[This file contains the REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, pp. 297-386]
Page i
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 39
REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS
COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY
COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH
ENDORSEMENTS
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
Page ii
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
Page iii
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Pages Transcript Hearings
No. pages
1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
Page iv
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 157
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. Report of Roberts Commission, dated January 23, 1942 ............ 1
2. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board dated October 20, 1944 ........ 23
3. Appendix No. 1: Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on
phases mentioned in House Military Affairs report which relate to
the Pearl Harbor disaster ....................................... 179
4. Exhibits A and B to appendix No. 1 (above) ...................... 219
5. Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board ...................... 220
6. November 25, 1944, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB report ................................ 231
7. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen's Investigation .. 270
8. September 14, 1945, memorandum from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB Top Secret Report reviewed in connec-
tion with Clausen Investigation ................................. 283
9. Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, dated October 19, 1944 ........ 297
10. Addendum to Navy Court of Inquiry findings of fact ............. 323
11. First endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Navy Judge
Advocate General for Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 2, 1944 .......... 330
12. November 3, 1944, memorandum from CincUS and CNO to Secretary of
Navy, listing parts of Navy Court of Inquiry record that contain
information of super secret nature ............................. 332
13. Second endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report by CincUS and
CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated November 6, 1944 (not made
public) ........................................................ 335
14. Paraphrase of second endorsement (item 13) which was made
public ......................................................... 345
15. Third endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Secretary
of Navy, dated December 1, 1944 ................................ 354
16. Fourth endorsement (undated) to Navy Court of Inquiry report,
and fourth endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary
of Navy (not made public) ...................................... 355
17. Paraphrase of fourth endorsement (item 16), dated August 1945,
made public August 29, 1945 .................................... 371
18. December 3, 1944, memorandum, from CincUS and CNO to Secretary
of Navy, commenting on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board ....... 383
19. Third endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by CincUS and CNO
to Secretary of Navy, dated August 13, 1945 .................... 387
20. Second endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Navy Judge
Advocate General for CincUS and CNO. Dated August 10, 1945 ..... 388
21. First endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of
Navy, dated July 25, 1945 ...................................... 389
22. Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated
July 12, 1945 .................................................. 390
Page 297
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
[1156] Under date of 13 July, 1944. this Court of Inquiry was ordered by
the Secretary of the Navy to inquire into all circumstances connected
with the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor,
Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December, 1941, to include in its findings a
full statement of facts deemed to be established, to give its opinion as
to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on
the part of any person or persons in the naval service and, in case its
opinion be that offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred,
to specifically recommend what further proceedings should be had.
The Court convened on 24 July, 1944, and since then has held daily
sessions almost continuously in Washington, San Francisco, and Pearl
Harbor, having called and examined numerous witnesses from the State,
War, and Navy Departments.
The Court, having thoroughly inquired into all facts and circumstances
in connection with the attack by the Japanese armed forces on Pearl
Harbor on 7 December, 1941, and having considered all evidence adduced,
finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
I
Pearl Harbor is situated on the Island of Oahu, near the city of
Honolulu, the capital of the Territory of Hawaii, distant 2100 miles
from San Francisco. It is the only permanent outlying United States
Naval Base in the Eastern Pacific. It possesses great strategic
importance as a point from which naval operations in defense of the
Western United States can be conducted, and offensive operations against
an enemy to the Westward launched and supported. The United States
possesses no base on the West Coast of the United States that meets
these requirements to an equivalent extent.
II
Prior to 1940 certain subdivisions of the Pacific Fleet and, beginning
in May, 1940, the entire Fleet operated in the [1157] Hawaiian area with
Pearl Harbor as a base. In May, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft
carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from the
Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.
For the purpose of conducting exercises and maneuvers at sea designed to
increase efficiency and readiness for war, the remaining major vessels
of the Pacific Fleet were organized in three main Task Forces. The
operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at least one of
these Task Forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently, during Fleet
maneuvers, the entire available Fleet was at sea.
Page 298
The vessels and the Fleet planes thus rotated their scheduled periods in
port, periods essential to the mobility of the Fleet for purposes
impossible of achievement at sea. At no time during 1941 were all the
vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
The operating schedule in effect on 7 December, 1941, was issued in
September, 1941. In accordance with its provisions Task Force One, under
the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N., and part of Task Force
Two were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. Task Force Three,
under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. N., was at sea,
engaged chiefly in escorting the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON to Midway to
which point planes were being ferried.
Part of Task Force Two, under the command of Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey,
Jr., U. S. N., and including the aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, was
returning from ferrying planes to Wake.
[1158] Task Force One included the preponderance of the battleship
strength of the Fleet. The three battleships of Task Force Two had been
left behind in Pearl Harbor because their slow speed did not permit them
to accompany the ENTERPRISE to Wake. It was purely a coincidence that
all battleships of the Pacific Fleet, except one undergoing overhaul at
the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
III
Beginning at 0755, Honolulu time, on 7 December, 1941, an attack was
delivered from the northward of Oahu by Japanese carrier aircraft
against units of the United States Pacific Fleet then moored and
anchored inside the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, against Army and Navy
aircraft, and against shore installations on the Island of Oahu. An
attack delivered simultaneously by Japanese midget submarines was
without effect. The details of these attacks and the extent of the loss
of life and of the damage inflicted by Japanese aircraft have since been
made matters of public record.
Within the same 24 hours the Japanese also delivered attacks on the
Philippines, Wake and Guam, as well as on Hong Kong and Malaya. The
attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be disassociated from these. All were the
reprehensible acts of a warrior nation, war-minded and geared to war
through having been engaged in hostilities for the past four years, and
long known to have aggressive designs for the dominance of the Far East.
The United States was then at peace with all nations and for more than
20 years had not engaged in [1159] hostilities.
In time of peace it is a difficult and complicated matter for the United
States to prevent an attack by another nation because of the
constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the
Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been
delivered. This is a military consideration which gives to a
dishonorable potential enemy the advantage of the initiative, deprive
the United States of an opportunity to employ the offensive as a means
of defense, and places great additional responsibility on the shoulders
of commanders afloat in situations where instant action, or its absence,
may entail momentous consequences.
Page 299
IV
From 1 August, 1939, to 25 March, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations,
charged by law under the Secretary of the Navy with the operations of
the Fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in
war, was Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. The Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet from 1 February to 17 December, 1941, was Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, U. S. N. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department
from 7 February to 17 December, 1941, was Lieut. General Walter C.
Short, U. S. A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District from 11 April,
1940, until 1 April, 1942, was Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N. He
was an immediate subordinate of Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him
with the task of assisting the Army in [1160] protecting Pearl Harbor.
With respect to those duties connected with the defense of Pearl Harbor,
Rear Admiral Bloch's responsibility was solely to Admiral Kimmel. It is
an established fact that this responsibility was discharged to the
complete satisfaction of the latter.
V
Admiral Kimmel and Lieut. General Short were personal friends. They met
frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations were cordial
and cooperative in every respect and, in general, this was true as
regards their subordinates. They frequently conferred with each other on
official matters of common interest, and invariably did so when messages
were received by either which had any bearing, on the development of the
United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing
for war. Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the
responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures
being undertaken by the other in the defense of the Base to a degree
sufficient for all useful purposes.
VI
For some time preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States,
engaged in the protection of shipping and the patrolling of sea lanes in
the Atlantic, was passing through the preliminary stage of a transition
from a state of national military unpreparedness to an ability to cope
successfully with two resourceful and fully prepared enemies. The
vigorous and convincing representations made by Admiral [1161] Stark
before Congressional committees, beginning in January, 1940, showed
clearly that the Navy was unprepared for war and greatly needed ships,
planes, and men. These representation, linked with the fall of France,
resulted in an Act of Congress in June, 1940, whereby appropriations
were voted for practically doubling the size of our Navy.
During all of 1941 and for some time thereafter the problem confronting
both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff. U. S. Army,
was one of expansion and of distributing, to the best advantage, the
limited supply of ships, planes, guns, and men and intensifying the
training of personnel while production was being stepped up.
Page 300
Under date of 30 December, 1940, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th
Naval District and the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, after conference with
Admiral Richardson, the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and
Lieut. General Herron, the then Commanding General Hawaiian Department,
initiated correspondence addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations in
which he set forth the inability of the 14th Naval District to meet a
hostile attack with the equipment and forces at hand. He pointed out
that, as Naval Base Defense Officer, he had no planes for distant
reconnaissance. He gave as his opinion that neither in numbers nor types
were the Army bombers satisfactory for the purpose intended. He invited
attention to the serious deficiency on the part of the Army with regard
to both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. He noted also that an
anti-aircraft warning system planned [1162] by the Army was scheduled
for completion at an indefinite time in the future.
This letter was forwarded to the Navy Department by Admiral Richardson,
by endorsement. He concurred in the opinion that the Army aircraft and
anti-aircraft batteries were inadequate to protect the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor against air attack, and urged that adequate local defense forces
be provided. He further expressed the opinion that the forces provided
should be sufficient for full protection, and should be independent of
the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet.
Under date of 24 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a
letter to the Secretary of War, based upon the representations made by
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the recommendations of the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and in general concurrence herewith.
In this letter the belief was expressed that, in case of war with Japan
hostilities might be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or on
the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The dangers envisaged in the order of
their importance and probability were considered to be: (1) Air bombing
attack. (2) Air torpedo plane attack. (3) Sabotage. (4) Submarine attack
(5) Mining (6) bombardment by gunfire.
Defense against all but (1) and (2) being considered satisfactory, it
was proposed that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase
of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment
of an air warning net in Hawaii; also that the Army give consideration
[1163] to the questions of balloon barrages. The employment of smoke,
and other special devices for improving the defenses at Pearl Harbor;
that local joint plans be drawn for defense against surprise aircraft
raids; that there be agreement on appropriate defences of joint
readiness for immediate action against a surprise aircraft raid; and
that joint exercises for defense against surprise aircraft raids be
held.
The Secretary of War, under date of 7 February, 1941, expressed complete
concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. He
pointed out that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of all
overseas Army departments and held a high priority for completion of its
projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection
to the Fleet. He outlined the details of the Hawaiian project and stated
the number of pursuit planes and antiaircraft guns eventually to be
supplied. He stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning system
was expected to be delivered in
Page 301
Hawaii in June, 1941, and that all arrangements for installation would
have been made by the time the equipment was delivered.
Copies of these letters were furnished Admiral Kimmel, Lieut. General
Short, and Rear Admiral Bloch.
In a letter dated 17 October, 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch reported to the
Chief of Naval Operations that the only increment that had been made to
the local defense forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels,
was the U.S.S. SACRAMENTO, an old gunboat of negligible gun power [1164]
and low speed. He urged that the Department send a number of small fast
craft equipped with listening gear and depth charges for anti-submarine
purposes and further urged that he be sent two squadrons of VSO planes
to be used for patrol against enemy submarines.
Admiral Kimmel forwarded this letter with the following endorsement:
"There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the
Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces
adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an
emergency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for
these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to
hardly warrant refutation. A fleet tied to its base by diversions to
other purposes of light forces necessary for its security at sea is, in
a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned,
in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of
which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as
can possibly be made available. The necessities of the case clearly
warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs."
The Chief of Naval Operations replied, under date of 25 November, 1941,
that no additional vessels could be supplied for the present but that
certain sub chasers, due for completion in May, 1942, had been
tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District, certain privately owned
vessels might be expected at a future time and that there were no
additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval
District.
It is a fact that, through 1941, the demand for munitions and war
supplies exceeded the capacity of the nation and in all important
commands there existed marged [sic] [1165] deficiencies in trained
personnel and in material equipment and instruments of war. Although
shortages were inevitable, it is a further fact that they had direct
bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor.
VII
On 5 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
Staff, U. S. Army, submitted a joint memorandum to the President,
recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time and
giving, as one of the basic reasons the existing numerical superiority
of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
On 7 December, 1941, the U. S. Pacific Fleet was numerically inferior to
the Japanese naval forces in both combatant and auxiliary vessels.
Aware of this existing weakness in relative fighting strength, and of
the vigorous steps being taken by the United States to overcome
deficiencies, Japan clearly sensed the advantage of striking before
these steps could become effective. Her advantageous position was
strength-
Page 302
ened by her extensive espionage system which utilized her civilian,
consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world, and enabled her
constantly to keep accurately informed of the U. S. Naval building
program and of the location and movements of U. S. Naval vessels.
The topography of Oahu is peculiarly suited to the observation of Pearl
Harbor and its activities. The local officials of the United States were
unable to overcome Japan's advantage in this respect. It was impossible
for [1166] them to prevent anyone from obtaining military information
and, because of legal restrictions imposed by the Federal statutes, they
could not interfere with the mails and the transmission of messages by
radio, telegram, and cable.
In addition, having in mind Japan's traditional tendency to distort
legitimate actions of a peaceful nation into deliberate threats to her
own security and prestige, the War and Navy Departments were compelled
to take every precaution to avoid offending her super-sensitive
sensibilities. For example, as of 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval
Operations directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to "take such
preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative action
against Japan" and, on 28 November, 1941, the War Department directed
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to "undertake no
offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act".
In contrast to the ease with which Japanese in United States territory,
particularly in Hawaii, were able to obtain and to transmit to Japan
military information of value, every obstacle was placed in the way of
such information being collected in Japan by foreign nationals.
As an instance of Japanese secretiveness and surveillance of foreigners,
including those of the U. S. Diplomatic services, the U. S. Naval
attache in Tokyo was compelled to report to the Japanese Navy Department
whenever he contemplated an excursion beyond the limits of the city, and
he was closely watched at all times. He was effectively prevented from
obtaining any information as to the type and [1167] number of Japanese
ships under construction and the capacity of their naval shore
establishments, as well as of the location and movements of Japanese
ships.
It is a fact that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet and the ability
of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial
advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December, 1941.
VIII
A naval base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental
requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be
assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so
effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the
Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels
within its limits. Periodical visits to a base are necessarily made by
mobile seagoing forces in order that logistics support may be provided
and opportunity given for repair and replenishment, for rest and
recreation, and for release of the personnel from a state of tension.
To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirements that the
seagoing personnel shall have the additional responsibility for se-
Page 303
curity from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval
base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare.
There is not, and there has not been, any lack of understanding on the
part of the Army and Navy on this point. The defense of a permanent
naval base is the direct responsi- [1168] bility of the Army. The Navy
is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within
whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the
base is a joint operation only to that extent. To be adequate, the
defense must function effectively during the periods when the Commander-
in-Chief and all the units of the Fleet are absent.
In the case of naval districts lying beyond the continental limits of
the United States, the commandant of the district occupies a dual
status. As commandant of the district, he is governed by all existing
instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts
and is answerable direct to the Navy Department. He is also an officer
of the Fleet and as such is under the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
for such duties as the latter may designate.
The fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was thus
designated as an officer of the Pacific Fleet is the circumstance that
links the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the duty of assisting
the Army in defending the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor. Except
for this, the chief responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, was for the readiness, the efficiency, and the security of the
vessels of the Fleet while at sea. It is through gaining and maintaining
control of vital sea areas that a Fleet contributes to the defense of
the shore and its activities.
The defense of the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor was the direct
responsibility of the Army.
[1169]
IX
Under date of 27 February, 1941, the Commandant, 14th Naval District,
Rear Admiral Bloch, in his capacity as Naval Base Defense Officer,
issued an operations plan establishing security measures, including air
defense and surface ship patrol, in order to cooperate with and assist
the Army in protecting Pearl Harbor and safeguarding the Fleet.
Under date of 28 March, 1941, joint agreements were reached between
Lieut. General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, as to joint security
measures for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. It
was agreed that when the threat of a hostile raid or attack was
considered sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander
was to take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available
without delay to the other commander such portion of the air forces at
his disposal as the circumstances warranted.
Joint air attacks upon hostile *surface* vessels were to be executed
under the tactical command of the Navy. The Army bombardment strength to
participate in each such mission was to be determined by the commander,
Hawaiian Department, the number of bombardment planes released to Navy
control to be the maximum practicable.
Defensive *air operations* over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu
were to be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The
Page 304
Commandant, 14th Naval District, was to determine the Navy fighter
strength to participate [1170] in these missions, the number of fighter
aircraft released to Army control to be the maximum practicable.
When naval aircraft under the command of the Naval Base Defense Officer
were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations, and
Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft so made available
were to be under the tactical control of the Naval commander directing
the search operations.
The Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely without aircraft, either
fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled
to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army
air units. The Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L.
Bellinger, U. S. N., was by Admiral Kimmel placed under Rear Admiral
Bloch's orders, and was by the latter directed to consult with the Army
and to prepare a detailed naval participation air defense plan. Rear
Admiral Bellinger thus was given the additional status of the Commander
Naval Base Defense Air Force, while retaining his status as an air
officer of the Fleet.
Under date of 31 March, 1941, plans were drawn up and jointly agreed
upon by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S.
Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. These plans were complete, and
their concept was sound. Their basic defect lay in the fact that the
naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft
belonging to the Fleet. This circumstance was forced by necessity, but
was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that to be
adequate, the defense of [1171] a permanent naval base must be
independent of assistance from the Fleet.
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance
knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time
and the plans were drawn with this as a premise. It was not possible for
the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet to make Fleet planes permanently
available to the Naval Base Defense Officer, because of his own lack of
planes, pilots, and crews and because of the demands of the Fleet in
connection with Fleet operations at sea.
X
Shortly after assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel
issued specific comprehensive instructions as to the steps to be taken
for the security of the Fleet in the operating sea areas. Aware of the
inadequacy of the shore defenses of Pearl Harbor, he also required the
vessels, while at the base, to assist to the limit of their resources.
These instructions were revised and brought to date on 14 October, 1941
were given wide circulation within the Pacific Fleet, and were sent for
information to other commands and to the Navy Department.
The security of the Pacific Fleet, operating in the Hawaiian Area and
based on Pearl Harbor, was predicted on two assumptions:
(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present
existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that
irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;
Page 305
[1172] (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an
obstruction in the Channel.
(3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl
Harbor.
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
The measures prescribed to provide against these possibilities included
continuous inshore, boom, and harbor patrols, intermittent patrol of the
inner and offshore areas by destroyers, daily search of operating areas
by air, the covering of sortie and entry, and daily sweeps for magnetic
and anchored mines. The only entrance to Pearl Harbor was guarded by an
anti-torpedo net.
The Task Forces operating at sea were screened protectively by aircraft
and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night,
ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Water-
tight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were
kept posted, the ships steamed darkened at night, and the use of the
radio was restricted to a minimum.
Admiral Kimmel, recognizing the potentialities of the submarine as an
instrument of stealthy attack, and believing that Japanese submarines
were operating in Hawaiian waters, was of the opinion that this form of
surprise attack against his Fleet was the one most likely to be employed
by Japan. Therefore, he had issued, on his own responsibility, orders
that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters [1173]
were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders
from higher authority and ran the risk of committing an overt act
against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule
"shoot first and explain afterwards".
Actually, in execution of these orders, a midget submarine was
discovered in an operating area, attacked and destroyed by the combined
efforts of a naval patrol plane and a destroyer of the inshore patrol,
about 20 minutes prior to the air attack on the morning of 7 December.
There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single submarine in the
vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was
imminent.
It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the
security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective. No naval
units were either surprised or damaged while operating at sea in the
Pacific prior to or on 7 December, 1941.
XI
While vessels of the United States Navy are lying in port, it is the
invariable custom to keep on board a number of officers and men
sufficient to provide for internal security, and to protect against fire
and the entrance of water. The force so remaining on board is always
balanced as to ranks and ratings so that all requirements can be met in
case of emergency. A watch is maintained day and night.
In other than normal situations a "condition of readiness" is placed in
effect. On the morning of 7 December considerably [1174] more than half
of the Naval personnel were on board their ships in Pearl Harbor, more
than ample to meet an emergency in port. Their
Page 306
efficiency and their heroic behavior on that day are proof of their
fitness for duty.
The Navy's practice in numbering its three prescribed "conditions of
readiness" is opposite to the method adopted by the Hawaiian Department
of the Army in numbering its "alerts". With the Army, the No. 3 alert
represents the maximum state of readiness, while the Navy refers to that
state as No. 1. In the interest of clarification, definition of the
respective states of readiness is here set forth:
Army Alerts Navy Conditions of Readiness
No. 1. Defense against sabotage No. 1. Entire crew, officers and
and uprisings. No threat from without. men at battle stations.
Action imminent.
No. 2. Security against attacks from No. 2. Provides the means of
hostile sub-surface, and aircraft, in opening fire immediately with
addition to No. 1. one-half the armament. Enemy
believed to be in vicinity.
No. 3. Requires occupation of all No. 3. Provides a means of
field positions. opening fire with a portion of
the secondary and antiaircraft
batteries in case of surprise
encounter.
The alert in effect in the Hawaiian Department of the Army at the time
of the attack was their No. 1. The condition of readiness of the vessels
in Pearl Harbor at that time was an augmented Navy No. 3. This condition
had been in effect for many months preceding that date. To assume [1175]
a high condition of readiness in port and to man guns and stations which
cannot be utilized in any circumstance, is to impose on the entire
personnel an unjustified state of tension and to defeat the purpose for
which the vessels have entered the base; i. e., to make repairs, to
replenish supplies, to give the personnel rest and relaxation, and thus
to prepare for operations at sea.
The same holds true with regard to the patrol planes of the Fleet. And
to a small number of fighters that had been left behind by the absent
carriers. They were part of the Fleet, engaged in daily operations and,
when not operating, were undergoing overhaul or the crews were being
rested in anticipation of further operations. At the time of and
immediately prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December 1941, some
were in the air covering the movement of a task force, others were on 30
minutes notice, some others were on 4 hours notice, and the remainder
were under overhaul.
These planes were not part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. To
have kept the crews awake and ready with engines warmed up, in the
absence of any indication of an impending attack, would have been to
undermine their further usefulness.
The Navy controlled none of the guns mounted on shore. The only means
available to the vessels of the Fleet for contributing to their own
defense against aircraft while in Pearl Harbor was their anti-aircraft
batteries. The anti-aircraft batteries installed on the ships in Pearl
Harbor were incapable of a volume of fire at all comparable to that of
the batteries of the same ships today.
[1176] On all ships inside Pearl Harbor a considerable proportion of the
anti-aircraft guns was kept manned day and night and with ammunition
immediately at hand. Also, by prearrangement with the Army, there was in
effect a system, correct as to its details, for the coordinating of the
anti-aircraft fire of vessels of the Fleet in part with that of the Army
on shore.
Page 307
Existing Fleet orders provided for the establishment of air defense
sectors within the Pearl Harbor area, and for the berthing of ships
within the Harbor in such positions as to develop the maximum anti-
aircraft gun fire in each sector, commensurate with the total number of
ships of all types in port.
These orders were carried out to the letter. On the morning of the
attack the vessels of the Fleet brought hostile planes, as they came
within one or more of these air defense sectors, under heavy fire
intensified within a very few moments by the full fire of the entire
anti-aircraft batteries of all ships.
It is a fact that the Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the
morning of 7 December, 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances
then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A
higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to
their defense.
XII
An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and
destroying the carrier prior to the launch- [1177] ing of planes. Once
launched, the attacking planes can be prevented from inflicting damage
only by other planes or anti-aircraft gunfire or both. Even when a
determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft, and opposed
by gunfire, some of the attacking planes rarely fail to get through and
inflict damage.
To destroy an aircraft carrier before she can launch her planes requires
that her location be known and that sufficient force, in the form of
surface or underwater craft, or aircraft, or all three, be at hand. To
have the necessary force at or near the point of intended launching in
time to insure the destruction of the carrier, it is necessary that the
carrier's presence in a general area, and within narrow limits of time,
be known or predicted with reasonable accuracy. Even in time of war the
fulfillment of this condition is difficult where vast sea areas are
involved, and where both the point from which the carrier departs, as
well as the fact of her departure, are unknown.
This was the case during the days immediately prior to 7 December 1941.
Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port. Their
departure and whereabouts were a closely guarded Japanese secret and
were likewise unknown, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.
Although the U. S. Ambassador to Japan reported, as of 27 January, 1941,
that there was a rumor to the effect that a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor was planned, its authenticity was discounted in the Embassy for
the reason that such an attack, if actually contemplated, would scarcely
be likely to be a topic of conversation in Japan.
[1178] The Navy Department informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, of this rumor and stated that the Navy Department "places no
credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the
present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no
move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the
foreseeable future".
In time of war, an outlying naval base may be expected to become an
enemy objective, sooner or later. It is an established fact, however,
that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded
Page 308
or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other
ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941.
The attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under the
circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place
was unpredictable.
XIII
Where a carrier's presence in a general area is not known in advance and
is not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must be resort to
procedure which will give warning of a hostile approach. The usual
procedure employed by carriers bent on delivering a surprise attack,
although by no means the only procedure possible, is to arrive about 700
miles from the objective at dark the night preceding the attack, steam
at high speed during the night, and launch the planes at dawn, about 400
miles from the objective. It [1179] is this general procedure which
establishes early morning as the time when an air attack is most likely
to be delivered. The events of 7 December, 1941, point to the likelihood
of this procedure having been followed by the Japanese.
The greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air attack
is obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted prior to dark the night
before. In such event, a maximum warning of about twelve hours may be
obtained. In the case of an island base, such as Pearl Harbor, it is
necessary to cover the circumference of a circle of 700 miles radius
each day (the direction from which the attack is expected being unknown)
in order to obtain either positive or negative information.
Assuming 25 miles visability (which in the Hawaiian area is not found
everywhere nor always assured), an effective daily search requires the
daily employment of patrol planes which, in turn, requires that double
or triple that number (180-270) be available, it being impossible to
employ the same planes and crews every day, or even every other day.
If only the dawn circle of 400 mile radius is to be searched daily, the
total number of planes required to be available is 100-150. The maximum
warning; is then reduced to about two hours.
Where planes are not available to cover all sectors, the selection of
sectors to be omitted is left purely to chance and under such
circumstances the advisability of the diversion of all planes from other
duties is questionable unless there be information as to the fact of a
hostile [1180] approach and of the direction, within reasonable limits,
from which the approach is expected.
Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform
this duty, even if the necessary number is available. The resulting
dispersion of strength not only renders the Fleet incapable of
performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in
detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarine over an
extensive sea area as a means of continuously guarding against a
possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not
sound military procedure either in peace or in war.
It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance.
The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons
and after making provision for such reconnaissance in case of
Page 309
emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range
reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this
action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or
neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much
deliberation and consultation with experienced officers, and after
weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved.
In brief, the deciding factors were:
(a) The Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch, although charged
with the conduct of the reconnaissance, had no patrol planes permanently
assigned to his command.
[1181] (b) The only Naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian area were the 69
planes of Patrol Wing Two and these were handicapped by shortages of
relief pilots and crews. They were a part of the Fleet, and not a part
of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. The only other planes suitable
and available for daily long range reconnaissance were six Army bombers.
(c) The task assigned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to
prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent (how imminent he
did not know). The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in
patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war
were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or
other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the
light of available information.
(d) If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war would be
reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations.
(e) The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced
seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews
to stand up under the demands of long-range reconnaissance.
It is a fact that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily long-range,
all-around reconnaissance was not justified [1182] in the absence of
information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow
limits of time. It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was
not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available.
XIV
At the time of the attack, only a few vessels of the Pacific Fleet were
fitted with radar. The radar of vessels berthed in a harbor such as
Pearl Harbor, partially surrounded by high land, is of limited
usefulness at best and does not provide the necessary warning of a
hostile approach.
The shore-based radar on the Island of Oahu was an Army service and
entirely under Army control. The original project called for 6 permanent
(fixed) and 6 mobile installations. The fixed installations had not been
completed by 7 December, 1941, and only 3 sets had been shipped to Oahu
up to that time. On that day there were in operation 6 mobile sets
located in selected positions, with equipment in efficient condition,
but inadequately manned.
Training of personnel had started on 1 November, 1941. Lieut. General
Short earlier had requested that the Navy assist in this training,
Page 310
and 15 of his men had been sent to sea on vessels of the Fleet for that
purpose. Admiral Kimmel also had detailed the Pacific Fleet
Communication Officer as liaison officer with the Army. He could not
supply six other naval officers requested for permanent duty in the
Information Center of the air warning system because no officers were
available for such detail.
During the second week of November, 1941, Commander [1183] W. G. Taylor
USNR, was, by Admiral Kimmel, detailed to the Army Interceptor Command
for duty in an advisory capacity, in connection with the setting up of
the Army air warning system. Commander Taylor had had experience with
the British air warning system and was familiar with radar in the stage
of its development that existed at that time.
On 24 November, 1941, he called a conference for the purpose of
determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully
operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional personnel
and equipment would be needed. Two naval officers and 6 Army officers
were present at this conference.
The minutes of the conference, concurred in by all present, included an
exhaustive statement of deficiencies and the steps to be taken for their
remedy. Copies of the minutes were furnished the conferees and copies
were forwarded to the Acting Commanding Officer of then Interceptor
Command, and to the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian
Department. Steps agreed upon as necessary for the improvement of the
system had not become effective by 7 December, 1941.
The Army Interceptor Command was barely in the first stages of
organization by 7 December. Four of its officers had been sent to school
on the mainland in order to fit them for their new duties. Until 17
December, 1941, the organization was on a tentative basis only and the
actual order setting up the Command was not issued until that date. One
of the [1184] principal weaknesses of the Interceptor Command on 7
December, 1941, was that the Information Center had no provision for
keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for
distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile.
Between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, the Air Warning System
operated from 0400 to 0700, the basis for these hours being that the
critical time of possible attack was considered to be from one hour
before sunrise until two hours after sunrise. On week days training in
the operation of the system also took place during working hours.
On the morning of 7 December the only officer in the Army Information
Center was 1st Lieutenant (now Lt. Colonel) K. A. Tyler, Army Air Corps.
He had received no previous instruction as to his duties, had been on
duty there only once before, and on the morning in question was present
only in the capacity of an observer for training. At 0715 that morning
he received a call from the radar station at Opana, located in the
northern part of the Island of Oahu, to the effect that a large number
of planes, bearing approximately north, had been picked up on the
screen. Assuming that these were friendly planes because he had heard
indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route from Hamilton Field,
California, to Oahu, he did nothing about this report. These B-17s
actually arrived over Oahu during the attack, and many of them were
destroyed.
Page 311
At the Opana station, where this report originated, Private Locard [sic]
(now 1st Lieutenant) and Private Elliott [1185] (now sergeant) were on
duty with instructions to observe and track flights and report them to
the Information Center. Private Locard had had some previous training
but Elliott none. The station was scheduled to shut down at 0700, but as
the truck had not come to take these men to their camp for breakfast,
Private Locard continued to operate the radar set in order to assist in
the training of Elliott.
Shortly after 0700 there was picked up on the screen an unusually large
flight of planes, coming in from a northerly direction at a distance of
about 136 miles. Checking the equipment to make sure, Locard decided to
call the Information Center and did so when the planes had come in to
132 miles. Having reported the fact to the Army officer on duty (1st Lt.
Tyler), Locard and Elliott continued to track the planes in to twenty
miles from Oahu, when they lost them due to distortion.
For information of this flight to have been of value as a warning, it
would have been necessary for the planes first to have been promptly
identified as hostile, and then their presence and their bearing and
distance immediately reported to and received by higher authority, and
disseminated throughout the Command. The organization and training, of
the Information Center and Communication System at this time was not
such as to permit these important requirements to be fulfilled.
Actually, the oncoming planes were not identified as hostile until the
Japanese marking on their wings came into view.
[1186]
XV
The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was
that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes. These
torpedoes were designed specially for the form of attack in which they
were used. Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility
of delivering an attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water
and under conditions of restricted length of approach, the best
professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain was to the
effect that such an attack was not practicable.
After a study had been made of the problem of protecting vessels in port
against torpedo attack, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 15 February, 1941, stated that
it was considered that the relatively shallow depth of water (about 45
feet) limited the need of anti-torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor, and, in
addition, that the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room
limited the practicability of the present type of baffles.
The letter further stated that certain limitations and considerations
must be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo
baffles within harbors, among which were the following:
(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed
necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and
fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present
experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between
120 and 150 knots. Desirable height [1187] for dropping is sixty feet or
less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the
exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.
Page 312
(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels
approaching and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil
barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships
(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels
used by shipping.
(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to
insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a
baffle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful
airplane attack from the land side most difficult.
(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel
attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft
batteries before they can range their torpedoes.
(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon
barrages, and aircraft protection.
(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a
harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a
large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory
baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.
On 13 June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the
Commandants of the various naval districts, modified limitation (a)
by stating that recent developments had shown that United States and
British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights as much as 300
feet and, in [1188] some cases, make initial dives of considerably less
than 75 feet with excellent runs. This letter, however, did not modify
the view expressed in the letter of 15 February as to the need for anti-
torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor.
Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but
were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with
the activity of U. S. Aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of
the prevailing winds would render it ineffective.
The specially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use
fell in the category of the so-called secret weapon, of which the robot
bomb and the magnetic mine are examples. Such weapons always give to the
originator an initial advantage which continues until the defense
against them has been perfected.
It is a fact that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by
the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to the secret development
and employment of a specially designed torpedo.
XVI
Strained relations between the United States and Japan had existed and
been a source of concern to this country for many months prior to 7
December, 1941. That the Japanese policy in the Far East was one of
aggression had been well known for many years. Their program of
expansion, which envisaged Japan as *the* dominating power in the
Western Pacific, was in direct conflict with the policies of the United
States [1189] and Great Britain, and opposed to agreements established
by treaty.
At the instigation of the Japanese, negotiations were begun by the State
Department on 12 May, 1941, looking to the peaceful settlement
Page 313
of existing problems. On 17 November, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington was joined by Mr. Kurusu in the capacity of special envoy.
On 26 July, 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. The
order freezing these assets required a system of licensing shipments to
Japan, and no licenses were issued for oil or petroleum products.
There was a feeling on the part of U. S. officials that hostilities,
unless prevented by some means, would become an actuality in the not
distant future. They were familiar with the Japanese trait of attacking
without declaration of war, as had been done against China in 1894, and
against Russia in 1904.
The Secretary of State held numerous conferences with the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy, at which the negotiations with Japan
were discussed. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations attended many of these conferences and were kept
informed of the progress of these negotiations. At the same time efforts
to improve the military position of the United States were being
vigorously prosecuted.
On 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Admiral
Kimmel by dispatch that a grave situation had been created by the
resignation of the Japanese cabinet, [1190] that the new cabinet would
probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia
were a possibility, and that the Japanese might also attack the United
States and Great Britain. In the same dispatch Admiral Kimmel was
directed to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not
disclose strategic intentions, nor constitute provocative action against
Japan.
On the following day, 17 October, 1941, Admiral Stark addressed a
personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated "Personally I do
not believe that the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I
sent you (that of 16 October) merely stated the 'possibility' ".
For the purpose of viewing the events of the succeeding months in their
true relation to the events of 7 December, this date of 16 October,
1941, may well be taken as the beginning of a critical period which
terminated in the attack of 7 December, 1941.
In accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16
October, Admiral Kimmel made certain preparatory deployments, including
the stationing of submarines off both Wake and Midway, the reinforcement
of Johnston and Wake with additional Marines, ammunition, and stores,
and the dispatch of additional Marines to Palmyra. He also placed on 12
hours' notice certain vessels of the Fleet which were in West Coast
ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the
sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coast Navy
Yard and placed in [1191] effect additional security measures in the
Fleet operating areas.
He reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps taken and
received written approval of his action. He continued the measures which
he had already placed in effect looking to readiness for war,
preparation of the Pacific Fleet for war being his assigned task.
He did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or
warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily
conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his
staff, all experienced officers of long service, and sought by every
Page 314
means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The
consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the
information at hand.
On 24 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations, addressed also to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, and to Commandants of Naval districts with headquarters at San
Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Panama, which stated:
"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiation with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and
movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on
Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this
dispatch concurs and requests action addresses to inform senior Army
officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to
complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X
Guam will be informed separately."
The contents of this dispatch were made known to Lieut. General Short
and discussed with him.
[1192] The reaction on Admiral Kimmel and his advisers was to direct
their attention to the Far East. They did not consider that the
expression "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" included
the probability or imminence of attack in the Hawaiian area, specific
mention having been made of the Philippines and Guam with no mention of
Hawaii.
They recognized the capability of Japan to deliver a long-range surprise
bombing attack and that she might attack without a declaration of war.
They reasoned that she would not commit the strategic blunder of
delivering a surprise attack on United States territory, the one course
that irrevocably would unite the American people in war against Japan.
Public opinion in the United States was far from being crystallized on
the question of taking steps to curb her expansion in the Western
Pacific.
Conceivably, Japan might well have taken aggressive action against
British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, gaining the oil and other
raw materials that she was seeking, without military interference from
the United States. An attack elsewhere than in the Far East seemed,
therefore, to be only a remote possibility and not enough of a
probability to warrant abandonment of the preparation of the Fleet for
war.
To continue these preparations was, therefore, Admiral Kimmel's
decision, made on his own responsibility in the light of the information
then available to him and in the knowledge that every precaution within
his power, compatible [1193] with maintaining the Fleet in a state of
readiness for war, had already been taken.
XVII
On 27 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations, reading as follows:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have
ceased and a aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few
days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization
of naval task forces
Page 315
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai
or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive
deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform
District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War
Department. Continental districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate
measures against sabotage."
This dispatch was sent also to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
and has since become known as the "war warning message".
On the morning following the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral Kimmel
discussed its contents with Lieut. General Short, Rear Admiral Bloch,
the Flag officers of the Fleet present, and the members of his staff.
After much further study, Admiral Kimmel and his advisers interpreted
the warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readiness to
undertake active operations was expected. They were unable to read into
it any indication that an attack against the Hawaiian area was to be
expected, particular attention having been directed to the Japanese
activities in the Far East, with objectives in that area [1194]
specifically mentioned. No reference was made to the possibility of a
surprise aggressive move "in any direction", as had been done in the
dispatch of 24 November.
There was nothing to indicate that defensive measures should take
precedence over all others. The "appropriate defensive deployment" that
was directed was not interpreted as referring specifically to the
Pacific Fleet, in view of the deployments of the Pacific Fleet already
made in compliance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16
October. In addition, since that date, a squadron of submarines had been
sent to the Philippines, leaving only 5 in Pearl Harbor.
There were other considerations which no doubt influenced Admiral
Kimmel. The Navy Department's dispatch of 30 November, addressed to the
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and sent to Admiral Kimmel for his
information, ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to scout for
information of Japanese movements in the China Sea. This appeared to
indicate that the authorities in Washington expected hostilities to
occur in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.
On 28 November the Chief of Naval Operations advised Admiral Kimmel that
the Department had requested, and the Army had agreed to, the relief of
Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops, and the
replacement of Marine planes with Army pursuit planes. This action,
involving as it did a complicated problem and the movements of sizeable
U. S. Naval forces westward to effect their transfer, was an indication
of the fact that the authorities [1195] in the War and Navy Departments
did not then expect a hostile movement toward the Hawaiian Islands.
On 28 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations repeated to Admiral
Kimmel the information contained in a dispatch which the War Department,
on 27 November, had transmitted to Lieut. General Short, and other Army
addressees, to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated,
that Japanese future action was unpredictable, that hostile action was
possible at any moment, and that it was desirable that Japan commit the
first overt act in case hostilities could not be avoided. Such measures
as were undertaken were to be carried out so as not to alarm the civil
population or disclose intent.
Page 316
To this dispatch Lieut. General Short had replied on 27 November:
"Report Department alerted against sabotage. Liaison with Navy."
The steps taken caused the Army planes to be grouped in such manner as
to afford better protection against sabotage, although militating
against their taking the air promptly. In the absence of a reply from
the War Department, Lieut. General Short considered that the alert he
had placed in effect was approved.
Lieut. General Short having, on 28 November, 1941, received instructions
from the Adjutant General of the Army to take measures to protect
military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage,
reported in detail the measures that he had taken and repeated the fact
that he had placed in effect Alert (No. 1) against sabotage. He
interpreted the dispatch from the Adjutant General as further [1196]
indicating that his alert against sabotage constituted complete
compliance with the War Department's wishes.
There was no mention in any of the dispatches received by Lieut. General
Short, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, of the possibility or
probability of an attack against Oahu.
As further evidence of the prevailing sentiment against the likelihood
of an immediate move toward Hawaii, it is a fact that a flight of B-17s
from the Mainland arrived over Oahu during the attack of 7 December,
without ammunition and with guns not ready for firing.
These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying
before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7
December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and
Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. There
were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the
Far East, rather than elsewhere.
XVIII
From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, conversations between our
government and Japan did continue, notwithstanding the statement
contained in the war warning message under date of 27 November, 1941,
that "negotiations with Japan, looking toward stabilization of
conditions in the Pacific have ceased."
This statement was based upon the note delivered by the State Department
to the Japanese representatives on 26 November, a copy of which was
furnished the Navy [1197] Department. It did not in itself discontinue
negotiations and conversations, but, on the contrary, gave an "outline
of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan."
The stipulations contained therein were drastic and were likely to be
unacceptable to Japan.
The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of
the War and Navy Department because of the feeling that Japan would not
accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be
severed or that war would declared. The sending of the note therefore
began the final phase of the critical period which culminated on 7
December.
Although it was stated in the press that a note had been delivered none
of its contents was given out to the public until after the attack.
Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note nor of
its contents until many months after the attack.
Page 317
In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, dated 26 May, 1941, he had
invited attention to the importance of keeping commanders, well removed
from Washington, informed of developments and eventualities, stating:
"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position
He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly
changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or
change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and,
as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own
situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him
and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry
out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends
to create uncertainty, a [1198] condition which directly contravenes
that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action
so necessary to the conduct of military operations.
"It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the
international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even
the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may
militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the
present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and
authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though
necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action
to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training
of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the
desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions,
or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this
same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well
informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the
status of current outlying island development, thus making even more
necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad
policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.
"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all
important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available."
From time to time during this critical period there was received in the
War and Navy Departments certain other important information bearing on
the current situation. The testimony as to this information forms a part
of the record of this Court. The details of this information are not
discussed or analyzed in these findings, the Court having been informed
that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution
of the war.
[1199] This information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, nor to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. No
facilities were available to them, either in the Fleet or in the
Hawaiian area, which would enable them to obtain the information direct.
They were dependent solely upon Washington for such information.
With regard to not transmitting this information, the stand taken by the
Chief of Naval Operations was that the "war warning message" of 27
November completely covered the situation. The fact remains however,
that this message, standing alone, could not covey to the commanders in
the field the picture as it was seen in Washington.
Only three other messages were received by the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, from the Chief of Naval Operations between 26 November
and 7 December, one informing him that the Japanese had instructed
diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London to
destroy certain codes, and the other two relative to the destruction of
United States codes at Guam and outlying islands.
Page 318
In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy
Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in
diplomatic relations was imminent and, by inference and deduction that
an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information
was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after
consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it
encoded and sent to the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and
Hawaii, with instructions that the naval authorities in those areas be
informed of its contents.
[1200] The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m. Washington
time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at
7:33 a. m. (Honolulu time) . Thus there remained but 22 minutes before
the attack began for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action.
Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the
afternoon of 7 December, several hour after the attacking force had
departed.
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could
have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began.
Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means
available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or
which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome.
There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to
the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.
XIX
It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate commanders,
particularly those in distant areas constantly supplied with
information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military
error
It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and
responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important
information in his possession during this critical period, especially on
the morning of 7 December, failed to transmit this information to
Admiral [1201] Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of
the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.
OPINION
Based on Finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a
large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor
on 7 December, 1941, was necessary, and that the information available
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure
from his operating and maintenance schedules.
Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the
Constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the
Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been
delivered. Prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking
offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels
or planes appearing [in] the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed upon him
the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be
construed as an overt act.
Page 319
Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations
between Admiral Husband E Kimmel, USN, and Lieut. General Walter C.
Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there
was no lack of interest, [1202] no lack of appreciation of
responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either. And
that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other
for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by
the common interest.
Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies
in personnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct
adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on
and prior to 7 December.
Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority
of the Japanese Fleet over the U.S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941,
and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave
her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7
December, 1941.
Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of
the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army,
that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval
District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to
this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the defense should
have been such as to function effectively independently of the Fleet, in
view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action
of the Fleet [1203] must be assured demands that the defense of a
permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to
remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base,
or for that of the vessels within its limits. Based on Findings IV, VIII
and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties of Rear Admiral
Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor,
were performed satisfactorily.
Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval
Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were
complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in
that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of
aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the
morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they
necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance
knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of
time, which was not the case on that morning.
The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently
available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for
their employment with the Fleet.
Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's
action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect
comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea
and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his
responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps taken
were adequate and effective.
Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the
information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated
Page 320
neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor, and bearing in mind that he had not knowledge of the State
Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's condition of readiness on
the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the hostile planes
being brought under heavy fire of the ships' antiaircraft batteries as
they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances,
although had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the
total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor
extent and to a degree which is problematical; and, that, had the Fleet
patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air,
they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost might thus
have been reduced.
The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in
advance that the attack would take place on [1204] 7 December, could
there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have
been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond the fact that
conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything might happen,
there was nothing to distinguish one day from another in so far as
expectation of attack is concerned.
It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in
the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft
guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is
questionable when it is considered that it could not be known when an
attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been
necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day,
and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and
planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7
December.
Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no
information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received
from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other
Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December,
1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the
circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would
take place was unpredictable.
Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine,
long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of
Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was
not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and
was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an
attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of
time.
[1206] Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-
based air warning system, an Army service under the direct control of
the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there
was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over
Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile
and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes which appeared
on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight of
Army B-17s en route from California, and that the information obtained
by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the planes could not
be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came
into view.
Page 321
Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the
greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in
Pearl Harbor was due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the
development and existence of which was unknown to the United States.
Based on Finding XVI. And particularly in view of the Chief of Naval
Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made
by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the
dispatch of 16 October, 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral
Kimmel's decision, made after receiving the dispatch of [1207] 24
November, to continue preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was
sound in the light of the information then available to him.
Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the
attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the
belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy
Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area,
that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and
that the same considerations which influenced the sentiment of the
authorities in Washington in this respect, support the interpretation
which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning message" of 27
November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from
Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.
Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and
responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound
judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific fleet, during the very critical period 26
November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the
Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7
December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately [1208] the fact that a
message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in
diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian
area might be expected soon.
The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information
been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what
action he would have taken.
Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion
that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the
part of any person or persons in the naval service.
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.
ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
President.
EDWARD C. KALBFUS,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
Member.
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
Member
Page 322
The Court having finished the inquiry, then at 4 p. m., [1209] Thursday,
October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the convening
Authority.
ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
President.
HAROLD BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.
Page 323
[1] ADDENDUM TO COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS
In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court had referred to "certain
other important information" as being available to the War and Navy
Departments. This information was obtained by intercepting Japanese
messages and breaking their diplomatic codes. The Court has been
informed that these codes are still in use and, if it became known to
the Japanese Government that they had been broken by the United States,
the codes would be changed and, as a consequence, the war effort would
be adversely affected.
For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or discussing
the details of the information in its Finding of Facts but feels that
its report would not be complete without a record of such details. The
Court, therefore, submits the following record in this addendum and
transmits it to the Secretary of the Navy for filing with other highly
secret matter referred to as such in the record of the Court's
proceedings.
Highly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted by the
War and Navy Departments during the very critical period 26 November to
7 December, 1941, and prior thereto. The method of handling these
messages in the Navy Department was as follows:
The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval
Communications operated directly under the Chief of [2] Naval
Operations. They were responsible to see that all messages were
transmitted to him in order that he might be kept conversant at all
times with existing conditions.
Officers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval
Operations, remained on duty night and day. They made every effort to
obtain all possible diplomatic and military information, in order that
high officials of our government might be kept fully informed.
Messages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon receipt
or intercept. The important messages were marked with a clip and taken
by a designated officer to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Directors of War Plans, Naval Intelligence, and Naval
Communications, and to the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of Naval
Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Wilkinson,
kept himself constantly informed regarding all messages. He checked as
to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations had seen the important
ones and in many cases took them personally to the Chief of Naval
Operations and discussed them with him.
Immediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941, from the
Secretary of State, the Japanese representatives in Washington sent a
message to Tokyo which was intercepted by the Navy Department. This is
Document 17, Exhibit 63, which gave Tokyo the following stipulations
contained in the note:
(a) The recognition of Hull's "four principles".
(b) (1) Conclusion of mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo,
Moscow, Washington, The Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
[3] (2) Agreement between Japan, United States, England, The
Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China
and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.
(3) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to support no
regime but that of Chiang Kai-shek.
(5) The abolition of extraterritoriality, the concessions in China, and
other requirements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty, rescinding
freezing orders, stabilization of yen, etc., and for Japan to amend her
tripartite pact with Germany and Italy.
The Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo, the
following:
"Both dumbfounded and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the
extent of even reporting this to Tokyo."
No information regarding the delivery of this note or of its contents
was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other
commanders afloat.
From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch
traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and
which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message
dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November,
1941, and referred to as "The Winds Code" was as follows:
"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations),
and the cutting off of international communications, the following
warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short
wave news broadcast.
[4] "(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO
KAZEAME.*
"(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***
"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather
forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard
please destroy code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely
secret arrangement.
"Forward as urgent intelligence."
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the
Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval
District, substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5
December, 1941, the United States Naval Attach‚, Batavia, sent to the
Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These
messages stated that at some future late information would be sent by
Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war
between countries designated.
All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy
Department, considering the expected information most important, were on
the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December
an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in
the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two
interpretations, either a breaking off of
* East wind rain.
** North wind cloudy.
*** West wind clear.
Page 325
diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or [5] war,
this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.
It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief,
Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this
code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy
Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl
Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl
Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether
this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
and by other Commanders afloat.
Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral
Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that
Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy
Department.
It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many years a
thorough system of espionage throughout the world and continuously
sought and received information regarding the location and movements of
United States naval vessels. There were certain messages received in the
Navy Department which showed very clearly that Japan, at this critical
period, was particularly desirous of obtaining exact information from
two sources, namely, Manila and Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo,
Manila, and Honolulu inquiring especially about planes, ships, their
places of anchorage, etc., in the latter ports, were intercepted.
Similar messages were sent to Japanese officials in Honolulu clearly
indicating that Japan was most [6] desirous of obtaining exact
information as to ships in Pearl Harbor.
The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor were as
follows:
(a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 December, 1941,
states:
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make
your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at rate of twice a week.
Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to
maintain secrecy."
(b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 December, 1941,
states:
"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein:
Area "N" Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your
investigation with great secrecy."
Note by Navy Department on this message:
"Manila Bay" probably means "Mamala Bay."
(c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 December, 1941,
gives information as to ships moored in certain areas in Pearl Harbor
and movements of ships in and out.
[7] (d) On 29 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 December, 1941, states:
"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future
will you also report even where there are no movements."
Page 326
Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regarding these
messages.
On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washington, was
intercepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing an agreement
between the United States and Japan by 25 November, 1941.
On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from Tokyo to
Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for 25 November,
1941, could be postponed until 29 November, and in explanation this
message stated:
"* * * There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next
three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans;
if the signing can be completed by the 29th, * * * if the pertinent
notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished,
we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the
deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are
automatically going to happen. * * *"
No intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was any
information transmitted to them regarding contents of the messages
mentioned in the following paragraphs.
[8] On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63, was
intercepted between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as follows:
"* * * The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal_"
referring to note of 26 November_
"* * * the Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for
negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial
Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or
three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is
inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting
instructions * * *"
etc.
The message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of 26
November, and further indicates that within two or three days
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Further, it emphasizes the
importance of delay. Neither the message nor any of its contents were
transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders
afloat.
On 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to
Washington and translated by the Navy Department 30 November, 1941,
directs that Japanese representatives make one more attempt to have
United States reconsider and states:
"* * * please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a
breaking off of negotiations."
Again, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
Washington to Tokyo indicated that negotiations were to be stretched
out.
These two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for time.
[9] On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated by the
Navy Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being
Page 327
a message from Tokyo to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading as
follows:
"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of
this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within
that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite
Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the
vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of
diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based
her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance.
With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in
the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these
negotiations.
"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the
view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and
equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past.
However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of
troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation
of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in
opposition to each other.
"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its
traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations,
re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in
the conversations carried on between the United States and England in
the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was
brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by
Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say,
the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan
was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of
friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand
they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency
to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite
Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that
it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has
[10] become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government
could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became
clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be
detrimental to our cause.
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into
with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon
the basic object of this treaty namely the maintenance of peace in the
Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in
case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese
Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It
is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it
impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations.
What is more before the United States brought forth this plan, they
conferred with England Australia, The Netherlands, and China_they did so
repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from
Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say
very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that
war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan and
this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our
pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain
from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians
how important secrecy is."
On 1 December, 1941, Document 21, Exhibit 63, was intercepted, being a
message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which reads
as follows:
"1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the
situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the
[11] United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising
the press and
** JD-1: 6710
Page 328
others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the
United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only
your information).
"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S.
Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message
#1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.
"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the
capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that
the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far
Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."
On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to
Tokyo, translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1941, reports that
conversations with the State Department continue; that the Japanese
representatives stated to Welles, the Under Secretary of State, that it
is virtually impossible for Japan to accept new American proposals as
they now stand, and that the Japanese representatives feel that the
United States is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult
situation.
On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to
Washington, translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941, requests
their representatives to explain Japan's increased forces in Indo-China.
On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to
Tokyo, translated by Navy Department 5 December, 1941, states: [12]
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action
between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a
declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an
occupation of Thailand."
On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to Washington,
was intercepted, giving notice to the Japanese representatives that a
reply consisting of 14 parts to American proposal of 26 November is
being sent to them, directing that secrecy should be maintained and
stating that the time of presenting this reply would be sent in a
separate message.
The first 13 parts of this reply were intercepted and received by the
Navy Department at about 3:00 p.m., December 6, 1941, and were
translated and made ready for distribution by 9:00 p.m., Washington
time, of that date. These 13 parts contain a very strong and conclusive
answer to the note of November 26 and state in part,
"Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations."
Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this class
of information, prior to 9:00 p.m., 6 December, 1941, 'phoned Captain
Wilkinson that an important message had been received and was being
translated. He also tried to communicate with Admiral Stark and Rear
Admiral Turner at their homes but found them out.
At about 9:00 p.m., Washington time, Commander Kramer proceeded to the
White House with the 13 parts of reply and delivered a copy to a White
House aide, with the request that [13] it be delivered immediately to
the President. Kramer then proceeded to the home of Secretary Knox where
he personally delivered to the Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply.
Secretary Knox read the reply, did not discuss it in detail with Kramer,
but 'phoned the Secretary of War and Secretary of State.
*JD-1: 6921.
*** Not Available.
Page 329
Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave a copy
to him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark and Turner.
Wilkinson made several 'phone calls, presumably to Admiral Stark and
others. This information regarding receipt of these 13 parts or their
contents was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or
other Commanders Afloat.
Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving
about 12:30 a.m., 7 December, and as no other important messages were at
hand, went home and returned to the Navy Department about 7:00 a.m. Upon
his arrival he found the 14th part of the Japanese reply had been
received and decoded. He then delivered a copy of all 14 parts to the
Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9
a.m., where he found several officers gathering for a conference with
Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded, about 9:30 a.m., to the White
House and made delivery of the 14 parts of the message. He proceeded
then, at about 9:50 a.m., to the State Department and delivered same to
the Secretary of the Navy, who was there in conference with the
Secretary of State.
At about 10:30 a.m., Kramer returned to the Navy Depart- [14] ment where
he found another message had been translated. This message, an intercept
from Tokyo to Washington, was marked "Urgent, very important" and read
as follows:
"Will the ambassador please submit to the U.S. Government (if possible
to the Secretary of State) our reply to the U.S. at 1:00 p.m., on the
7th, your time."
Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to as the
"one p.m. message") to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the latter
at the time being in conference with several officers.
Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the "1:00 p.m.
message." From there he went to the State Department where the Secretary
of the Navy was still in conference with the Secretary of State. On
arrival he requested one of the State Department assistants to present
the message to the Secretary of the Navy and to invite his attention to
the fact that 1:00 p.m., Washington time, meant dawn at Honolulu and
midnight in East Asia.
Admiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department at some
time between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m., on the morning of 7 December. Although
he testified that he had no information prior to this time relative to
the Japanese reply to the note of November 26th he was informed of the
14 parts and "the 1:00 p.m. message" not later than 10:30 a.m., of that
date. He testified that General Marshall 'phoned him and suggested that
the information regarding the delivery of the 14 parts at 1:00 p.m. was
most important and significant and, in his opinion, should be
transmitted to Commanders in the [15] Pacific. Admiral Stark at first
demurred and hung up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he 'phoned General
Marshall requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the
Commanding Generals in the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this
message to naval opposites.
The message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows:
"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we
Page 330
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of
this communication."
This message left the War Department at 11:52 a.m., Washington time, was
sent out over R.C.A. at 12:17 p.m. (6:47 a.m. Honolulu time) and arrived
in Honolulu's R.C.A. office at 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. There remained
but 22 minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination,
and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch
until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours after the attacking
force had departed.
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have
been received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event,
however, there was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have
stopped the attack or which could have had other than negligible bearing
upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of
readiness best suited to circumstances attending vessels within the
limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet planes in their air
bases in Oahu.
Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
President.
Edward C. Kalbfus,
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Member.
Adolphus Andrews,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Member.
[1] FIRST ENDORSEMENT [Stamped:] Nov. 2, 1944.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered
by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944.
1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the
function of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that
of the reviewing authorities. Where the testimony is such as will
reasonably support either two or more different conclusions, it is not
within the province of the Judge Advocate General to attempt to
substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that of the Court. But
where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a finding
or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly on one
side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion,
the Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a
finding or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9
of 1928, P. 8; CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936;, P. 11.
3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact
XVIII:
"In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the Army
and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that
a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *by inference and
deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon*."
4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it
may convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible
officials of the War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference
and deduction underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing
this Finding, used the past tense of the verb "appear", and used the
expression "appeared to indicate rather than "should have indicated"
lends support to this construction. Such
Page 331
an [12] impression would not be supported by the record, as the great
preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such
conclusion. It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible
officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available
to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could
be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather
against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the
Far East.
5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941 held positions in the Navy
Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the
prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in
substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants
had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be
expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was
that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility
of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low
probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information
available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and
deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers
who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied
subordinate positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly
unconsciously colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of
selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports available to the
Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent events
proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions.
Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible
officials the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an
attack on Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The
Court recognizes this fact, as shown by its finding last paragraph of
Finding XVII) that);
"These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses
testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack
of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War,
and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area,
there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in
the Far East, rather than elsewhere."
[3] 7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion
of Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that:
"Admiral Harold R Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible
for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment
expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26
November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the
Japanese situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December
1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been
received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations
was imminent, and, that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected
soon."
As been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not
construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as
indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area.
8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the
time at which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a
break in diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of
hostile action by the Japanese on that date, was in the early forenoon
of 7 December, Washington time. It is not considered amiss to comment in
further detail on this finding, in view of a widespread misconception in
some quarters that this information was known in Washington on 7
December, 1941. The evidence before this Court establishes, beyond any
doubt, that the information referred to was not available to any
responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m., the
morning of 7 December 1941.
9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the
apparent contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that
the Chief of Naval Operations failed to display the sound judgment
expected of him in failing to transmit certain information to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the final Opinion that "no
offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred in the part of
any person in the naval service". That this is only an apparent, and not
a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that had this important
information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of
conjecture as to what action he would have taken. This statement, as
well as the Finding of
Page 332
Facts and Opinions taken as a whole indicate [4] that it was the
conclusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed that the
evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit
the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of
the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December 1941 and that any causal
connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and the disaster
would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported by
the testimony in this record.
10. Subject to the foregoing remarks the proceedings findings opinions
and recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion
of the Judge Advocate General, legal.
T. L. Gatch
T. L. GATCH
The Judge Advocate General.
---------------------
TOP SECRET
[1] UNITED STATE FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
3 Nov. 1944.
FF/A17-25.
Serial: 003191.
TOP SECRET.
From: The Commander In Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry_Review
of.
Reference: (a) SecNav ltr of 21 October 1944.
Annex: (A) List of Parts of Record that Contain Information of super-
secret nature.
1. In compliance with Reference (a) the following comment is submitted
as to how much of the record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears
such relation to present military operations as to require high security
classification.
2. There are only two general classifications of information which, if
made public, would be detrimental to the conduct of current and future
operations. These are:
(a) Information which directly or by inference would lead the Japanese
to suspect that we have been able to break their codes.
(b) Verbatim plain language reproductions of messages sent in United
States Codes. The Japanese presumably have the enciphered versions of
these messages and if they are given the word for word plain language
version it would help them to work on our codes. This is a matter of
less importance than the possible compromise of what we know about
Japanese encryption but it should be guarded against.
[2] 3. The really vital point is to preserve absolute secrecy as to our
success in breaking Japanese codes. It is essential to keep this
information to ourselves. I say this for the following reasons:
(a) All Japanese intercepts considered by the Court were in diplomatic
codes. Most of these are still in effect with only minor changes. They
are still the sources of information of incalculable value. Furthermore,
all Japanese codes, Army and Navy ,as well as diplomatic, are of the
same general structure. The Japanese codes of today are not basically
different from those they used in 1941. Breaking one code makes it easy
to break the others. The Japanese presumably are well aware of this. If
they were told that we broke their diplomatic codes in 1941 there is a
reasonable assumption that they will change the whole basic code
structure. If they were to do this the damage would be irreparable. The
information we get relates not only to the current and prospective
movements of Japanese naval vessels upon which we base our operating
plans but also include data as to troop strength and prospective troop
movements which are vital to the Army. It also relates to the
disposition of Japanese Army and Navy air forces. It is impossible to
overstate the disadvantages we would suffer if there were to be a
leakage direct or indirect that an alert enemy might interpret as
indicating that we can and do break his codes. It is no exaggeration to
state that Midway might have been a Japanese victory had it not been for
the information which we obtained by intercepting his coded despatches.
The risks we have
Page 333
taken in advancing into the Marshall Islands and the Philippines would
have been far greater than they actually were had we not been able to
obtain information of Japanese dispositions and movements from Japanese
sources.
(b) In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that there be no
public release of any information which would alert the Japanese as to
the possibility that we were breaking their codes.
[3] (c) It is a pertinent question as to just what part, if any, of the
record of proceedings can be made public, without resulting in a leak of
vital information.
(c) I can say unequivocally that Volume 5 (the Top Secret volume of
proceedings) must not be made public. With regard to the other volumes
of the record I find there are certain paragraphs which do point quite
clearly to the fact that we have information which could only be
obtained by reading Japanese coded messages. I have listed these in
Annex (A) of the report, which also includes certain references which
might be damaging to the security of our own codes.
(e) I am not any too certain of the effectiveness of the deletions
recommended in Annex (A). There are statements of a border-line nature
concerning which it is difficult to tell whether or not an alert enemy
might find a clue as to what our knowledge of his codes really is.
However, if the record is also abridged by deletion of the matter
enumerated in Annex (A), it would be devoid of any direct reference to
information which we must keep from becoming public.
(f) The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that I am in favor
of making public the parts of the record not referred to in the Annex.
On the contrary, I am of the opinion that publication of a weeded record
or of abridged Findings would have the following undesirable results:
(1) The picture presented would be disjointed and full of unexplained
gaps. I think this would lead to a demand of Congress and by the Press
for more information, on the ground that the part made public was
incomplete, and that withholding of any information is indicative of a
desire on the part of the Navy to whitewash high naval officers. A
situation such as this might well lead to discussions that would
inadvertently disclose just the information that we feel is vital to
keep secret.
[4] (2) Admiral Kimmel's principal contention is that he was kept in
the dark as to certain information which the Navy Department had
obtained from various sources, including the breaking of Japanese codes.
This is a matter which cannot be made public without irreparable damage
to the conduct of the war. It is not unlikely that if there is a public
release of some of the Facts and Opinions, but no release concerning
matters in which Admiral Kimmel is particularly concerned, he may take
further action to protect his own reputation. The potentialities are
particularly dangerous, because Admiral Kimmel's civilian lawyers have
now been informed, so I understand, of the existence and content of the
many Japanese messages in question. I know of no means of keeping these
lawyers from talking in public, except such ethical views as they may
have concerning their responsibility for not doing anything that would
jeopardize war operations. It is a question just how far they could be
restrained by ethical considerations, if the Navy Department were to
make public the part of the record which is unfavorable to Admiral
Kimmel, while suppressing that part which he regards as a main element
of his defense.
(3) I also invite attention to the fact that the Findings include
certain Facts and Opinions critical of Army efficiency, ascertained by
proceedings to which the Army was not a party. The publication of this
part of the record might well result in an inter-service dispute, which
would tend to bring out the very information which it is essential to
conceal.
4. In regard to the requirements of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, I
note that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are
severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the
facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence
proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. This law does
[15] not obligate the Secretary of the Navy to make any public statement
of what the Court of Inquiry has ascertained. Furthermore, as I
understand it, the President has definitely expressed himself as opposed
to any act which might interfere with the war effort. I, therefore,
conclude that there is no necessity for making anything public, except
on the ground that something should be done to suppress the rumors and
irresponsible accusations that are now current. I do not believe that
such considerations in any way warrant jeopardizing the war effort by
publicising all or any part of the record.
Page 334
5. With regard as to whether or not there should be any public
statement, I offer the opinion that no steps should be taken without
consulting the Secretary of War, and arranging for parallel action. The
two Departments should not issue conflicting statements, nor should one
keep silent while the other one makes a statement. Assuming that the War
Department would take parallel action I recommend that there be no
public release whatsoever. However, if the Secretary of the Navy and the
Secretary of War decide that there must be some report to the public, I
recommend a statement to the Press in substance as follows:
"The Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry is of the opinion that no offenses
have been committed which warrant court martial proceedings against any
person or persons in the naval service. The Secretary of the Navy
approves the Findings. The record of the Court will not be made public
while the war is in progress."
6. If you should find it advisable, at a later time, to issue a further
statement it seems to me that it would also be desirable to make public
in some manner the fact (see page 1160 of the record) that Admiral
Kimmel and General Short were personal friends, that they met
frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every
respect, and that they [6] invariably conferred on matters bearing on
the development of the Japanese situation and their several plans in
preparing for war. This would refute the statements and rumors that have
been prevalent to the effect that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were
at odds with one another. Of course, no such statement could be made
unless the Secretary of War concurs. If the Secretary of War does concur
you might find occasion to make informal comment on the matter at a
press conference.
/S/ E. J. King,
E. J. King.
TOP SECRET
ANNEX "A" To COMINCH SERIAL 003191
1. The following portions of the Record of the Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry should not be made public, because they convey information which
the enemy could use to the detriment of United States war operations.
(a) Volume 5 (the "Top Secret" volume).
(b) The following paragraphs of Volumes 1, 2,3, and 4:
(1) Volume 1
Page Paragraph Page Paragraph
166 683 255 174
172 739 256 179
213 Entire Page 266 180
214 116 266 260
214 117 266 261
214 127 297 81
(2) Volume 2
Page Paragraph Page Paragraph
315 25 470 3
315 26 470 4
326 145 471 5
328 153 471 6
344 226 471 7
396 54 471 8
427 43 471 9
430 54 472 15
432 63 473 18
432 64 473 19
463 18 473 20
463 19 473 21
463 20 473 22
465 24 483 51
466 25 534 40
466 26 563 168
466 27 567 187
468 38
Page 335
(3) Volume 3
Page Paragraph Page Paragraph
805 176 889 16
817 7 889 17
818 8 911 38
850 149
(4) Volume 4
Page Paragraph
938 34
939 35
(c) Also the following parts of the "Findings" in Volume 4:
Page 1191. Third paragraph (beginning with words "on 24 November") and
the despatch quoted therein.
Page 1192. Entire page.
Page 1193. Entire page.
Page 1194. First 3 lines
Page 1198. Last paragraph.
Page 1199. Entire page.
Page 1200. Entire page.
Page 1201. First 2 lines
Page 1206. Last paragraph.
Page 1207. Entire page.
Page 1208. First 7 lines.
Statement of Admiral Stark:
Paragraph 7.
Paragraph 8.
Statement of Admiral Kimmel:
Page 21. Last paragraph.
Page 22. First paragraph.
(d) All "Top Secret" exhibits, and the following exhibits listed in the
index to Volume 1: 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 40, 57, 62, 63, 64,
65, 66, 68, 76, 76, 77.
NOTE
The Top Secret Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl
Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 6 Nov. 1944 by the Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, was not published,
however a paraphrased copy of this endorsement was published.
[1]
TOP SECRET
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
FF1/A17-25.
Serial: 003224
TOP SECRET.
6 Nov 1944.
SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF
INQUIRY
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor. Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
Page 336
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of
Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the
Judge Advocate General in the first endorsement and to the following
remarks.
2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of
rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-
thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and
necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required,
not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also,
for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going
stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task
force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I
discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of
constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be
struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has
been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this
gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it
impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive
as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District (Admiral Kimmel) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and
was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of
Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval
measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were personal friends; that they met frequently, that their relations
were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently
conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by
either which bad any bearing on the development of the United States-
Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each
was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of
the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is
important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since
the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not
cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy
Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the
weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in
particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It
further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941,
expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and
the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile
attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that
the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and
Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the
safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the
Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had
been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate
degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint
memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no
ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the
basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet
over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that
owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan
to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free
opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and
dispositions.
My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement
that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a
declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United
States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained
relations.
(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a
base were necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be
provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for
rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is
foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to
assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the
limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept
imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the
United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment
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is that this principle is sound enough but it cannot be carried to an
illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses
were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not,
and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely
because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears
from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of
the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor *should*
have been strong enough for self defense. The [4] fact that it *was not*
strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the
employment of the Fleet, but nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted
the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans
made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl
Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned
responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned
to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be
made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the
basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval
participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the
availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this
circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the
fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must
be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks
that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance
knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of
time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes
permanently available to the Naval Base (because of his own lack of
planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in
connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the
Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes
in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound
policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral
Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his
disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of
the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the
state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included
the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise
attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships
in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures
prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of
operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine precautions,
the netting of the harbor entrance and the maintenance of augmented
Condition 3 on board vessels in port. Condition of readiness No. 3
provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and
anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court
points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire
promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in Alert
No. 1 which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no
threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer
the comment that condition of readiness No. 3 is normally maintained in
port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a
considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense
forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was
not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was
well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was
not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I
discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings
that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes
moored on the water were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some
patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol
planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises: 50% were on 4
hours notice (page 669). This is further indication of the lack of
appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of
large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the
Findings, also points out that there were no longer range reconnaissance
in effect on 7 December a matter which I will refer to again later on.
It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads:
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7
December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending
the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition
of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defence."
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This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur,
for reasons set forth later on.
(j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier
aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the
carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that
to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must
be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that
in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an
unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of
any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source
which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to
Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states
as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the
circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to
time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the
Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as
discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been
interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and
that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
[7] Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range
reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points
out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically
ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The
controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if
the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would
have been rapidly worn out and, therefore unavailable for Fleet
purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this
matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to
put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the
information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on
entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance,
particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days
immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means
available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a
distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes
could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous
than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would
appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the
circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early
December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral
Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance
by patrol planes using the few at his disposal to cover the most
dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170 and 350
to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of
attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or
shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683,
1053, 1055).
(l) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army
had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the
process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning
system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7
December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in
use for training and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick
up the approaching Japanese planes when they about 130 miles away, and
reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer
present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a
flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He
made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of
the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have
pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor-both Army and Navy. It there had
been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and
awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning
system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an
hour's warning before the air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV (1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl
Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The
Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected
against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no
anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual
ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be
made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision
not to install baffles appears to
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have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use
barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical
reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese
aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court
traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines
certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more
important items are as follows:
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a
grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese
cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was
necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such
deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute
provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral
Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that
the Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating
that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were
doubtful and that indications were that a *surprise aggressive movement
in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a
possibility.
(o) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain
in, formation, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted
to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact
that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in
the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the
Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that
hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The
summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO
beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war
warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was
expected within the next few days: [101] [sic] that there were
indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines,
Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel
to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War
Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be
terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile
action was possible at any time and that it was desirable that Japan
commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information
Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the
China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided
to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the
Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with
information that became available in Washington during the period
beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7
December, conversations, which had been in progress between our
Government and Japan, were continued, coming to all end on 7 December.
The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions
during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set
forth as follows:
[11] (1) A number of messages were received from informers during and
prior to this period in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral
Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's
Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The test of the
messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692.
These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at
Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United
States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it
undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatehes, because to do so
might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to main as to the
ability of the Navy Department to obtain them. This contention as some
merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect
the sources of this information. However, it was equally his
responsibility to give
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Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these
messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatehes he
did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known
and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions,"
the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an
adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in
this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the
handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to
the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received
in the Navy Department on 6 December at 2100, on that date. They set
forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for
resolving matters under dispute between the [12] countries, and leave no
doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but
do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about
0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message was received. This part
of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope
of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was
impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiation. This part
of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and
0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox.
Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.
(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p. m. message" was
received in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador
deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on
that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p. m. in
Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to
the Office of the Chief Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to
the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to
point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. 13 the significance of the "1:00 p. m.
time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about
10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) Navy Department, or at least,
some officers therein, appreciated that the formation just received
pointed to the possibility_even to the probability-of a dawn attack on
Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this mess came to his
attention about 11:00 a. m., and that he immediately telephoned to
Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with
Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii would be expected
soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the [13] need for sending
this message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to
include in his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to
naval commanders. General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that
the Japanese were presenting "what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 p.
m., Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders to
destroy their codes immediately and that while the War Department does
not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, you
are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of
this communication." He sent this via commercial radio, which was then
the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The
despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu
time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu
time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the
message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was
already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of
delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could
have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began.
The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor
means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack,
or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome,
since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited
to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor
naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go
along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning
would have been of great value in a planes and in augmenting the
condition of readiness existing on board ship.
(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings: it is
stated Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was [14] informed that the Japanese
had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington
and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his
statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted
substantially by publication
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of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he
did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to
strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the
destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those
necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant
destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6
December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and
confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater
emergency". (Exhibit 22.)
(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the
Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three
preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the
so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo
on 19 November, was received in the Navy Department on 28 November. It
set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our
diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the
middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed
that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This
message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and
Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look
out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December the Federal
Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast"
which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again
at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing
message meant that Japanese relations with Russia were [15] in danger.
These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal
Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the
Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence
(Volume 5, page 746) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the
Director of Naval Communications saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on
which was written a different version of the implementing code, which
meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in
danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an
East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message
referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War
Department or the Navy Department There is considerable testimony in the
record as to what was done with the "Winds message." Various officers
testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval
Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they
do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact
that none of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral
Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds
that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that
the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far
East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on
page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was
delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese
representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and
likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of
the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the
attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had
particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of
the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all
important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means
available."
[16] (s) Fact XIX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime
obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied
with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information
in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7
December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus
depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese
situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view
of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important
phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy
information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem
essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony
of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for
handling information of the enemy.
Page 342
It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then
Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a
witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information
was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify;
however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was
unfortunate.
3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion:
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses
the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in
Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information
available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any
departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not
entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information
available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly
disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's
dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they
actually were on that occasion.
[17] (b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court
expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which
existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the
defense of Pear I Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the
comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and
materiel at the time and that available means were spread thin
throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of
means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration.
However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means
available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The
fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy
Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of
the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to
some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications
of that information which was given to him.
(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds
that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct
responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means
provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base
was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think
this is a narrow view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had
to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in
general.
(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties
satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX (page 1203), the Court states that
naval defense plans were complete and sound in [18] concept, but
contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely
upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the
Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were
ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that
there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected
within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I
cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be
no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner
best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces
available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the
Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky
chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently
alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own
fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by
the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204), expresses the view that
Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in
placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the
Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility
for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and
effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 1204), as to the effect that
the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper,
and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take
place on 7 December could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to
the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The
Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should
have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all
anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that
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no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of
routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not
indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December
approached. I think they did.
[19] (h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court
holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine
long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating
that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow
limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I
think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral
Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would
have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance
in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (1207), the Court expresses the
view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials
in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and
Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East
rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable
scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact,
the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December.
However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor
would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a
campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of
this possibility_a possibility that was strengthened by information
received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court
expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment
in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical
period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he
had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that,
on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the
fact that information had been [20] received which appeared to indicate
that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in
the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first
endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this
Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and
his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an
attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge
Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon
the message in question nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer
(attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did
take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the
fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu, and
midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the Findings).
It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not have his
attention drawn to the possible significance of this message,
nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers
of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this
important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of
conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to
this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if
Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the
Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation
better than he did.
4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 120S) the Court finds
that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the
part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that
no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not
adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this
does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree
likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the
Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor [21]
incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond
human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a
whole is basically responsible in at the people were unwilling to
support an adequate army and navy until was too late to repair the
consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack
that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for
local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been
done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it
is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have
taken.
Part 344
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was
primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important
United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and
the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those
two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had
been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that
Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to
the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all
important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure
means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact
that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his
initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the
situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running
picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my
opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary
of the information available in Washington, particularly in the
following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26
November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking
relations.
[22] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain
Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl
Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a
possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds
Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but
it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together
with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of
efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.
m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the
implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It
appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available
means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have
reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute
preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl
Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense
of intensification of the critical relations between the United States
and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark
to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of
increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had
the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible
at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that
Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6
December [23] concerning destruction of United States Secret and
confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be
considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral
Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due
consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion
that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the
danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses
of action were open to him:
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to
conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether
or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the
Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the
Japanese task more difficult.
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessel in a less
routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to
have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have
made the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours
before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes
would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships'
batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control
organizations would have been fully operational.
6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
questions they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
Page 345
[24] 7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the
evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be
the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of
superior judgment may not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my
views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present
military operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King.
E. J. KING.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Memo for File: This is Admiral King's Second Endorsement, as
paraphrased, by the deletion of the magic. This is the paraphrase that
was made public because the public interest required that the magic not
be made public.
JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.
COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
FF1/A17-25.
Serial:
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Correspondence re Court of Inquiry Investigating Pearl Harbor.
Enclosure: (A) Subject correspondence.
1. The attached file copy and rough draft (which was published) is the
paraphrased version of my second endorsement to the record of
proceedings of the Court of Inquiry investigating Pearl Harbor.
/S/ E. J. KING,
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.
[1] COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
SECOND ENDORSEMENT
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of
Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the
Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following
remarks.
2. (A) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of
the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time
at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely
scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the
ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel
sufficient recreation to keep them from
Page 346
going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one
task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I
discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional
requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until
after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a
declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an
unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for
Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of
defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was
charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of
Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval
measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact VI sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were
personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were
cordial and cooperative in every respect, that they frequently
conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by
either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-
Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each
was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of
the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is
important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since
the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not
cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the
War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the
defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to
cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that
the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence
as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every
possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that
Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should
be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet
free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is
further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given
full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to
augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general
state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President
on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan
at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing
numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States
Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security
policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own
strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to
obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment
is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United
States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war,
or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a
disadvantage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are
necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided,
and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and
recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the
concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume
responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits
of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes
upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United
States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that
this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical
extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were
inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and
did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely
because, in principles this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears
from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of
the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should
have been strong enough for self-defense. The [4] fact that it was not
strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the
employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless,
Page 347
he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the Fleet in
defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by
Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It
points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned
responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned
to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be
made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the
basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval
participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the
availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this
circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the
fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must
be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks
that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance
knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of
time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes
permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his
own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the
Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that
the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol
planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was
sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of
Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at
his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense
forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces
at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of
readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the
assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise
attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships
in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures
prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of
operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine precautions,
the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "augmented
Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. 3"
provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and
anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court
points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire
promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert
No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with
no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer
the comment that "condition of readiness No 3" is normally maintained in
port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a
considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense
forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was
not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was
well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was
not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I
discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings
that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes
moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly.
Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some
patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50% were
on 4 hours notice. This is further indication of the lack of
appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of
large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the
Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance
in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on.
It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI reads:
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7
December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending
the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition
of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur,
for reasons set forth later on.
(J) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can
be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to
the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a
carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and
sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this
instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown
port, and that it is an established fact that
Page 348
no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or
received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other
ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941 The
Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7
December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and
unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive
knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian
area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might
logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii
was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly
narrow limits.
[7] (k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance
with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral
Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine
long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to
have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were
used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out
and, therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a
difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be
considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However,
after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it
seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no
attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation
became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the
Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit
an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the
approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there
were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been
covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover
would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel
in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this
connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he
provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at
his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He
considered the are between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance,
and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the
southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before,
Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
(1) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed
responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of
installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but
that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in
condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and
it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching
Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this
fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an
officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army
bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report
of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted
feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at
Pear Harbor_both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the
states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese
potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it
was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the
air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor
resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court
points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against
break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-
torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual
ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be
made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision
not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy
Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered
but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that
the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously
underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the
deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain
information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject The more important
items are as follows:
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a
grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese
cabinet,
Page 349
that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for
the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as
would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action
against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral
Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that
the Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating
at chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful
d that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a
possibility.
(o) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information,
which as known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel
which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7
December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and
Navy Departments and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that
there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in
the Far East, rather an elsewhere. The summary of the information on
which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO
beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war
warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was
expected within the next few days; [10] that there were indications of
an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute
an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War
Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be
terminated; Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile
action was possible any time; and that it was desirable that Japan
commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information
Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
directing him scout for information of Japanese movements in the China
Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided
relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the
Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that
became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November.
It set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which
had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued,
coming an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information
as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of
the Navy Department are set forth as follows:
[11] (1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior
this period which was made available in the Navy Department but which
was to sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates definite
Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire
in some cases to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral
Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel
this information, because to do so might compromise the sources from
which it was obtained. This intention has some merit, in my opinion. It
was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this
information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral
Kimmel a general picture of the information which he was receiving.
Admiral Stark says that he considered that the dispatches he did send to
Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred
as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court
holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate
summary of the information at Admiral Stark's disposal. I have to concur
in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the
handling certain information which was received in the Navy Department
on the 6th of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this
information indicated the Japanese views concerning certain United
States proposals for solving matters under dispute between the
countries, and leaves no doubt that the United States' proposals were
[12] unacceptable to Japan, but do
Page 350
not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At, or about,
0700, 7 December, further trustworthy information was received which
indicated that the Japanese Government had finally given up hope of
being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was
impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This
information was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 the White House, and at
0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox.
Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at State Department.
(3) At about 10:30 A. M. on 7 December, further reliable information was
received in the Navy Department. The substance was that the Japanese
Ambassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred to
in the preceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 P. M. on
that day. Information was of significance because 1:00 P. M. in
Washington was dawn in Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations and immediately thereafter, to the
State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point
out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In my opinion, the
foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (Honolulu time)
the Navy Department, or at least some officers therein, appreciated that
the information just received pointed to the possibility_even
probability_of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states
this information came to his attention about 11:00 A. M. and that he
immediately telephone [sic] to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn
General [13] Short that a break with Japan was imminent and that an
attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at
first, as to the need for sending this message, but after brief
consideration, asked General Marshall to include in his proposed
dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General
Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting
what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00 P. M. Washington time on 7
December; and that while the War Department did not know the
significance of the hour set for delivering the note, he, General Short,
was to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of
this communication. He sent this via commercial radio, which was the
usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The dispatch
left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and
arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M. Honolulu time. This
was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had
decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway.
The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been
used (plain language telephone) this information could have been
received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court
remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means
available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or
which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome,
since there was already in effect a condition of readiness suited to the
circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval
base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go with
this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would been
of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of
readiness existing on board ship.
[14] (4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every
reason to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and
consular in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their
codes. Admiral Kimmel says that "the significance of this dispatch was
diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning
newspaper in Honolulu," and he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning
of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the
destruction of Secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those
necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant
destruction in event of emergency. This was followed on 6 December by
authorization for outlying islands to destroy Secret and confidential
documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency."
(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 25 November
reliable information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that
certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese
short-wave news broadcast. When these words were heard, codes were to be
destroyed. This inform was available in various places, including Pearl
Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had
Page 351
it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the
expected broadcast. On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications
Commission monitored the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo
twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December.
Various officers testified that the implementing broadcasts were
transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Director of Naval Communications, but [15] Admiral Stark and Admiral
Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them.
*It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts [1] were
never sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4)
above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was
informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and
consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy
certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII)
that 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the
United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The
stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be
unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence
of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court
points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the
Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic
situation in order that he might be "informed of all important
developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."
(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of
command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with
information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his
possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December,
failed to transmit this information Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the
latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in
Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important
phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy
information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would [16]
seem essential thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony
of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for
handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear
Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not
available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes
that all essential information was obtained despite the fact that
Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; [2] however, it appears to that the
failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
[17] 3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view
that presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on
7 December was necessary. And that the information available to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet did not require any departure from his
operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with
this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department
been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to
believe that Admiral Kimmel's disposition on the morning of 7 December
would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.
(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that
deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an
adverse bear upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on
and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army
and Navy were short of and material at the time and that available means
were spread thin through the various areas of probable hostility. The
shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into
consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used
the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did
not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not informed by the Navy
Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of
the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to
some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the indications
of that information which was given to him.
[1] Later investigations indicate that the vital implementing broadcasts
were not, in fact, received by the Navy Department.
[2] Admiral Wilkinson's testimony was later received but did not change
any of the opinions or facts established.
Page 352
[18] (c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the
defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the
Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th
Naval District and that the defense of the base was a joint operation
only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this a narrow view of
the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of
the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect
Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.
(d) The court holds that Admiral Bloch performed his duties
satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval
defense plans were complete and sound in concept, but contained a basic
defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the
availability of aircraft belonging and being employed by the Fleet, and
that on the morning of 7 December, the plans were ineffective because
they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance
knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of
time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with
this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that
available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the
danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it
would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers
before they launched their planes except by lucky chance. However, I do
think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of
the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on
the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese
did attack.
[19] (f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral
Kimmel's action taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in
effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea,
is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security
of the Fleet and the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur
in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures
taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only
had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7
December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps
that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes
note of suggestions that each day naval planes should have been in the
air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns
manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have
been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question
at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening of
precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII, the Court holds that Admiral
Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range
reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the
attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of
time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if
all available information had placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and
that if he had evaluated it properly he would have found it necessary to
do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately
preceding the 7th of December.
[20] (i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XV II, the Court expresses the
view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials
in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and
Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East
rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable
scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact,
the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December.
However, it was not illogical to suppose an attack on Pearl Harbor would
be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign,
and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this
possibility_a possibility that was strengthened by information received
in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
[21] (j) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the court presses
the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he
did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from
26 November to 7 December, important information which he received
regarding the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the
morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact
that information had been received which appeared to indicate that a
break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the
Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement
that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this
Page 353
Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and
his principal advisers did not construe this information as indicating
an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the views of the
Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed
upon the information, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer
(attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did
take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the
fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight
in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident, that though Admiral Stark
did have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this
information, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least
some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that
had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a
matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no
exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair
conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of information
available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge
the situation better than he did.
[22] 4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no
offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of
any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no
further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not
adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this
does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree
likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the
Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor
incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God," beyond
human power to prevent or mitigate. It true that the country as a whole
is basically responsible in that the people are unwilling to support an
adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences
of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered
in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense
at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by Navy
to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and
Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to
examine possible courses of action they might have taken.
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was
primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important
United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and
the Hawaiian Islands. Attention should have been centered on those two
places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been
informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral
Kimmel felt the need for early accurate information [23] as to the
general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important
developments as they occurred by the best and most secure means
available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that
Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his
initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the
situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running
picture the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion,
Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the
information able in Washington, particularly in the following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26
November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking
relations.
(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain
information available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition
of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in
Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the
broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got
this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral
Stark's office. This together with the handling of other matters of
information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's
organization.
(3) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the
information which he received indicating that a message was to be given
to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m., which information Admiral Stark
received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were
appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. [24] It appears that
had this information been handled by the quickest available means, and
with due appreciation of its significance, it *might* have reached
Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last
Page 354
minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in
Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense
of intensification of the critical relations between the United States
and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark
to keep him fully informed nevertheless did have some indications of
increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had
the "war warning" of 27 November; the 3 December information that the
Japanese were destroying their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6
December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential
matter in outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered
in connection with other facts of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's
statement on this phase of the matter must be must given consideration.
After weighing those considerations, I am of the opinion that he could
and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to
which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action
were open to him:
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to
conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors.
Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the
Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the
Japanese task more difficult.
[25] (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in
a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese
to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would
have made the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours
before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes
would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships'
batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control
organizations would have been full [sic] operational.
6. The derelictions of the part of Admiral stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
question they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence
adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the
relegation of both of these officers to position in which lack of
superior judgment may not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my
views concerning how much of the records bears such a relation to
present military operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King
E. J. KING
THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF
INQUIRY
[Stamped:] 1 Dec. 1944
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.
1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of
the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate
General, a Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I
find the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of
judgment part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied,
however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of
all possible evidence.
2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an
investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for
further investigation by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet in the
Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear
Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as
may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain the relevant facts
relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary
further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to
institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
Page 355
TOP SECRET
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Memo for File:
This is the Sec'ys 4th Enc. that was not used because it contained magic;
instead the Secy signed the one of Aug 13, that the President made
public Aug 29, from which the magic was deleted in the public interest.
JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR
Special Assistant to the Secretary
[1] TOP SECRET
Fourth Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry and Fourth Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report to the
Secretary of the Navy Dated 12 July 1945
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further
investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., ordered by the
Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission
headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into
the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The
commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission
concluded in part that:
"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate
action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December
7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect
for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty
on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other
respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate
measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The
attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his
lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out
the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the
plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of
appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in
their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding
general, Hawaiian Department."
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February
1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of
witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese
attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to
proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the
Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such
persons as the facts might justify.
[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U.S.N.,
(Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U.S.N., (Retired), and Vice
Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U.S.N., (Retired), with Commander Harold
Biesemeier, U.S.N., as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944.
The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter
as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances
connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor,
Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the
matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it
might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state
its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame
incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and,
in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious
blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings
should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and
submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain
portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the
findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET,"
and the balance "SECRET."
Page 356
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of
the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations, and by me, was that the evidence secured by the Court did
not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of
any person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl
Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the
evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the
part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had
not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.
Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by
an investigating officer and that pending the completion of the
necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the
institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every
material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the
prior investigations and that an appropriate summary of all information
developed in the prior Naval investigations be prepared. Upon the
completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination
of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I
appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., as investigating officer, and
John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and obtain such
other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop the facts
in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further
investigation directed by my precept of [3] 2 May 1945 was completed on
12 July 1945 and the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwarded to the Judge
Advocate General and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment.
9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report of further
investigation, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General advised,
among other things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any
offense known to Naval law; that the evidence indicated that the
officers in question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty
of culpable inefficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an
offense triable by general court martial. The Judge Advocate General
further advised in his Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion
that any such court-martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities
with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war
effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months
immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the
efficiency of the Naval service." Notwithstanding the difficulties
pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion,
however, that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral
Kimmel tried by general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist.
The Judge Advocate General recommended that Admiral Hewitt's
investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that
Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything
contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be
done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral
Kimmel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him
for any alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 7 December
1941.
10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13 August
1945, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurred generally in the
remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed
the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by
court martial of any person in the Naval service in that it would not
sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the
Navy; that with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant
other proceedings, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet was still of the
opinion that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, although not culpable to
a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, nevertheless lacked the
superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with
their duties, and that appropriate action, consisting of the relegation
of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment might
not result in future errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and
Admiral Kimmel, and stated that no further action was recommended. The
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement,
that in any event he considered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark
or Admiral Kimmel to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with
Japan because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure
of information which would be detrimental to current military operations
and to [4] national security measures. He
Page 357
concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy
Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before
a general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stated that
this action should not be taken until after the completion of
hostilities with Japan. He concurred in the further suggestions of the
Judge Advocate General that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made
available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel and that Admiral Kimmel be
informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this
record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without
prejudice to national security.
11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements
to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements
to the report by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following
remarks:
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II._This finding states, in substance, that
the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and
the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the
effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he
anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the
opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel
did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance
schedules. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, states further in this
connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods
of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible
for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in
port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I
concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this
finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III._This finding states that,
"Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ."
make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as
a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of
avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, comments that this gives an
unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional
requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a
definite handicap. It does not appear that there was any proximate
causal relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the
instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to
overt acts did not preclude either long [5] distance reconnaissance or a
sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941,
Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his
responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance
of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV._This states that Admiral Bloch was
subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of
assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently,
Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with
local defense.
It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found:
"75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only
Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes.
"76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral
Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were
operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by
him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The
schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant
reconnaissance from Oahu."
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V._The court here finds that relations
between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and
cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were
received, and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being
taken by the other.
In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are
approved:
"1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were
designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack,
including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war
plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet
that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a
state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between
the local com-
Page 358
manders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior
to the attack.
"2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of
mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the
local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of
attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information
concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
"3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective
exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of
information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there
was no organized system to ensure such exchange."
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were
informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and
Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the Army of some
information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained
both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates,
however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently
informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It
appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December
1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions.
They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear
that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to
be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in
effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval
Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect
Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified
that he did not know what alert the Army had in effect, and that he made
no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears
from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November
1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to
United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He
testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be
furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they
were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen
these dispatches.
In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the
Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command,
was not working effectively_it failed. In this connection the following
conclusion of Admiral Hewitt is approved:
"War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major
decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be unity of
command."
However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is
important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively
demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two
or [7] more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning
forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in
an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have
been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some
even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified
command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and
their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the
higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.
I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for
having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine
contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior
to the air attack. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports the
following conclusion by him, which is approved:
"26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack
on Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in
plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready
destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army
unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption
which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not
received until the air attack had commenced."
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI._This states in substance that
unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the
effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.
Page 359
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points out, however, that the
pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to
the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII._The Court finds that Japan had an
initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority,
and the superiority of Japanese espionage.
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the
general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court
will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of
strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct.
Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it
overlooks the fact that:
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to
Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into
account in the war plans;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a
disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and
War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence
advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII._This states that it was the direct
responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that
the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
[8] The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the
fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes
a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel
was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet
had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to
be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible
for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.
(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX._The Court finds that the air defense
plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet
aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local
defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact
that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was
sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal,
that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could,
that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited
to the danger that threatened; that it is doubtful whether with the
available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers
before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that
Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely
due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of
damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX._Based on these findings the
conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed
his duties.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is
approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X._This holds adequate and effective
Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI._The substance of this finding is that
Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called
for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of
readiness would have added little to the defense.
In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition
of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that
condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained
on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the
Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, further states that he does not
agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of
readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view
that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening
up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the
comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concur.
(l) Court of Inquiry Finding XII._The Court here finds that there was no
information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to
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attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to
predict that attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point:
"There was information that might logically have been interpreted as
indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time
could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral
Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel,
particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December
1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.
This information, which consisted principally of daily radio
intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese
naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is
set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral
Hewitt's report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in
Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as
indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active
operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel
conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of
Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel
noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet
Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions
1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned
that those four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were
then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese
carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer [10] in his
written estimate, in Japanese home waters, with the exception of
possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral
Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his conversation with
Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:
"Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you
said, as best you recall it?
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You
don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I
replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do
not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty
confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as
sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially
with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could
be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that
effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now" or
words to that effect....
"Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me,
arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye
when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion
about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or
a jocular one?
"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said
"Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but
if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area
since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be
refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and
it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said "Do you mean to say
they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other
words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact
location.
"Mr. SONNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information
about those carriers?
"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a
statement to me in a way to point out to me that I should know where
they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hewitt's report,
the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral
Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of
information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat
promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls
have been partially identified since the change on the first of December
and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier
traffic is at a low ebb," and that the daily summaries delivered to
Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there
was no information as [11] to Japanese carriers.
In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the
Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the
Commander in Chief,
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U.S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the
information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval
forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding
the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had
received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief
of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an
attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack
could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII._It is here stated that Admiral
Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was
sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that
such use of available planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval
Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to
make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors
to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all
of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears
that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no
attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation
became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the
Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means
available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a
distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes
could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more
dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and
that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances
known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. Attention
is called to the fact that Admiral Richardson had maintained distance
reconnaissance, using the few patrol planes at his disposal, to cover
the most dangerous sectors in rotation, and that these patrols were
discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral
Richardson.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted that
Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the
summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by
Admiral Bloch at that time.
[12] The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the
question of air reconnaissance are approved:
"77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he
decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
"78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war
warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range
reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject
must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The
Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any
of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had
no such discussion with him.
"87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the
attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance
daily for more than a few days.
"89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact
available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown,
for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 120 degrees
to a distance of about 700 miles.
"90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the
most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the
Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
"91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27
November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors
probably would have been searched.
"101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200
miles due north of Oahu."
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV._This states in substance that the Army
radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding,
which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the
radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic
state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should
have served to give at least
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an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also
approve the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt:
"15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during
[13] certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and,
although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of
the approach of Japanese aircraft."
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV._This states that the best professional
opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December
1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal
water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor,
was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful
principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo,
which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It
is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft
torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which
the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding
that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at
that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in
waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the
Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in
1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully
launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water
at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court
also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval
Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict
with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that:
"It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe
when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a
sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient
run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes
launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of
water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there
was circulated in the Department an intelligence report which described
the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this
report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and
that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching
than the depth at which it made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the
British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which
torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year
prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of
an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary
Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second
only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of [14] the types
of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had
been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February
by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not
approved.
(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI._The Court here finds that Admiral
Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made
after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the
approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16
October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the
information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17
October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated that a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the
Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores
that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "A
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the
Philippines or Guam is a possibility . . ."
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words
"A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on
the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on
those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also
included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark
stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us
and the message
Page 363
I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the
message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued:
"Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in
the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until
something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript,
stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that
we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that
on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his
bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such
contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we
keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid
on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to
detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my
advice to him was not to worry."
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal [15] with the
question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue
preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important
information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and
otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November
27th.
(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII._The Court here finds that there were
good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far
East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points
out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of
Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He
notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a
commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl
Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably
strengthened by information available at Washington, all of which was
not available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation
that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would
include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information
received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November
27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been
approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of
war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly
possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location
and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with
these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this
connection is approved:
"23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of
forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the
probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The
information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week
of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an
unusual change in Japanese radio call signs, that, on the basis of all
information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of
the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no
information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of
positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a
study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence,
through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of
the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel
to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such
an attack...."
[16] (r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX._These state in
substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December
1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information in his
possession, obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages, and
summarized in the addendum to the Court's findings of facts, constitutes
a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this finding
was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give
Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in
Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, on the Naval
Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral
Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to
the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the
conclusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with
the handling of enemy information in the Navy
Page 364
Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough
exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval
Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling this information.
It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was
unfortunate.
With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concurred. It
further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was
assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to
other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with
the handling of such intercepted enemy information, would be most
helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the
Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and
Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the
enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the
nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their
assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of
the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly
be obtained.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the
testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other
testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The
following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved:
"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United
States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington,
concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic
negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception,
decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.
[17] "6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and
Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged.
The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese
naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War
Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led
that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the
Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch
of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel,
concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk
and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to
the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not
flown because the special Army planes were not made ready....
"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy
Department.
"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he
be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to
all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not
communicate to him important information which would have aided him
materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In
particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of
November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means,
information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were
unfortunate.
"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in
his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and
that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were
imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important
messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
"11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the
"war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important
subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus
Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton,
who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this
and other important messages."
[18] 12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the
intelligence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate
General at Hawaii and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese
Consulate General are approved.
"Conclusion 12: Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone
lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that
various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information
was
Page 365
obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a
Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such
cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in
the Hawaiian area.
"Conclusion 13: Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General
at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of
ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of
the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information
was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain
other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December
1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not
decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack,
apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such
work."
13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds
that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the
part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that
no further proceedings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry,
I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second
Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the
Pearl Harbor incident, and that the disaster cannot be regarded as an
"act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not
it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country as a
whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take
adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the
consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a
whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most
recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the
true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt
by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same
token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was
known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were
recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these
factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the
responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them
to bring about that implementation [19] of the plans that was necessary
if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in
several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly
evaluated, although there was ample information available on this
subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this
information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense
plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack,
but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these
selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack
had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate
provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the
fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army
and Navy; in practice, none of these measures came into being to any
appreciable extent prior to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the
Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the
procurement and material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of
the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the
undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they
require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance
of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage
of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that
any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost
impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however to all
these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas
in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which,
though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have
tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to
inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center
upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective
sphere, to take appropriate action.
14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of
the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is
pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel, as the
Page 366
responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the
initial Japanese blow.
[20] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out
that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of
information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese,
which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum;
(2) The intercepted Japanese message inquiring as to the disposition of
ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) The implementation of the "winds" message;
(4) In failing to appreciate the significance of the "one p.m. message"
it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available. [sic]
(5) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement
that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of
intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United
States.
I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In
connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of
the implementation of the "winds" message, the following conclusion by
Admiral Hewitt is approved:
"7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic
messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio
broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to
the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message
was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating
to the United States."
Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27
November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communications
sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the
message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark
sent previously to Admiral Kimmel. That message read as follows:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have
ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few
days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization
of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either
the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly
Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X Inform district and Army
authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X
Appropriate measures against sabotage."
[21] Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U.S.
Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not
only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the
available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to
evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941.
The evidence shows that the State Department reply to the Japanese of 26
November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum that it was
known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese
regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it was known, as early as 1
December 1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It
was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the State
Department's note the Japanese were directing their emissaries in the
United States to do everything in their power to allay any suspicion of
a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received on
6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an intercepted Japanese message
to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part reply to the State
Department's note of 26 November 1941 was being transmitted, and further
that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted
from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first
thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy
Department by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the
thirteen parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the
reply constituted a final breaking off of relations. All this pointed to
the conclusion that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the
delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was not known on 6
December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there was ample
evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within
narrow limits of time.
Page 367
On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen
parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the
breaking off of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery
of that reply at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was
information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu
and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by
Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl
Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an
attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have
dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral
Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about
some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second
Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated
that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him
fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of
relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the
"war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at
any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the
Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6
December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential
matter at outlying Pacific Islands.
[22] In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his
personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and
as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the
possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the
information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and
movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should have
been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued
and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially
noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message
of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was
relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War
Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the
arrangements for the reinforcing of and continuing the limited air
patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth
bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging
in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect
the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of
readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-
range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet
air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His
failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable
nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to
what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral
Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan
of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against submarine
attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase
"appropriate defensive deployment," he should have asked the Chief of
Naval Operations for an explanation.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court states that Admiral Kimmel
could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger
to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of
action were open to him, viz.:
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct
long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made
the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have
resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less
routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have
predicted when there would be any vessels in port;
(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which
Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period
ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control
organizations fully operational.
Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in part:
"The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese
carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under
radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due
appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have
induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable pre-
Page 368
cautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures
which reasonably were open to him were:
"(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the
most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably
permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
[23] "(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft
readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
"(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by
ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
"(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in
port.
"(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept
possible attack forces.
"(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry
into port at irregular intervals.
"(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and
aircraft warning installations."
I concur with these comments as to the various courses of action which
Admiral Kimmel could and should have taken. The evidence indicates
clearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure to
conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from
Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest
from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt and from his following
conclusion, which is hereby approved.
"Conclusion 14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel
could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning,"
as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning
service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant
air reconnaissance from Oahu."
During the critical period after November 27 the limitations of the
aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the
only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled
to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant
air reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings,
would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance of
success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force
contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any
other single factor.
In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was of course always open to
Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his
organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective
joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an
objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of
the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was
excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed from
the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency
as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
[24] 15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet,
to the Naval Court record concludes that:
"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel
were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the
evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be
the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of
superior judgment may not result in future errors."
16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Fleet, states in part:
"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge
Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to
the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following
opinions are submitted:
"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant
trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that
Page 369
the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for
the Government of the Navy.
"(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other
proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously
expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to
a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless
inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment
necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.
"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of
these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment
may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case
of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is
recommended.
"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it
impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one
of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan,
nor are court [25] martial or other proceedings (prior to the
termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such
proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information
which would be detrimental to current military operations and to
national security measures."
17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral
Hewitt's report states in part:
"1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in
the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former
investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the
pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I
believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be
considered completed.
"2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which
impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a
distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of
placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that
there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible
officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical
period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those
officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected
from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to
appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor
was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the
necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of
these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a
poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all
possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war
except through an attack in the Western Pacific.
"3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and
co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any
great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that
they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer
understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views.
Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese
sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principles
been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The
security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a
fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic
concept of responsible officers.
[26] "4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first
endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:
"(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not
believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any
of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.
"(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are
worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable
Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be
necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that
it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did.
In my opinion this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these
officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly
defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly
performed. As stated
Page 370
by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court
of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the
acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment
necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their
assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of Superior
Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-martial.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
"(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and
Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members
of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a
court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or
during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many
of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired
lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter,
the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having
been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more
than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely
new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a
former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to
challenge. The summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in
temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers
in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the
opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of
hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to
the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six
months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously
impair the efficiency of the naval service."
18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of
the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate
General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Fleet, thereto; the record, findings, and conclusions of Admiral
Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis
of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark,
particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941,
failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising
command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action
should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to
active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of
superior judgment may be necessary.
(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted
with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure
of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in
these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken
without injuring current military operations or the national security.
19. Accordingly, I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any
position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of
superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position
in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior
judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with
the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the
facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these
investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken without
injuring current military operations or the national security.
JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.
Page 371
NOTE
This endorsement released by President Truman 29 August 1945-thereby
changing classification.
[1]
13 AUGUST 1945.
FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF
INQUIRY
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further
investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., ordered by the
Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission
headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into
the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The
commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission
concluded in part that:
"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate
action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December
7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect
for Joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty
on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other
respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate
measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The
attitude of each that he was not required to inform himself of, and his
lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out
the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the
plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of
appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in
their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding
general, Hawaiian Department."
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February
1944 Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of
witnesses likely to have knowledge of facts in connection with the
Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to
proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the
Pearl Harbor catastrophe and to commence such proceedings against such
persons as the facts might justify.
[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN
Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral
Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN
as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed
to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for
the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the
attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on
7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include
in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be
established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to
whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the
part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its
opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred,
to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and
submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain
portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the
findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET" in
the interest of national security, and the balance "SECRET."
The material which was classified "TOP SECRET" was so classified by the
Court of Inquiry and retained in that classification upon the
recommendation of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations because of the extreme care which has been necessary to
safeguard information in the hands of the Navy Department and especially
the sources of that information. These sources were many, including the
Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the Office of Strategic
Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations now
informs me that it is still in the public interest that the sources of
this infor-
Page 372
mation be safeguarded. Accordingly, I have directed that all of the
report of the Court of Inquiry be made public except that part,
publication of which in the opinion of the Commander in Chef, U. S.
Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations would necessarily disclose the
sources of secret information. To the same end in the discussion of the
report of the Court of Inquiry the evidence before the Court and the
additional evidence discovered by Admiral Hewitt's investigation herein
I have avoided any reference which would disclose the sources of secret
information.
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of
the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations, and by me was that the evidence secured by the Court did not
warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any
person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl
Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the
evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the
part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry had not
gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I
directed that further investigation would be conducted by an
investigating officer and that pending [3] the completion of the
necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the
institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every
material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the
prior investigations upon the completion of this review of prior
investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt,
USN, as investigating officer, to examine such witnesses and obtain such
other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop and
clarify the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. The further investigation was completed on 12 July 1945.
9. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in
Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements
to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record are approved subject to the
following remarks:
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II._This finding states, in substance, that
the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and
the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the
effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he
anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the
opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel
did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance
schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet states further in this
connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods
of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible
for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in
port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I
concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to
this finding.
(b) Court Of Inquiry Finding III._This finding states that,
"Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . . "
make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as
a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of
avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an
unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional
requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a
definite handicap. Though, in contrast with our Constitutional
principles, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was but a repetition of
the historically treacherous Japanese method of inaugurating hostilities
and commencing a war, yet it does not appear that there was any
proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and
the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction
as to overt acts did not preclude either long distance reconnaissance or
a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it [4] appears that prior to 7 December
1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his
responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance
of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV._This states that Admiral Bloch was
subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of
assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently,
Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with
local defense.
Page 373
Upon the basis of all the evidence including Admiral Hewitt's
investigation, it appears that:
(1) No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only
Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes.
(2) The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral
Kimmel and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were
operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by
him at that time which were not revised prior to the attack. The
schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant
reconnaissance from Oahu.
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V. The Court here finds that relations
between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly cordial and
cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were
received and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being
taken by the other.
In this connection upon all the evidence it appears:
(1) The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were
designed to meet with the available means various types of attack
including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war
plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet
that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a
state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between
the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was
the ease prior to the attack.
(2) The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of
mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the
local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of
attack which presupposed the possession and exchange of information
concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
[5] (3) A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective
exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of
information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there
was no organized system to ensure such exchange.
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were
informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and
Navy at Hawaii which included the transmission to the Army of some
information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained
both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates
however that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently
informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It
appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December
1941 Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions.
They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear
that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to
be placed in effect or the question or advisability of placing in effect
air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that
after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed in effect Army Alert
No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did
not know which degree of alert the Army had in effect and that he made
no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears
from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November
1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to
United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He
testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be
furnished to General Short and that he did not know whether or not they
were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen
these dispatches.
In view of these facts I cannot agree with the above finding by the
Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation of joint
command was of working effectively_it failed.
War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major
decisions must devolve on one person; that is there must be unity of
command. However it is important to point out that the experience of
this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency
between the existence of two or more separate military or naval
organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of
unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the
major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more
distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations
but all
Page 374
acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of
the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical
proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters
or command post.
[6] I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for
having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine
contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior
to the air attack. The evidence supports the conclusion that the attempt
to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor
was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language.
Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer.
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI._This states in substance that
unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the
effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that the
pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to
the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII._The Court finds that Japan had an
initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority,
and the superiority of Japanese espionage.
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the
general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court
will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of
strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct.
Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it
overlooks the fact that:
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to
Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into
account in the war plans;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a
disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and
War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence
advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII._This states that it was the direct
responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that
the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the
fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes
a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel
was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the ships
of the Fleet in port had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With
this I concur. It is to be noted moreover, that under the defense plan
the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.
[7] (h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX._The Court finds that the air
defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon
Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local
defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact
that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was
sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal;
that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could;
that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited
to the danger that threatened that it is doubtful whether with the
available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers
before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance that Admiral
Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to
his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage
resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in
Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX._Based on these findings the
conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed
his duties.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is
approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X._This holds adequate and effective
Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI._The substance of this finding is that
Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called
for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of
readiness would have added little to the defense.
Page 375
In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition
of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that
condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained
on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the
Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
[8] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not
agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of
readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view
that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening
up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the
comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.
(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII._The Court here finds that there was no
information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to
attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to
predict that attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point:
"There was information that might logically have been interpreted as
indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time
could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral
Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel,
particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December
1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.
This information consisted principally of daily radio intelligence
summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval
communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It
appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls
on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale;
that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet
Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and
that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the
absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written
estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of
four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were
among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading
toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the
Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home
waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In
his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer,
Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. N., described his conversation with
Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:
"Q. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as
best you recall it?
"A. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know
where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied,
'No, sir, I do not. I think they are [9] in home waters, but I do not
know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of
their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he
would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a
twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be
rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that
effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or
words to that effect." . . .
"Q. Your testimony Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of
your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke.
What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence
of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?
"A. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said 'Where are
Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must
estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we
haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they
finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when
he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say that they could
be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he
was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.
"Q. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those
carriers?
"A This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I
quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in
the way to
Page 376
point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so
indicated their location."
It is to be noted further that the daily communication intelligence
summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that:
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,
since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been
recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb" and that
the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to
the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese
carriers.
[10] In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the
Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the
view that the information as to the location and movements of the
Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the
week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which
he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the
Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating
that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an
attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII._It is here stated that Admiral
Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long range reconnaissance was
sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that
such use of the available planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval
Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to
make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors
to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all
of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears
that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no
attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation
became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the
Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means
available did not permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance
necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be
launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous
than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such
particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to
Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, the following points
may be noted:
(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in
the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by
Admiral Bloch at that time.
(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he
decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
[11] (3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion between
Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the
"war warning " as to the advisability or practicability of long range
reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject
must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The
Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any
of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had
no such discussion with him.
(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the
attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance
daily for more than a few days.
(5) There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact
available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown,
for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees
to a distance of about 700 miles.
(6) The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the
most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the
Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
(7) If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27
November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors
probably would have been searched.
(8) The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200
miles due north of Oahu.
Page 377
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV._This states in substance that the Army
radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding,
which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the
radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic
state, nevertheless even in its then condition it could have and should
have served to give at least all hour's warning of the attack.
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV._This states that the best professional
opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December
1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions [12] of shoal
water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor,
was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful
principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo,
which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It
is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft
torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which
the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding
that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at
that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in
waters as shallows as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view
the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in
1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully
launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water
at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court
also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval
Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict
with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that:
"It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe
when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a
sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient
run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes
launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of
water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there
was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described
the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this
report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and
that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching
than the depth at which it made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the
British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which
torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year
prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of
an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary
Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second
only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of
attack upon Pearl Harbor which [13] he considered likely. His letter had
been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February
by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not
approved.
(P) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI._The Court here finds that Admiral
Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made
after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the
approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16
October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the
information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17
October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November 1941, which stated that a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the
Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores
that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "*A
surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the
Philippines or Guam is a possibility...."
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words,
"A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on
the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on
those two places would be on foreign territory but that the words also
included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
The Court refers in its finding to a part personal letter sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark
Page 378
stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us
and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I
tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also
continued: "perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long
pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at
least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a
postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was
anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel
assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in
order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any
such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that,
while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully
planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be
difficult to detect. However. We are on guard to the best of our
ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question
of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of
the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he
received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the
critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.
[14] (q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII._The Court here finds that there
were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the
Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, points
out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of
Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He
notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a
commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl
Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably
strengthened by information available at Washington, not all of which
vas available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation
that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would
include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information
received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November
27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been
approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of
war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly
possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location
and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with
these estimates.
The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to
the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of
Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which
was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941,
indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in
Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to
December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of
four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to
any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as
to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which
was possible to them, under radio silence. Through the unguarded areas
of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air
attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable
precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.
(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX._These state in substance
that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1911 to
transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information [15] in his possession
constitutes a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, as to this finding
was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give
Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in
Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, on the Naval
Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral
Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to
the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the
conclusions of the Court based thereon were concerned principally with
the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department, and that
consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the
facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence who
was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded
that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
Page 379
With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred.
It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who
was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who according to
other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with
the handling of such information, would be most helpful. Captain
McCollum was also available as a witness to the Court. I ascertained
that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were
actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so
engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties
which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined
that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their
testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the
testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other
testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. From this
evidence the following conclusions appear:
(1) Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United
States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington,
concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic
negotiations and its intention to wage war.
[16] (2) The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and
Navy Departments was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained
by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to
intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War
Department had information which led that Department to believe that
Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This
appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General
Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic
reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain
information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval
vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army
planes were not made ready.
(3) The information obtained by the Navy Department was adequately
disseminated within the Navy Department.
(4) Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he
be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to
all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not
communicate to him important information which would have aided him
materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In
particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of
November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means
certain information indicating the imminence of an attack by the
Japanese that was available at Washington on the morning of December
7th, were unfortunate.
(5) Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his
possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and
that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were
imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important
messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
(6) The available information in the possession of the Commander in
Chief Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war
warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important
subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus
Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton,
who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this
and other important messages.
[17] 10. From the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt it appears that
prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General
at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were
secured at Honolulu but no information was obtained prior to December
7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal
restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite
handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.
11. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds
that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the
part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that
no further proceedings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry,
I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second
Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the
Pearl Harbor incident, and that that disaster cannot be regarded as an
"act of God" beyond human power
Page 380
to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the
Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible
in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense
until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to
do, it appears that the Navy, although its ranking officers were fully
informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare,
failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until
their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of
the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action
by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet
and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile
action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds
of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel
them to bring about that implementation [18] of the plans that was
necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least
mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in
several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air torpedo attack was not properly
evaluated, although there was ample information available on this
subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this
information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense
plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack,
but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these
selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack
had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate
provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the
fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army
and the Navy, in practice, none of these measures came into being to any
appreciable extent prior to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, conduct of the organization was such as to
submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail
pertaining to the procurement and materiel programs incidental to the
rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans
and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience
has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the
critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage
of hindsight nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that
any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost
impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all
these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas
in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which,
though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have
tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to
inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center
upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective
sphere, to take appropriate action.
12. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of
the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is
pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to
lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
[19] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement on the Report of the
Naval Court of Inquiry, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to
give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in
Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese,
which was a definite step toward breaking relations.
(2) Certain information indicating Japanese interest as to the
disposition of the ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) In failing to appreciate the significance of the information which
he received on the morning of 7 December indicating that a message was
to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. and in failing to
transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available;
(4) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement
that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of
mounting intensification of critical relations between Japan and the
United States.
I concur generally with these.
Page 381
Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it
might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the
failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available
information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate
that information, particularly on 7 December 1941. Although it was not
known on 6 December precisely when or where the attack was to be
delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a
surprise move was due within narrow limits of time. On the morning of
December 7 by 10:30 Admiral Stark had information indicating that a
message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. Eastern
Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time
corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far
East. Although no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl
Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an
attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have
dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral
Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring bout
some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
[20] (b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5 (b) of the
Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there
stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep
him fully formed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of
relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the
"war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at
any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the
Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6
December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential
matter at outlying Pacific islands.
In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal
letters which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in
the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of
attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information received by
Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval
forces after 27 November 1941 should be been evaluated, as previously
pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of
such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel
was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941 and again on
28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was
carrying forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing
the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28
November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating
area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He
continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the
lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He
neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent
nor advised his fleet air wing and other commanders of the receipt of
the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective
action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the
meaning of or disagreement to what would constitute an "appropriate
defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial
tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and
guarding against surprise attack by Japan, and if he did not know what
was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should
have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation. The Second
Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could
and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger which
the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action
were open to him, viz.:
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct
long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made
the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have
resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less
routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have
predicted when there would be any vessels in port;
(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which
Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period,
ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control
organizations fully operational.
[21] The absence of positive information as to the location of the
Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them.
Under radio
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silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due
appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have
induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the
effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open
to him were:
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most
probably approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably
permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at
least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by
ships in port particularly, during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in
port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept
possible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry
into port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and
aircraft warning installations.
The evidence indicates clearly, however, that Admiral Kimmel's most
serious omission was his failure to conduct long range air and/or sea
reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week
preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence
obtained by Admiral Hewitt.
The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have
secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the
approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service,
traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air
reconnaissance from Oahu.
During the critical period after November 27th, the limitations of the
aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the
only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled
to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant
air and/or sea reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach
bearings, would have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to
detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the
success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.
[22] In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander
in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel
also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and
the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command.
That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is
indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court
that the social relationship between him and General Short was
excellent. The need for Admiral King taking such measures existed from
the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency
as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
13. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to
the Naval Court record concludes that:
"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel
were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the
evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be
the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of
superior judgment may not result in future errors."
The first endorsement of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy states
his conclusion and recommendation that trial by general court martial is
not warranted by the evidence produced.
14. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of
the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate
General thereto and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.
S. Fleet, thereto, and the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt, and on
the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E Kimmel and Admiral Harold B Stark,
particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December, 1941,
failed
Page 383
to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command
commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action
should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to
active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of
superior judgment may be necessary.
[23] (d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully
acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public
disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
obtained in these investigations, should be made to the extent that such
action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the
national security.
15. Accordingly I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any
position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of
superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position
in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior
judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with
the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the
facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these
investigations, will be made to the extent that such action can be taken
without injuring current military operations or the national security.
(Signed) JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
[1] SECRET
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
3 Dec. 1944.
FF1/A17.
Serial: 003489.
SECRET.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board-Comments concerning.
1. The following comments on the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
are submitted.
2. The Army findings as to the basic cause of the surprise are not at
variance with the findings of the Navy Court. In brief, they are that no
one in authority appreciated the danger to which Pearl Harbor was
exposed and consequently the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii were
preoccupied with training activities to the exclusion of adequate
alertness against attack.
3. There was general agreement between the Army Board and the Navy Court
the following particulars as to lack of awareness of danger:
a. It was impossible for United States agents to get information in
Japan while Japanese agents were given free rein in Hawaii and
encountered little difficulty in transmitting intelligence by cable.
b. The information that did reach Washington was not correctly
evaluated, and vital parts of it either never were sent to Hawaii or
else got there too late.
c. Estimates of Japanese intentions were based predominately on what the
Japanese were likely to do, rather than upon what they could do. All
basic plans contain the assumption that hostilities might be opened by
an air attack on Oahu, but this assumption was generally ignored during
the period preceding the attack. Is of interest to note in this
connection that AA batteries of ships in port were ready to open fire
when the Japanese planes came in. This is evidence that Admiral Kimmel
was less blind to the potential danger than was the Army command. [2]
The Army forces had no ammunition at mobile guns and
Page 384
it was a matter of hours before it could be distributed from the
magazines to the anti-aircraft batteries.
d. The Army was in readiness against sabotage. The Navy condition of
readiness, though far from fully effective, was designed to meet air
attack. In this connection, the Army Board (Page 229 of the Record)
observes that there was conflict in the nature of the information sent
to Hawaii, in that Navy Department messages were predominate with
warning of conflict while War Department messages were predominate with
the idea of avoiding conflict and taking precautions against sabotage
and espionage.
e. The Army air warning system was usable, but was being used for
training_not for warning-when the Jap planes came in.
4. The Army Board finds that General Short established cordial relations
with the Navy, but did not accomplish fully the detailed working
relationship necessary for his full information in the performance of
his mission. For example, the Board points out that General Short was
under the impression that distant reconnaissance was being adequately
provided by naval task forces in connection with exercises (he
apparently knew that no such exercises were in progress on 7 December),
that Admiral Kimmel failed to acquaint him with certain messages he
received from the Navy Department (there is conflict of testimony as to
some of these), that General Short hesitated to inquire as to the
details of naval arrangements, and that he was not informed of the fact
that a Japanese submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor in the
early morning of 7 December (the Naval Court explains that Admirals
Kimmel and Bloch withheld report of this attack until the contact could
be verified, in view of many false contacts that had occurred; the air
attack began before verification was obtained). This finding of the Army
Board is in conflict with the Navy finding that relations_official as
well as personal_were not only cordial but adequate. I am inclined to
agree with the Army Board for reasons discussed in the next paragraph.
[3] 5. The Army Board criticizes the command arrangements in Hawaii.
There was no unity of command, and no integrated staff to evaluate
information and to attend to the details of coordinating defense
measures. Certain joint plans had been prepared which were sound in
concept, but defective in that neither Service had the means to carry
them out. Furthermore, for the most part, these plans did not become
effective until an emergency arose, and the emergency came too suddenly
to permit effective implementation. Unity of Command could have been put
into effect (but was not put into effect before the 7th of December) by
the President, or by agreement between the Departments or by local
arrangement. My comment on this is as follows:
a. Coordination by mutual cooperation, which was the system in effect in
Hawaii until after the attack, is a well recognized system of Command.
Personally, I consider it inferior to unity of Command in circumstances
such as existed in Hawaii, but it is a fact that this system has worked
effectively elsewhere during the current war. I think Kimmel and Short
were at fault in not making the system work better than it did.
b. The lack of coordination in Hawaii was not in itself a disease, but a
symptom of the deeper ill_lack of awareness of danger. As stated by the
Army Board, local Commanders were unwilling to put war measures into
effect because they would interfere with training.
6. The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between
the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea
Frontier, the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air
Commander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment "The
Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells
(Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and
responsibility." My comment as to this is that there are some
unavoidable complexities in the Command relation ships between a fleet,
a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. [4] However, in this case,
there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval
forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been
able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The
reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5
above.
7. The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent
upon the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was
doing and for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is
obviously sound. It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General
Short but also the War Department fully acquainted with the estimate of
the Japanese naval situation.
Page 385
There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War
Department information which should have been given to them by the Navy,
but the basic trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the
Japanese Navy could, and did, do.
8. The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further
investigated by the Navy. These are:
a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some
naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a
Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About
1 December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is
noted in the Record that this information never got to General Short.
There is some reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval
Court, but it was not followed up, presumably because the officer who
was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time was not called as a
witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since even if there
actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had nothing
to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of
completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.
b. The Army Board is of the Opinion that Japanese midget submarines
operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th
of December, for the [5] purpose of obtaining information. This opinion
is based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, who apparently reached his conclusions by a study of
certain captured Japanese charts which were made available to F. B. I.
By Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there is no real ground for
the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam around Pearl
Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, it
is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval
investigation.
c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from
naval and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but
no record of what this information was. This should be cleared up.
9. The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault
in that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international
situation and that he delayed in getting critical information to General
Short. In these respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court
findings as to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army Board further
Finds that General Marshall was at fault and that he failed to keep his
Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could act
intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on General
Short's report on 28 November that he had established "Alert No. 1"; and
in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian
Command.
10. The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he
failed to place his Command in an adequate state of readiness (the
information which he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was
sufficient to warn him of tense relations), in that he failed to reach
an agreement with local naval officials for implementing joint Army and
Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in that he failed to inform
himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being
conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient
staff officers.
11. I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify
the opinions expressed in my endorsement on the [6] Record of the Naval
Court of Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral
Kimmel and General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit
discussion of this phase of the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer
of the opinion that cooperation between these two officers was adequate
in all respects. The cordial, but informal, contact which they
maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate the means at their
disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out, this
fault was part and parcel of the general blindness to Japanese
potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the
Pearl Harbor disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and
the Naval Court are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to
our disadvantage, but they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more
than that the two naval officers in the high commands concerned_Admiral
Stark and Admiral Kimmel_failed to display the superior judgment they
should have brought to bear in analyzing and making use of the
information that became available to them.
Page 386
12. I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further
investigation to be made in the matters referred to in paragraph 8
above; namely, the alleged radio contact with a Japanese force in the
Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of Japanese midget submarines
inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the substance of
information obtained by naval and F. B. I. telephone and cable
intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this
purpose. The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or
by an investigating officer, for attachment to the Record of the
original Court of Inquiry.
13. I find no reason to modify the recommendations I made in my
endorsement on the Record of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
/S/ E. J. King
E. J. KING.
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