Fw: [peirce-l] Re: Existence

James Piat piat1 at bellsouth.net
Tue Apr 30 13:19:48 EDT 2002


Dear Ken, Folks  --

Ken,  your comments got me to thinking further and I thought you might be
interested in this post I sent to the Peirce list thread on Existence.
Perhaps our views of this matter are not so far apart.

Best,
Jim

> To be is not merely to exist.  The fullness of being is triadic and
suffused
> with meaning.  To merely exist without meaning is a tale told by an idiot
> full of sound and fury signifiying nothing. But even less than a
meaningless
> existence is that saddest of all modes known as unrealized potential.
> Potential is a form of being that lacks existence in the same way that
> existience is a form of being that lacks meaning.
>
> Peirce did speak of a relation less than monadic  (the zero relation)
which
> one might suppose is mere nothingness or non being.  On the other hand he
> precluded on principle a form of being beyond the triadic as it was his
> contention that the nature of meaning and of the true triad was such that
> all higher relationship were simply elaborations of the triadic pattern.
>
> Qualities or properties do not exist as such.  To exist qualities must be
> actualized as objects. Similarly objects do not have meaning.  To be
> meaningful objects must be represented or interpreted.
>
>
> I think it is important to distinguish betwen identity and equivalence.
> Identity refers to the unique relationship objects have with themselves
such
> that no two objects are identical any more than a single object can be in
> more that one place at the same time.  Identity is a property found only
at
> the dyadic mode of being or existance. On the other hand equivalence is a
> property of triadic relations or meaning.  Objects which are not identical
> at the level of existance (ie different objects as opposed to the same
> object in a different place) can none the less be equivalent (in a sense
> "identical") at the representational level.  That is to say they are
> equivalent for all intents and purposes or for some intent or purpose.
>
>
> In my view the existentialist didn't have it quite right.  Man is not
> defined by the fact that his existence preceeds his essence, but by the
fact
> that neither essence nor existence by itself is meaningful. Meaning is the
> consequence of the triadic joining of essence and existence.  Meaning
> resides in the sign or triad and man is a sign.





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