Reflections on the late war – Views of Jeswunt Rao Holkar – Negotiations – Lord Lake advances against Holkar, preceded by a detachment under Col Monson – Holkar retires across the Chumbul – Tonk-Rampoorah taken – Umeer Khan cuts of part of a detachment in Bundelcund – Lord Lake reinforces Monson and cantons the main army for the rains – Monson advances – escalades Hinglaisgurh – Holkar crosses the Chumbul – Monson hesitates – Holkar attacks him – Monson retreats bravery – privations – distresses – disasters – and discomfiture of his detachment – Holkar invades Hindoostan – Muttra evacuated – is repulsed at Delhi – Defence of Col Burn at Shamlee – Holkar carries his depredations into the Dooab – is pursued by Lord Lake – battle of Deeg – surprise at Furruckabad – storm of Deeg – Holkar’s possessions in the Deccan reduced – Indore evacuated – Lord Lake determines on besieging Bhurtpoor – Raja’s resolve,
The rapidity of the conquests, and the speedy termination of the war surprised all India, and it was naturally supposed, that the astonishing success of the British arms, would have deterred any power, however inimically disposed, from evincing a spirit of hostility at such a moment; but the conduct of Asiatics is frequently so capricious that it cannot be foreseen by any reasonable estimate of their real interests.
Family rivalry, next to disputes concerning hereditary rights, are always uppermost in the mind of a Mahratta. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, notwithstanding
the great sacrifices made by Sindia to induce him to join the confederacy, could not believe that his rival would forget the defeat and disgrace he had so lately suffered; and he concluded, that in the event of success against the British power, that Sindia’s first object, after re-establishing his influence at Poona, would be a war of extermination against himself. On the other hand, if the tide should turn against the confederates, he imagined, after the power of Sindia had been reduced to the level of his own, he might not only interpose with safety, but attain a consequence, so much the greater, as it would be manifest, in the event of ultimate success, that it had mainly depended on his exertions. Like all the Holkar family, he was a great advocate for the predatory system of warfare; and conceived that it would have been better for the confederates, if they had carefully reserved their infantry and guns, under the protection of forts, avoided an action, devastated the Company’s provinces, and acted with vigour upon General Wellesley’s supplies.
Holkar, during the progress of hostilities, remained in Malwa, levying enormous contributions115 from friend and foe, and could scarcely credit the accounts he received of the rapid victories of the English. When too late, he began to carry his designs into execution, and moved up towards the Jeypoor territory, for the purpose of negotiating for aid from the Rajpoots, the Raja of Bhurtpoor,
the Rohillas, and the Seiks. He likewise despatched an envoy to Sindia, recommending him to break the treaty, and renew the war; but that chieftain was, or pretended to be at the moment, so exasperated against him, that he immediately communicated the fact to the British authority. Some of his ministers, especially his father-in-law Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, had more confidence in Holkar, and advised Sindia, notwithstanding the communication to the British resident, to despatch a wukeel to the camp of Jeswunt Rao for the purpose, as they gave out, of ascertaining his designs; but in reality to leave open the door of reconciliation, in case the project of Holkar, in whose wisdom and fortune all the Mahrattas began to have great confidence, should prove worthy of regard.
The principal part of the British armies in the Deccan, after the termination of hostilities, retired to the southward, and two considerable divisions were stationed, the one at Jaffeirabad, to ensure the tranquillity of the country and its occupation by the Nizam, and the other at Poona, with the Peishwa, whose territory was a good deal molested by plundering insurgents and freebooters, which is usually the case in India after the close of a war.
The army in Hindoostan under General Lake was still in the field to watch the motions of Holkar, whose menacing position, as well as the tone of his language, the general report of his hostile intentions, and his having put to death three officers, British subjects, who wished, in consequence of these reports; to take advantage of the governor-general’s
proclamation and retire from his service, afforded strong indications of an approaching rupture. Superadded to these, were the machinations already mentioned, which were ascertained from his intercepted correspondence; but it was scarcely credible that he could intend risking a war; and General Lake believed, to the last, that affairs with Holkar would be amicably adjusted. In Holkar’s letters to General Lake, as is frequently the case, when insolence is designed on the part of a Mahratta, it is difficult to discover whether friendly profession, arrogance, or humility, predominate. In his first letter, professing that he had no intention of saying anything improper, he requested General Lake to retire towards Agra, “as his near approach to his victorious army appeared likely to produce unpleasant circumstances.” In his next, he declares, that from him the general shall never have any other language than that of friendship; “but if anything contrary to friendship shall appear from you, then I am helpless.” At length it became absolutely necessary to ascertain the designs of Holkar, and the governor-general directed General Lake to intimate to him the necessity of withdrawing his troops from the frontier of the allies of the British government. Whatever claims might be urged by the Holkar family against the Rajpoots, and others, such claims, he was told, could not be considered to rest in him; but the British government was willing, with the consent of the Peishwa, to arbitrate the existing difference between him and his brother Khassee Rao, on principles of equity and justice: Jeswunt Rao was also invited
to send wukeels to the British camp. To these proposals Holkar replied by promising to withdraw his troops; and in the middle of March sent wukeels to General Lake’s camp at Ramgurh. These persons produced a letter from Holkar, in which, after-many friendly professions, he recommends the general to consent to the propositions they would offer, I otherwise, “his country and his property were on the saddle of his horse, to whatever side the reins of his brave warriors should be turned, the whole of the country in that direction should come into his possession.”
The wukeels submitted the following propositions: 1st. “That Holkar should be permitted to collect Chouth, agreeably to the custom of his ancestors. 2d. That the ancient possessions formerly held by the family, such as Etaweh, &c; twelve districts between the Ganges and Jumna, and a district in Bundelcund should be ceded to him. 3d. That the country of Hurriana, which was formerly in the possession of the family, should be given to him. 4th. That the country then in his possession should be guaranteed, and a treaty should be concluded with him on the same terms as that with Sindia.” These demands were altogether extravagant, and were treated as such by General Lake. Most of these countries, mentioned in the second and third propositions, had been conquered from Sindia; Etaweh had not been in the possession of the Mahrattas since their garrisons were driven out by Shujah-ud-Doulah, after the recal of the Peishwa’s general, Visajee Kishen, in 1773, and had been ceded in 1801, by the nabob of Oude, to the East
India Company. The wukeels proceeded, in a high strain of menace, to exaggerate the power of Holkar, and the value of the connections, hostile to the British government, which he had formed. General Lake replied, “that it was not customary with the English to boast of their power, but that Holkar would find, in the event of a rupture, that he had much overvalued his own.” General Lake also took occasion to mention to the wukeels, that their propositions and their language were so much at variance with the tenor of Holkar’s letters, that no judgment could be formed of his real wishes and intentions. On the ensuing day the wukeels attended to receive a reply to the letter they had brought from Holkar, when they solicited a grant of some country, or an annual sum in lieu of an increase of country, and asked whether or not Holkar was to be allowed to collect the customary tribute from the states of Oudepoor and Kotah. To all which General Lake merely replied, that Holkar must first evince his friendly intentions by returning into his own country, before the British government could be enabled to enter upon a discussion of any claims.
Five or six weeks before the despatch of these wukeels to General Lake, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had addressed a letter to General Wellesley, in which he demanded from him certain districts claimed by his family in the Deccan, as the condition of peace, and concluded in a strain of the most vaunting menace, in case, by non-compliance; it should be rendered necessary to resort to war.
In the beginning of April Holkar repaired, on pretence of devotion, to Ajimere, belonging to Sindia, where he levied contributions, and made an unsuccessful attempt to possess himself of the fort but he justified these acts to Sindia’s wukeel as necessary to enable him to prosecute a war, involving the independence of the Mahrattas. A great portion of his army remained on the frontier of the Jeypoor territory, where they commenced plundering.
In the meanwhile the governor-general having been made acquainted with Holkar’s demands, and apprehending many evils from continuing to temporize, issued orders to General Lake and General Wellesley to attack Holkar’s troops and possessions in every direction, declaring at the same time, that it was not his intention to retain Holkar’s territories for the British government, but to divide them amongst its allies.
General Wellesley was at this period at Bombay, and, in consequence of a famine in the Deccan, from a deficiency of rain, superadded to the devastations occasioned by the moving armies and plundering bands, by which that country had been for years infested, it was apprehended that it would be impracticable to act against Holkar’s possessions in that quarter, until the fall of the rains; but General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray to assail them from Guzerat, and to advance upon his capital in Malwa. Sindia, who was informed of these particulars, professed his readiness to act in cordial co-operation for the reduction of Jeswunt Rao.
On the 18th April General Lake sent forward a detachment of three native battalions, under Colonel Monson to Jeypoor, on which Holkar began to retire rapidly to the southward.
Parties of irregular horse, under European officers, followed his march to watch his motions and harass his troops. Holkar having halted for two days, General Lake advanced upon him preceded by Lieutenant-Colonel Monson’s detachment, but Holkar renewed his flight and continued his route until he had gained his own frontier, and crossed the Chumbul. During his retreat he made an attempt to renew the negotiation which was declared inadmissible. He was followed by the irregular horse and Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, covered by General Lake’s army, from which a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Don gallantly stormed and took the fort of Tonk-Rampoorah on May 16, by blowing open the gate.
The news of this first success in the war against Holkar, was shortly afterwards followed by intelligence of a different description from the province of Bundelcund, where the refractory chiefs in that strong country occupied the troops for a considerable period, after its transfer to the British Government. Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, the officer in command, had detached seven companies of Sepoys, with some artillery, for the purpose of reducing a small fort. Whilst operations against it were in progress, the Killidar sent out an offer to surrender on the ensuing morning on condition
that the firing should cease. The proposal being accepted, the Killidar apprized Holkar’s General Umeer Khan of the circumstances, and invited him to send a detachment, and fall by surprise on the British troops. In this scheme they were partially successful; the horse approached the battery before they were discovered, and two companies of Sepoys with fifty artillery men, their officers and guns were completely cut off. The remaining five companies, under Captain Smith, supported by their only remaining gun, effected their retreat to the head-quarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett. Umeer Khan, encouraged by this success, made an attack on Kalpee and at tempted to pass the Jumna, for the purpose of plundering the Dooab, but he was checked by two companies of Sepoys stationed on the bank, and was shortly afterwards attacked and routed by a party of horse, and a battalion of infantry which had been received into the British pay from the service of Ambajee Inglia. Umeer Khan, however, continued to act for some time on the side of Bundelcund, where the numerous refractory Zumeendars facilitated the means of predatory warfare.
In the mean time, as the rains approached, and the troops in Guzerat, in concert with those of Sindia, were supposed best capable of acting with advantage against Holkar’s possessions, during that season, General Lake, after the capture of Tonk-Rampoorah, returned with the main army into cantonment, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Monson to keep Holkar in check, with five battalions
of Sepoys, and about three thousand irregular horse; the latter divided into two bodies, the one under Bappoojee Sindia, in the service of Doulut Rao, and the other under Lieutenant Lucan. After the return of General Lake, Monson, intending to co-operate with Colonel Murray from Guzerat, entered Holkar’s territory by the Mokundra pass and a detachment from his division took the hill fort of Hinglaisgurh by escalade. Without efficient means of supply, he continued his route towards the Chumbul, until the 7th July, when he received information that Holkar was crossing that river to attack him, with the whole of his army, including his infantry and guns. Monson, who shortly after his appointment to his present command was nominated to the temporary rank of brigadier-general, by the British commander-in-chief, at first advanced with the intention of meeting the enemy, and of taking advantage of their probable confusion in crossing the river. But staggered by a report that Colonel Murray intended to fall back on Guzerat, he began to reflect, that he had only two days grain for the supply of his camp, and that several detachments might be expected to join him; he therefore determined to retire to the Mokundra pass. A prompt and spirited attack on Mahrattas has always succeeded: indecision on the part of their enemy encourages them to fight when they would otherwise only think of escape, and a prolonged retreat before them, except in the single instance of the British detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Camac, has invariably ended in disaster.
Having adopted the unfortunate alternative we
have mentioned, Brigadier-general Monson, on the 8th July, began his retreat, by sending off his baggage and stores at four o’clock in the morning. No enemy having appeared, the line of infantry followed at nine, and the irregular horse were left on the ground, with orders to follow in half an hour, and to send the earliest intelligence of Holkar’s motions. The division had retired about six kos, when intelligence was brought that the irregular horse had been attacked and defeated, and that Lieutenant Lucan116 was taken prisoner.
This information, it may be here observed, was brought by Doulut Rao’s officer, Bappoojee Sindia, who in a few days afterwards deserted to Holkar. On the ensuing morning, however, Monson took post in front of the Mokundra pass.
On the 10th, the Mahratta cavalry appeared, and next morning, their numbers having greatly increased, Holkar sent a letter requiring the surrender of the arms of the British detachment.
The demand was of course rejected; when Holkar, dividing his cavalry into three bodies, attacked the division in front and flanks, but after various unsuccessful attempts, he withdrew his troops in the evening, and encamped at the distance of two kos, where, being joined by his
infantry and guns, he intended, as was supposed, to renew the attack on the following morning. Monson not deeming his post tenable, and being apprehensive of having his retreat cut off, quitted his position, and in two marches, though harassed by the enemy and exposed to very heavy rain, reached Kotah on July 12. The Raj-Rana of Kotah, when the British troops appeared as fugitives, would neither admit them into the town nor supply them with food117; Brigadier General Monson was therefore obliged to continue his route towards the Gaumuch ford on the Chumbul. Although its distance from Kotah was only seven miles, the obstructions occasioned by the incessant rain, and the deep nature of the soil, prevented his reaching the expected ford until next morning, July 13, when it was found impassable until the ensuing day. On the 14th Monson was obliged to halt to enable the troops to procure some grain: heavy rain continued throughout the night. On the 15th he resumed his march, but the guns sank so deep in the mud, that they could not be extricated. The grain in the adjoining villages was exhausted, – retreat was now necessary to procure subsistence / the ammunition was therefore destroyed, and
the guns were spiked and abandoned; but they were recommended to the care of the Raja of Boondee, who, although he could not save the guns, had the courage to maintain his engagements with the English, in the face of the host of Holkar.
On the 17th the troops reached the Chumbelee rivulet which was not fordable, but Monson, on the ensuing day, sent his artillery men across on elephants, with orders to proceed to the fort of Rampoorah. Nearly ten days elapsed before the whole of the troops, some on elephants, some on rafts, and some by being sent to a ford farther down, could cross this rivulet, so greatly was it swollen. During that time they sustained much privation; in different situations, they repulsed several persevering attacks which were made upon them by Holkar’s cavalry, and a detachment of flank companies under Captain O’Donell beat up the camp of a large body of the enemy, on the evening of the 21st July, with great spirit and success.
Many of the men were drowned in crossing the Chumbelee; but the most trying to the poor Sepoys of all that they endured, was the loss of many of their wives and children, who being in some instances necessarily left on the opposite bank till the last, were, in this helpless and unprotected state, in view and within hearing of their husbands, barbarously massacred by Bheels, from the neighbouring hills, who were in the interests of Holkar.
By the 29th July the whole of the corps of the division reached Rampoorah, and here Brigadier
General Monson was joined by two battalions of Sepoys with four field pieces, two howitzers, and a body of irregular horse, bringing with them a supply of grain. This reinforcement had been ordered forward by General Lake as soon as he was apprised of the situation of the detachment at the Mokundra pass; but Brigadier General Monson, not judging his supplies sufficient, after a long and apparently unnecessary halt, determined to continue his retreat to Kooshalgurh, where he expected to find supplies and to be joined by six of Sindia’s battalions with twenty-one guns, under Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur, the officer defeated by Holkar at Poona, in October 1802. After throwing a strong garrison with his field-pieces into Rampoorah, the division, consisting of five battalions and six companies of Bengal Sepoys118, with two howitzers, on the morning of the 22d August, reached the Bunass, which was so much swollen as to be scarcely fordable for the largest elephants. Three boats were found with which the treasure of the detachment, protected by the six companies of the 21st Regiment under Captain Nicholl, were sent across on August 23d, and forwarded to Kooshalgurh. On the 23d August Holkar’s cavalry again made their appearance in force, and on the 24th the river being fordable, Brigadier General Monson began to send over his baggage, and one battalion. Holkar, at the same time, took possession of a village on Monson’s right, but was
promptly dislodged from it. The rivet having decreased considerably, the Mahrattas were enabled to pass it to the right and left, and most of Monson’s baggage having got across, his main body, consisting of three battalions with one of the howitzers, followed. Major James Sinclair was left with one battalion, the 2d battalion 2d regiment, and the picquets of the four corps which had crossed, to protect the passage of the remaining baggage and camp followers. At 4 P. M., however, Holkar’s infantry and guns came up, and opened a heavy cannonade. Major Sinclair desperately charged the guns with the small party that remained, took several of them, and for a moment was victorious; but the enemy, rallied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar in person, charged in turn with overpowering numbers, and the gallant handful of Sepoys was nearly annihilated. Of the brave European officers who led them on, twelve fell with their commander, and the wreck of the party escaped under cover of the fire of their comrades, who lined the opposite bank. The Mahrattas, as usual in success, were now active and energetic; they prosecuted the advantage which they had obtained, and compelled Monson to abandon his baggage, which, with their usual avidity, they seized as trophies of a decisive victory.
But the British detachment could yet show they were far from being subdued; every attack was repulsed, and Colonel Monson reached Kooshalgurh on the night of the 25th August. Here a most unexpected state of affairs presented itself; – instead of finding an
ally in Sewdasheo Bhow, that officer had attacked Captain Nichol], who had, with much judgment and spirit, maintained his post, and protected Kooshalgurh, a town belonging to the Raja of Jeypoor. On the 26th August, the Mahratta cavalry encamped in separate bodies, surrounding the British detachment; and two companies of Sepoys, belonging to the 1st battalion 14th regiment, with a large proportion of the irregular horse, seduced by Holkar, deserted. Of the cause of this partial disaffection, there is no account afforded, but for the treachery of the few, the general fidelity and steadiness of the detachment, most amply made amends119. Unfortunately, Brigadier General Monson did not know the Sepoys, they had no confidence in him, nor he in them. At seven o’clock, on the evening of the 26th August, having previously spiked his remaining howitzer, the other having been taken by the enemy on the bank of the Bunass, Brigadier General Monson moved out of Kooshalgurh, and prosecuted his retreat towards Agra, in an oblong square. During that night, and the ensuing day, the Mahratta horse, supported by guns, repeatedly attempted to penetrate, but could make no impression.
On the night of the 27th, under the protection of the ruined fort of Hindoun, Monson halted a few hours to refresh his weary men, but one hour
after midnight, his retreat was resumed. As soon as he had cleared the ravines near Hindoun, the horse, in three different bodies, made a desperate charge; but the Sepoys, reserving their fire until they were almost within reach of their bayonets, then gave it with such signal effect, that the enemy retired in every direction. The troops almost exhausted with fatigue and hunger, reached the Biana pass about sunset; here Brigadier General Monson intended to halt during the night; but the ardent and persevering enemy, once more brought up their guns, and opened so heavy and severe a fire on the exhausted troops, as to oblige them to go on as they best could. But weary, and harassed beyond endurance, the baggage having become entangled with the line of march, and the night being excessively dark, no order could be restored, and the whole were thrown into inextricable confusion. In this state, the troops fairly broke, and fled towards Agra.
The enemy, though they attacked in straggling parties, fortunately were not in sufficient force to reap the full advantage they might have done, and by the 31st August, the greater part of the fugitives, who escaped the enemy, found an asylum at Agra.
Holkar, at the head of sixty thousand horse120, fifteen thousand infantry and artillery, with 192 guns, advanced triumphantly to Muttra, which, at
his approach, was abandoned by the British troops; and parties of the Mahratta horse pushed across the Jumna. But General Lake, with his accustomed energy, had already taken measures for repairing these disasters. The Mahrattas who crossed the Jumna, were driven back, troops were ordered on to Agra with all expedition, and the British army, in the course of a month, again advanced on the Mahrattas. In a few days, the Mahratta horse began, in their usual manner, to show themselves in small parties, gradually encreasing in numbers, flying before the British cavalry when sent to pursue them, evading every attempt to bring them to action, turning as their pursuers turned, firing their matchlocks, and brandishing their spears; whilst others, stole in upon the flanks and rear, where they at first cut off stragglers and baggage with considerable success. The cruelties committed by Holkar, on all who fell into his hands, were barbarous in the extreme.
It is probable, that General Lake, instead of making fruitless attempts from a standing camp to bring Holkar’s cavalry to action, would have pushed at his infantry and guns, but he seems to have remained at Muttra for the purpose of collecting supplies, which afforded Holkar an opportunity of attempting an important enterprise, being no less than that of endeavouring to possess himself of the emperor’s person. The plan was well conceived, but it was completely frustrated by the precaution and gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony, the resident at Delhi, assisted by Lieutenant-1 Colonel Burn the commandant. The whole of the
enemy’s infantry and-artillery attacked Delhi on October 8th, and continued the siege until the 14th, during which, though deserted by a party of irregulars attached to the garrison, a small body of British Sepoys, ably commanded121, made a successful sortie, repelled an assault, and, under incessant fatigue, defended a city ten miles in circumference.
General Lake, on hearing of this attack, marched to the relief of the capital, and arrived there on the 18th October; but it was Holkar’s plan to keep his infantry out of reach, and, they were already five days on their march towards the territory of his ally the Raja of Bhurtpoor; who, in favour of his old friends the Mahrattas, particularly the family of Holkar, had seceded from his engagements with the English, notwithstanding the great advantage which he derived from their alliance. Holkar’s cavalry, except a few thousands who accompanied the march of his infantry, continued to hover round Delhi for some days; but on the 29th of October suddenly crossed the Jumna below Panniput, for the purpose of cutting off a detachment
under Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, who, after being called in for the defence of Delhi, was on his return to his station at Sehraunpoor, with one battalion of Sepoys and some matchlockmen, when he was overtaken by Holkar at Shamlee. He formed his camp into a square which, towards evening, the enemy surrounded; but drew off in the night to the high road leading to Sehraunpoor, which enabled Colonel Burn to throw his party into a small gurhee near the town, where he resolved to defend himself if he could procure supplies, and if not, to fight his way back to Delhi. In consequence of the hostility evinced towards him by the inhabitants of Shamlee, who joined Holkar in attacking him, he had determined to adopt the latter alternative, when he heard that General Lake with three regiments of dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry, the horse artillery, and a brigade of infantry, under Colonel Don, was marching to his relief. General Lake arrived at Shamlee 3d November; Holkar retired on his approach, and now prepared to execute his long meditated threat, of wasting the Company’s provinces with fire and sword. To leave him no time for the purpose was now the object of the British general; and on the 5th November the pursuit of Holkar commenced; his route lay in a southerly direction, straight down the Dooab, in which he pillaged and burned the defenceless villages as he passed along.
The British infantry, excepting the Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Don, was sent with two regiments of cavalry by General Lake, when he
crossed the Jumna, to follow Holkar’s infantry and guns, which had taken post near Deeg, a fort belonging to the Raja of Bhurtpoor.
Major-General Frazer, who commanded, arrived in the neighbourhood of Deeg on the 12th November. Holkar’s infantry was encamped behind an extensive morass and a deep tank; with their left on a fortified village, and their right on the fort of Deeg supported by ranges of batteries, which they deemed impregnable.
On the morning of the 13th the British troops, in two lines, moved on to the attack; the gallant 76th first carried the fortified village with their bayonets, and finding a range of guns immediately under it, charged on through a tremendous fire of round, grape, and chain shot: the 1st Bengal European regiment rushed on to support the 76th, followed by the Sepoys. Holkar’s infantry abandoned the first range of guns, and retired to the next; but this was as instantly charged by General Frazer, who fell mortally wounded in the operation, deeply regretted by his troops. The command devolved on Colonel Monson, under whom the victory was completed; the enemy being compelled to abandon battery after battery, until they were forced into the fort of Deeg, the garrison of which immediately fired upon the British troops. During the battle the Mahratta horse retook the first range, and for a short time turned the guns on the rear of the British line, but they were again retaken by twenty-eight men of the 76th regiment, headed by Captain Norford, who lost his life in the performance of this remarkable exploit. The loss.
of the British was severe; no less than six hundred and forty-three were killed and wounded, and of these twenty-two were European officers.. The loss of the enemy was estimated at about two thousand. Eighty-seven pieces of ordnance were taken, and among them Colonel Monson had the satisfaction, of finding fourteen of those lost during his retreat.
Four days after the victory at Deeg, on the morning of the 17th November, General Lake, after a most persevering pursuit, came up with Holkar’s cavalry at Furruckabad, and falling upon them by surprise, put three thousand of them to the sword. General Lake from the 31st October estimated, that he had marched at the rate of twenty-three miles daily, and that during the night and day preceding the attack, including the space gone, over in the pursuit, his cavalry went upwards of seventy miles in less than twenty-four hours.
The explosion of a tumbril, as the British, troops approached the Mahratta camp, gave the alarm to Holkar, and, on the first discharge from the gallopers, Jeswunt Rao fled with such of his followers as were ready on the instant, taking the, direction of Deeg to join the remains of his army, of whose defeat he received intelligence the night before he was surprised. General Lake continuing the pursuit, arrived at Deeg on the first December, when the siege of that fortress having, been determined upon, the battering train was brought from Agra, and the trenches opened on the thirteenth. In ten days a breach was made in an outwork, strongly fortified, at one of the angles
of the city, which was stormed and taken at midnight, with the loss of 227 men killed and wounded.
On the ensuing day and night the town and citadel of Deeg were evacuated, the garrison, including the remains of Holkar’s infantry, betaking themselves to Bhurtpoor.
The capture of Deeg, involving the loss or the greater part of the territory of the Raja of Bhurtpoor, was a severe blow to Holkar. His territory in the Deccan was already reduced by the capture of all his forts, including Chandore and Galna, which after a slight resistance, surrendered to a division under Colonel Wallace by the end of October. His principal forts in Malwa were also occupied by British troops, and in the month of August, Indore, his capital, had been taken possession of without resistance by the detachment of the Bombay army from Guzerat. That division had been ordered to advance into Hindoostan for the purpose of endeavouring to intercept Holkar in his expected flight to Malwa, and it had reached Kotah by the end, of December. The reduction of Bhurtpoor, however, was deemed necessary in order to cut off Holkar’s only asylum, after which he might, it was supposed, be followed up as a fugitive, and either taken prisoner or rendered insignificant.
But the fortunes of Jeswunt Rao, though in a few weeks they had Undergone a signal reverse, were not yet destined to close. The situation of his ally the Raja of Bhurtpoor was still more desperate than his own, for as a Mahratta freebooter
“he had still his country and his property on the saddle of his horse,” but the Jhat Raja, as he himself declared from the first, “must stand or fall with his fort122.”
115. Sir John Malcolm mentions his having exacted a krore of rupees from the city of Mundissore alone.
116. Lieut. Lucan’s fate was never positively known. He was supposed to have been poisoned, but this I have heard contradicted on tolerably good native authority, which stated that he died of a bowel complaint. The authority alluded to was Mohummud Khan Bungush, one of Holkar’s officers, taken in rebellion by Colonel Wallace, in 1808.
117. Monson’s narrative as published by government. The Raj Rana, Zalim Sing, afterwards denied his having refused them food, and said he had offered them an asylum outside the walls; but allowing this last to have been true, Colonel Monson, by accepting such an equivocal support, might have exposed his detachment to certain destruction between two fires. It is however certain, that Zalim Sing was fined ten lacks of rupees by Holkar, whilst the latter lay in the neighbourhood of Kotah.
118. 2-2d, 1-9th, 1-14th, both battalions of the 12th, and six companies of the 21st Bengal Native infantry.
119. During the most harassing days, many of the old Sepoys and Native officers, were often heard encouraging the younger European officers, when sinking under their fatigues, telling them “to cheer up, for that they would carry them safely to Agra.”
120. So stated by Sir John Malcolm, who, in regard to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, is our best authority. To account for this vast body, it must be recollected, that he was recruited by the wreck of the armies of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay; and a part, no doubt, were Pindharees.
121. In regard to Sepoys, it cannot be too well understood, that much depends on their European officers; no officers in the British service can be placed in situations where more address, suavity, and firmness, are necessary; consequently, none are more deserving of consideration from their country; but officers must also remember that it is generally their own fault when confidence is not mutual. To encourage the Sepoys on this occasion, Colonel Ochterlony served out sweetmeats, and promised them half a month’s pay, as soon as the enemy was repulsed. He knew them.
122. The above chapter, where the authority is not expressly mentioned, is from English Records. Major Thorn’s memoir and Oral information.
This collection transcribed by Chris Gage