Team Signal

 

 

 

 

 

July

2004

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

59th Signal Battalion in World War II

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  In a recent letter to the Commander of 59th Signal Battalion, a Ms. Carol R. Trainer wrote us to enquire about possible battles her Dad, Tech Sergeant Norbert A. Rawert, would have participated in as a member of the 59th Signal Battalion in WWII.  The first reminder of the history is the five battle streamers the 59th was awarded for service in WWII:  Normandy 1944; Ardennes-France 1944-1945; Northern France 1944; Rhineland 1944-1945; Central Europe 1945.  But what did our historical band of brothers do during those campaigns?  What battles and what ground did the 59th Signal Battalion Guidon once participate in?

 

  The battalion was constituted on 11 May 1942, activated 28 October 1942 at Camp Crowder, Missouri, and then inactivated 24 Nov 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.  Sometime in late 1943 or early 1944, the 59th Signal Battalion transferred to England to prepare for Operation Overlord.  59th Signal Battalion did not participate in the 6 June 1944 Normandy Landing; but was brought ashore later in the week, and on 15 June 1944 started their combat action with the operational standup of VIII Corps, led by MG Troy H. Middleton. 

 


  As a small support unit, 59th Signal Battalion has not garnered the recognition we might think it deserves.  The history books are more concerned with Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery, but even then, barely going below battalion level, unless it is a small tactical engagement analysis.  I could only find three references to 59th Signal Battalion from here in Alaska.  The first is from "The Signal Corps:  The Outcome", a Center of Military History WWII series book.  On page 125, it refers to 59th Signal Battalion, as a part of VIII Corps during the attack in Brittany, France, being responsible for wire communications to three divisions, an extensive fire direction net, the radio co-ordination for naval bombardment of the city, and the maintenance of radio link contact to two armies, an army group, and a tactical air force.  Our Signal battalion was also responsible for rehabilitating over 7,250 miles of existing open wire and underground cable in four weeks.  Now that would be a job for today's DCO shop!  The second reference I found about 59th Signal Battalion was on the University of Texas webpage, a project to archive information about U.S. Latinos and Latinas & World War II.  A Jose "Joe" Eriberto Adame was assigned to 59th Signal Battalion in the U.S., and then moved over to 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion while in England.  The third and final reference to 59th Signal Battalion was on a webpage dedicated to the 33rd Signal Construction Battalion Reenactors.  One officer and 34 enlisted men (four crews) from Company B were dispatched to VIII Corps on July 14, equipped with two line trucks (K-43), to 2 ½ ton 6x6 trucks, and one ¼ ton truck.  Their mission was to maintain communications between the VIII Corps and First Army, and they joined the VIII Corps in a bivouac area near La Haye do Puits, being attached to Company C, 59th Signal Battalion.  What is especially interesting about this support is it is likely that these Soldiers from 33rd Signal Construction are specifically the reason the 59th Signal Battalion was able to provide the Corps level support described in "The Outcome."


 

 

 

  The remaining documented history of 59th Signal Battalion is likely buried within thick tomes of military orders and deep shelves of dedicated military libraries at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Gordon.  However, as a support unit for VIII Corps, their battles are our battles, as we provided the communication...

 

  I offered to go TDY to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for a few days to do additional research, but MAJ McPherson asked about how this supports Active Directory, so I had to let it slide.  The next best thing to do is describing some of the engagements VIII Corps participated in, and imagine laying wire and raising antennas during it.

 

  The immediate mission of VIII Corps was the organization of defensive positions from Carentan (France) west across the peninsula.  As the beachhead continued to expand, VIII Corps was charged with guarding the security of VII Corps southern flank, as VII Corps prepared to move west and clear the French peninsula through the city of Cherbourg of all German resistance.  On 29 June 1944, VII Corps conquered the city of Cherbourg, but only after the port facilities were completely destroyed by the remaining German troops. 

 

  July 1944 started with plans for a major offensive, starting with VIII Corps.  On 3 July, VIII Corps (Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton) opened the First Army offensive. Three divisions jumped off abreast in a downpour of rain that not only nullified air attacks but prevented artillery observation.  Enemy resistance was heavy, and the 82d Airborne Division scored the only notable advance.  During the next three days, slow progress was made in hard fighting under adverse weather.  The corps struck the enemy's MLR (main line of resistance) along the line le Plessis-Mont-Castre Forest-la Haye-du-Puits, and enemy counterattacks stiffened by armor helped to slow down the VIII Corps.  Though la Haye-du-Puits was nearly surrounded, average gains for the three-day period were under 6,000 yards on the corps front, and, contrary to expectations, the enemy had clearly shown his intentions of defending in place whatever the cost.

 

  The slugging match continued through 11 July in both VII and VIII Corps zones.

 

The hard battles of VIII Corps finally produced their fruits in mid-July.  As the three attacking divisions broke past the rough la Haye-du-Puits-Mont-Castre hills, where they had cracked the enemy's MLR, they found resistance less and less tenacious.  On 14 July, VIII Corps came up to the line of the Ay River; it had reached the initial objectives prescribed in its attack order, a gain of 12,000 yards in 12 days of battle.  But the corps was still far short of its assigned ultimate objectives when orders from First Army stopped the


 

 

 

 

attack at the positions then reached.  Though hard fought, the two Corps, VII and VIII, stopped to solidify their positions and prepare for Operation Cobra.  XIX Corps continued to fight through June 19th, as it battled south to St-Lo, France.

 

  Following the action in July, VIII Corps continued to attack along the west coast of the French peninsula as part of Operation Cobra, launched on 25 July 1944 in order to break the stalemate following the Normandy beachhead.  As the Third Army continued to move East through France towards Belgium and Germany, VIII Corps continued to attack toward Brest, capturing the vital port city on 18 September 1944.  Unfortunately, this left the VIII Corps well behind its higher headquarters, which resulted in VIII Corps being reassigned to the Ninth Army. 

 

  Following the taking of the Brest Peninsula, VIII Corps was moved into a supporting position, covering the southern flank of the Third Army, as they pushed into Belgium through the fall. 

 

  As the winter started, the battle lines were reorganized throughout the Ardennes Forest, and VIII Corps moved into the Northern portion.  The strongest fighting was occurring in the south, still with Third and First Army, so VIII Corps became the place for divisions to reorganize, and new divisions to be placed to get their first experience in combat, as the VIII Corps portion of the western line was relatively sedate compared to the southern portion.

 

  The fighting in the fall was fierce and slow, as the Germans fought for every inch, as the Allies pushed them closer and closer to their homeland.  By 15 December, the Allies had almost completely recovered whole of France and Belgium, through Operation Market Garden.  The setting in December 1944 is represented below.  Both Armies were in static positions, with the rivers separating France and Germany as the main obstacles.

 

  Directly from the CMH book "Battle of the Bulge"; here is what happened on December 16th.

 

  "Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton's VIII Corps on First Army's right flank had no part in the Allied attacks of early December.  Two of Middleton's infantry divisions were weary and casualty-ridden


 

 

 

 

from the intense fighting of the November push to the Roer.  The third was newly arrived from the United States.  The corps mission, then, was to train, rest, re-equip, and observe the enemy.  Nonetheless this was no Blighty, a haven for second-rate troops and bumbling commanders.  The 28th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota) and the 4th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Raymond O. Barton) had distinguished themselves in the bloody battles of the Hurtgen Forest.

 

  The veterans of this fight were well equipped to train and hearten the replacements for some 9,000 battle casualties the two divisions had sustained.  General Middleton himself had a fine combat record reaching from World War I through Sicily, Normandy, and Brittany.  Deliberate and calm but tenacious, he was regarded by Bradley and Patton as one of the best tacticians in the U.S. Army.

 

  As the result of the relief of the 83d Infantry Division, en route to the VII Corps, the deployment of the VIII Corps (as it would meet the German attack) took final form on the 13th.  The 4th Infantry Division abutted on the Third Army at the Luxembourg-French frontier and followed the Moselle and Sauer Rivers, marking the German border, as far north as Bollendorf.  A combat command of the 9th Armored Division, as yet inexperienced, had taken over a narrow sector to the left of the 4th on 10 December.  The second combat command of this division, earlier comprising the corps reserve, was assigned to V Corps and started its march north on 13 December.  The veteran 28th Infantry Division held the corps center, fronting on the Our River.  The newly arrived and green 106th Infantry Division had completed the relief of the 2d Infantry Division in the Schnee Eifel sector on 12 December.  Here the German West Wall turned northeastward following the Schnee Eifel crest.  In the Losheim Gap, at the northern terminus of the Schnee Eifel, a light task force of the 14th Cavalry Group maintained a screening position between the 106th and 99th Infantry Divisions.  It should be noted that this was the seam between the VIII and V Corps.

 

  Although the VIII Corps forward area possessed many terrain features favoring the defender, notably the Schnee Eifel on the left wing and the river sequence fronting the corps center and right, there were numerous points of entry for an attack moving east to west. The three infantry divisions under Middleton's command were responsible for a front of about eighty-five miles, a distance approximately three times that normally assigned an equivalent defending


 

 

 

 

force by U.S. service school teaching and tactical doctrine. On the morning of 16 December the total assigned strength of the VIII Corps was 68,822 officers and men. Immediately after the Battle of the Bulge, the tag "a calculated risk" would be applied to the attenuated VIII Corps front as it existed on 16 December. Middleton was well aware of the risk--indeed he had made this clear in discussions with his superiors. Somewhat after the event General Eisenhower wrote General of the Army George C. Marshall (on 10 January 1945) that in early November he and Bradley had discussed the possibility of a German counteroffensive in the Ardennes but had agreed that such a move would be unprofitable to the enemy. The line of reasoning, as set before Marshall, was this: the "Volkssturm" would be no good in offensive operations, winter in the Ardennes would render continuous logistic support impossible, and Allied strength was so great that the Germans could not push far enough to reach really vital objectives."

 

  Without going in to depth about the Battle of the Bulge, the VIII Corps took the heaviest brunt of the Germany counterattack, having to dislodge their headquarters from Bastogne, leaving the city to 101st Airborne Division, which led to their historical defense, and famous line by Gen McAuliffe in regards to the German demand of surrender "Nuts!"  The Third Army, which absorbed the remnants of VIII Corps, pushed back into Bastogne, and relieved 101st Airborne.  By January 18th, the German counterattack was defeated, and the battle lines were restored.  The Battle of the Bulge was Germany's last serious attack, and 4 months later, once the Allies and Russian Armies met in Saxony, Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945.

 

  While a majority of this information is about VIII Corps, a non-divisional support unit like 59th Signal Battalion would have been spread throughout the battlefield.  When GEN Middleton moved his headquarters from Bastogne to Neufchateau on 18 December, it is likely that the 59th moved also. 

 

Works Cited:

Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle Of The Bulge.  Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1965 <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_cont.htm>

Trejo, Frank.  U.S. Latino & Latina World War II Oral History Project.  8 July 2004 <http://www.utexas.edu/projects/latinoarchives/index.html>

Phillips, Ed. 33rd Signal Construction Battalion Reenactors.   8 July 2004 <http://members.tripod.com/33rdscb/>

Harris, Dixie H., and Thompson, G.R. The Signal Corps: The Outcome.  Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1966.


Voice of the Arctic, a monthly publication of the 59th Signal Battalion, Fort Richardson, Alaska, is published for members of the 59th Signal Battalion.  Contents of Voice of the Arctic are not necessarily the official views of, or endorsed by, the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or U.S. Army Alaska.

For information on submitting story ideas, articles, or announcements, call 59th Signal S1 (907) 384-0103 or submit in writing to email address 59s1oic@richardson.army.mil.  This publication is produced by CPT Earl Zortman, 59th Signal Battalion, S1.