I am forwarding herewith 156 photographs composing a complete copy of the "Register of Incoming Messages" and 124 photographs of a "Register of Messages Received," maintained by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.

These should be considered with the translations previously furnished your office.

Very truly yours,

(s) R. L. Shivers

R. L. Shivers,

Special Agent in Charge.

cc ONI, with enclosure

Enc.
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board

The following documents were obtained from the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District, Honolulu.

a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cablegrams from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and numbers of cablegrams in date order: 363, 3 December 1941; 364, 4 December 1941; 365, 4 December 1941; 221, 5 December 1941; 308, 6 December 1941; and 369, 6 December 1941.

b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November 1941 to the following addresses: Shagro, San Francisco; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu; Growsamida, Honolulu; and Shokin, Honolulu.

c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November 1941 to the following addresses: Rev. Hiro Higuchi, Waipahu Community Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.; American Consul, Papeete; Y. Watanabe, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.; and Shokin, Honolulu.

d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 November 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae.


f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941, Japanese time.

g. An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands prepared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND, dated 20 April 1943.

h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg) T. W. Joyce.

h1-h35. Various evaluations and related paper from 14ND, Honolulu.

12/3/41

From: Kita
To: FM Tokyo #363
Wyoming and two seaplane-tenders departed third.

12/4/41

# 364
From: Kita
To: FM Tokyo

PM/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X approximately 1100 tons one stack one four inch gun fwd and aft X fueled?

Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British Consulate

12/4/41

# 365
From: Kita
To: FM Tokyo

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th

12/5/41

# 221
From: Kita
To: FM Tokyo

In reply to Number 221 (Banker)

Auditing accounts with Government expenditures only not completed X Upon settlement of above will have balance of $16,224.13

(Special students expenses $2610 ?????????)
From: Kita
To: F. M. Tokyo

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickman Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

Delivered 1248
Transmitted 1304

6 Dec 1941
Delivered to RCA—1801
Transmitted—1807

No. 369
From: Kita
To: Washington—Tokyo

On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

BB—9
CL—3
DD—17
am—3

Ships in dock:

CI—4
DD—2

(CA and CV all ——)

PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet (?)

11/27 2.33 PM

Shagro San Francisco
Two hundred screenings reply price

(S HATA SHOTEN)

11/27 7.31 AM

ZL HU 17 Mexico City 13 1130AM 27th
Dr Holmes 45 Young Building, Honolulu

We stay here expecting you.

FATHER

11/27 9.14 AM

ZL HU 36 San Francisco 35 1105AM 27th
Growsumida Honolulu

Recable yesterday advice positively best possible would not have sent cable yesterday unless all possibilities extending contract had been exhausted must have immediate cable authorization and amendments letter credit otherwise cannot prevent cancellation

11/27 9.01

ZL OHU 39 New York 17 155 PM 27th
Shokin Honolulu

TODORIYORIDEN KONOSAINARUBEKU TASUUKITYOOSERI MURUKOTOSIKARU RESITOOMOWARURU NTUKIHIUUYOONA RABANISEIYATOSI RETOONIYORITUGO OTUKEHOKUBEIKA KUTENISSEIGENIN HAIROYONEGAITASI SIMEISIKYUUDEN POONOKENKAKUTEN ETOKUHOKUSEYO

79716—46—Ex. 148—32
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

RH 014 Los Angeles Calif 15 905AM 25th
Rev HIRO HIGUCHI
Waipahu Community Church
Waipahu Oahu.
Richard Currier died last night pneumonia

W 054 Washington DC USG 88 FST 55 3.15 PM 26
AMERICAN CONSUL PAPAAE

Twentyfifth Swiss interests your August 25 eight am Swiss Legation has informed department that in letter dated September 20 Paul Nordmann stated that he has been temporarily released from internment to consult physician at Papeete Legation received prisoners post card dated September 25 signed by Nordmann stating that he was in bad health and still detained by police authorities at Papeete Legation is particularly anxious to learn reason for expulsion decree against him on July 31 please make informal inquiry and report by telegraph

HULL

SB HU70 Los Angeles Calif 24/23 230PM 25th
NLT Y Watanabe Box 511 Wailuku Maui

Gladly received your letter air mailing $500 today depending everything on you wire when ship

MAYEDA

w 83 New York 18 5.50 25
Shokin Honolulu

TODORIYORIDEN KINZITUHONPOOSE NKITIMUKESYUPPA NSUBEKINITUKIKO NOSAIZAIIEIKAKU TENINSAISSYOGEN DONIKIRITUMESEI ZEI TASHUUKITYOO SURUYOLOTSUKETU NAIRYONEGAI TASI NAODOOSENITEKI TYOOSIUBEKISIME ISIKYUUTODORIE HENDENSEYOHok

Shokin

Mackay Radio
1941 NOV 19 PM 8 47

NLT HACHIYAEINOSUKE
TOKYOMITUKOSI

GOANCHAKUO SHUKUSU REINOKENWA KOSHOCU KINJITY KAIKETUNOMIKOMI JUSHOWA TOMO HONOLULU EIBUNWA TOKETUKANNO KYOKAWOETE OKURUYOCHUIARI ASUSIRASU

Araki

Translation:
INOSUKE HACHIYAE,
TOKYO MITSUHOSHI

FELICITATIONS ON SAFE ARRIVAL IN REGARD TO CERTAIN MATTER NOW IN NEGOTIATION LOOKS LIKE DECISION IN NEAR FUTURE RESIDENCE STILL HONOLULU ENGLISH WORDS TO BE SENT AFTER PERMIT FROM FREEZE OFFICE. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED WILL LET YOU KNOW TOMORROW

Araki

Note: If this was sent by Joe ARAKI it deserves attention. SS

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Confidential


Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: and References: (See first page of details.)

14ND (3)

Copy to: ONI (5)

CinCPac (1)

Com 14 (1)

FBI-Hon (2)

MID-HD (2)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A. ONI File No.:

Synopsis: On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, clothes, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has been found that KUEHN’S signal system ever was employed.

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender’s name as FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941 will be charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

Deductions: Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

Approved:

J. H. MAYFIELD
Captain, U. S. Navy
District Intelligence Officer

WBS/zw 11D

14ND

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:

(a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
(b) ComId Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
(c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
(d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 5-1-41.
(e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI), 5-31-41.
(f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 7-17-41.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAIICHI SAKI, 2-3-42.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
(j) 1ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

(A) Table Showing Number of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.

1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.
2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed very important.

3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Dicken, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radiograms and cabledgrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo
(Secret Military Message No. — )
(By Chief of Consulate’s Code)
To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.
From: Fujii
Re Signals I Wish to Simplify Communications as follows:
(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) Battle Force, including Scouting Force, are about to put to sea—
   1. Several Aircraft Carriers plan to put to sea.
   2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
   3. Several Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third.
   4. All Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third.
   5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.

3. 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
   7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
   8.

(2) Signal
1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night—one light from 8 PM to 9 PM indicates “1”, from 9 PM to 10 PM indicates “2”. The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate “3” and “4”. Two lights, according to the time, indicate “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”.
   When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight and one half light indicate “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”. Two full lights indicate “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”.
   2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 AM until noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”. Two pieces linen cloth indicate “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”.
   3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, a star and “II” indicates “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”.
   4. Light in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 PM to 1 AM every hour indicates “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”.
   5. “KGMB want ads” advertisements 9:45 AM—
      (a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates “3” or “6”.
      (b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates “4” or “7”.
      (c) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates “5” or “8”.

in the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakula Road which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal “EXEX” this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 PM to 8 PM indicates “3” or “6”; 8 PM to 9 PM indicates “4” or “7”; 9 PM to 10 PM indicates “5” or “8”.

4. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3
December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, the FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the “Lanikai beach house” referred to was not readily identifiable, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the “dormer window of Kalama house” probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class “A” German suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from “dormer window of Kalama house”.

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the indicated markings.

3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a “Lanikai beach House”; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, Island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paaoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paaoa, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by Agent McCarthy:

“In compliance with instructions, Agents Paaoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 10.

“Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kalua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

“Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn’s house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn’s family nor did any members of this family put in their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.”
"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period. [7] It was pointed out by many of the residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in traveling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with automobiles headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office."

[8] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following pertinent incident:

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing the light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident ad have also been given all information available here, in regard to
FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien.

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of Shigee FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941. FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regarding investigation of the Haleakula and Kula Sanitarium region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight—actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December 1941, the reporting officer in Company with Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes. At 8:40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe fire signal seen.

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan—"Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island—where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

"However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December, 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in part:

". . . Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed.

[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 18 December, 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light
flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanitorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject light any matches."

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the activities of Shigee FUKUWA, since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being prepared on FUKUWA.

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARUYAMA to determine whether signals had been emanating from his house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships at sea.

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is Ichio Fujii.

[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.

17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu, from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been discovered.

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case is continuing.

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:

- Miss Kimie DOUE
- Takalchi SAKAI
- Katsukichi MURAOKA
- Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO
- Kanaye SAHARA
- Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJII
22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojirō OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyōnosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vinyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3290), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [44] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On those occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyōnosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.
30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitome Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, those men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a “haole” (Hawaiian for “white person”) [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General’s private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer’s room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the “haole” she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a “spy”.

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36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and Allen, is submitted for information:

KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 1915, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928–1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNS have owned two homes at Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty shop brought in only about $80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the [18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for $40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was $6,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was $9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of $10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, purser of the SS KAMAKURA MAHU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the $40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.
43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines "in some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "these figures were purely fictitious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals con-
tained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 m. meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1; one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was postcarded to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing $500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [28] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.
"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30 and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing $1,400.00 in $100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were $14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new $100.00 bills, some $20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Malunui Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Malunui Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalahoe Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA appeared, walking along Kalahoe Avenue from the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tilliman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on either 28 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very similar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has
seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.

48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the $14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of 'KGMB want ads'. KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original $14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, $5,000.00 in new $100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given $2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth Kuehn). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through, Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following information appeared on the suspect card:

"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu None at present
Formerly (1918) officer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."
54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNs had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Government, through the Consulate.

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December, 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)

Pending—14ND.
Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22–30 November, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Types of ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/22</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>BBs 3, CAS 6, CLs 1, CVS 1, SSs 4, DDs 21, DMs 8, AVDs 31, (#)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1800</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1800</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/27</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>BBs 3, CAS 11, CLs 1, CVS 2, SSs 4, DDs 23, DMs 8, AVDs 34, (#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0800</td>
<td>BBs 1, CAS 8, CLs 2, CVS 4, SSs 1, DDs 11, DMs 4, AVDs 19, (#)</td>
</tr>
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<td>BBs 6, CAS 7, CLs 6, CVS 1, SSs 2, DDs 24, DMs 4, AVDs 31, (#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/30</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>BBs 5, CAS 7, CLs 5, CVS 1, SSs 2, DDs 23, DMs 4, AVDs 32, (#)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: BB—battleship; CA—heavy cruiser; CL—light cruiser; CV—aircraft carrier; SS—submarine; DD—destroyer; DM—light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD—seaplane tender (destroyer type).

(¹) Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

[1] Enclosure (B): Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941

### BATTLESHIPS (BBS)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>BBs</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>CLs</th>
<th>CVS</th>
<th>SSs</th>
<th>DDs</th>
<th>DMs</th>
<th>AVDs</th>
<th>(#)</th>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(¹) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and used as a target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a battleship.

### HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>BBs</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>CLs</th>
<th>CVS</th>
<th>SSs</th>
<th>DDs</th>
<th>DMs</th>
<th>AVDs</th>
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79716–46–Ex. 148—33
### LIGHT CRUISERS (CLS)

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<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0600</td>
<td>Underway in harbor (DETROIT)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0637</td>
<td>DETROIT cleared</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1138</td>
<td>HELENA entered</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>1131—HONOLULU entered</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1148</td>
<td>ST. LOUIS entered</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>PHOENIX entered</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1212</td>
<td>RALEIGH entered</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250</td>
<td>HELENA moored</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>HONOLULU moored</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>RALEIGH moored</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1305</td>
<td>PHOENIX moored</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1328</td>
<td>ST. LOUIS moored</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>1350</td>
<td>DETROIT entered</td>
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<td>1510</td>
<td>DETROIT moored</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>At moorings</td>
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### AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS)

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<td>At moorings (LEXINGTON, ENTERPRISE)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0735</td>
<td>ENTERPRISE underway</td>
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<td>0838</td>
<td>ENTERPRISE cleared</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>At moorings</td>
<td>1</td>
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### SUBMARINES (SSS)

<table>
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<th>Event</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>0600</td>
<td>At moorings</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1254</td>
<td>ARGONAUT underway</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>TROUT underway</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1340</td>
<td>ARGONAUT cleared</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350</td>
<td>TROUT cleared</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>At moorings</td>
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### DESTROYERS (DDS)

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<th>Event</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>0600</td>
<td>At moorings or underway</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0602</td>
<td>MUGFORD cleared</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>0605</td>
<td>GRIDLEY cleared</td>
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<td>0608</td>
<td>MAURY cleared</td>
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<td>0612</td>
<td>BAGLEY cleared</td>
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<tr>
<td>0617</td>
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<td>0620</td>
<td>CRAVEN cleared</td>
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<tr>
<td>0621</td>
<td>PATTERSON cleared</td>
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<td>1221</td>
<td>ALXWIN entered</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1228</td>
<td>CONYNGHAM entered</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1232</td>
<td>CASSIN entered</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1236</td>
<td>HULL entered</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1243</td>
<td>DALE entered</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1245</td>
<td>REID entered</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1247</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1254</td>
<td>DEWEY entered</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>MONAGHAN entered</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>TUCKER entered</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1318</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CASE entered</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336</td>
<td>MacDONOUGH entered</td>
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Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.


Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.


Origin of Case:


Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

Copy to:

ONI (5)
ClnCPac (1)
COM14 (1)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-H (2)
14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A

Synopsis: During the period 3–6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.

Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inaccurate as to destroyers.
Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was engaged in this espionage activity.

The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.

Deductions: Despatches of 3–6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to protect battleships in the harbor.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U.S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/zw  
[1] Confidential  
14 February 1942.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:  
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject 2–9–42.  
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHIRODO, 2–8–42.  
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIIE MIKAMI, 2–6–42.

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a). It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and (b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.

2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those communications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter discussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December, 1941.

3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor, and their entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadashi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consulate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [3] area for the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings to the Consulate. The modus operandi of MORIMURA and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:  

WYOMING and two seaplane-tenders departed third.

(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as “operational data”), shows the above despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1655, 5 December. The seaplane
tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.

5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister TOGO by the local Consulate:

USS HONOLULU arrived 1300/4th.

From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth E-21 at 1300, on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at Pearl Harbor during the period 1–6 December, 1941, were the departure of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, between 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message was sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One (ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to Tokyo.

7. The following message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0510, 5 December, in company with the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735, the same morning.

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore, correct.

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed, before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.

11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLS) and ex-destroyers now used as mine-layers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as to all destroyer-type ships are presented: At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that after-
noon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon on 5 December, the four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1405, 1431, and at 1612.

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of interest:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the fourth.

There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.

14. At 1501 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington:

On the evening of the fifth the Battleship Wyoming and one sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 17 destroyers; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock: 4 light cruisers; 3 destroyers. (CA and CV all ——) PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet.

The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts:
The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the following are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYOMING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0800, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day—four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three seaplane tenders (AVDs)—which to the untrained observer might have appeared also to be destroyers.

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered at 0830, cleared at 0920, [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the harbor.

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms "moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in drydock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at moorings on that afternoon. The ninth Battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.

21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 1248, which called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic):
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further comment thereon is offered.

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco:

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.

The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner LURLINE is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo:

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the fourth, about 1100 tons; one stack; and had a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British Consulate.

[8] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT's crew went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December, 1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4, 14.)

C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU. (Paragraph 5.)

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9).

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it is concluded that:
A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTO-SHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the erroneous reports.)

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, readily available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battleships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was surprisingly inaccurate.

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).

Pending

14 February 1942.

ENCLOSURE (A): Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

21 March, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.

29 April, 1941

(To Tokyo)

The American Army Transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

14 May, 1941

(To Tokyo)

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reinforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Emmons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickman Field at 0558 the 14th.
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

7 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units of the fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

13 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)

Reference San Francisco Msg #92:
SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

26 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo)

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

27 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Chungking—Burma Road—trucks

28 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)

Danial Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation Managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via Clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

8 JULY 1941

(To Tokyo and Washington)

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force: The local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his Consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese Military Attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) Furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

15 JULY, 1941

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

26 JULY 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in
a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

2 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced) enter port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

23 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

18 NOVEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma Road trucks 3000—2 ton trucks.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H. Date: June 15, 1942

Report made by: Lieut. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, and Ensign Don Woodrum, USNR

Period covered: February 15—June 15, 1942 Status of Case: Pending—14ND


References: See first page of details.

Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: None

Copy to:

ONI (5)

CinCPac (1)

Com14 (1)

MID-HD (2) Zone II (1)

FBI-Hon (2) Zone III (1)

14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND/#54-A ONI File No.:

Synopsis: Questioning of former employees of Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, indicates that Tadasi MORIMURA, Consulate secretary who came to Honolulu in March 1941, was the chief collector of facts for the Consulate concerning the movements of U. S. Navy vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor.

MORIMURA's coming to Hawaii was accompanied with publicity that he would attend to expatriation matters at Consulate, which work he did not do. His work at the Consulate was done in privacy of Vice Consul OKUDA's office, involved poring over a map of Oahu, but the exact nature of his work is not known. MORIMURA went to his office at hours of his choice. He spent much time away from the office, visiting strategic points on Oahu, such as Pearl City peninsula and Alea Heights (both commanding a view of Pearl Harbor), Haleiwa beach (a potential landing place), Kaneohe Bay (across from the Naval Air Station), and made flying trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii. On drives around Oahu, he often took with him KOTOSHIRODO, Consulate clerk, and
MIKAMI, regular taxi driver for Consulate, but sometimes sent KOTOSHIRODO alone to count ships in Pearl Harbor, which they last did on December 5, 1941. MORIMURA contacted many persons who have since been interned.

Deductions: Naval information reported to Tokyo by despatches analyzed in reference (b) was chiefly gathered by, or under the direction of, MORIMURA.

Approved:

I. H. MAXFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

JUNE 15, 1942

WBS/cop

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities

References:

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 9, 1942.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 14, 1942.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kimie DOUE, dated February 3, 1942.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Takaichi SAKAI, dated February 3, 1942.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kanaye SAHARA, dated February 3, 1942.
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, dated February 8, 1942.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated January 29, 1942.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated June 15, 1942.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI, dated February 6, 1942.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kenzo MAEHARA, dated May 11, 1942.
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ryuichi MORIBE, dated March 6, 1942.
(l) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ikuzo SATO, dated May 16, 1942.

This report has been prepared to supplement references (a) and (b), and to demonstrate, insofar as is known to this office, the means by which the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, gathered information relative to ship movements.

1. In paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of reference (a), it was stated that, when interrogated, Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist and typist at the Consulate, and subject of reference (c), stated that Tatsui MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, had arrived from Japan on March 27, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, but did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned to a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, and the nature of his work there was unknown to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA often came to work about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and was seldom at his desk in the afternoon. Miss DOUE stated that there was a week during October or November, 1941, when MORIMURA did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi between 1000 and 1100, and she would not see him again the same day. The [2] staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the ROYAL TAXI STAND, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu, (telephone 2399), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. (The proprietor of this taxi stand, John Yoshiye MIKAMI, subject of reference (i), has been interned.) On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, subject of reference (f), one of the Consulate clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO’s car, and other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

2. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time.
Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

3. Takaichi SAKAI, a Consulte clerk, subject of reference (d), when interrogated, corroborated Miss DOUE’s statements about MORIMURA’s failure to concern himself with expatriation matters and his frequent departure from the Consulate during business hours.

4. Another Consulate clerk, Kanaye SAHARA, subject of reference (e), also was interrogated. SAHARA stated that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or the third, cut off at the first joint, but could not remember which hand was without a finger. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA’s departures from the Consulate during business hours with KOTOSHIRODO, adding the KOTOSHIRODO often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day.

5. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they were going to “important places”, and, upon being asked what he meant by that, said “military places.” On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and because neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO would make any mention of where they had gone when they returned to the Consulate. SAHARA added that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he often used on these trips.

6. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA’s background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data on diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years old, and if [3] he is a regular member of the consular service, he should have been listed, as he could not at his age be a recent college graduate. (MORIMURA is said to have told Sakae INAKA, a Consulate maid, that he was graduated from Hedini University.)

7. SAHARA added that he believed that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they entered or departed from the office. When asked if he thought this was not strange in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clercs at the Consulate, SAHARA made the explanation that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy one another’s company.

8. In light of these revelations, KOTOSHIRODO was interviewed, and his personal history is set forth in reference (f). (It should be noted that none of the Consulate clerks were interrogated until after they had severed their connections with the Japanese Government.)

9. KOTOSHIRODO stated that his duties at the Consulate were to receive and open local and Japanese mail, and to handle out-going mail. He usually logged in letters from the Foreign Office, Japan, but these letters were actually opened by Kokichi SEKI, one of the secretaries. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he wrote down the date of receipt and the number of each item from the Foreign Office, which was addressed to the Consul-General, but he did not see the actual letters, as those usually came in inner envelopes. SEKI would take this mail in to Vice Consul OKUDA, and from there is would go into the Consul’s office. Each letter had a receipt inside the first envelope which was signed and returned to the Foreign Office. Routine letters would come back to SEKI from the Vice Consul, and either SEKI or KOTOSHIRODO would enter the subject of each letter and its date in a record book.

10. SEKI’s predecessor at this job was Mitsugi IKETANI, who returned to Japan late in 1940. (It was recently learned that while he was in Hawaii, IKETANI was head of the JAPANESE RED CROSS.)

11. Mail from the Foreign Office, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was of two types—that which pertained to the business of the Honolulu Consulate only, and letters addressed to all Consulates. The former type would carry consecutive numbers. Ordinary mail consisted of domestic matters such as births, deaths, marriages, expatriation, divorce, and adoption. This type of mail, and the circular letters addressed to all Consulates, would arrive by post, and would be picked up at the Consulate’s post office box by the chauffeur, or would be delivered by a regular mail carrier. Other mail would arrive by diplomatic courier. This would be opened in the telegraph [f] (or, coding) room by Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary. The couriers would carry the mail in a suitcase, and upon arrival, would go straight into the telegraph room accompanied by the Consul, Vice Consul, and SEKI. KOTOSHIRODO did not remember the same courier ever coming twice, and he added that one would not necessarily arrive every time an N. Y. K. liner called at Honolulu.
12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that letters received from local sources were not logged in at the Consulate. Only those received from the Foreign Office, other Japanese Consulates, and those of especial importance were logged. Most of the local mail came from consular agents, and consisted of letters or routine reports.

13. Office supplies for the Consulate were purchased by SEKI, who also acted as treasurer. KOTOSHIRODO's desk was in SEKI's office, so he was familiar with the purchasing. Most office supplies were purchased from the Honolulu Paper Company, and the remainder from the Hakubundo Book Store. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the persons usually contacted at the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE were Tomoaki NAKAMURA or Minoru FUJWARA, the manager. NAKAMURA was familiar with everyone in the Consulate. Confidential Informant J-1 (rating "A") had previously informed this office that NAKAMURA was one of the most frequent visitors at the Consulate, and although there was no evidence that he had purpose other than that of selling office supplies, it was noted that he treated everyone in the Consulate, from the Consul General down, with insolent camaraderie and general disrespect that was unusual—one might say, unique—coming from a member of the local Japanese community. NAKAMURA made frequent trips to all parts of the Island of Oahu in the course of business, but when interviewed, denied that he had ever supplied information of any nature whatsoever to the Consulate. NAKAMURA has been interned.

14. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of his activities with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not altogether frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived at the Consulate in March, 1941. A week later, KOTOSHIRODO drove the new secretary over Tantalus, a residential district on the heights overlooking Honolulu. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he drove MORIMURA out to Walipahu, a plantation town about a mile equidistant from the northern shores of the Middle Loch and the West Loch of Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA was anxious to visit a tea house called the SHIOYU, which was off the highway to the left below the high school, and which was noted for its balloon fish soup. KOTOSHIRODO had been there before. The Consulate chauffeur, Ichitaro OZAKI, advised that it was impossible to get service there without prior reservation, but MORIMURA insisted. However, at the intersection KOTOSHIRODO said, "Let's go," and MORIMURA agreed, so they turned around. Following this admission, KOTO- [5] SHIRODO displayed a reluctance to remember any further trips with MORIMURA outside of town, but was finally persuaded to recall trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii.

15. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he was asked to go to Maui by Vice Consul OKUDA. KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA left John Rodgers Airport, Honolulu, at 8:00 a.m. on the morning of May 5, 1941, and arrived at the Maui airport an hour later. They immediately hired a cab and a driver. The driver was a second-generation Japanese who could not converse very well with MORIMURA. MORIMURA spoke little English and had difficulty understanding the local Nisei brand of Japanese. However, they utilized the services of this driver for the two days they were on Maui. From the airport, they proceeded to the TOMEDA HOTEL, a Japanese hotel located in Kahului, the east coast port of Maui. KOTOSHIRODO said that this hotel was run by a Japanese with a "funny eye" (elaborated to mean that he couldn't see from it). MORIMURA talked to the owner of the hotel about a Japanese poem, but never introduced himself. (The TOMEDA HOTEL was operated by one Itsuo HAMADA. A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated March 10, 1941, described HAMADA as having a left eye that was either injured or made of glass. HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nippu Jiji, a Honolulu bilingual (Japanese-English) daily newspaper. HAMADA is now in custody.)

16. It is interesting to note that HAMADA was a frequent contact of Shigeo FURUKAWA, the activities of whom were reported in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12 of reference (a). Letters from HAMADA to FURUKAWA at Kula Sanatorium, Maui, were found in FURUKAWA's possession, and it is known that HAMADA visited FURUKAWA at Kula, a number of times. It was also reported that the two men phoned each other on occasions. One of HAMADA's letters was a forceful plea that FURUKAWA dismiss the notion of suicide from his mind. FURUKAWA, as was shown in reference (a), made two attempts at suicide following the outbreak of hostilities. Another letter talked of Japanese poetry. FURUKAWA being a poet of some small reputation. Before entering Kula Sanatorium, FURUKAWA was advertising manager for the Nippu Jiji, of which HAMADA was the Kahului representative.
17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA stayed at HAMADA's hotel for two hours. They rested and had breakfast, but did not stay because the hotel looked too dirty. After they left HAMADA, they drove to the Grand Hotel in Wailuku, Maui, not a Japanese hotel. They registered here, and then drove to Lahaina, on the west coast of Maui. Ships of the United States Fleet, when visiting Maui, anchor off Lahaina Roads. They stopped at a fountain shop for a while, then drove back to Wailuku. From here they drove to Spreckelsville, a few miles from Wailuku. There KOTOSHIRODO went to a [6] Japanese school and met Tetsunosuke SONE. Consul General KITA had requested KOTOSHIRODO to give a package to the person to whom it was addressed, a female. KOTOSHIRODO thought the package contained a gift of some sort. He gave the package to SONE, because the woman to whom it was addressed was supposed to be one of SONE's former pupils. A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated April 11, 1942, states that SONE was the principal of the Japanese language school at Spreckelsville, had served as a Japanese consular agent for 30 years, and had served as a private in the Japanese army for two years. SONE was taken into custody on January 5, 1942, and on January 21, 1942, the Internee Hearing Board at Wailuku, Maui, recommended that SONE be paroled. While KOTOSHIRODO was presenting the package to SONE, MORIMURA stayed in the car. After leaving the school, they saw a pineapple cannery, and then returned to the hotel in Wailuku about 4:00 p.m. After dinner they took a walk, saw a swimming meet, and about 9:00 p.m. dropped down to the fairgrounds hall where there was dancing. They bought tickets and went inside, but did not dance. They returned to the hotel about 11:00 p.m.

18. The following day, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited Lae Valley, located in Maui's northern range of mountains, back of Wailuku. Then they drove up the summit of Mount Haleakala, a dormant volcano rising 10,000 feet above sea level which is located in the southern half of Maui. They remained at the top about 20 minutes, and on their return from the summit, passed Kula Sanatorium. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they merely drove up to the sanatorium, got out of the car, and surveyed the building. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a photograph of the building which he still has in his album. He insisted that he did not give the print or the negative to MORIMURA, or to anyone else at the Consultate. In the afternoon they drove to the Makawao district, in central Maui, and arrived at the airport about 3:30 p.m. The plane took off at 4:00 p.m. and they arrived in Honolulu about 5:00 p.m. (The fact of MORIMURA's interest in the Kula region should be read in connection with the information reported in paragraphs 4, 9, 10, and 11 of reference (a.).

19. The second trip, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was made October 13–17, 1941. Again, Vice Consul OKUDA requested that KOTOSHIRODO accompany MORIMURA. They went to Hilo, Island of Hawaii, by plane, arriving in Hilo about 10:00 a.m. on the 13th. They hired a taxi driver, using him during their entire visit. His name was NARIKAWA, employed by the ABC TAXI COMPANY (probably Shigeo NARIKAWA, 1014 Kamemameha Avenue, Hilo). MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO registered at the Naniloa Hotel, operated by the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and were assigned Room 8. After lunch on October 13th, they drove up to Kilaeua Volcano, and spent the entire afternoon around the craters. They visited the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO, and purchased photographs of the volcano in eruption and of the lehua flower. The [7] proprietor of the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO was then Kenzo MAEBARA, subject of reference (j), who has been placed in custodial detention, principally for his association with officers of Japanese naval and other public vessels which used to call at Hilo.) On October 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO drove to the Kona district (west side of Hawaii), via Kilaeua Volcano, stopping for lunch at the SHIRAKAWA HOTEL, at Waiohinu. (Of Kayato SHIRAKAWA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the hotel bearing his surname, this office has no derogatory information.) At Kona, they stayed at the KONA HOTEL, at Holualoa, but according to KOTOSHIRODO they did not talk to anyone there. (Jentaro INABA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the KONA HOTEL has no adverse record in the files of this office.) On the evening of the 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO went to a motion picture show at Kainalii, about seven miles from Holualoa.

20. Certain facts about the trip to Kona are of interest. Although there are a number of Japanese hotels in Hilo, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODA preferred
to stay at the Naniloa, which is a new hotel catering to the tourist trade. It is the most expensive hotel in Hilo. The trip from Hilo to Kona can be made in three and one-half to four hours by automobile. However, a leisurely trip must have been made, inasmuch as Waiohlin is only a little more than half way between Hilo and Kona. At Kona there is a hotel comparable to the Naniloa, the Kona Inn, also operated by Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and catering to tourists. In Kona, however, they preferred to stay at a Japanese hotel.

21. On October 15th, they departed from Kona and drove to Kawaihae to see cattle shipping. Kawaihae is the port for the immense Parker Ranch, and other smaller ranches in the neighborhood. From here they proceeded to Kapaaun, in the Kohala district, and lunched at the NAMBU HOTEL. Here they talked to an old man, whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not remember. The old man told them about the birth and childhood of Kamehameha (probably Kamehameha I, (1758-1819), first king of Hawaii.) Directories show the proprietor of this hotel to be one Yoshio Hori. They had lunch at one o'clock and, stopping only to view Akaka Falls, returned to Hilo, arriving there about dark. That night, after dinner, they went to the Hananoya Tea House where they met two Japanese girls. The chauffeur went along with them. They returned to the hotel about 4:00 a.m.

22. The following day, October 16th, they went to see the County Fair at the High School and Intermediate School Building. Later they saw Rainbow Falls, the Country Club golf course, Puuanille Home (county hospital for tubercular patients), and then went to eat Japanese food at the Tokiwatei. They returned to Hilo about 2:00 p.m. That evening they again visited the Hananoya Tea House, but left at 11:00 p.m. 

23. On October 17th, they checked out of the hotel and went directly to the airport, taking the 10:00 a.m. plane for Honolulu. They arrived in Honolulu at 11:45 a.m.

24. KOTOSHIRODO insisted that the two tea house girls, the driver and the old man at the NAMBU HOTEL at Kapaaun were the only persons they contacted on the whole trip. KOTOSHIRODO stated that, on both trips, he handled money which was given to him at the Consulate before they left. On the Maui trip he was given $110,000, and on the Hawaii trip, $300.00. On the latter trip they spent $65.00 at tea houses, while the driver cost them $55.00.

25. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a number of trips to various points on Oahu with MORIMURA. In the early part of April, 1941, about two weeks after MORIMURA’s arrival, MORIMURA asked KOTOSHIRODO to take him motoring to the Kanehoe district. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali and turned into the Kokokahi road which runs along Kanehoe Bay (across from Kanehoe Naval Air Station). They followed this road until they reached the Kailua beach pavilion. They got out of the car, and took a stroll in the park on the ocean side of the pavilion. In the car again, they drove past the cattle farm and the Kailua Theater, and then turned left on the road running to the Waimanalo district. Here they stopped near the old wharf on Waimanalo beach. They walked over to the wharf where several people were fishing. After about ten minutes, they got back in the car and returned to Honolulu, arriving at the Consulate about 4:00 p.m. In July or August, 1941, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA again made a trip to the Kanehoe district. This time they went in MIKAMI’s taxi. Again they followed the Kokokahi road along Kanehoe Bay, and at one point MORIMURA told MIKAMI to slow down. Further, along the road they stopped at a roadside stand and purchased two watermelons. This stand was near a pine grove (KOTO- SHIRODO evidently mistook ironwood trees for pines), on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the road. They drove on to Kailua Tavern where MIKAMI had breakfast, while MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO each had a can of beer. They were served by a waitress of Portuguese ancestry. After about twenty minutes they returned to the Consulate via the Nuuanu Pali road.

26. On a Japanese holiday in April, the Yasukuni Shrine Extraordinary Cen- mony, when the Consulate was closed, MIKAMI drove KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Waianae, on the west coast of Oahu. They drove out beyond Waianae to Makua Cave, where the road ends. They departed from town about ten in the morning and returned about two, having lunched at a Chinese store in Waianae. KOTOSHIRODO admitted making three trips to Haleiwa, on the northwest coast of the island, with MORIMURA. The first trip was made in the latter part of April. They stopped at Haleiwa beach, near a ballground, for about ten minutes. Then they returned to Honolulu. Both the trip to, and
curred some time in May; the third in July. On neither trip did they get out of the car. KOTOSHIRODO remembered stopping at the maauka-ewa (towards the mountain—towards Ewa plantation) corner of the Pearl City intersection for a while, but he could not remember whether MORIMURA talked with any one on those occasions. (It should be noted that the Waianae and Haleiwa beaches are considered important as the places on Oahu where enemy troops might first attempt landings.

27. Early in the summer of 1941, MIKAMI drove MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO up to Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. No one got out of the car, and KOTOSHIRODO was uncertain whether or not MORIMURA used binoculars. After a few minutes they drove down the hill again. In November they again drove to Aiea Heights. This time they drove in KOTOSHIRODO’s car, and they were there about ten o’clock in the morning. MORIMURA directed them to visit a house just off the road, and stated that the person whom he was visiting was a Mrs. MATSUO. He asked KOTOSHIRODO to enter the house, too, so KOTOSHIRODO followed. MORIMURA introduced himself to her, and asked here about the condition of the Japanese school and the Japanese people in that district. Mrs. MATSUO hesitated, and refused to give a definite answer, stating that there were other people in the district who knew more about such matters. She offered to introduce him to other persons, but MORIMURA stated that would not be necessary. MORIMURA talked with her for about 20 minutes. Afterwards they drove directly back to the Consulate.

28. Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, and Lieutenent G. P. Kimball, USNR, of this office, questioned Mrs. MATSUO concerning MORIMURA’s visit. Mrs. MATSUO is a nisei whose husband, now deceased, was a Japanese consular agent during his lifetime. She remembered the visit of MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, although she did not remember their names, and she did not know that they had come from the Consulate. She stated that MORIMURA asked her how the Japanese were being treated. She answered that the Japanese on the plantation (Honolul Plantation were being well treated. MORIMURA then asked if they weren’t “suspected”. Mrs. MATSUO stated that she told him that Americans of Japanese ancestry were not suspected if they were loyal Americans. After they had gone, Mrs. MATSUO wondered if they were agents of the United States. The interrogating agents concluded that MORIMURA was looking for a case of disaffection in Mrs. MATSUO, but found her to be barren soil. From Mrs. MATSUO’s house an excellent view can be had of the usual battleship moorings in East Loch.

29. During July or August, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove to the top of Punchbowl about 8:30 a.m. (Punchbowl is a small, extinct crater which overlooks downtown Honolulu.) According to KOTOSHIRODO, they merely looked at the view and drove down again.

[10] 30. All the foregoing information has not been presented precisely as KOTOSHIRODO first told it. Much of it was drawn from KOTOSHIRODO only after several hours of questioning and prompting. Later he was taken to various areas on Oahu where he pointed out the exact spots he had visited with MORIMURA and MIKAMI. Later he typed out and signed a statement of all he had said. The information which KOTOSHIRODO gave has been rearranged in this report to indicate the various areas which he and MORIMURA visited.

31. KOTOSHIRODO finally admitted that he had made about thirty trips to the Pearl City peninsula and vicinity with MORIMURA. Sometimes they went in MIKAMI’s taxi, sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO’s car. On the peninsula proper they visited the Pan-American Airways landing, and also the soda water stand belonging to Teisaku ETO, subject of references (g) and (h). However, they did not always visit these two places. ETO is an alien about 67 years old. His soft drink stand is adjacent to the Pearl City Navy landing, and from this spot, one may obtain an excellent view of Pearl Harbor.

32. About two days after his arrival, in March, 1941, MORIMURA hired a taxi and went around the Island of Oahu, alone. About a week after his arrival, SEKI accompanied MORIMURA to the Pan-American Airways clipper landing at Pearl City. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he heard this from SEKI.) About a week later, MORIMURA insisted that KOTOSHIRODO drive him to the peninsula in KOTOSHIRODO’s car. They got out of the car and bought soft drinks at ETO’s stand. MORIMURA talked to the ETOs, both the old man and his wife, about their business. He asked them how long they had been situated in this spot. KOTOSHIRODO did not know whether MORIMURA had a previous introduction to the ETOs, or had merely struck up an
acquaintance. KOTOSHIRODO said that he heard SEKI and MORIMURA speak of ETO. They thought him a very common fellow, and thought it amusing that an alien Japanese was permitted to operate his business so close to a naval base.

33. Another Consulate contact in the Pearl City area was a young Japanese who worked at a store on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the highway at the junction of Kamakana Highway and Pearl City Road. MORIMURA would talk to this Japanese while KOTOSHIRODO played the pinball machines. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they visited this place at least six times a month, and sometimes MORIMURA would go there alone. The last time KOTOSHIRODO stopped at this store with MORIMURA was in September, 1941. When KOTOSHIRODO was taken to the Pearl City junction, he identified the PEARL SERVICE STATION as the place MORIMURA had spoken to the young Japanese. However, KOTOSHIRODO has been unable to identify any employee of the PEARL SERVICE STATION or any other person thereat as the person to whom MORIMURA had spoken. This service station was owned and operated by one Nakajiro KURASHIGE.

[77] 34. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in the middle of April, 1941, all the Consulate staff members, together with their wives and children, went on a picnic at the home of Sam WOODS at Lanikai Beach, Oahu. The party went to their destination in four taxis and the official Consulate car. On the way to the WOODS residence, they travelled on the Kalamianaole Highway around Koko Head. They started out about 9:30 a.m. and arrived about 10:30 a.m. They lunched in the yard, and afterwards played soft ball. They were served coconut juice from nuts picked by an old Japanese man. Also present were a middle-aged Hawaiian couple. About 3:00 p.m. they left for home, returning to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali. They reached the Consulate shortly before 4:00 p.m. It was originally believed that one SAKURADA, yard man for Sam WOODS, had arranged this party. However, investigation indicated that SAKURADA had nothing to do with the affair. MIKAMI, the taxi driver, apparently arranged the outing. MIKAMI had chauffeured for the WOODS on occasions, and also had connections on the windward side of Oahu, where Lanikai is located, through a Mrs. BECKLEY, the arranged faucis (Hawaiian feasts). MIKAMI sometimes would transport the food prepared by Mrs. BECKLEY to its destination. MIKAMI was well acquainted with Mrs. Mary FREITAS, housekeeper for the WOODS. The WOODS were away on the mainland, and MIKAMI arranged the picnic through Mrs. FREITAS.

35. KOTOSHIRODO also was questioned concerning the existence of maps at the Japanese Consulate. He stated that MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu on his desk, which he saw both MORIMURA and the Vice Consul study at times. KOTOSHIRODO denied that any marks were made on this map, or that any Japanese writing appeared thereon. He was shown a new Geological Survey map of Oahu (1928 edition), and he believed that this was identical to the map which MORIMURA had in his office. KOTOSHIRODO also stated that he seen MORIMURA working on a map of the Pacific Ocean with a compass and protractor.

36. In light of the evidence that MIKAMI was a conspicuous member of the KOTOSHIRODO-MORIMURA expeditions, MIKAMI was interrogated on January 6, 1942, by Agent Tillman, Lieutenant Kimball, and Captain F. O. Blake of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. MIKAMI stated that he drove persons from the Consulate to golf, to parties, downtown for shopping, to take the children to school, and to Waikiki for swimming. He added that while driving the Consul's car, he paid bills and did other errands. He had been doing this for the past six or seven years. MIKAMI was extremely reluctant to answer questions, but eventually considerable information was obtained. He admitted driving MORIMURA along the Kokokahi Road, where views were obtained of the Kanehoe Naval Air Station. He said that several times MORIMURA had instructed him to drive slowly so that a better view could be obtained. At one spot they stopped for at least three or four minutes. MIKAMI believed that MORIMURA had binoculars with him, but was unable to say whether MORIMURA had used them or not. KOTOSHIRODO went along with them the second trip only. MIKAMI stated that on one occasion he had driven MORIMURA to Haleiwa, via the windward side of the island. They stopped at "Sato's restaurant" in Haleiwa. ("Sato's restaurant" has been identified as the SEAVIEW INN, owned by Ikazo SATO, subject of reference (1). It is known that on many around-the-island automobile trips of visiting
Japanese naval officers, a stop was made at the SEAVIEW INN, usually to eat lunch. While such stops might be accounted for by the fact that the SEAVIEW INN is the logical half-way point at which to stop for lunch on such trips, it should be noted that the restaurant is located in plain view of Haleiwa beach, which is considered one of the places on Oahu where enemy troops might attempt a landing.) MIKAMI went on to state that he had driven MORIMURA to Wahiawa on two occasions. On one of these trips they attempted to enter Schofield Barracks, but the sentry at the gate refused them permission to enter because MIKAMI’s taxi did not have proper identification plates. He also stated that on one occasion, he drove Tomoaki NAKAMURA, of the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE (see paragraph 13, above), and someone from the Consult, to Waipahu. They saw someone there, but MIKAMI could not remember who it was.) (When question separately, NAKAMURA vigorously denied that he ever made such a trip.) MIKAMI also confirmed the trip to Waimae mentioned by KOTOSHIRODO.

37. MIKAMI admitted taking MORIMURA to Pearl City many times, and also admitted having stopped at ETO’s stand at the end of the Pearl City peninsula. However, he claimed that he did not know ETO’s name. He stated that sometimes he saw an old man, and sometimes he saw an old woman. He remembered hearing the old man say the fleet had just come in, or the fleet had just gone out, and that his business prospered when the fleet was in, but fared otherwise when the fleet was out. MIKAMI often played the pinball machines while MORIMURA conversed with ETO. When taken out to ETO’s stand, MIKAMI pointed out a large pile of lumber on the east side of the boat landing. He stated that this occupied a spot to which he and MORIMURA once walked in order to obtain a better view of the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.

38. One day, according to MIKAMI, he drove MORIMURA up the Waimano Road. The agents proceeded along this road with MIKAMI almost two miles to a point where MIKAMI said he, with MORIMURA, had turned around. At this particular point, a major in the same general vicinity, there are no houses. The view of Pearl Harbor, where the agents turned around, is not good, which probably accounts for the fact that MORIMURA visited this place only once.

39. The agents also drove MIKAMI to Honolulu. Here MIKAMI indicated a Japanese store, opposite a Standard Oil installation, at which he stated MORIMURA had asked directions. He stated that he had driven MORIMURA [13] to Honolulu only once. Leaving the location of the Standard Oil installation, MIKAMI directed the agents along a dirt road to the main highway, which he stated he had followed back to Honolulu. It was noted that this same highway, if followed in the opposite direction, would lead to Fort Weaver and the West Loch Naval Ammunition Depot docks. However, MIKAMI denied that he had ever driven MORIMURA in that direction.

40. At Aiea, MIKAMI directed the agents up the road to Aiea Heights to a point just below the residence of Mr. Chester Clarke, where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor is obtained. This was the same spot to which the agents had previously been directed by KOTOSHIRODO. MIKAMI stated that he had taken MORIMURA to this spot on two or three occasions, and on at least one occasion, MORIMURA had gotten out of the car and stood about three minutes observing Pearl Harbor.

41. MIKAMI stated that on December 5, 1941, he again drove MORIMURA to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, proceeding along the old road through Fort Shafter and past Red Hill, and returning by the new Kamehameha Highway. MIKAMI stated that he saw two battleships at anchor between 1000 and 1030. Other ships, led by a battleship, were coming into the harbor at that time, but he could not say how many battleships were in the line. However, he remembered that the ship behind the battleship in the lead was almost as large, and the other ships were strung out behind. MIKAMI denied returning to Pearl Harbor that afternoon. (In paragraphs 6 and 8 of reference (b) it is noted that prior to the arrival of the ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA at Pearl Harbor on December 5, 1041, there were five battleships already moored. The ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA, inbound, passed the outer channel buoys of Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, that date, mooring before 1100.)

42. MIKAMI also stated that KOTOSHIRODO began to accompany MORIMURA to ETO’s stand about the second or third trip that MORIMURA and MIKAMI made to Pearl Harbor. He added that he had taken KOTOSHIRODO to Pearl City without MORIMURA about four or five times. MIKAMI was asked if, when he took KOTOSHIRODO alone, the latter had ever said anything about his mission. MIKAMI replied that KOTOSHIRODO might have talked about
ships. When pressed further, MIKAMI's memory failed him, and he would say only that the purpose of KOTOSHIRODO's trips appeared to be a desire to see the Naval base.

43. In light of the above statement, KOTOSHIRODO was again interrogated. He admitted that he had been to Pearl Harbor in MIKAMI's taxi about four times without MORIMURA, the last time in the latter part of November, 1941. He usually received instructions to make this trip from MORIMURA, who would direct him to go to Pearl Harbor and find out if there had been any change in the number of ships in Pearl Harbor. However, KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not consult with MIKAMI concerning his mission. On this last trip, as well as on several other occasions when KOTOSHIRODO had gone to Pearl Harbor unaccompanied by MORIMURA, he stated that the latter made a rough sketch of the harbor, showing the approximate locations of the usual battleship, cruiser, and carrier moorings. No much emphasis was placed on the location or presence of destroyers in the harbor. On the last trip KOTOSHIRODO went to the end of the peninsula, turned around without talking to anyone, and returned to the Consulate about 1000. He went to the end of the Pearl City peninsula to see exactly what type of carrier was berthed at Ford Island, for he could see from the highway that there was a carrier at the mooring on the west side of Ford Island. However, he went to the end of the peninsula pursuant to instructions from MORIMURA to "go all the way around."

43. KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his own car, alone, four or five times to check on the number of ships in the harbor. This was also done at the direction of MORIMURA. These trips, and the ones he made with MIKAMI without MORIMURA, were during the period from July to November, 1941. The last trip he made with MIKAMI alone was on November 27 or 28, 1941. The last trip he made with MORIMURA was later in the same week. KOTOSHIRODO denied that he had been to Pearl Harbor at any time during December. However, he stated that he once heard SEKI say that MORIMURA was going out to Pearl Harbor almost every day, and was spending a good deal of money on taxi fares. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Consulate paid all of his gasoline expenses, and bought some of his oil. The greasing and repair bills he paid himself.

44. On several occasions MORIMURA showed KOTOSHIRODO Jane's Fighting Ships. One of the things he remembers that MORIMURA pointed out was that certain American battleships could be distinguished by their masts, and that MORIMURA had used the word "yagura"/literally, "turret"/to describe the cage masts on certain battleships.

45. KOTOSHIRODO stated that when MORIMURA first came to the Consulate, he and Vice Consul OKUDA used to go out together. However, as far as he knows, the time that he took MORIMURA and OKUDA to Kalina, as described in paragraph 46 of reference (a), is the only time they ever contacted anyone outside of the Consulate.

46. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA seemed to know Shigeo SHIGENAGA, proprietor of the VENICE CAFE, Honolulu. MORIMURA took KOTOSHIRODO there one time when Special Envoy KURUSU was on his way to Washington and was detained at Midway Island. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA had talked to some of the waitresses at the VENICE CAFE, and seemed to know them. (The VENICE CAFE drew the largest part of its trade from Naval enlisted personnel. SHIGENAGA, the proprietor, is an alien, about 40 years old. His home, when searched, revealed a quantity of Japanese literature strongly nationalistic in tenor. Also discovered were photographs of high Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in 1939, as well as a photograph of a Japanese Army officer. SHIGENAGA has made several trips to Japan. In October, 1939, he invited Commander John P. Dix, USN, of the Shore Patrol, to visit Admiral Yorio SAWAMOTO aboard H. I. J. M. S. IWATE, flagship of a Japanese naval training squadron then visiting Honolulu. Commander Dix accepted, and SHIGENAGA made all arrangements through the Japanese Consulate. Commander Dix commented on the ease with which SHIGENAGA arranged the visit, and on the fact that SHIGENAGA treated all the Japanese officers present, from the Admiral on down, as equals. SHIGENAGA has been interned for the duration of the war.)

47. On February 9, 1942, Special Agent Tillman, Captain Frank O. Blake, of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and Lieutenant Kimball interrogated Kimika ASAKURA, who was employed as a maid at the Consul General's residence from June 16, 1941, to February 9, 1942. Miss ASAKURA is a dual citizen who was born at Alea, Oahu, on May 18, 1923. Miss ASAKURA
stated that a man named FUJITA, first name unknown to her, came to her home on or about June 13, 1941, and asked if she would like to work at the Consulate. She had never seen FUJITA before, but she believed that she knew her father. She believed that FUJITA was a flower raiser and lived in Puna Valley, Honolulu. He brought her to the Consulate on the same day. There she talked to Ichitaro OZAKI, the Consulate chauffeur, and later, to Kokiichi SEKI, who engaged her services. Miss ASAKURA's duties at the Consulate were to clean the Consul General's living quarters, wait on table, and do his laundry. The Consul General lived upstairs in a building which is on the makai (towards the sea) side of the office building. Miss ASAKURA lived downstairs, sharing a room with Clara Yoshie KIKKAWA, who was the maid for the house in which MORIMURA lived.

48. Miss ASAKURA's predecessor at the Consul General's residence was a girl named Sakae TANAKA. Miss ASAKURA stated that Sakae TANAKA had been rather intimate with MORIMURA, according to gossip she had heard from Miss KIKKAWA, and the cook and his wife. Miss TANAKA left the Consul's employ because she had a quarrel with the cook.

49. Consul General KITA's most frequent social visitor was MORIMURA. MORIMURA would drop over to visit KITA in the evenings several times a month. Sometimes SEKI would drop in, and she would hear him talking about treasury matters, money and business, with KITA. She stated that she had never heard MORIMURA discuss business matters with KITA.

50. The makua (towards the mountains) residence in the Consulate residence in the Consulate grounds was occupied by Vice Consul OKUDA and his family. SEKI lived upstairs in the office building. MORIMURA occupied one of the residences facing on Kukanini Street, while Kyososuke YUGE, another secretary, occupied the other residence on that street. OZAKI, the chauffeur, and his wife, lived above the garage.

51. Miss ASAKURA stated that on December 7, 1941, she called the Consul General about 8:30 a. m. and informed him that breakfast was served. KITA was in bed when he was called. Later he came down and ate his breakfast. Miss ASAKURA did not see KITA having breakfast as the usual way of serving that meal was to set it on the table in the dining room where he could help himself. She was busy with her work and did not see anyone come from the office building to call KITA. Neither did the telephone ring. Later in the morning, reporters came to the residence and asked for KITA. When the maid could not find him at the residence, she suggested to the reporters that he might be at his office. Thereafter, Miss ASAKURA remained at the Consulate and assisted in serving members of the staff, who were all living in the office building. She stated that her services as an interpreter were frequently used by the detectives who were placed on guard duty at the Consulate from and after the morning of December 7th.

52. On February 11, 1942, the agents interrogated Miss Yoshio KIKKAWA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that she had obtained her position at the Consulate through Toyoki FUJITA, who lived next door to the KIKKAWAS and raised flowers. At the Consulate, Miss KIKKAWA did housework for MORIMURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA occupied a house on the Consulate grounds facing Kukanini Street. She confirmed the fact that she shared quarters in the Consul General's house with Miss ASAKURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA usually got up at nine o'clock in the morning, had breakfast at nine-thirty, and went over to the Consulate office building about ten o'clock. He lunched about twelve, spending about an hour, and returned from the office about three. After that, MORIMURA sometimes played baseball in the grounds with other members of the staff and the clerks. Other times he read, listened to the radio, or went out with friends.

53. Sometimes, however, according to Miss KIKKAWA, MORIMURA would get up about seven in the morning. Often he would leave the Consulate about three in the afternoon with KOTOSHIRODO, and would be gone for several hours, not returning until about seven in the evening. On two occasions, KOTOSHIRODO stayed and had drinks and dinner with MORIMURA. She stated that Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary, once came to see MORIMURA after dinner. Sakae TANAKA, a former maid at the Consulate, came to see MORIMURA several times in the evening after she had left the Consulate. Girls from the Shunchoro Tea House came to MORIMURA's house several times in the evenings, and remained two or three hours. On eight or nine occasions, after attending tea house parties, MORIMURA slept until noon. Each morning, MORIMURA had to be wakened. In September, 1941, MORIMURA went on quite a drunk. When he awoke, about noon, he was still drunk, and he
made considerable commotion. Miss KIKKAWA went to the Consulate office building and informed SEKI, who came over and induced MORIMURA to go back to bed and sleep off his drunken condition. Upstairs, MORIMURA had a study, and in this was a wooden desk which he kept locked. On several occasions, Miss KIKKAWA saw letters written by MORIMURA, but the characters were too difficult for her to read, she said. She once saw a letter written by MORIMURA to a girl named Tomoyoko. (Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball later interviewed "Tomoyoko", a geisha. She admitted her association with MORIMURA, and told of a golf game she and another geisha once played with MORIMURA and Katsuiebiro TAKAGISHI, an espionage suspect who left Honolulu for Japan on the Talyo Maru, November 5, 1941.)

54. On December 7, 1941, Miss KIKKAWA, according to her statement to the agents, left the Consulate about 11:30 a.m. She had set breakfast on the table for MORIMURA about 8:30 a.m. There was a slip of paper on the table directing her to put breakfast on the table and then go home. MORIMURA usually left such messages on Saturday nights. There was nothing noticeably different about his activities just prior to December 7th, she said. Miss KIKKAWA emphatically stated that she did not like MORIMURA, that he was "awful" and said "nasty things." MORIMURA told miss KIKKAWA that he had lost the tip of his finger "on account of love". (It has been noted from several sources that one of MORIMURA's fingers, either the middle or third finger, was cut off at the first knuckle. However, the various observers have been uncertain which hand was mutilated.) Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA was quite friendly with Lawrence K. NAKATSUKA, a reporter for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Occasionally, NAKATSUKA used to telephone MORIMURA, and on one occasion that she knew of, they went to a tea house together.

55. Also on February 11, 1942, Miss Sakae TANAKA was interviewed by the agents. She stated that she lived in Upper Pauoa Valley, Honolulu, with her father, Yotichi TANAKA, a vegetable farmer. She was born in Honolulu on March 28, 1924, and worked at the Consulate from March 13 to June 12, 1941. She did housework in the Consul's residence. Miss TANAKA stated that she had obtained a job at the Consulate through FUJITA and in her own words, "she put me in there to work." She left the Consulate because of a quarrel with the cook, who had recently come from Japan, as to who had left the icebox open. Miss TANAKA denied having had any intimate relations with MORIMURA. She stated that she once had asked him about his finger, but he refused to tell her anything about it. She often went to the house where MORIMURA lived, to see Miss KIKKAWA, who worked there. MORIMURA told her that he could not, and would not, let her go into his study room.

56. One Sunday, MORIMURA took both Miss TANAKA and Miss KIKKAWA over to Kaneohe, where they went out in the glass-bottom boat. This was while Miss TANAKA was still employed at the Consulate. They drove over with MIKAMI in his taxi, and MIKAMI joined them in the glass-bottom boat. After the boat trip, they went to Kailua and had lunch on the beach, returning to Honolulu via Koko Head. While on the boat, MORIMURA asked MIKAMI questions about Coconut Island, in Kaneohe Bay, but Miss TANAKA could not remember any other questions about the bay which MORIMURA asked. While at Kaneohe they drove by Dr. Iga MORI's country place and stopped and looked at it. However, Dr. MORI was not there, so they did not go into the house. (Dr. MORI is an "elder statesman" of the Japanese community of Honolulu, and was an advisor to the Consul. He was taken into custody following the outbreak of hostilities, but due to his advanced age and enfeebled condition, subsequently was released.) Later, Miss TANAKA stated that prior to going to the Kaneohe district, they had driven up Aiea Heights in MAKAMI's taxi.

57. Robert Orion Glover, Cy (AA) USNR, of the office of the Cable and Radio Censor, Honolulu, has reported that he was fairly well acquainted with MORIMURA, having met him through his membership in the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI. Glover has been training in Japanese military arts under the direction of Dr. Henry OKAZAKI at the NIKKO RESTORATION SANATARIUM, Honolulu, since 1934, and has conducted classes himself since 1937. A kendo (fencing) group, of which Glover was a member, began meeting in the summer of 1941. One George HAMAMOTO of Maui, who was a member of this group, declared that the group needed more help with its study. For this purpose, HAMAMOTO introduced MORIMURA to the group, in October, 1941. Glover first met MORIMURA in mid-October, and he was told that MORIMURA was a member of the
Japanese Consulate staff, that he had come from Japan only three months before, and that he was an accomplished kendo man. In his kendo matches and instructing, MORIMURA disapproved of the local style of fencing which, as described by Glover, consists of short, rapid thrusts without much power. MORIMURA stressed the superiority of the heavy chop stroke, stating that the latter had proved best in the Chin "Incident." Glover said that MORIMURA did not speak English very well, although he was an attentive listener, and appeared to understand the language. MORIMURA showed particular interest in the haoles (whites) in the kendo class, and asked them many questions as to who they were, where they were educated, where they worked, and similar questions. Besides Glover, there were two other whites in the class, Ted Fielding, Y2c, USNR, and Harold Schnack, a [19] junior draftsman, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA once invited Glover and Fielding to join him in one of his wild parties, but the invitation was not accepted.

58. According to Glover, MORIMURA was known to travel a great deal, around Oahu and between the islands. MORIMURA once remarked to Glover that he was interested in Maui, that he had been over there and liked it very much. MORIMURA also went fishing a great deal, shore-casting and spear-fishing with a glass box. It was not clearly established whether MORIMURA ever went deep sea fishing on sampans.

59. Alice ABE, a waitress at the SUNCHORO TEA HOUSE, Honolulu, whose professional name is "Sadako", also was interviewed by the investigators. She stated that MORIMURA and Ryuichi MORIBE, subject of reference (k), once held a private party at that tea house, with only those two men present. It is not known what was discussed at that meeting. (MORIBE, who has been interned, is a prominent alien businessman in the Japanese community of Honolulu. He admitted, among other things, attending a dinner with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and other prominent local Japanese who were close to the Consulate.)

60. A number of undeveloped leads concerning the Consulate and persons who had contacts with it are still under investigation by the local intelligence agencies, and new leads are from time to time uncovered in the investigation of seemingly unrelated cases of individuals being considered for internment. The same will be developed in further reports under the general title of this case, or under individual case titles, as may be appropriate.

PENDING—14ND

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Confidential

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Fourteenth Naval District

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities

Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H. Date: Feb. 15, 1943

Report made by: Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, Ens. Don Woodrum, USNR.

Period covered: June 15, 1942—Feb. 10, 1943 Status of Case: PENDING—14ND

Origin of Case: Investigation of espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu

Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: (A) Copy of signed statement of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, dated Oct. 1, 1942, entitled "Trip to Kauai". (Photostat to ONI; copies to others.)

Copy to: ONI (5)

14ND (3)

FBI—Hon (2)

MID—HD (2)

Zone II (1)

Zone III (1)

Zone IV (1)

CinCPac (1)

Com14 (1)

Source File No. 14ND/51(c) ONI File No.: 518

Synopsis.—Former clerks and employees of the Japanese Consulate were re-interviewed and various investigative leads developed therefrom followed.
Review of all known Consulate espionage activity indicates that the Consulate was concerned only in "legal" espionage; that is, that which could be discovered by observation (in a broad sense) without entering any restricted area. Interest was displayed in U. S. Fleet movements, airports, harbors, Army camps, and any new construction by the Army or Navy. Interest also was shown in power plant on Kauai. Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO's trip to Kauai in July, 1941, to collect information for the Consulate, is discussed herein. Trips taken by Secretary Tadashi MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO appear to have been made for general survey purposes. There is no evidence that either of these individuals established contacts on Kauai, Maui, or Hawaii. However, there is evidence that Vice Consul OKUDA maintained a personal espionage agent on Maui.

Other information indicates that the Consulate was granted an allowance for "Korean Intelligence", and was using paid Korean informants to keep close contact with Korean nationalist movements.

Deductions:

Approved

I. H. MAYFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

By direction

WBS/cop

[1]

FEBRUARY 15, 1943.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, same subject.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Takachi SAKAI.
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Katsukichi MURAKI.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Kanaye SAHARA.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 2, 1942, subject Shigetaro MATSUO.
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 27, 1942, subject Isuke HORIZAWA.
(l) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject Unji HIRAYAMA.
(m) 14ND Investigation Report, dated March 28, 1942, subject Zenichi KAWAZOE.
(n) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 3, 1942, subject Kenneth Kilsoo HAAN.
(o) FBI-Honolulu report, file 100-1718, dated November 23, 1942, subject Kilsoo K. HAAN, with aliases (available in Washington, Los Angeles, and Honolulu).
(p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 12, 1943, subject Sanji ABE.
(q) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 12, 1942, subject Kikujiro Clifford KONDO.
(r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 11, 1942, subject Katsuzo SATO.
(s) 14ND Summary Report, dated February 8, 1943, subject Kenju OHTOMO.
(t) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 8, 1941, subject JAPANESE POSTAL EMPLOYEES.
(v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject VISITS OF JAPANESE PUBLIC VESSELS TO THE ISLAND OF OAHU.
(w) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 3, 1942, subject Kimie DOUE.
[2] 1. This report is a continuation and an expansion of the material set forth in references (a), (b), and (c). During September and October, 1942, all former employees of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, who were still available were reinterviewed in the process of a joint investigation conducted by the Army Contact Office (MID), Honolulu; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu; and the District Intelligence Office. In addition, a number of other individuals who were in a position to supply information concerning the espionage activities of the Consulate were interviewed.

2. The following officers and agents were present at various times during the interrogations which were conducted at the Army Contact Office, Honolulu:

Military Intelligence Division:
- Captain Frank O. Blake
- Special Agent William T. Hiraoka
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu
- Special Agent J. Harold Hughes
- Special Employee Larry S. Chiwa
- District Intelligence Office
- Lieutenant G. P. Kimball
- Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson
- Ensign Don Woodrum

3. The following individuals were interviewed at the Army Contact Office by representatives of the three agencies:
- Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, subject of reference (d).
- Joan Kimie KOTOSHIRODO—Wife of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
- Takaichi SAKAI—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (e).
- Katsukichi MURAOKA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (f).
- Kanaye SAHARA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (g).
- Yasumasa MURATA—A clerk at the Japanese Consulate until 1938.
- Misaky KIMIE—Formerly employed as a receptionist at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (w).
- John Yoshibe MIKAMI—Regular taxi driver for the Consulate, subject of reference (h).
- Albert Shuichi HAYASHI—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
- Koreshige KUDO—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.
- Shotaro NIIYA, alias Shigetaro MATSUO—Regular taxi driver for Keiizi KIMURA, manager of the Honolulu office of the N. Y. K. line. He is the subject of reference (i).

ICHITARO OZAKI—Consulate chauffeur.
Jitsuei TAKAMIYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and Tadasi MORI-MURA, a Consulate secretary, on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Maui.

4. The following individuals were interviewed by agents of the Military Intelligence Division alone:

- George Masayoshi KAWAMOTO—Relative of KOTOSHIRODO who was visited by KOTOSHIRODO during his stay on the Island of Hawaii.
- Toshimasa MINATOYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and his wife on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Kauai.
- Namiko FUKUSHIMA—Recipient of a present from Consul General KITA which was delivered by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO to Tetsunosuke SONE, a toritsugimai at Puunene, Maui.
- Mrs. Tetsunosuke SONE—Wife of Tetsunosuke SONE, interviewed in lieu of her husband, who is now interned on the mainland.

5. The following individual was interviewed by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
- Noah Kwang Won CHO—A Korean Christian minister who rendered various services to the Japanese Consulate on Korean matters. CHO is the subject of reference (j).

6. The following individual was interviewed by officers of the District Intelligence Office:
- Lawrence NAKATSUKA—Reporter employed by the Honolulu Star Bulletin who covered the Japanese Consulate as one of his regular assignments.
TRIPS MADE TO VARIOUS PARTS OF OAHU

Pearl Harbor Area

7. The information set forth in this report concerning the various trips made by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO is intended only to supplement the information thereon already set forth in reference (c). KOTOSHIRODO amplified certain phases of these trips, but he did not contradict his former story except on a few minor points.

8. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip from the Consulate to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor about January, 1941, when he was asked by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA to drive Kokichi SEKI, one of the Consulate secretaries, to Pearl City and Alea. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that the purpose of these trips was to determine the number and types of ships in Pearl Harbor, and to keep the Consul General informed of the movements of United States Naval vessels. KOTOSHIRODO further stated that to the best of his knowledge, the personnel of the Consulate had begun making these trips either in December, 1940, or in January, 1941. (It should be noted here that there is no evidence that any agent of the Consulate ever entered the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, except upon official invitation.)

9. To the best of KOTOSHIRODO's recollection, it was early in 1941, probably January, that he overheard OKUDA tell SEKI that they (OKUDA and SEKI) should start "motoring around." KOTOSHIRODO also remembered having heard Kenosuke YUGE, another secretary, say, about the same time, that all Consulate secretaries should start making Sunday "excursions" to "public places," such as radio station KGU, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, and the like. KOTOSHIRODO stated that prior to January, 1941, he had never seen any evidence of any secretary's making trips away from the Consulate as he and SEKI and MORIMURA subsequently did.

10. For the first few months, SEKI acted as observer. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having "heard" that SEKI had attended a naval academy in Japan at one time, but had been forced to withdraw before graduation because of his health. However, SEKI was interested in, and had considerable knowledge of, naval matters. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI made a number of trips to Pearl Harbor together.

11. When Tadasi MORIMURA first arrived in March, 1941, SEKI and MORIMURA went to observe the ships in Pearl Harbor together. Occasionally KOTOSHIRODO went along with them. He stated that both secretaries knew how to identify various types of warships, and they would explain various identifying characteristics to KOTOSHIRODO.

12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in 1941 someone from the Consulate went out to look at the ships in Pearl Harbor about twice a week. However, SEKI appears to have been of the opinion that observations should be made more often.

13. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip alone to observe the ships at Pearl Harbor in August, 1941. He claimed not to have stopped any place on this particular trip, but to have counted what ships he could see while driving at 25 miles per hour on Kamehameha Highway, just outside the Navy Yard boundaries. Whenever he went to Pearl Harbor, whether alone or with MORIMURA or SEKI, KOTOSHIRODO always was asked to state how many ships he had counted. On some occasions he was told to count only the number of destroyers, while SEKI or MORIMURA would count the other types of ships.

14. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he knew the usual berths and anchorages of the various types of warships in Pearl Harbor. He stated, correctly, that battleships berthed on the Honolulu side of Ford Island; that carriers berthed on the side of Ford Island nearest the Pearl City landing; that destroyers and cruisers moored in East Loch, off Waian. He further stated that MORIMURA had pointed out a vantage spot on the Kamehameha Highway between Aiea and Makalapa where the best view of the Submarine Base could be obtained; KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not know what a torpedo net was, and he added that he had never heard MORIMURA discuss the subject.

15. KOTOSHIRODO remembered conversations with MORIMURA in which the latter had stressed the strategic importance of the Aiea and Pearl City regions for purposes of observation. MORIMURA had attempted to locate a girl friend in Aiea, presumably to develop her as an informant, and had asked KOTOSHIRODO if he had any close friends in Aiea or Pearl City "who could
be trusted". KOTOSHIRODO was unable to say whether MORIMURA had succeeded in this plan.

16. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that occasionally he would board a jitney bus in Honolulu and head for some destination beyond Pearl Harbor. He would get off at Aiea and walk around a bit. On one occasion, according to his story, MORIMURA got off the jitney at Aiea and walked back along the Kamehameha Highway, finally coming to a Navy Yard gate. KOTOSHIRODO was unable to state whether this was the Submarine Base gate or the main gate; however, the former seems more likely. At the gate, MORIMURA inquired about getting employment in the Navy yard. The sentry referred him to an office downtown. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that he "roamed around" Aiea.

17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI had been driven to Pearl Harbor on a number of occasions by John Yoshiye MIKAMI, the usual Consulate taxi driver. However, MIKAMI, when interviewed, denied ever having driven SEKI on any of the observation trips, although he admitted driving KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA on numerous occasions.

Kaneohe Bay Area

18. About one month after MORIMURA arrived in Honolulu, KOTOSHIRODO drove him (in KOTOSHIRODO's car) over the Nuuanu Pali, thence along the Kokokahi Road. They drove slowly and looked across the bay toward the Kaneohe Naval [7] Air Station. At the Kailua Beach Pavilion, they parked for about five minutes, but did not get out of the car. After leaving Kailua they drove through Kailua town, without stopping, and proceeded along the highway to Honolulu via Waimanalo. They stopped at Waimanalo beach, near the old pier. This time they got out of the car and walked out on the pier. However, they talked to no one. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he could not see Bellows Field (Army) from the pier. They stayed here for five or ten minutes, and then returned to Honolulu by way of Koko Head. They made no other stops. KOTOSHIRODO cannot remember having heard MORIMURA make any comment about the Naval Radio Station at Wailupe.

19. Shortly after their trip to Main (early in May, 1941), MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, this time driven by MIKAMI, again went over the Nuuanu Pali. As they approached Kaneohe town, they turned onto the Kokokahi Road, and drove to the Kalama Road. While on the Kokokahi Road they had MIKAMI drive slowly. KOTOSHIRODO believes that MORIMURA had field glasses with him on this trip, but he was unable to remember whether MORIMURA had used them. However, he did remember MORIMURA's observing that all the hangars at the air station appeared to have been completed. MORIMURA had no camera with him. (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember seeing MORIMURA with a camera on any occasion.) On the Kalama Road, they stopped at a watermelon stand on the side of the road away from the beach. Then they proceeded to the Kailua Tavern, where MIKAMI ate breakfast, and KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA each drank a can of beer. They talked to no one but the waitess at the tavern. From there they returned to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali highway. The whole trip lasted about two and a half hours. KOTOSHIRODO believed that the purpose of this trip was to observe Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

20. Paragraph 34 of reference (c) describes a picnic held by the Consulate at the home of Sam WOODS, at Lanikai Beach, Oahu, about the middle of April, 1941. Ichitaro OZAKI, regularly employed chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled two such picnics, an earlier one having taken place in 1940, while OKUDA was Acting Consul General. On this occasion, the entire Consulate staff attended. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali, and then OKUDA ordered OZAKI to drive to Lanikai by way of Kaneohe (a considerable detour). They parked at Kaneohe and everyone in the party went sightseeing in a glass-bottomed boat in Kaneohe Bay. Then they drove to Lanikai by way of the Kokokahi Road. On the occasion of the second picnic, described in reference (c), they made no such detour, but proceeded directly to the WOODS home.

21. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to describe again the trip to Kailua which was detailed in paragraph 46 of reference (a). This trip was made in the latter part of October, 1941. (KOTOSHIRODO was unable to remember, however, if this trip was made prior to the arrival of, during the visit of, or after the departure of, the TATUTA MARU, Japanese evacuation ship which was in port October 23-24, 1941.) OKUDA accompanied MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO
in the latter's car. This was the only trip on which OKUDA accompanied the other two, and OKUDA appeared to be very nervous. KOTOSHIRODO was given no explanation of the reason for this trip, nor was he told where to go when he left the Consulate. OKUDA merely in- [8] structed him to "just keep on driving". They proceeded over the Nuuanu Pali and went directly to Kailua. When they reached the Kailua Tavern, OKUDA directed KOTO-
SHIRODO to drive straight ahead, toward the ocean, past the tavern to the first or second intersection. There KOTOSHIRODO was directed to stop the car, and MORIMURA got out. Then OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO drove down the road almost to the junction of the Kalama Road, where OKUDA told KOTOSHIRODO to stop the car and wait for MORIMURA, who was to be back in about 15 minutes.

22. KOTOSHIRODO stated that while driving from Honolulu he had glanced in the rear-view mirror and noticed that OKUDA had a money bag folded in such a manner as to indicate that there might be a stack of currency in it. When MORIMURA left the car he wore white trousers and an aloha (sport) shirt. He wore no coat, and his short was hanging outside his trousers. He had nothing in his hands. KOTOSHIRODO did not know where MORIMURA went. When the latter failed to return in 15 minutes, KOTOSHIRODO suggested that they return and look for him, but OKUDA said they were to wait instead. After an absence of about 30 minutes, MORIMURA returned. His appearance was the same as it was when he left, except he was carrying a tree branch with him. When he got into the car, MORIMURA told OKUDA, "It's all okay", or something similar, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.

23. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, when interrogated, stated that he had driven MORIMURA over to Windward Oahu some five or six times. KOTOSHIRODO came along on some of these occasions; at other times, MORIMURA was alone. On all occasions he was directed to drive slowly along the Kokokahi Road, which commands an excellent view of the Kanesdhe Naval Air Station.

24. According to the statement made by Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, the Consul General's official car was never used for exploring the island. This car was driven only 17,000 miles during the four years it was used by the Consulate. It was used primarily by the Consul General himself, or by OZAKI when he drove around town on errands. The only time it was used for a trip to Windward Oahu was on those occasions when the Consul General escorted some visiting dignitary on a sightseeing tour of the island. The itinerary for these trips was to follow the coast around Koko Head and through Waimanalo, then return to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali.

Other Parts of Oahu

25. The reinterrogation of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI added little information concerning trips to other portions of Oahu, it being largely a repetition of the information set forth in paragraph 26 of reference (c). However, some miscellaneous items are of interest.

26. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard MORIMURA say that he had made a trip around the island only a day or so after his arrival (March 27, 1941). KOTOSHIRODO believed that MIKAMI had driven MORIMURA on this occasion. KOTOSHIRODO denied ever having made a complete circuit of the island with MORIMURA.

27. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered hearing MORIMURA speak of staying overnight on some Oahu beach, but MORIMURA had added no details, and the time and circumstances under which MORIMURA had done this were unknown to KOTOSHIRODO.

28. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO of meeting a "nice girl" at Waialawa. Apparently she was a Japanese language school teacher, but MORI-
MURA did not reveal her name.

29. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA had made only one trip to the Haleiwa region. On that occasion they went directly to Haleiwa Park, by the beach, where they stopped the car near a concrete wall. They did not get out of the car, but sat there for five or ten minutes. MORIMURA mentioned that it was a good swimming beach, but did not talk about the reef or any other kindred subject of possible military interest. At the time, KOTOSHIRODO had no idea why MORIMURA had made this trip to Haleiwa.

30. KOTOSHIRODO recalled two trips to Waianae. On the first occasion, they were driven by MIKAMI, and drove to the end of the road, Makua Cave.
On the second occasion, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove in the former's car, and they went as far as Nanakuli Beach.

31. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had never driven the road between Waialua and Kaena Point.

32. KOTOSHIRODO could remember no significant discussions with MORIMURA concerning military objectives on Oahu. Benches as potential landing spots for invasion forces were never discussed, he said. Hickam Field and the Kaneohe Naval Air Station were discussed only in a cursory fashion. Other airfields on Oahu were never mentioned. MORIMURA once estimated the air strength on Oahu to be no more than 500 planes. (That this figure was fairly accurate is reflected in the Navy Department's communiqué of December 5, 1942, which revealed that there were 475 Army and Navy planes on Oahu on the morning of December 7, 1941.)

TRIPS TO OTHER ISLANDS

Kauai

33. During the course of the reinterpretation, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he had made a trip to the Island of Kauai for the Consulate during July, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO had not mentioned this trip on the original interrogation. He and his wife made this trip together; they were not accompanied by any other representative of the Consulate.

34. Originally, MORIMURA had been scheduled to make the trip to Kauai with KOTOSHIRODO, and the latter had been so informed by OKUDA about 10 days prior to the prospective date of departure. However, a disagreement arose among [10] OKUDA, MORIMURA, and SEKI. SEKI, who had made none of the trips to the outside islands, wished to make this trip himself, and because of this friction developed between SEKI and MORIMURA. To settle the argument, OKUDA decreed that neither should go. Instead, he told KOTOSHIRODO to take Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO along as a "front".

35. Two days before he left, KOTOSHIRODO conferred for about an hour with OKUDA in the latter's office, and received the following instructions:

(a) OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a rough sketch of the Barking Sands Airport, said by OKUDA to have been taken from a newspaper, and instructed KOTOSHIRODO to note any activity there;

(b) OKUDA also showed KOTOSHIRODO a photograph of Nawiliwili port, taken about 1933, and instructed the latter to note any changes;

(c) OKUDA stated that he had heard a story (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember the source) that the United States Navy was planning to make some use of Hanalei Bay, and KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note evidence, if any, of Naval activity there;

(d) KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note what use was being made of the airport in the old race track at Lihue, and to further note any expansion activity there;

(e) He was further instructed to take a look at the power plant in Waihina Valley (the only power plant on the Island of Kauai). The Vice Consul showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of Kauai, in English, which showed the location of the power plant, and had transmission lines printed in red. (It is believed that this map was a United States Geological Survey map, edition of 1912.)

OKUDA impressed upon KOTOSHIRODO that the primary rule to be obeyed was caution. He was to tell no one that he was from the Consulate. He was to make no inquiries about the things he was sent to observe. He was to contact no friends or relatives. He was to obtain only such information as he could see with his own eyes. Before he left, both SEKI and MORIMURA told him to treat the trip as a vacation and have some fun.

36. KOTOSHIRODO and his wife departed for Kauai by airplane on Saturday morning, July 12, 1941. (This has been verified by an inspection of the records of the Inter-Island Airways, Ltd.) Mr. and Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO left their home at 0715 and were driven to the airport in MIKAMI's taxi. At John Rodgers Airport, KOTOSHIRODO learned that he would be unable to return to Honolulu on [11] Sunday afternoon, July 13th, as he had planned, so he decided to return the following morning. He then directed MIKAMI to meet the Monday morning plane. The plane for Kauai departed from Honolulu at 0800 and arrived at Port Allen airport about 0900, on July 12th.

37. A number of taxis were waiting for fares at the Port Allen field when KOTOSHIRODO's plane arrived. However, there was only one Japanese driver,
so KOTOSHIRODO approached him. The driver has been identified as Toshimasa MINATOYA. OKUDA had warned KOTOSHIRODO that he should use only Japanese drivers when “sightseeing”. KOTOSHIRODO told MINATOYA that he and his wife were sightseeing on Kauai and wanted to see both sides of the island. They agreed on a price. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he agreed to and paid $25.00. MINATOYA, when interviewed, stated that the price was $35.00. Records of the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA’s employer, indicate that the latter figure was the correct one.)

38. From the airport, they drove directly to Waima Canyon, getting out at the tourists’ observation point for 10 or 15 minutes. Then they drove further up the road until they reached Kokee. At MINATOYA’s suggestion, they turned back here. They returned to the Waima Hotel, where MINATOYA and KOTOSHIRODO and his wife made mutual introductions and lunched together. However, KOTOSHIRODO did not tell MINATOYA that he was from the Consulate.

39. They left the Waima Hotel about 1400 and drove to the Barking Sands. They had postponed this trip until the afternoon because of MINATOYA’s information that the Army held bombing practice there in the morning. MINATOYA mentioned that there was a new airport at Barking Sands. They drove as far as a large sand hill, where KOTOSHIRODO and his wife got out of the car and walked to the top of a dune. They saw only sand, sea, and 

40. One of the passengers on the plane on which the KOTOSHIRODOS flew to Kauai was Isuke HORIKAWA, subject of reference (K). HORIKAWA, who was taken into custody in April, 1942, was suspect because he was the owner of the Pensacola Hotel in Honolulu, a suspected Japanese espionage center prior to the war. HORIKAWA was the head cook at the Lihue Hotel, and was one of the wealthiest Japanese on the Island of Kauai. He was identified with a number of pro-Japanese activities on that island prior to the war. KOTOSHIRODO was questioned very closely regarding HORIKAWA’s presence on the same plane, but KOTOSHIRODO main [12] tained that this was pure coincidence. He stated that when he met HORIKAWA later at the Lihue Hotel, they merely exchanged greetings as having been fellow travelers earlier that day. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered HORIKAWA from having seen him at the Japanese Consulate on two occasions.

41. On Sunday morning, July 13th KOTOSHIRODO and his wife ate breakfast at the hotel. At the suggestion of MINATOYA, they had the hotel pack them a picnic lunch, and they left the hotel about 0900 and drove around the east coast of Kauai. They went first to Wailua Falls, then to a grass shack at a heiau (ancient Hawaiian religious site). They visited a number of tourist spots, and finally arrived at Hanalei about 1000. They ate their picnic lunch at the Hanalei Park pavilion, while KOTOSHIRODO observed the bay. He noted only that the water in Hanalei Bay was shallow and very calm, and that there was no sign of any construction work going on. About 1245, they drove to Haena where they visited both the wet cave and the dry cave, tourist attractions.

42. From Haena, they drove up Wainiha Valley to a point near the power plant. They turned the car around and parked about 50 or 100 yards below the power plant, and got out of the car to pick guavas. KOTOSHIRODO noted that the power plant was small, and had two lead-in water pipes, each about three feet in diameter. He also noted that the pipes were directly alongside the road, and that the plant was unfenced.

43. On the return journey, they stopped at Kilauea lighthouse, which is off the main highway, and went up into the lighthouse with the keeper. KOTOSHIRODO believed that he had signed his name in the lighthouse log.

44. From Kilauea, they drove directly to Nawiliwili harbor as far as the wharf where Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company steamers docked. He saw at once that there had been no new construction since the picture in OKUDA’s possession had been taken (1935), so they left immediately. He did note, however, the Standard Oil Company gasoline tanks there.
45. From Nawiliwili they drove back to the hotel, arriving about 1630. They dismissed MINATOYA. That night they walked to the nearby Aloha Theater and saw a movie.

46. During the course of the afternoon, when they passed the Lihue airport twice, KOTOSHIRODO noted that the only signs of military activity there were some Army tents pitched in camp.

47. The following morning, July 14th, MINATOYA came to the hotel about 0800. The KOTOSHIRODOs checked out of the hotel about 0830, and MINATOYA drove them to the Hanapepe airport. Their plane departed for Honolulu about 0930, and arrived in Honolulu about 1000. MIKAMI was waiting for them, and drove them home. KOTOSHIRODO then drove his wife to her dressmaking shop, and he went back to the Consulate.

48. At the Consulate, OKUDA and MORIMURA had a two-hour conference with KOTOSHIRODO, and took notes while questioning the clerk. KOTOSHIRODO detailed the general lack of activity on Kauai, and MORIMURA finally remarked, "There isn't anything big going on it seems". SEKI was not present at this conference. He merely asked KOTOSHIRODO later if he had had a good time, but also commented that it was "waste time" just to "look from the road for things that were meant to be hidden".

49. On October 1, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO personally typed and signed a statement regarding his Kauai trip. A photostatic copy of his statement is herewith forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence as enclosure (A). Mimeographed facsimile copies thereof are provided for the other disseminators.

50. Toshimasa MINATOYA was interviewed on three occasions by a representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and his story substantiates that given by KOTOSHIRODO. Records of the Lihue Hotel and the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, also bear this out. There is no evidence of prior arrangement between KOTOSHIRODO and MINATOYA. MINATOYA remembered KOTOSHIRODO's having had a camera on this trip. The pictures taken by KOTOSHIRODO on this trip were examined by the interrogating officers and agents, and all proved to be either innocuous scenic views or pictures of Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the only map he took with him on the trip was an ordinary tourist cartograph, which were available at many places throughout the Territory. He made no markings on this map, nor did he make any notes concerning his observations.

51. Prior to his departure, KOTOSHIRODO was given about $100.00 for his expenses by SEKI, out of which he claims he returned about $7.00 or $9.00. However, he stated that his expenses were: $50.00 for the air fare, $20.00 for the hotel bill, and $25.00 for the taxi. (As already mentioned, this last figure actually was $35.00.)

Maui

52. KOTOSHIRODO, upon request, again detailed the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Maui in May, 1941. These details were substantially the same as those set forth in paragraphs 15-18 of reference (c). The only change is that it was reported in reference (c) that KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited a pineapple cannery while on Maui; whereas KOTOSHIRODO stated on re-interview that they had passed a couple of pineapple canneries, but had not visited either.

53. Prior to their departure for Maui, OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of that island. However, he did not tell KOTOSHIRODO what to look for, that is, what military objectives. OKUDA told MORIMURA, who later told KOTO- SHIRODO, that the important places to be looked at were:

[14] (a) Puumene Air Field (Navy);
(b) Kahului Harbor;
(c) Lahaina Bay;
(d) National Guard Camp.

54. MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO visited Lahaina, a fleet anchorage off Maui, on the first day of their visit. However, they saw no ships there. Later that day they drove to Kahului on the other side of the island, passing Maalaea Airport, since abandoned, on the way. They drove out on a pier at Kahului. MORIMURA asked the driver whether Navy ships came into Kahului, and was told that destroyers and submarines occasionally paid that harbor a visit. MORIMURA commented on the fact that the water at Kahului was rough compared to that of Lahaina.
55. Sometime during their first day on Maui, MORIMURA discussed making a trip to the Hana region with their taxi driver. (This trip is long, and necessities traveling over bad roads.) MORIMURA also asked if there were an air field there. The driver told them there was a field, but he thought that the road was too rough and too long for them to make the trip during the limited time MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO planned to be on Maui.

56. On the following day they drove to the top of Haleakala, and then to Kula Sanitarium. They got out of the car near the buildings. KOTOSHIRODO took a picture. MORIMURA commented on being able to see the ocean both on the Wailuku side and the Lahaina side of Puunene Valley. They stayed at Kula about 10 minutes, seeing no one. In the afternoon they drove to the National Guard Camp at Waihee, about ten minutes out of Wailuku; however, they saw no troops. They drove along the coast a little farther, and then turned back and drove to the Puunene Airport where they boarded a plane for Honolulu about 1500.

57. Investigation indicated that the taxi driver on this trip was Kenneth Jitsuei TAKAMIYA, a Hawaiian-born Nisei, 26 years old, who was expatriated from his Japanese citizenship in 1934. He made only one trip to Japan, that being when he was five years old, and for a stay of only six months. TAKAMIYA, when interviewed, substantially confirmed KOTOSHIRODO’s description of the trip around Maui. There was no evidence brought forth which would indicate that TAKAMIYA had any prior knowledge of the visit of the two men from the Consulate. Apparently the only two contacts made on Maui were with Itsuo HAMADA, as set forth in paragraphs 15–16 in reference (c), and with Tetsunosuke SONE, as set forth in paragraph 17 of reference (c).

58. Although the contact with Itsuo HAMADA was in itself highly suspicious, nothing has been brought forth which would indicate that this contact was anything more than a casual coincidence. However, investigation by representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Maui have added some details concerning the contact made with Tetsunosuke SONE. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had visited SONE, who was a toritsuginin and principal of the Japanese language [15] school at Spreckelsville, and had delivered to him a package sent by Nagao KITA, the Japanese Consul General. This package was to be given to a Japanese woman (whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not recall) who lived at Spreckelsville. Investigation indicated that the woman in question was Miss Namiko FUKUSHIMA, Miss FUKUSHIMA, when interviewed, stated that she had gone to school in Japan from August, 1937 to May, 1938, and during that period she had become very well acquainted with a Yoshiko ISHII, daughter of a Consul General ISHII, said to be a prominent member of the Japanese consular corps. After her return to Hawaii in 1938, Miss FUKUSHIMA maintained a personal correspondence with Miss ISHII. Apparently Miss ISHII had requested KITA to take a present to Miss FUKUSHIMA prior to KITA’s coming to Honolulu as Consul General in March, 1941. The present, which Miss FUKUSHIMA produced for the interviewing agent, was a Japanese doll and a battledore. She stated that the package had been delivered to her by SONE.

59. A check of hotel registers, and an interview with Mrs. Itsuo HAMADA, failed to produce any evidence which would contradict KOTOSHIRODO’s story.

60. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO carried binoculars on their trip to Maui. The only map they had was an ordinary tourist map, and the only mark that MORIMURA made on this map was a small check along the coastline just below Lahaina. MORIMURA reportedly made this check to indicate that the Lahaina coast was extremely rugged, and thus, presumably, unsuitable for landings. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO made any written notes. OKUDA talked only to MORIMURA about the trip. Later MORIMURA observed to KOTOSHIRODO that “there wasn’t much going on” on Maui. KOTOSHIRODO took a camera along, but made no effort to photograph the places they regarded as “important”. The camera was used merely to add to their pose as tourists. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Maui trip had cost between $115.00 and $130.00.

61. According to KOTOSHIRODO, one outgrowth of the Maui trip was the confirmation of a belief held by MORIMURA that OKUDA had a personal agent collecting information for the Consulate on Maui. MORIMURA had expressed this opinion on a number of occasions, although SEKI disagreed with him. SEKI said that such a person would have to be paid well, and OKUDA did not have the funds with which to pay such an agent. (SEKI was Consulate treasurer, and presumably would know of such expenditures, unless OKUDA had a secret per-
sonal fund at his disposal.) MORIMURA stated that OKUDA expected him to tell OKUDA every secret, but the Vice Consul was not so "open-hearted" with MORIMURA, especially about the secret of Maui coverage. Since OKUDA and MORIMURA worked so closely together, it irked MORIMURA that OKUDA would not tell him of the Maui agent. The incident that confirmed MORIMURA's suspicions about Maui coverage occurred a few days after their return from that island: Vice Consul OKUDA asked MORIMURA whether he had seen any mooring buoys at Lahaina Roads. MORIMURA said that he had seen none, but OKUDA contradicted him and said that there were some buoys there. MORIMURA then went to KOTOSHIRODO and asked the same question of the clerk, but KOTOSHIRODO could not remember any buoys there either. MORIMURA concluded that OKUDA's personal agent had supplied the contrary information.

Possibly supporting MORIMURA's theory are these facts concerning the Maui trip: MORIMURA conducted that mission very hastily. He did not visit Hana to see for himself the airport facilities allegedly there. He traveled no farther north on the leeward coast than Mala Wharf. On the windward coast, he omitted more than half the road running north from Waikiki. He did nothing to observe the Puunene Naval Air Station field other than pass it going to and coming from the plane. On Hawaii and Kauai, almost every foot of highway along the coastline was traversed. It is believed that OKUDA's contact on Maui may have been Unji HIRAYAMA, a priest of the Hompa Hongwanji who resided at Lahaina, and who was taken into custody on December 7, 1941. It is known that HIRAYAMA, who is the subject of reference (1), was requested on at least one occasion (June, 1940) to keep the Consulate informed of any movements of the United States Fleet at Lahaina, and it is believed that he compiled with this request.

**Hawaii**

63. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to discuss again the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Hawaii in October, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO stated the facts of the trip substantially as they are set forth in paragraphs 19–24 of reference (c). The details KOTOSHIRODO added in his later version principally concerned the various drinking parties in which they indulged while on Hawaii.

64. Before they left Honolulu on the trip to Hawaii, MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he wanted to see:

(a) Hilo harbor;

(b) Kilanua. (Speculating on the reason for their desire to see Kilanua, it should be noted that there was a Hawaii National Guard camp there prior to the war, and also there was some talk of building a new airport in the lava flats);

(c) South Point, where a new airport was actually in the process of construction;

(d) Kohala, where there is an Inter-Island Airways landing field at Upolu.

65. In their trip around the island, they passed the Kilanua Volcano, and MORTIMURA asked about the military camp there. They drove down the road toward South Point until they came to a sign "Kapu—Military Reservation". They made no effort to enter the reservation, but instead turned the car around and returned to the main highway. They could see nothing of interest from outside the gate.

66. They stopped at the Kona Hotel that night on the suggestion of the driver. The next day they included Upolu in their itinerary, but they only [77] paused there for a few minutes. They did not get out of the car. While in the Kohala district they also inspected Kawainoe, the landing from which cattle are swum out to the Inter-Island steamers.

67. On the fourth day of their visit they drove all around the city of Hilo, seeing Rainbow Falls, Hilo Hospital, the waterfront, Hilo Country Club, and Punalue Home (for the tubercular).

68. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA were not sent to contact anyone on the Island of Hawaii; on the contrary, they were strictly enjoined not to do so. However, KOTOSHIRODO made one exception, and made a personal call on his wife's cousin, Mrs. George KAWAMOTO. He brought her candy, and she was greatly surprised to see him. KOTOSHIRODO told her that he was staying at the Nu’uanu Hotel, but he stayed only a few minutes. However, after he had returned to the hotel, and was drinking in the bar with MORIMURA, George KAWAMOTO came in to see KOTOSHIRODO, having been told by his wife of KOTOSHIRODO's visit. KOTOSHIRODO introduced him to MORI-
MURA. They had a drink at the bar, and then KAWAMOTO invited them to the Hilo Theater. They saw the show, and then KAWAMOTO went home.

69. A representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, contacted George KAWAMOTO regarding his relationship with KOTOSHIRODO. KAWAMOTO stated that his wife was a cousin of KOTOSHIRODO's wife, and he gave an account of a visit made to Hawaii by KOTOSHIRODO and his wife in 1940. Apparently this trip was merely a vacation. However, there is nothing in the Military Intelligence Division report to indicate that KAWAMOTO was interrogated concerning the trip taken by KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Hawaii.

70. Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Hawaii also interviewed Shingo NARIKAWA, who was taxi driver for MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO while they were on Hawaii. Although interrogated at length, NARIKAWA could remember nothing which was at variance with the story given by KOTOSHIRODO.

TADASI MORIMURA

71. From the information that has been collected from the Consular clerks and other persons close to the Consulate, it is apparent that MORIMURA was something of a mystery man. All agreed that he had special privileges. He was frequently drunk, often had women in his quarters overnight, came to work late or not at all, as he pleased, insulted the Consul General on occasions, and generally conducted himself as if he were beyond penalty. This naturally caused much comment among the Consulate secretaries and clerks.

72. Some of the secretaries and clerks believed that MORIMURA was an officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy. According to KOTOSHIRODO, however, SEKI denied this. SEKI said that he knew how Japanese naval officers behaved, and that MORIMURA definitely did not conduct himself as an officer.

[18] 73. It was publicly announced MORIMURA’s arrival that he had been sent to Honolulu to assist in expatriation matters. Takachi SAKAI, senior clerk at the Consulate, who had been handling the routine of expatriation matters for a number of years, stated that MORIMURA had made a pretense of helping with the work for only the first three or four weeks he was there, but had done none of it personally, and appeared to know nothing about the work.

74. John Yoshive MIKAMI, who, although uneducated, has given himself an amazing self education in naval matters, had little regard for MORIMURA, and emphatically stated that the secretary lacked the sharp eye and the smart gait of a Japanese military or naval officer.

75. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA was an eighth rank secretary in the Japanese consular service. This is the lowest rank, a first rank secretary being the highest. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard YUGE and Samon TSUKIKAWA, the Consular Secretary in charge of the code room, remark that eighth rank secretaries were usually sent to the least desirable posts in the consular service. The desirability of posts was said to vary according to climate. Most of the less desirable posts were in China. Honolulu, on the other hand, was considered one of the best posts in the Japanese consular service. It was usually given to men with many years of faithful service, and it was unusual for a secretary of the eighth rank to have his initial assignment in Hawaii. They believed this to be MORIMURA’s first assignment abroad, since his name, at the date of his arrival here, had not yet appeared in the consular roster of the Japanese Foreign Office. Because of this, they assumed that he was recently admitted to the foreign service, and had served only an indoctrination period in Tokyo before coming to Honolulu.

76. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA never talked about his past life except of the time he spent in grammar school. However, on one occasion, MORIMURA did refer to Chinese coolies pulling barges on the Yangtze river. He called the coolies the lowest people on earth. This remark led KOTOSHIRODO to believe that MORIMURA had lived in, or had at least visited, China.

77. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, supplied one version of MORIMURA’s background. He stated that on one occasion he had overheard a conversation between SEKI and YUGE regarding MORIMURA. They had remarked that MORIMURA was the only child of a wealthy family of Ehime-ken on Shikoku, in Japan. His father died when he was rather young, leaving his mother in comfortable circumstances, inasmuch as the family owned considerable land. Prior to his arrival in Hawaii, MORIMURA had been working in the Foreign Office in Tokyo, possibly for as long a period as three years, although
it was more likely that he had been there for only two years. On one occasion he had been discharged from the Foreign Office for excessive drinking, but his mother had written to a prominent official about the matter, and through this connection had been able to have MORIMURA reinstated.

78. Whatever his background, MORIMURA was not popular with the rest of the Consulate staff. This was probably due to his youth, his favored position, and the advantage he took of this position. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that SEKI greatly resented MORIMURA. SEKI had done the work of gathering data about ships in Pearl Harbor until MORIMURA came, but then had been relieved of these duties. SEKI openly exhibited professional jealousy, often telling KOTOSHIRODO that MORIMURA did not know what he was doing. The change in plans for the Kanai trip was cited as an example of this dissenion. As KOTOSHIRODO put it during one of the interviews, both SEKI and MORIMURA were trying to gain all the credit for the information-gathering work. Further information about MORIMURA's background is to be found on pages 10 and 11 of reference (u).

79. KOTOSHIRODO stated that shortly after MORIMURA's arrival, the new secretary made a point of "making friends" around town. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA spent a lot of time at the offices of the Japanese newspapers, particularly the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA had many friends at the Nippu Jiji, but until questioned at length showed no great willingness to "remember" who they were. Finally he admitted that of all the men at the Nippu Jiji, Shigeo FURUKAWA, the advertising manager, was best known to MORIMURA. The significance of this fact is indicated by the information contained in paragraphs 9-11 of reference (a). Paragraph 16 of reference (c) should also be noted in this regard. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA was an excellent Japanese poet. (Other information corroborates this statement.) KOTOSHIRODO was then asked if he would explain the common interest between MORIMURA and FURUKAWA. It was pointed out that FURUKAWA was about 55 years of age, a poet, a family man and a business man, whereas MORIMURA was only about 29, was not a poet, and preferred to spend his leisure in drinking and playing with the geishas. KOTOSHIRODO stated in answer to this that they often played go (Japanese checkers) together at the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA also knew Zenichi KAWAZOE, subject of reference (m), who covered the Consulate "beat" for the Nippu Jiji. Other Nippu Jiji personnel whom MORIMURA knew were Shoichi ASAMI, the city editor, and Katsunichi KAWAMOTO, the business manager. All these men have been interned.

80. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA came to the Consulate very rarely. He remembered FURUKAWA's coming there only when he brought Nippu Jiji representatives from the outside islands to introduce them to the Consul General.

81. KOTOSHIRODO stated that another close associate of MORIMURA was Katsunichiro TAKAGISHI, chief chemist of the Honolulu Sake Brewery. TAKAGISHI was the subject of an intensive investigation by this office prior to his departure for Japan aboard the Taiyo Maru on November 5, 1941. TAKAGISHI is the son-in-law of an Admiral HYAKUTAKE of the Imperial Japanese Navy. (There are two admirals of this name, brothers, in the Japanese Navy; this office has been unable to determine which admiral is the father of TAKAGISHI's wife.) TAKAGISHI was a frequent visitor of the Japanese Consulate, and often played golf with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and Tsunetaro HARADA, manager of the Pensacola Hotel, where TAKAGISHI resided. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he often thought that the friendship of MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI was "funny", because TAKAGISHI loved golf so much and MORIMURA did not play the game. However, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI used to "chase women" together. It was never established that TAKAGISHI actually was engaged in espionage for Japan, although a mass of circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that he was so engaged.

SEKI AND MORIMURA DISCUSS ESPIONAGE

82. On many occasions KOTOSHIRODO was present at discussions between MORIMURA and SEKI. On other occasions, they would discuss things with him individually. It should be remembered that KOTOSHIRODO worked as SEKI's assistant while he was inside the office, although he was MORIMURA's assistant.
in collecting information outside the office. Because of this situation, KOTO-
SHIRODO was in close contact with both men.

53. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that the Japanese consulates all over
the world were supposed to gather all the information they could without doing
"illegal things". (This point is considerably amplified in reference (u).) MORI-
MURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that an outside system, which was separate
and apart from the Consulate, and which worked directly on orders from Tokyo,
collected such information as it was necessary to obtain by "illegal" means. This
would include, for example, the practice of buying secrets. MORIMURA ob-
served that such an outside system would not report through the Consulate, nor
would the Consulate contact the outside system. In all probability, the Consulate
would know nothing of this outside system, he said.

54. MORIMURA once asked SEKI if there were any Japanese espionage agents
(meaning those outside the Consulate) in the Territory of Hawaii. SEKI replied
that he did not know. MORIMURA observed that he did not know what
the facts were, but that there must be such a system. However, he did not know
the manner in which such an outside system would operate.

55. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA and SEKI discuss espionage coverage
on one occasion. SEKI stated that it was necessary for the Consulate to have a
"good man" on each island. However, MORIMURA was of the opinion that this
requirement would be difficult to meet, since the average Japanese in the Terri-
tory of Hawaii lacked the technical knowledge necessary in the work. MORI-
MURA and SEKI agreed that because of the large number of Japanese in the
local population, Hawaii should be "the easiest place" to carry on espionage.
However, they believed this advantage to be lost, because the local Japanese were
too poorly educated to do this work. MORIMURA was very outspoken on this
point, claiming that the toritsuginin (the so-called local consul agents) were
no good for the work, and that most Japanese in Hawaii was "just trash" and
insufficiently educated. He remarked that the Japanese had come to Hawaii
as laborers and were therefore uneducated, where the Japanese on the Mainland
of the United States were much better educated.

56. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA say that throughout the world then
(1941), all nations "use other kind of people" (i.e., non-nationals of the country
employing [27] them) as espionage agents. MORIMURA believed that
Japan sometimes used non-Japanese espionage agents (although KOTOSHIRODO
never heard him say whether such agents were operating in Hawaii). MORI-
MURA once said in KOTOSHIRODO's presence that he had "heard in Tokyo" that
Japan had long had a British naval officer acting as an espionage agent in China.
(Whether this Britisher was working for Japan only against China, or against
both China and Britain, or only against Britain, was not stated). MORIMURA
had said that this officer had been so employed "for years". However, he com-
mented on the fact that non-Japanese agents were expensive. He said that the
first time such agents submitted information, they submitted a lot of it, but after
that the law of diminishing returns began to operate, and eventually the employer
would pay the same price for mere driblets. He also stated that it was safer and
less costly to use Japanese agents in espionage work. However, more valuable
information could be obtained by non-Japanese, although at a greater cost to
Japan.

57. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he thought the extra-Consulate es-
plionage system to which MORIMURA referred might be operating in Hawaii
at the present time, and sending information from Hawaii to Japan. KOTO-
SHIRODO expressed surprise that such an operation was considered possible, saying,
"How can?" The only pertinent fact he could recall in this connection was that
MORIMURA once remarked that it would be impossible to use short-wave radio
for getting information out of Hawaii after war started because of "a device"
the Americans had which enabled them to ascertain the exact location of a radio
transmitter. KOTOSHIRODO knew what short-wave radio was, and knew of
Radio Tokyo broadcasts, but professed complete ignorance about amateur radio
stations. He stated that he had never heard anyone at the Consulate talk about
the subject, nor had he and MORIMURA ever stopped to see anyone in town
who operated an amateur short-wave radio station.

58. KOTOSHIRODO stated that on another occasion MORIMURA remarked to
SEKI that Hawaii would be a fine place from which to watch a Japanese-
American war. Either SEKI or MORIMURA observed that there would be no
way for a spy to communicate from Hawaii to Japan by radio, referring to
the risk of discovery by radio detection equipment.
SECURITY

89. Apparently one of the “legal” methods of collecting information indulged in by the Consulate was the close scrutiny of daily newspapers. Yasumasa MURATA, a clerk at the Consulate until 1938, stated that the local newspapers were clipped daily. He added that the Vice Consul always had charge of this work. The Vice Consul usually would mark such items as he desired and pass them on to MURATA, who would do the actual clipping. Usually two—occasionally three—clippings were secured of each item. One copy was sent to Japan, and one retained at the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he used to receive the first edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin for the Consulate at his home, because the first edition was not delivered to the zone in which the Consulate was located. KOTOSHIRODO’s home, two blocks away, was near enough to be included in the delivery zone. Apparently the Consulate wanted to keep close watch on all editions of the paper. Many of the Consulate despatches (viewed after the outbreak of war) merely contained synopses of press stories.

[22] SECURITY MEASURES

90. KOTOSHIRODO said that he was taught at the Consulate that the first rule in “information collecting” was “no get caught”. He was told never to go out of his way to get information. Even if he could not see his desired objective from the highway, he was not to ask questions about it, nor leave the highway to view it. If ever he and MORIMURA were stopped by the authorities and questioned, KOTOSHIRODO was to explain that they were merely “sightseeing”, KOTOSHIRODO was to do the necessary talking, because of MORIMURA’s poor command of English.

91. He was told never to take pictures of “important places”. Although he took a camera to Kauai and Maui, this was merely a “prop” to carry out their pose as sightseers. KOTOSHIRODO expressly denied ever having taken pictures of air fields, harbors, power plants, or other conceivable military objectives. His snapshots were only of the usual scenic places, he said.

92. MORIMURA occasionally carried field glasses on his trips to various parts of Oahu. He never carried them to the outside islands. Even on Oahu he was extremely careful in their use. The field glasses used were bought early in 1941 at SEKI’s insistence. Prior to that time, there had been no field glasses at the Consulate. To divert suspicion, the glasses were bought for the Consulate by Toro NISHIKAWA (now interned), an employee of the Nippu Ji Ji. (NISHIKAWA handled certain commercial printing orders from the Consulate.)

93. KOTOSHIRODO could recall no instance in which MORIMURA had made written notes of their observations prior to their returning to the Consulate after “sightseeing”. KOTOSHIRODO likewise denied ever making any notes himself. Instead, he said that his practice was to report verbally what he had seen to MORIMURA or OKUDA, who would make notes, at the Consulate, of KOTOSHIRODO’s reported observations.

94. KOTOSHIRODO stated that neither he nor MORIMURA ever carried maps which might attract suspicion. On such occasions as they did use maps, they carried cartographs published by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, and the only occasion upon which notations were made thereon was on the trip to Maui, see paragraph 60, above. However, in earlier interviews, as reported in paragraphs 42 of reference (c), KOTOSHIRODO stated that on trips he made alone to the Pearl Harbor region, he had marked the positions of various warships on rough maps drawn by MORIMURA. (Note might be made here of KOTOSHIRODO’s extraordinary powers of perception and memory for details of events which happened months, or years, before. Many of his statements were otherwise known to be true, tending to make KOTOSHIRODO’s statements and admissions generally reliable.)

95. KOTOSHIRODO said that when he was first employed at the Consulate (1935), he was told by Vice Consul YAMASAKI that he was not to talk about Consulate business to strangers. When KOTOSHIRODO first began to make trips to Pearl Harbor, SEKI warned him not to mention these trips to his wife.

[23] CHRISTMAS PRESENTS GIVEN BY THE CONSULATE

96. Takaichi SAKAI stated that every year the Consulate gave Christmas presents to a number of United States Customs inspectors. He stated that he personally delivered gifts to the homes of Customs Inspectors Carl F. EIFLER, George W. SPENCE, Andrew A. BUTA, and John OLIVIERA. These gifts usually consisted of merchandise orders of $20.00 to $30.00 drawn on M. McNerny, Ltd., or the Liberty House, both large Honolulu retail stores.
97. The Honolulu barbormaster, James L. FRIEL, and his assistant, Frank J. UNTERMANN, received similar Christmas presents, according to SAKAI.

98. Another recipient was Ernest M. HIRAKAWA, an alien Japanese, foreman of the registry section of the United States Post Office, Honolulu. Comment has been made on HIRAKAWA in reference (t).

99. Ichitaro OZAKI, regular chauffeur for the Consulate, confirmed the fact that he drove SAKAI around to deliver Christmas presents. Although he was unable to recall all the persons to whom presents had been delivered, he did remember that SPENCE and FRIEL were among the recipients. KOTOSHI-RODO also remembered that Christmas presents were given to a number of persons.

MIKAMI'S NAVAL KNOWLEDGE

100. The interrogating officers and agents were surprised at John Yoshiye MIKAMI's knowledge of naval matters. MIKAMI is so poorly educated that he speaks both pidgin Japanese and pidgin English. He has been a taxi driver for the greater part of his life. He was detained on January 6, 1942, and since that time has been incarcerated on Sand Island, Honolulu, with other internees.

101. During the course of the interrogation (September 28, 1942), it became apparent that even while interned MIKAMI had been able to keep familiar with current movements of the United States Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor. MIKAMI stated that only a week before a new battleship that he had never seen before, and a carrier that was either the LEXINGTON or the SARATOGA, had arrived at Pearl Harbor. (The SOUTH DAKOTA and the SARATOGA actually had arrived.)

102. He stated that in July, 1942, a large body of United States ships had left Pearl Harbor—for Australia, he presumed. He stated that these ships had recently returned. He then commented on the large number of destroyer movements.

103. MIKAMI commented upon seeing “the same old battleships” return to Pearl Harbor in August (true), and also upon a new carrier he had never seen before which entered Pearl Harbor on the same day. This latter was the WASP, on her first trip to Honolulu. (The Fleet Intelligence Office, Pacific Fleet, was seasonably [24] informed of the knowledge that MIKAMI, an internee, was able to see concerning current ship movements, from the internment camp on Sand Island.)

104. MIKAMI conversed intelligently about naval subjects in general. He mentioned “anti-torpedo nets”, knew their purpose, and stated he had never seen them in use on his trips to Pearl Harbor before the war. He also mentioned “anti-airplane balloons” which he thought were impractical for use around Pearl Harbor because they would give away the exact location of the objective. MIKAMI also discussed the “balance of naval power” theory, and expressed the opinion that the United States-Japanese war began 30 years ago when a naval race between the two powers was started. He also expressed the opinion that the United States would beat Japan only when she had beaten the Japanese Navy.

105. MIKAMI was asked how he had acquired such a broad knowledge of naval subjects. He said that he had been reading American magazines for about three years, naming Our Navy, Life, and the Naval Institute Proceedings. He said he received copies of the latter publication when the Consul threw its old copies away. He stated that he did not read Japanese naval magazines because “they tell big lies”. However, whether MIKAMI actually gained his excellent (though perhaps superficial) knowledge of naval subjects by reading magazines in a language in which he is extremely deficient, or by some other means, remains a matter of conjecture.

KOREAN CONTACTS

106. All the Consulate clerks agreed that the Japanese Foreign Office made a point of keeping stationed in Hawaii one secretary who could speak Korean. There were two reasons for this practice: First, to handle various Korean matters which were a legitimate concern of the Consulate; second, to use the Honolulu Consulate as a “listening post” regarding various Korean nationalist movements. The Japanese apparently regarded Honolulu as an excellent place for keeping in touch with existing or incipient Korean political developments.

107. Takaichi SAKAI, former senior clerk at the Consulate, who was employed there from 1927 until the outbreak of war, recalled that during his time secretaries Takeo KASHIMURA, Gishiro MASUO, Tadaaki IIZUKA, and Kyonosuko
YUGE had spoken Korean and had handled Korean affairs at the Consulate. (For some reason SAKAI "forget" to mention YUGE, the most recent of these secretaries, until it was brought to his attention at a subsequent interview. All the other clerks were familiar with YUGE's Korean duties, they having been instructed to refer all Korean callers to YUGE as a matter of office routine.)

108. All the clerks employed at the Consulate prior to 1937 remembered having seen Kilsoo HAAN at the Consulate on a number of occasions. HAAN is the subject of a number of reports by this office, the most recent of which is reference (n). Yasumasa MURATA, who was employed at the Consulate until 1938, stated that he once heard from Tsuko KUROKAWA, who was senior clerk at the Consulate at the time, that the Consulate had been paying money to HAAN.

[25] 109. From a confidential, but reliable source, the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently received the originals, in Japanese, of various papers evidencing the interest of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, in Korean matters. Translations of these papers are set forth in reference (o). One source indicates that up to 1925, the Consulate was allowed $100.00 a month for its Korean Intelligence Fund. From 1926 to 1931, the Consulate appears to have operated on an accumulated surplus in this field. Following that time, the Foreign Office appears to have made special allocations from time to time, as needed. A summary of these translations indicates that the following Korean informants received payment from the Japanese Consulate:

Kwang Won CHO

110. This individual is a Korean priest, mentioned as being a frequent visitor of the Consulate by the various clerks. He is more commonly known by the name, Father Noah CHO. The translations indicate that he received a payment of $37.00 on May 19, 1934, and a payment of $20.00 on August 6, 1934. He is the subject of a Registration Act case by the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a report of which is noted as reference (j), the synopsis of which follows:

"Subject /CHO/ born October 21, 1897 in Korea; came to Hawaii in 1923 as Episcopal missionary and has since been associated with St. Luke's Korean Mission, Honolulu. He became priest at the St. Luke's Mission in 1931; however his entire family, including mother, father, wife and five children presently residing in Korea, have never been in the United States. Confidential source reveals Subject paid $37.00 in May, 1934, and $20.00 in August, 1934, by Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, for informant's services. Signed statement obtained in which Subject admits contact with Consulate, beginning in 1932, and beginning about September, 1939, and extending to April 1, 1941. He admits having performed work for the Consulate relating to Korean activities; further, that during the latter period approximately $200 was paid him by the Consulate for his services which included obtaining and translation of two Korean newspapers. Subject claims to have performed services for the Japanese Consulate under threat to bring harm to his family in Korea; however, his acceptance of remuneration makes this claim appear questionable. Subject denied receipt of any payments in 1934."

111. A check of the files of this office reveals the additional information that the Reverend CHO returned from a trip to Japan aboard the ASAMA MARU on August 20, 1940. It is of possible significance that a fellow passenger aboard the ASAMA MARU was Sanjja ABE, subject of reference (p), former Territorial senator, now interned, who was returning from a trip to Japan during which he conferred with Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA, and also made an overseas broadcast to Hawaii in which he praised Japan's war effort in China. Other passengers on the same ship were Clifford Kikujiro KONDO, subject of reference (q), now in custody; Katsuuo SATO, subject of reference (r), now in custody; and Kenji OHTOMO, subject [26] of reference (s). OHTOMO, executive secretary of the Young Men's Buddhist Association, Honolulu, and whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese government, has been classified on numerous occasions by this office as dangerous to internal security. Ten other of Reverend CHO's fellow passengers are now in custody, and another two, although still at large, have been classified as dangerous by this office. Although it may have been pure chance that these persons traveled on the same ship, the coincidence is being set forth for what it may be worth.
Doo Ok Chung

112. Translation of these papers indicated that CHUNG received $80.00 on May 22, 1933. A review of the files of this office indicates that he is a 54-year-old alien, a tailor by trade, and operates a concession at the Honolulu Army and Navy Y. M. C. A. CHUNG appears to be extremely active in Kilsoo HAAN's SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. A letter from Dr. Soon HYUN, formerly chairman of the League in Honolulu, to HAAN, dated June 22, 1942, described CHUNG as one of "the cornerstones of our League".

113. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that CHUNG was born in Korea in 1889, came to Hawaii in 1903. He has three sons serving in the United States Army. Another son, four daughters, his wife, and his mother all reside in the United States. He has been active in Korean political circles since 1915, when he joined the KOREAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. He withdrew from this and aided in forming the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE, becoming the second president of the latter organization. The KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE have been comparatively inactive since 1929, and eventually he joined the SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. He denied, with seeming sincerity, his ever having had contact with, or accepting money from, the local Japanese Consulate, but there appears to be no other individual in Hawaii of a similar name.

Won Sam Kim

114. The translation indicated that this individual received the following payments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 10, 1935</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28, 1934</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 1934</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10, 1934</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 1936</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 1937</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that KIM was born in Korea in 1879, came to Hawaii in the early 1900s, and was a carpenter by trade. [27] In 1919 he had become a member of the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE. He died on March 14, 1939, in Honolulu, and his widow denied all knowledge of his past activities or relations with the Japanese Consulate.

Sang Ho Lee (Yee)

115. LEE was paid $100.00 on March 31, 1932, and $20.00 on August 19, 1933. Directories of that period indicate that an individual of this name was with the Nahm Choon Furnished Rooms, 339 North Beretania Street, Honolulu. Later directories do not include the name. However, the latest directory lists a Mrs. Sang Ho LEE, 1355 Miller Street, Honolulu.

116. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that LEE was born in Korea on November 5, 1879, and first arrived in the United States on February 3, 1905, under the name YE CHONG KUL. He visited China from July, 1922, to May, 1923. He departed from Honolulu bound for Korea on February 16, 1934, and has not re-entered the United States.

Ok Nam Shin

117. The translation indicates that this individual received $50.00 on March 31, 1932, and $3.40 on June 9, 1933. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that SHIN, a grocer, was born in Korea in 1901, came to Honolulu in 1920, and returned to Korea in 1933. He returned to Honolulu in 1938, but went back to Korea shortly thereafter, and has never returned.
118. The following is a list of payments received by this individual, who is usually referred to as Kilsoo Haan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 1936</td>
<td>$60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 1936</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 1936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chin Ho Tough

119. On May 22, 1933, TOUGH received the sum of $80.00 from the Consulate. TOUGH (he is known by all the combinations of the above three names) has been the object of suspicion for a considerable period. He entered the Territory in 1931 as a Buddhist priest, but apparently has never practiced his profession. He was educated in Japan. For a while he worked at various military posts as a tailor, and later went into business for himself on the Island of Molokai. He has been very active on the UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE. When interrogated, TOUGH stated that he had visited the Consulate on only one occasion, that being upon his arrival in 1931 when it was necessary to have his passport stamped.

[23]

OTHER CONSULATE CONTACTS

Ensei (Enju) Kobayashi

120. On March 15, 1932, KOBAYASHI received $8.00 from the Consulate. An alien, aged 54, he was a priest of the Jodo sect (Buddhist), a Japanese language school principal, and a toritsuginin at Hawi, Kohala, Hawaii, T. H. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and subsequently was interned. He is reported to be at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, and apparently is planning for repatriation to Japan.

Katsuchi Miho

121. MIHO received the sum of $27.00 from the Japanese Consulate on March 15, 1932. MIHO is a 59-year-old alien. Prior to the war he operated the MIHO HOTEL at Kahului, Maui, T. H., and was a toritsuginin for that district. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be interned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Minoru Murakami

122. MURAKAMI received the sum of $10.00 from the Consulate on March 15, 1932. MURAKAMI, a Japanese alien, formerly employed as a representative for the Nippon Jiji (Honolulu bilingual newspaper), has a long record of pro-Japanese activities and statements. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Apparently he desires to repatriate to Japan.

Masao Sogawa

123. On January 6, 1932, SOGAWA received the sum of $50.00. He was editor and publisher of the Hawaii Shimpo, a Japanese weekly newspaper published in Honolulu until the outbreak of war. This paper was considered highly pro-Japanese in its sentiments. SOGAWA was taken into custody on December 14, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.

Wade Warren Thayer

124. On August 21, 1935, THAYER reportedly received the sum of $40.00 from the Japanese Consulate. For years, THAYER was attorney for the Japanese Consulate, and was so registered with the Secretary of State. It is not known why this lone entry was found among the expenses of the Korean Intelligence Fund, inasmuch as it is believed that THAYER undoubtedly had some permanent financial arrangements with the Consulate with regard to his legal services.
[29] THE CONSULATE Prepares For War

125. Takaichi SAKAI stated that in the summer of 1941 the Consulate began to burn old documents. All the clerks helped in this work, and about the same time, the clerks were paid bonuses each month. The clerks were told not to talk about the fact that documents were being burned almost daily in the back yard of the Consulate. SAKAI could recall no such burning of papers shortly before the war started, although he did observe that the number of visitors to the Consulate from the N. Y. K. Line and from the Yokohama Specie Bank increased greatly in the last two weeks of peace. These visitors sometimes carried handbags with them.

126. Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist at the Consulate, remembered that about the middle of November, 1941, two Yokohama Specie Bank officials came to the Consulate and went into Consul General KITA's room, where they stayed for about an hour. One of these men was Nihei MIYAMOTO, sub-manager of the bank. KITA was not present, and the two men were alone in the room. They asked for a typewriter. Miss DOUE believed that MIYAMOTO and his companion wrote a telegram which they sent under the name of the Consulate. She stated that they had probably done their own coding. She added that, to her knowledge, Torataro ONODA, of the Sumitomo Bank, had never done this.

127. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled that in June, 1941, the two yardmen of the Consulate had burned a large number of official appearing books. OZAKI was able to set the month because it was just before his departure for Japan. He was in Japan from June to November, 1941. OZAKI explained that the Consulate was not supposed to keep material longer than 10 years, and every year they accumulated material to burn. OZAKI stated that he helped carry these books from the Vice Consul's office to the yardmen, who would burn them. He estimated that more than 100 publications were thus burned in 1941. The two yardmen who did this burning, Saburo SUMIDA and Rakuro FUKUSHIMA, were repatriated to Japan in 1942 with the Consulate staff. OZAKI stated that he was in Japan when the United States freeze order against Japanese assets went into effect, but he heard that the Consulate burned a considerable amount of material at that time.

128. OZAKI stated that it was his belief that telegrams received from Japan were burned as soon as they were received, or at least within a week. He stated that in the code room of the Consulate was a small brazier, and when papers were burned in this room, he would sometimes notice smoke coming out of the window. He believed that he had seen more smoke coming out of this room after he had returned from Japan (on the last ship, November 1, 1941) than he had prior to his departure. He believed that code room material was burned about once a week. The code room was always cleaned by Saburo SUMIDA. Samon TSUKIKAWA, Consulate secretary in charge of coding, was always present during this operation.

129. On December 6, 1941, at about 1500, the two yardmen went into the coding room of the Consulate and removed a wheelbarrow full of papers and other material. These they burned in a pit in the yard. OZAKI said that he put out this fire about 1600, just before darkness fell. He noted that everything had been burned. OZAKI said that yard rubbish was being burned all the time, so he was unable tourate how often code room material was burned. The incident of December 6th was the only time he actually saw them remove the material from the code room.

130. OZAKI stated that the Consul and Vice Consul had an engagement to play golf with Tsumitaro HARADA on the morning of December 7, 1941. He remembered that MIKAMI's taxi had actually called at the Consulate for the two officials, but by that time guards had been placed around the Consulate. MIKAMI requested the guards to inform OKUDA of his arrival, which they did. However, OKUDA sent back a message that MIKAMI was not to wait because he, OKUDA, probably would be unable to play golf that day.

131. OZAKI expressed his conviction, based on observations made prior to and subsequent to December 7, 1941, that Consul General KITA had no foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, he insisted that the Consul General had received a telegram from Washington at 0700 on the morning of December 7th. (This was a radiogram from Tokyo, reporting that Japanese-American and Japanese-British relations were strained.) Immediately upon its receipt, KITA had
called TSUKIKAWA, who lived at the Kyoraku Kan Hotel, two blocks from the Consulate grounds, and insisted that the latter come to the Consulate immediately to decode this message. OZAKI stated that he heard of this incident from SEKI about a week or two after the attack. OZAKI stated that TSUKIKAWA was at the Consulate at the time of the attack.

132. OZAKI stated that the Consulate staff members were burning papers when the police arrived on the morning of December 7th. He remembered seeing smoke come out of the code room window. After the Consulate staff was repatriated (February, 1942), he went into the code room to clean it. All he saw was a big tub filled with ashes.

133. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he first heard the noise (of battle) about 0900 on the morning of December 7, 1941, so he walked to the Consulate to find out what all the commotion was about. KITA, OKUDA, SEKI, and TSUKIKAWA were all there, and appeared to be worried. MORIMURA dropped in a little later with his hair tousled, clothes wrinkled, and in short sleeves. KOTOSHIRODO heard him remark that it was a "noisy morning". MORIMURA wanted to go up on the heights and see what was going on, but KITA would not allow him to leave the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO left the Consulate about 1000.

CONSULATE DOMESTICS

134. As was reported in paragraphs 47 and 52 of reference (c), three of the domestics at the Consulate secured their positions through one Toyoki FUJITA, a flower grower. FUJITA was interviewed to determine his connection with the [37] Consulate. FUJITA stated that among other retail florist shops to which he sold his blossoms, was the SERVICE FLORIST, operated by one Tetsuo SHINAGAWA. SHINAGAWA supplied the Consulate with flowers. He secured this account because he is a brother-in-law of Ichitaro OZAKI, Consulate chauffeur, who apparently ordered flowers purchased by the Consulate. FUJITA first met OZAKI when he delivered some plants to the Consulate. On one occasion OZAKI asked FUJITA if the latter knew of a girl who would like to cook at the Consulate. FUJITA secured the services of Yoshie KIKKAWA. (Results of an interview with Miss KIKKAWA are set forth in paragraph 52–54 of reference (c)). Because FUJITA was once successful in securing a domestic, OZAKI asked him for assistance in securing help on two other occasions. FUJITA was able to send to the Consulate Sakae TANAKA, whose interview is set forth in paragraph 55–56 of reference (c), and Kimika ASAKURA, paragraphs 47–51 of reference (c).

JAPANESE NAVY TANKERS

135. Takaichi SAKAI stated that when Japanese naval tankers called at Honolulu, their captain would call at the Consulate and talk for an hour or more with the Consul General or the Vice Consul. Sometimes the captains would leave the Consulate carrying envelopes they did not bring with them. One Ishichi MATSUDA, now in custody, the owner of a grocery store at the old Aala Market, often visited these vessels. He was noted on numerous occasions by representatives of this office to have carried a mail bag onto the boat. SAKAI explained that MATSUDA would pick up mail being held at the post office pending the arrival of the tankers, and carry it aboard. Presumably this was a labor of love. SAKAI recalled hearing that Japanese navy men sometimes left the tankers here, then sailed aboard a tanker calling at Honolulu at a future date. However, SAKAI could not recall where he had heard this. He further disclaimed all knowledge of what these officers did while in port, or of where they lived while here. (In connection with this topic, see reference (v), paragraphs 42–43.)

TORITSUGININ

136. Takaichi SAKAI stated that the term soryojikan toritsuginin was not accurately translated as "consular agents". He believed the more correct translation to be "Consulate General ‘go-between’ men". He remembered Vice Consul OKUDA's once expressing the opinion that the toritsuginin were not agents of the Japanese government within the meaning of the United States statute requiring such agents to register with the State Department.

137. It should be remembered that the status of the toritsuginin was never clarified by judicial decision. They were "agents" of the Consulate only in a very loose sense of the term. They rarely received remuneration from the Con-
sulate, and their duties apparently were merely routine. Actual military espionage on the part of a toritsugin in has been proven to the satisfaction of this office only in one case, that of Unji HIRAYAMA, subject of reference (1). Economic espionage has been indicated in a number of other cases. However, the basic motive in placing all toritsugin in custody immediately after the attack of December 7th was the fact that, as a class, they were extremely pro-Japanese, and there is evidence to indicate that they were chosen to be toritsugin on the basis of their loyalty to Japan. There is scarcely one who was not engaged in a number of pro-Japanese activities in addition to his duties as toritsugin.

Pending—14ND.

[1] TRIP TO KAUAI

One day in the early part of July, 1941, Morimura told me that he and I will be sent on a trip to Kauai in the near future. Sometime after that Seki told me that he wants to see the island by himself. So it seemed to me then that both of them wanted so much to take a trip. I don't really know how the situation was between them. After several days (few days before we left) Morimura suddenly told me that he is not going and said that I will be sent. After hearing that from Morimura, I asked Seki what has happened. And Seki said that they (Morimura and Seki) had some kind of misunderstandings. I told Seki why he (Seki) himself doesn't go since I was told he wanted to go so much. But Seki said he is not going and told me to take my wife with me. He told me to go and have a good vacation. And then Okuda called me to his desk and told me to go to Kauai with my wife and also told me to see Seki about the money. Seki gave me about $100, and the following day I went down to the airway company office to buy our tickets. The day before we left Okuda called me at his desk and gave me the following instructions: (1) See the things that could be seen from the highways; (2) Not to talk to anyone; (3) He said that he knew the air field project at the Barking Sand is going on. He told me to see that if it could be seen from outside; (4) See the Lihue airport if there is any improvements; (5) See the Hanalei bay if anything is being done. He said he saw in a newspaper that the U.S. Navy is planning to use the bay for small boat base: (5) He showed me the geological survey map of Kauai and told me to see the Waimea power plant.

[2] He said that it is the source of power used on Kauai: (6) He showed me a photograph of Port Allen and Nawiliwi harbors. He told me to see any change has been added. He told me to take the usual sightseeing schedule and see what I can see. I called up Nikami on the phone and told him to take us to the airport next morning.

Next morning (I believe it was Saturday in the middle part of July) my wife and I went to the airport in Mikami's car. We left the airport at about 8 a.m. and reached Hanapepe airport at about 9 a.m. I noticed Horikawa was one of the passengers of the same plane. After we reached the Hanapepe airport I happened to see Minatoya (I didn't know him then) and hired him to show us around the island. He said the auto fare will be $25. Then we started out immediately for the Kokee. I asked him if we can see the Barking Sand. He said we cannot go there in the morning because the Army usually practice bombing there. We went up to the place where tourists usually see the canyon. We got out of the car and stayed there for about 15 minutes, and continued our drive to Kokee and we went as far as the place where there were some residences. Since Minatoya said there isn't anything more to see further up we turned back and came back to Waimea. Minatoya suggested to have our lunch at the Waimea Hotel so we went in and all three of us sat at one table. He then introduced himself and said he is working for some transportation company. He talked about his having brother who is a doctor in Honolulu. We, my wife and I, introduced ourselves too, but I didn't say I was from the consulate. Soon after lunch we left the hotel and started for the Barking Sand. We didn't stop at anywhere on the way and [3] reached the Barking Sand. We got off the car then walked up the sand hill and tried if the sand really barks. I took a picture of my wife there. I looked from the sand hill if there was any work going on for the air field, but I couldn't see anything at all. Only things I saw were sandy beach and keawe trees. After staying there about 20 minutes and started back the same road to Lihue. On the way back to Lihue, we passed through Kukuiolono park and stopped at the Lawai beach to see the Spouting Horn. And then we rode to
Koloa beach where we got off the car and walked around the sandy beach seeing many human skeletons. After staying there about 20 minutes we rode to Lihue without stopping anywhere. It was about 5 p.m. when we reached the Lihue hotel. We registered there and shown to our room. We had our dinner at the dining hall. *After dinner my wife and I thought of going to see some movie so we called upon Minatoya on the phone and asked him to take us. He came soon after and we went to the Lihue theatre. We three sat together. I remember the title of the picture was “Strawberry Blonde”. After show Minatoya took us back to the hotel. We stayed in our room until we retired. There was some kind of party at the hotel that nite. The following morning Minatoya came to the hotel at about 8 a.m. After breakfast I happened to see Horikawa in the kitchen so I went in just to say hello. I introduced myself and my wife. All he said to us was that “You were on the same plane yesterday morning. Are you on a sightseeing trip?” Minatoya put the lunch in the car and we started out at about 9 a.m. We went to see the Wallua fall. We didn’t go near to the fall but just saw it far from the hill. Then we went to see [4] the Grass shack where we got off the car and saw some old Hawaiian mats, drum and sandalas. From there we went to see the Slippery Fall. We got off the car and walked down to the fall. After staying there about 15 minutes we started to Hanalei direction. We didn’t stop anywhere before reaching Hanalei where we had our lunch. We ate our lunch in the pavilion. I didn’t see anything been done at the bay. After staying there about 45 minutes we started to Haena. On the way I asked the driver if we can see the power plant and he suggested of seeing it on the way back. We went way back we went up the Wainiha valley and went as far as the power plant was. I expected to see something large but All I saw were two pipes running down and one small power house building. Without stopping the car we just turned back from there and stopped about 1/2 mile down on the same road and picked up some mountain apples. After staying there about 15 minutes we started back and didn’t stop anywhere before we reached Kilauea lighthouse. Minatoya suggested of seeing the lighthouse since it is the largest one in the world. The watchman of the lighthouse came and showed us in to the lighthouse. We climbed the stairs and saw the large lens. I remember we signed our names on the visitors’ signature book. From there started back and didn’tstop anywhere before reaching Lihue. On the way to Lihue we went down to Nawiliwili harbor. We didn’t got off the car. Minatoya said pointing one office building that was his company office. We reached Lihue hotel at about 5 p.m. After dinner at the hotel my wife and I thought of going to see [5] Japanese movie and walked to the theatre. I don’t remember the name of the theatre, it was very near to the hotel) It happened that night was the bank night at the theatre. After seeing the show we went back to the hotel and retired soon. The following morning Minatoya came at about 8 a.m. we checked out the hotel at about 8:30 a.m. I remember I paid $20.00 to the hotel. We went straight to the Hanapepe airport. We left the Hanapepe airport at about 9:30 a.m. and reached Rogers airport at about 10 a.m. Mikami met us there and took us home. I took my wife to her shop and went to the consulate. Seki, Morimura and Okuda asked me how was the trip. They asked me if I enjoyed. I said it was fine but I couldn’t see much. Seki said it’s natural that I didn’t see much. He said many things couldn’t be seen from the highways. Then Okuda came at his desk and asked me to tell him what I have seen. I told him I didn’t see anything at the barking sand. I told him it was so quiet and I even never seen a plane flying. I told him there wasn’t anything at the Hanalei bay. All I noticed was the sea was calm and it was a large bay. He asked me how was the reef of the bay but I said I couldn’t see any reefs. I told him threr were two pipes running down the mountain at the power plant at Wainiha and one building. He asked me anything more so I said none. I told him there wasn’t anything new at the Nawiliwili harbor and Port Allen harbor. I told him at the Lihue airport I didn’t see anything but some army tents. I didn’t tell him that I talked to Horikawa. Morimura never asked me anything about the trip. [6] When I talked with Okuda Morimura was there too. Morimura just said “There isn’t anything big going on it seems”. On the trip I brought along one tourist map. I didn’t bring any letter or notes to anybody and I didn’t bring back anything from anyone to the consulate.

Oct. 1, 1942.

/s/ RICHARD M. KOTOSHIRODO
With our army and navy entering in a state of war with England and America at dawn of the 8th, an Imperial declaration of war against England and America was announced. Our army and navy, hence, has entered in a state of war with England and America. In regard to this, the Imperial army and navy headquarters at 6 am on the 8th announced that our army and navy entered a state of war with England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today, the 8th. At the same time, the brilliant achievements of our armed forces, too, were announced by the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters, as follows: (1) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today made a death-defying raid upon the American naval and air strength in the Hawaiian area. (2) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today sank the British gunboat . . . . . . . . (sounded like Petrol) and captured the American gunboat . . . . . . . (sounded like Nice) at Shanghai. (3) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today raided Singapore and achieved great results. (4) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today bombed enemy military establishments at Davao, Wake and Guam. (5) Our Imperial Army, upon entering into a state of war at dawn today, attacked Hongkong. (6) Our Imperial Army, cooperating closely with our Imperial Navy, undertook a landing operation in Malaya at dawn today and is obtaining great results.

Furthermore, according to a Domei dispatch from the front, our imperial air force at eight this morning carried out its first raid on Hongkong and returned safely back to their base. Immediately afterwards, a second raid reportedly was carried out.

Then, a Domei dispatch from Honolulu reported that our naval air force raided Honolulu at 7 am Hawaiian time, which is 3:05 am Japan time.

According to an announcement made by the White House, the casualty inflicted by our air force's raid was very great and the oil storage tanks on Guam, which is presently being besieged by our Imperial Navy, are throwing up large amounts of smoke.

A British gunboat was sunk and an American gunboat was captured. This news was announced by the Imperial headquarters, but according to the announcement made by the headquarters of our fleet in China waters at 9 am today, the 8th, our Commander-in-Chief of the fleet in the China waters sent his staff officers to the British Gunboat Picadelli (phonetic) and the American Gunboat Wills (phonetic), respectively, immediately after our country entered in a state of war at 5:40 am and requested them to surrender for the peace and order of Shanghai. Since the British gunboat refused to surrender, we were compelled to sink it. The American gunboat was captured with . . . . . . . . . . Thus read the announcement

* * * * * * * * * * * *

[3] to respond to your will. On behalf of the government and the Army and Navy, we, Hideki and Shigetaro, your subjects, respectfully make this reply. December 8, 1941.

(Signed) Hideki Tojo,
Minister of War.
Shigetaro Shinada,
Minister of Navy.

Since our Army and Navy has started a war against England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today, our Government at 7 am today held an emergency session of the cabinet at the premier's residence. Outside of Foreign Minister Tojo, all the cabinet ministers were present. Firstly, Minister of Navy Shimada reported the developments of war against England and America and based on this report, the course to be taken by the government was decided, whereupon Premier Tojo called on the Emperor and reported the decision.

According to a Domei dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo reported by order Envoys Kurosu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull at 1:00 P. M. on the 7th, 3:50 A. M. of the 8th Japan time, and present our government's official reply to the American note of the 26th. At the same time, Foreign Minister Togo invited American Ambassador to Japan, Grew, to his official residence at 7:30 A. M. today and handed him an official note similar to the one handed to Secretary of State Hull. Immediately afterwards at 7:45 A. M., he invited British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie and explained to him the text of this reply.
Immediately after our loyal Army and Navy had entered a state of war with England and America at dawn today, it was decided to break off diplomatic relations with both countries and enter a state of war. Consequently, our government at 11:45 A. M. today declared war against England and America. At the same time, an order for the convocation of a two days special session of the Diet on the 15th was issued. At the emergency session urgent bills of appropriations and other nature will be presented and, at the same time, the governments policy to cope with the unprecedented emergency is expected to be explained by Premier Tojo and other ministers.

(Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were "Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time, ‘West wind, clear.’" Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.)

At 8:30 A. M. today, our government made the Foreign Ministry announce the results of the Japanese-American negotiation and the Japanese-American notes. The announcement made clear the real facts of the effort exerted by our government till the very last minute to preserve the peace of the Pacific. Japan's note to America was an official reply to America's note of the 26th and notified the fact no settlement can be expected even if the negotiation were to be continued. It actually was a final notice

[5] Pacific has been brought about by America and England. It should be definitely stated at this time that President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill has undertaken the Pacific war without consideration of the war's havoc on humanity as one of their program for the domination of the world. In the course of the four and a half years of the China incident, each and every Japanese has shed tears of indignation against England and America's wicked hostile attitude, but has remained patient for the sake of the peace of the Pacific as well as the world. This patience, today has reached its limit. The time has come to rise unitedly and risk the fate of the nation for the cause of righteousness.

At dawn today, December 8, the announcement of the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters to the effect that our Imperial Army and Navy will enter a state of war against American and British forces in the Western Pacific at dawn today was made public throughout our country through the radios and newspapers. Every one throughout the country has now further strengthened their determination that the inevitable has at last come and instantaneously, our peace loving idea has been transformed into a determination to punish the evil and cut off the sinister hands of the outrageously wicked England and America. Today, the sky over Japan was clear and devoid of even a speck of cloud and under this blue sky, which seemed to be congratulating the promising future of Japan, who has risen to fight for the establishment of a new order of East Asia as well as of the world just like the brilliant rays of the sun, our excellent air forces, as an indication of our strong air defense, is flying about everywhere! When I received this report that war on the Pacific had broken out, I hurried to my * * * and on my way, I saw reflected upon the passers-by as well as those working, a hereto unseen expression of seriousness. Then with the issuing of the Imperial decree declaring war at 11:45 A. M., the nation's determination to march forward and support the emperor's will gushed forth. Not long afterwards, Premier Tojo's confident determination of our country was announced over the radio, and, at the same time, the achievements of our Navy, which is carrying on operations against American and British forces from Malaya to Honolulu with an overflowing amount of power as though the Pacific were too small, were reported throughout the nation. Hence, the confidence and spirit to rise against England and America and to secure Asia as the haven of the Asiatic race through the establishment of a new order of the world has been made to flare up within the heart of the people.

The next is a Domei despatch of the 8th from Stockholm, which states that according to a Reuter's despatch of the 7th from Washington, official sources in Washington believe that Germany will declare war against America in the next 24 hours.
At this time, let me again make a weather forecast "West wind, clear." (Repeated this forecast.)

Now, let us broadcast to you the talk of Major General Yoshizumi.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

AN ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE ESPIONAGE PROBLEM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

PREPARED BY THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION, DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

April 20, 1943

FOREWORD

The Counter Intelligence Section (Op-16-B-7) of the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is charged with counter-espionage responsibility in the Naval Service, recently promulgated a new operating plan, from which the following is extracted:

"In accordance with the new concepts of intelligence and counter intelligence, the Counter Intelligence Section actively seeks primary data and no longer passively waits for it to be received.

"This aggressive method of operation permits the Navy to detect and combat espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities directed against its war effort before the fact, rather than merely to establish an historical record of facts after the damage is done." (一号)

One of the functions of the Counter Intelligence Section is to "delineate patterns of subversive thought and activity." (一号) This is likewise a function of the Counter Intelligence Section (B-7) of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, which section has prepared the within analysis.

This analysis is intended to present facts and considered opinions pertaining to Japanese espionage in Hawaii and the correlative counter-espionage measures, both before and during this war. In formulating the analysis, deficiencies in existing counter-espionage methods and measures have been noted, and suggestions for the alteration or supplementation of existing methods and measures have been made.

No attempt has been made to analyze the related topics of sabotage and counter-sabotage. This analysis has been confined simply to espionage and counter-espionage, with only the necessary incidental introduction of other intelligence subjects.

Attention is invited to Appendix "A", which sets forth references to much of the source material pertaining to facts and opinions included in this analysis, and which particularly shows the sources of all quotations set forth herein.

A statement or paragraph footnoted to Appendix "A" is indicated by the symbol "(#)") at the end of the documented portion.

Particular places on the Island of Oahu which are mentioned in the analysis can be seen with reference to one another by consulting the map attached as Appendix "B".

The within analysis perhaps will be revised at a later date to include relevant facts hereafter discovered. Criticisms and suggestions are therefore especially requested.

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District Intelligence Officer.

Distribution:
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Copies handed to Col. Twitty G-2 and to Mr. Thornton F. B. I.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE ESPIONAGE PROBLEM
IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This analysis is predicated upon the premise that accurate knowledge of the United States naval and military activities in the Hawaiian Islands (and particularly those in and around the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor) is of inestimable value to Japan. It may not be an overstatement to say that no single place in the world is of greater interest to Japanese naval leaders.

2. It is assumed that Japan, many years ago having foreseen the possibility of war with the United States, and fully realizing the importance of Pearl Harbor as a naval base, had arranged for an adequate espionage system to operate in Hawaii during wartime.

3. It is believed that Japan has, over a period of more than 30 years, collected complete information concerning the geography and hydrography of the Hawaiian Islands, and has studied the military and naval necessities arising therefrom. (See paragraph 81.)

4. At the present time, Japan is assumed to be primarily interested in the offensive, as distinguished from defensive, strength of forces of the United States based in or from Hawaii. The specific matters of interest to the enemy, in what is judged to be their present order of importance, are:
   (a) Departures and arrivals of Naval task forces and units, and the disposition of Naval units in Pearl Harbor and in other Hawaiian ports and waters.
   (b) Status of readiness and repair of Naval units, and specifically, information concerning damage to vessels and estimated time of repairs.
   (c) Character and strength of Marine forces in Hawaii, and particularly, departures of Marine forces.
   (d) Movements of military aircraft from and to the Hawaiian area.
   (e) Movements of merchantmen and troop convoys.
   (f) Military and air strength of the Hawaiian Islands, particularly Oahu, and specifically, new airfield construction.

5. In any event, the matter of primary interest to Japan is the offensive strength and disposition of United States Naval forces in these Islands. If this assumption be correct, it is accurate to state that any Japanese espionage organization now operating in the Hawaiian Islands is primarily concerned with reporting naval information.

II. FACTORS REQUIRED IN THE OPERATION OF A WARTIME ESPIONAGE SYSTEM

6. An espionage system functioning in hostile territory in wartime is of necessity much more carefully set up than its peacetime predecessor. The restrictions imposed in wartime by the creating of new restricted areas, additional patrolling of vital installations, the invoking of censorship, and the promulgation of curfew, blackout, and alien control regulations all contribute to the situation. New means of communication with the enemy overseas must be put into operation; previously untapped sources of information must finally be utilized; agents possibly "uncovered" prior to the war, because of their known proximity to military and naval installations, their alien status, or their contact with known enemy centers or agents, must be discarded.

7. It is believed that any espionage organization functioning in the Territory of Hawaii in wartime must consider and balance the following factors to produce a workable equation:

   (A) Security

8. It is axiomatic that any espionage group in enemy territory must remain undetected to continue proper functioning. It must provide maximum security for the organizational nucleus, sacrificing, if necessary, less important members to preserve the heart and brains of the system. Only the most necessary risks must be taken in gathering information and communicating the same to Japan. Agents of the espionage system should be known to one another only to the extent absolutely necessary, limiting so far as possible the ability of one agent to expose the whole system. Agents who have no need to know each other should not know each other. In short, a strict echelon system should be maintained, with each agent knowing only the superior to whom he reports and the operative or operatives he directs.

70716—46—Ex. 148—36
(B) Mobility

9. There must be sufficient mobility of the espionage group to permit the ready collection and transmission of information, as well as to allow the necessary intercourse among agents of the group. This requires that movements of agents be unobtrusive, often necessitating the careful selection of pretexts. It must be anticipated in advance of war that movements in certain vital areas (for example, [4] the Honolulu waterfront) will be restricted in wartime. Hence, plans must be well laid to maintain the espionage organization normal mobility in such areas.

10. Therefore, the espionage agents must be able to reach without apparent effort all information within public view, and to have other information brought to them by "insiders," as far as is possible. Such mobility obviates the necessity of information-gathering agents having to expose themselves as such.

(C) Flexibility

11. Wartime conditions are inherently unstable and unpredictable. The continued functioning of an espionage organization often may depend upon its ability to adapt itself to changing conditions. Proper security measures taken to prevent and detect espionage can be overcome only by a highly adaptable espionage organization—one which is prepared to use Caucasian agents as well as Orientals, women as well as men, and agents "planted" inside vital areas as well as those mingling with the general public outside.

12. It must reasonably have been anticipated by Japan that war with the United States in all probability would cause the Hawaiian Islands to be put under martial law, the exact nature of whose application could hardly have been anticipated. That the enemy, Japan, have a highly adaptable wartime espionage system was therefore particularly required in Hawaii.

(D) Simplicity

13. It is a basic requirement that the espionage organization should be as simple as possible. Simplicity makes for security and efficiency in such an organization. Too elaborate an organization is likely to place various portions of the mechanism at the whim of uncontrollable outside factors, as well as increase the likelihood that if one agent is discovered and "talks," the whole system will be exposed.

(E) Deception

14. As a means of achieving security, mobility, flexibility, and simplicity in its operations, the espionage organization must employ deception generally, as well as in specific operations. Its agents must, in the main, be [5] able to discharge their duties casually and without apparent illegality. Transfers of money necessary for the running of the organization must not arouse suspicion. The existence of a "front," possibly in the guise of a legitimate business house, is therefore necessary to afford cover to many of the activities of the espionage group. How a business "front" could be utilized will be noted later. (Paragraphs 142-146).

III. FUNCTIONS OF AN ESPIONAGE SYSTEM

15. For the purposes of this analysis, the functions of an espionage system operating in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime are assumed to be:

(a) Collection of information;
(b) Evaluation of information;
(c) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination.

(A) Collection of information

16. In the Hawaiian area, information of value to the enemy can be collected by any or all of the following methods, which vary in risk, according to the circumstances indicated:

(1) Observation

17. From the Naval standpoint, the most important island of the Hawaiian group is Oahu, and unfortunately the geography of Oahu is such that observation
of the movements of Naval vessels cannot be prevented. The arrival and departure of ships at Pearl Harbor in the daytime is visible, to anyone interested, from a number of places not in any restricted area and where the presence of an observer would not arouse suspicion. For example, every vessel entering or leaving Pearl Harbor by daylight can readily be seen (and by a trained observer, identified as to type and class) from many buildings in downtown Honolulu.

18. The number and type of ships in Pearl Harbor, whether in drydock, at berths, or at moorings, can be determined with a high degree of accuracy by anyone living on, or visiting, Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. The fact that a field glass is required in aid of such observation is but a small obstacle.

19. It is known that employees of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, who were designated to observe and report on arrivals and departures of Naval units at Pearl Harbor, and the number of vessels there, prior to the outbreak of war, did much of their observing from Aiea Heights and areas nearer to Pearl Harbor, but at a lower elevation. (#) Likewise, many Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in recent years made sightseeing trips to Aiea Heights and the environs of Pearl Harbor. (#) It is also known that [7] at least one of the two-man Japanese submarines that participated in the attack on Oahu, on December 7, 1941, had aboard a panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor, which later was found to have been photographed from Aiea Heights—not by an espionage agent, but by a commercial photographer, who sold prints thereof openly in Honolulu. (#)

20. There are many ways, less direct than those noted above, where acute and intelligent observations will reveal information concerning Fleet dispositions. The number of officers and men on leave in Honolulu often will provide a clue to the number and identity of Fleet units in port. Where officers or men who maintain residences in Honolulu are known to be attached to a given ship, an observer will be able to state with reasonable certainty that if a certain officer or man is at home in Honolulu, his ship is in port and not at sea.

21. Thus, unless the observer enters a restricted area without right, or uses visual or photographic equipment whose use is illegal, his activities in collecting information of naval value by observation alone can easily go wholly undetected.

(2) "Loose talk" and rumors

22. No matter how extensive a campaign may be to prevent "loose talk" and rumor-mongering concerning military and naval subjects, it seems impossible to restrain either entirely. Since much of what passes as rumor often contains germ of truth, the trained enemy agent, referring what he hears to a competent evaluator, can make this a profitable source of information for the enemy. Many stories—for example, the sinking of the aircraft carriers LEXINGTON, YORKTOWN, and WASP, and the impending Battle of Midway—were common gossip in Honolulu before official announcement of the facts.

23. "Loose talk" is of two types—that which is offered gratuitously, and that which is "pumped" from one having knowledge of the facts. The distinction is obvious and is especially important in the operation of the espionage organization from the standpoint of risk.

(3) "Pumping"

24. This type of information-gathering consists of eliciting facts from the possessor thereof, by pretext, use of force, or sensuous or intoxicating inducement. The [8] person imposed upon does not consciously and willingly betray his trust, but may be brought to do so by the enemy agent’s use of force, misrepresentation, or proffer of food and drink, narcotics, or women. (#)

(4) "Inside" information

25. This is the type of information generally bought and paid for by the enemy agent, who need not (and generally cannot) obtain the information himself, but who commissions someone else to provide him with the information. Unless, however, the espionage organization has developed a source of "inside" information prior to the outbreak of war, it may find it difficult to do thereafter because of the extreme risk involved in approaching a person with a proposition that he commit treason in wartime. (#)

26. There is no evidence that any person in a position of military or naval trust in the Hawaiian Islands, either before or during this war, has supplied information to enemy agents. However, history teaches that vigilance against treason must be maintained,
(5) "Planted" agents

27. As distinguished from the traitor already in a place of trust who sells information to the enemy, a "plant" is an agent installed in a place of confidence (usually within a restricted area) who himself gathers all available information of value to the enemy. Less valuable and less likely to be used, but possible, is a person (for example, a domestic) "planted" in the home of any military, naval, or civilian official likely to have considerable knowledge of vital information.

28. Less likely to be found, but not to be dismissed, is the possibility of enemy agents using "planted" mechanical devices for the gathering of important information. Telephone wires over which vital information is transmitted may be "tapped." Microphones may be arranged in conference rooms and offices.

(6) Overt criminal action

29. Unable to secure desired information by any of the foregoing methods, the enemy espionage organization may resort to actions more easily detected, and therefore carrying a greater risk. Among the more direct methods would be murder, assault, forgery, burglary, and larceny (to secure writings, maps, charts, and code books) and perjury, impersonation, and trespass (to obtain entry to restricted areas). Murder and arson might be indulged in to destroy the evidence of other crimes incident to espionage activity.

30. It is believed, however, that under present conditions in Hawaii, it is unnecessary for the enemy to resort to overt criminal activity to carry out its espionage mission here.

(B) Evaluation of information

31. Since, as will be discussed below, the chief obstacle confronting an espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime is that of communicating information to Japan, it is desirable that all information collected by enemy agents be evaluated and digested locally as far as possible, so as to provide the shortest possible messages for transmission, whatever the means of communication may be.

32. While before the war broke out the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, was able to send lengthy intelligence reports and newspaper articles to Japan in the consular pouch, and was able to send encrypted radiograms and cablegrams without undue limit of length, it is assumed that the transmission of information to Japan is at the present time sufficiently difficult to prohibit the sending by most means of any great volume of information without great risk of detection. (#)

33. Therefore, it is believed necessary that the enemy have a competent evaluator (or evaluation unit) in the Hawaiian Islands, so that all available information can be digested to its important essentials. This presupposes one or more individuals highly intelligent and trained in military and naval subjects.

34. It is also believed likely that the chief evaluator of the espionage organization will be found to be the principal organizer and primary directive force of the group.

(C) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination

(1) General considerations

35. In executing its ultimate function—that of communicating vital information to the enemy—the espionage organization, in all probability, exposes itself to a far greater risk than it does in discharging its other functions. [10]

36. It is quite possible that more than one means of transmission of information is used. In general, it may be said that the more rapid types of communication involve the most risk, and that the sender will, therefore, use such means only when the value of data transmitted justifies the assumption of the greater risk.

37. "Spot news," such as the departures of a Naval task force, Marine force, bomber squadron, or a convoy, would merit the most speedy means of communication. Such intelligence obviously would lose its value if delayed too long in reaching the effective enemy destination.

38. On the other hand, more "durable" information, such as that concerning new construction (airfields, hangars, and ammunition dumps, for example), relating to conditions of a static and permanent nature, would be of value to the enemy even if delayed months in reaching Japan.
39. It must also be noted that certain information may be unsuitable for transmission telegraphically, and may have to be transmitted manually. Articles such as maps, charts, ordnance, or a bomb sight are of greatest value to the enemy only if received intact.

40. Certain information, although capable of telegraphic transmission, may be so lengthy as to make anything other than manual transmission impracticable and dangerous. Detailed intelligence monographs and stolen code books would be examples.

41. The problem of transmission of information has been thoroughly considered, chiefly for the reason that it is believed that there is more likelihood of discovering the enemy's espionage organization through its communication facilities than in any other way. The organization exposes itself most openly when exercising its communication function. The possible ways in which it is thought that enemy agents might send information from here so as to directly or ultimately reach Japan, are the following:

(2) Shore-to-ship contact

42. Under this heading, there are a number of different methods by which communication between an enemy agent in the Hawaiian Islands and enemy submarine off shore can be effected. While there is no conclusive proof that such communication has existed during the war or immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, there are two significant facts which strongly suggest the possibility:

(a) It has been learned since the outbreak of war that the local Consulate had a plan for signalling by various means from the Islands of Oahu and Maui. This plan emphasized visual signalling from the windward coast of Oahu, presumably to submarines, (\#)

(b) Since the outbreak of war, enemy submarines have appeared off various of the Hawaiian Islands, at night and close to shore. Evidence that such craft have appeared close off windward Oahu at various times is strong. However, enemy submarines have not engaged in combat activity in that area, nor could they have effected reconnaissance of United States Fleet units there (since that sea area is off the regular sea lanes and at the opposite side of Oahu from Pearl Harbor). It therefore appears that with the presence of enemy submarines off windward Oahu should be associated the possibility that they were there to receive communications from, or send them to, enemy agents on shore—more likely the former—or to make physical contact with agents on shore. (See paragraphs 47-48.)

(a) Blinker-tube signalling

43. The hills rising sharply from the shores of the Hawaiian Islands contain many natural signal positions. These hills are cut my many deep valleys, most of which open almost directly into the sea, rather than into plains lying between the main mountain ranges and the sea. A blinker-tube signalling device (easily improvised from a flashlight and a cylindrical tube, pipe, or can) operated from one of the valleys and brought to bear upon a prearranged sea area cannot be seen unless the observer is on an almost direct bearing with the tube.

44. Since the outbreak of war, local intelligence offices have received many reports concerning suspicious lights, flashes, and flares—some well inland, some on land near the sea, and some off shore. In the many cases investigated, no instance of signalling to the enemy has been established, but neither have all cases been satisfactorily explained.

45. The killing of Gichiro UXENO, a Japanese alien by an Army sentry at Waimanalo (windward Oahu) shortly before midnight, July 25, 1942, is worthy of particular note. UXENO was discovered close to a machine-gun emplacement on the beach. Several times challenged by the sentry, UXENO failed to make himself known and took flight, whereupon the sentry shot him. While attempting to flee, YENO discarded a flashlight which he had been carrying. Examination of the flashlight indicated that it had once been "blackened out" with colored cellophane, but that the cellophane had been removed. According to available evidence, UXEN0 previously had always been in his quarters at a private home (where he was employed as a yard caretaker) by 8:00 o'clock each night, complying with the Military Governor's curfew for aliens. He was a recluse, but considered sane.

46. At the time he was first seen near the machine-gun emplacement, UXENO was approximately 400 yards from his quarters, in a place he had no legitimate
reason to be. He was abroad at night in violation of the Military Governor's order, was illegally in the vicinity of military emplacements, was carrying an unblacked flashlight (though unlighted), and failed to heed the sentry's challenges. In those circumstances, it is reasonable to say that UXENO knew he was risking death. The probability is that his mission at the time justified assuming that risk. It is conceivable that UXENO was proceeding to, or returning from, a point of vantage from which signalling would have been, or was, accomplished with the use of the undimmed flashlight. In this connection, it is relevant to quote the following entries from the log of the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.), Honolulu, for July 26, 1942:

"0040 Ph. from For'd Echelon (Lt. Porteus): Several 'Radar' plots indicate a strange surface vessel (or surfaced submarine) off Kaneohe Bay "0055 Ph. from For'd Echelon (Lt. Porteus): Reports that a guard at Bellows Field shot and killed a Japanese man; CO asked to identify him.

The deceased Japanese later was identified as UXENO. The place where he was shot was approximately ten miles, on a straight line, from Kaneohe Bay. (#)

47. It is relevant to observe that during the latter [15] part of July, 1942, considerable suspicious offshore activity was noted in the windward Oahu area, near the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay. The following is a recapitulation of events, as related by a highly reliable informant:

On the first appearance in the last week of July, 1942, the Japanese submarine was seen to be sending signals toward the shore by means of blinker. The submarine was located at this time near the entrance of Kaneohe Harbor just off the Mokapu peninsula. On its second appearance, probably July 26, 1942, the submarine was fired on by the shore batteries with no effort. On its next appearance, July 27, 1942, it was reported that all shore batteries had fired on the enemy submarine, with at least one shot hitting its mark. The submarine retired to a position behind Moku Manu island. This position rendered safety to the vessel since it is characterized by two cliffs which rise from the water on either side of the channel between the two islands. The submarine's position in this channel rendered it impossible for direct shots to be thrown at it. It was also understood that airplanes took off to drop bombs on the submarine, but because of conditions, were unable to make satisfactory runs.

Coincident with the retiring of the submarine on this latter date, the figure of a man was seen to be swimming in the channel in Kaneohe Bay, emerging from the water close to the old Navy Pier, Kahaluu landing, which is near Koolau. A company of soldiers was dispatched to head this individual off, but because of the nature of the terrain, which is characterized by swamp and heavy underbrush, he was able to evade this group. Footprints inspected showed that this man was wearing rubber-soled shoes. (#)

In connection with the foregoing report must be considered the following memorandum, dated July 30, 1942, from the Intelligence Unit, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay:

"For the past several months the U. S. Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, has been menaced by attack from enemy submarines. Numerous radar plots of such submarines have been recorded and our aircraft, destroyers, and coastal artillery have been brought into action against enemy [14] submarines as recently as July 27, 1942."

48. More recently, similar enemy activity has been apparent off Kaneohe Bay. On April 15, 1943, the District Intelligence Officer received the following report from the same Intelligence Unit:

"On the night of April 6, 1943, in addition to radar contacts, the station crash boats, in search of survivors from a plane crash in the area outside of Kaneohe Bay, saw an object identified as a submarine conning tower. (There were no such friendly craft in this area at this time.) "At 1100 on April 10, 1943, planes from the Naval Air Detachment, NAS, Kaneohe, saw a submarine off Kahuku Point, (later identified as enemy), break surface and shortly, on his approach, submerge. At 2100 that same evening radar contacts were made off Kaneohe Bay, bearing 345°, range 7000 yards. At 2200 the station gun batteries illuminated with star shells and fired upon the conning tower of a submarine, range 7000 yards, bearing 342°, proceeding rapidly to bearing 345° when it submerged."
On April 11, 1943, a plane was dispatched from this station to search for an enemy submarine observed off the northeast coast of Maui.

49. Sight, sonic, and radar plots of enemy submarines and unidentified objects off windward Oahu (particularly in the area off Waimanalo to Kaneohe Bay) have been recorded during the war. These usually have been at night. These facts, together with the incidents involving UXENO and the unidentified swimmer in Kaneohe Bay, cast the highest degree of suspicion upon the windward Oahu region. The coincidence of several such events in the last week of July, 1942, coupled with particularly active suspected enemy submarine activity at that time, makes the situation doubly noteworthy. It is clearly possible that signalling to enemy craft has been, and still is, carried on in that region. Further, the possibility of actual physical contact between enemy submarines and enemy agents on shore is apparent.

(b) Personal contact.

50. The waters and beaches of much of the coastal areas of the Hawaiian Islands are such that a reasonably good swimmer can swim from the beach to a submarine, or vice versa. This provides the enemy with a method not only of receiving written, graphic, pictorial, and oral information from shore, but of putting ashore instructions, equipment, and new personnel for use by the espionage organization.

51. The landing of Nazi saboteurs on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and a spy in Canada, and the report referred to in paragraph 47, above, illustrate the possibilities of effecting physical contact with shore. (§) With even greater ease, enemy agents can be landed or picked up on islands of the Hawaiian group other than Oahu.

52. Before the war, there was speculation as to whether Hawaiian fishing sampans (largely manned by alien Japanese) might be making contact with Japanese vessels in or near the Hawaiian area for subversive purposes. Such meetings were never proved. (§) Contacts of local sampans with enemy vessels are not likely at present, due to the strict patrolling of all such craft in Hawaiian waters and the limited distance from shore within which they must operate. Furthermore, persons of Japanese ancestry are no longer allowed to fish in boats off shore.

(c) Sonic devices

53. Sonic equipment for underwater signalling is mentioned as a possible, though not probable, means of communication between enemy agents in small craft in Hawaiian waters and submerged enemy submarines. The latter, of course, carry sonic signalling apparatus as standard equipment.

(d) Water caches

54. The coastal areas of the Hawaiian Islands in some places have shelves outside the reefs, the shelves being at relatively shallow depths. This is true to a large extent of the Waimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area and the north shore of Oahu. For many years it has been the practice of local fishermen (many of whom are alien Japanese) to lay fish traps in those waters without buoys or markers attached, later picking them up by dragging or diving. The waters in which this type of fishing has been practiced are in many cases deep enough to permit a submarine to navigate close to shore, where it could recover a cache.

(e) Land caches

55. There are a dozen or more small islands or rocks off windward Oahu, varying in height above the sea from 20 to 360 feet. Several lie parallel to the shoreline and are long enough to conceal a submarine off shore from the view of observers on shore. Several lie in the Waimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area. Espionage agents from shore could visit such islands or rocks with comparative security and leave intelligence pouches in prearranged places, such pouches to be later picked up by enemy submarines.

56. The use of land and water caches as a means of transferring information of any type to the enemy has a singular advantage over many of the other means of communication. Where caches are used, the transmitter can choose the time of day most appropriate to the performance of his task, and the recipient can do likewise. The times of their respective actions need not, and probably would not, be the same.
Radio

57. The use of this means of communication would be highly desirable to the enemy espionage organization, from the standpoint of rapidity of communication, but involves a high degree of risk. By radio, information could be sent directly to Japan, or, with less power, to Japanese stations in the Mandated Islands or to enemy surface units or submarines considerably closer to the Hawaiian Islands, for re-transmission.

58. Properly used, however, this method of communication could give the sender a fair degree of security, taking into consideration the following safeguards or operating procedures:

(a) Transmissions on a given frequency to be of short duration;
(b) Varying frequencies to be used;
(c) Use of a mobile transmitter, hidden in a truck or automobile;
(d) Use of frequency modulation;
(e) Use of directional transmitting antenna;
(f) Use of ultra-high frequencies.

59. In this work, small sets operating only with a key could be used. It is known that Japanese landing forces in the Orient have used portable ultra-high frequency field sets only 8" x 8" x 10" in size. By using the transmitter carefully, changing frequencies rapidly, and employing mobile equipment, a maximum degree of protection against detection could be achieved.

60. Frequency modulation transmissions would be chiefly of value in this work for its freedom from detection by ordinary (that is, amplitude modulation) receivers. Frequency modulation transmission in the higher frequencies is reported to have a service range of about twice the distance from the point of transmission to the horizon. Thus, a transmitter located at an elevation of 500 feet could send to an enemy submarine almost 30 miles away. (#)

61. In conjunction with frequency modulation or other type of transmission, the use of a directional antenna would greatly improve the security of the espionage activity by limiting the area within which monitoring equipment, fixed or mobile, would be able to intercept signals. Directional transmission in the higher frequencies, with their limited service ranges, would be used to best advantage with a fixed rather than mobile transmitter.

62. A strong objection to the use of radio is the unsatisfactory equation between the operator's vulnerability and his importance to the espionage organization. His technical skill would be a great asset, yet during periods of transmission he would be the most exposed member of the organization.

63. Other than an unidentified message intercepted by an Army radio unit on the morning of December 7, 1941 (following the attack on Oahu), which message was partly in German and partly unintelligible, and which reported in a very general way the damage caused by the Japanese attack, there has come to the attention of this office no instance of communication by radio from the Hawaiian Islands to the enemy. (#)

64. However, in line with what should always be the basic operating premise of the counter-espionage agent—to assume the worst and work against it—it must be assumed that the enemy has carried on radio communication from these Islands. On January 10, 1942, the senior FCC representative in Hawaii wrote:

"It is generally believed and logical to assume that radio is being used to convey information to the enemy in this area. The fact that no illegal operation has been discovered here to date means that the enemy is clever and that there is inadequate radio coverage. . . ." (#)

After specifying the existing monitoring facilities and requesting additional equipment and personnel, the same writer believed that FCC would still be unable to cover the field completely, saying:

"... Those recommendations constitute a practical compromise with the requirements for theoretically perfect coverage."

On January 16, 1942, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation wrote:

"In regard to present conditions in the Hawaiian Islands, it is apparent that illicit shortwave radio transmissions are being sent from clandestine stations operating in the islands themselves, in communication with mobile units of the Japanese Navy, through which intelligence information is being reported to the enemy. . . ." (#)

65. Opinion is divided as to whether the enemy espionage organization would use radio as a frequent and usual means of communication with Japan, or use it
only in the rarest and most urgent cases. The answer to the question will depend directly upon the amount of risk apparently involved in such transmission and upon the suitability of other, less risky means of communication. Fixed and mobile FCC monitoring stations in the Hawaiian Islands maintain a constant watch for suspicious radio signals, and constitute a serious threat to any illicit sender. However, it is believed that such monitoring is not, and could not be, complete. Transmissions in the higher frequencies from certain portions of the island of Oahu cannot be received at certain other parts of the island. Emanations from a high-frequency transmitter located in a valley formed by sharply rising mountains usually might only be received within the valley or beyond its entrances, the mountains acting as a shield against lateral transmission. Using a directional antenna with a transmitter so situated, the field of interceptability could further be reduced, eliminating almost entirely the possibility of interception by at least the fixed monitoring stations.

[19] (4) Commercial radio station transmissions

66. In the Consulate communications plan already referred to (paragraph 42 (a)), this type of communication was provided for—a radio want ad offering for sale a Chinese rug was to mean that several aircraft carriers had left Pearl Harbor; one advertising a complete chicken farm for sale, that all aircraft carriers had sailed; and, one offering to employ a beauty operator, that the whole battle force had sailed. If used, these transmissions were to have been sent over Radio KGMB, Honolulu, at about 9:45 o’clock on any morning. No such advertisements were in fact ever placed.

67. Such a method of code transmission is entirely feasible, although normally there would be a delay of at least a day in reporting information in this manner, since Honolulu radio stations generally require that advertising copy be submitted at least a day before it is broadcast. Commercial radio transmissions of KGU and KGMB, Honolulu, while probably not to be heard at all hours of the day in the Mandated Islands probably could be heard there at night. Daytime broadcasts could be heard by Japanese vessels cruising between there and the Hawaiian Islands, and by them be relayed to Japan.

68. The type of code to be used in conjunction with radio advertising would be simple to conceive and should create no suspicion in the minds of censors or the public, because it would use only words well known to the trade of the advertiser. The use of nouns representing trade names or products would be stressed in this code, to escape the effects of any ordinary paraphrasing that censors or radio station operators might impose. An internal indicator could be used to differentiate ordinary advertisements from those intended to convey information to the enemy.

60. While the use of spot ads of the type mentioned in the Consulate communications plan would arouse suspicion at the present time, it should be mentioned that there are a considerable number of commercial firms (some of them operated by Japanese aliens) who regularly advertise over the local commercial radio stations, and have done so since before the war. One of these firms might well be a “front” whose radio advertising could be used to transmit code messages.

[20] (5) Trans-Pacific and inter-island radio telephone; radiograms

70. These means are grouped together because they each are interceptable by the enemy. There is good evidence that trans-Pacific telephone communications between Hawaii and California can be intercepted in Japan, but whether they are intelligible there depends on whether the Japanese have a suitable inverter (“unscrambler”). As to all of these means, however, sound counter-espionage practice requires that it be assumed that the Japanese can intercept such communications and render them intelligible.

71. Where these means are used to transmit information directly to an intercept station, a simple code similar to that which could be used in radio advertising would be appropriate. Here, again, the use of a business house as a “front” would add security for the espionage organization. Examination of trans-Pacific telephone censorship extracts indicates that many such calls are of a business nature, and involve conversations concerning products and brand names.

72. In addition, these means can be used for the purpose of communicating directly with other Japanese espionage agents, on the Mainland. Their use for that purpose would be essentially the same as the use of commercial cable, air mail, regular mail, and courier, which are discussed below.
(6) Telegrams

73. Assuming the existence of Mainland "post offices" to which intelligence messages might be sent, the use of commercial cable as a means of getting vital information out of the Hawaiian Islands is quite feasible. This practice presupposes the existence of an information relay system whose task it would be to re-route the information through any of many possible channels to an Axis country or to an Axis agent in a neutral state, for relay to Japan.

74. This method of communication requires only a simple code, perhaps of as few as 100 words and numerals, together with code designations for geographical sections on a grid map. If this means of communication were used often, several codes could be used to avoid the possibility of detection through repetition of the same code words.

75. Although the use of cablegram eliminates to some extent the time lag incident to transmissions by air mail [27] and ordinary mail, there are some obstacles interposed by censorship, inasmuch as the immediate censor might take a fancy to paraphrase a message or suppress it entirely (in which case the sender would not necessarily be notified). However, it is believed that the use of proper codes, especially designed to avoid censorship and the effect of paraphrase, would make this a useful means of communication.

(7) Air mail; ordinary mail; parcel post; cargo; railway express

76. These media of transmission have several advantages not possessed by some of those previously discussed: First, the permitting of transmission of bulkier reports, in more detailed and more secure code; second, the opportunity for use of secret links, grids, and other hidden writing; third, the transmission of maps, charts, plans, and other matter that must be represented graphically or pictorially, rather than verbally; and fourth, the transmission of physical objects of intelligence value, and written reports that have been reproduced on microfilm.

77. The great time lag between the happening of an event and the time a report of it reaches the effective enemy designation by one of the above means is the most serious disadvantage here. However, certain durable information (for example, that relating to the location of new airfields, drydocks, ammunition dumps, and especially the estimated dates of completion of construction in progress) would be only slightly diminished in value if so transmitted.

(8) Courier

78. The use of agents who are officers or crewmen of commercial airlines or the merchant marine has been suggested. (#) Such means would possess two advantages: First, in allowing the transmission of information by word of mouth; and second, the handling of physical objects.

79. However, because of the vagaries of merchant marine sailing these days, an agent on a certain ship could not be expected to call at Honolulu regularly. This would necessitate having couriers on a large number of vessels, requiring the espionage organization to become too large in proportion to the benefits to be gained by the use of couriers. Also, the factor of time required in such transmission is an additional adverse condition. It is much more likely that officers or crewmen of Pan American Airways, whose clippers make fairly regular trips between Hawaii and California, or [22] other commercial airlines, would be sought to act as couriers.

(9) Carrier pigeon

80. Simply because it might be used for the carriage of information between islands of the Hawaiian group, this possibility is mentioned. However, it is considered relatively insecure, and perhaps vain, since inter-island mails are not censored and can therefore be used to better advantage than homing pigeons.

[23] IV. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII PRIOR TO THE WAR

(A) Type of information collected

81. An alien Japanese internee, who claims to have engaged in espionage for Japan in Hawaii 30 years ago, has stated that Japan started its espionage coverage of the Hawaiian Islands shortly after the Russo-Japanese War. (#) Initial study is said to have been made of the geography, topography, and hydrography of the Islands, so that by World War I, Japan had a rather complete compilation of all basic data concerning those subjects.
82. As indicated in Paragraph 19, the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, was particularly interested in the movements of United States Naval vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence that such movements were especially watched and reported by the Consulate prior to the summer of 1940. This probably is accounted for by the fact that until that time the status of relations between the United States and Japan did not demand such reporting and that up to that time Fleet movements were publicized in the press.

83. Of particular importance to the Consulate in 1941 was information concerning new airfields in the Islands. Persons attached to the Consulate travelled to the islands of Kauai, Mani, and Hawaii particularly to look for new airfield construction, while new fields on Oahu were constantly sought. (#) The importance of such information is readily apparent when one considers the attack of December 7, 1941.

84. Arrivals of new air squadrons and troops to strengthen Hawaii's defenses in 1941, and the passing through Honolulu of men and materiel destined for China, also were closely watched and reported by the Consulate to Tokyo. (#)

85. Data concerning beaches, reefs, anchorages, tides and currents, and the like, undoubtedly were gathered chiefly by alien Japanese fishermen who almost exclusively manned Hawaii's sampan fishing fleet. Those beaches most suitable for enemy landing operations were closely studied, both by Consulate personnel and visiting Japanese naval officers on sightseeing trips.

86. The Consulate is also known to have been interested, but to a lesser degree, in the waterfront facilities on the four main islands; and, in the case of Kauai, the electric powerhouse at Wainiha was the object of scrutiny by a member [2/4] of the Consulate staff sent to the Island of Kauai for that purpose in July, 1941. (#)

(B) Personnel

87. Upon the basis of known facts, persons who have engaged in espionage in the Hawaiian Islands for the benefit of Japan may be classified as (a) officials, (b) agents, and (c) volunteers. For instant purposes, Consulate staff members, employees, and toritsuginin ("go-betweens," popularly called "consular agents") are denominated officials. Other local residents—the self-appointed spies—are classed as volunteers.

88. It is believed that the Vice Consul, at Honolulu, was ex officio responsible for the conduct of espionage operations of the Consulate. Certain Consulate secretaries (alien Japanese) and one local-born clerk (dual citizen) are known to have collected military and naval information for the Consulate, in each instance reporting their finding to the Vice Consul. In another instance, a consular agent who was a Buddhist priest at Lahaina, Maui, was called upon by the Vice Consul to report the movements of the Fleet at Lahaina Roads, (#) Other consular agents were asked to report economic matters.

89. When interrogated after the outbreak of war, the local-born Consulate clerk above referred to stated that he had heard one Consulate secretary (who also was engaged in espionage in Honolulu) state that it was Japan's policy to maintain two espionage systems in countries abroad—one system run by consulates, and the other separate from the consulates and entirely unknown to them. Whether any such extra-consulate espionage system was active in the Hawaiian Islands is not known. The difference in functions of the two systems was said to be that a consulate would indulge only in such espionage activity as could be carried on without compromising diplomatic and consular relations (such as the gathering of facts from newspapers, viewing ship movements from places of vantage not in any restricted area, and observing airfields and beaches from public highways), whereas an extra-consulate organization would carry on "illegal" espionage (such as trespassing restricted areas and the buying of confidential information).

90. The Consulate undoubtedly had a few paid agents, although in the one outstanding case, it does not appear whether the agent who received pay through the Consulate was receiving the same for services rendered at the direction of [25] the Consulate or of someone in Japan. This agent, Otto KUEHN, an alien German, is known to have received $14,000.00 through the Consulate in October, 1941, but the money seems to have been transmitted directly from Japan, with the Consulate acting merely as delivery agent. However, subsequent to that time, KUEHN did commit overt acts of espionage and report his work to
the Consulate directly, for which acts he has since been tried by a military commission, found guilty, and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. The Consulate is known also to have paid certain other persons who appear to have been chiefly engaged in propaganda work, but who may well have engaged in espionage, also. ( )

91. Much information of value to Japan is believed to have been gathered by Japanese espionage agents who came to Hawaii for relatively short periods of time, as non-quota immigrants or in the guise of visitors—in either case, seemingly having no connection with the local Consulate. One case is known of a Japanese agent who, around 1892, stayed in Hawaii for about four months, evidently to perform a specific mission. With the help of a Japanese bookstore owner (now a United States citizen following his service in the United States Army in World War I), the visiting agent conducted considerable observation of the Island of Oahu and its points of naval and military interest. ( )

92. Espionage agents, or observers, who stayed but a short time in Honolulu were chiefly those military and naval officers of Japan who were passing through Honolulu on commercial or naval vessels. In the cases of visiting Japanese naval training squadrons, the officers invariably made sightseeing trips around Oahu, taking them within full view of Pearl Harbor, certain Army reservations, airfields, and strategic beaches. Lieutenant Commander Sadamoto OKADA, JIN, expelled from the United States in the summer of 1941, is reliably reported to have come ashore here and to have driven with the Japanese Vice Consul to the vicinity of Wai'anae, long considered a possible landing beach. ( )

93. It is also believed likely that when Japanese naval oil tankers used to call at Honolulu (up until 1941), tanker personnel occasionally would be left in Honolulu on specific missions, and would take a later vessel back to Japan. No adequate control of the personnel of such vessels was ever effected here. Tallies made by other Government agencies of the number of persons leaving and going aboard such ships here often would show that more persons had gone ashore than had returned before sailing, but the accuracy of these tallies cannot be positively asserted. A Japanese clerk of the Consulate who had been engaged in espionage activities stated, when interrogated, that he once heard that Japanese tankers would sometimes leave some of their personnel in Honolulu, but he could not state the source of his information. ( )

94. In an effort to "make face" with Japan's officialdom, several local Japanese residents (aliens and citizens) have gratuitously, and in some instances voluntarily, engaged in espionage or propaganda activities beneficial to Japan. The Japanese bookstore owner previously referred to was found to have gathered extensive military information (of dubious value, however). He also willingly obliged a visiting Japanese, since found to have been an espionage agent, by driving the latter to points of military importance on the Island of Oahu. On other occasions (1938-1941), in response to requests received while visiting Japan, he sent to Japan large quantities of maps, charts, and hydrographic publications on sale in Honolulu. The full volume of what he transmitted is not known, but his effects show that he sent at least 43 ocean charts, 8 air charts, and 51 maps, as well as several publications. ( ) Many other local Japanese residents, over a period of 20 years, voluntarily (and in most cases, proudly) volunteered to drive visiting Japanese naval personnel to points of interest on the various islands at which such personnel called. One Japanese alien residing on A'ena Heights, whose home has an unsurpassed view of Pearl Harbor, is known to have been visited on occasions by officers of Japanese naval vessels which called at Honolulu prior to the war. ( )

(C) Operational methods

(1) Collection of information

95. From the facts at hand, it must be said that almost all military and naval information known to have been transmitted from Hawaii to Japan, either by the Consulate or agents sent here on special missions, was gathered by the simple expedient of open observation, without trespassing restricted areas. (See Paragraphs 17-21) In this connection it will be remembered that an analysis of the military and naval data found in the effects of Lieutenant Commander Itaru TACHIBANA, JIN, prior to his expulsion from the United States in the summer of 1941, revealed that about 70% of the national defense information was compiled from public reading material. ( )
96. In only a few instances were Consulate observers known to have used binoculars to observe Pearl Harbor and the [27] Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and even then, not illegally.

97. In the few cases of trespass to Government reservations and defensive sea areas that were investigated before the war, none were investigated beyond the point necessary to secure a conviction for trespass. It was therefore never established that the trespassers were or were not trespassing incident to espionage activity.

98. Accurate maps and charts of the Hawaiian Islands and adjacent waters long were on sale in downtown Honolulu, and available to any purchaser. Tourist maps showed the approximate location of many military and naval installations. (¶)

99. Photographs of many strategic places on Oahu were on sale in Honolulu stores—even panoramic views of Pearl Harbor. (See Paragraph 19.) With the exception of the highly suspicious activity of seven Japanese seen photographing from various points on the shore of Kaneohe Bay, looking toward the Naval Air Station, on November 4, 1941, no outstanding cases of suspicious photographing have been noted. (¶) The Kaneohe Bay incident is significant, however, because construction work then in progress at the Naval Air Station could not readily be seen from any point close to the station, the same being on a peninsula. Photographs taken from across the bay, however, would have provided excellent information.

(2) Evaluation of information

100. Since nothing is known of the contents of intelligence reports transmitted to Japan by couriers, it cannot be said whether the information therein was evaluated by the Consulate as to its over-all value, or as to reliability only, nor whether information sent through the Consulate was digested before transmission. However, according to former Consulate clerks, where reports were sent by commercial radio or cable, they were always predigested. Where a newspaper was the source of information transmitted by radio or cable, that fact would be stated.

101. It is believed that in general the Vice Consul was responsible for making close initial evaluation of all intelligence transmitted to Japan. While he rarely made observations himself, it was he who questioned the Consulate staff members who were sent to view ships in Pearl Harbor or to observe vital installations on Oahu or the outlying islands. He also seems to have been the person through whom reports from all available sources filtered, and in one specific [28] case he is reported to have told a secretary that the latter's observations on a certain matter were wrong (presumably basing his conclusion on what he considered better evidence from another source). (¶)

102. Considerable information transmitted to Japan was clipped from local newspapers, all of which were personally studied and marked for clipping by the Vice Consul. (¶)

103. With regard to facts not of a military or naval nature, but affecting the Japanese residents of Hawaii (and possibly Japan's international relations with the United States), these generally were discussed by the Consul General and the Vice Consul, in consultation with prominent alien Japanese residents who acted as advisors to the Consulate.

(3) Transmission of information to Japan

104. While vessels of the N. Y. K. Line were running regularly through Honolulu (until mid-summer, 1941), much of the Consulate correspondence was transmitted to Japan by diplomatic couriers, who made regular trips between Tokyo and the embassy in Washington, and return. The captains of N. Y. K. liners and of Japanese naval oil tankers also carried pouches from the local Consulate to Japan.

105. However, in 1941, a large volume of commercial radio and cable messages was sent to Japan, most of the messages encrypted. (¶) These means of communication were particularly necessary in the fall, when only one ship, which left Honolulu on November 5th, went to Japan.

106. Although there were many amateur radio operators of Japanese ancestry in Honolulu who might have been used for the purpose, there is no evidence that any Consulate traffic ever was sent to Japan through them. (¶) Commercial communication facilities being open for that purpose, there was no need to jeopardize a potential source of wartime espionage transmission. Neither is there any evidence, nor was there ever any reason to believe, that the Consulate maintained its own radio transmitter for direct communication with Japan.
V. PRESENT JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII

(A) Introductory

(1) Evidence of enemy espionage

107. In the earlier sections of this analysis, there are set forth certain facts tending to show specific instances of enemy espionage activity. Properly functioning counter-espionage organizations must assume the existence of such enemy activity at the present time, for the contrary cannot be proved.

108. It is believed that there have been sufficient unexplained suspicious activities in the past 16 months to warrant the assumption that Japan is carrying on some form of espionage in the Hawaiian Islands. Assuming that the unidentified craft that have been detected at night close off Oahu and Maui since the outbreak of war were Japanese submarines and were in Hawaiian waters primarily on combat or reconnaissance missions, their presence here for either or both of those purposes alone cannot be reconciled with the fact that they have unnecessarily exposed themselves in waters close to shore—particularly in waters outside fruitful combat and reconnaissance areas. It is tactically unsound for submarines to have operated in many of the areas in which the unidentified craft were detected, except if they were there for some other reason—to put agents ashore, receive communications from shore, and the like.

(2) Espionage activity as affected by the state of diplomacy

109. It should be mentioned, in passing, that espionage activity must be, and in Hawaii has been, affected by the state of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan. The three usual states of international relations are:

(a) Period of normal diplomatic relations.
(b) Period of ruptured diplomatic relations, or non-diplomacy.
(c) Period of belligerency.

110. In the recent history of United States-Japanese relations, the period of normal diplomatic relations ended on December 7, 1941. During that period, espionage in Hawaii was largely handled through the Consulate, which could expeditiously report its intelligence to Japan in encrypted despatches and by commercial cable and radio.

111. It is believed that the Japanese contemplated that a period of ruptured relations would exist before war was started, and appropriately planned a system of communication to be used in that period. Reference has been made to the signalling system of the Consulate. (See Paragraph 42 (a)). This system was designed and submitted to the Consulate by KUEHN, referred to in Paragraph 90. It is not known whether the signalling system was ever used.

112. The third phase in which an espionage system would have to work is the period of war, in which period all Japanese consulates and Japanese (foreign-owned) business houses, which formerly might have collaborated in the gathering and transmission of intelligence to Japan, would be closed.

113. It is believed that, in all likelihood, the espionage organization which would go into action in wartime would not have been operative as such before the war. At least, it would have maintained no connections with the Consulate or leading alien Japanese business houses, for fear of attracting the attention of counter-espionage agencies. The remainder of this analysis will dwell upon what is believed to be a workable pattern of Japanese wartime espionage in Hawaii.

(B) Personnel

(1) Selection of personnel prior to the war

114. The successful operation of an espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime implies a considerable amount of forethought and planning. The key personnel of the system must have been in the Islands, prepared to execute their basic orders under such conditions as might develop.

115. Appendix "C" is a schematic diagram setting forth the various functional units of an espionage organization. It will be noted that the organization is divided into the directive, collection, evaluation, and communication units. Presumably the key men in the Islands when war broke out included the heads of each of these units. In discussing the matter of the probable or possible Japanese espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands, it is not intended that the use of the singular should imply that it is believed that only one such system might exist. The possibility must always be considered, that there are two or more systems, working jointly or separately.
116. It is not necessary that all personnel ultimately needed in the organization should have been recruited before the war. In many of its functions, the espionage system will use in the most exposed positions persons recruited from time to time, either because of their loyalty to Japan or for their love of money or revenge. It is quite possible that in past years the local Japanese Consulate General, through its toritsugimin (themselves appointed because of their loyalty to Japan), had established lists of loyal Japanese who could be called upon at any time to aid Japan's cause. (Gichiro UYENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45-46, may have been a loyal Japanese so selected.)

117. Also presumably available to the wartime espionage organization would be a list of all persons, Japanese and non-Japanese, who might ever have been used by the Consulate in any criminal or subversive capacity. This group should contain many persons loyal to Japan, or otherwise disaffected. In addition, such persons are likely to be more valuable because of their prior experience.

(2) Type of personnel used

118. Opinion is varied concerning the nationality and race of personnel in the wartime espionage system. The operating premise of counter-espionage agents must embrace three conceptions of the possible composition of the Japanese espionage organization, namely, that it uses:

(a) Individuals of Japanese ancestry only; or,
(b) Only non-Japanese; or,
(c) A combination of Japanese and non-Japanese.

The concensus of those who have carefully considered the problem is that the third possibility is the most likely.

119. It is reasonable to assume that Japan would have preferred to have built her wartime espionage organization in Hawaii wholly around Japanese of known loyalty to Japan. However, certain considerations might deter the adoption of such a policy:

(a) Upon the outbreak of war, all Japanese in Hawaii immediately would invite the greatest degree of suspicion.

(b) Japan could not foresee the attitude of United States authorities in Hawaii towards resident Japanese, for the excellent reason that no policy concerning control of resident Japanese was formulated until after war began.

(c) Therefore, Japan had no reasonable assurance that any person of Japanese ancestry would retain freedom of movement in wartime. Japan might well have assumed that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be denied access to vital areas in wartime, that many such persons (possibly all alien males) would be interned, that stringent curfew, travel control, and communications restrictions would attach to all such persons, and that mass evacuation or relocation measures might be invoked to remove virtually all Japanese from at least the island of Oahu.

If the foregoing facts were so considered by Japan, she would never have built her local espionage organization entirely around a nucleus of Japanese.

120. On the other hand, Japan may have reasoned that the magnitude of the Japanese problem in Hawaii, in terms of sheer numbers (160,000 Japanese residents), was such that the United States authorities would have to allow many Japanese to remain at liberty. If this were the reasoning, one might expect to find that the espionage agents include American-born Nisei, probably expatriated, who have negative records of pre-Japanese activities and positive records of pro-Americanism. They might well be informants of the counter-espionage or law enforcement agencies. They could reasonably expect to be among the last Japanese to be evacuated or interned. It is therefore pertinent to observe that many of the Japanese so described are still at large and are able to carry on their appointed tasks.

121. Variations of the above two extremes are equally possible. For purposes of security, the vital core of the organization might be composed of non-Japanese. As the extent and effectiveness of United States security and counter-espionage methods became more apparent, the espionage leaders would be able to draw upon loyal Japanese personnel to the extent deemed prudent and necessary. Contrariwise, the central unit might be under instructions to use no Japanese.

122. On the other hand, the nucleus of the organization may be composed of Japanese, who will make use of non-Japanese as the need and opportunity arises. This group might even have available a non-Japanese whose sole function would be to assume direction of the espionage organization in case the members of the original core are immobilized or rendered ineffective by security or counter-espionage measures.
123. The Japanese already have used individuals of other racial groups to collect information. In Hawaii, during the last few weeks of peaceful relations, the Japanese Consulate General requested KUEHN, an alien, to submit a plan for shore-to-ship signalling. The Farnsworth and Thompson cases may also be cited. A former clerk of the local Consulate, when interrogated, told a story given him by one of the Consulate secretaries, that for years Japan had been purchasing information from a British naval officer stationed in China. (#) Reports from Mainland Naval Districts indicate that the Japanese contemplated using disaffected Negroes for espionage work. It is entirely plausible, then, that the Japanese espionage organization may be using Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, or members of other racial groups represented in the Territory of Hawaii.

124. A clear distinction must be made between the concept of a Japanese espionage organization which employs non-Japanese, and the concept of a German espionage unit operating here for the benefit of Japan. The existence of the latter type of organization, while possible, is deemed doubtful. Germany has little immediate military interest in Hawaii, and lacking that, it is doubted that it would risk the services of trained German agents to aid a not completely trusted Axis partner. If a German espionage unit is functioning in Hawaii, it probably exists merely as an observational check on information which Japan from time to time undoubtedly supplies Germany regarding military and naval operations centering around or emanating from Hawaii. There is the possibility that German and Italian agents might before the war have recruited personnel for the wartime Japanese espionage organization, and it is known that an Italian courier system was operating across the Pacific, through Honolulu, prior to the closing of the local Italian Consulate in July, 1941.

(C) Operations

(1) Functional units of the espionage organization

125. Reference to Appendix "C" will show that the functional divisions of the espionage organizations are believed to be four:

(a) Directive unit;
(b) Collection unit;
(c) Evaluation unit;
(d) Communication unit.

The word "unit" is intended to mean functional, rather than personal, unity in operation, although a single person might in some cases be the entire personnel of one or more units. It is intended to stress the functions of the organization, rather than the number of personnel.

(a) Directive unit

126. This is the person or section of the organization which directs all operations. It is assumed that well in advance of war, the head of this unit received explicit instructions as to the nature of information to be gathered in Hawaii in wartime, the relative importance of different types of intelligence, and the manner in which the same should be reported. The directive unit would be responsible for the entire espionage organization, centralize the authority therein, and keep the machine functioning.

127. Probably but not necessarily, the head of the directive unit of the organization would also be directly in charge of the evaluation unit.

(b) Collection unit

128. The function of this section is to culled from available sources (see Paragraphs 16-30) such information as is known to be of value to Japan. The director of this unit may confine his activity to collection work alone, or may supervise that in addition to other duties. Conceivably, the directive head of the whole organization might personally direct the collection unit.

129. In all probability, the collection unit was partially organized before the war. In order to be able to best utilize certain sources of information in wartime, previous preparation would have been necessary. For example, to effect ready and constant observation of Pearl Harbor, it would be desirable to have a home on Aiea Heights occupied by an agent of the espionage organization. (#) Agents could more readily be "planted" in the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and in other vital areas, and disaffected persons could more readily be developed as sources of "inside" information, before the war then thereafter.

130. The prime requisite of an agent operating for the collection unit is that he have access to the information he desires without creating suspicion. Not
all agents can collect information at their normal places of work or abode; some must travel to obtain it. For the latter, unobtrusive mobility is a necessity.

131. While much information of value can be learned in the course of a normal day’s activity in the city of Honolulu proper, regular trips around the whole island of Oahu undoubtedly would be of great value (and perhaps be considered absolutely necessary by the directive unit). Travel around Oahu in the daytime is virtually unrestricted, and the trained observer can readily determine the location of many new plane dispersal points, searchlights, radar installations, machinegun emplacements, and landing fields. For example, the new airfield at Kualoa, Oahu, extends across the around-the-island highway, so that private vehicles drive across the runway of the field, and planes land across the highway. Automobiles on the highway are required to drive slowly in this area, but are not allowed to stop, unless planes are landing or taking off, when automobiles must stop. Normal driving speed, however, affords ample opportunity, on two or three trips, to locate most of the camouflaged revetments, estimate the length of the field, and locate wooded areas in which planes are hidden or being overhanned, and where fuel trucks are parked.

132. It would also seem likely that observers have been placed on the outside islands of the Hawaiian group (principally Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai), in order to make available to the head of the espionage organization (presumably on Oahu) military and naval information available on those islands. No censorship of mails transmitted between islands is maintained, and travel of civilians (including Japanese) by air is considerable, so that transmission of the information from outside islands would present no great difficulty. It is possible, though improbable, that agents on outside islands would communicate their information directly to Japan. More likely still is the possibility that information may be sent from Oahu to outside islands for re-transmission to Japan.

[36] (c) Evaluation unit

133. This section of the organization probably would contain one or more trained operatives familiar with military and naval matters. In order to discharge its duties, the evaluation unit would have to be cognizant of the basic instructions of the organization as to the type of intelligence required to be reported to the enemy.

134. This section would evaluate and digest all information of value to the enemy, determine what information should be communicated, and probably the manner of its communication—subject to the general supervision of the directive unit.

135. Where coding of messages is required, the same probably would be handled by this section, and not by the communication unit. This would be in keeping with the principle that, insofar as possible, the workings of the organization and the product of its work be known by as few persons within the organization as possible.

(d) Communication unit

136. The function of the communication section is to transmit information from the Hawaiian area to the enemy, utilizing any or all of the means indicated in Paragraphs 42–80, subject to the general supervision of the directive unit. Since the manner of transmission to be employed in each case will vary with the nature and urgency of the information to be sent, presumably the directive unit would determine what means of communication would be used.

137. A technical communication section is not required for all types of transmission. While the use of short-wave radio would require technicians, the use of other means might require only an expert cryptographer, who might be a member of the directive or evaluation units. However, there are many amateur radio operators in Honolulu (a large number of them Japanese), from whom could possibly be drawn the necessary technicians for short-wave radio work. Many communications might be released in different ways through a business “front.”

138. Since it is believed that the espionage organization exposes itself most while communicating information, it is felt that those most exposed agents are the agents most likely to be securely insulated from the directive center. The organization should be so constructed that the apprehension of a communication agent would not lead to exposure of the whole system. Following the usual echelon pattern, the agent farthest from the hub would know no one but the agent from whom he receives his instructions (and preferably not even him). Various ways of effecting liaison between agents who do not know one another have been discovered in the past history of espionage and new
ways may be devised by a directive head having a good imagination and a reasonably good knowledge of prevailing counter-espionage measures in a given locality.

139. In the shore-to-ship sub-unit of the communication section (see Appendix “C”) men of known loyalty to Japan, but not necessarily possessed of better than average intelligence, could be used to good advantage. These persons might be denominated “action men,” whose only function it would be to conduct blinker-tube signalling, or to swim or row to a submarine off shore, or to arrange land or sea caches. These persons would know little or nothing of the rest of the organization; they need not be told the meaning of messages they might be directed to transmit, nor the contents of pouches they might deliver.

140. Perhaps Gichiro UTENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45-46, was an “action man.” Immediately before he was killed, his actions were those of a person who might have been proceeding to a point of vantage from which to conduct visual signalling to a submarine off shore. He was a recluse, living in such a manner and at such a place that suspicion was not likely to be attracted by a person calling upon him to give him instructions with regard to signalling. Had he been captured, rather than killed, he likely would not, and perhaps could not, have named the person or persons who had given him instructions.

141. Anticipating that all local stocks of radio equipment might be commandeered for military use in the event of war, or that the purchase of suitable transmitting equipment during wartime would arouse suspicion, the organization certainly would be well supplied beforehand with such equipment, as well as with technicians and operators.

(2) Use of a business firm as a “front”

142. As previously stated, the espionage organization must employ deception to cover many of its activities. Private individuals cannot, without good reason, engage in the ramified work of the espionage organization without soon inviting suspicion. Therefore, a “front” of some kind for the organization, most likely the use of a business firm is required. It is not assumed, however, that the “front” [38] would have to be a business house.

143. A glance at Appendix “C” shows the many activities that the espionage organization may engage in. The use of a business firm in discharging the communication function is stressed in the diagram, although it is obvious that the same “front” could be used also in the collection of information. For example, deliverymen of many Honolulu firms have access to certain restricted areas on Oahu; salesmen and collectors regularly make the around-the-island road trip in dealing with customers; workmen of all types have regular access to the Honolulu waterfront.

144. The heads of the directive or evaluation units, or both, might be managers of the business “front.” Among customers patronizing such business house might be agents of the espionage organization who call there to meet with their chiefs, either to receive instructions or to report information. Deliverymen and salesmen of the firm could in the normal course of their work contact with members of the espionage organization who never visit the business house.

145. An established business house whose volume of business warranted the same would be in a position to use regular commercial radio advertising as a medium for the transmission of intelligence to the enemy; similarly, overseas telephone calls, radiograms, cables, and mail.

146. An important advantage to be found in the use of a suitable business “front” would be the availability to it of large sums of cash, the procurement of which the ordinary individual in Hawaii at the present time would find most difficult.

(3) Finances of the espionage organization

147. An espionage organization must have available to it at all times large sums of money for a number of purposes, among which may be mentioned:

(a) Payment of agents’ salaries;
(b) Maintenance of a business “front”;
(c) Purchase of supplies and equipment;
(d) Purchase of information.

It will be recalled that the eight Nazi saboteurs captured in [39] the United States in 1942 were supplied with currency amounting to more than $100,000 for their operations.

148. Currency control measures instituted in the Territory of Hawaii since the war began could well have seriously affected the enemy espionage organization’s
financial structure. First, the Military Governor ordered that all persons in the Hawaiian Islands should turn in to banks all currency in their possession in excess of $200.00, and that they might thereafter draw no more than $200.00 cash a month. Corporations and businesses requiring larger sums of cash on hand were given special licenses. Second, the Treasury Department called in all standard United States currency circulating in the Hawaiian Islands and issued new like currency bearing the word “Hawaii” overprinted thereon. The overprinted currency may not be taken from the Islands and is not legal tender elsewhere. Standard United States currency can no longer be used as legal tender in Hawaii, except when presented by United States Navy personnel arriving from outside the Territory.

149. Since it is difficult to smuggle into Hawaii in quantity money which is legal tender here, telegraphic and draft transfer of credits is the only feasible means of supplying the espionage organization with funds from without. These means afford little opportunity for the transfer of large amounts of money without suspicion, because of the close watch kept on all such transfers by censorship authorities. (#)

150. It is possible that the espionage organization might have foreseen that drastic currency control measures would be put into effect in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime, and to have planned accordingly. This could have been done in some measure by the purchase before the war of readily realizable assets, such as high grade securities and readily marketable real estate.

(4) Instructions from Japan in wartime

151. The general operating instructions of the enemy espionage organization as formulated prior to the war must have specified definite types of data that should be gathered during wartime and the manner of communicating the same to Japan. However, the course the war might take would affect these matters, necessitating new directives to the organization.

152. Code messages over Radio Tokyo are known to have been among the contemplated means of disseminating information to Japanese consulate abroad, just about the time of the outbreak of war. (#) This is still considered a likely means of communicating with agents in Hawaii.

153. For the transmission of detailed instructions, new operating codes, or the introduction of new outside personnel into the organization, physical contact by enemy submarines with Hawaiian shores is feasible.

[47]

VI. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE MEASURES IN HAWAII

(A) “Counter-Espionage” defined and distinguished

154. “Counter-espionage” is that intelligence activity which “has as its objective the denial of information to the enemy,” and which “includes the supervision, coordination, and active operation of all investigative measures intended to prevent espionage.” (#)

155. Counter-espionage does not include the functions of maintaining internal security, preventing sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, or isolating disaffected persons. However, agencies charged with the latter functions and the counter-espionage agencies must work in close cooperation and maintain a constant exchange of information regarding subversive trends, persons, and groups.

156. As used in this analysis, “internal security” does not refer to the security of the Naval Establishment, but to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands generally. The maintenance of such internal security is chiefly a problem of population control, and, from the intelligence viewpoint, is simply a matter of isolating from the general public enemy sympathizers and disaffected persons whose future actions may be detrimental to good public morale or injurious to vital installations. (#) The maintenance of the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands, under martial law, is the responsibility of the Military Governor, but the Navy has a fundamental concern in its maintenance:

“The Navy has a vital and paramount interest in maintaining the internal security of these Islands. This interest arises from the fact that, from a military point of view, the sole function of the Islands is to afford the United States an advanced Naval base.” (#)

It must be emphasized, however, that the problems of internal security (that is, population control) and espionage (enemy information-gathering activity) are essentially dissimilar, and must be approached from entirely different angles.
157. The District Intelligence Officer has in the past investigated both espionage and internal security cases in the civilian population. Still a third class of cases, which now occupies the greatest portion of the investigative efforts of this office, is made up of the so-called "Naval security" cases, which concern the loyalty of Naval personnel and employees and other persons having access to Naval ships, [42] stations, and other areas under Naval jurisdiction.

158. The functions of maintaining internal security or Naval security, preventing sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, and countering espionage are not unrelated. It often develops that an espionage investigation will uncover persons whose activities or sympathies are imputed to the United States and its internal security, but do not necessarily involve espionage activity. In the respective cases, prompt dissemination of information is required, so that the officials properly charged with responsibility in the premises may pursue their own courses of action. This avoids having counter-espionage agents doing internal security and police work, and of having internal security and police officials working in the counter-espionage field.

(B) Various approaches to the espionage problem

(1) Introductory

159. Historically, espionage is a military operation, not a crime. The laws of war have always classed espionage as a permitted military practice, at the same time recognizing the right of nations spied upon to punish individual spies for their gathering or communicating of information to an enemy. (#) However, since the adoption of the Espionage Act of 1917 in the United States, whereby espionage was for the first time in this country defined as a civil (as distinguished from military) crime, there has been a tendency to class espionage as just another, albeit "glamorous," Federal criminal offense.

160. Because of the popular fallacy that espionage is just a crime, there has seemingly developed another popular (and costly) belief that the way to catch spies is to apply proven crime solution methods in counter-espionage work. This has not been wholly beneficial. While the skilled investigator's services are needed in counter-espionage work, his detective viewpoint (that is, crime solution rather than crime prevention) is a seriously diverting influence. By training, his mission has been to solve a crime that has already been committed. Figuratively, the detective's work is half done when he starts, because at least he knows that a crime has been committed, and he need only find the person or persons responsible. Therefore, as a detective, he thinks in terms of starting an investigation only when evidence of a crime is shown him (that is, when he learns of the corpus delicti), usually by means of what he calls a "complaint."

161. But, there is seldom a visible corpus delicti of [43] espionage. By their very nature, espionage operations are conceived to be imperceptible if possible, and they rarely leave any evidence of their commission; A photograph taken of a warship leaves no tangible trace on the subject photographed; the irresponsible person who divulges confidential information is not warned when his utterances reach enemy ears; a secret code book is not marred by photostatting. The professional detective, however, attempts to adapt himself to this new field by considering the suspect himself as the corpus delicti. Thus, he opens a case on the basis of a specific or vague complaint, concerning a known or unknown person who "has been acting suspiciously," "spends too much money," "keeps his ear cocked when there is talk about ships at Pearl Harbor," "owns several cameras and does his own developing," and the like. He cannot appreciate the lesson of experience, that spies, unlike criminals, do not commit espionage in the sense that ordinary crimes are committed, nor do they generally "act suspiciously" in the presence of the good citizens who generally are the informants in these cases.

162. In the rare instance where an espionage agent gets his desired information by overt criminal action (for example, by stealing classified matter), there is generally a discernible corpus delicti. From that point on, sound police investigation methods can be employed with a normal expectation of success of determining who committed the theft. However, counter-espionage is only incidentally interested in "catching the criminal"—it uses the immediate criminal as a guide to other members of the espionage system, with the thought in mind of eventually uncovering the whole network. Then, and only then, should any thought of prosecution (and its necessary, but undesirable, concomitant, publicity) be considered. Here, again, the police detective adopted into the
counter-espionage fold is at a disadvantage, for he has been used to looking for newspaper recognition for his successful solving of cases.

"The disclosure of these /foreign espionage/ services is the main purpose of counter-espionage work and the most difficult problem which confronts the Intelligence agent. Law enforcement or police procedures are entirely inappropriate for this work. Experienced counter-espionage agents have long since learned the futility of attacking espionage services by routine methods of investigation which may have proved successful in ordinary crime detection . . ." ( # )

[45] (2) The "Suspect" Approach

163. The "suspect" approach in counter-espionage is that which concerns itself with the investigation of one or more persons suspected of being espionage agents. For purposes of exposition, these suspects may be divided into three classes:

(a) "Logical" suspects
(b) "Complaint" or "reported" suspects
(c) "Developed" suspects

164. The logical suspects are those persons who, because of the very nature of their occupations, are known or assumed to be engaged in espionage of one sort or another. In this class are diplomatic and consular officials, military and naval attaches, and visiting foreign government officials. Investigation of such persons may be made to determine whether in fact they are engaged in espionage, and, if they are, what other persons in contact with them are likewise engaged.

165. The reported suspects are those who are investigated on the basis of a specific complaint or report alleging that they are suspicious or subversive. (See Paragraph 161) Approaching the espionage problem chiefly through the investigation of reported suspects is costly in effort and largely unproductive. It represents the police detective approach to a non-police problem.

166. Trying to identify the enemy's espionage organization by this approach alone generally is successful only if the original report is accurate and has been properly evaluated. Unfortunately, the intelligence offices are deluged with complaints, of which proper evaluation can generally only be made after some investigation. In practically all such cases, the complaints are found groundless. In many cases, the allegations made can be neither proved, disproved, nor explained. The fact that a person is engaged in espionage can be established in most cases only after intensive and discreet surveillance. Obviously, surveillance cannot be used in the investigation of every complaint.

167. The "complaint approach" psychology is fatal to effective counter-espionage, because it causes the investigator to depend mainly upon the incidental scraps of information supplied by voluntary informants who are mainly untrained. Trained informants, paid or voluntary, are relatively few. Enemy agents are not likely to create suspicions in the minds of untrained [45] informants, and rarely will they leave themselves open to detection by even the most trained informant.

168. Because complaints are not likely to be received concerning the vital matters which the counter-espionage services should know, those services will continue to remain ignorant of espionage activity as long as they depend upon receiving complaints before instituting counter-espionage measures of which investigations are but a part. And, as long as counter-espionage agencies continue to function principally on the "complaint basis," they are easy prey for the enemy espionage agents, who will provide diversions in the form of false reports (i.e., "complaints") to the intelligence services, causing the counter-espionage agents to waste a great deal of valuable time. Every investigative man-hour wasted on a false "lead" is an additional hour of security for the espionage organization. ( # )

169. What we have chosen to call the "developed" suspects are those persons who have been for all practical purposes established as enemy agents, either after investigation, or by chance. The development of a suspect to the point where he becomes a known enemy agent then presents a situation where further counter-espionage measures may be taken along either the suspect or the functional lines, or both.

(3) The "Functional" Approach

170. The functional approach in counter-espionage work is that imaginative approach which, utilizing a full knowledge of all known facts concerning the
modus operandi of enemy agents and reasonably estimating the objectives of the enemy's espionage, seeks to detect, counter, and neutralize enemy espionage functions. This approach is essentially a screening operation, the purpose of which is to throw both an observational surveillance and a protective cordon around places and things it is believed the enemy agents will try to learn about. It is the same in principle as the putting of cheese in traps to attract and catch rats, thereby saving the tremendous effort of seeking out the rodents individually without having a clear idea of where to find them.

171. The difference between the functional approach and the suspect approach can be illustrated in a simple situation: Assume that on the island of Oahu there is a hill that affords the best possible location for visual signalling from shore to ship. Using the functional approach, a surveillance should be placed around the hill to ascertain what persons, if any, visit the locale either to engage in signalling or for no apparent valid reason. When a likely suspect is noted in this manner, further investigation along appropriate lines can be made. On the other hand, using the suspect approach in the same situation, the counter-espionage agents would sit in their offices, not thinking of the hill more than anything else, and await reports from informants concerning unusual occurrences or suspicious persons, some of which reports might possibly involve the hill.

172. Constant patrol or observation—the active seeking of information, as distinguished from the passive receiving of it—is another manifestation of the functional approach. Thus, the continuous monitoring work of the Federal Communications Commission radio intelligence units in Hawaii is essentially a functional approach to the problem of detecting enemy transmissions. If the FCC monitors were to take action only upon the receipt of specific reports or complaints of suspicious radio activity—the suspect approach—the situation would be patently absurd.

173. It has been asserted that in discharging its communication function, the espionage organization is most vulnerable. Communications, above everything else, should be attacked vigorously and functionally. It is foolhardy to sit back complacently and await reports from informants who believe they have noticed a suspicious transmission, whether by radio, visual signal, or otherwise. Rather, all avenues of possible communication should be under constant observation. Then, if the enemy agent indulges in communication, he must cross the field of observation, thereby risking detection; and, if he does not attempt communication, the ultimate purpose of counter-espionage has been fulfilled, for no information has been transmitted to the enemy.

(C) Responsible Agencies

174. The United States Government agencies which before, or during, the present war were, or are, charged in some way with denying information to the enemy in the Hawaiian Islands are:
(1) Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. (MID)
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu Field Division. (FBI)
(3) District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District. (DIO)
(4) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Radio Security Center (Hawaiian Monitoring Area). (FCC)
(5) National Censorship:
   (a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii.
   (b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu.
(6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu.

The functions of each of these agencies is discussed briefly below:

(1) Military Intelligence Division

175. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department, is in charge of both combat intelligence and domestic intelligence staff functions. Active direction of domestic intelligence activities is delegated to an officer designated as the Contact Officer, whose office is in downtown Honolulu, proximate to all other agencies above named.

176. Until the declaration of martial law in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, MID had no investigative responsibility in counter-espionage matters except in cases wherein the subjects were persons in the Army, employed by the Army, or having access to Army reservations. (§) However, upon the outbreak of war, the Army Department Commander assumed the Military Governorship of Hawaii
and MID took over active direction of intelligence work affecting the general civilian population.

177. On February 9, 1942, at Washington, the heads of MID, FBI, and ONI signed a new delimitation agreement, wherein it was provided that in areas under martial law the military commander should be responsible for domestic intelligence coverage. As to Hawaii, the new agreement has been interpreted to mean that the Department Commander (Military Governor) is the military commander. The Contact Officer, MID, derives his authority from the Military Governor and is actively responsible for such intelligence coverage.

178. The Contact Officer is in close and frequent consultation with the Special Agent in Charge, FBI, and the District Intelligence Officer. He has a subordinate designated as liaison with FCC for radio intelligence work. In lesser degrees, the Contact Officer is in touch with the work [46] of the District Postal Censor and the Cable and Radio Censor, Honolulu.

179. Except in cases of espionage "directed solely against" the Navy and for subversive activities occurring within areas under Naval jurisdiction, or involving Naval personnel or employees or Naval contractors' personnel, the Contact Officer is responsible for counter-espionage planning and coverage in the Hawaiian Islands.

(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation

180. The Special Agent in Charge heads the Honolulu Field Division, FBI, which field division embraces the Hawaiian Islands and not Honolulu alone.

181. Prior to December 7, 1941, FBI had investigative responsibility in all cases of subversive activity (including espionage) involving the general civilian population. In cases of Japanese subjects, FBI and DIO had concurrent authority and responsibility. FBI supervised the formulation of a list of persons considered dangerous and who should be taken into custody in the event of war. Persons on whom the Attorney General of the United States had authorized the issuance of custodial detention warrants were promptly apprehended on December 7th or as soon thereafter as possible by squads of FBI, MID, and DIO agents, and local police. Other persons on whom the Attorney General had not issued such warrants were apprehended under the authority of the Military Governor.

182. Even though the pre-war delimitation agreement (among MID, FBI, and ONI) remained in force until February 9, 1942, on the outbreak of war FBI in effect deferred to MID in the matter of counter-espionage responsibility and direction because the superimposition of martial law on the Hawaiian Islands effected such a radical change of circumstances as to make the then existing delimitation agreement inapplicable to conditions of martial law.

183. Under the present delimitation agreements, FBI has no responsibility for counter-espionage coverage in the Hawaiian Islands, but does cooperate with MID and the DIO in intelligence matters. However, FBI does in fact conduct some investigations of possible espionage suspects, seeking to determine whether certain persons have acted as foreign governmental agents without having properly registered with the Secretary of State. Even though the investigation of such suspects might also be of counter-espionage concern, the delimitation agreements do not make reference thereto.

[49] (3) District Intelligence Office

184. The District Intelligence Officer is in charge of this organization and is directly responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence. The District Intelligence Office is composed of a main office in downtown Honolulu, three zone offices on outlying islands, and ten intelligence units operating within Naval stations on Oahu, Maui, and Midway.

185. Prior to December 7, 1941, the DIO had investigative authority in all counter-espionage matters where the subjects were Navy personnel and employees and Naval contractors' employees, and concurrently with FBI, counter-espionage responsibility in cases of Japanese subjects. Upon the outbreak of war, the DIO also deferred to MID, when the Contact Officer took over active direction of intelligence matters concerning the general civilian population. The DIO concentrated its efforts on Naval security cases, assisting MID insofar as possible in internal security matters.

186. Under the new delimitation agreement of February 9, 1942, the Military Governor was charged with intelligence coverage, including the coordination of the facilities of other agencies with MID. Cognizance over strictly Naval cases has been retained by the the DIO, who has also lent all available assistance to
MID. Under a local agreement signed by the Military Governor, District Commandant, and the Special Agent in Charge, FBI, on March 27, 1942, there was reserved to the DIO authority over "All matters pertaining to espionage and sabotage, directed solely against such naval units or installations or fleet units, and all matters pertaining especially to Fleet and Naval Intelligence, both domestic and beyond the Hawaiian area," as well as cases involving personnel of ships tied up at territorial and privately-owned piers. (#)

(4) Federal Communications Commission

187. The Radio Intelligence Division of FCC maintains a Radio Security Center (Hawaiian Monitoring Area) in downtown Honolulu. This FCC activity has close liaison with MID, as well as with Army and Navy communications offices. Other investigative agencies, including the DIO, refer information concerning suspicious radio activity to FCC.

188. The FCC is actually a counter-espionage organization, for its duties include:

[50] (a) Detection of violations of the Espionage Act, as far as it relates to the use of radio for subversive purposes.

(b) Investigation of complaints and/or other information received alleging illegal and subversive radio activity.

(c) Detection of violations of rules and regulations established by the Director of Censorship relating to the operation of radio stations.

(d) Aiding other agencies of the Federal Government and representatives of the Allied Governments having an interest in operation of radio stations by espionage agents throughout the world as well as other related radio intelligence matters. (#)

(5) National Censorship

189. Functioning under the Director of Censorship, in Washington, the National Censorship organization has two main divisions in Hawaii, the Postal Censor and the Cable & Radio Censor. The primary mission of wartime censorship is to deny information to the enemy. Because of this, censorship is primarily a counter-espionage function.

(a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii

190. Censorship of the mails leaving the Territory of Hawaii has existed since December 7, 1941. Such censorship is peripheral only, and does not extend to local or interisland postal carriage.

191. MID, FBI, and the DIO maintain close liaison with the Postal Censor, who supplies those and other interested offices with comment sheets concerning postal intercepts deemed to have intelligence value.

192. Postal censorship is not operated under the authority of the Military Governor, nor is it affected by any of the delimitation agreements previously referred to.

(b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu

193. Censorship of overseas radio-telephone calls, radiograms, and cablegrams was invoked by the District Intelligence [51] Officer on the morning of December 7, 1941. On March 1, 1942, he was relieved of this censorship function by the Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu, who is responsible directly to the Director of Censorship, Washington.

194. The Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu, has supervision over only those communications leaving the Hawaiian Islands through commercial facilities. Inter-island radio-telephone and wireless traffic is censored by a representative of the Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

(6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu

195. Inasmuch as certain of his work is concerned with the enforcement of statutes and executive orders whose purpose is to deny information to the enemy, the Collector of Customs must be included as a counter-espionage officer.

196. In this field, the Collector's principal wartime function is to enforce the Trading with the Enemy Act. He has the right to examine any cargo leaving the United States not under government control, and enforces the requirement that export declarations be filed concerning exports. He is also responsible for seeing that persons other than accredited United Nations couriers, entering the United States through the Hawaiian Islands, do not carry on their persons or in their effects censorable matter not previously passed by competent authority.
Prior to December 7, 1941

Prior to the outbreak of war, investigations within their respective spheres of authority were made by FBI, MID, and the DIO of Japanese, German, Italian, and Communist subjects. Whether the investigations were denominated “espionage” or “internal security” cases was of little import, for the manner in which either type of case was handled was generally the same. Most cases were opened on the basis of a “complaint” or specific report, alleging that a person was “acting suspiciously,” was “pro-Nazi” or “pro-Japanese,” had served in the Japanese Army, and the like. The investigative process normally would include some or all of the following steps:

(a) Check files of FBI, MID, DIO, Honolulu Police Department, and credit agencies (in most cases).
(b) Check files of Immigration & Naturalization Service or other Government agencies (in appropriate cases).
(c) Interview or re-interview original informant.
(d) Interview subject’s employer, business associates, and neighbors.
(e) Check bank accounts.
(f) Consult confidential informants.
(g) Surveillance (rarely).

The type of investigation indulged in was well suited for the purposes of internal security, that is, determining whether certain persons in wartime would likely be loyal to, or sympathize with the cause of, or give to, nations at war with the United States. It was not suitable for counter-espionage purposes.

In a few instances was the espionage problem in Hawaii attacked from the functional standpoint. This was largely, not not entirely, the fault of the responsible local agencies. There was a serious shortage of trained personnel available for counter-espionage work. Inadequately staffed, in numbers, FBI was hard put to investigate all prospective custodial detainees. The DIO devoted a majority of its investigative time to investigation of naval personnel cases, including applicants for the Naval Intelligence Service, and civilian employees of the Navy and Naval contractors. While there was full cooperation between FBI and the DIO, insofar as assisting one another upon request, there was not close coordination of their work in attacking the Japanese espionage system here.

In the several instances of functional approach to the Japanese espionage problem, FBI and the DIO generally worked jointly. Together, they maintained a partial surveillance of the activities of the Japanese Consulate General and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line), utilizing informants on the spot. FBI's investigation of the activities of the Italian Consul, in which the DIO assisted, was similarly conducted, with fruitful results. When the last Japanese “evacuation liner,” the Taiyo Maru, was in Honolulu, November 1-5, 1941, FBI, the DIO, and Consuls closely coordinated their efforts in effecting scrutiny of passengers returning to Hawaii from Japan, in searching persons leaving for Japan on the liner, and in maintaining a surveillance of the ship and activities on the nearby docks while the Taiyo Maru was in port. In furtherance of the purpose of this investigation, representations were made to the Postmaster General, in Washington, with the result that he ordered that no mail other than second class matter (newspapers, magazines, etc.) be put aboard the Taiyo Maru for carriage to Japan.

December 7, 1941, to March 27, 1942

Almost immediately upon the outbreak of war, the Contact Officer, MID, assumed general direction of intelligence work concerning the general civilian population, with FBI and DIO assisting. In this period, intelligence agents devoted almost all their time to the handling of internal security cases, apprehending persons who had been designated for custodial detention, conducting searches and interrogations, and investigating hundreds of specific complaints and rumors concerning alleged subversive activity.

A joint investigation of the past espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate General was instituted by MID, FBI, and the DIO (and still continues) in the hope of gaining some indication of what Japan's wartime espionage organization in Hawaii might be like and what personnel it might employ. Information gained in this investigation aided the FBI in its
investigation of Otto KUEHN, and established the latter's connection with the Consulate. The product of this joint investigation, added to the facts ascertained by the pre-war partial surveillance of the Consulate, illustrates the value of the functional approach to the espionage problem.

(3) Since March 27, 1942

202. After the signing of the local delimitation agreement on March 27, 1942, FBI ceased to investigate internal security and espionage cases as such, but continued to make available to MID and the DIO all information in its files or thereafter acquired. The DIO also ceased opening its own internal cases in the general civilian field and opened about 2,000 security cases on persons of Japanese ancestry employed on Naval projects. DIO Zone Offices have continued to conduct internal security investigations when requested to do so by Army S-2 officers in their respective zones, to the extent of available time and personnel.

203. On the islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai, preliminary hearing boards, usually of three men (one each from MID, FBI, and DIO), hear nearly all cases where custodial detention of a person is considered. The function of the boards is to supplement investigations by interrogation, and [54] to advise the appropriate Army authority whether a warrant of detention should issue. From time to time, in Honolulu, special investigating groups of MID, FBI, and DIO personnel are convened to interrogate persons likely to have important information concerning local Japanese subversive activity.

204. On three occasions, special investigating parties, composed of MID, FBI, and DIO representatives, generally totalling about 20 men, have flown to outside islands to aid resident intelligence personnel in conducting internal security investigations in large volume.

205. Cooperation of the three intelligence agencies in internal security work has been excellent. However, there has been virtually no effective work done in the field of counter-espionage. A small number of the cases investigated in this period (and since the war began) are entitled "espionage," but in few has there been anything other than an "internal security" approach to the problem. In nearly every instance, the emphasis has been on the personalities and their utterances, criminal and credit records, and probable nationalistic sympathies. There have been few cases approached in light of the functional bases of espionage.

(E) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) Intelligence personnel

206. Much of the failure to cope with the espionage problem in Hawaii lies in the fact that sufficient trained personnel have not been assigned to this area. MID and DIO offices have grown greatly since December 7, 1941, without many additions of much needed trained counter-espionage agents. The number of trained FBI agents in Hawaii has been reduced during the war.

(2) Coordination

207. While there exists close coordination in the field of internal security cases, because the Army has complete responsibility therefor and either conducts itself or requests DIO Zone Offices to conduct such investigations, the same cannot be said of counter-espionage efforts. This is perhaps attributable to problems presented by the local delimitation agreement of March 27, 1942.

(3) Shoreline coverage

208. It is believed that no agency has been paying adequate [55] attention to the coasts of the Hawaiian Islands, insofar as domestic Intelligence coverage is concerned, nor is there known to be any plan for such coverage.

209. Insofar as this office has been advised, investigations of suspicious activities near or close off shore have been conducted by trained intelligence personnel in but a few cases. In some instances of reported suspicious activity, which activity might indicate that persons on shore were making contact with the enemy, the immediate investigation has been made by Army field personnel (sometimes working under the S-2 officer), but with no follow-up, detailed investigation by trained investigative personnel. (#)

210. The former Coastal Information Section (B-8) of the DIO functions under the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and has been separated from the DIO since before the outbreak of war. What coastal intelligence work it has
done has been confined to the operational or combat implications of happenings off shore.

(4) Travel control

211. Civilians entering and leaving the Territory of Hawaii have not been subject to careful scrutiny, interrogation, or search, nor required to identify themselves. Until only recently, almost any person not under surveillance could leave the Territory without the knowledge of the intelligence or law enforcement agencies.

212. Several months ago, the DIO established the Naval Travel Control Office under the Commerce and Travel Section (B-5). The Naval Travel Control Office processes all persons leaving the Territory by Pan American Airways clipper, excepting military and naval personnel of the United Nations travelling under official orders, diplomats in diplomatic status, and United Nations civilian officials traveling on official business. The function of the processing office is to make sure of the identity of every commercial air traveller, and to apprise interested official agencies of what individuals are leaving the Territory. It is estimated that 23 1/2% of the persons whose passage has been validated by the Naval Travel Control Office were of more than nominal interest to the intelligence agencies.

213. It is anticipated that in the near future, the Military Governor of Hawaii will promulgate a general order establishing a similar travel control office whose function it will be to process all travellers leaving the Territory (save those exempt because of official status), whether passage is taken by air or surface.

214. In the past, several violations of censorship have been detected in situations where persons leaving the Territory have carried uncensored censurable matter (principally letters) on their persons or in their effects upon going aboard ships sailing from here. In the discovered cases, however, no indication of espionage activity has appeared, the violations involving personal motives only. (4)

215. That enemy couriers could with ease enter and leave these Islands, carrying vital information on their persons or in their effects (or, better still, in their minds), is apparent. It is anticipated, however, that when surface as well as air travellers are processed before leaving, the risks to couriers will be increased.

(5) Lack of coordination among domestic intelligence, combat intelligence, and operations activities

216. Before and during this war the flow of information has been almost entirely from the domestic intelligence agencies to combat intelligence and operations activities, with little flowing from the latter to domestic intelligence. While it is true that combat intelligence and operations offices have the primary interest in operational data and are vitally interested in the security thereof, it is not true that they have an exclusive interest in all such information. For example, the domestic intelligence agencies are, or should be, greatly concerned with all information indicating the presence of enemy units (particularly submarines) close off the Hawaiian Islands.

217. As previously stated, the presence of an enemy submarine close to shore, in an area and at a time inappropriate for combat action or reconnaissance, should be assumed to present a situation wherein the enemy is attempting to effect contact with agents on shore. The responsibility for destroying or repelling the enemy craft off shore lies with combat activities; the responsibility for detecting who are the enemy agents on shore lies with domestic intelligence. But, domestic intelligence will not know that there is a specific instance of possible enemy contact or signalling which it should investigate, unless the presence of enemy (or unidentified) units off shore is reported to it.

218. When there are operational movements in the Hawaiian [57] area of such importance that enemy observers would be likely to report the same to the enemy—such as the facts concerning arrivals and departures of Naval task forces—the counter-espionage agencies should be made cognizant of such movements. Knowing what the enemy agents are likely to be interested in provides a clue as to when enemy communications may be made. The security of operations would not be endangered by providing counter-espionage agencies with this type of information, for it would be desired only in cases where an enemy agent on shore could by simple observation learn it himself. It is reasonable that such information should be given to the counter-espionage agencies, otherwise they will have to go to the absurd extreme of stationing their own observers to obtain in the same manner that enemy agents do the information concerning ship movements.
VII. CONCLUSION

219. The criticism implicit in the foregoing analysis is inescapable. It is intended to be wholly constructive. The effect of the criticism is not directed against any one intelligence agency any more than any of the others. While there has been excellent cooperation among the agencies, coordination of plans and measures to deal with espionage in Hawaii has not been what it could have been.

220. Whereas this analysis is the result of studies made by one of the intelligence agencies, the District Intelligence Office (Counter Intelligence Section), and is believed to be based upon all available pertinent facts, it is felt that little, if any, progress can be made until the three principal agencies jointly approach the problem discussed herein. It would be highly desirable to have a small group of officers and agents—possibly only one or two from each agency, who should be the best suited for the task involved—appointed to study the question of espionage in Hawaii. Such a joint study should enable the representatives to make intelligent and comprehensive recommendations for the improvement of counter-espionage technique and procedure in this area.

221. Unless vigorous, astute and coordinated counter-espionage measures are placed in operation in Hawaii, the primary task of Counter-Intelligence—denial of information to the enemy—will never be performed.

APPENDIX "A": SOURCE MATERIAL

This appendix has been prepared chiefly for the benefit of readers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, who may wish to pursue further certain topics mentioned in the foregoing analysis. No attempt has been made to supply disseminates of this analysis with copies of all reports and other materials referred to below.

Immediately below are listed, as references, a number of investigation reports and other official correspondence which are cited in support of certain portions of the analysis. Following the list of references are explanations or citations of authority, arranged in the numerical order of paragraphs of the analysis.

REFERENCES

(a) DNI Conf. Ltr. AS–2/EN3–10, Serial 02525216, dated November 11, 1942, subject: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Activities.
(b) ONI Counter-Intelligence Section (Op–16–B–7) Operating Plan, dated October, 1942.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.
(d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
(e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 7, 1942, same subject.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, same subject.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 6, 1941, subject: JAPANESE EVACUATION SHIPS.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 15, 1941, same subject.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 25, 1941, same subject.
(k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 1, 1942, subject: Ernest Shigeru MATSUSAKA.

[A–2] (1) 14ND Summary Report, dated April 30, 1942, same subject.
(m) 13ND Investigation Report, dated May 1, 1941, subject: Lt. Comdr. Sadatomo OKADA, IJN.
(n) 12ND Investigation Report, dated July 17, 1941, same subject.
(o) 14ND Investigation Report, dated August 6, 1942, subject: Oliver Albert KIRKEBY.
(p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 30, 1942, subject: Giichiyo UXENO.
(q) DNI Conf. Memo., dated October 1, 1942, subject: GERMAN SABOTAGE AGENTS.
(r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject: Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
(s) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject: Yoshiye MIKAMI, alias John MIKAMI.
(t) DNI Secret Memo., Serial 02304616, dated November 3, 1942, subject: JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.
(u) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject: Rev. Unji HIRA-YAMA.
(v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 2, 1942, subject: Otto Carl Ferdinand JAENTSCH.
(w) 12ND Investigation Report, dated May 30, 1942, same subject.
(x) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 11, 1942, same subject.
(y) 12ND Information Card, dated June 19, 1942, same subject.
(z) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 24, 1942, subject: Louise SLATON.
(bb) DNI Conf. Memo., Serial 013098716, to DIO-5ND (copies to DIOs-10-11-12-13-14-15 NDs), dated June 3, 1942, subject: Flashing Lights and Suspected Signals Along the Coast—Investigation of.
[4-3] (cc) 11ND Investigation Report, dated October 8, 1941, subject: Itaru TACHIBANA.
(dd) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject: Visits of Japanese Public Vessels to the Island of Oahu.

DOCUMENTATION BY PARAGRAPHS

Foreword.—All quotations are from reference (b), Pars. 1215-1216 and 1003.
Par. 19.—Reference (e); Reference (g); Reference (r); Reference (s), pp. 2-5.
Reference (dd). The panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor and ships therein was taken by E. J. PARISH, Honolulu photographer, about 1937. An almost identical photograph, taken by PARISH in 1938, is contained in the files of this office. In 1937 or 1938, before offering such photographs for sale to the public, PARISH called at the District Intelligence Office to obtain official permission for sale. At that time, PARISH was told that while the Navy objected to the sale of such pictures, there was no law prohibiting such publication.
Paras. 24-25.—Reference (o) presents a case in point, illustrating how a Navy enlisted man was first "pumped" for Naval information, then developed as a source of "inside" information, for which he was paid in "loans". KIRKEBY's offenses were committed in 1936-1937, and he was met by Japanese espionage agents both in San Francisco and in Los Angeles.
Par. 32.—For examples of the type of information reported by the Consulate to Japan in 1941 by cable and wireless, see reference (d).
[A-j] Par. 42 a/—The Consulate signalling system referred to is set forth in Reference (c), Par. 4.
Paras. 45-46: A preliminary report of the UYENO case, containing only the details of the shooting but nothing concerning UYENO's possible motives, was received from the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.), Honolulu, shortly after the incident. The investigating agent recommended further investigation, but a check of the files of the Army Contact Office on February 15, 1943, revealed no further reports, and at that time a representative of the District Intelligence Officer was informed that the case was closed. UYENO is subject of reference (p).
Par. 47.—Informant who furnished the information in the two indented paragraphs is given reliability "A" by this office. His report was not rendered until four months after the events reported. A copy of informant's report was forwarded to the Army Contact Office, which returned to the District Intelligence Officer the following comment from another Army activity (not naming it):
"** As to a man swimming ashore and the finding of prints in the sand, there is no record on this **
"It is very improbable that the events described in this report could have happened without being recorded at this Headquarters."
Par. 51.—Reference (q) reports the landing and capture of eight Nazi saboteurs in the United States, 1942.
Par. 52.—Investigation by the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.) of former Japanese sampan fishermen in Hawaii has revealed that many of the fishermen entered the United States illegally and are extremely pro-Japanese, but has produced as yet no specific evidence of espionage activity by such fishermen.
Par. 60.—See article on frequency modulation: "This New FM", Naval Institute Proceedings, February, 1942.
Par. 65.—The suspicious radio message was intercepted as follows:
[A-5] RAUMIG HINDERUST SINDEN ZURCH REMSCHED REMSCHIE OWES ZAE MERE MSCHIE ID ----- DECK SEDWIG CGER DECK ORENE
EL ZEMLIE MEULVEN HAFNO ANN EDLMANN ISAR ISAR SETZE UME IN MEUWEG SIEDEN IN GELS

Source of above information was Combat Intelligence, 14ND, who reported:
"This transmitted Sunday A. M. /December 7, 1941/. Apparently local station
to local station. Received from Army." A very free translation of understand-
able parts of the message was also submitted by Combat Intelligence:

Extensive areas have been completely razed . . . . Oriental . . . . Edlmann /proper name/ . . . . . . Set oil and machinery fires one after another
in which many were killed.

Par. 63.—FCC writer referred to is Mr. Lee R. Dawson, supervisor, Hawaiian
Monitoring Area. Quotations are from Mr. Dawson's letter of January 10, 1942,
to Chief of National Defense Operations Section, FCC, subject: Additional Sec-
ondary Monitoring Units Needed in the Hawaiian Area. (Copies of this letter
were indicated for Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department.)

Quotation of the Director of the FBI, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, is from his letter
of January 16, 1942, to Hon. James Lawrence Fly, chairman of FCC. (Copies
of this letter were sent to G-2, War Department, and ONI, Navy Department.)

Par. 78.—The Japanese are known to be using couriers among officers and
seamen of merchant vessels plying between United States and South American
ports: reference (t).

Par. 81.—Reference is to Tamotsu MATSUMURA, interned alien Japanese,
who was at one time a paid informant of this office. Before coming to Hawaii
prior to the first World War, WATSUMURA was in the Japanese oversens
colonization service, being a civil secretary to the governor-general of Formosa.
He admits having transmitted information of strategic value, concerning Hawaii,
to Japan prior to 1914. In recent years, especially 1937-1940, he was a leading
propagandist for Japan in Hawaii.

[A-6] Par. 83.—This appears from the admissions of Richard Masayuki
KOTOSHIRODO, formerly a clerk at the local Consulate, who visited the islands
of Maui, Kauai, and Hawaii in 1941 on espionage missions for the Consulate:
reference: (g).

Par. 84.—See enclosure (A) of reference (d).

Par. 86.—From KOTOSHIRODO's admissions: reference (g).

Par. 88.—Buddhist priest referred to is subject of reference (u).

Par. 90.—Propagandists referred to are Frank VON HEILAND and Rev. Paul
Junichiro TAJIMA. Paid informants of the Consulate, among them some
Koreans, are discussed in reference (g).

Par. 91.—Japanese agent who was in Hawaii in 1932 was Rinzo SHIMURA,
mentioned in references (k) and (l), and Japanese bookstore owner was Ernest
Shigeru MATSUZAKA, subject of those reports.

Par. 92.—OKADA is the subject of references (m) and (n).

Par. 93.—The Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.

Par. 94.—For a detailed description of the information gathered by MATSU-
ZAKA and transmitted to Japan, see enclosures to reference (k).

The alien on Alea Heights is Shigeichi TAKAFUJI. A report of the activities
of personnel of Japanese Naval vessels while visiting Hawaii before the war is
contained in reference (dd).

Par. 95.—Report concerning information gathered by TACHIBANA is con-
tained in reference (cc).

Par. 98.—When KOTOSHIRODO and Consulate Secretary Tadashi MORI-
MURA made observation trips to the outside islands of the Hawaiian group in
1941, they carried with them only the innocuous-looking Hawaii Tourist Bureau
cartographic maps. According to Consulate clerks interviewed, the maps and
charts used by the Vice Consul in his office were standard U. S. Hydrographic
Office and Coast & Geodetic Survey publications.

[A-7] Par. 99.—The photographing incident was referred immediately to FBI,
Honolulu, but no report of FBI's investigation of this case was written. The driver
of the car which carried the seven Japanese has not been interred, but is serving
a prison term for violation of a general order of the Military Governor regulating
the amount of currency an individual may carry on his person.

Pars. 101-102.—KOTOSHIRODO related the information reported in these
paragraphs: see reference (g).

Par. 105.—See references (c) and (d).

Par. 106.—Army Contact Office, Honolulu, for some time past has been investi-
gating all local Japanese known to have operated radio transmitters in Hawaii
prior to the war. To date, the DIO has not been informed of any operator who has been found to have used his transmitter for subversive purposes.

Par. 123.—Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.

Par. 129.—Japanese aliens still live on Aiea Heights and on Pearl City Peninsula (which juts into Pearl Harbor to a point only several hundred yards across open water from a carrier berth).

Par. 149.—While considerable amounts of "Hawaiian currency" have turned up in Mainland banks, it is believed that such currency could not be purchased from those banks because of prevailing legal restrictions.

Par. 152.—First sentence: source secret, but known to ONI. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (Overseas Department) is currently using regular short-wave broadcasts from China for the transmission of instructions in code to Kuomintang representatives in the United States. (See Postal Censorship Records No. SF—8891.)

Par. 153.—First quoted clause is from reference (b), Par. 1005; second is from ONI-T—8—10, Sec. 21203 (2).

Par. 156.—The distinction between the maintenance of internal security and the countering of enemy espionage seems to have been kept clearly in mind in a recent War Department publication: War Department Counter Fifth Column Plan (1942 Revision), promulgated November 2, 1942. Therein, the task of countering the Potential Fifth Column is essentially the task referred to in the foregoing Analysis as the maintenance of internal security in Hawaii. While the Counter Fifth Column plan seems not deemed to be applicable to Hawaii (for the Hawaiian Department commander is not on the distribution list), it is significant that the Plan and its study and improvement are the responsibility of the Provost Marshall General, and not of the Military Intelligence Service. This is a clear recognition of the fact that Counter Fifth Column planning is a police, rather than a counter-espionage function.


Par. 150.—"War cannot be waged without all kinds of information about the forces and the intentions of the enemy, and about the character of the country within the zone of military operations. To obtain the necessary information, it has always been considered lawful to employ spies, and also to make use of the treason of enemy soldiers or private enemy subjects, whether they were bribed, or offered the information voluntarily and gratuitously. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations enacted the old customary rule that the employment of methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country is considered allowable. The fact, however, that these methods are lawful on the part of the belligerent who employs them does not protect from punishment such individuals as are engaged in procuring information. Although a belligerent acts lawfully in employing spies and traitors, the other belligerent, who punishes them, likewise acts lawfully..." Oppenhein, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (5th ed., 1935), Vol. II, Sec. 150, p. 337.

Par. 162.—Quotation is from ONI-T—8—10, Sec. 23201.

Par. 168.—While there is no positive evidence of the fact, it appears that several false reports concerning alleged Japanese espionage in Hawaii were given to the U. S. Naval Attaché, at Mexico City, in early 1941. Each report contained some important known facts, around which apparently were spun many false statements. While ONI gave the reports very low reliability rating, the reports were of such serious nature as to require investigation.

Par. 176.—Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, entered into by FBI, MID, and ONI, governed the respective spheres of responsibility of the three agencies in Hawaii until the outbreak of war.

Par. 186.—Copy of local agreement of March 27, 1942, was sent to ONI as enclosure to DIO—14ND (IHM/w) Conf. Ltd. (Personal) to Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN, dated June 20, 1942.

Par. 188.—Statement of FCC duties taken verbatim from memorandum of E. K. Jett, Chief Engineer, FCC; to all offices of the FCC Radio Intelligence Division, dated June 3, 1942, subject: Jurisdiction of the Radio Intelligence Division.

Par. 199.—Reports on Japanese "evacuation liners": see references (h), (i), and (j).

Par. 201.—Reports of the joint investigation of the Japanese Consulate: see references (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g).
MEMO
Nov.
Rollo
Waldemar

Par. 209.—Reference (aa) sets forth the manner in which coördinated shoreline coverage by plane, surface craft, in automobiles, and on foot was effected on the North Carolina coast. This procedure could well serve the same purpose in the Hawaiian Islands. Reference (bb) indicates the interest and approval of ONI in that procedure.

Par. 214.—In one case, a merchant marine captain cabled his wife, "Happy birthday", to indicate the fact that his vessel was about to sail from Honolulu: references (v), (w), (x), and (y). In another case, the second officer of a cargo vessel used a simple code in ordinary correspondence to reveal movements of his ship prior to sailing: reference (z).

(Pages 197D and 198D of Exhibit 5, being an outline map of the Island of Oahu—Appendix "B"—and a chart captioned "Pattern for Espionage, Hawaiian Islands"—Appendix "C"—will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 10 and 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,
SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 3 December 1941

Confidential

MEMO FOR THE FILES

Reference: Wilkinson Report, 6 October 1941.

During the past 3 years in North China I had considerable official and social contact with various German firms and their representatives in North China, and with reference to the Wilkinson Report of the 6th October 1941, the following information is submitted for what it may be worth.

1. The German merchants in occupied China are given very little preference over other foreign (i.e., American, British, etc.) merchants and their businesses are being interfered with to practically the same extent by the Japanese military; except in such cases as the military directly benefits. The German merchants fully realize they are only being used to the advantage of the Japanese and what preference they receive is only on sufferance.

2. The average German definitely detests the Japanese military clique and Japanese businessmen in China and much prefer to do business with the Chinese. They consider their future is with China rather than Japan.

3. In March 1941, one (Wilhelm?) Dunsing (official Nazi representative in Northern Shantung) the Chefoo manager for Niggeman & Co., had just been forced by the local Japanese Gendarmerie to sell something like 90,000 bags of flour (U. S. goods) at a considerable loss; remarked to me, "never mind we (meaning Germany) are only playing with them for the time being, we will get even, etc., etc. They will be chased from country (China) and put where they belong. It is all planned". Dunsing then pointed to a map of the world on office wall and saying, "here is our first step", drew an arc starting from Germany with the vertex passing through the center of the Caspian Sea, and ending in the vicinity of Karachi. Dunsing was extremely angry at this time and while talking was intermittently cursing the Japanese in general.

4. I had known DUNSING for about four years and am sure that he was sincerely expressing himself. This same sentiment has been expressed to me by other German merchants in China, and particularly by Helmut Lanz, owner and manager of the Shantung Traders Inc. of Chefoo; Rollo Miss of A. H. Anz & Co. Chefoo (German Consular Agents); Waldemar Balthasar of Krauch & Co., Shanghai, China, representatives of Dentsche- Stickstoffhandelsgesellschaft.

T. W. Joyce
Lt. (jg) T. W. Joyce

Copy sent to M. I. D. on 12-5-41. S.

Attention Ens. Stevenson

Nov. 5th, 1941

NOTES—COMMENTS

I suggest that the number of German advisors and technicians appearing in these reports is somewhat exaggerated. I have met several of them in China.
during the past year and up to May of present year—and was given the impression that Germany is reluctant to send as many as Japan asks for—also they are mostly erectors or mechanics supervising installation of German-designed arms and machinery, etc., and move about from yard to yard.

T. W. Joyce.

(Handwritten in margin:) this info. too old to be of use—if Jap C. G. has arrived—fact will be rptd by U. S. Consuls—or friendly Consuls.

COPY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, October 14, 1941.

Op-16-F AS-4/EF13 Serial No. 0665916
From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Secret Agent in Manila—information received from)
Reference: (a) D10—14 letter IHM/ba, dated August 22, 1941.
(b) OPNAV dispatch 072049, October, 1941.
(c) OPNAV dispatch 061720, August, 1941.

1. In paragraph 1 of reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer stated that a British secret agent in the Far East suggested that an arrangement be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent could be carried in special locked compartments of the Pan-American Airways clipper between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation, the British agent in the Far East would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy as gathered by him or his agents in the Far East.

2. In reference (b), the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, were authorized to arrange for the transmission of correspondence between accredited British intelligence officers in the Far East and in the Fourteenth Naval District by locked compartments or locked boxes in the Pan-American Airways service between Honolulu and Manila whenever space and other considerations within the discretion of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, render such service practicable.

3. It is to be understood that this service is not to be considered in exchange for information gathered by the British Intelligence in the Far East and sent to the Fourteenth Naval District via clipper for transmission to the District Intelligence Officer. Such transmission is decidedly cumbersome, slow and impractical. Any such information should be transmitted by the British representatives to representatives of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, for his information and further transmission at his discretion. The proper British authorities in Washington have been informed of the foregoing and requested to make arrangements accordingly.

4. As a matter of interest to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, he is advised that the information contained in enclosure (A) with reference (a) was not of importance or of particular interest to the Division of Naval Intelligence, because it was too detailed in its nature, too local in its application and too late in its reception.

5. It is to be noted that reference (b) cancels reference (c).

(Signed) A. G. KIRK.

Copy with copy of ref. (a) to: CINCAF

Shanghai French Concession—Japanese Designs on.

14ND #1534
Rating "C"

Ref : 14ND C rd #1463

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Japanese Government is "contemplating" taking over French Concession of Shanghai in the name of Nanking Government. Japanese Army wishes to take action immediately but is not in complete agreement with Japanese Naval landing party. Meanwhile, Nanking 79716—46—Ex. 148—38
Government is going ahead selecting personnel for future administration in what will be called "Shanghai Special Administrative Area". Informant believes that Nanking’s action is more wishful thinking, but states that both Japanese and Nanking efforts at penetration of the Shanghai French Concession lately has been intensified.

**FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.**

*From:* ONI CINCPAC com14

14ND #1534

**Rating “C”**

**Thai-Japanese Activities in**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: (A) In the middle of August, 1941, thirty aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI airdrome; (B) Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department agents into the number of fighters and their tonnage in the Gulf of Siam; (C) The following proposal was said to have been presented to the Prime Minister of Thai on August 18 by the Japanese Minister: (1) SATTAHIB Naval Base to be loaned to Japan; (2) 6 airdromes in north, south, and west Thai to be lent to Japan, who will undertake to improve them; (3) Double tracks to be laid on the railway from ARANH to BATTAMBANG; (4) Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thai; and (5) Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces; the foregoing proposals to be taken up by the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival at Thai. FBI and MID cognizant.

*From:* ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1535

**Rating “C”**

**Formosa—Meito Airdrome**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 27 August, 1941: On 18 June the following left for unknown destination—3 3-engine monoplane bombers, 9 twin-engine monoplane bombers, 4 fighters, 2 reconnaissance. On 28 June following left for Hainan under command of MIYASAKI—15 twin-engine monoplane bombers, 11 single-engine monoplane fighters, 8 single-engine bi-plane reconnaissance. On 3 July 24 aircraft under command of MORI GITARO left for Hainan.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.

*From:* ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1533

**Rating “C”**

**Confidential**

**JAPAN—General Intelligence**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of 1 September, 1941: (A) 5 new (reorganized) divisions have been mobilized in Japan for service in Manchuria; (B) All forces in Korea are now divided in two divisions are to be in process of moving into Manchuria and to North Korea; (C) 3 new mechanized divisions have been added to Kwangtung Army as well as chemical warfare units trained in Japan by German instructors; (D) Training of parachute troops is being intensified but is considerably delayed by lack of transport airplanes; passenger airplanes from a commercial air line are being used for training purposes; (E) Informant reports unverified information to the effect that two Japanese Capital Ships will be completed and commissioned in the battle fleet by the end of 1941 and that two airplane carriers will be completed in March and July, 1942, respectively.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.

*From:* ONI CINCPAC COM1.

14ND #1531

**Rating “C”**

**Confidential**

**Japanese Fleet Organization**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That from and after June, 1941, Japanese Navy was to have been divided into four fleets, with Admiral KATO as Com-
mander-in-Chief. The first fleet will be stationed near Indo-China, Thai, and Hainan; second fleet will be the main force for the southward advance; third fleet to be stationed to cover the Pacific flank and oppose the American Fleet; and, fourth fleet to be engaged in transport (convoy?) work. FBI and MID cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1532
Rating “C”

Indo-China—Japanese Moves In

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese Navy intends to construct a submarine base at CAMRANH BAY. Japanese are reported to be taking steps to completely suppress all pro-Chunking elements in Indo-China, and to encourage Annamite independence movement which would be definitely pro-Japanese and anti-French. It is believed that object of Japanese moves is to create internal domestic trouble in Indo-China, thus providing further excuse for expansive Japanese control.

PBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1528
Rating “D”

Japan—Ordnance Production

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Chinese staff Secret Booklet of October, 1940, contains following information on Hiroshima Iron Works—Yearly production 9 anti-aircraft guns, 8 tanks, unknown number of Naval and Military guns. Monthly production of shells 300. Raw materials are obtained from Yawata, Kyeshu. 2,000 men and women employed.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14
From: 14ND 9-23-41

14ND #1525
Rating “C”

Japan—Indication of Action in Malaya

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That Japanese Army is calling up all English and Malay-speaking Japanese irrespective of age. Some Japanese born and educated in the Straits Settlement have left for Army service in Japan.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14
From: 14ND 9-23-41

14ND #1530
Rating “C”

Far East Exports to Germany

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (as of 23 July, 1941): German firms in the Far East have received instructions from the Commercial Counsellor instructing them that they must keep all goods purchased for export to Germany for a period of at least five months, since it can be expected that transport via Siberia will be resumed at the expiration of that period. Firms encountering difficulty over storage space are advised to ship goods to Dairon for storage. Further, all purchases of goods in the immediate future for export to Germany must be of “non-perishable” kind. FBIHON and G-2ND are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1526
Rating “C”

China Blockade—Smuggling

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 28 June, 1941, Asaji FASAHARA, Commanding Officer of the Destroyer ACHI (or ASHI) of the Japanese Thirteenth Destroyer Flotilla, was found guilty of having allowed smuggling in his blockade area and was replaced by his second-in-command. The ACHI was patrolling off Hainan Island at the time. Admiral Seiichi SHIMOMI (or HIIMI), Commanding the Japanese South China Fleet, is suspected by his subordinate officers of being financially interested in the South China smuggling racket.
When Chin-Ting-Wah, puppet magistrate at Chungahan, was assassinated recently in Macao, it was extensively rumored that SHINOMI's personal demarche with the Governor of Macao was brought about by the consideration that CHIU had previously been working hand in glove with SHINOMI in breaking the blockade which the latter himself was responsible for maintaining. FBI and MID cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1527
Rating "C"

Formosa—Coastal Defenses

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine gun posts. These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each is manned by six to eight men. They were recently erected in great haste. 4,000 troops, with 6 tanks and 8 armored cars, are stationed at Taichu. FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1825

Formosa (Takao)—General Military Intelligence

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Transport #174 arrived at Takao on 17 June with large quantities of military personnel, equipment (uniforms, steel helmets, respirators, etc.), all of which were sent by rail to Tainan. Sixty German Naval, Military, and Air Force experts and over thirty Japanese officers arrived on same vessel, but soon after landing they all left via SS HOSAN MARU for the Pescadores. It is reported that all of these men will soon be transferred to South China. On 21 June, 260 Mountain Artillery, together with local recruits, left Tainan for Koshun for maneuvers. On 25 June, 6 armored cars and 3 tanks left Tainan for Taito to participate in coastal defense exercises. On 23 June, about 800 recruits from Koshun Sector were sent to join Labor Corps at Tainan. These men were given a complete set of uniforms and equipment but no rifles. Their ages were from 35 to 45. On 6 June, they returned to Koshun for further training.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1523

Formosa—Conscription

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Governor of Formosa has received orders to recruit within the next month (by 5 September, 1941) 100,000 men between the ages of 35-45 for service in Labor Corps. It is reported that an additional 150,000-200,000 recruits in Formosa are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1524

Formosa—Troop movements

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: From 23 to 29 June, 1941, 500 troops of Tailoku Infantry were exercised in coastal defense near Shinchiku. On 25 June, 180 Artillery arrived at Karenko from Tailoku, together with 6 anti-aircraft guns drawn by trucks and 4 anti-aircraft machine guns. 25 June, Transports #141 and 163 arrived at Keelung and embarked military supplies and provisions. They both sailed for Hainan on 27 June.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14
Japanese Troop Movements

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 25 June, 1941, six hundred troops of Nakana Armored Car Unit arrived, together with three hundred Service Corps Troops with unknown number of armored cars and motorcycle combinations, all embarking on two transports at Shibaura, Tokyo, bound for Formosa. On 5 July, one thousand men of 32nd Infantry Regiment embarked in two transports at same port for Formosa. FBI and MID cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Japanese Troop Movements

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 16 June, 1941, one transport arrived at Shikama (Port of Himeji) from Shanghai and discharged 200 wounded of the 11th Mixed Brigade, and 100 boxes of ashes. Wounded were sent to Tsuyama, Okayama-Ken. Reinforcements which left Japan in May and June, 1941, for North China were drawn from Sendai, Kanasawa, Yamagata, and Yonasawu. Reinforcements for the same period for South and Indo-China were drawn from Kanasawu, Kyushu, Kagoshima, Kurume, Saga, and Kumamoto. FBIHON G-2HD cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Formosa—Supplies

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 17 June, 1941 SS MORAI MARU arrived at Keelung from Japan with about 400 cases of military uniforms and steel helmets. 200 cases were sent to Karenko by SS FUKUSEI MARU and the remainder to Taihoku by train. 19 June, Transport #140 arrived at Keelung from Japan with military supplies which were sent by rail to Taihoku and Tachiu. This Transport left again on 22 June with a full load of copper ore. 20 June, Transport #135 arrived at Karenko with 600-700 tons of petrol from Japan via the Pescadores (where she unloaded an unspecified amount of petrol). FBIHON, G-2HD cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Manchuria—Travel Restrictions

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August 1941: New regulations affecting all Europeans and most Chinese were introduced as of August 1, 1941 in Manchurian Frontier Regions. Permits for all travel must be obtained from Police Headquarters. Restrictions are especially severe in Mulin District, while travel in the interior is prohibited. Special control has been established at Mulin and Suisenho. Early in 1941 pressure was brought to bear on all foreigners in Jehol Province, and many left. Remaining foreigners, about twenty-five missionaries, are not now permitted to travel beyond the city. Tarter businessmen have been told to remove their business to Mukden area, the reason given being that Jehol is not safe. Garrisons in this area have been greatly augmented, large troop movements are taking place, considerable road construction is in hand, and it is not desired that aerial maneuvers should be witnessed by foreigners. FBIHON and G-2HD are Cognizant

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Manchuria—Censorship

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: All the correspondence from within Manchuria, addressed to China, is now censored. FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant

Confidential
Manchuria Mobilization

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of August 15: Whole population, men and women, of eastern part of former Chinese Eastern Railway District has been mobilized as "militia" for defense and anti-aircraft work; all are registered and may not leave their villages without permission from Staff Headquarters. Fresh units of Japanese troops arrived in Mulin District the end of July, movements being shrouded in great secrecy. Troop movements at night. Police forbade populace to visit villages or to engage in fishing or other occupation in vicinity except under special permit, this applying even to normal agricultural labor. FBIHON, G-2. Cognizant. Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI COM14 CINCPAC

Manchuria—Construction

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August, 1941: New barracks near Mulin Coal Mines are now occupied by troops recently arrived. Maneuvers in which tanks participated have been held. Work has commenced on new highway from Irike through Chola-Arabanu District. Cossacks, residing in this district, are engaged in the work. 1,500,000 Manchurian dollars have been allocated for hospitals, barracks, and other works at Telan-Heiho. Several European firms at Harbin have been permitted to tender work in the Tiamosi District and for work in connection with the Tiamosi-Madalsian Railway which opened two years ago. 3,000,000 Mongolian dollars have been allocated for Government Buildings, residences, hospitals, barracks, etc. All employees must be certified. Work to be completed not later than June 1, 1942. FBIHON, and G-2HD are cognizant. Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Confidential

From: District Intelligence Officer.
To: Director of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with.
Reference: (a) DIO conf. 14th ltr. dated 27 June, 1941. Subject Mr. Gerald H. Wilkinson.
(b) OpNay Despatch on same subject.
(c) DIO conf. 14th ND ltr. dated 22 August, 1941. Subject British Secret Agent in Manila, information received from.

1. Subject British Agent in Manila continues to forward information via Lock Box in Pan American Clipper planes to the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District. Much of this information is of value to the Military Intelligence in Hawaii, and to this office, as well as to the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reference (c) listed by numbers some of the cards containing this information which have been disseminated by the office of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Paragraph five of reference (c) stated that the District Intelligence Officer considered this information to be valuable and requested authority by despatch to permit the sending of information by the local representative of Subject agent to Manila in the lock compartment of Pan American Airways planes.

3. The despatch reply requested in paragraph five of reference (c) has not been received to date.

I. H. MAYFIELD

Hongkong—Prospective disorders,

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that the Japanese are preparing to create strikes, disturbances, and riots when and if Japan breaks with England. Source stated that puppet officials of the Chungshan area and Japanese agents are being permitted to enter Macao with arms, and that it is through this channel a large quantity of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hongkong. An agent in the employ of FURUKAWA, Chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence at Macao, has been recruiting 100,000 refugee street-sleepers to take part in sabotage and
nuisance activities in Hongkong on the outbreak of hostilities. A large number of
these street-sleepers are already receiving financial assistance from the Japan-
ese. The following Chinese are said to be actively engaged in the foregoing
work in the pay of Japan: JOHN LUI, a senior member of the Shanghai Tai
Fung Insurance Co. His headquarters are at 19/20 Connaught Road, West, 3rd
Floor (next to Ping On Hotel) where he operates as the Chun Kin Firm. He
visited Shanghai in July 1941 and was said to be planning a trip to Singapore
thereafter. CHENG SAI-HOF, son of the Chief Detective of Amoy, is one of
Lui's close associates. TAM KWOK-WA has made many visits recently to Hong-
kong and is said to be employed by the Special Service Department of Japanese
Intelligence at Macao, to act as Liaison between Macao and Hongkong. CHAU
WING TING has been in the employ of the Japanese for the past ten years, op-
erating mainly in the Swatow/Amoy sector. He is believed to be residing in
Connaught Road, West (number of house unknown.) FBI, MID cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-12-41.
To: ONI; All ND's; CincPac; Com14.

Japanese Foreign policy.

14ND #1492
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Admiral NOMURA (Ambassador to
the U. S.) has been instructed to work for a modification of the American em-
brace policy and to offer re-adjustment of American-Japanese relations on the
basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined and recog-
nized as foreign spheres of influence of the United States and of Britain. FBI-
Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. Com14.

Japanese-Chinese Relations.

14ND #1470
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Japanese movement is consid-
ervably perturbed by the "insincerity of the Siamese Government". B. Japanese
Government states that in spite of military "representations" by Japanese Min-
ister at Bangkok, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompro-
mising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan and that is clearly due to
British and American intrigue and influence. C. Instructions have been sent to
Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong repre-
sentations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter. D. FBI WEN CHUAN further
stated Japanese Government in carrying out its programme in French Indo-
China is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that
unless latter changes its attitude towards Japan and her co-prosperity pro-
gramme Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into
line." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

14ND #1466
Rating "C"

Manchuria—Japanese Troop Movements.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Between 10 July and 17 July about
50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden proceeding north ** * * car-
rried full war kits. (Note. No means of checking numbers, which should be
accepted with reserve). B. During period named a total of 75 troop "specials"
passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried artillery and tanks. C. On departure
from Mukden on 21 July source was told by Japanese station master of South
Manchurian railway that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop
specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was
short of cars these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suiyuan and
Peking-Hankow lines. D. On 20 July troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden.
They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTZE on Peking-Mukden line.
Source saw great activity at Tangku Tun junction." FBI-Hon and G2-HD
cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC CoM 14.
Japanese Foreign Policy.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Admiral TOYODA (Japanese Foreign Minister) already has informed German Ambassador OTT the Japan is ready to re-adjust its political relations with the Reich at a pre-requisite for closer economic accord upon which will be founded the future economic relations between Asia and Europe. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL
Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND #1467
Rating “C”

Manchuria—Railways, Buildings, etc.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: “A. It is reported that the following railways in Manchuria are now regarded as military lines on which number of passenger trains has been reduced to minimum: Harbin-Latia-Tunhara and to Korea via Tumen, Harbin Belian-Heiho, Hsingchiang-Taonan, Taonan-Doekk Arshun, Tsitsihar-Pelian, Tsitsihar-Budheda-Hailar and Manchouli, Tumen-Mudadzian, Mudadzian-Tzetsiamus, all railways in Jehol. B. Since end of June 1941 steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang Harbin by construction of sidings and numerous small stations for storage. C. In Kwangtung leased territories since 1940 sand bag emplacements guarding bridges station, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures. Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity demands.” FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL
Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND #1465
Rating “C”

Shankhai French concession.

Japanese Designs On.

Ref: 14 ND card #1402 (Tientsin French Concession)

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That a plan similar to that stated on the reference card for Tientsin is said to be in order for Shanghai French Concession, with the Nanking Government said to be ready to assume control of the concession before 10 October, 1941. It is rumored that there is a committee studying this matter under the chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) and General KAGESA, and that their recommendations have been forwarded to Tokyo for consideration. FBI (Hon) and G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI; All NDs; CincPac; Com 14.

Formosa-Japanese Airplane Movements

14ND #1456

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 25 July, 1941 following aircraft left OKAYAMA Airdrome for HAINAN: 24 twin-engine monoplane, heavy B; 15 monoplane fighters; 3 reconnaissance. 28 July following left for Indo-China: 6 three-engine monoplane, heavy B; 9 single-engine monoplane, light B. 26 July, 27 aircraft comprised mainly of twin-engine monoplane, heavy bombers, arrived KAGI from Japan and left 29 July for Indo-China. 1 August, 9 heavy bombers and 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-China. Parachute troops are being
trained daily at TOGO airfield, 8 aircraft being used. FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September 1941.
To: ONI; All NDs; CincPac; COM14.

Formosa-Japanese Troop Movements.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 20 July, 1941 the following left KARENKO for INDO-CHINA—24,000 TAKAHASHI Infantry; 1200 ISE Artillery; 600 KONDO and FUKASE, A. F. V. Units with 16 armored cars, 15 light tanks, 40 motorcycles, and 32 field guns. FBI-Hon and G2—HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2); All NDs; CINC PAC; COM14

Japanese Naval Ordnance.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-3); Naval guns are being made at Osaka Arsenal under German supervision. On 8 May, 1941 warships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted out with new guns from this arsenal. FBI-Hon and G2—HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINC PAC COM14.

Japanese Factory.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports the following concerning the AICHI Aircraft Factory at NAGOKA. Beginning 3 April, 1941 German engineers arrived at this factory from the DORNIER works. They are said to be supervising construction of a new type of fighter. This is described as K.22 type twin-engine 2 seater, which is still in the experimental stage. 2000 laborers are working 24 hour shifts, and the production schedule aimed at is 50 planes per month. FBI-Hon and G2—HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINC PAC COM14.

Japanese Troops in Indo China.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 21 August 1941 the strength of Japanese troops in southern Indo-China numbered about 80,000, composed of units of: Guards; 25th Division; 38th Division; Formosan Army Corps; Naval landing party. Lieutenant General HDA is the Army High Commander, Major General KWANGI for air, and Vice-Admiral HIRATA for Navy. FBI-Hon and G2—HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINC PAC COM14.

Japanese Troop Movement.

British Secret Agent, Far East reports that on 8 June, 1941, 12,000 men left French Indo-China. He stated that it is rumored that they were bound for Manchuria, but he takes this with great reserve. On 14 June the following units of the 11th division, totalling 3900 men left Haina for an unknown destination: HIROSE Infantry Regiment, NAKAMURA Medium Artillery Battalion, HIROKA Transport Company and YOSHINO and KUNO Cavalry Squadrons. FBI—Hon and G2—HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINC PAC COM14.

Japanese Naval Construction.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (with considerable reserve) that 20 vessels of the following type were in July 1941 under construction at HARIMA Shipyard, OSAKA: Displacement 100 tons; dimensions 200 ft x 28 ft x 5 ft 6'
speed 30 knots; armament 6 machine guns. These vessels were to be completed by the end of July 1941. Informant's source stated that these ships were to be used as troop landing craft in the Southern expansion movement of Japan. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-1): That Japan is constructing "Pocket Destroyers" by building the new craft inside some old hulks that have been emptied of machinery and equipment. He stated that as a further aid to secrecy the positions of these hulks are changed from time to time by being towed from one place to another. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Aircraft Factory.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a factory situated at KAWAGUCHI in OSAKA, in May 1941, started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the AICHI Factory, NAGOYA. It is estimated that a labor force of 2,000 working ten hours a day, under supervision of 3 German advisers, is producing wings and fuselage for 100 fighter planes per month. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

———— Island—Japanese Construction.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 21 April, 1941 two armed merchantmen left KOBE for ——— ISLAND. These ships had aboard 400 men of a naval landing party and 160 coolies. On 19 April these same ships had arrived at KOBE and unloaded scrap material and 1,800 caskets of ashes and were loaded up with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components. The above measured about six by eight feet. FBI and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

German Raiders in Pacific.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 20 Apr, 1941 two of the German vessels lying at KOBE left for KURE. Guns were to be fitted and the ships were to be ready for sea again at the beginning of August. FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. COM14.

Japan-Kobe Navy Yard.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): The floating dock at Kobe, capable of accommodating ships of 18,000 tons, is expected to be transferred to Hainan. At the end of May 1941 an aircraft tender was under repair in this dock, 2,000 workmen working day and night shift were engaged on the aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDS. CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Submarine Construction.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): In collaboration with German advisers the construction of 75 submarines is projected in Japan. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 ships and the Osaka Iron Works is to build 4. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14
Japanese aerial bomb factory.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that there is a Japanese aerial bomb factory named IAKABE Heavy Industrial Works, located in Himeji. In mid May 1941 this factory was said to have had a working force of 600 laborers and 4 German engineers, producing monthly 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese National Policy.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a competent British observer has rendered the following report: “When Itagaki was appointed C-in-C, Korea, this writer took the view that he is a convinced northern expansion, as opposed to southern expansion believer; and that his appointment was therefore to be interpreted as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria, Korea being the first reserve pool for Manchuria. A technically competent observer in Honckong now confirms this view and adds that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C, South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of the Japanese forces in China, is of the same persuasion. He may be counted on not to neglect the north, therefore, however tempting the easy gains in the south may be at the moment. Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc., by a certain date, such as September 15th bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners. The Japanese in the past have often revealed their long term objectives, but have very seldom talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them.” FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japan—Airdrome at Kamakura.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: A large airdrome is under construction near Kamakura (believed to be identical with Totsuka airdrome). The field is 3,500 yards long and 3,500 yards wide and was to have been completed at the end of August, 1941. 8,000 laborers were said to have worked on the field under the supervision of 18 German engineers. 3,000 parachute troops under training there. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japan—General Military and Naval Information

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): “A There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMA-KURA and TOYOHASHI. B. Source states that at end of June there was considerable movement of Japanese sailors from Tokyo to Koshiro and Takahachi and that between 26 and 28 June, 1941 numerous tramloads of young men arrived at Zusi. C. At Run-it source observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders and also several howitzers pulled by heavy trucks with camouflage gun platforms. D. At HAMAMOTO he observed 57th, 72nd and 8th divisions. E. At Wushiza 22nd Division. At OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA 2nd and 4th Divisions. New oil storage tanks in this district which is very heavily industrialized. (Comments: All above observations were made at end June. Although agent has had military training he is newly recruited and I have had no opportunity of cross-examining him. Valuation therefore C-3). F. Area between Kobe, AWAJI and SAKAI heavily fortified. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14
Japanese National Policy

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation B–2): That a fairly reliable informant of his states that his Japanese business associates (who include local heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank) appear genuinely to believe that present Japanese threats of future southward expansion are merely a "war of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight Great Britain or America. FBI-Hon and G2–HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Dutch East Indies—Japanese Propaganda in

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C–3): That an informant of his, a Sakdal candidate for the next Philippine election has stated that local Japanese agents have recently cultivated him closely and volunteered the following information: That 650–700 airplanes are now assembled on Formosa; that an attack on the Philippines and Singapore will take place simultaneously about the end of August; that the campaign in the Philippines will begin with a rising in Mindanao and the bombing of Manila; that the attack on Singapore will be overland through Siam where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support the Japanese; that heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. Informant states that he has given the names of the alleged Japanese agents to American Military Intelligence. He gives his own information on the Valuation C–3 and states "This looks like a whispering campaign." FBI-Hon and G2–HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Saigon

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C–2): "Following from Free French sailors who left Saigon about August 8th: A. S. S. FRANCOIS LOUIS DREYFUS is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo." Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Francisco." R. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel AMIRAL CHARNER and the submarine PEGASE. C. S. S. SAGITARE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber." FBI-Hon and G2–ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Philippine—Japanese Business in

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation A–1): "A. Local Agents Tokyo Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram August 15th from Tokyo instructing them: 1. To accept no new business or renewals until further
Japanese National Policy

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A translation of a letter from Information Section of Concordia Society to local branch of same, dated 2 July, which states that on that day the national policy in connection with Russo-German war was decided at a liaison conference between the Government and High Command. The following general principles were stated to have been decided upon: A. Japanese Government recognizes as her main guiding principles her national safety and the success at any cost of establishment of new order in East Asia. B. Japan must depend only upon her own strength and resources and concentrate her attention upon East Asia problems. C. She must use every means to further her own aims but always take into consideration the constantly changing international position and must not allow herself to be detracted from her present course by any claims, requests or suggestions, if even slight risk of wasting her power and resources is involved." FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Anti American Measures by Japanese in Occupied China

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 27 July, 1941 Japanese High Command at Canton discussed retaliatory measures against American and British freezing of assets, and the following steps were decided upon and forwarded to Tokyo for approval: 1. Ascertaining financial holdings of Americans and British in South China; 2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of expulsion; 3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. (The Nanking Government to be forced to co-operate in this measure); 4. Expedition of plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces; 5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Nanking Government. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Indo-China

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): "A. Between July 25th and July 29th 12,000 troops left Bangkok for Indo China frontier. B. Partial confirmation is afforded by official Siamese communiques which stated
that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary and special mission units left for frontier — of July. C. An order has been placed with Japanese for delivery in July 1942 of 2 warships probably torpedo boats to replace 3 vessels sunk by French. D. 500,000 TICULS have been paid on account of this order.” FBI-Hon and G-2-D cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1432
Rating “C”

British Secret Agent Far East, reports: A. OKAYANA Airdrome; Between 7 and 13 July, 1941 about 25 aircraft have been arriving here nightly from Japan. On 19 July the following aircraft were based here: 40 tri-motored monoplanes, heavy B; 40 twin-engined monoplanes, Medium B; 40 single-engined monoplane, light B; 60 monoplane fighters; 20 reconnaissance; 4 four-engined transports. This airdrome is about one mile square and is the largest in Formosa. B. 14 July, 1941. 6 fighters arrived at TAIKONU from QUODY Island. C. 10 and 11 July, 1941, 15 fighters arrived at KAGI from Japan. D. 15 July, 1941, 15 monoplane fighters arrived at KETTO from — E. 12 fighters reported at QUEMOY. F. Japanese Naval Units from PESCADORES laid mines, — June, 1941. G. 11 July, 1941, 200 mines and 120 torpedoes landed at — from Japan. FBI-Hon and G2-D cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Confidential

IHM/ba

AUGUST 22, 1941.

From: The District Intelligence Officer.
To: Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence.
Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila; information received from.
Reference:

(a) DIO Conf. Ltr. dated 27 June, 1941 on same subject.
(b) Opnav despatch same subject.

Enclosure: (A) 14ND Cards Nos. 1345-1348, inclusive, and 1351-1355 inclusive.

1. In reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer outlined the proposal of a Mr. Wilkinson, a British Secret Agent in the Far East, that an arrangement be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent, Mr. Harry Dawson, be carried in the special locked compartments of Pan-American Airways clippers flying between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation Mr. Wilkinson would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information gathered by himself and his aides in the Far East and of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy. It was proposed that the District Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts should make the necessary arrangements with Pan-American Airways.

2. Reference (b) stated that the Department could not authorize the above plan at this time because of the status of the matter and the small amount of information submitted. The District Intelligence Officer informed Mr. Dawson of the Department's decision and has declined to forward any further correspondence from Mr. Dawson to Mr. Wilkinson. However, every clipper from the Orient brings confidential mail from Mr. Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, forwarded by the District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District.

3. By dispatch from the District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was informed that Mr. Wilkinson was thoroughly reliable and trustworthy. Investigation in Honolulu discloses that Mr. Wilkinson is the properly accredited branch manager in Manila for Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and that his wife is a grand- [?] daughter of the original Mr. Theo. H. Davies. This company is one of the five largest corporations in the Territory of Hawaii and, although incorporated as an Hawaiian corporation, the majority of its stock is held by members of the Davies family who are British subjects and live in England.

4. Mr. Harry Dawson, above mentioned, is manager of the steamship department of Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, a British subject, and British vice-consul for Hawaii.
5. The District Intelligence Officer considers the information received from Mr. Wilkinson to be of value and requests authority by despatch to effectuate the arrangement proposed by Mr. Wilkinson.

6. Information so far received by this office from Mr. Wilkinson has been furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence on Fourteenth Naval District dissemination cards Nos. 1240, 1322–1326 (inclusive), 1333, 1334, 1345–1348 (inclusive), and 1351–1355 (inclusive). The last nine cards listed are forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A).

I. H. MAYFIELD.

14ND #1333 Rating “B” Japanese Military Armor

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that the Tohoku Imperial University, Japan, Metallurgical Laboratory, has compounded an excellent bullet resisting steel, said to be more efficient than similar foreign steel. According to the patent announcement the steel is composed of: 0.15–0.35% carbon; 0.5–1.5% chrome; 0.6–2.0% manganese; 0.2–1.0% molybdenum; 0.2–1.0% cobalt of vanadium; 0.8% silicon; remainder iron. Discoverers of the steel are K. ONO and S. CAHIBA. FBL (Hon); MID (IID) cognizant.

From 14 ND 8–15–41
To: ONI (2) CINCPAC (2) COM 14 (2)

Japan Military Body Armour

An excellent anti-bullet steel has been evolved by the Metallurgical Laboratory of the Tohoku Imperial University headed by Mr. K. HONDA. According to the Patent Announcement, the steel is composed of the following:

- 0.15–35% of carbon,
- 0.5–1.5% of chrome,
- 0.6–2.0% of manganese,
- 0.2–1.0% of molybdenum,
- 0.2–1.0% of cobalt of banadium,
- 0.8% of silicon

and the remainder iron.

Series of tests for hardness proved that the metal was more efficient than the best foreign anti-bullet steel. Discoverers of the metal are Messrs. K. ONO and S. CAHIBA.

14ND #1334 Rating “B”

Japanese Industrial Management

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports information on above subject, which is related verbatim: A. Controller. Decides all quantities of all materials required by factory under his control. Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc. Can even control development and study of prototype. Decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and adjustment of internal disputes. Supervises allotment of salaries, wages, bonuses. His control is complete and his decisions are final. B. Trained Engineers. All certificated engineers from Imperial Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for Naval, military or aviation factories. Engineers with certificates from private universities (such as Waseda) may work in other defence industries. Factories which are not working for national defense get no certificated engineers. Numbers are carefully fixed, e. g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 Imperial University graduates per annum. System extremely unpopular amongst students. C. Limitation of Salaries. Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1440 Yen. Graduates from private university get 1170 Yen annually. Rises only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 2,000 Yen per annum. D. Artisans. Average wages are 50 to 65 yen per hour, with exceptionally good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this works out at higher salaries than that of certificated engineers. Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this work is often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shaming sick and have taken a week or fortnight’s holiday. Et Discipline. No factory personnel may change their factory or branch of work without consent from the controller. Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will accept no supervision. They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.

F. Naval and Military Friction. This extends to an astonishing degree, even when the same article is being made for both services. Files of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy. All component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with
the result that double checking and control service has to be established. Two distinct trial and reception services have to be established. Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable. FBI-Hen and G-211D are cognizant.

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**Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 6**

*Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War—Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*

The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me 1 through 165, from the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonel Gerald Wilkinson) at Manila to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Honolulu, and were obtained from their respective files.

They comprise reports during the period from June to December 1941.

*Urgent cable received from Manila night of Dec. 3, 1941*

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:


2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Navy Intelligence Honolulu, cc. Col. BICKNELL

Mr. SHIVERS

Capt. MAYFIELD

*Copy of cable received Nov. 27, 1941*

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy).

American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.

Copies to: Mr. SHIVERS

Capt. MAYFIELD

Col. BICKNELL

*Cable recd. from Wellington 25.11.41*

Pacific raider intelligence.

(1) On 6th November U. S. A. “Capillo” sighted surface vessel in 003° 20' South 177° 32' East. Vessel is thought to have been raider G number 41 believed to be “Steiermark” of HAPAG Line.

*Extract from Manila*

To: Capt. MAYFIELD
Mr. SHIVERS
Col. BICKNELL

Following received indirectly from German source, reported to have good connections in Japan.

A. German ambassador Tokio is concentrating:

1. On breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the head of the Japanese fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America.
2. On destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis and Right army groups into a united front.

3. Encouraging higher officers of the KWANGTUNG and Korean armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.

B. German ambassador Tokyo has exercised considerable influence over General SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral ROYOSU NAKAMURA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among civilians were SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURO TOYAMA, KENSO ADACHI.

C. “Waverers” at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.

D. In Korean and Kwangtung forces following are known to be influenced by German ambassador: Lt.-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-General MITUSUNAMI and Lt.-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in far east on basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. S. R. Government resulting in a guarantee of the INVIOLABILITY of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers and, as a consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from the East.

(Value 3.)

Index: German Ambassador, activities in Tokio.

Extract No. 182 for Honolulu

27th October, 1941

To: Col. BICKNELL
Capt. MAYFIELD

---------- report October 6th.

A. September 17th 9 repeat 9 twin-engined bombers left Kagi for West (destination not known).

B. September 18th 12 repeat 12 bombers, 3 repeat 3 fighters and 3 repeat 3 unidentified aircraft left TAIHOKU for Swatow.

C. TOSHIYEN (TAKAO) 2 repeat 2 seaplane hangars, each 160 repeat 160 by 50 repeat 50 by 45 repeat 45 feet have been erected. Rails run from hangars to sea wall where a crane is used for transfer of aircraft into sea.

D. A trial coastal reconnaissance unit of 50 repeat 50 reconnaissance and fighter aircraft is being organised in Formosa. Base of operation and particulars under investigation.

E. Paratroop training is still being carried out at KOGO and ROKKO.

F. Conscription and military training in Formosa has now reached the figure of 500,000 repeat 500,000, about one third of these are already receiving active training which will last over a period of four repeat four months.

G. A new fortress is under construction at SHOZAN (mountain overlooking Takao harbour). Due to utmost secrecy it is not yet known if guns are yet in position.

H. A small arms factory is being built at KOCHIYE (— degrees 15 north 120 degrees 32 east) where a new wharf and six new warehouses have been completed. This place is becoming an important port and a number of large merchant ships have called here. A new motor road connects with TAICHU.

I. At KAKENPH, four repeat four new wharves have been completed bringing total to six repeat six. Lengths vary from 130 repeat 130 to 250 repeat 250 feet. Total of warehouses (130 by 50 feet) number ten repeat ten.

October 2, 1941

Capt. MAYFIELD
Mr. R. SHIVERS
Col. BICKNELL

Following is a result of enquiries and information given in strict confidence from ex Chinese official whose Japanese wife died a few months ago.

A “CHRYSANTHEMUM Society” is a very secret patriotic organization members of which are Japanese wives, mistresses, and female employees of aliens.

B. Unquestionable loyalty to Emperor is shown by them secretly supplying information on a variety of subjects likely to be of assistance in extending power of influence.

C. Members living outside the empire with relatives at home and unable to report direct to their own authorities do so by code letters to homeland. Failure to carry out this sacred duty may result in reprisals against their families.

D. Any confirmation of above would assist further further enquiries.

79716—46—Ex. 148—39
Capt. Mayfield
Mr. R. Shivers
Col. Bicknell

Following is a result of enquiries and information given in strict confidence from ex Chinese official whose Japanese wife died a few months ago.

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D. Any confirmation of above would assist further enquiries.

Capt. Mayfield
Mr. R. Shivers
Col. Bicknell

The most important problems for the Chinese Army, Government and Party are the lack of planes, heavy artillery and the maintenance of the goods prices.

The Chinese Government intend to construct a road from Sikang to British India. This road is to begin at Sichang in the province of Sikang, passes through Yungning and Teching in Yunnan, Teuching and Chavy in Sikang up to Sadiwa, the terminus of the railway in the province Assam. The length will be about a thousand kilometers. The traffic along the Burma-Yunnan road which was originally calculated to be about 3000 tons a month has increased with 7000–10,000 tons a month. At Rangoon and along this road about 200,000 tons are still waiting for transport.

The war Ministry consents to publish gradually the list of killed and wounded men. The estimated loss of the enemy is about two million.

Since the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia the relations between the Kuomintang and Communists are becoming better.

The West road from Ho-erh-kwo-ase near the Chinese Russian frontier to Chungking has a length of 4406 kilometers. The transport along the Burma-Yunan road is about 15,000 tons a month. The road is repeatedly bombed. The Kungkwo bridge has been bombed 16 times, the Hultung bridge 6 times, the Channan bridge 5 times. Damage has not been repaired. Now ferry-boats, pontoon-bridges and wire ropes are used. In ordinary times traffic goes on, but during the rainy season it will be difficult and traffic will probably have to be stopped.

Value not known.
This data well known.
Periodically reported by official U. S. observers on the spot.

Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell

Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell

[Hand written:] Not carded.

INDO CHINA—Persecution of Chinese

The Chinese Embassy at Vichy was informed by Chungking that the Saigon police have arrested a number of Chinese men and women, some for taking part in a patriotic action, some for being suspected to be communists and others because
they refused to pay their taxes to the enemy.' The Ambassador must discuss this question with the French Government and ask them to instruct the Government of Indo-China:

1. To allow respite to those who are behind in paying their taxes.
2. To liberate the suspected people against whom there is no convincing evidence;
3. As the people who took part in the patriotic action are most wealthy merchants and as their arrest and the order to expel them from the country have already caused a repercussion in local business, the Ambassador should request to have them released and the order to expel them cancelled.

Value 1.

[Hand written:] No value & may be reported by U. S. Consul. Not carded.

To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 167 for Honolulu

14th October, 1941.

Informant revisited Sasebo Dockyard in February and reports the following hearsay information.
A. 6,000 ton cruiser was launched in the summer of 1940; and there were then rumours current that her tonnage was, in fact, 10,000 tons.
B. A new cruiser was laid down about January 1941.
C. This is said to be a sister ship of the vessel mentioned in paragraph A above.
D. A "special type destroyer" is being built here.
E. Aircraft carrier, formerly reported as completed has now left Sasebo.
F. In February 1941, 24 repeat 24-hour shifts were being worked and source was told that the yard was mainly employed on refits and repairs.

To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 165 for Honolulu

14th October, 1941.

[Hand written:] rating C
A. — confirms construction of naval small craft at the following yards only: URAGA, FUJIMAGATA AND HARIMA.
B. This is only hearsay, but note that we now have independent reports from three different agents regarding construction at HARIMA yard.
C. — also quotes a Japanese press report that the destroyer TANIKAZE was launched at HARIMA at end of 1940.
Comment (There has always been great confusion regarding this particular destroyer.) The old TANIKAZE was still in commission up to 1935: and in 1937 we reported her as still at sea, having been rearmed and reconditioned.
D. Source was told that destroyers have recently taken 8 repeat 8 months to build from laying down to completion.

To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 163 for Honolulu

14th October, 1941.

— reports on ENOSHIMA Peninsula, 17 kms. WNW of YOKOHAMA, in July 1941.
A. 4 oil tanks have been completed here and 8 are under construction, total 12.
B. 300 repeat 300 labourers are engaged in defence works.
C. A naval ferry service running from HIRATSUKA to YOKOSUKA calls here.

To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 150 for Honolulu

13th October, 1941.

— obtained following hearsay information on Yokosuka dockyard from 3 entirely independent sources.
First sub source, a Tokyo merchant.
A. Capital ship, 43,000 tons launched in summer of 1940.
B. Capital ship, sister ship to above, on slip.
C. Heavy cruiser, over 10,000 tons, on slip.
D. One vessel newly laid down, class unknown.
Second sub source, a Yokohama electrical engineer.
E. Capital ship, over 40,000 tons, on slip.
F. Heavy cruiser, 15 to 25,000 tons, on slip.
Third sub source, a Tokyo journalist.
G. Capital ship, over 40,000 tons, launched June 1940.
H. Capital ship, sister ship to above on slip.
I. Heavy cruiser, 15,000 tons, on slip.
J. Comment. All 3 sources seem agreed that there are 2 heavy ships still on the slips at Yokosuka. (See 14ND card 1824)

Otherwise, all above information is given with utmost reserve.

To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 158 for Honolulu

13TH OCTOBER, 1941.

About 300 workmen from Nagasaki dockyard were employed at Kure from October 1940 to February 1941. ———— following report is based on conversations with these men.
A. The Capital Ship, Nisshin, of over 40,000 repeat 40,000 tons, is now being completed here. Note:
Comment: Contradiction of agent’s previous report that the Nisshin was a 10,000-ton cruiser.
B. Another Capital ship of over 40,000 tons on slip.
C. One heavy cruiser of unknown displacement on slips.
D. One 20,000 repeat 20,000 ton aircraft carrier on slips.
E. Further confirmation of continuous submarine construction, which is now being carried out under supervision of considerable numbers of German technicians, who are constantly to be seen, both in Kure and the surrounding country side.
F. Although we do not repeat not regard the above information as accurate, it agrees remarkably closely with that given by the American Intelligence.

11TH OCTOBER, 1941.

To Capt. Mayfield
Extract No. 157 for Honolulu.

——— having revisited Nagasaki in February and received additional information up to May, reports as follows:—
A. No. 1 Slip. The Kashiwara Maru (tonnage of 27,700 tons confirmed) and her sister ship Itsumo Maru building at Kawasaki Yard, Kobe, are both being converted for use by the Fleet Air Arm.
Note. It is quite uncertain whether these are to be aircraft carriers, seaplane tenders or “aviation transports”.
B. No. 2 Slip. A liner was laid down after launch of Kasuga Maru (April 1941).
Told she was to be towed to SASEBO on 1st May for conversion to aircraft carrier.
C. No. 3 Slip. A 12,000 tons merchant vessel was laid down after launch of Kobe Maru.
D. No. 4 Slip. A 12,000 ton merchant vessel was laid down here after launch of Nitta Maru.
NOTE. Source was told that vessels building on both No. 3 and No. 4 slips had been taken over by the Navy but that up to February 1941 no repeat no alterations had been made to constructional plans.
E. No. 5 Slip. Note. This was formerly mistakenly reported as No. 4 slip.
A “new type destroyer” is believed to be under construction here but slip has been screened.
F. No. 6 Slip (previously reported as No. 5 slip). Capital ship under construction here, was launched on 23rd October, 1940.
Source saw this vessel at a great distance in February 1941 and said it did not look like an aircraft carrier, as there was a heavy forward superstructure and a long low superstructure amidships.
Source was told that this vessel was towed to Sasebo in February, 1941 for completion.
A new naval vessel (class unknown) is now under construction, and the slip is still screened.
G. 24 repeat 24 hour shifts are now being worked at Nagasaki.
Source was told that Kasuga Maru was not repeat not launched until April 1941 and that she was then towed to Sasebo on the 1st May for conversion to an aircraft carrier.

See note to paragraph A above.

**10th October, 1941.**

Col. Bicknell only

Extract No. 176 for Honolulu

It was reported that 500 paratroops trained in the Chiba area by German instructors recently left Sasebo for French Indochina in the destroyer Yukihaze.

Value 5.

**10th October, 1941.**

To: Col. Bicknell

Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

Extract No. 176 for Honolulu

It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North China to proceed Japan under Japanese flag. They will be armed to operate against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok.

Value 4.

**To:** Col. Bicknell

Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

Extract No. 178 for Honolulu

It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North China to proceed Japan under Japanese flag. They will be armed to operate against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok.

Value 4.

**8th October, 1941.**

To: Captain Mayfield

Col. Bicknell

Mr. Shivers

Extract No. 175 for Honolulu

It was reported on 12th September that:

A. German and Japanese S. I. S. have reached AGREEMENT whereby the Germans operate in all far eastern countries not occupied by the Japanese except Burma, Malaya, Indochina, N. E. I., and Philippines which are operated by the Japanese.

B. Inspite of this agreement Germans intend to operate in all far eastern countries under the cover of the D. N. B. In Indochina the D. N. B. and Domei will operate private W/T stations.

C. The Germans in Shanghai are operating, for political information, a Gestapo type of organization.

Value 2

**To:** Mr. Shivers

Col. Bicknell

Capt. Mayfield

Extract from Manila

It was reported on 12th September that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai has been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro in which capacity he will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.

Value 2

**Extract No. 174 for Honolulu**

**8th October, 1941.**

To: Col. Bicknell

Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

Extract No. 173 for Honolulu

It was reported on 12th September that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai has been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro in which capacity he will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.

(Value 2)

**Extract No. 173 for Honolulu**

**7th October, 1941.**

Col. Bicknell only

reports the following alterations in dispositions of Germans working in Japan.

A. Kure. 5 working in shell factory, and 4 in shipbuilding yard.

B. Yokosuka. 18 working in munitions factory, 26 in shipyard, 6 at aerodrome.

C. No change.

D. Maizuru. 5 working on A. R. P.
E. No change.  
F. Totsuka. 18 aviation and parachute instructors, two constructional engineers.  
G. Shirahama. 8 working on aerodrome.  
H. Nakamita. 10 working at aerodrome.  
I. Nagoya. 4 working at Aoki aircraft factory.  
J. Himeji. 5 working at chemical warfare factory.  
K. 3 Germans, living in Osaka, pay periodic visits to Nankia Heavy Industries Corporation to superintend parachute manufacture.  
L. Source was told that 125 Germans, en route for Japan, were detained by U. S. S. R. on outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.  
M. Note please we have already reported movement of 30 German personnel from Japan to Indo China.  

N. Source was further told that there were 11 German aviation and parachute instructors stationed at Nanking, and a total of 84 attached to Japanese forces at Shanghai, Hankow and Nanchang, but this is given with reserve.

**Extract No. 172 for Honolulu**  
6TH OCTOBER, 1941.  

**Col. BICKNELL only**  
Source revisited Shirahama aerodrome and reports as follows.  
A. Area has now been extended to 600 by 750 yards repeat 600 by 750 yards.  
B. A sea wall is being built along the northern boundary and further constructional work is in progress at the North East corner.  
   Total of 1,200 labour force are still employed here.  
C. Following buildings have now been erected to south of aerodrome:  
   1 large single storey workshop,  
   Two storey office.  
   Five oil tanks.  
   There are an additional five tanks on two small islands about one mile to west of aerodrome.  
D. All 10 tanks are described as about 40 feet in diameter and built partially underground with only 4 feet in height projecting above the surface.  
E. *Parachute training centre.* All wounded have now been removed from this establishment which is in full occupation by air force personnel and candidates for parachutist numbering in all 3,400.  
F. A small proportion of these are attending lectures in fighter tactics, but the great majority are undergoing elimination tests before commencing training as para troops.  
   These candidates include a considerable proportion of men formerly engaged in various technical trades such as plumbers and mechanics.  
G. 8 German advisers are attached, two supervising aerodrome construction and six instructing in parachute work and aviation.  
H. 50 women are employed in folding parachutes.

**Extract No. 180 for Honolulu**  
6TH OCTOBER, 1941.  

To: Col. BICKNELL  
Capt. MAYFIELD  
Mr. SHIVERS  

It was reported that—Head of Otto Wolff informed source that acting under instructions from Hamburg headquarters he is buying up materials of which Germany is or will be in great need, e. g. wolfram, rubber, tin, etc. In particular they are interested in purchase of supplies of these in Siam where it is proposed that they shall be stored under innocuous cover names until such time as they can be delivered to Germany.  
(Valuye 2.)

**Extract No. 181 for Honolulu**  
6TH OCTOBER, 1941.  

To. Col. BICKNELL  
Mr. SHIVERS  
Capt. MAYFIELD
N. E. I.—JAPANESE SUSPECT OKANO TETSUO

On board the Kitano Maru the Japanese political agent OKANO TETSUO returned to the N. E. I. OKANO who lived in the Netherlands Indies from 1915, is in the possession of a settlement permit and therefore does not need a visa. According to a police report OKANO was employed by a high Japanese official during his stay in Japan.

During his former stay in the Netherlands Indies OKANO was in close contact with many suspected Japanese.

(Value 1.)

Capt. MAYFIELD
Mr. R. SHIVERS
Col. BICKNELL

It was reported that—
A. Source reports that opinion is being quietly expressed in German circles that Japanese authorities fear that Germany may attempt to resume friendly relations with Chungking Government after defeat or collapse of U. S. S. R. forces.
B. Japanese are alleged to fear that Germany may attempt to supply arms to Chungking via the ALMA ATA route in barter exchange against important Chinese products, and
C. To fear a German-Russian-Chinese commercial bloc since German industries and commerce circles are persistently demanding such a combination in the future since it would ensure to German industries the supply of raw material and would constitute a permanent market for her finished goods.

(Value 3.)

Extract No. 132 for Honolulu

4TH October, 1941.

Capt. MAYFIELD, only

It is reported that—Japanese Consul KAWABACHI with a staff of five is expected to arrive DILLY, TIMOR, by flying boat on 9th or 11th October.

(Value 2.)

Extract No. 171 for Honolulu

3RD October, 1941.

Col. BICKNELL only

— reports further on aerial bomb section of Himeji factory in July.
A. Labour force 700 repeat 700, male and female.
B. This factory is having difficulty in increasing its labour force owing to dangerous nature of work.
C. Three German technicians are attached.
D. On 14th June an order was received for 10,000 flares from the Military Air Department.
E. One ton repeat one ton bombs are now under production and 2,000 repeat 2,000 of these have already been stored.

Extract No. 170 for Honolulu

3RD October, 1941.

Col. BICKNELL only

— reports on Aichi Factory Nagoya in July (following information obtained from a new sub source).
A. 4 German technicians now attached.
B. Labour force increased to 6,000 repeat 6,000.
C. Junkers Jumo engines are being fitted to single engine, single seater army fighters, 25 repeat 25 of which are being completed every month.
D. Experiments on large 3 repeat 3 engined bomber are still being conducted under supervision of German advisers.
Col. BICKNELL only

Extract No. 169 for Honolulu

3rd October, 1941.

 decidedly reports on Nanki Heavy Industries Corporation.
A. Only about 300 repeat 300 of the parachutes produced here every month are of satisfactory quality (i.e. only 50 per cent, but this is given with reserve).
B. Experiments with hemp fibre for parachutes have not repeat not proved satisfactory.
C. Babbed wire is also under production here.
D. Labour force 1,100 repeat 1,100 working 1 shift of 10 hours.

Extract No. 128 for Honolulu

To: Mr. SHIVERS
Col. BICKNELL

October 3rd, 1941

decidedly reports that Japanese proprietor of TRIANGULO Studio, Manila, recently sought him out in order to tell him following:
A. 500,000 men and 3000 tanks now in Formosa.
B. Aerial attack on Philippines to start October 12th.
C. Japanese Navy preparing to intercept 27 American ships en route to Vladivostok.
The circumstances of presentation of this report, as well as its contents, indicate resumption of whispering campaign.
Note similarity to reports on same subject from N. E. I.

Extract No. 153 for Honolulu

Capt. MAYFIELD, only

To: Mr. SHIVERS
Col. BICKNELL

2nd October, 1941.

My telegram of 26th September, paragraphs D and E.
(Both jobs H. I. and V. G. appear to be going to have three turrets, two forward and one aft.)
(Add to No. 149; rate c.)

Extract No. 179 for Honolulu

To: Col. BICKNELL

Capt. MAYFIELD

2nd October, 1941.

Following received indirectly from German source, reported to have good connections in Japan.
A. German ambassador Tokio is concentrating:
1. On breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the head of the Japanese fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America.
2. On destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis and Right army groups into a united front.
3. Encouraging higher officers of the KWANTUNG and Korean armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.
B. German ambassador has exercised considerable influence over General SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUIITSUZU, Admiral RYOOSO NAKAMURA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among civilians were SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURU TOYAMA, KENSO ADACHI.
C. “Waverers” at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.
D. In Korean and Kwantung forces following are known to be influenced by German ambassador: Lt.-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-General MITSUNAMI and Lt.-General TAKAIHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in far cast on basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. S. R. Government resulting in a guarantee of the INVIOABILITY of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers and, as a consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from the East.
(Value 3.)
Extract No. 145 for Honolulu

A. Source reports that on September 20th he met a certain CHIU CHE SHENG, a head of a certain department of the Nanking Ministry of War.

B. Latter stated, appropos of announcement over the radio of sentence passed on a Japanese in Singapore for possession of seditious literature that "not long" General HATA had very secretly approached head of War Ministry, of Nanking, requesting his co-operation in enlistment of Chinese agents for work in Thailand, Burma and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure FUKINESE or Chinese speaking dialect of that province.

C. Chiu Che Sheng stated that a certain number of men were recruited and despatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated Chinese. Those chosen, in all cases, had some previous military knowledge gained through service at one time or another with Chinese forces. According to source CHEN KUANG is responsible directly to Japanese military H. Q. at Nanking and to all their authority.

D. Source endeavours to follow up. It is sent merely because Chiu Che Sheng's statements were spontaneous but it is not known if they have any foundation in fact.

(Value 3.)

The following is a report obtained October 1 from an American Shipping Agent from Kobe enroute to San Francisco.

1. He reports about September 10, 800 trucks assembled in the Sports ground Kobe and loaded soldiers. He could not state regiments since no civilians allowed near but he had opportunity to count the trucks. Their destination was supposedly Dairen.

2. Supplies of lub oil and gasoline are stored in valleys at Itozaki near Naval base, off the Inland sea. These valleys are dammed either end with concrete blocks—the whole stored area covered with soil and grass planted. A stevodor superintendent told him Japanese navy has oil reserves for 2 years.

3. Maruzen Oil Co., Shanghai reported to be still importing gasoline and oil from U. S. which is then transhipped to Japan.

4. In early September a Frenchman from Saigon told him the Japanese were bluffing regarding troop numbers in French Indo China to divert public attention from the huge numbers being sent to the Siberian front via Dairen. The Frenchman estimated Japanese troops in French Indo China were only 35,000.

5. He reports the intense anti-American and British feeling in both Kobe and Yokohama. Every obstacle is put in the way of these nationals trying to complete formalities to leave the country. Both British and Americans have to stand in line in the streets for hours awaiting their applications to local police or prefecture officials examination, only to be told to come again next day. Personal search is made, particularly of British before they leave. One man, a Canadian (CPR Agent) was forced to lower his pants before embarking whilst police examined his body for hidden money.

(Valuation C2.)

Extract No. 135 for Honolulu

30th September, 1941.

Only to Col. BICKNELL

INDO CHINA—AVIATION—LANDING GROUND AT: CAP. ST. JACQUES

(Cap. St. Jacques Town—107°06 East 10°21 North)

It will be noticed that the centre arm of the "T" has been somewhat extended, and that parts of the old landing Ground have been neglected and short scrub is now growing there.

Surface. The ground is reported as not suitable for Heavy Bombers. Surface is sandy and not liable to flooding. Source considers that the surface would be firmer after rain than during dry weather.

Buildings: NIl.

Activities: There is, at present, little activity and the Landing Ground is not being used.

A small Japanese guard is, however, on duty at nights.

(Valuation B 1.)
To: Col. Bicknell,  
Mr. Shivers  

It was reported that Admiral Decoux  
A. Expressed his surprise at the many facilities accorded to Japanese in  
southern Indo China and his intention to put a stop to it. From personal  
observation in Saigon it was stated that something appears to have been done.  
B. Stated that he had given instructions to Press to cease attacks on Britain  
and U. S. This was confirmed by Editor of "Breton" who states these instruc-  
tions were given to a Press Meeting on 20th September.  
(Value 2.)

*Extract No. 151 for Honolulu*  
29th September, 1941

Capt. Mayfield, only  
— revisited Kure at beginning of July but was unable to enter dockyard  
himself owing to increased security measures.  
We are of course unable to interrogate his sub source directly and following  
information is therefore given with reserve.  
A. Job F8. Construction of upper works has been commenced.  
B. Jobs C. 96 and C. 97. Vessels are expected to be launched in October and  
completed in January 1942.  
C. German merchant ships. Two German merchant ships of 6,000 and 4,000  
tons respectively were being overhauled and refitted, having arrived from Kobe  
on 2nd June. (Add 17 of #152)  
(omit) Their structure was said to have deteriorated to such an extent as  
to make them unable to carry the guns for which they had been designed and  
they would therefore be with lighter guns than had originally been intended.)  
Source was told that these vessels would probably operate as troop transports  
under Japanese flag.  
D. Labour force. Has recently decreased to 6,300 repeat 6,300: this is believed  
due to shortage of raw materials; and superfluous labour was released for work  
in rice fields. (Miroshima is a rice growing district.)  
One 10 repeat 10-hour shift is being worked on all shipbuilding jobs.  
E. New shell factory. Labour force has been increased to 2,400 repeat 2,400  
working in three shifts.  
F. German technicians. Five repeat five are attached to shell factory and  
four to shipyard.  
(Rate C.)

To: Col. Bicknell,  
Mr. Shivers  

It was reported that—  
A. The better class Annamites are pro French and anti Japanese and will not  
join Pan Asiatic League the Japanese are forming. The Japanese are obtain-  
ings recruits for this League from the unemployed clerk class and from among  
hired car drivers who are employed by them.  
B. The Chinese more than any other community are inclined to cooperate  
with Japanese especially when their pockets gain.  
C. There is talk of the formation of a Buddhist League.

Valuation 2

*Extract No. 150 for Honolulu.*  
27th September, 1941  

Only to Col. Bicknell  
A. Army Air Stations.  
ASAHIGAWA: pin point 43 degrees 44 minutes North, 142 degrees 28  
Minutes East. (Hokkaido)  
FUKAYA: pin point 36° 9' North, 139° 16' East.  
MIKATAGAHARA: pin point 34° 47' North, 137° 35' East.

B. Naval air stations.  
KURIDA: pin point 35° 37' North 135° 7' East.
C. Commercial Aviation Fields.
NOSHIRO: pin point 40° 10' North, 140° 01' East.

D. Landing fields with little or no equipment.
NAIRO: South East coast of Sakhalien: pin point 49° 06' North, 142° 57' East.
AKKESHI: pin point 43° 05' North, 144° 50' East.
HIROO: pin point 42° 22' North, 143° 21' East.
TAKENOHARA: 39° 8' North, 141° 3' East.
KOFU: 35° 42' North, 138° 28' East.
TO TORA: 35° 36' North, 134° 16' East.
SHIBUSHI: 31° 32' North, 131° 9' East.

Extract No. 149 for Honolulu

Capt. Mayfield, only

------- revisited Maizuru dockyard at end of June and reports as follows:
A. Pocket battleship afloat, "KISHU." Vessel is still berthed near the slip from which she was launched.

Source was told that although the (rate D) Naval authorities were not repeat not satisfied with her performance, improvements could only be effected by extensive reconstruction. The authorities have decided not repeat not to undertake this, and vessel would therefore shortly join the sea-going fleet.

B. Pocket battleship on slip. Work still suspended.

C. Two small vessels on slips. Work still suspended, and hulls appear to have been put in a state of preservation, painted black and covered with canvas.

D. Job H.J.

Forward superstructure: 6 storeys have now been completed and source was told there were to be 11 in all.

Midship superstructure. A row of steel girders has been erected on the after section. The section adjacent to the after superstructure has been increased in height, and what appears to be the stump of a mainmast is now visible.

Aircraft hangar. Source was told that the low structure immediately aft of the forward superstructure was to be the aircraft hangar.

Note. Source has previously reported that this ship was identical with "Job 45" at Yokosuka, and this resemblance appears to be growing.

E. Job V.6.

Forward superstructure. 7 storeys are now completed and work has commenced on the 8th.

Source was told this superstructure would also have 11 storeys.

F. (Rate D.) Source was told that launching of both these vessels had been delayed until December, but that it was expected to complete them by April. He volunteered the explanation that the short period required for completion was made possible by the advanced state of construction before launching.

He was also told that the difference at present to be seen between these two ships would disappear when they were completed.

G. 10 repeat 10-hour shifts were being worked on both ships.

H. (Rate D.) 2 new destroyers projected. Source was told that, although blue print plans for these vessels had arrived in the yard, work had not repeat not commenced, due to the inability of Yawata Iron Works to supply constructional steel.

He was told that at least one of the destroyers would be built in dry-dock.

1. 4 repeat 4 submarines (2 identified as 1.57 and 1.64) were in harbour.

J. Labour force in shipyard was reduced to 5,300 repeat 5,300 during June. About 7,000 repeat 7,000 Korean labourers are engaged in defence works outside the dockyards.

K. A. R. P.

Source was told that 5 Germans were supervising A. R. P. organization. He saw 4 large cases of sound locators arrive by train.

He was told that all important archives had been shifted from this dockyard, in anticipation of bombing attacks in the event of war with Russia.

Extract No. 152 for Honolulu

Capt. Mayfield, only

Japan Naval Kure Dockyard

25th September, 1941.
Increased Security Measures

1. Source was unable to visit the dockyard in person, owing to increased security measures, and all the following information has been secured from a contact of his who had access to the yard. This sub-source has not been interrogated and his information is therefore given with reserve.

2. At the end of May a new permit for entry into the dockyard was issued and several arrests were made of unauthorized persons in the vicinity of the dockyard.

3. This was partially due to the increased troop movements from Ujina. Sub-source reports on dockyard at the beginning of July:—

Job F. 8
4. Work was progressing on the upperworks.

2 DESTROYERS. C.96 and C.97
5. Vessels expected to be launched in October and completed in January 1942.

German merchant ships
6. Two German vessels, 6,000 and 4,000 tons respectively, arrived in the yard on 2nd June from Kobe for overhaul and refitting, and were still here at the beginning of July.

No card—reported in #151 add to #151

7. It was found that the ships were in poor condition. They are therefore being more lightly armed than originally planned.

8. Sub-source was told that these vessels, on completion of refitting, would operate as transports under the Japanese flag.

Note: This last item is given with the utmost reserve.

Labour force
9. Decreased to 6,300.
10. One 10-hour shift is worked on all shipbuilding jobs.
11. Decrease in labour force has been due to shortage of raw materials, and superfluous labour has been released for work in the ricefields. (Miyoshima is a rice growing district).

Shell factory
12. Labour force increased to 2,400 working in 3 shifts.

GERMAN TECHNICIANS. 5 are attached to shell factory, 4 to shipyard.

Extract No. 146 for Honolulu

Capt. Mayfield, only
25th September, 1941.

A. Our telegram of 24th September, paragraph C. suggests that the ship launched is the pocket battleship which we have previously reported as building at Yokouska, but regarding which no further information was obtainable on ——last trip.

B. Please note this is only conjecture, and we have no repeat no definite evidence to support it.

To: Col. Bicknell
Capt. Mayfield

—— reports.
A. 2 new types of Japanese heavy bombers have recently appeared in North China. They are described as “type 98 and type 99 Naval.”

B. Only specifications available and which apply to both types are:
Duration of flight, when not repeat not carrying maximum load, 10 repeat 10 hours.
Speed not repeat not more than 250 miles repeat 250 miles per hour.
Service ceiling 35,000 repeat 35,000 feet.
C. The Hitachi aircraft works and the Ikegai Iron works are both producing German Jumo Junkers aero engines.

Combined output of these two works is 40 to 50 Jumo aero engines per month.

Note: Both these factories are located in town of Kawasaki which is mid-way between Tokyo and Yokohama and should not repeat not be confused with factory at Kobe.
D. Air force connections have recently been replaced by new men: this information is therefore not repeat not as reliable as that formerly obtained from same source and should be accepted with reserve pending confirmation.

Extract No. 133 for Honolulu

24th September, 1941.

Capt. Mayfield only

A. ______ revisited Yokosuka dockyard at beginning of June but, owing to greatly increased security measures was unable to walk about the yard as on previous occasions.

B. He was obliged to remain in the waiting room in the administrative building, but was able to see the two large ships, jobs A45 and F15, both of which were still on the slips.

C. Note please that this contradicts reports by ______ that one heavy ship was launched here in the Spring; but discrepancy can be explained, if his statement in report under reference that three heavy ships are building here is correct.

D. Job A45. Main alternation of appearance is in forward superstructure where 7th story has been completed, 8th story has been added and 9th storey has been begun.

Source was told that there were to be 11 repeat 11 storeys in all, a fire control top being the 11th.

Source was also told that the aircraft hangar was situated in the low structure immediately aft of the forward superstructure.

Source was also told that this ship was due to be launched in October repeat October and to be completed in April, 1942. Note. Very short time for completion may be explained by the unusually advanced condition in which this ship is apparently being launched.

E. Job F15. Forward superstructure. 6th storey has been completed and work has commenced on a 7th storey which is built in at the after end.

Source was informed, but not repeat not definitely, that launch would take place about the same time as capital ships.

F. 24 repeat 24 hour shifts are still being worked on both these vessels.

G. Source was told that there was a total of 26 German technical advisers in the ship building department of which 4 were supervising the fitting out of these two vessels, particularly as regards the following points,

1. Mounting of new type of anti-aircraft gun.
2. Construction of fire control tower.
3. Improved method of catapulting aircraft.

H. Destroyers. Source was told that work on the two destroyers under construction here had been held up by shortage of steel produced by the Yawata Iron Works.

Source was told that 4 submarines and one transport were being refitted here in June.

J. Labour force. Total labour force in shipyard estimated at 8,800 repeat 8,800.

K. A. R. P. Source saw 9 air raid shelters near the main offices; constructed of concrete and estimated to be 120 feet by 60 feet by 11 feet high, of which 4 feet was below ground level.

Extract No. 173 for Honolulu

Only to Ricknell

24th September, 1941.

Indo China Aviation Landing Grounds

The following are less important Landing Grounds in South Indo China, but worthy of mention:

1. Baria (107 11 East 10 31 North) 245 x 300 metres.
2. Hon Quan (106 36 East 11 37 North) 600 x 130 metres.
3. Long Thanh (105 17 East 11 7 North) 400 x 150 metres.
4. Nui Bara—500 x 350 metres.
5. Trang Bang (106 22 East 11 1 North) 400 x 400 metres.
6. Vin Chau (106 54 East 10 10 North) 580 x 270 metres.
7. Vo Dat (107 36 East 11 14 North) 600 x 750 metres.
8. Soetrang (105 31 East 9 32 North) 510 x 250 metres.
Of the above the following is known:

No. 5. Cannot be enlarged owing to nature of surrounding country.

No. 7. Of earth and grass surface. Liable to flooding during rains.

No. 8 SOCTRANG. Situated 2 kms to the SW of SOCTRANG on the road to FAI XAU. Ideal for enlargement as it is surrounded by flat land. Japanese have purchased the surrounding land and intend to enlarge and build an important aerodrome there.

Valuation B. 2

(Page 53C of Exhibit 6 is an outline map of Thailand and French Indochina and will be found reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

**Japanese air bases in Indo-China**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of hangars</th>
<th>Landing Area in yards</th>
<th>Runways</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TONGKING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?Bacinh</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>1220 x 1220</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>Always serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia lam (Hanoi)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1220 x 1220</td>
<td>2(600 x 44)</td>
<td>Always serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiphong (Cat Bl)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2400 x 440</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?Laichau</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>660 x 230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGSON</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>800 x 500</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laosay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1300 x 220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu lang thuong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>660 x 660</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phutho</td>
<td>(small)</td>
<td>780 x 200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNAM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhatrang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>550 x 300</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel &amp; repairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touane</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>2(1300 x 44)</td>
<td>Liable to flood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCHIN—CHINA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bienhoan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1100 x 770</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel. Repairs. W/T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompong Trach</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>880 x 44</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel. Minor repairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phnompenh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>990 x 880 x 660</td>
<td>3(880 x 44)</td>
<td>Always serviceable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sem reap (Angkor)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>2700 x 1900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soctrang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1100 x 880</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel. Repairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tansoumhut (Saigon)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1100 x 880</td>
<td>2(1300 x 44)</td>
<td>Always serviceable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

? Not certain if Japanese have actually used this base.

Only to Col. Bicknell

*Extract No. 136 for Honolulu*

24th September, 1941.

**INDO CHINA AVIATION LANDING GROUNDS**

The following is a list of other Landing Grounds mentioned as existing in Indo China in 1938:

*Province of Annan.—AN-KHE; BA NGOI; BA METHUOT; DAK TO; DALAT; DONG HOI; DRAN; HA CO; PHAN RANG; PHANTHET; PHU CAT; QUANG NGAI; QUANG TRI; TAM KY; TAN, MY; THANH HOA; VINH; VINH HA O; TUY HOA; VAN XUAN; CANH DUONG:*

*Province of CAMBODIE.—CHROUI SRADAN; HAUT CHLONG; KOMPONG CHNANG; POMPONG THOM; KRATIE; MUONG OU DONG; PREY VENG; PURSAT; SAMBOR; SISENHON; SOAI RIENG;*

*Province of LAOS.—BAN DON; BAN NA XALA; BAN NONG BOA; PHON PHO; BAM THOUFEI; BUN KHONG; LA KHONE PENG; LAK SAO; LUANG PRABANG; MUONG SINI; NAPE; PAKSANE; PAKSE; SAM NEUA; SAVANAKET; KIENG KHOUANG:*

In all cases where any of these Landings have not been referred to in previous reports, it can be assumed that they are small. State of preservation, if still in existence, is unknown and doubtful.

Capt. Mayfield, only

Extract No. 154 for Honolulu
23rd September, 1941.

Japan Naval Maizuru Dockyard

Source revisited Maizuru dockyard at the end of June and reports as follows:

(A) Pocket Battleship Afloat—"Aisuru"
1. This vessel was seen berthed near the slip from which she was launched.
2. No work was going on, but source saw the large crane had been moved near her.
3. He was told that it was expected that this vessel would soon be sent to join the fleet, although the (Naval Authorities were not satisfied with her. This was because improvements could only be made by extensive reconstruction, which could not be authorized.)

(B) Pocket Battleship on Slip
4. Work was still suspended on this vessel.

(C) Two Small Vessels on Slips
5. No further work on these vessels.
6. Entire keels have been covered with canvas, and painted black. Source was told that this was to preserve the steel.

(D) Job "H.1."

Forward Superstructure:
7. Six storeys have been completed and work has begun on the seventh.
8. Source was told that there were going to be eleven storeys in all.

Note.—This agrees with what he was told concerning the A.45 at Yokosuka.

Midships Superstructure:
9. A row of steel bars has been put up in the after section.
10. The section adjacent to the aft superstructure has been increased in height, and a post or main mast is visible.

Aircraft hangar
11. Source was told that the low structure immediately aft of the forward superstructure was the aircraft hangar.

(E) Job V.6.

Forward Superstructure
12. Seven storeys now completed and work has commenced on the eighth.
13. Source was told that this vessel, also, was to have eleven storeys.

II. 1. and V.6 General
14. Source was told that launch of both these vessels had been delayed until December, but that it was expected to complete them by April, this brief period for completion will be made possible by the advance state of construction before launching.
15. In conversation with dockyard employee, source commented on dissimilarity of forward superstructure on these two vessels, and on that of the A.45 at Yokosuka. He was told that on completion these differences would disappear.
16. 10-hour shifts were worked on these vessels.

(F) Proposed Two New Destroyers.
17. Although the plans of these vessels had arrived at the yard, work had not commenced, owing to the inability of the Yawata Iron Works to supply steel.
18. Source was told that at least one of the destroyers would be built in a dry-
dock.

(G). MISCELLANEOUS.

Vessels refitting.

19. Four submarines were seen moored in the harbour, two of which were seen
to be L 57 and L 64.
20. One large armed trawler was seen in dry dock.

Labour Force:

21. This was reduced to 5,300 by repeat 5,300 in the shipyard in June.
22. About 7,000 Korean labourers are engaged in the preparation of defence
works outside the dockyard.

MILITARY POLICE:

23. A unit of 35 gendarmes is stationed in the dockyard.

A. R. P.

24. Source was told that five Germans were attached to assist in A. R. P.
matters.
25. At the end of June, source saw four large cases of sound locators arrive
by train.
26. He was told that important documents had been shifted from the dockyard
in anticipation of war with Russia. Should this occur, it is expected that
Maiwara will be bombed.

Extract No. 99 for Honolulu

--- reports September 5th, Hainan Island.

A. Among instructions issued by General TERAUCHI SHOICHI (DQU ANR
COM AAB) to forces in this area were:
1. Black out exercises to commence from September 10th.
2. To complete by end of October the construction of 5 repeat 5 small arms
factories. They are under direction of engineer Colonel HARAKAMI (ACY
AAG).
3. Following are principal Intelligence Agents appointed at:—
Hainan Island, SANO (AFQ TAK).
Indo-China, TSUKADA (CIG JYS).
Canton, YOSHIMOTO TAIGIRO (BAD GOK CQU MAY SQU).
C. August 24th 500 repeat 500 cases of bombs, 1,200 repeat 1,200 cases of
shells and 300 repeat 300 cases of aircraft spares landed at YU LIN KAN from
Japan.

Extract No. 100 for Honolulu

D. August 25th 22 repeat 22 twin engine bombers, commanded by Colonel
MORIYAMA (HDU DYA) arrived at KIUNG SHAN aerodrome from Formosa
(stated to be dive bombers but this is to be accepted with reserve and source
is being questioned on this type).
E. According to air force gossip it has been decided that with the advent of
foggy season at Chung-King aircraft at Hankow will be transferred to the
southern area and that after September 500 repeat 500 bombers are to be
based in Indo-China.

To Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

Extract No. 136 for Honolulu

23rd September, 1941.

JAPANESE DAILY NOTES, YAMAMOTO Goro, VISA REFUSED

September 6th, 1941—YAMAMOTO Goro, member of the Mitsubishi Shoji
Kaisha applied for a visa at the Netherlands consulate general at Bangkok.
He has been in the Netherlands Indies from February 19, 1940, till June 17,
1941, as a representative of the aforesaid firm, but travelled over West and
Middle Java with YOSHIDA Toshio, naval officer and Major FUKUDA Nasue,
A medical officer. He now explains that his former stay at Java was connected with the audit of the accounts of the Mitsubishi concern (Batavia and Soera-buja branches). However he never applied for a labour permit.

As there is no sufficient reason now for a renewed audit of the accounts after 4 months, visa was recommended for refusal.

Valuation 1.

Only to Col. Bicknell

Extract No. 134 for Honolulu

20th September, 1941.

JAPANESE TROOPS IN INDO-CHINA

A. Partial confirmation as to presence of puppet troops in Indo-China is afforded from Free French sources, who put their proportion of total very much lower, i.e. 40 repeat 40 per cent Chinese and 10 repeat 10 per cent Manchukuo or Korean.

B. Our opinion (based on experience in Formosa, Hainan and South China) is that proportion of puppet troops to Japanese in always greatly exaggerated and has very seldom proved to be more than 20 repeat 20 per cent.

For Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

September 19, 1941.

Survey of the Political Situation in Japan

Excellent survey for Sept. 19

According to a well-informed Japanese, the army as well as about fifty ultranationalistic, pan-Asian organizations brought heavy pressure upon the Japanese government and the Navy in order to attack the oil tankers from America Vladivostokward. The Navy refused positively, maintaining that it was not up to her to force Japan's national policy, being however prepared to carry out the policy decided by the Emperor with all its might.

The Japanese Navy seems as yet to be opposed to provoke America and is aware to be no match for the combined America-Allied Forces in the Pacific.

The army is firmly determined to continue to assist Germany in accordance with Tripartite Pact by binding the Allied Forces in South-East Asia through its occupation of Indo-China, which country Vichy handed over to the Japanese by the order of Hitler and through concentration of big military forces (about one million) at the Manchukuo frontier in order to lighten the pressure on Germany's East front.

The army was absolutely convinced that the Russian resistance would be soon annihilated, being much impressed by the reports of the Japanese military mission to Germany under Lt. General MATSUSHIMA. That army therefore expected soon to be able to occupy Siberia and the Maritime Provinces.

The army authorities and the majority of the Japanese people however gradually realize that a quick destruction of Russia's army cannot be counted on, with the result that the army is holding back for the present.

The recent speech of General Baron Sadao ARAKI concerning the necessity of internal unity against the threatening danger from abroad, really has the difference of opinion between the army and navy about Japan's immediate policy as its background.

Admiral Sankichi TAKAHASHI, Cabinet-adviser and one of the most powerful Navy leaders, published recently an article in which he doubted whether Germany will win the war and which should be considered as a hint, that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was a blunder.

The dispute between Army and Navy is supposed to have strengthened the position of KONOR and the entourage of the Emperor, giving the present cabinet a chance to maintain itself and to withhold the army from bringing about an armed conflict.

However, all this by no means implicates that Japan directly will turn its back on Hitler, nor will Japan be inclined to negotiate about the withdrawal of its troops from Indo-China. This is considered impossible, firstly in view of the fact that the Axis-Pact was announced by Imperial Decree and secondly because of the vital importance of the stranglehold on Indo-China by Japan, both economically and strategically.
Another question to be reckoned with is the mission to Indo-China of Ambassador YOSHIZANA and his suite of Army, Navy, and other officials, which actually prepared Yoshizawa's appointment to Governor-General of Indo-China.

September 18, 1941.

To: Capt. Mayfield, Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

It is reported on 7th September, that:
A. Japanese Consul General Batavia stated that Japanese Government intend to attach the courier NOMOTO TATSUO to the Consulate for two months after his return from Singapore.
B. Consul General ISHIZAWA stated that N. is cipher expert attached to give instructions on use of the new complicated Japanese code.
C. N. told Immigration authorities that he would hold conferences at various Japanese Consulates and would serve as a temporary cashier at Consulate General.
D. It was stated KAWASAKI YOSHIZAKI, who sailed from Japan on 11th September, was registered as a secretary to Consulate General but was in reality a code expert in service of Japanese Navy.

September 17, 1941

To: Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
It was reported on September 14 that General WU YI PING, who returned that day from Tokio after a special visit on behalf of Nanking Government stated:
A. KONOYE Cabinet was experiencing much difficulty as a result of increasing criticism from extreme right-wing elements who were secretly demanding energetic measures to be taken to conceal Japan’s position in the TIEH YO.
B. If it was true Premier had strengthened his position by obtaining support of the so-called “court groups” it was doubtful if this support was powerful enough to keep despotism of Rightists in full check. Main argument of the latter is that Japan, in order to gain any real results from conversations with America and democracies in general, will have to make definite concessions, not only in both China and Far East questions in general, but most probably in connection with her future relations to Axis.
C. Equally the Government understands that such concessions (particularly in relation to the China incident, which was started by the Army extremists) may lead to open insubordination of extreme Right groups and adoption of a provocative policy by them, either in north or south, which will finally identify Japan’s fate with that of Germany.
D. Cabinet’s policy is therefore to drag out conversations with America to the utmost possible limit and to profit by any easing in the Far East situation to strengthen its own position.
E. Cabinet is also exercised as to the final effects of British and American economic policy and while it is putting on a bold front at present it realizes that the Japanese people are becoming anxious as to the future. This anxiety has been further increased by the inability of Germany to force a quick decision against Russia and thus help to remove the menace of the Soviet forces in the Far East.

Value 3

Extract No. 123 for Honolulu

17th September, 1941.

- - - - - - - reports:
A. Important fortifications with heavy calibre guns “facing south” at Keishu (22 degrees 29 min North 120 degrees 36 min. East).
Comment. This position appears to be about 4 miles from the sea and the purpose of such fortifications is hard to understand.
B. Calibre of largest guns mounted at Kotobuki Yama (Ape Hill; northern defences of Takao; subject of numerous reports in 1936 and 1937) is 14 inch repeat 14 inch.

Extract for Honolulu

Sept. 17, 1941.

July 18, 1941

From censorship we learned that an AGARIE Saburo at Pelew (writing to a fisherman at Ambon) employed by the Japanese Navy Ministry “gathered sand and stones.”
"As you know" thus he writes further to his friend, "there are starting this year, 100 persons enlisted yearly as "celestial storming troops" destined for the Netherlands Indies. Although I should like to take part in it, I abandoned this plan, as I earn monthly 200 and 300 yen."

It is very remarkable that some time ago a similar letter concerning the training on the Island of Yap of storm troops destined for the Netherlands East Indies came to our attention.

July 19, 1941


To this person, formerly managing director of Nanyo Koshitsu Kaisha at New Guinea, entrance was refused to this country because of his devising plans to attack this country, as was revealed from his writing during a home search at the N. K. K. office at Nanokward. According to him the Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha was an outpost of the Japanese southward move, and his employees were the stormtroops. In connection with the discovery of this compromising correspondence he was dismissed by his company just as was (for the same reason) IWOUE Yoshio administrator.

It is not without interest that this arduous southward expansionist now entered the service of the notorious Ishihara! Only to Col. Bicknell

Extract No. 142 for Honolulu

16th September, 1941.

It is reported that—
A. 40 of the 80 Japanese aircraft at Tienho and Pakwan received orders to fly to Indo China on 20th August.
B. 7,000 Korean conscripts who were training in Heito Formosa were sent to Hainan middle August.
C. Japan troop Hainan (Runin).
D. Passed with reserve. Untried source.
Value 4.

Mr. Shivers
Col. Mayfield
Col. Bicknell

CONFIDENTIAL

It was reported that,
A. During conversation with a Japanese source in YAMASHITA line it was learned that owing to the acute shortage of shipping available for carrying Japanese goods from Japan to Shanghai, Japanese were considering possibility of chartering foreign flag vessels for Yokohama and Kobe Shanghai runs.

Same source also reports investigation of a market in which he is personally interested, i.e., export of Japanese manufactured imitation Panama hats, fibre and paper hoods to United States shows Japanese are making contracts with third parties here to sell their goods in order to obtain U. S. currency.

B. Goods in question are imported from Japan marked "Made in China" and sold by third parties hereto importers in U. S. against cash U. S. dollars or against letter credit to foreign exporters.

Note:
1. It has been consistently rumored on China coast that this is being abitted by British merchants in Hongkong—
2. It is a fact that much of this goods moves through Hongkong.

Extract No. 122 for Honolulu

September 16, 1941.

——— has supplied a sketch map of Yokosuka dockyard.

Points of interest are:—
A. One new building slip in position between No. 3 and No. 4 dock, as shown in sketch map.
B. 2 new, very small, slips in basin adjacent to railway station, on each of which one motor torpedo boat is being built.
C. No repeat any alterations in dry docks.
D. Confirms position of small repair slip astern of "Mikasa already reported by ——— agent in November, 1940.
Extract No. 120 for Honolulu.

13th September, 1941.

--- reports.
A. Appearance in South China area of new type of high altitude bomber built in Germany.
B. Described as Heinkel-land (IJA OMR GYH OYK) type 98 repeat 98.
C. Its special function is "silent approach" bombing.

Extract for Honolulu

September 12, 1941.

Between August 7 and August 10 mine layers for Pescadore laid further mines off TAI AN KEI.
August 13, 9 repeat 9 destroyers and 4 repeat 4 gunboats arrived KEELUNG and 3 repeat 3 destroyers arrived TAKAO from Japan and sailed after refueling.
August 9, 100 repeat 100 mines and 10 repeat 10 motor launchies were loaded on transport which left for Indo-China.

Extract No. 98 for Honolulu

11th September, 1941.

JAPAN—ECONOMIC—EFFECT OF ALLIED PRESSURE ON JAPAN IN N. E. I.

Concerning the economic pressure on Japan the following can be remarked.
IMAGAWA Yoshiotchi, Director of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Batavia, is rumoured to have said that the economic retaliatory measures taken by England, America and the Netherlands East Indies were a heavy blow for Japan’s economic position, but, in view of the good relations with Thailand, Indo-China, Manchuria and occupied China, Japan would quickly recover from it.

The difficult point was always and would remain whether the oil supplies would be stopped or not. The Japanese ambassadors in America and England had received instructions to do their utmost to prevent the stopping of these supplies. In the other case Japan would not hesitate but immediately take the necessary steps to occupy Borneo.

In the latter case (provided the Japan Japs had not attacked the other islands) England and America would only protest and not intervene.

According to a report from Soerabaja some big Japanese firms as for instance the Naayo Veen (Southern Godown Company) dismissed already members of their staff. In view of a report in Japanese newspaper the Japanese Consul at Soerabaja wrote this newspaper that the Japanese banks and firms did not intend to close down following the Netherlands economic measures. A similar letter he addressed to the head of the local Government of Soerabaja.

Valuation C 9.

Extract No. 119 for Honolulu.

11th September, 1941.

--- has again visited Himeji but has not repeat not been able to obtain any satisfactory confirmation of the location or existence of the aerial bomb and poison gas factory previously reported.

Extract No. 116 for Honolulu

10th September, 1941.

--- while in Japan, was given the following information by Formosan friends from Takao area regarding Toshiyen Naval Base.
A. 4 repeat 4 dry docks completed.
B. Submarines are based here.
C. New aerodrome completed.

Extract No. 117 for Honolulu

10th September, 1941.

--- reports that the underground hangars at Okayama aerodrome reported in my telegram of September 3rd, paragraph C, are built to a similar design to that of Kasumigaura aerodrome and that they have a capacity for 50 repeat 50 aircraft.
From censorship we learned that MURAKAMI Shogo, employee of the Tijjoda Department Store, Soerabaja, in possession of a temporary residence permit dated 8.4.34, No. 454, being on furlough in Japan, follows a course at school of great importance for the National Policy where he received lessons from officers of the Army and Navy, and from officials of the Ministry of Overseas affairs.

The name of the School he indicates as "XXX Institute, the teachers are marked in the same way XXX officers of the Army etc.,

Undoubtedly the School in question is one of the "Southward Expansion" schools where Japanese colonists are trained for their future task of propaganda and espionage.

Moreover Murakami is a great admirer of the German "Kultur", as we in February already learned from censorship. He has made a study of the German language and intended to go to Germany.

In connection with the above his temporary residence permit was cancelled by Government Order as he is considered dangerous for public peace and order.

Value C 9.

Extract No. 118 Honolulu.

10th September, 1941.

---- reports the construction of a new aerodrome at Toko, which affords independent confirmation of telegram of 15th May.

Extract No. 94 for Honolulu

9th September, 1941.

N. E. I.; JAPANESE—REPRESENTATIVES OF OSAKA MAINICHI AND TOKYO NIOHI NICI
FORCED TO LEAVE N. E. I.

ISHIBASHI Tsuneyoshi and TOBISHIMA Sadashirero, representatives of the Osaka Mainichi and Tokio Nichi Nichi were forced to leave the country. In the future no reporters of the above mentioned Japanese newspapers will be allowed to enter the Netherlands Indies. The aforesaid measure was enforced on account of the systematic anti-Dutch press campaign in these papers.

ISHIBASHI, moreover, made photo's in forbidden areas and violated the alien registration ordinance.

Value 1.

Extract No. 95 for Honolulu.

9th September, 1941.

N. E. I. JAPANESE ACTIVITIES AND APPLICATIONS FOR VISAS

ARAKI Keijiro, managing director of Toyo Bosuifu Manufacturing Co. applied for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Tokio. He intends to stay here for 3 months to inspect a rubber factory now under construction at Soerabaja following up his visit to this country in December in connection with the erection of a factory of waterproof cloth at Soerabaya. Although this matter is still under consideration and for this purpose MASHIBA Tetsuo, a proxy of this firm, is already in this country, it was advised to grant the visa under condition however that the duration of his stay is limited.

SHIGITA KENZO, exporter of automobile parts, accessories, etc. applied for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Shanghai. He intends to make a 2 month's business trip over Java. Applicant paid already a visit of about 14 days in April 1940 and a visit of about 20 days in January-February 1941 to Java. No objection.

HAYASHI Junjiro, acting manager of Nomura & Co. Singapore, who on 29th July left this country by plane after having paid a short visit to Batavia, again applied for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Singapore, as he has
to negotiate once again with the director of the Batavia Branch of this firm. It was advised to grant the visa provided the duration of his stay is fixed previously.

Extract No. 96 for Honolulu

9th September, 1941.

N. E. I.: JAPANESE EVACUATION OF WOMEN

In connection with the growing political tension between Japan and the Netherlands Indies 180 Japanese women and children of Batavia, Samarang and Soerabaya are reported to have embarked on 1st August on board of the HARUNA MARU to return to their home country. From conversations heard during this embarkment it appeared that these families do not intend to return to this country before the war is over (which would be within 6 months according to some optimistic Japanese).

The employees of the Domei Agency in this country get also telegraphic consent from Tokio to repatriate their families. The Japanese Consul-General at Batavia is reported to have sent a circular to the Japanese colonists in order to advise them to speed up the evacuation of their wives and children. The "Nanyo Kaimu" received permission from the Japanese Government to double the passengers accommodation of the next two ships (Nichiran Maru and Burma Maru) for evacuation purposes. The Nichiran Maru is leaving Soerabaya on the 12th August.

In Semarang it is rumoured that the German women who from the Netherlands Indies intended to return to Germany via Japan and Russia are working in Japanese munition factories.

Valp. 1.

Extract No. 112 for Honolulu

9th September, 1941.

Reports regarding aerodromes which are in the vicinity of, and may perhaps be identical with those already reported by R. A. F. Intelligence.

A. SUNOSAKI (IGD EAB) Naval aerodrome and seaplane base.
Pin point 34° 58' North, 139° 49' East.
6 kilometres East of promontory of the same name and 4 kilometres west of town of Joje (VHA HAL).
Area about 100 acres repeat 100 acres.
Possibly identical with Tateyama aerodrome.

B. FUNAHASHI (OJL HOI) Military aerodrome.
Pin point 35° 42' North, 139° 56' East. West of and adjacent to railway station of same name.
Area about 106 acres repeat 106 acres.
Buildings: 4 hangars, also barracks.
300 paratroops from Eastern Section Army headquarters undergoing training here under German supervision.
Source states "there is an aircraft factory in vicinity with German technicians attached".

Perhaps identical with Shinosaki aerodrome.

C. AKITSU (LTA IFX) Military aerodrome.
Pin point 35° 49' North, 139° 29' East. One and a half kilometres North of railway station of same name.
Area about 170 acres repeat 170 acres.
Total of 3000 personnel stationed here, of which a very small proportion are believed to be paratroops being trained by German instructors.

Perhaps identical with Sayama aerodrome.

D. SHINAGAWA (IGU ECB) aerodrome and seaplane base.
Position approximately 35° 38' North, 139° 44 and a half minutes East.
One and a half kilometres south east of railway station of same name.
Area about 50 acres repeat 50 acres.
Possibly identical with Shibata aerodrome, already reported.
Extract No. 114 for Honolulu

9th September, 1941.

Reports on the following new aerodromes in Japan:

A. Yokkaido (BYO, PON, S1/R) Military Aerodrome. Pin point 35° 40' North, 140° 09' East. One kilometre North West of railway station of same name. Area 75. Repeat 75 acres.

B. Miyake (AAF AIU) Military Aerodrome. Pin point 35° 0' North, 138° 3' East. Small number of paratroops from Shidzunoka Military formations are under training here.

C. Suma (UHN LIL) Naval Aerodrome. Still under construction. Location approximately 5 kilometres west of Kobe. Area about 325 acres. Repeat 325 acres.

Extract No. 115 for Honolulu

9th September, 1941.


F. Yokoi (BYO, GAZ, ECK) Military Aerodrome. Locally known as Kawai (ECB, BAC) aerodrome. Area 125 repeat 125 acres.

Extract No. 113 for Honolulu

9th September, 1941.

Furnishes following information regarding aerodrome already located by R. A. F. Intelligence:

A. Tsudanuma (IFX, JYS, IEC) Military Aerodrome. Area 75 repeat 75 acres. Paratroops of 1st repeat 1st Division under training here.

B. Yokoi (BYO, GAZ, ECK) Military Aerodrome. Locally known as Kawai (ECB, BAC) aerodrome. Area 125 repeat 125 acres.

To: Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

9th September, 1941.

Source reports that a meeting of important Japanese was held on August 31 in Yokohama Specie Bank Shanghai which was addressed by a certain Major Kuno. He spoke—

A. Japanese-American conversations at Washington were commenced at urgent request of German Government conveyed to Admiral Toyoda through German Ambassador.

B. German Government's view was that only through such conversation would it be possible to discover real intention of Great Britain and U. S. A. following upon occupation of Iran and before opening of Moscow conference.

C. Ott in his message to Toyoda stressed that it should be possible for Japan, in discussing question of American aid to Russia via Vladivostock, to discover quantity and exact nature of cargoes which it is intended to send to Russia, number of vessels to be used, whether they would be conveyed and nature of at least certain clauses in agreement for America assistance to Soviet.

D. He thought also, it should be possible to discover whether or not American aid would be sent via Iran.

E. He admitted that in its greater measure such information would be of more value to Germany than to Japan but held also that Japan would through the conversations obtain a clear indication of Anglo-American decisions and future plans in Pacific area and the degree of solidarity of the A. B. C. D. front.

F. He admitted that to gain such invaluable information Japan would have to adopt a conciliatory attitude but this coupled with astute diplomacy would probably cause American statesmen to reveal more than they realized.

G. KUNO stated German Government's proposals were fully discussed at urgent meeting of Supreme Command. The results were conveyed by Prince Konoye to the Emperor who then authorized former to address his recent message to American President.

Comment. I do not know what interpretation of value to place on this report. It may be a clever fabrication; on the other hand it is not inconsistent with
"SLICK" methods of German diplomacy and FACTUAL information and indications sought would be of much value to Reich if obtained.

Source was not repeat not at meeting but obtained the above information from Minutes of the Meeting filed at CONCORDIA Association. Comments would be of great value to us.

Your comments would be appreciated.

Extract for Honolulu

JAPAN—AIR

NOTES ON MISCELLANEOUS AERODROMES

Following is some miscellaneous information mostly hearsay on Japanese aerodromes:

A. SUNOSAKI ( )

1. Naval aerodrome and seaplane base.

2. Locations. Entrance Yokohama Bay. 34°58' north, 139°49' east. 6 kilometres east of promontory of same name. 4 kms. west of town of HOJO ( ) and TATEYAMA. NOTE: R. A. F. Intelligence thinks this is Tateyama aerodrome, located by them 34°59' N, 139°53' E.

by

3. Area. 120,000 tsubo, i. e. about 100 acres.


B. FUNABASHI (E. OF TOKYO 6 MILES)

5. Military aerodrome.

6. Locations. 35°42' north, 139°58' east. West of and adjacent to town and railway station of this name.

NOTE: This might be the same aerodrome as that reported by R. A. F. Intelligence as Shinosaki; 35°43' N, 139°54' E.

7. Area. 130,000 tsubo, i. e. about 100 acres.

8. Parachute Training. 300 troops of the Eastern Section Army H. Q. are under training here as parachutists under German supervision.

9. There is one parachute training tower.


11. Aircraft factory. Source states "there is an aircraft factory here with a few German technicians attached." This is hearsay only and no further information is available.

C. TSUDA NUMA

12. Military aerodrome.

13. Location. 35°41' North, 140°01' East. West of and adjacent to railway station of same name.

NOTE: R. A. F. Intelligence gives location as 35°39' N, 140°05' E.

14. Area. 90,000 tsubo or 75 acres.

15. Parachute training. Parachute troops of 1st division are under training here.

16. There is one parachute training tower.

D. YOKAIDO

17. Military aerodrome.

18. Location. 35°40' North, 140°09' East. 1 kilometre N. W. of town and railway station of same name.

19. Area. 90,000 tsubo or 75 acres.

E. AKITSU

20. Military aerodrome.

21. Location. 35°49' north, 139°29' east.

1 and a half kms. north of railway station of same name.

22. NOTE: This might be the same aerodrome as that reported by R. A. F. Intelligence as Sayama; 35°41' N, 139°28' E.

22. Area. 200,000 tsubo, i. e. about 170 acres.

23. Parachute training. Parachute training is carried out here under the supervision of German advisers.
24. There are two parachute jumping towers.
25. Personnel Total of 3,000 men are based here, inclusive of aviation personnel and parachutists.

F. YOKAICHI

27. Location. 35°06' north, 136°13' east. 3 kms. E.S.E. of town of same name.
Note: R. A. F. Intelligence gives location as 35°10' N, 136°15' E.
28. Source states that name of aerodrome is known locally as Kawai, although YOKAICHI is the nearest town.
29. Area. 150,000 tsubo or 125 acres.
30. Parachute training. There is one parachute training tower here.

G. MIO

31. Military aerodrome.
32. Location. 35°00' north, 138°31' east.
33. Parachute training. A small number of parachutists from SHIDZUOKA Units is under training here. There is one parachute training tower.

H. SUMA

34. Naval aerodrome. A new aerodrome is under construction at SUMA. Location. Approximate 5 kms. west of KOBE.
35. Area. 400,000 tsubo, i.e. about 325 acres.

I. TOKYO

36. There is an aerodrome and seaplane base one and a half kms. S. E. of SHINAGAWA railway station. Position is approximately 35°38' N, 130°44 and a half minutes east.
37. Area. 100,000 tsubo, i.e. about 80 acres.
38. Comment. This may possibly be the SHIBATA aerodrome reported previously.

J. KANOYA

39. Location. 31°25' north, 130°51' east.
Note: (a) Source states that this is a military aerodrome, whereas R. A. F. Intelligence says it is Naval, and located at 31°22' N, 130°53' E. It is probable that our source was misinformed as to the service, but it is possible that there are two separate aerodromes in the vicinity.
(b) Source also states that aerodrome is known locally as the KASANOHARA aerodrome.
40. Area. 400,000 tsubo, i.e. about 325 acres.
41. Parachute training. There is a parachute unit here being trained by German instructors. There are two parachute jumping towers.
42. Aircraft factory. Source was told that there was an aircraft factory here employing several thousand workmen.

Extract for Honolulu:

September 5, 1941.

reports considerable air traffic passing through Waichow Island from East to West, including a large proportion of twin-engined monoplane bombers.

September 5, 1941.

Some idea of the intensity of paratroop training at KOGO can be formed from the fact that 8 aircraft have been in daily use since the middle of July for this purpose.

Valuation B 2.

Extract No. 125 for Honolulu.

JAPAN

4TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.

MILITARY

Unfamiliar Type of Armoured Car

An old and well-established Source, who can generally be relied upon to use his eyes with accuracy, has reported seeing at TAKAO an unfamiliar type of armoured car which he describes as follows:
2. 20 ft. long, 9 ft. high, and six wheels with three wheels at the front and back. (i.e. three wheels abreast).
3. This is given with all due reserve, but we should be interested to know whether it fits in with any new type of vehicle in use elsewhere.

3rd September, 1941.

Extract No. 124 for Honolulu.
— gives following information on Japanese Naval Air units in China. (Compiled in April, 1941).
B. Central China. 2nd Combined Air Unit. YAMAMOTA KAWAHIKA (DYA GOK ECB EKU).
   1. 12th Naval Air Squadron, Location unknown. FURUSE KIKI (AZF IIX RAW DII). Three light bomber, three fighter squadrons.
   2. 13th Naval Air Squadron, Location unknown. KIKUCHI ASAZO (OPR ICK GOB AAF). 4 Heavy bomber, 1 reconnaissance squadron.
C. South China. 1st Combined Air Unit. YAMAGUCHI TAMON (DYA AZG CPA CBZ).
   2. Takao Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. Three heavy bomber squadrons.
   3. Kisarazu Naval Air Squadron. Waichow Island. Four heavy bomber, one fighter squadron.
D. Third Combined Air Unit. ONISHI TAKIJIREE (CQE FZA 1SE IKR SQU).
   1. 14th Naval Air Squadron. Sanoho Island. 3 light bomber, 1 reconnaissance squadrons.
   2. 15th Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. YAMAMOTO CHIKAO (DYA GOK QAL UBR). 3 heavy bomber squadrons.
   3. 16th Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. 2 heavy bomber, 1 fighter squadron.
E. 2nd Air Unit. KAGA. 3 light bomber, 1 fighter squadrons. RYUHO. 2 light bomber, 1 fighter squadron.
F. 3rd Air Unit. NOTORO and KAMOI. 2 reconnaissance squadrons each.
G. 4th Air Unit. CHIYODA and MOZUHO. 2 reconnaissance squadrons each.
H. Total aircraft 500 repeat 500.

JAPANESE REPATRIATION 14ND #1420
Rating "A"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation A-1): "372 Japanese residents of Philippines have booked and paid for passage on SS MARECHAL JOFFRE due leave Manila for Shanghai August 13th." This is reported to be about four times the usual volume of Japanese departures. FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

Confidential

HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr. 14ND #1421
Rating "C"

Ref: ONI card 8-13-41, 14ND card #1390, same subject.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Employed by R. K. O. Pictures. B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period from Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has openly stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese. C. Shanghai French Intelligence emplistic that HULL was in Japanese employ." FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com14. 9-21-41

Confidential

DAKAR—Military Exercises
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): "Dakar air forces carry out combined exercises with fleet from Monday or Tuesday, to Friday of each week, but seldom on weekend." FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

Confidential
DAKAR—attitude of natives

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): “Hatred of Germans, indifference to British. French community would prefer intervention in Dakar by America to intervention by Britain.” FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

MOROCCO—Outgoing visas from

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-1): “Morocco outgoing visas granted only after approval of German authorities.” FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

DAKAR—Commercial Airlines

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-1): “Air-France Service operating twice weekly in both directions—MARIGNANE—CASABLANCA—FORT ETIENNE—DAKAR. General BERGERET, in charge of French Aviation, visited Dakar regarding project to extend Air-France service to Brazil, stating that South American service could be re-established if German air service was allowed to pass through Dakar once a week. Governor BOYSSON refused this and matter was shelved.” FBI (Hon), G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

DAKAR—Airdromes

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): One Dakar airdrome on the Medina plateau at OUAKAM with 2 asphalt runways (1000 x 80 and 1300 x 150 meters). Another airdrome near RUFISQUE. Seaplane hangers at BELAIR, a little beyond arsenal. FBI (Hon), G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

DAKAR—munitions

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): “Local French officer (Dakar) told source that Navy has supplies but that Army is short.” FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.
From: 14ND 2 September, 1941
To: ONI (2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

Extract No. 71 for Honolulu

--- reports August 20th.

A. In the middle of August, 30 repeat 30 aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI aerodrome.

B. Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department agents into numbers of lighters and their tonnage in the gulf of Siam.
C. On August 18th the Japanese minister presented the Prime Minister with the following requests:—
1. SAITAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.
2. 6 repeat 6 aerodromes in north, south, and west will be lent Japan who undertakes to improve them.
3. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.
4. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
5. Japan to co-operate in improving Thai armed forces.

D. The above will be taken up by the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival from Japan.

Valuation C. 2.
Message ends.

Extracts for Honolulu

Sept. 2, 1941.

-----reports August 20.
A. In the middle of August, 30 repeat 30 aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI aerodrome.
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D. The above will be taken up by the new Japanese ambassador on his arrival from Japan.

Valuation C 2.
Message ends.

Extracts for Honolulu

Sept. 1, 1941.

-----reports he recently met brother of Mayor of ----- who returned from Japan on 19th instant, later stated.
A. 5 new (reorganized) divisions have been mobilized in Japan for service in Manchuria.
B. All forces in Korea other than two divisions are to be in process of being moved into Manchuria and to North Korea.
C. 3 new mechanized divisions have been added to Kwangtung army as well as chemical warfare units trained in Japan by German instructors.
D. Training of para troops is being intensified but is considerably delayed by lack of transport aeroplanes. Passenger aeroplanes from commercial air line are being used for training purposes.
E. Source stated he heard that 2 capital ships will be completed and commissioned to battle fleet by end of this year and that 2 aeroplane carriers will be completed in March and July 1942 respectively (it should be noted that this was merely overheard in conversation).
F. Above passed with reserve as I am not in position to estimate reliance of original source.

30th August, 1941.

Extract No. 110 for Honolulu

----- independently reports on UDA (NYI JYS) aircraft factory.
A. Location 3 kilometres south of Kasumigaura aerodrome.
Pin Point: 35 degrees 50 minutes North 140 degrees 14 minutes East.
Note: This disagrees with ----- report who states it is in Tokyo, but Kasumigaura might loosely be called "near Tokyo".
B. This factory has been producing aircraft for the last 3 years.
C. Labour force 3,500 repeat 3,500.
D. Production—45 repeat 45 aircraft per month.
Note: We think that this factory is only used for assembling aircraft.
E. The German Messerschmidt M. E. 110 is under production here.
F. On 20th May source saw 6 or 7 Messerschmidts on the adjacent Kasumigaura aerodrome.

Extract No. 102 for Honolulu

29 T. H. August, 1941.
JAPAN

Air

Kasumigaura Aerodrome

Location:
1. On the shore close to western corner of Lake KASUMIGAURA, East of and adjacent to AMI Village.
2. Latitude 36°, 02' North. Longitude 140° 14' East.

Size and Shape:
3. Roughly rectangular, total aerodrome area, inclusive of buildings, about 1200 X 2000 yards. Source was informed that south edge of landing field had been extended about 300 yards.

Surface:
4. Sand and grass.

Barracks and offices:
5. 26 buildings on the east side provide accommodation for Headquarters, offices and barracks. These are two storey buildings painted in camouflage patches of brown and green.

Hangars and Repair Shops:
6. There are two steel hangars cum workshops on the north edge, about 200 by 50 feet high.
7. Source was told that aircraft were stored in three layers in these hangars.
8. A new large circular hangar about 250 yards in diameter was completed at the end of 1939 in the south-east corner.
9. This hangar only protrudes about 20 feet above the ground at its highest point and is believed to extend some distance below ground level.
10. It is built of reinforced concrete and covered with earth and grass.
11. There are 8 doors to this hangar.

W/T
12. The W/T station is situated on the south edge.

Seaplane and Flying boat facilities:
13. Hangar accommodation is believed to be provided by the two hangars on the north edge.
14. A number of mooring buoys were seen off shore.
15. What appeared to be three catapults were seen on the water's edge, north of the aerodrome.

Aviation School: 16. Source was informed that there is an aviation school here with 600 students.

Personnel: 17. Total of 2,600 aviation personnel is stationed here.

Parachute Training:
18. Two high towers for parachute training were seen on the south edge.
19. Source was told that 1,000 troops were being trained as parachutists, but it is believed that this large number is being tested out as to suitability and only a small proportion will be retained for training.

German Advisers: 20. 10 Germans are attached to this aerodrome and to the neighboring UDA Aircraft Factory.

Aircraft: 21. Source saw about 20 aircraft along the south edge, including 6 or 7 Messerschmitts Me 110.

Valuation B. 2.

Extract No. 111 for Honolulu

29th August, 1941.

— reports.

A. On 28th May at a naval air demonstration at Misaki near Yokohama he saw two 3-engine repeat 3-engine monoplane aircraft and 30 twin-engine monoplane aircraft.
B. Concerning the three-engined aircraft he was told:
C. These were Italian "Piaggio P. XI, RC. 40" bombers manufactured in Japan.
D. The engines are 14, repeat, 14 cylinder 1,000, repeat, 1,000 horsepower.
E. Load capacity: 4,200 kilogrammes, repeat, 4,200 kilogrammes.
F. Camouflage on under wings was light blue, grey and pale green in large irregular patches.
G. Reference paragraph C above. It is suggested that these aircraft are fitted with Italian engines and for this reason are named after them.
H. Concerning the twin engine aircraft he was told:
I. These were German Messerschmidt M. E. 110 fighters manufactured in the UDA factory.
J. These aircraft gave a demonstration of low level dive bombing.
K. Source noted, however, that both these types of aircraft had single, repeat, single rudders and stuck to this statement even when shown pictures in Jane's.
L. Both these types of aircraft are based on the Sunosaki naval aerodrome, near the promontory of the same name on the South West tip of China peninsula.

Extract for Honolulu

--- reports.
A. On June 25,000 troops of NAKANO (AAW TAK) armoured cars unit arrived, 300 service corps troops with unknown number of armoured cars and motor cycles combinations, embarked on 2 transports at SHIBAURA, Tokio and left for Formosa.
B. On July 5, 1000 repeat 1000 men of 32d repeat 32d infantry regiment embarked in 2 transports in Shibaura for Formosa.
Source of paragraphs A and B above was a --- --- friend of source whose ship was in dock at Shibaura for 14 days.
C. On June 16 I transport arrived SHIKAMA (Port of HIMEJI) from Shang-hai and discharged 200 wounded of 11th mixed brigade and 100 boxes of ashes. The wounded were sent to TSUYAMA (OKAYAMA KEN).
D. Reinforcements leaving Japan in May and June for north China have been drawn from following districts.
SENDAI, KANAZAWA, YAMAGATA and YONEZAWA.
E. Reinforcements during same period for south and Indo China were drawn from: KANAZAWA, KYUSHU, KAGOSHIMA, KURUME, SAGA AND KUMAMOTO.
Valuation C 2.
Extract No. 109 for Honolulu

--- reports on Yokosuka dockyard in June.
Valuation C 2.
B. Capital ship. This was launched in Spring of 1941.
C. Armament will consist of:
   9 16 inch (40 cm)
   20 5 and a half inch
   10 anti-aircraft.
D. Name Takamatsu.
E. A sister-ship is under construction at Maizuru dockyard.
F. Heavy Cruiser. This vessel is still on the slips.
G. Name Chichibu.
H. Displacement variously given as 10,000 tons to 25,000.
Note that this disagrees with --- who states that it is 19,00 and --- who says "between 15,000 and 25,000" tons.
I. 2 Destroyers are being armed in the bay. Source was unable to state whether these vessels were launched here or not.
J. Four repeat four fast motoboats are under construction. They are about 10 tons and have one gun mounted forward.
Source was told that similar vessels were under construction in many Japanese shipyards. A merchant from Formosa informed him that private shipyards in Takao were building the wooden hulls only of these ships for fitting out in Naval yards factory.
K. A 7,000 ton cruiser and a destroyer were in dry dock.
L. One cargo boat was undergoing alterations.
M. On 10th June there were concentrated here:
   8 cruisers, 1 seaplane carrier, 11 destroyers, over 10 submarines and 18 transports.
N. Two of these transports were fitted with degaussing apparatus (described by source) and were destined for conveyance in the Sea of Jpan.
O. About 20 German technicians travel daily to Yokosuka from Tokyo.
Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 28, 1941.

Following is a summary of report dated August 15 on Manchurian frontier conditions:

A. Mobilization: Troop movements.

1. Whole population, men and women, of eastern part of former Chinese Eastern Railway district has been mobilized as "militia" for defensive and anti-aircraft work, all are registered and may not leave their villages without permission from staff headquarters.

2. Fresh units of Japanese troops arrived in MULIN district as from end of July, movements being shrouded in great secrecy. Police forbade population to visit villages or engage in fishing or other occupation in vicinity except under special permit, this applying even to normal agricultural labour. Troop movements took place at night.

B. Construction.

1. New barracks near Mulin coal mines are now occupied by troops recently arrived. Manoeuvres in which tanks participated took place.

2. Work has commenced on the new highway from IRIKTE through CHOLA-ARSHANU district. Cossacks resident in this district are engaged on the work.

3. PEIAN-HEIHO. Manchurian dollars 1,500,000 has been allocated for this work which includes hospitals, barracks, etc.

4. TIAMOSI. Several European firms at Harbin have been permitted to tender work in this district and for work in connection with the TIAMOSI-MUDALZIAN railway (opened two years ago). Construction of Government buildings, residences, hospitals, barracks, etc. Total allocation said to be Mongolian dollars 3,000,000. All employees must be certified. Work to be completed not later than June 1, 1942.

C. Travel restrictions.

1. New regulations, affecting all Europeans and most Chinese, were introduced as from August 1 in Manchurian frontier regions. Permits for all travel must be obtained from Police H. Q., travel in interior prohibited. Restrictions especially severe in Mulin district. Special control established at Mulin and SUIFENHO.

2. In spring of this year pressure was brought to bear on all foreigners in JEHOL Province and many left. Remaining foreigners—about 25 missionaries—are not now permitted to travel beyond the cities. Tarter business men have also been recommended to remove their business to MUKDEN area. Reason given is that Jehol is not safe—that troops have been greatly augmented, large troop movements are taking place, considerable road construction is in hand and it is not desired that aerial manoeuvres should be witnessed by foreigners.

D. Censorship. Private correspondence from within Manchuria addressed to China is now censored.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 27, 1941.

— reports on HEITO aerodrome.

A. On June 18 following left for unknown destination:

Three, 3 repeat 3 engine monoplane bombers.

9 twin engine monoplane bombers.

4 fighters

2 reconnaissance

Total 18

B. On June 28 following aircraft left for Hainan under MIYASAKI.

15 twin engine monoplane bombers.

11 single engine monoplane fighters.

8 single engine biplane reconnaissance.

Total 34

C. On July 3, 24 aircraft under command of MORI GITARO (HDU NYA CQU SQU) left for Hainan.

Valuation C 3.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 26, 1941.

A. It is reported that SEDES BEY, secretary of -------, toko, and now in Shanghai, confirmed contents of this telegram in its entirety. He ------- in addition that German influence in Japan is increasing in strength on account
of fact of diversity of Japanese circle. It is now realized that the many instructors and advisors in navy, army, air force, propaganda service, Home Office, etc. have come to stay for at least the war period and their services are indispensable.

B. _______ of Germany Embassy is reported to have stated that Japanese mobilisation will have reached a sufficiently advanced state by end of August/beginning September that Japan will be able to move North or South as she wishes.

C. In connection with southward movement he stated "Japan's conversations with Thailand are proceeding slowly but it is a practical certainty that Thailand will side with Japan."

D. Germany Embassy in Tokio are protesting to the Japanese Government concerning delivery of coal (particularly) and other commodities to Axis opponents from French Indo China.

E. Germany has guaranteed to VICHY that Japanese occupation of Indo China will be temporary only and Japan has agreed. Germany made this guarantee in order to secure close collaboration with VICHY.

Extract No. 107 for Honolulu

25th August, 1941.

_______ reports regarding Pelew Islands.
A. A black-out practice is carried out monthly.
B. The construction of underground hangars is being pressed forward.
C. Source: Japanese pearlimg luggers based on Pelew and operating off the Australian coast.

Extract No. 108 for Honolulu

25th August, 1941.

_______ reports:--
A. HANEDA (NYI, JYS) Aircraft Factory, Tokyo has recently produced 100 repeat 100 Italian 3 repeat 3 engine mid wing monoplane bombers.
Note: Agent gives above characters for name of factory, but gives romanisation as UDA, characters for this are (UCO, JYS) which resemble those given by him.
B. These aircraft have been delivered to Army and have been seen in the Air over Tokyo.
C. Valuation C.3.

Extract No. 106 for Honolulu.

23rd August, 1941.

_______ independently reports on Kawasaki Dockyard, Kobe.
A. Work on clearing civilian houses surrounding Kawasaki. Dockyard commenced on 10th July.
B. A factory controlled by the Dockyard for the construction of complete aircraft will be erected on this site.
C. German engineers are supervising plans and installation of machinery.
Valuation C.2

Extract No. 105 for Honolulu

23rd August, 1941.

_______ reports on Shibata aircraft factory.
A. Under the supervision of German engineers, this factory has produced a 2 repeat 2 engine monoplane fighter.
B. Armament 2 fixed machine guns (cannon guns?) and 4 moveable machine guns.
C. Tests have proved very satisfactory.
D. The Germans refer to this as Messerschmidt and the Japanese as the "16th Year of Showa" (1941) type.
Valuation C.3.

_______ reports on low Angle defences in Pescadores.
A. Gycote Island, 2 12 inch.
B. Koseisho Island, 2 6 inch.
C. Near Komokusel village, 2,000 yards north of Mako.
  2 6 inch
  2 4.7 inch

August 21, 1941
D. Near Kokutsutan village, ¾ of a mile north of Mako.
   2 8 inch
   2 6 inch
E. Taishoku,
   East Fort, 2 12 inch
   West Fort 2 6 inch
F. Sensan 2 6 inch
   2 4.7 inch
G. 19 A.A. guns have been located at 13 places.

Valuation C 2

Extract for Honolulu August 21, 1941

--- reports August 6.
A. OKAYAMA aerodrome.
   July 25 following aircraft left for Hainan:
   24 repeat 24 twinengine monoplane heavy B.
   15 repeat 15 monoplane fighters.
   3 repeat 3 reconnaissance.
   July 28 following left for Indo-China:
   6 repeat 6 three engine monoplane heavy B.
   9 repeat 9 single engine monoplane light B.
B. July 26, 27 repeat 27 aircraft comprised mainly of twin engine monoplane
   heavy B arrived KAGI from Japan and left July 29 for Indo-China.
C. August 1, 9 repeat 9 heavy B and 6 repeat 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-
   China.
D. July 20 following left KARENKO for Indo-China:
   24,000 repeat 24,000 TAKAHASHI (URA HOP) infantry.
   1,200 repeat 1,200 TSE (AES AU) artillery.
   600 repeat 600 KONDO (SCY MRU) and FUKASE (IIU IRX) A.F.V.
   units with:
   16 repeat 16 armoured cars.
   15 repeat 15 light tanks
   40 repeat 40 motor cycles
   32 repeat 32 field guns
E. Paratroops are being trained daily at TOGO aerodrome.
   8 repeat 8 aircraft being used.

Extract for Honolulu August 21, 1941

--- reports.
A. Present strength in southern Indo-China about 80,000 repeat 80,000.
   Composed of units of:
   Guards: 28th repeat 28th division; 38th repeat 38th division, Formosan
   army corps; naval landing party.
   This is given with reserve pending confirmation.
B. High Commands are:
   Lt. General IIDA—army
   Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH)—air
   Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS)—navy

--- reports.
SANCHO ISLAND
A. On August 2d, 500 naval landing party left.
B. Total garrison strength now 400 repeat 400 naval landing party and 200
   puppets.
C. Present stock:
   2,000 repeat 2,000 cases small arms ammunition.
   300 repeat 900 cases shells.
D. At KUKOK Island are 200 repeat 200 KATSUMURA (AUE GPA) naval
   landing party, 100 having left on July 22d.
Extract No. 52 for Honolulu

AUGUST 21st, 1941

--- reports.

A. Present strength in southern Indo-China about 80,000 repeat 80,000.
   Composed of units of:
   Guards.
   28th repeat 28th division.
   38th repeat 38th division.
   Formosan army corps.
   Naval landing party.
   This is given with reserve pending confirmation.

B. High commands are:
   Lt. General IIDA—army.
   Major General KWANG1 (MIV GOH)—air.
   Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS)—Navy.

Message ends.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 21, 1941

--- reports.

A. There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO repeat KOSHIRO,
   TAKAHACHI repeat TAKAHACHI and ZUSI repeat ZUSI and air bases at
   KAMAKURA repeat KAMAKURA and TOYOHASHI repeat TOYOHASHI.

B. Source states that at end of June there was considerable movement of
   Japanese sailors from Tokyo to Koshiro and Takahachi and that between June 26
   and June 28 numerous tramloads of young men arrived at Zusi.

C. At Numazu repeat Numazu source observed soldiers wearing green badges
   on shoulders and also several howitzers pulled by heavy trucks with camouflaged
   gun platforms.

D. At HAMAMOTO repeat HAMAMOTO he observed 97th repeat 97th, 72d
   repeat 72d and 8th repeat 8th divisions.

E. At WUSHIZU repeat WUSHIZU 22d repeat 22d Division. At OKOYAMA
   and HIROSHIMA 2d repeat 2d and 4th repeat 4th divisions. New oil storage
   tanks in this district which is very heavily industrialized.

Comments.

All above observations were made at end June. Although agent has had
military training he is newly recruited and I have had no opportunity of cross
examining him. Valuation therefore C 3.

F. --- was informed by Polish refugee journalist in Japan at end
June that he had seen great earthworks, indicating underground aerodrome,
with planes landing, at TAKARUZUKA repeat TAKARUZUKA. Valuation D 4.

G. Area between Kobe, AWAJI repeat AWAJI and SAKAI repeat SAKAI
   heavily fortified. Valuation C 3.

Following from a responsible British source.

When Itagaki was appointed C-in-C, Korea, this writer took the view that
he is a convinced norther expansion, as opposed to southern expansion believer;
and that his appointment was therefore to be interpreted as a precaution against
the need for big operations in Manchuria, Korea being the first reserve pool for
Manchuria. A technically competent observer in Hongkong now confirms this
view and adds that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C, South China, now Chief of Staff
at Nanking of the Japanese forces in China, is of the same persuasion. He may
be counted on not to neglect the north, therefore, however, tempting the easy
gains in the south may be at the moment.
Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc., by a certain date, such as Sept. 15th bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners. The Japanese in the past have often revealed their long yermojectives, but have very seldom talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them.

**Extract for Honolulu**

August 20, 1941.

--- reports on Indo China.

A. Japanese strength in TONKIN area (August 1) approximately 25,000 repeat 25,000.

B. Strength in southern Indo-China (August 12) approximately 36,000 repeat 36,000.

C. Collaboration between French and Japanese authorities appears close and it is believed that French troops are to be sent to the Yunan and KWANGSI borders.

D. Quantities of railway equipment is being sent to PNOM PENH for the construction of a railway to the THAI border.

August 21, 1941.

J. July 28 a transport left TOSHIYEN for Indo-China after loading 20 repeat 20 launches, 120 repeat 120 mines and a quantity of naval ammunition.

August 19, 1941.

A. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations Japanese delegates expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic Indian Ocean communications.

B. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company with a capital of a million yen to start operations around island.

**Extract No. 57 for Honolulu**

19th August, 1941.

A. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations Japanese delegates expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic Indian Ocean communications.

B. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company with a capital of a million yen to start operations around island.

**Extract No. 54 for Honolulu**

August 19th, 1941.

--- reports.

Sancho Island.

A. On August 2nd, 500 naval landing party left.

B. Total garrison strength now 400 repeat 400 naval landing party and 200 puppets.

C. Present stock: 2,000 repeat 2,000 cases small arms ammunition. 900 repeat 900 cases shells.

D. At KUKOK Island are 200 repeat 200 KATSUMMRA (AUE GPA) naval landing party, 100 having left on July 22nd.

**Extract No. 35 for Honolulu**

August 18th, 1941.

--- who was recently elected as a Sakdal candidate for next political elections, states that local Japanese agents (whose names I have given to American Military Intelligence) have recently been cultivating him closely and volunteering following information:

A. 650–700 aeroplanes are now assembled on Formosa.

B. Attack on Philippines and Singapore simultaneously, will take place about end August.

C. Campaign in Philippines to begin with rising in Mindanao and bombing of Manila.

D. Attack on Singapore to be overland through Slam. where at least 3 repeat 3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.

E. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Salpan. This looks like a whispering campaign.

Valuation C 3.
Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 18, 1941.

---------- Report that his Japanese business associates (who include local heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank) appear genuinely to believe that present Japanese threats of further southward expansion are merely a "war of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight Great Britain or America.

Valuation B 2.

Extract No. 33 for Honolulu

AUGUST 16TH, 1941.

A. Local Agents Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram August 15th from Tokio instructing them:
1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.
2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty.
3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.
B. This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds).
Valuation A 1.

---------- of German Embassy recently returned from Japan is reported to have stated:
A. Mobilization continues in Japan and it is known that certain units are being equipped for service in cold climate.
B. In the event of hostilities between Japan, America and Great Britain, Japanese neutrality regarding Russia will not repeat not be maintained.
C. In this event Japan proposed to try to effect occupation of entire territory north of Vladivostock up to Amur River, northern half of SAGHALIEN and KAMCHATKA.
D. Object would be to lessen danger of air attack against industrial centres in Japan and prevent American supplies reaching Russia through these areas.
E. Japanese policy in northwards threat and southern expansion is identical; to force democratic front to maintain forces in readiness to meet potential danger. At the same time he added that it was not yet possible to say definitely whether Japan's large scale preparations were merely to keep anti Axis powers generally on the alert in Asia or whether they mean Japan is seriously contemplating an active part in war.
F. Same source stated that anti British and anti American feelings were growing as the population is suffering from lack of foodstuffs, with it materials and certain essential commodities and fear of the introduction of card rationing system in near future.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 15, 1941.

A. It is reported that as a retaliatory measure for British and American action against Japan Japanese military authorities discussed with Nanking Government desirability of blockading International Settlement on lines of Tientsin blockade of British Concession.
B. Japanese "business" Shanghai strongly opposed this and sent delegation of four representatives to interview General KAGESA at Nanking.
C. Latter assured delegation that if any steps were taken along lines suggested at any time, every effort would be made to safeguard Japanese interests operating in International Settlement. He further stated that they were not contemplated in the near future as there was no complete accord between Japanese naval and military authorities on matters.

AUGUST 10, 1941.

It is reported.
A. Following completion of Japanese military occupation of Indo-China local military have been considering possibilities of securing control of Tientsin French Concession through puppet North China administration.
B. Local military circles consider if Tientsin venture is accomplished similar action might be taken through Wang-Ching-Wei Government at other points
in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all non-Axis interests.

C. Above passed for it may be worth enquiries proceeding.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 14, 1941.

Following from Free French sailors who left Saigon about August 8. Valuation C 2.
A. S. S. Francois Louis Dreyfus is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked “Tokyo.” Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked “San Francisco.”
B. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel AMIRAL CHARNER repeat AMIRAL CHARNER and the submarine PEGASE repeat PEGASE.
C. S. S. SAGITAIRE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 15, 1941.

It is reported.
A. Paper plans for taking over French Concession in Shanghai has been completed and provided future developments in general situation in Far East do not necessitate change in plans, Nanking Government expected to assume control in concession before October 10.
B. Committee studying this matter under chairmanship of HSU LLANG (Foreign Minister) and General KAGESA have forwarded their recommendations to Tokio for consideration.

AUGUST 8, 1941.

reports.
A. On July 31 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in Po On area for “the German expeditionary engineer corps” and are as soon as possible being sent to Germany.
B. According to a high puppet official further recruiting is being carried out.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 13, 1941.

A. Between July 25 and July 29 12,000 repeat 12,000 troops left Bangkok for Indo China frontier.
B. Partial confirmation is afforded by official Siamese communiques which stated that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary and special mission units left for frontier at end of July.
C. An order has been placed with Japanese for delivery in July 1942 of 2 repeat 2 warships probably torpedo-boats to replace 3 vessels sunk by French.
D. 500,000 TICULS have been paid on account of this order.

Valuation C-3.

Extract No. 27 for Honolulu

AUGUST 12, 1941.

At a meeting held by High Command at Canton on July 27th to discuss retaliatory measures on British and American freezing, following steps were decided upon and forwarded to Tokio for approval:
1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.
2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of expulsion.
3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. The Government to be forced to co-operate in this measure.
4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces.
5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Puppet Government.

Extract for Honolulu

AUGUST 12, 1941.

N. Y. K. Tokio despatched confidential telegram August 9 to their Japanese representative in Manila stating that Japanese Government have ordered:
A. S. S. ASAMA MARU (Now between Honolulu and San Francisco) to return to Japan.
B. S. S. NITTA MARU to remain in Yokohama until further notice.
C. Through cargo loaded at Manila for United States on these vessels to be discharged at Yokohama and Kobe respectively.

Valuation A-1.

Extract No. 23 for Honolulu

August 12th, 1941.

To: Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD
Mr. R. SHIVERS
Col. GEO. BICKNELL

A. 372 repeat 372 Japanese residents of Philippines have booked and paid for passages in S. S. MARECHAL JOFFRE due leave Manila for Shanghai August 13th.

B. This is about four repeat four times the usual volume of Japanese departures.

Valuation A 1.

 Completely reliable source and information.

C. Okayama aerodrome,

1. Between July 7 and July 15 about 25 repeat 25 aircraft have been arriving nightly from Japan.

2. Aircraft based here July 19 are: 40 repeat 40 3 engined monoplane heavy B; 40 repeat 40 twin engined monoplane medium B; 40 repeat 40 single engined monoplane light B; 60 repeat 60 monoplane fighters; 20 repeat 20 reconnaissance; 4 repeat 4 four-engine transports.

3. This is largest aerodrome in Formosa being about one mile square.

D. July 14 6 repeat 6 fighters arrived TAIHOKU from QUEMOY Island.

E. July 10 to July 11, 15 repeat 15 fighters arrived KAGI from Japan.

F. July 15, 15 repeat 15 monoplane fighters arrived HELITO from Kwangtung.

G. Aircraft reported at Que moy 12 repeat 12 fighters.

H. June 6, mines by naval units from Pescadores.

I. July 11 200 repeat 200 mines and 120 repeat 120 torpedoes landed at Takao from Japan.

At a meeting held by High Command at Canton on July 27 to discuss retaliatory measures on British and American Freezing, following steps were decided upon and forwarded to Tokio for approval:

1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.

2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of expulsion.

3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. The Government to be forced to cooperate in this measure.

4. Expediting the plans for the subverting of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces.

5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Puppet Government.

Extract No. 59 for Honolulu

10th August, 1941.

It is reported.

A. Following completion of Japanese Military occupation of Indo-China local military have been considering possibilities of securing control of Tientsin French Concession through puppet North China administration.

B. Local military circles consider if Tientsin venture is accomplished similar action might be taken through Wang-Ching-Wei Government at other points in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all non-Axis interests.

C. Above passed for what it may be worth enquiries proceeding.

Extract No. 24 for Honolulu

August 9th, 1941

To: Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD
Mr. R. SHIVERS
Col. GEO. BICKNELL

Following is summary information to hand on HULL.

A. AMOS TYLER HULL, employed by R. K. O. Pictures.

B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period from Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has openly stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese.

C. Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that Hull was in Japanese employ.
A. Local Agents N. Y. K. have today received telegram from N. Y. K. Tokio stating that all "overseas" service is now suspended.
B. "Overseas" means all sailings except Japan-China ports.
Valuation A 1.

Extract No. 61 for Honolulu  
8TH AUGUST, 1941.

——— reports.
A. On 31st July 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in Po On area for "the German expeditionary engineer corps" and are as soon as possible being sent to Germany.
B. According to a high puppet official further recruiting is being carried out.
It is reported that the following railways in Manchuria are now regarded as military lines on which number of passenger trains has been reduced to minimum.
A. Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara and to Korea via Tumen.
B. Harbin Peian-Heiho
C. Hsingchiang-Taonan
D. Taonan-Doekk Arshan
E. Tsitsihar-Peian
F. Tsitsihar-Bukheda-Hailar and Manchouli
G. Tunen-Mudadzian
H. Mudadzian-Izetsiamusi
I. All railways in Jehol.
J. Since end of June 1941 steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang Harbin by construction of sidings and numerous small stations for storage.
K. In Kwantung leased territories since 1940 sand bag emplacements guarding bridges station, etc. have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures.
L. Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity demands.

Extract for Honolulu  
AUGUST 7, 1941.

It is reported.
A. Between July 10 and July 17 about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden proceeding north ** carried full war kit. (Note. No means of checking numbers, which should be accepted with reserve.)
B. During period named a total of 75 troop "specials" passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried artillery and tanks.
C. On departure from Jukden on July 21 source was told by Japanese station master of South Manchurian railway that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was short of cars these would be drawn from Peking Mukden, Peking Suiyuan and Peking Hankow lines.
D. On July 20 troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTZE on Peking Mukden line. Source saw great activity at Tangku Tun junction.

Extract No. 21 for Honolulu  
6th AUGUST, 1941.

To Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD  
Mr. ROBERT SHIVERS  
Col. GEORGE RICKNELL

Following report on Dakar given to ———— by Free French business man who was in Dakar from February 5th till May 28th.
Valuation C 2:—Casual observation believed reliable.
A. Battleship Richelieu could proceed at greatly reduced speed, but complete repairs can not be carried out at DAKAR.
B. Other warships at Dakar:—
  Escort Vessels D'ENTRECASTEAUX repeat D'Entrecasteaux and Bougainville repeat Bougainville.
  Also about 3 repeat 3 destroyers and 15 repeat 15 submarines.
C. Fortifications on island of GORÉE have been modernized. Headland at end of the “CORNICHÉ” also fortified. Fortifications of little strength at RUFISQUE.
D. Troops totalled about 15,000 repeat 15,000 Senegalese tirailleurs, spahis and Colonial infantry.
  General BARRAU repeat BARRAU in command.

Extract No. 22 for Honolulu

For: Capt. I. H. Mayfield
  Mr. Robt. Shivers

Following is continuation of report on DAKAR dated 6th August.
E. Air-France Service operating twice weekly in both directions MARI-
  CHANE—CASABLANCA—FORT ETIENNE—DAKAR.
  General BERGERET, in charge of French Aviation, visited Dakar regarding project to extend Air-France Service to Brazil, stating that this South American service could be re-established if German air service was allowed to pass through Dakar once a week.
F. Governor BOYSSON refused this and matter was shelved (Valuation for this and immediately preceding paragraph C 1).
  Reliable from new contact.
G. Morocco Outgoing visas granted only after approval of German author-
  ities. (Valuation C 1).
H. Aerodromes at DAKAR one on the Medina plateau at OUAKAM with 2 asphalt runways (1000 metres by 80 and 1300 metres by 150).
  Other aerodrome near Rufisque.
  Seaplane hangars at BEL-AIR, a little beyond arsenal.
  Valuation C 2. Believed reliable from new contact.
I. Munitions. Local French officer told source that Navy has supplies but that army is short.
J. Exercises. Local Air forces carry out combined exercises with fleet from Monday or Tuesday, to Friday, of each week but seldom on weekend.
K. Attitude of natives:
  Hatred of Germans indifference to British.
  French community would prefer intervention in Dakar by America to inter-
  vention by Britain.
  Valuation C 2.
  Believed reliable from new contact.

Extract No. 75 for Honolulu

organization reports on Formosa for end of June.
A. Orders have been given to recruit 100,000 repeat 100,000 men between ages of 35 and 45 for service in their labour corps.
B. Another 150,000 repeat 150,000 conscripts are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

JAPAN MILITARY, FORMOSA
KEELUNG
Supplies

1. On June 17 s. s. “Horai Maru” arrived at Keelung from Japan with about 400 cases of military uniforms and steel helmets. 200 cases were sent to Kar-enko per s. s. “Fukusei Maru” and the remainder to Taikoku by train.
2. On June 19 Transport No. 140 arrived at Keelung from Japan with mili-
  tary supplies which were sent by rail to Taikoku and Taichu. The transport
  left again on June 22 with a full load of copper ore.
3. On June 20 Transport No. 135 arrived at Karenko with 600/700 tons of petrol from Japan via the Pescadores (where she unloaded an unspecified amount of petrol).
Conscription

4. The Governor of Formosa has received orders to recruit within the next month 100,000 men between ages of 35 and 45 for service in Labour Corps.

5. It is reported that an additional 150,000/200,000 recruits in Formosa are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

Troop Movements

6. From June 23 to June 29 500 troops of the Taihoku infantry were exercised in coastal defense along the coast near Chinchiku.

7. On June 25 180 artillery arrived at Karenko from Taihoku together with 6 A. A. guns drawn by trucks and 4 A. A. machine guns.

8. On June 25 Transports Nos. 141 and 163 arrived at Keelung and embarked military supplies and provisions. They sailed together for Hainan on June 27.

TAKAO

9. Transport No. 174 arrived at Takao on June 17 with large quantities of military personnel, equipment (uniforms, steel helmets, respirators, etc.), all of which were sent by rail to Tainan.

10. 60 German naval, military and air force experts and over 30 Japanese officers also arrived by the same vessel. Soon after landing they embarked in s. s. "Hosan Maru" for the Pescadores. It is reported that all these men will soon be transferred to South China.

11. On June 21 200 Mountain Artillery, together with local recruits left Tainan for Koshun for exercises.

12. On June 25 6 armoured cars and 3 tanks left Tainan for Taito to participate in coastal defence exercises.

13. On June 28 about 800 recruits from the Koshun sector were sent to join the labour corps at Tainan. These men were issued with a complete set of uniforms and equipment, but no rifles. Their ages were between 35-45. On June 30 they returned to Koshun for further training.

Valuation B. 3.

Secret booklet printed October 1940 by Chinese staff contains following information on Hiroshima Iron Works:

A. Yearly production 9 repeat 9 A. A. guns, three tanks, unknown number of Naval and Military guns. Monthly production of shells 300.

B. Raw materials are obtained from Yawata, Kyushu.

C. 2,000 repeat 2,000 men and women employed.

July 30, 1941.

------------ organization reports for middle of June.

A. All conscripts in Formosa have been called up for military training.

B. 4,000 troops are stationed at Taichu. These are of all arms and include 6 tanks and 8 armoured cars.

C. The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine guns posts. These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each holds 6 to 8 mm. They were recently erected in great haste.

August 5, 1941.

A. It is reported that mobilization and reequipment of troops in Korea Kwangtung and Manchuria is quietly progressing in preparation of eventual movement against the Soviet.

B. There has been a "tug of war" between high ranking military officials as to when move should be launched and that question is still not settled. It is thought that the only event which would stop the move would be a decisive German defeat at hands of Soviet.

C. High Japanese official has expressed some concern over Japanese anti-aircraft defences and lack of air raid protection but no further details were mentioned.

Report for Honolulu

August 2, 1941.

------------ reports.

A. A large aerodrome is under construction near Kamakura. Note: We believe this is identical with Totsuka aerodrome.

B. Overall dimensions: 3,500 by 3,500 yards.
C. Labour force 8,000 repeat 8,000 under supervision of 18 repeat 18 German engineers.
D. Aerodrome expected to be completed in August.
E. 3,000 repeat 3,000 parachute troops are under training here.
F. Comment: Valuation C 3.

-------- reports on Kobe.
A. The floating dock here, capable of accommodating ships of 16,000 tons, is expected to be transferred to Hainan.
B. At the end of May an "aircraft tender" was under repair in this dock.
C. Total of 2,000 repeat 2,000 workmen working day and night shifts are engaged on aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock.
Valuation C 3.

Extract for Honolulu

JAPAN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION OF POCKET DESTROYERS

Secrecy surrounding construction of "Pocket Destroyers"

1. Following information is hearsay and is given with the utmost reserve:
2. Some old hulks have been emptied of machinery and equipment and the "pocket destroyers" are being constructed within them.
3. As a further aid to secrecy the positions of this hulks are changed by towing from one place to another.

Comment
4. This may be an exaggerated account of Japanese tendencies to secrecy, but there may something in it, and the report is passed on for what it is worth.
Valuation C 4

-------- reports.
A. Naval guns are being made at Osaka arsenal under German supervision.
B. In May 8 warships at Yokosuka were being fitted with new guns from this arsenal.
Valuation C 3.

Extract No. 20

To Capt. I. H. Mayfield
Mr. Robert Shivers
Col. George Bicknell

-------- reports.
A. On June 16th German S. S. Ramses had completed overhaul of engines in Nagasaki.
B. Guns were being fitted and they are expected to be camouflaged as derricks.
C. Ordnance supplies will be drawn from Osaka arsenal.
D. Strength of crew 150 repeat 150.
Valuation C 3.

To Capt. I. H. M. Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. George Bicknell

Extract No. 20 for Honolulu

-------- reports.
A. On June 16th German S. S. RAMSES had completed overhaul of engines in Nagasaki.
B. Guns were being fitted and they are expected to be camouflaged as derricks.
C. Ordnance supplies will be drawn from Osaka arsenal.
D. Strength of crew 150 repeat 150.
Valuation C 3.

Extracts for Honolulu

A. It is stated that Japanese Government is "contemplating" taking over French Concession Shanghai in name of Nanking Government. Japanese military wish to take action as soon as possible but it is not in complete agreement with
Japanese naval landing party. Meanwhile Nanking is going ahead selecting personnel for future administration which is entitled “Shanghai Special Administrative Area.”

B. I personally interpret Nanking’s action as wishful thinking but against this French have warned me that both Japanese and Nanking efforts at penetration of concession have lately been intensified.

AUGUST 5, 1941.

organization reports on Formosa for end of June.

A. Orders have been given to recruit 100,000 repeat 100,000 men between ages of 35 and 45 for service in their labour corps.

B. Another 150,000 repeat 150,000 conscripts are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

JULY 30, 1941.

JAPAN NAVAL VENALITY OF JAPANESE NAVAL OFFICERS

1. On the 28th June the captain of the destroyer ACIII of the 13th Destroyer Flotilla, FASAHARA Asaji ( ), who was under suspicion of having allowed smuggling in his blockade area, was found guilty and was replaced by his second-in-command.

TAKADA.

2. The ASHI was patrolling off Hainan Island at the time.

3. SHINOMI (or H111) Seiichi ( ), commanding the South China Fleet, is suspected by his subordinate officers to be himself financially interested in the South China smuggling racket.

4. When Chiu-Ting-Wah, the puppet magistrate of Chungshan, was assassinated recently in Macau, it was extensively rumoured that SHINOMI’s personal demarche with the Governor of Macau was brought about by the consideration that Chiu had previously been working hand in glove with SHINOMI in breaking the blockade which the latter himself was responsible for maintaining.

JULY 29, 1941.

From source not well placed July 25.

Japanese army is calling up all English and Malay speaking Japanese irrespective of age.

Note.—Some Straits born and educated Japanese have left for army service in Japan.

Value 3.

Extract No. 73 for Honolulu

organization reports for middle of June.

A. All conscripts in Formosa have been called up for military training.

B. 4,000 troops are stationed at Taichu. These are of all arms and include 6 tanks and 8 armoured cars.

C. The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine guns posts. These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each holds 6 to 8 men. They were recently erected in great haste.

JULY 30, 1941.

Extract for Honolulu

It is reported:

A. Japanese Government is considerably perturbed by the “insincerity” of the Siamese Government.

B. Japanese Government states that in spite of military “representations” by Japanese Minister at Bangkok, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan and that it is clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence.

C. Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter.

D. FEI WEN CHUAN further stated Japanese Government in carrying out its programme in French Indo-China is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that unless latter changes its attitude toward Japan and her coprosperity programme Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into line.
reports on oil fuel tanks in Pescadores.
A. Ansan Naval Base.—Large surface tank capacity 600 repeat 600 tons. Small surface tank capacity 400 repeat 400 tons.
B. 1 underground at Taishoku Fort capacity 400 repeat 400 tons.
C. 1 underground tank at Kelm-U aerodrome capacity 300 repeat 300 tons.
D. Comment: It is regretted that source was unable to differentiate between types of oil fuel.
Valuation C 2.


Extract No. 18 for Honolulu

A. Following is actual text of order issued on July 28th (but not published) by K. OYAMADA for administrative Commissioner Chinese Maritime Customs obtained very confidentially.

Begins:
B. Shipment of exportation and interport export for America and England and their colonies, Burma, French Indo China, Hongkong and unoccupied area of China of following goods are temporarily to be referred to me before release:—
Machinery, provisions, oils, chemicals, cereals and fodder, fertilizer, cotton piece goods and yarn:—
Except for Japan and North China:—
Signed K. Oyamada.

(Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)

Extract No. 19 for Honolulu

A. June 16th 150 repeat 150 infantry transferred from TAICHU to KOGO for parachute training and on June 18th 200 repeat 200 paratroops were transferred from KOGO to ROKKO.
B. KOGO area now under martial law and entry near-impossible.
C. Recruiting for army and labour corps still being maintained.

Extract for Honolulu.

It was reported July 24.
A. Thailand is secretly making preparations of a military character and is not releasing, as originally intended, certain classes called up over the Indo China dispute.
B. The Thai delegates who have gone to the Indo China border to take over the ceded territory have also been given a special mission which is presumed to be connected with Japanese Southward move.

It has further been reported that circular has been issued to German firms by German Chamber of Commerce, on instructions from Commercial Counsellor, instructing them that they must keep all goods purchased for export to Germany for a period of at least five months (from middle of July) since it can be expected that transport via Siberia will be resumed before expiration of that period. In the event of firms encountering difficulty over go-down storage space they are advised to ship goods to Dairen for storage. Further all purchases of goods in immediate future for export to Germany must be of "non-perishable" kind.

Japan Naval Fleet Organization

Following is passed with utmost reserve:
1. In June the Japanese Navy will be divided into 4 fleets with Admiral Kato as Commander-in-Chief.
2. The 1st Fleet will be stationed near Indo-China, Thailand and Hainan.
3. The 2d fleet will be the main force for the southward advance.
4. The 3d fleet will be stationed to cover the Pacific flank and watch the American Fleet.
5. The 4th fleet will be engaged in transport (? convoy) work.

JULY 28, 1941.

A. It is stated that according to information obtained from local Japanese source Japanese naval authorities intended to construct a submarine base at CAMRANH BAY. Also, according to letters from Tokyo and Hanoi to local Concordia Club it was clear that immediate steps were to be taken:
1. Completely to suppress all pro Chungking elements in Indo China.
2. To encourage Annamite independence movement which would be definitely pro Japanese and anti French.

He believes object of such a move is creation of internal domestic trouble throughout Indo China which will provide further excuse for expansive Japanese control.

(Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)

Extract No. 16 for Honolulu

--- reports.

A. On June 8th following units of 12th repeat 12th division total strength 6,000 repeat 6,000 left Hainan for Manchuria.
46th infantry regiment.
48th infantry regiment.
24th artillery regiment.

B. On June 14th HIROSE (EGZ IRX) infantry regiment of 11th repeat 11th division left Hainan. On June 30th this unit arrived Dairen and went on to SCHEUNGKIANG in Manchuria.

C. --- reports that on June 24th 11th cavalry regiment of 11th division arrived WHAMPOA from North River area and embarked for Manchuria.

Valuation C 3.

Message ends.

(Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)

Extract No. 15 for Honolulu

--- reports July 25th.

A. July 15th 200 repeat 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon.
B. July 21st Lieutenant General HOMMA (GOK TTA) commander-in-chief Formosan army and Major General SUMIDA (IPB JYS) arrived Saigon with 30 repeat 30 German and Italian advisers.
C. On mornings of both July 20th and July 21st aid reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft.
D. July 20th one cruiser, one destroyer, one unidentified auxiliary and four repeat four transports packed with troops arrived CAMRANH BAY.

Message ends.

Extract No. 79 for Honolulu

23RD JULY, 1941.

It has further been reported that circular has been issued to German firms by German Chamber of Commerce, on instructions from Commercial Counsellor, instructing them that they must keep all goods purchased for export to Germany for a period of at least five months since it can be expected that transport via Siberia will be resumed before expiration of that period. In the event of firms encountering difficulty over go-down storage space they are advised to ship goods to Dairen for storage. Further all purchases of goods in immediate future for export to Germany must be of "Non-perishable" kind.
Extract for Honolulu

July 22, 1941

It was reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I. following is now being said:

1. in MENADO. Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be taken off in vessels from Pelao.

2. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from eastward of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S. arrives.

3. Japanese will not be evacuated as evacuation would give N. E. I. indication of pending attack.

Extract for Honolulu

July 16, 1941

HONG KONG—JAPANESE SPONSORED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Following information is dated June 20, 1941.

1. WANG KI (———), who was previously Wang Ching Wei’s representative in Hong Kong is now the Police Commissioner at Canton. The post of Wang’s representative has been taken over by LAM FEI (———).

2. LAM FEI (———) with 45 senior agents under him, is mainly interested in the collection of military intelligence in Hong Kong; they also recruit questionable characters for subversive activities.

3. The removal of the Japanese Military Attache’s Department to Macau has caused the Japanese great inconvenience. TAKEDA, of the Special Service Section, has now been attached to the Japanese Consulate in Hong Kong to control the intelligence section here.

INCITEMENT OF DISTURBANCES AND RIOTS

4. Plans are prepared for the creation of strikes, disturbances and riots when and if Japan breaks with Britain. One of the principal agents employed in this department is JOHN LUI (———), a senior member of the Shanghai Tai Ping Insurance Co. Lui’s headquarters is established at 19/20 Connaught Road West, 3rd floor (next door to the Ping On Hotel), where he is operating as the CHUN KIN FIRM (———). He left for Shanghai recently and a few days ago returned to Hong Kong; it is believed that it is his intention to proceed to Singapore in the near future.

5. One of Lui’s close associates is the son of the Chief Detective of Amoy, CHENG SAI-HOI. Lui is also believed to have been the founder of the Tung Man Alumni Association (———).

6. According to information imparted to an agent in the employ of FURUKAWA (———), Chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence at Macau, it is learned that the Japanese hope to have recruited about 100,000 refugees street-sleepers to take part in sabotage and nuisance activities in Hong Kong on the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Japan.

7. A large number of refugee street-sleepers are already receiving financial assistance from the Japanese.

8. Japanese Agents. Other Chinese employed by the Japanese are:

TAM KWOK-WA (———), who was employed by the Special Service Department at Macau to act as Liaison between them and Agents in Hong Kong. In this connection he made innumerable visits here.

CHAU WING TING (———), who has been in the employ of Japanese for the past ten years, mainly operating in the Swatow/Amoy sector. He is believed to be residing in Connaught Road West (1st Floor—the number is at present unknown and is being investigated).

ARMS SMUGGLING

9. Source stated that puppet officials of the Chungshan area and Japanese agents are being permitted to enter Macau with arms, and it is through this channel that a large quantity of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hong Kong.
Telegram from Hongkong of July 19th, 1941

--- reports June 15th.
A. June 1st 150 repeat 150 mines and 60 repeat 60 torpedoes landed at KAREIKO, E. Coast Formosa, 24° N 121° E, from Islands.
B. During June Pescadore Naval units carried out mine laying operations along the Formosan coast. (Message ends.)

Telegram from Hongkong of July 19th, 1941

--- reports June 15th.
A. June 4th 6 repeat 6 twin-engine monoplane bombers arrived KARENKO from Japan en route for Hainan.
B. On June 7th 6 repeat 6 monoplane fighters arrived HEITO from Japan.
C. On June 11th 12 repeat 12 monoplane fighters left KAGI for QUEMOY. (Believed all aircraft at Quemoy had left for Hainan).
D. Aircraft based Heito June 10th:
   9 repeat 9 twin-engine monoplane bombers.
   18 repeat 18 monoplane fighters.
   3 repeat 3 reconnaissance.
   12 repeat 12 trainers.
   3 repeat 3 transports (3 engine monoplanes).
E. Aircraft based KAGI aerodrome June 10th:
   9 repeat 9 monoplane bombers.
   18 repeat 18 monoplane fighters.
   14 repeat 14 reconnaissance.
F. On June 8th 500 repeat 500 paratroops arrived KOGO from TAIHOKU for training. Present number of paratroops at Kogo now about 1000 repeat 1000. Message ends.

Telegram from Hongkong of July 17th, 1941

Commissioner of Customs Hongkong reports that on July 16th the following were observed at BOCCA TIGRIS:
25 repeat 25 transports.
100 repeat 100 (approximately) landing barges (empty).
1 repeat 1 motor landing craft. Message ends.

Extract for Honolulu

--- reports.
A. On April 19 two armed merchant men arrived Kobe and unloaded scrap metal and 1,000 caskets of ashes and were loaded up with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components.
B. The cases measured about 8 x 6 feet.
C. 400 men of a naval landing party and 130 coolies who had been segregated until going on board embarked on April 21.
D. The ships left for Spratley Island on April 21.

--- reports.
A. On April 20, 2 repeat 2 of the German vessels lying at Kobe left for Kure.
B. Guns to be fitted and ships will be ready for sea again at the beginning of August.

--- reports on French Indo China and Hainan:
A. On June 8 12,000 men left French Indo China.
B. It is rumored that they were bound for Manchuria but this is given with great reserve.
C. On June 14 the following units of the 11th repeat 11th Division, totalling 3300 men left Hainan for unknown destination:
HIROSE (EGZ IRX) infantry regiment
NAKAMURA (AAW GPA) Medium Artillery Battalion
HIRAOKA (FEU DYJ) Transport Company
YOSHINO (BAD TAK) and KUNO (COP MZA) Cavalry Squadrons

JULY 14, 1941

Extract for Honolulu

A translation of a letter from Information Section of Concordia Society to local branch of same, dated July 2, which states that on that day the national policy in connection with Russo-German war was decided at a liaison conference between the Government and High Command. The following general principles were stated to have been decided upon.

A. Japanese Government recognizes as her main guiding principles her national safety and the success at any cost of establishment of new order in East Asia.
B. Japan must depend only upon her strength and resources and concentrate her attention upon East Asia problems.
C. She must use every means to further her own aims but always take into consideration the constantly changing international position and must not allow herself to be detracted from her present course by any claims requests or suggestions if even slight risk of wasting her power and resources is involved.

JULY 12, 1941.

Extract for Honolulu

A. 20 repeat 20 of these vessels are under construction at Harima shipyard, Osaka.
B. 24-hour shifts were being worked on these jobs in May.
C. Vessels are expected to be completed at end of July.
D. Specifications:
   Displacement 100 tons.
   Dimensions 200 ft. x 28 ft. x 5 ft. 6".
   (Note that these dimensions will give displacement of well over that reported and are therefore given with the utmost reserve).
   Speed: 30 knots.
   Armament: 6 machine guns.
E. Source further stated that these ships are to be used as troop landing craft in the Southern expansion movement.
Valuation B 3 for paragraphs A to C only.

Extract for Honolulu

July 9, 1941

A. In collaboration with German advisers the construction of 75 repeat 75 submarines is projected in Japan.
B. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 repeat 20 of these jobs of which the Osaka Iron Works are to build 4.
C. Valuation C. 3.

July 11, 1941

Extract for Honolulu

A. Name of factory is Nakabe (AAW? SRY) Heavy Industrial Works.
B. Labor force in mid May 600 repeat 600.
C. Monthly production 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares.
D. 4 repeat 4 German engineers are attached.

July 11, 1941

Extract for Honolulu

A. A Shadow factory situated at Kawaguchi in Osaka has now started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the Aichi Factory, Nagoya.
B. Labor force 2,600 repeat 2,600 working ten hours per day.
C. Estimate of production is wings etc., for about 100 fighters per month.
D. 3 German advisers are attached to the Kawaguchi Factory.
Extract from letter from Manila 7-12-41

Commandeering of Japanese ships by the Japanese government has reached significant proportions,—many vessels used wholly in Japanese commercial interests and not running to U. S. ports.

Something seems to be brewing in Japan, and although anything except watchful waiting by Tokio may make no sense to us the symptoms nevertheless indicate preparations for activity against either Russian Maritime Provinces Indo China.

I think not a) because of the strength and separateness of the Russian forces in the Far East and probably latter.

[It seems extraordinary that the Japanese should not now begin to turn towards America and cease their irritating gestures—but the preparations are proceeding and the removal of these profitable vessels is costing them plenty in the meantime.]

GERALD WILKINSON

[Copy]

A. Controller.
Decides all quantities of all materials required by factory under his control. Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc.
Can even control development and study of prototypes.
Decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and adjustment of internal disputes.
Supervises allotment of salaries, wages and bonuses.
His control is complete and his decisions are final.

B. Trained Engineers.
All certificated engineers from Imperial Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for Naval, military or aviation factories.
Engineers with certificates from private universities (such as Waseda) may work in other defence industries.
Factories which are not working for national defence get no certificated engineers.
Numbers are carefully fixed, e. g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 Imperial University graduates per annum.
System extremely unpopular amongst students.

C. Limitation of Salaries.
Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1440 Yen. Graduates from private university get only 1170 Yen annually.
Rises only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 2,000 Yen per annum.

D. Artisans.
Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this works out at higher salaries than that of certificated engineers.
Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this work is often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and have taken a week or fortnight’s holiday.

E. Discipline.
No factory personnel may change their factory or branch of work without consent from the controller.
Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will accept no supervision.
They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.

F. Naval and Military Friction.
This extends to an astonishing degree, even when the same article is being made for both services.
Files of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy.
All component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with the result that double checking and control service has to be established.
Two distinct trial and reception services have to be established.
Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable.
Extract for Honolulu

July 7, 1941

Source reports that he has been informed by two separate Chinese sources that they understood Japan promised Germany, in return for recognition of Wang Ching Wei, to blockade Vladivostok and that action was likely at an early date.

July 12, 1941

__________ reports on the Aichi Aircraft Factory, Nagoya.
A. Beginning of April 3 German engineers arrived at this factory from the Dornier works.
B. Name of one is given as Andernich (DJ1 IZU DUN).
C. They are supervising construction of a new type of fighter.
D. This is described as K.22 type twin-engine 2 seater. It is still in the experimental stage.
E. Production aimed at is 50 repeat 50 per month. (Note that production figures of this aircraft coincide with those given for dive bomber reported as being manufactured in this factory in January.)
F. Labor force 2,600 repeat 2,600 working 24-hour shifts.

Extract No. 9 for Honolulu

3rd July, 1941

To London:
A. A Chinese Maritime Customs cruiser which had been scuttled by the Chinese in West River area has been salvaged by Japanese and put into commission for the Kwangtung Defense Headquarters.
B. Name HIP LIK.
Length about 310 feet.
Armament one small gun at bow and stern and two machine guns.
C. Note please that this vessel has been definitely allocated to the Puppet Chinese Naval Force.

Extract No. 10 for Honolulu

2nd July, 1941

To London:
A. There is no repeat not landing ground at Boryo.
Katosha is evidently identical with Kato and there is definitely a landing ground with two hangars here.
There is also a landing ground at Suitaeryo, which is usually used in connection with military training at Boryo.
B. Koko is believed to be the same as Kogo, but we do not repeat not agree with longitude of the latter place as given by you (we make it 121 degrees 08 minutes East). Koko is believed to be the centre of parachute training in Formosa.
My immediately following telegram.

Extract No. 11 for Honolulu

2nd July, 1941

To London:
My immediately preceding telegram.
Shinchiku is an entirely separate aerodrome and we believe that naval air force units are permanently based here.
C. Agreed that Reigaryu is the same as Takao.
D. Taiboku aerodrome is equipped for night flying and has a civil aviation school and a military aviation centre attached.
Matsuyama was originally a civil aerodrome but barracks have recently been built here.
E. Detailed summary and sketch maps of aerodromes in Formosa have been despatched by bag.

Extract No. 2 for Honolulu

18th June, 1941

A. Controller.—Decides all quantities of all materials required by factory under his control.
Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc.
Can even control development and study of prototypes.
Decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and adjustment of internal disputes,
Supervises allotment of salaries, wages and bonuses.
His control is complete and his decisions are final.

B. Trained Engineers.—All certificated engineers from Imperial Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for naval, military or aviation factories.
Engineers with certificates from private universities (such as Waseda) may work in other defense industries.
Factories which are not working for national defence get no certificated engineers.
Numbers are carefully fixed, e.g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 repeat 3 Imperial University graduates per annum.
System extremely unpopular amongst students.

Extract No. 3 for Honolulu
18th June, 1941

C. Limitation of Salaries. Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1440 Yen.
Graduates from private university get only 1170 Yen annually.
Rises only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 2,000 Yen per annum.

D. Artisans. Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this works out at higher salaries than that of certified engineers.
Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this work is often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shaming sick and have taken a week or fortnights' holiday.

Extract No. 4 for Honolulu.
18th June, 1941

E. Discipline. No factory personnel may change their factory or branch of work without consent from the controller.
Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will accept no supervision.
They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.

F. Naval and Military Friction. This extends to an astonishing degree, even when the same article is being made for both services.
Files of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy.
All component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with the result that double checking and control service has to be established.
Two distinct trial and reception services have to be established.
Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable.

Extract No. 1 for Honolulu.
12th June, 1941

JAPAN—MILITARY—BODY ARMOUR

Following item from ______ dated 19th March, 1936, may be of interest in view of recent reports of bullet proof vests, etc.
"An excellent anti-bullet steel has been evolved by the Metallurgical Laboratory of the Tohoku Imperial University headed by Mr. K. Konda. According to the Patent Announcement, the steel is composed of the following:—

0.15–0.35% of carbon,
0.5 1.5% of chrome,
0.6–2.0% of manganese,
0.2–1.0% of molybdenum,
0.2–1.0% of cobalt of banadium,
9.9% of silicon
and the remainder iron.

Series of tests for hardness proved that the metal was more efficient than the best foreign anti-bullet steel. Discoverers of the metal are Messrs. K. Ono and S. Cahiba.

(Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, Aug. 9, 1941. Honolulu Field Office.)
To Capt. I. H. Mayfield
Mr. Robert Shivers
Col. Geo. Bicknell

Following is summary information to hand on HULL.
A. AMOS TYLER HULL, employed by R. K. O. Pictures.
B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period from Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has openly stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese.
C. Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that Hull was in Japanese employ.
(#1421)

Extract No. 33 for Honolulu

A. Local Agents Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram August 15 from Tokio instructing them:
1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.
2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty.
3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.
B. This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds).
(Valuation A 1.)

To: Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers

A. Source reports that on September 20 he met a certain CHIU CHE SHENG, a head of a certain department of the Nanking Ministry of War.
B. Latter stated, a propos of announcement over the radio of sentence passed on a Japanese in Singapore for possession of seditious literature that "not long" General HATA had very secretly approached head of War Ministry of Nanking requesting his cooperation in enlistment of Chinese agents for work in Thailand, Burma and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure FUKINESE or Chinese speaking dialect of that province.
C. Chiu Che Sheng stated that a certain number of men were recruited and dispatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated Chinese. Those chosen, in all cases, had some previous military knowledge gained through service at one time or another with Chinese forces. According to source CHEN KUANG is responsible directly to Japanese military H. Q. at Nanking and to all their authority.
D. Source endeavours to follow up. It is sent merely because Chiu Che Sheng's statements were spontaneous but it is not known if they have any foundation in fact.
(Value 3.)

Extract for Honolulu

Who was recently elected as a Sakdal candidate for next political elections, states that local Japanese agents (whose names I have given to American Military Intelligence have recently been cultivating him closely and volunteering following information.
A. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on Formosa.
B. Attack on Philippines and Singapore simultaneously, will take place about end August.
C. Campaign in Philippines to begin with rising in Mindanao and bombing of Maulua.
D. Attack on Singapore to be overland through Siam, where at least 3 repeat 3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.
E. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. This looks like a whispering campaign.
(Valuation C 3.)

[Japanese map]
Translation of Data in Outer Margins of Map of Singapore Region.

1. Top Center: Singapore, Malaca, Benkalis
2. Top Right:
   English colony: Straits Settlements
   Dutch colony: Sumatra
3. Right Upper:
   East Asia World Map
   West 7th Vertical Segment
   South 7th Horizontal Segment
   Southern part
4. Right Lower: Form of map instituted in 29th year of Meiji (1896) for
   for East Asia World Maps
5. Bottom Right (scale):
   Boundary of West Coast Provinces of Sumatra+
   Provincial Boundaries
   Provincial Capitals: •
   District Capitals: ☐
   Sub-district Capitals: *
6. Bottom Right: (Seal) Imperial Japanese Government Land Survey
   Department
   Strategic Points: °
7. Bottom Center: 1,000,000 to 1
   (left) Kilometers (right) Japanese “li”
8. Bottom left: Fixed Price—20 sen
9. Left, Bottom: Possessor of Copyright for Printing and Publishing: Imperial
   Japanese Government Land Survey Department.
10. Left, Top:
    Made Meiji 32 (1899)
    Printed Meiji 34 (1901)
    Railways added Meiji 43 (1910)
    Printed Dec. 5, Meiji 43 (1910)
    Published Dec. 10, Meiji 43 (1910)
11. Top, Left:

<table>
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<th>West 7th Vert. Segment</th>
<th>West 6th Vert. Segment</th>
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<td>South 8th Horizontal Seg. (North 14)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SINGAPORE

[Surrounding place names, given to establish the identity of the region, appear in the 8 blank spaces, but are left untranslated.]

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Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board

a. The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941 of
radio messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and which were not
included in Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
b. The documents following those mentioned in a above are the intercepts
which comprise Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred to
in their affidavits.
TOP SECRET

From: Hon.
To: Tokyo
Dec. 6, 41
PA-KY

#253 release p5 ——— 123a.

1. On American continent in Oct. Army began training barrage balloon troops
at Camp Davis, N. C., 400,500 balloons considering use in defense of Hawaii &
Panama. So far as Hawaii concerned though investigations made, they have not
set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected troops to man them. No training
for maintenance balloons. No signs barrage balloon equipment. "In addition,
it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any limits to barrage balloon de-
fense. "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left
to take advantage of a surprise attack against these places.

In my opinion battleships do not have torpedo nets. Details not known; will
report results of investigation.

Army 7178 25877 2a Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT).

TOP SECRET

From: Hon
To: Tokyo
Dec. 6, 41
PA-K2.

#254

1. On evening 5th, among battleships which entered port—one sub tender. The
following ships observed at anchor on 6th.

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 sub tenders, 17 destroyers, in addition 4 light
cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (heavy cruisers & airplane carriers all left.

2. "It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."
Army 7179 25874 Trans. 12/8/42 (2-22) 3 a.

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941.
J-19

#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along
the following lines insofar as possible.

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas.
(We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This
area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch.
Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you
report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves,
buys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would
like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels
along side the same wharf.)

290 SECRET Trans. 10-0-41 (S)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple

#943 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told
me, it is this:

*—For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.
"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple

#03. (Part 2 of 2) a

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE b told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists. MOORE c reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER d reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.

ARMY 5854 23516 SECRET Trans. 10-15-41 (7)

From: Toyko (Toyoda)
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)

#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

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a—Part 1 of 2 not available.
b—Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.
c—American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.
d—A Washington newspaper correspondent.
any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you.

(Separate Wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 23031 Secret

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my conferees here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23839 Secret Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort. I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 Secret (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo
To: Hongkong
November 14, 1941
Purple
Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code)

(Strictly secret outside the Department)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.

b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas).

In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is directed to Nanso,⑨ Hokudai,⑩ Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai ⑩ will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsing-tao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

JD 6801 Secret Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)

⑨—Kana spelling.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,④ and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

④—See JD-6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.
2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and
I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you
to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to
realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what
turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say
that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the
solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change.
Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do
not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any
further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your
best to bring about an immediate solution.

--- S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the
Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the
United States.

--- S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

Army 24878 JD-1:6638 Secret Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19
#113

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area
“N”, Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make
your investigation with great secrecy.)

--- Probably means Mamala Bay.

Army 25773 7063 Secret Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19
#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in
my #210a on that day.
Area A—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left
port.
Area C—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise,
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class,
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks “KS”. 4 merchant vessels were
at anchor in Area D.
3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed enter-
ing the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of
1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in
Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time
roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these
destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern
side.

Relayed to ________________

--- Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
--- East Loch.
--- Middle Loch.

Army 25817 7111 Secret Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:
(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.
See Supplementary Information File (Voice broadcasts)
SIS 25432 JD-1: 6875 Secret Navy Trans. 11-28-41

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J.19)
Circular #2354

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U.S. relations "HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russia relations "KITA"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "NISHI"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.
SIS-25392 JD-1: 6850 Secret Navy Trans. 11-26-41.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple-CA)

Re my #797*

The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan have been made more definite" we imagine would naturally have reference to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S. will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.

On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B** proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.

The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797*, #800,** and #801****) will please present our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can be made.

If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts.

We note what you say in your #1133**** and, #1134****, but in these negotiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this office. We would emphasize this.
S. I. S. #25040
JD-1: 6558

*JD-1: 6657
**JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528.
***JD-1: 6666
****JD-1: 6661
*****Not yet available.

(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT).
From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 22, 1941  
Purple CA (Urgent)  
#812

To both you Ambassadors,

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.* You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

*See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 26, 1941  
Purple  
#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)</td>
<td>Nyun Yooku (New York)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musabetsu Taigun Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)</td>
<td>Shikago (Chicago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shina Mondai (The China question)</td>
<td>Sanfuranshishuko (San Francisco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soori (Premier)</td>
<td>Itoo Kun (Mr. Itoo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)</td>
<td>Date Kun (Mr. Date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rikugun (The Army)</td>
<td>Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaigun (The Navy)</td>
<td>Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)</td>
<td>Endan (Marriage proposal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daitooryoo (President)</td>
<td>Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haru (Hull)</td>
<td>Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokunijioosei (Internal situation)</td>
<td>Shoobai (Trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jooho Surn (To yield)</td>
<td>Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jooho Sezu (Not to yield)</td>
<td>Yama Wo Uremi (Not to sell the mountain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keisei Kynuten Surn (Situation taking critical turn)</td>
<td>Kodomo Gaumar eru (The child is born).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO----------------------------- Setagaya 4617
Section Chief KASE----------------------------- Yotsuya 4703
The Minister's residence----------------------------- Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence----------------------------- Ginza 1022

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Con- sidering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1190. (Part 2 of 2)*

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, de- liberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the

*—S.I.S. # 25444. (Part 1 of 2)
responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumptions. I would like, if such a course is followed; to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there by anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)
(Telephone Code) **

Transpacific Telephone
To Kumaicho Yamamoto * from Kurusu:

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they will not yield.*** I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also," after thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail".

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i.e. progress?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.
**See JD-1: 6841, (SIS #25344), of this date.
***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The Interpreter read this as "Sore... kesa" (that... this morning) and translated it as "It is now...", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple. (CA)
#844.

Re your #11804.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you
are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #11808 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
20 November 1941
(JJ9)

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple-Ca)

Re my #844
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

JD-1: 6921 Secret (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code

TransPacific Radio Telephone

Note: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (I.e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."
Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."
Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"
K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."
Y: "Is that so?"
K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There is no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspaper are giving."

(Pause)
"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-considered statements. Please tell Mr. Tanl."
Y: "We are being careful."
K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i.e. Premier's speech.)

JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)
K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japanese)
Y: "No particular—(one or two words faded out)—" 
K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"
Y: "Yes."
K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches. ! ! ! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."
Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"
K: "Let's see. . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"
Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"
K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."
Y: "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
#985. (Part 1 of 3)a

Re my Circular #2387.b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986.c) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

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a Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. # 25553.
b Not available.
c See S.I.S. # 25554 and 25555.

25552 JD 6943 Secret Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA).

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

25553 Secret Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested, (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

79716—46—Ex. 148—43
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

SECRET

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2436

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand.
for this purpose. The Attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

25545 JD-1: 6939 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: London
1 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2443

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YÜ GÖ No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

Message not seen but—British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London, 26 April 1945. E. J. Layton.

25787 JD-1: 7091 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)

From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#863

In the event that Manchuria participates in the war _____ in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

Codes Manchoukuo, etc.
JD-1: 7092 SIS 25783 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple—CA)
#865

Re my #857.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

*JD-1: 6921.
**JD-1: 6710.
*** Not available.

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

Completed Translation

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232 (Part 1 of 2)
Re my #1231.

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233*. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

*—Not available
*Original translation incomplete from this point on. Trans 12/3/41.

To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232. (Part 2 of 2)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtfull consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation
here." [2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.*

* Not available.

25680 ARMY Trans. 12-3-41 (7)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#867 (Strictly Secret)

(CORRECTED TRANSLATION)

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)
2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.
3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna".
4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all messages coming and going and all other secret documents.
5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860* is no longer recognized.)

* S.I.S. #25550 in which Tokyo wired Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

#25640 Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 5007 27053 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#123

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785 JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)
From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
#1410

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would
like to arrange to have Secretary MATSU1 of that office and three others
(URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two
other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best
to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo.
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#1268 Re your #867*

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication
Section;

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese nego-
tiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for
a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

25836 JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*(Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (SIS #25440): Directs Washington to destroy all
copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#901 Re my #844.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the
26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the
United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts
and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The
situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to
keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States,
I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime
to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the
Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 Secret Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

*See S.I.S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington that the Imperial Government
cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the
Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be
destroyed. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that
negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we
also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close
relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because
of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly
secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised
him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at
once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known
what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is
his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS
and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these
individuals.
(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us — (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) —.

ARMY 25846 7176 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQB place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavors toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfectly an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, endeavoring still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of policy in the negotiation and endeavored strenuously to reach a settlement of the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, led to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

ID-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

On: Tokyo
Washington
December 6, 1941

(75 letters garbled)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 29th another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more vital and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

ID-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

On: Tokyo
Washington
December 6, 1941

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, it made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading at time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to pose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese aims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

ID-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple  
#302 (Part 6 of 14)  

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.  

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.  

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.  

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD: 1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 4, 1941  
Purple  
#302 (Part 7 of 14)  

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.  

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 Secret 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple  
#302 (Part 8 of 14)  

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.  

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations
under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country —— (35 letters garbled or missing) —— been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the —— es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n——(50 letters mission)——sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of
the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government, failing, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDVD * presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT ** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

*Probably "and as"
*Probably "China, can but"

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)
#902 Part 14 of 14

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1 7143 Secret (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT) 25843
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#128
Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123 the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.
ARMY 7381 26158 Secret Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.
Re my #902.
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.
ARMY 7145 25850 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

From: Budapest
To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA
#104
Re my #103.
On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

ARMY 25806 7184 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 8

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, Jagd, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board

The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources. They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to 22 December 1941.
MOST SECRET.

To be kept under lock and key: never to be removed from this office.


No: 097975
Date: 21st November, 1941.

From: Japanese Consul-General, SINGAPORE.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 717.
Date: 17th November, 1941.

Immediate:

Some day the British authorities will prohibit the use of cypher telegrams by this office. To prepare for this eventuality please draw up secret code words and send them by Consul-General OKAMOTO as diplomatic correspondence. Please include in this secret code, words necessary for military intelligence, evacuation of residents, the closing down of this office etc. Please see the Naval Secret Code which I have received recently.


Japanese Code Phrases for Broadcasting in Event of Emergency

No: 008127
Date: 25th November, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister. TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Chargé, LONDON.
No: 2333 Circular.
Date: 19th November, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

The international situation is tense and we cannot tell when the worst may happen. In such an event, communications between the Empire and the enemy countries will immediately cease. Therefore when our diplomatic relations are on the point of being severed, we shall broadcast, as the weather report, the following phrases in the middle and at the end of the news in Japanese in our overseas broadcast service:

(1) If Japanese-American relations are in question: "Higashi no kaze ame" (Easterly wind, rain).

(2) If JAPAN and the SOVIET are concerned: 'Kita no kaze kumori' (Northerly wind, cloudy).

(3) In the case of JAPAN and BRITAIN (including the invasion of THAI-LAND or an attack on MALAYA): "Nishi no kaze hare" (Westerly wind, fine).

The appropriate phrase will each time be broadcast twice in a resolute voice and you should accordingly [group corrupt: destroy by fire] codes, documents, etc.

The above is to be treated as strictly confidential.

From: The Japanese Chargé, LONDON.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 700 Urgent of 21st November, 1941.
Reference your circular telegram No. 2333. (above).


Sir E. Bridges,
Dominions Office.
Japanese Foreign Office View of Conversations With America

No: 998151
Date: 25th November, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Diplomatic Representatives, ANGORA, &c
No: 2364 Circular.
Date: 20th November, 1941.

Confidential.

1. Since the formation of the new Cabinet the Government has started a conference in daily contact with Imperial Headquarters and has been able to debate a fundamental national policy to cope with the pressing situation of the day. At the morning session on the 5th instant, a decision was taken on the policy to be adopted for adjusting Japanese-American diplomatic relations.

2. The Japanese-American negotiations are to be pursued by considering the adjustment of diplomatic relations on an equitable basis. These have been in progress since the 7th, but there is a considerable difference of opinion between the two parties, and in view of the progress made so far there is some doubt as to whether a compromise will be reached. For our part, we are doing our utmost to reach a compromise, but we cannot make any further concessions, and the outlook is not bright. Should the negotiations break down, that part of the situation in which the Japanese Empire is involved will be critical.

The foregoing is for your exclusive information.

This telegram is addressed to BERNE, ANGORA and VLADIVOSTOK.
BERNE will repeat to VICHY, MADRID, LISBON, STOCKHOLM, HELSINGFOR and PRETORIA.
ANGORA will repeat to BUCHAREST, SOFIA and BUDAPEST.

Togo.

Sir E. Bridges.

At this post there is nothing for it but to use the Navy’s wireless. Details have been telegraphed by the Naval Attaché to the Admiralty. Please refer to them and make the necessary arrangements.

Japanese Broadcasts: Reception in Rome.

No: 098232
Date: 27th November, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 740.
Date: 20th November, 1941.

In regard to the general news broadcasts, not only JUO but JAP (which was changed on the 20th) were generally impossible to receive. This was due to unstable weather conditions at this time of year which made the note weak, in addition to which there was much interference from miscellaneous noises.

In view of the recent international situation the demand for [group corrupt: ? news ? information] is steadily increasing. We foresee no difficulty about reception arrangements at this end but in present weather conditions good reception will not be possible on one wavelength only. It is essential that simultaneous broadcasts be sent on two or three wavelengths. I understand that the recently changed DOMEI broadcasts in English have begun simultaneous broadcasts, and I ask that every effort be made for these simultaneous broadcasts to be carried out.

For your information I will, till further notice, telegraph reception efficiency every three days.


Horikiri.

No: 098313
Date: 29th November, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: BERNE, WASHINGTON, etc.
No: 2398 (Circular telegram).
Date: 25th November, 1941.

Most Secret:

Recently our cypher machines (the printing portion of "A" and the shift key of "B") have been designated as a State Secret. Any leakage of information connected therewith will incur the application of the National Defence Peace Preservation Law. As regards the machine in your keeping, you are strictly enjoined to take every precaution for safe and secret custody.

On the right-hand side of the number plate affixed to the printing portion and shift key, please write the words "Kokka Kimentsu" [State Secret] in red enamel.

This telegram is to be relayed, as the Foreign Minister's instructions, in the following manner:

From WASHINGTON to MEXICO, RIO DE JANEIRO and BUENOS AIRES.

By cable.

BERNE to LONDON, VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. By cable.

VICHY to MADRID. By safe hand.

HANOI to SAIGON. By safe hand.

Director. F.O. (3). M.I.5.

Japanese Ambassador, Hanoi, Asks for Instruction in Event of Emergency

No: 098400.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
From: Japanese [? Ambassador], HANOI.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 118.
Date: 26th November, 1941.

[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

(Secret.)

To judge from what I hear from the Military, the American answer reached us [? on the 24th]. If this is so the Cabinet Council will no doubt finally reach a decision in a day or two and determine whether it is to be peace or war. If Japanese-American negotiations are to be held we shall of course take in hand progressively the various undertakings previously planned; but if the negotiations break down, as preparations for military operations are nearing completion, an advance would be possible within ten days or so. In that event considerable modifications would be necessary in the programme of undertakings to be carried out under our present policy, and it will be necessary to initiate measures and negotiations in keeping with our military operations. What causes me most concern and [? anxiety] is whether, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, it is the policy of the Government and Imperial Headquarters to carry on military operations leaving the status of the Government of INDO-CHINA as it is at present, and on this point I require to be informed in advance: and not only so but I want to make necessary preparations with all speed. If, therefore, you have any views on the development of the Japanese-American negotiations and the prospects alluded to I beg that you will telegraph them at once. Moreover, while it goes without saying that secrecy must be preserved, nevertheless, according to newspaper reports, AMERICA has been consulting with BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, the NETHERLANDS and the Chinese in WASHINGTON, and these Governments are aware of the purport of the Japanese-American negotiations. And what is more, the Military here, as the result of comings and goings between here and TOKYO, are aware of the nature of your instructions and of the ins and outs of the negotiations: in fact, I have the impression that the only people who are left in the dark are Foreign Office officials. Seeing that the situation is as tense as is indicated in your circular telegram No. 2383 [our No. 09S127], should be glad to receive your instructions on these points as soon as possible, either by telegram, messenger or some other method.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To: Japanese (? Ambassador), HANOI.
No: 2414 of 26th November, 1941.
(Also in Chef de Mission cypher recyphered).
Reference your No. 118 (above).
My circular telegram *No. 2414 gives the course of the Japanese-American negotiations and my circular telegram *No. 2416 tells of their present continuation. Even in the event of the worst happening the Imperial Government has not taken any special decision to make a change in the status of the Government of INDO-CHINA. You may therefore take it that for the present our policy is to maintain the status quo. Please do your best on this understanding.
Repeated to Paris and Berlin.

[Dept. Note *Not yet decyphered].

Japan and the Axis: Plans in Event of Breakdown of Washington Conversations
No: 098413.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassadors, BERLIN and ROME.
No: 2387 Circular.
Date: 24th November, 1941.

[Very corrupt text. In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

For your own information only.
The Japanese-American negotiations (?) are [seem to be] approaching their final stage . . . . [two lines corrupt]. In the event of the breakdown of the negotiations we shall be face to face with a rupture of relations with BRITAIN and AMERICA, and the necessity is likely to arise for the sudden tightening up of the relations which have hitherto prevailed for cooperation between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY. My idea is that (?) you should then propose [two groups] action to be taken; but [two groups] I shall ask Your Excellency to be active during this month. It is possible that circumstances may necessitate your having a special interview with Führer HITLER (Premier MUSSOLINT), so please bear this in mind. [Two groups] until you approach them you should refrain absolutely from saying anything to the Germans (Italians). This for your information and in haste.

At the moment the time is not ripe for a detailed report on the Japanese-American negotiations. Please note, however, that we have taken every precaution to obviate any obstacle to the maintenance of the Three Power Pact. This telegram is addressed to BERLIN and ROME.

Toco.


Japanese Communications by Naval Wireless in Event of Emergency
No: 098414.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
No: 778.
Date: 29th November, 1941.

In present circumstances it may happen that the despatch and delivery of telegrams may be purposely delayed or completely held up and that we shall not be able to depend on the reliability of communications. I therefore request you to take steps to [?] make simultaneous use of] the Naval wireless, as in my No. 760 [our No. 098127].

[Dept: Note: Cyphered in “X” and recyphered on the machine].

Japanese Plans: Instructions to Ambassador at Berlin

BJ/35.
No: 098452.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 335 Very urgent.
Date: 30th November, 1941.

[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

Reference my circular telegram No. 2387. [Our No. 098413].

1. The Japanese-American negotiations begun in April of this year under the former Cabinet have now reached a stage at which a breakdown is inevitable, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government. The Empire, faced with this situation, has to take the most serious decisions. You should therefore see Führer HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP at once and give them an outline of developments in confidence. At the same time you should tell them in confidence that the attitude of BRITAIN and AMERICA has recently been provocative and they have continued to move troops into all parts of Eastern ASIA. To meet this we too have been compelled to move troops, and it is greatly to be feared that an armed collision will occur and we shall find ourselves in a state of war with BRITAIN and AMERICA. You should add that this may happen sooner than is expected.

[Here Part II is missing. It will be sent in later if received].

4. If when you make this communication questions are asked by the Germans and Italians as to our attitude towards RUSSIA, you should tell them that our attitude towards the SOVIET is as explained to them on 2nd July of this year, that we will of course not relax our restraint on the SOVIET as the result of our action in the south; but that if the SOVIET, acting in cooperation with BRITAIN and AMERICA, take hostile action against us, we are prepared to resist it resolutely; that it is on the South, however, that we lay most emphasis, and that we propose to refrain from deliberately taking positive action in the North.

5. As all this concerns our plan of campaign it of course requires the utmost secrecy, and you should make a special point of impressing this strongly on the Germans and Italians.

6. With regard to telling the Italians, immediately after our Ambassador in BERLIN has told the Germans, Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO should be informed. As soon as the dates for the German and Italian interviews are fixed please telegraph.

Please repeat to Rome as my instructions.

Togo.


Japanese orders for destruction of cypher machine in London Embassy

Date: 3rd December, 1941.
No 638509.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, LONDON.
No: [? 2443] Circular.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
Secret and Urgent.

Please take steps for the immediate disuse of the cypher machine at your Embassy.

With regard to the steps to be taken, these should conform to the instructions sent previously. Please exercise the greatest care and, in particular, with regard to the methods of dismantling and breaking up the essential parts, carry them out strictly in accordance with instructions.

On receipt of this, please telegraph immediately the one word “SETSUJU” (Received) en clair, and, having carried out these instructions, telegraph the word “HASSO” (Despatched), also en clair.

With regard to the cypher connected with the machine, you are, of course, also to burn your copy No. 26 of the YU code (machine code) (the settings for use on the machine for communication between this Department and the Embassy in LONDON).
Japanese-Thai Relations: Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Care Thai Minister

No: 608525.
Date: 4th December, 1941.
From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1847.
Date: 20th November, 1941.

I received a visit from the Thai Minister on the 20th. He opened his remarks by saying that he also was a soldier and would like to have a frank talk with me as between men who had known each other for many years. He then referred to a recent crop of rumours to the effect that JAPAN was to invade THAILAND, and to reports of large Japanese troop concentrations on the Thai frontier of French INDO-CHINA, and asked point blank whether there was any truth in them or not.

I replied that I had had no news from my home Government on these matters but that my own belief was that JAPAN'S actions toward all Far Eastern races were aimed at applying the principle of live-and-let-live, the fact being that in cases such as that of the recent arbitration between THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA JAPAN had done her utmost for THAILAND for this very reason and would never invade THAILAND for the purpose of aggression. But the facts were that GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA had set up the so-called ABCD front in opposition to JAPAN'S establishment of a New Order, finally threatening the existence even of JAPAN herself. JAPAN of course would be compelled to continue her course brushing this aside, and that she wished to attain this and by peaceful means was obvious from the mere fact of her having sent Mr. KURUSU to AMERICA. However if the worst came to the worst and it was unavoidable, JAPAN would have to take the necessary steps for her own existence—not that there would be any question of this happening if THAILAND soon understood JAPAN'S ultimate purpose and displayed an attitude of cooperation with JAPAN; she would have to invade THAILAND only if that country should blindly follow the lead of GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA and take up an attitude of opposition.

The Minister interposed by describing the position in which THAILAND was placed and by stating emphatically that THAILAND would never oppose JAPAN as an Anglo-American cat's-paw.

When suggesting his visit the Minister said that he wished to see me urgently, and OMMINISI's view that he probably came on instructions from his home Government.

The Germans are also extremely interested in Thai problems and I should be glad if you would inform me at once as to the latest situation.

Japanese Chargé, London, Submits Plans for Withdrawal of Embassy etc. Staffs

Date: 4th December, 1941.
No: 098539.

From: The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, LONDON.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 751.
Date: 1st December, 1941.

It is feared that in the event of the situation becoming critical the exchange of telegrams may become impossible. I therefore submit the following points for your consideration and request instructions.

1. In view of conditions at this post, countries suitable for protecting our interests after the withdrawal of this Embassy are BRAZIL or SWITZERLAND. I suggest that the matter be discussed in TOKYO with the country concerned, so that instructions may be sent by that Government to its Ambassador (Minister) in LONDON.

2. Is there any objection to burning the consular exequaturs at present held in custody, viz: LIVERPOOL, DUBLIN, RANGOON, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, BATAVIA, MACASSAR and VANCOUVER?
3. The stipulations for withdrawal of the Embassy etc. staffs and of resident Japanese should be made with the British on a strictly reciprocal basis. If this could be done it would be necessary to effect the exchange at a stipulated place, each side providing a ship. An agreement would have to be drawn up regarding the dates of departure etc., to prevent anything going amiss.

(1n the case of GERMANY the exchange took place in HOLLAND, in ITALY's case it was at LISBON. If hostages are taken there is the danger that our nationals will not be able to leave the country). The evacuees to be exchanged are:

1st party: Embassy and Consular staff
2nd party: Newspaper correspondents
3rd party: Japanese Staff of banks and companies

who were sent out from JAPAN (the 2nd and 3rd parties are not necessarily in order of precedence). Exchange for each party will be arranged separately. As a principle I do not wish to include employees locally engaged and Japanese residing here of their own wish. Concerning the above negotiations should be undertaken both here and in TOKYO and, if necessary, instructions can be given via the countries who will protect our interests.

In round figures the number of persons is:

(a) Officials—34 (including the Chargé d'Affaires, secretaries, military and naval attachés, advisory consuls, telegraphic attaches, chancellors, special employees and their families).
(b) Newspaper correspondents—6.
(c) Bank and Company employees—30.


Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc. in Washington Embassy

Date: 4th December, 1941.
No: 0985/40.
BJ/S7

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, WASHINGTON.
No: 867. Secret.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: Compare our No, 098509].

Of the telegraphic cyphers with which your Embassy is provided you are to burn all (including the cyphers of other Ministers in your charge) except one copy each of the machine cypher now in use, cypher "O" and cypher "L".

2. You are also to discard one complete cypher machine.
3. As soon as this is done you should telegraph the one word "HARUNO".
4. You should deal with files of in and out telegrams and other secret documents in an appropriate and suitable manner at your discretion.
5. The cyphers brought by Cypher Officer KOSAKA (? should all be burnt). (Consequently the need to get in touch with MEXICO referred to in my telegram No. 869 [not received] [last word corrupt]).

[Dept: Note: *The words used, "haki", can mean "cease to use", "abolish", "discard". It is not the normal word for "destroy"].


Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Reports Ribbentrop's Statement on German War Plans

No: 098541
Date: 4th December, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1393.
Date: 28th November, 1941.

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

I was to have had an evening meeting yesterday, the 28th, with RIBBENTROP at his request, but he suddenly asked me to postpone it, and it was ten at night before we met.
The reason for the postponement was that GOERING and leading Government and Forces personalities met at the Fuehrer's official residence and held an important conference lasting for many hours. Now that the objects of the Russian campaign have for the most part been achieved, and the results of interviews with the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the European countries collated, they discussed the direction and policy of next year's campaign, and I have no doubt that at this conference JAPAN's action was also discussed.

1. First of all RIBBENTROP again asked if I had received any news about the Japanese-American negotiations. I replied that I had not yet received any official news. RIBBENTROP said JAPAN must not lose this opportunity of achieving the establishment of the New Order in East ASIA, and never had there been a time when close cooperation between the three Allies was more imperative. If JAPAN hesitated and GERMANY carried through the New Order in EUROPE alone, BRITAIN and AMERICA would turn the brunt of their attack against JAPAN. He insisted that, as the Fuehrer had said that day, the existence of JAPAN and GERMANY on the one hand and of AMERICA on the other was fundamentally incompatible, and the Germans were in receipt of reports that, owing to the stiff attitude of the Americans, there was practically no possibility of the Japanese-American negotiations being successful. If this was so, and if JAPAN determined on war against BRITAIN and AMERICA, not only would this be to the common advantage of JAPAN and GERMANY, but he believed it would be to JAPAN's advantage also.

I said I knew nothing of JAPAN's plans and therefore could not answer; but I asked whether His Excellency really thought a state of war would arise between GERMANY and AMERICA. He replied that ROOSEVELT was diseased, and there was no knowing what he would do.

Considering that hitherto RIBBENTROP has always answered that AMERICA would avoid war, and in view of recent speeches by HITLER and RIBBENTROP, it seems to me that GERMANY's attitude towards AMERICA is gradually stiffening, and that she has reached the stage where she would not shun even war with AMERICA.

2. I enquired about the future of the war against RUSSIA. RIBBENTROP replied that the Fuehrer had said that it was now his inflexible determination to sweep away and crush the SOVIET once and for all. The most important military operations had been concluded, and a large part of the army would be withdrawn to GERMANY. They would, however, continue operations in the CAUCASUS, and next Spring with a part of it they would make an attack on and beyond the URALS and chase STALIN into SIBERIA. I asked when approximately this was to be, and he said it was intended that the attack should start in about May of next year.

I next observed that I gathered from what he said that they were quite determined on attacking the SOVIET, and the thing I should like done as soon as possible was the creation of air communications between MANCHURIA and GERMANY. He replied that the Germans had been thinking of this for some time past, and he thought that next Summer it would not be impossible to fly in one hop from somewhere near the URALS to MANCHURIA.

3. I asked about plans for an attack on BRITAIN. He said that before the landing in BRITAIN they would chase British influence clean out of the NEAR EAST, AFRICA, GIBRALTAR and the MEDITERRANEAN. I gather from this statement by RIBBENTROP that they attack even more importance than before to this area. I asked if they intended to carry on without, attacking the BRITISH ISLES. RIBBENTROP said that GERMANY was of course making preparations for this; but according to reports reaching GERMANY the internal situation in BRITAIN was not any too good. For instance the split in the Conservative Party, the lack of confidence in CHURCHILL and the revolutionary ideas of BEVIN, the Labour leader, were making internal conditions quite difficult. There were of course some people who did not believe this; but the Fuehrer believed that conditions in BRITAIN were bad and thought that as the result of GERMANY's future operations, even, it might be, without an invasion, BRITAIN would be beaten.

In any case, however, GERMANY for her part had no intention whatever of making peace with ENGLAND, and the plan was to drive British influence out of EUROPE entirely. After the War, therefore, BRITAIN would be left absolutely powerless, and although the BRITISH ISLES would remain, all other British territory would be split up into three under GERMANY, AMERICA and JAPAN. In AFRICA, GERMANY would, generally speaking, be satisfied with
her old colonies and would give a great part to ITALY. It was, he said, to obtaining (group corrupt) that GERMANY attached the most importance.

4. Remark ing in conclusion that the very satisfactory progress of the War under German leadership was fully recognised and that GERMANY naturally had to extend the area of operations by regarding as enemies not only BRITAIN but also countries under British influence and those helping BRITAIN, I asked him when he thought the War would end. To this he replied that, although he hoped it would be brought to a conclusion in the course of next year, it might possibly continue till the following year.

He also said that if JAPAN were to go to war with AMERICA, GERMANY would, of course, join in immediately, and HITLER's intention was that there should be absolutely no question of GERMANY making a separate peace with ENGLAND.

At the end of this talk RIBBENTROP asked that the substance of it should be kept strictly secret, so please pay special attention to its handling.

This telegram has been given to the Naval and Military Attachés and to Vice-Admiral NOMURA and Major-General ABE. Please have it shown to the Army and Navy.

OSHIMA.


Japanese instructions regarding cypher machines and codes

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese (? Ambassador), HANOI etc.
No: 2444 Circular. Secret.
Date: 1st December, 1941.

Instructions have been sent to LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE and MANILA to discard the cypher machine, and BATAVIA's machine has been returned to JAPAN.

Notwithstanding my circular telegram No. 2447 (see below), WASHINGTON is retaining its machine and machine code.

BERNE to repeat to VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. WASHINGTON to repeat to BRAZIL, ARGENTINA and MEXICO.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, ROME etc.
No: 2447 Circular of 2nd December, 1941.

Instructions have been sent to the following to burn all telegraphic codes except one copy each of OITE and L:

North AMERICA (including HONOLULU), CANADA, PANAMA, (one group corrupt), South Seas (including (one group: ? Portuguese) TIMOR), SINGAPORA, CHIENMAI, British possessions (including Embassy in LONDON), and Dutch possessions.

Togo.


Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Consul, MOMBASA [and other posts unspecified].
No: 2436. Circular.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.

(Secret).

Immediately on receipt of this telegram you are to carry out the following instructions with the greatest care and as inconspicuously as possible.

(a) Burn all cyphers except one copy each of "O" and "L". As soon as you have done this immediately telegraph the one word HARUNA en clair.
(b) Burn all files of in and out telegrams and all secret and confidential documents.

These are precautions envisaging an emergency, and you should therefore redouble [rest of text corrupt: ? precautions in the discharge of your duties].


**Japanese Code Words for Telegraphing to Notify Critical Condition of Situation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No: 098602</th>
<th>Date: 6th December, 1941.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.</td>
<td>To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: 2409 Circular.</td>
<td>Date: 27th November, 1941.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

The following is the method of telegraphing secret code words to notify the critical condition of the situation.

Using the names on the first column a plain language text will be made up on some ordinary subject. The second column will contain the information which it is desired to send.

(Example:

"Collision between Japanese and Soviet armies" will appear in the text under date* [? 15th] as "Junior Secretaries HIJIKATA and KUBOTA are ordered for duty at your post. STOP".*

Further telegrams sent by this method will all end with the word "STOP" to distinguish them from other communications. The word "OWARI" [— "end"] will therefore not be used.

Arimura: cypher communications prohibited.

Asai: communicate by wireless broadcast.

Asakura: listen carefully for wireless communication by broadcast.

| Asikaga: | jamming by oversea broadcasts reception impossible. |
| Azuma: | pressure on JAPAN becoming greater. |
| Edoguti: | prepare for evacuation. |
| Hanabus: | evacuation preparations made. |
| Hanazono: | proceed with preparations for requesting suitable foreign envoy (consulate) to protect Japanese interests. |
| Hatakeyama: | diplomatic relations severed between Japan and . . . . |
| Hattori: | relations between JAPAN and . . . . are extremely critical. |
| Hijikata: | collision between Japanese and . . . . armies. |
| Hosone: | JAPAN is engaged with . . . . on the whole front. |
| Ibaragi: | telegraph time at which rupture of diplomatic relations between JAPAN and country to which you are accredited anticipated. |
| Inagaki: | has telegram been received on the matter of . . . . ? |
| Ishikawa: | telegram received on the matter of . . . . |
| Kashiwagi: | positive action has begun against . . . . |
| Kobayakawa: | stop granting Japanese entry and transit visas to . . . . nationals. |
| Kodama: | Japan. |
| Komiyama: | China. |
| Koyanagi: | Great Britain. |
| Kubota: | U. S. S. R. |
| Kuribara: | France. |
| Kusunoki: | Germany. |
| Matsutani: | Italy. |
| Minami: | United States of America. |
| Miwata: | Canada. |
| Miyazaki: | Mexico. |
| Morokoshi: | [? Brazil]. |
| Motizuki: | Panama. |
| Nagamine: | Argentine. |

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To: Japanese Consul-General, Singapore
[and other posts unspecified].
No: 2461 Circular of 3rd December, 1941.
Secret:
Duplicates of secret code words (including those for use in broadcasting*) are to be kept until the last moment. If anyone has already burnt them he should inform me by telegram and they will be telegraphed again.

[Dept: Note: *These are presumably those given in our No. 098127].

Japanese orders for destruction of cyphers, etc.

BJ/90
No: 098603
Date: 6th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To: Japanese Ambassador, London.
No: 2445 Circular. (Secret).
Date: 2nd December, 1941.

Please take the following action without delay and see to it that no word of it leaks out to outsiders.

1. Except for one copy each of the O, E, H, P, G, and L codes and the Character Code, all telegraphic codes (including the cypher books for intercommunication between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine) to be burnt.
2. When this has been done, the one word “HARUNA” to be telegraphed.
3. The files of all incoming and outgoing telegrams and all other confidential documents to be burnt.
4. Taking all possible care not to arouse outside suspicion, all secret documents to be treated in the same way.

As these are precautions envisaging an emergency, you should communicate this to no one but members of your staff and you should redouble your attention to your duties and maintain your calmness and self-respect.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
No: 790 of 3rd December, 1941.
HARTUNA [see paragraph 2 of telegram above].

Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.
No: 2421 Circular.
Date: 29th November, 1941.

Additions to list given in my circular No. 2409 [our No. 098602].
(To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher).

Kasima: Have residents been interned?
Kanoo: All residents are safe.
Kikuti: All residents have been interned.
Katuno: Some residents have been interned.
Kawasino: General Information. Wave-length changed to...
k/es from ... [month] ... [day].
Kakao: General Information. Sensitivity bad; please change wave-length.
Tujikita: General Information. Please change to shorter wave-length.
Tabuse: General Information. Please change to longer wave-length.
Saitoo: General Information. Time of broadcast changing on ... [day] from ... [time] to ... [time].
Kakasaki: General Information. Please change time of broadcast from ... [day] from ... [time] to ... [time].
Isezaki: Hundred.
Yasui [KYO]: 0,000.
Uno: 00,000.
Itimata: 000,000.


Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, RIO etc.
Date: 29th November, 1941.

As the following additions have been made for use in connection with your area only, please add them to the list already sent to you. (See our Nos. 098602 and 098604).

Asahima: The supplying of fuel to Japanese ships putting into Port has been stopped from ... (date).
Date: Please telegraph what quantity of ... can be bought.
Kawahara: It is thought that about ... tons of ... can be bought.
Niwaii Qniti: Purchase of ... impossible.
Mukanuma: Negotiations for purchase of ... in progress.
Mukakata: (? Please) communicate via ... (name of country).
Kazuma: Communications (? to be carried out) via diplomatic mission in ... (name of country).
Tokusina: Japanese ship due ... (name of country) on ... (month) ... (day).

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No. 986.
Date: 30th November 1941.

(Dept. Note: First paragraph missing).

2. The present Cabinet has therefore continued the negotiations (with AMERICA) hitherto on an equitable basis though at the same time exercising every care to safeguard JAPAN’s authority and existence.

Amongst the most knotty points in these negotiations has been the conflict in the respective opinions regarding the question of withdrawing troops (withdrawal of troops from CHINA and INDO CHINA was demanded) etc., but to judge by circumstances in the negotiations hitherto, the fundamental obstacle has been the traditional policy of AMERICA with regard to the conduct of international relations, that is to say her adherence to the same fundamental principles as were expressed in the recent Anglo-American talks at sea (2 i.e. the Atlantic Charter). In short, AMERICA’s real intention is to veto and obstruct the establishment of the New Order in EUROPE and ASIA by JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY (i.e. the purpose of the Tripartite Pact), their view being that Japanese-American relations cannot be maintained on a friendly basis so long as JAPAN makes common cause with GERMANY and ITALY, and, acting on this view, they have to all intents and purposes demanded JAPAN’s renunciation of the Tripartite Pact. This has brought the negotia-
tions to their final stage, and, as the talks of the last few days have made this matter still more clear, JAPAN has been compelled to realize that to continue the negotiations any longer cannot be expected to serve any useful purpose.

3. Again, the proposals presented by the American Government on the 26th make the above attitude even clearer, the clause affecting the Tripartite Pact being worded: "It is agreed that any treaty which either of the two Governments may have concluded with a third country shall not be construed as conflicting with the principles of this treaty, in other words, with the maintenance of peace in all regions of the PACIFIC . . . ." It is apparent that this was planned with the object of restricting the interpretation of JAPAN's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, and thereby of making JAPAN refrain from giving support to GERMANY and ITALY in the event of American participation in the (group corrupt: ! European) war, and to judge by this clause alone it has been realised that, quite apart from all other questions, it would be impossible for the American proposals to be made (group corrupt: ! the subject of) negotiations. Moreover the fact is that the American Government held constant discussions with GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, and the Dutch before presenting their proposals, and hence it can be seen that AMERICA is at present (2 acting in common) with these countries and regards JAPAN as an enemy together with GERMANY and ITALY.


Japanese Ambassador, Rome, reports interview with Mussolini.

No: 098630
Date: 7th December, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 3rd December, 1941.

(Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine).
Reference your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098452).
Accompanied by ANDO I saw the Duce, MUSSOLINI, (CIANO also was present) at 11 a.m. on the 3rd. I first gave him an outline of the Japanese-American negotiations as set forth in your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098633). MUSSOLINI said he had been following the negotiations from their inception until to-day with the greatest attention, and my communication had caused him no surprise. There was no doubt that the present situation was the natural result of the (2 obstinacy) of the American Government and of President ROOSEVELT's policy of intervention. The plotters of AMERICA aimed at the economic exploitation of Eastern ASIA for their own benefit, and wanted to detach JAPAN from the Axis and intervene in the European war. He had always known from the beginning that JAPAN, who was faithful and loyal, would not respond to such an attitude on AMERICA's part, negotiations or no negotiations. As I and my predecessor knew, he was a whole-hearted supporter of JAPAN's fundamental policy for the establishment of a New Order in East ASIA, and as it was in the past, so it was in the present and would be in the future. He firmly believed that JAPAN, as a natural right, would be the leader of Great East ASIA.


I then spoke on the lines of your telegram under reference (2 This passage in brackets is not clear. The sense seems to be: "With regard to paragraph 3 of your telegram, it was to be done as one copy between our Ambassador in BERLIN and ROBBENTROP and talks of some sort were in progress. I should like him to ask the German Ambassador about it.") With regard to paragraph 2 in your telegram MUSSOLINI said that if war broke out ITALY would give military support to the best of her power; that is to say she would do her best to keep the British Navy in the MEDITERRANEAN. Moreover GERMANY and ITALY to-
gether had recently established an air blockade and were trying to put further pressure on BRITAIN in the MEDITERRANEAN. Also with regard to [? 2 ? 3], he was ready to sign to-day. I therefore asked further with regard to 2 if ITALY would do this at once if JAPAN declared war on BRITAIN and on AMERICA. He replied that in accordance with the Three Power Pact naturally she would. As, however, it would be necessary to do it simultaneously with GERMANY, they would have to go through the formality of consulting with GERMANY. With regard to 3, I submitted the [one group] translation in your telegram No. 237 [not received], and asked which procedure he preferred, a single copy or separate copies. He replied that it should be done simultaneously with GERMANY, but he did not much mind what form it took. If it were possible a single copy would give a greater impression of strength. He would at once consult MACKENSEN on this point.

At this meeting MUSSOLINI asked me questions about the Russian question, and I therefore did not refer to it.

Repeated to BERLIN.

HORIKIRI.

Japan and the Axis, Proposed Three-Power Pact.

No: 038651
Date: 7th December, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 782.
Date: 5th December, 1941.

Reference my telegram No. 775. [Not received].

Accompanied by ARDO I had an interview with the Foreign Minister CIANO on the 5th at his request.

CIANO showed me the Italian text of the draft of a Three-Power Pact to which GERMANY and ITALY have agreed. (BERLIN will have telegraphed this to you, I imagine), regarding participation in the war and not making an independent armistice or independent peace. He said that if the Japanese would agree to this it could be signed at any time. The procedure could be arranged by conversations between BERLIN and TOKYO and then all the parties could sign.

Repeated by telegram to BERLIN.

HORIKIRI.


Japanese Foreign Minister's View of Washington Conversations.

No: 098671.
Date: 8th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN, etc.
No: 2416 Circular.
Date: 28th November, 1941.
[Dept: Note: Very corrupt text].
(Chef de Mission cypher).

With regard to the Japanese-American negotiations, the counter-proposal made by the Americans on the 27th ignores the position of JAPAN and cannot be considered for a moment. It seems, therefore, that there is nothing for it but to discontinue the negotiations. The situation is that it is impossible to guarantee that within a few days from now there will be no [? change in] the relations of JAPAN with BRITAIN and AMERICA.

This is for your personal information only.

Togo.

Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D.
**Japanese Broadcasting.**

No: 008673  
Date: 8th December, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, RIO DE JANEIRO.  
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
No: 482.  
Date: 30th November, 1941.

Recently at this post, we have been testing general news reception. At present it is quite impossible [group corrupt:] ? to hear] the 10.30 p. m. Tokyo time, broadcast and, for the time being, please note that we are only listening to JVJ's [group corrupt: ? JZI's] broadcasts directed to American states at 6.30 p. m., Tokyo time. The same, I understand, applies to Argentina.

Actually, reception conditions here are considered best between 4 a. m. and 6 a. m., Tokyo time, and I consider it would be most advantageous to use this period for South American broadcasts. Two wave-lengths [of frequencies] between 10 and 15 magacycles [group corrupt: ? are suggested].


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**Japanese Ambassador, Bangkok, Wishes to Burn Codes.**

No: 008674  
Date: 8th December, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.  
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
No: 883.  
Date: 30th November, 1941.

In view of the state of emergency, I should like to burn all telegraphic codes except those set out below. Please wire at once whether you have any objection.

Y0, KA, OITE, TO, TSU, FUJI, X. [Group corrupt]. MATSU with No. 1 rules for use, directions for using “B” machine (KO-OTSU [{(a)}-{(b)}]) and the machine code—one of each of the above.

1. YAKKO [—NU]—two of each.

Further, I should like to burn all shipping codes, naval codes and codes for use between the three Ministries. Please negotiate with the Departments concerned and telegraph instructions.


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**Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.**

No: 008693  
Date: 8th December, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.  
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
No: 1416.  
Date: 5th December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: See our No. 08851).

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

Reference my No. 1407 [not received].

I called on RIBBENTROP at his request at 3 a. m. on the 5th. He made a formal reply that they accepted the two points put forward by us. My following telegram gives the draft Treaty which he gave me in this connection.

OSIMA.

No: 1417 of 5th December, 1941.

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

(1. The last part of the Agreement is in the same form as the Three Power Treaty.

2. The place of signature is BERLIN.)

[Dept: Note: Translation follows at end of text].


(Part of German text in original illegible.)
Artikel 1

Falls zwischen Deutschland und Italien einerseits und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika andererseits der Kriegszustand eintritt, wird sich Japan sofort auch seinerseits als im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten befindlich betrachten und diesen Krieg mit allen ihm zur Verfügung stehenden Maachtmitlen führen.

Artikel 2.

Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, im Falle eines gemäß Artikel 1 dieses Abkommens von den drei Mächten gemeinsam gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika geführten Krieges ohne volles [gegen]seitiges Einverständnis keinen Waffenstillstand oder Frieden mit den Vereinigten Staaten zu schliessen.

Sie übernehmen die gleiche Verpflichtung auch hinsichtlich eines Waffenstillstands oder Friedens mit England für den Fall, dass zwischen Japan und England der Kriegszustand eintritt.

Artikel 3.

Die drei Regierungen sind darüber einig, dass dieses Abkommen auf das strengste geheim gehalten wird. Sie werden jedoch die von ihnen in Artikel 2 übernommene Verpflichtung in einer noch zu verabredenden Form bekanntgeben, sobald sich Deutschland, Italien und Japan gemeinsam im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika oder England oder mit diesen beiden Mächten befinden.

Artikel 4.

Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft und bleibt ebenso lange wie der am 27. September 1940 abgeschlossene Dreimächtepakt in Geltung.

Translation

In view of the increasingly obvious desire of the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND to bring to nought a just New Order with all the armed forces at their disposal and to cut off the means of existence of the German, Italian and Japanese peoples, the German Government, the Italian Government and the Japanese Government have, in order to ward off these grave threats to the existence of their peoples, jointly resolved on the following:

Article (1).

Should a state of war arise between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES, GERMANY and ITALY for their part shall also consider themselves to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces at their disposal.

Should a state of war arise between GERMANY and ITALY on the one hand and the UNITED STATES on the other, JAPAN for her part shall consider herself to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces at her disposal.

Article (2).

GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN bind themselves in the event of a war waged jointly by the Three Powers against the UNITED STATES according to Article (1) of this Treaty, not to conclude any armistice or peace with the UNITED STATES without full mutual agreement.

They undertake a similar obligation regarding an armistice or peace with ENGLAND, should a state of war arise between JAPAN and ENGLAND.

Article (3).

The three Governments are in full agreement that this agreement shall be kept most strictly secret. They shall, however, announce in a form yet to be decided, the undertakings assumed in Article (2), as soon as GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN find themselves jointly at war with the UNITED STATES of AMERICA or with ENGLAND or with both these Powers.

Article (4).

This agreement comes into force immediately on signature and remains in force as long as the Three Power Pact concluded on 27th September 1940.
Japanese Notification of "Extremely Critical" Relations with Great Britain and United States

BJ/91
No. 008694
Date: 8th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Embassy, LONDON, etc.
No. 2494 Circular.
Date: 7th December, 1941.

Relations between JAPAN and GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES are extremely critical.

JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER.

[Dept. Note: This telegram was sent in plain language with the special code words inserted given in our No. 068602. It was despatched from TOKYO at 1150 hours OMT on 7th December 1941, i. e. Japan Time 8.50 p. m. on 7th December 1941].


Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.

No: 068696
Date: 8th December, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No. 1004. Most immediate.
Date: 7th December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

Reference your Nos. 1418 and 1419 [these telegrams were received in corrupt and fragmentary form. The former appears to deal with Russian supplies and the latter with the draft treaty].

We are in complete agreement with GERMANY's counter-proposals. Accordingly there is no objection to initialling right away and formally signing as soon as the [group corrupt: ? necessary] procedure has been completed. However, the situation may take a sudden turn and we cannot tell whether a [group corrupt] collision may not occur in the interval before the formal signing is performed. Thus, supposing we initial now, it must be understood that for the actual signing, the text proposed by GERMANY may not apply to the existing circumstances (for example, clauses like No. 1 will be unnecessary if GERMANY and ITALY join in the war without delay).

[Two groups] I wish you to see RIBBENTROP immediately and explain the above particulars confidentially to him. Also make clear that it is the expectation of the Imperial Government that if war breaks out between JAPAN and AMERICA before the formal signature of the agreement, GERMANY and ITALY will immediately participate.


As regards the text of the agreement, [group corrupt: ? please negotiate] only for the stimulation concerning the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Respecting GERMANY, please refer to the text in my No. 907 (not received). Further, discuss with GERMANY whether the formal signing should be made public after GERMANY and ITALY have joined in the war and telegraph the reply.

Please repeat to ROME.
Far Eastern War: Question of German and Italian Participation

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1432. Most immediate.
Date: 5th December, 1941.
(Chef de Mission cypher)

At 11 p.m. to-day, the 7th, I received a radio report that hostilities had broken out between JAPAN and AMERICA, and at once called an RIBBENTROP. He said that from reports which he too had received he thought this was true, and that therefore, although he had not yet secured HITLER's sanction, the immediate participation in the war by GERMANY and ITALY was a matter of course. The secret agreement had in consequence already become ——?—, and [? they had decided] to drop it * * * [a portion is lost here] * * * Form of German and Italian participation. RIBBENTROP said he would discuss with me to-morrow, the 8th, about the time of publication of this declaration and so on.

RIBBENTROP rang up CIANO then and there, and notified him of the foregoing.


Far Eastern War: Text of Japanese-German-Italian Agreement

From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No. 1440. Most Immediate.
Date: 8th December, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

Reference my No. 1432. (Our No. 038722).

The text of the agreement, after consultation with GERMANY, is given below. An explanation follows in my separate telegram.

In dem unterschriebenen Entschluss, die Waffen nicht niederzulegen, bis der gemeinsame Krieg gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und England zum erfolgreichen Ende geführt worden ist, haben sich die Deutsche Regierung, die italienische Regierung und die Japanische Regierung über folgende Bestimmungen geeinigt:

Artikel 1.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden den ihnen von den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und England aufgezwungenen Krieg mit allen ihnen zu Gebote stehenden Machtmitteln gemeinsam bis zum siegreichen Ende führen.

Artikel 2.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, ohne volles gegenseitiges Einverständnis weder mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika noch mit England Waffenstillstand oder Frieden zu schliessen.


Artikel 3.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden nach siegreicher Beendigung des Krieges zum Zwecke der Herbeiführung einer gerechten Neuordnung auf das enge Zusammenarbeiten.

Artikel 4.—Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft.

Zu Urkunde dessen haben die Unterzeichneten, von ihren Regierungen gebührend bevollmächtigt, dieses Abkommen unterzeichnet und mit ihren Siegeln versehen.


No. 1441 of 8th December, 1941.

With reference to my telegram No. 1440 [see above].
From 5 p. m. to-day myself, RIBBENTROP, KASE, USHIDA, and GAUSS put our heads together on this matter of the declaration of the non-conclusion of a separate peace with a view to imparting to this declaration the loftiest possible significance, and produced the text of the agreement contained in my telegram under reference. This goes beyond the adoption of our proposal in regard to a promise of nonconclusion of a separate peace (Clause II) to the following extent:

(a) The Three Powers' firm intention to fight together against Anglo-American aggression until final victory is expressed in Clause II.

(b) Cooperation with a view to the establishment of a new order after the war is promised in Clause III.

Thereby the significance of this war is elucidated, while at the same time Clause III has an advantage from the point of view of obtaining German and Italian cooperation when the Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere is established after the war, this, I believe, being in accord with the views of the Japanese Government. I hope therefore that the above text will be adopted unless there are any serious objections, and that the formalities for signature may be completed promptly. I would add that in the meantime the Germans have notified me that the Italian Government is in complete agreement with this proposal.

2. Ribbentrop said that he would like the publication of this agreement to take place on the 10th and immediately afterwards hoped to stage a big demonstration. He was unable at the moment to say what kind of demonstration this would be but it was sure to be something distinctly favourable to JAPAN, and he was most anxious that signature should be on the 10th. I therefore told him that this could not be undertaken in view of formalities in JAPAN, but as it is likely to be helpful to us if we play our part in falling in with GERMANY's intention I would suggest that you push on with the formalities as fast as possible with a view to prompt signature. Should signature on the 10th not be possible please reply immediately by telegram on what date it can be accomplished.

3. Just as this very talk was in progress RIBBENTROP received the Imperial Headquarters report of the victory in which the American battleships were sunk, and was greatly delighted and praised highly the daring of our Navy.

No: 14/2 of 8th December, 1941.
Most immediate. Secret.
Reference my No. 1440. [See above.]

As the matter is urgent, I have tentatively complied the Japanese text given below. If you have no objections I should like to take this as the (Japanese) text of the agreement. Please telegraph your reply at once.

The Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government with the inflexible determination not to lay down their arms in the joint war against the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE until final victory is achieved have made the following agreement:

1. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY will jointly prosecute the war forced upon them by the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE will all the means at their disposal until victory is attained.

2. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, except by mutual consent, undertake not to conclude a separate [Dept. Note: the Japanese word used means literally "arbitrary" "self-willed"] armistice and/or peace with the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE or with either of them.

3. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, after victory is attained, will cooperate closely in the establishment of an equitable New Order.

4. This agreement will come into force simultaneously with its signature. In witness whereof, the undermentioned, having received competent authority from their respective countries, have set their seals this — day of the 12th month of the 16th year of the Showa Bra Era 1. e. — December 1941 or the—day of December of the 20th year of the Fascist Era, in BERLIN, the said agreement having been drawn up in Japanese, German and Italian.

Japanese Instructions to Embassy, Rio, etc. to burn cyphers etc
BJ/97.
No: 098786
Date: 10th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To: Japanese Ambassador, Rio De Janeiro, etc.
No. 2318 Circular.
Date: 6th December, 1941.
1. On receipt of this telegram please burn the following, leaving one copy of each, NU, CITE, TSU, L and X. Depending on the situation, it will also be all right to burn the remaining codes, but please keep TSU as long as possible and leave CITE and L to the last.
2. Please leave one copy each of HIMOKE and the Machine Code in current use (including the rules for use between our Embassy in England (sic) and us; only MEXICO does not possess these). But if in view of the situation you wish at any time to destroy them please telegraph me.
3. With regard to the files of my telegrams and other secret documents please watch developments and adopt suitable means of destroying them.
4. In the event of your completing the above, telegraph me the one word JURYO. If you have destroyed TSU the word SHOTI, if CITE and L have been destroyed the word ANZEN.
5. If you have in your care telegraphic codes of other Posts please destroy them all.


Japanese Codes to be Destroyed at Bangkok
No: 098800
Date: 11th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
No: 881. Confidential.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.

In reply to your telegram No. 863. [Our No. 098674]. I agree with your request, to which there is no objection. But please transfer one copy of OIITZ to SINGORA for safe keeping. Please destroy the codes for use between the three Ministries; also all the naval code books. The codes remaining after consultation with the posts concerned and the cypher machine[s] please deposit in the special safe. Please be sure that this is carried out.


Japanese Broadcasting: Reception in Bangkok
No: 098801
Date: 11th December, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 902.
Date: 4th December, 1941.

At 10:30 p.m. J.A.P.'s selectivity is gradually improving.
We look for broadcasts at this hour and also for JUP at 6:30 p.m.


Japanese Consul, Dublin, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers
No: 098831
Date: 12th December, 1941.

From: The Japanese Vice-Consul, DUBLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 7th December, 1941. 1040 hours.

*HARUNA,
Japanese Consul.

[Dept. Note: *See paragraph 2 of TOKYO circular telegram No. 2445 of 2nd December, 1941, our No. 098803].
Director. F.O.(3). Dominions Office.
79716—46—Ex.148——45
Japanese Vice-Consul, Ouritiba, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers, etc.

No: 098832
Date: 12th December, 1941.

From: The Japanese Vice-Consul, OURITIBA.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 10th December, 1941. 2040 hours.

*JURYO, Komine.

[Dept: Note: *See Tokyo circular telegram No. 2318 of 8th December, 1941, paragraph 4, our No. 098766].
Director. F.O.(3). M.I.5.

Japan and the Axis: Signature of Treaty

BJ/101.
No: 098833

Date: 12th December, 1941.
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1015.
Date: 10th December, 1941.
(Dept: Note. See our No. 098760, BJ/98).
Reference your telegram No. 1013. (Not received).

I have received the whole of the Japanese text. I called on the Foreign Minister at noon to-day, 10th, and arranged for signature on the 11th at 1100 hours Berlin time and for publication at 1600 hours. Accordingly please publish at 2300 hours in JAPAN.


JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, BERLIN, AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THREE-POWER TREATY

No: 098846
Date: 12th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 1016.
Date: 10th December, 1941.
(Dept: Note: See our No. 098760).
Most immediate.
To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.
My telegram No. 1013. (Not received).
For your information, the following is a translation into German of the document giving you power and authority to sign:

(Übersetzung).

(Amtliches Insiegel).
Der Minister des Auswärtigen Amtes, Shigenori TOGO.
An den Ausserordentlichen und Befvollmächtigten— Botschafter in BERLIN, Herrn OSHIMA.
Seine Majestät de Kaiser haben nachdem die Beratung des kaiserlichen geheimen Staatsrates abgeschlossen ist, mit dem heutigen Datum den Abschluss

Director.
F. —. (3).
P. I. D.
Abschluss des Abkommens zwischen JAPAN, DEUTSCHLAND und ITALIEN zu bewilligen geruht.
Sie sind bevollmächtigt, das oben genannte Abkommen zu unterzeichnen und zu siegeln.
(Translation of German given above is as follows:—
At The 9th December, in the 16th year of the Shōwa Era.

Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO,
To Mr. OSHIMA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at BERLIN.

Upon the advice of the Imperial Privy Council, His Majesty the Emperor is pleased to agree to the conclusion of a Pact, dated to-day, between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY.

You are empowered to sign and seal the aforesaid Pact.

Japan and the Axis: Text of Three-Power Treaty

Re:
Date: 12th December, 1941.
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 1010.
Date: 9th December, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.

At 9 p.m. to-day the German Ambassador called on me and we had a second interview when he submitted the new draft of the text. You will already have received this, I expect.

In regard to this text I said that this involved the 1st paragraph of Article 3 of the Three-Power Treaty, and suggested the removal of Article 3. At the same time, I said, if GERMANY stuck to the retention of this Article, after the words "an equitable New Order" in that same Article should be added "in the Three-Power Treaty concluded on 27th September, 1940". Article 4 should therefore be amended to read "This pact shall come into force at the time of its signature and its period of validity shall be identical with that of the Three-Power Treaty concluded on the 27th September, 1940".

The Japanese text is given in my immediately following telegram. (See below.)

[The remainder of the telegram gives instructions for telegraphing the texts in the three languages to enable the formalities in JAPAN to be concluded. See Dept. Note: at end of TOKYO-BERLIN No. 1011 of 9th December, 1941. (See below)].

TOGO.

Director (3).
F. O. (3).
P. I. D.
Admiralty.
War Office (3).
India Office (2).
Colonial Office.
Air Ministry.
Sir E. Bridges.
Dominion Office.

No. 1011 of the 9th December, 1941.
Reference my immediately preceding telegram No. 1010. (See above).
(To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher).

Pact between JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY.

In the inflexible resolve not to lay down their arms till the joint war against the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND has been successfully concluded, the Japanese, German, and Italian Governments have jointly agreed as follows:

Article 1.

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will fight together with all the resources at their command until victory is achieved over the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND.

Article 2.

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY undertake not to make a separate armistice or separate peace with the UNITED STATES or ENGLAND without full mutual understanding.
Article 3.

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will after the victorious conclusion of the war collaborate closely in establishing an equitable New Order in the spirit of the Three-Power Treaty signed on 27th September, 1940.

Article 4

This Pact shall come into force at the time of signature.

As witness whereof the undermentioned plenipotentiaries etc.

Signed in triplicate in Japanese, German and Italian at BERLIN (dates).

TOGO.

(Dept. Note: The German and Italian versions of the above were cabled to TOKYO from BERLIN as Nos. 1450 and 1453 respectively, dated 10th December, 1941).

MOST SECRET.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY: NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.

JAPANESE BROADCASTS OF GENERAL INFORMATION REPORTS.

No. 098971

Date: 16th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, AMGORA, etc.
No: 2548 Circular. Secret.
Date: 11th December, 1941.

From 10:20 p. m. 11th December, general information reports will be sent on the 9450 wavelength [?] with the call sign] JUO.

TOGO.

Director.
P. O. (3).
P. I. D.
Admiralty.
War Office (3).
Air Ministry.
M. I. 5.
Sir E. Bridges.

JAPANESE NAVAL PLANS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC

No. 099199

Date: 22nd December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, Buenos Aires.
No. 288.
Date: 9th December, 1941.

[The first part of this telegram recounts the events that led up to the outbreak of war from the Japanese point of view—Japanese patience and A. B. C. D. encirclement. Part II follows].

2. The Imperial Japanese forces, however, right at the outset and in one heavy attack, have achieved the following: two battleships sunk, four severely damaged, four heavy cruisers severely damaged (three are confirmed), one aircraft-carrier sunk and over one hundred aircraft destroyed. It may be said that the main strength of the American Pacific Fleet has been practically annihilated.

From now on the Imperial (Japanese) Navy will be able to extend the scope of its activities little by little to the South Atlantic and South Pacific and it is clear at least that we shall obtain command of the seas in the South Pacific before long. Even, therefore, if economic intercourse between JAPAN and the South American States bordering the Pacific be cut off for the time being, it will not be long before communication is restored. Not only so, but intercourse with ARGENTINA and BRAZIL by merchant ships in convoy will be urged upon these
two countries, while sea communication with BRITAIN, AMERICA, and Latin AMERICA will, on the other hand, be severed (? shortly) by the Imperial (Japanese) Navy.

Director (3).
F. C. (3). (Dept. Note: Part III of this telegram missing)
P. I. D.
Admiralty.
War Office (3).
India Office (2).
Colonial Office.
Air Ministry.
M. E. W. (2).
Sir E. Bridges.
Dominions Office.
INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS

CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parentheses following the description)

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<td>Table A (p. 1) showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates. (Exhibit B, p. 130.)</td>
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<td>Photostatic copy of a portion of the <em>Honolulu Star-Bulletin</em> (undated) relating to reported talk of Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 2, p. 92.)</td>
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**Note:** 
- **C1:** Time Message Sent To Center
- **C2:** Time Message Hrs.
- **C3:** Drafting Officer & Branch
- **R/S:** Record Section
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**Table A (Page Two)**
Observation tower (or Battery Control Station) and Shore Battery Emplacements under construction. Dispersed rcs recently unloaded from Transports were "Ten-foot" barrels six-inch bore."

NOTE: All Lighthouses are now undoubtedly being used for observation posts or Battery Control Stations. Informant believes batteries are deployed near each lighthouse. All are "PROHIBITED AREAS".

PELELIU Is.

Village

3 Barracks "Navy Base" Land Plan "Base"

Barracks: Shore Batteries

Angaur I.
SHORT URGES
ONE MAN FOR
M-DAY CHIEF

Berna, Army Remains in
Texas Ready Late in
Captured Hands

HESCENTLY ADDED

ADDITIONAL ADDED

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Admiral Kimmel Calls On Hawaii To Face Realities

Speaker at Defense Week Luncheon Asks Sacrifices Similar To Those Navy Is Making

Admiral William F. Halsey, U.S. Navy, recently in charge of the Pacific defense area, in an address to the luncheon audience yesterday, said that the entire nation must face the realization that the war has already started and will continue, and that all people must do their part to save the nation.

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Admiral Kimmel

Highlights Of Today's Talk By Admiral Kimmel
APPENDIX "C."

PATTERN
for
ESPIONAGE
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

SECRET

Flow of information is from collection unit to Japan. Arrows indicate flow of directives and control.