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CHAPTER 4

THE NORTH ATLANTIC ROUTE

In one sense the North Atlantic route had its beginning as a major dependence of the U.S. armed forces with the BOLERO movement—the flight delivery to the United Kingdom between June 1942 and January 1943 of some 366 heavy bombers, 150 medium bombers, 183 P-38 fighters, and the same number of transport aircraft.1 Except for a relatively small number of replacement aircraft delivered by ATC crews late in 1942, the planes were flown by their own combat crews, the men who were destined to fly them later in combat over Europe or in Africa.23 which carried the highest hopes of the AAF. But the pilots had, except in rare instances, no experience to equip them for a transatlantic flight. They depended upon transient facilities on northern bases that were unequal to the demand and upon weather forecasts in an area where weather constituted under the best circumstances a major hazard to flying, which depended in turn upon the reports of half-trained radio operators scarcely able to translate the dots and dashes they laboriously received.4 Only the exigencies of war could have justified the risks assumed by the AAF.* The development of a North Atlantic ferrying route had been undertaken first by Britain and Canada in 1940. After passage of the

By all existing standards, their passage across the North Atlantic represented a tremendous achievement, one for which any one of the pilots very recently could have anticipated a parade up Broadway and a complimentary speech by the mayor of New York City.Feverish preparations had been made for the movement,


* The story of this movement has been told in Vol. I, 630-45. In addition to the 882 aircraft which reached their destination in Britain, there were 38 planes which had been wrecked or otherwise "lost" en route.

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Lend-Lease Act early in 1941, the United States assumed an active part in the joint effort to take full advantage of the "steppingstones" provided by Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland and so to make possible the ferrying of short-range fighters from North America to Great Britain. As an alternate to the previously developed base at Gander Lake in southern Newfoundland, the Canadian government in September 1941 began the development of Goose Bay in Labrador. During the preceding July the United States had sent engineers to Narsarssuak in Greenland for the building of the air base that came to be known as BLUIE WEST 1 (BW-1), and in the following September work began on BW-8, a much more northerly base on the western coast of Greenland. United States forces had taken over the defense of Iceland in July 1941, where they improved airstrips previously occupied by the RAF and began in the spring of 1942 to build two new air bases (Meeks and Patterson) near Keflavik.* The eastern terminal lay at Prestwick in Scotland. When the Eighth Air Force began its movement in the summer of 1942, work was still in progress all along the route.

At that time it was hoped that some of the disadvantages of the existing route might be overcome by developing a more northerly airway extending from Great Falls, Montana, across Canada to Hudson Bay and thence by way of Baffin Island to BLUIE WEST 8 in Greenland. By thus following the great circle course, long one of the goals of airmen, the distance from southern California, where much of the U.S. aircraft industry was concentrated, to Iceland might be cut by almost 600 miles. It was expected that more favorable flying weather would be found, that valuable experience with Arctic conditions of flight would be acquired, and that the experiment might lead to the development of a shorter airway into Russia.5

Preliminary surveys had been made in 1941, when weather stations were also established at Fort Chimo in Quebec (CRYSTAL I), on Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL II), and on Padloping Island (CRYSTAL III). In consequence of a directive issued by the Chief of Staff on 24 May 1942 construction of landing strips and other necessary facilities was begun in the following summer at The Pas and Churchill in Manitoba, at Southampton Island, and at CRYSTAL I and CRYSTAL II. CRYSTAL I did not lie on the line of the proposed CRIMSON route, but it was expected that the field there would make


* See Vol. I, 342-49.

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possible a useful alternate route between Goose Bay and Greenland. The program received a severe setback on 27 August when an enemy submarine operating off the Labrador coast sank a ship carrying some 6,000 tons of cargo, including vital construction equipment intended for use at CRYSTAL I, CRYSTAL II, and Southampton Island. A more predictable limitation upon the project resulted from the early onset of extremely cold weather.6

The winter of 1942-43 presented major problems all along the North Atlantic route. An accident rate of 2.9 per cent in September rose to 5.8 per cent in October, and it continued to climb. On 22 November ATC suspended the transportation of passengers across the North Atlantic for the duration of the winter. The operation of two-engine transports beyond Iceland already had been forbidden. Some ferrying, chiefly of long-range aircraft, continued into December, as did the transport operations of C-54's and C-87's under contract with TWA and American Airlines, but by mid-December the North Atlantic route had been virtually closed down for the winter.7Traffic was diverted to the South Atlantic. The distance to Britain by this route was double that of the projected CRIMSON route, but operations could be maintained on a year-round basis. The prospect in 1943 that a transatlantic route through the Azores would soon be possible brought the expensive and unlucky CRIMSON project to an early end.8

Problems of Control

When the air movement of the Eighth Air Force began in the summer of 1942, Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles had just become the commanding officer of the newly established North Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command. According to his instructions, he was responsible "for all operations, facilities and installations" along the North Atlantic route, including "all meteorological and communications systems and personnel pertinent to the operation of this activity."9 But it immediately became apparent that these instructions had not been fully "co-ordinated" back in Washington. The Eighth Air Force assigned to its fighter command full responsibility for the control and direction of its planes in flight from the United States to Great Britain, and during the first phase of the movement the orders were given by VIII Fighter Command "control" officers who had been stationed along the route for that purpose. Few if any of these

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officers had the experience that would qualify them for this special service, and the Eighth Air Force quickly agreed that ATC should take charge. After 22 July, when the second phase of the movement began, ATC had full operational control, and ATC pilots flew the lead planes. A sharp drop in the accident rate justified the transfer.10

More complex were the problems involving the Canadians and the British. No serious difficulty developed with the Canadians, whose influence along the western part of the route had tended heretofore to be dominant. There it proved to be easy enough to agree that, where bases were shared, each national service would be free to become as self-sufficient as it desired to be for the assistance and direction of its own traffic. But it was not so easy to fit American plans into the requirements of British policies governing the movement of aircraft from Iceland east into Britain. All planes flying this last leg of the North Atlantic route penetrated a zone of vital importance to the immediate defense of Great Britain, and British authorities were naturally inclined to feel that they must maintain full control over all aircraft flying within that zone.

General Giles and other responsible U.S. officers, on the other hand, saw in this situation "a major obstacle to the all out effort when the U.S. ATC ferrying operations are increased to sustain the large American forces" to be deployed ultimately in the United Kingdom.11Especially objectionable was the existing necessity for American pilots and navigators to "change over from American flight control procedure to unfamiliar British procedure" in the very area where the most hazardous flying conditions were encountered.12 Had the American flyers been largely veteran transport pilots, the story might have been different, but instead the AAF's planes were flown, and quite obviously would continue to be flown, very largely by inexperienced and recently trained combat crews. Giles urged the establishment of an American controlled airway all the way into Britain and the acquisition there of additional terminal fields to be staffed by American personnel.

The problem was fully discussed in a series of meetings at Montreal and Washington during November and December 1942, in which Maj. Gen. Harold L. George of ATC and Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill, Air Officer Commanding in Chief of the RAF Ferry Command, participated, as did other ranking officers of the AAF and the RAF.13 At these conferences the RAF Ferry Command

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insisted upon its need for "over-riding control" between the final point of departure, wherever it might be along the route,* and Prestwick.14 In reply, General George insisted upon the need for the AAF to exercise full control over its own planes throughout the entire route. More particularly, he demanded that American communications and weather services be extended into Britain, that all communication between the ground and American planes in flight pass through AAF control officers, that two major airports in the United Kingdom be set aside for the exclusive use of the AAF, and that at least four alternate airfields be specified for ATC's use, each of them to be staffed by AAF weather, communications, and control personnel.15

This was a large order, but George had the advantage of speaking for the organization to which belonged, as everyone present understood, most of the planes destined to fly the North Atlantic during the coming years. Consequently, most of his demands were met. It was agreed that U.S. communications services and procedures would be established throughout the route. It was also agreed that the AAF would develop its own weather service, subject to the approval of the Air Ministry. Communications between ground stations and American aircraft normally would be conducted through the agency of ATC's control officers, but no ATC officer would dispatch an aircraft for flight into the United Kingdom until clearance with the RAF Fighter Command had been secured by ATC at the terminal point of the flight. At all points close liaison between the AAF and the RAF or RCAF would be maintained. General George agreed to accept joint tenancy at four bases, Prestwick in Scotland, Nutts Corner in North Ireland, Valley in Wales, and St. Mawgan in Cornwall, in lieu of the exclusive control of two bases. Finally, the ATC was authorized to utilize four alternate fields within the United Kingdom.16 To direct Air Transport Command operations within the European Theater and between Great Britain and North Africa, it was decided to establish a European Wing of the ATC, under the command of Col. Paul E. Burrows, commander of the Caribbean Wing since its establishment, who was known to be acceptable to Sir Frederick Bowhill.17

The final agreements between the RAF Ferry Command and the


* Long-range planes did not necessarily land at Iceland and might fly direct from Newfoundland or Greenland.

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Air Transport Command were reached on 2 December 1942. On 4 February 1943 Colonel Burrows with a skeleton staff opened his headquarters at London. Meanwhile, the new control procedures agreed upon were put into effect. In April the Air Transport Command became the principal tenant at Prestwick. At the other proposed ATC bases, additional construction and personnel were required, but in June all three were opened to ATC traffic. The Air Transport Command's control of ferrying and transport activities over the North Atlantic was now virtually complete.18

The Re-establishment of a Northern Route

Meanwhile, the successful Allied invasion of North Africa, together with the suspension of operations in the North Atlantic because of the adverse effects of winter weather, had redirected the flow of transoceanic traffic to the South Atlantic route. Not only did combat in North Africa and the Mediterranean greatly increase the demand for ferrying and transport of key personnel and critical items of supply by the southern airway but Allied control of Morocco and Algiers had the effect of opening a new airway to Britain.* The first weeks of 1943 saw the initial flight delivery of B-17's to the Eighth Air Force in Britain by way of Marrakech.19 And General Spaatz, chief of the U.S. airmen on Eisenhower's staff, soon asked ATC to inaugurate a regular transport service of two round trips per week between Marrakech and the United Kingdom.20

ATC had already placed enough C-54's, flown by TWA crews, on the South Atlantic route from the United States to the United Kingdom to supply a through service of one round trip a week, a service designed to handle only the highest priority cargo and passengers. It now proposed to step up that service to a twice-weekly schedule early in February, with each plane making an extra round-trip shuttle between Prestwick and Marrakech before returning to the United States.21 As the winter months wore on, the need for a larger transport operation to North Africa and Great Britain became increasingly apparent. Ferrying crews piled up in the United Kingdom, as the existing military service, even when supplemented by the commercial flights of Pan American Airways' and American Export's seaplanes, proved quite incapable of handling this load alone, much less other high priority air traffic.22 As additional C-54 aircraft


* See above, p. 77-80.

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were made available, the military contract service over the South Atlantic was stepped up to three trips a week, and an equivalent increase in the shuttle between Marrakech and the United Kingdom was made. But it was the reopening in April of the much shorter North Atlantic air route that met the ever increasing demands. The route thus reopened was never to be shut down again until after the close of hostilities.23

At the beginning of the 1943 season, conditions generally along the North Atlantic route were superior to those pertaining in the previous year. Personnel at the North Atlantic Wing bases were more numerous and more experienced, and communications facilities were more complete, though far from perfect. To handle the anticipated increase of traffic, the North Atlantic Wing in March secured permission to use Dow Field at Bangor, Maine, as a second staging point for the overseas movement of tactical crews and their aircraft. In March, too, Meeks Field near Keflavik in Iceland was opened as a replacement for the crowded airdrome at Reykjavik.*

The new season opened with something of a flourish. When Col. Robert M. Love, Deputy Chief of Staff of the ATC, ferried a B-17 directly across the North Atlantic from Newfoundland to Prestwick in a ten-hour flight on 16-17 April, he was one of approximately sixty ferry pilots cleared within a few hours to fly the same route.24Meanwhile aircraft operated by TWA from Washington and by American Airlines from New York had inaugurated a direct transport operation over the North Atlantic, averaging approximately one round trip a day. The U.K.–Marrakech shuttle now became an appendage to the North Atlantic rather than to the South Atlantic schedules. The backlog of ferry pilots was speedily reduced, and the demand for a high priority cargo and passenger service between the United States and Great Britain was met. By summer the tempo of operations was speeded up to an average of three round-trip flights daily over the North Atlantic airway.25

Although the North Africa operations had made serious demands on the Eighth Air Force for men and materiel, its primary mission of daylight strategic bombing, never forgotten, was reaffirmed in May at the TRIDENT conference in the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan.26 By devoting most of its ferrying and transport operations on the North Atlantic route to the build-up for this offensive, ATC


* See above, p. 93.

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contributed significantly to its success. Over three thousand aircraft, principally four-engine bombers and especially B-17's, were flown to Britain by the North Atlantic route in 1943, while less than seven hundred planes of all types went by way of the circuitous South Atlantic route. Nearly 550 ferried planes made the eastward passage in June, the best month of the year in total deliveries.27

The crews which flew the ferried aircraft during 1943 and subsequently were of three sorts. During 1943 approximately 27 per cent of all planes delivered were flown by members of established tactical organizations, notably heavy- and medium-bomber groups destined to see service with the VIII Bomber Command. Thirty-eight per cent of the deliveries were made by replacement crews, that is, by crews intended for combat service in some tactical organization of the Eighth Air Force. The remaining 35 per cent were delivered by ATC's Ferrying Division crews, who, after arrival in the U.K., returned to their home bases for new ferrying assignments.28

The original plans for 1943 provided for sending all four-engine aircraft through Dow Field, Gander, and thence directly to Prestwick; two-engine ferried planes were to go by way of Presque Isle, Goose Bay, BW-1, Meeks Field, and Prestwick. During the spring months, however, weather conditions led to the dispatching of many four-engine planes through Goose Bay rather than Gander and in some cases over the more northerly circuit provided for two-engine craft. For a time, after Harmon Field near Stephenville in Newfoundland was transferred to the Air Transport Command in August, most of the four-engine planes flew directly from that field to Prestwick. With the coming of winter the movement of two-engine planes was stopped, and most of the heavy bombers were again routed by way of Greenland and Iceland.29

During the BOLERO movement nearly two hundred P-38's had been ferried over the North Atlantic route, and so planning for 1943 contemplated the flight delivery of additional pursuits over the same airway. A forecast issued in March called for the movement during the months of June and July of three fighter groups, each equipped with seventy-five P-47's.30 This program was abandoned, however, and the only fighters to attempt the run in 1943 were ten P-47's, flown by Ferrying Division pilots, which left the Republic factory for an experimental flight on 23 July 1943. Two B-24's were assigned as lead planes, and one C-87 followed to drop emergency equipment to

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any pilots who might be forced to bail out. The flight was delayed at Goose Bay for twelve days, as a result of a mistaken impression by the officer in command of the movement regarding the minimum weather requirements. Pushed along finally by higher authorities of the North Atlantic Wing, the flight reached Prestwick on 11 and 12 August, minus one P-47, which had ground-looped, ruining its landing gear, at BW-1.31 The movement was pronounced successful by the North Atlantic Wing and the Ferrying Division, and both of these organizations expressed a qualified readiness to deliver large numbers of P-47's over the route. On 20 August, however, the Air Staff decided that no further flight deliveries of P-47's should be attempted that season.32

The safe delivery of as many aircraft as possible was of course the goal of every ferry movement. This was emphasized afresh by ranking officers of the North Atlantic Wing during the spring of 1943. Control officers were directed to clear the early ferry movements through their stations only when conditions were "most favorable." Although it was impossible for the wing to supply command pilots to fly in the lead planes of tactical convoys, as had been done in 1942 after the first phase of the BOLERO movement, ferried aircraft in 1943 moved over the route in much greater safety than was the case the previous year. In 1942, approximately 4.12 per cent of all aircraft which entered the North Atlantic Wing for overseas movement was wrecked or otherwise lost. During the first ten and a half months of 1943, the loss ratio dropped to 1.14 per cent, and the Ferrying Division was quick to point out that its own crews had made a still better record on the planes which they ferried over the North Atlantic route. They had delivered approximately a third of the B-17's which traveled that way and had to their charge only an eighth of the B-17 accidents which had occurred on the route during the year.33

Meanwhile, plans for the winter use of the North Atlantic route through the season of 1943-44 took shape. Even in the latter months of 1942, Col. Lawrence Fritz, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations at ATC headquarters, had personally demonstrated the possibility of winter flights over the route, at least by a skilled and experienced pilot. But for large-scale ferrying there was urgent need for more accurate weather forecasting, particularly of conditions at the termini of the route. The means of collecting the necessary information had indeed improved notably during the course of 1943,

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The 30th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, using stripped B-25's specially equipped for weather observations, had been flying back and forth between the stations of the North Atlantic Wing. Its pilots had also undertaken numerous scheduled daily flights along routes which were planned to give the forecasters more direct information regarding doubtful weather conditions. Meanwhile, corresponding British observers had been working out to the west, north, and southwest of the United Kingdom. The improved forecasts based on these flights encouraged those who wished to keep the North Atlantic route open during the winter of 1943-44. After the decision had been reached, the Operations Division at ATC headquarters assigned three of the command's C-54's as weather planes, to fly back and forth over the North Atlantic routes for the winter, accumulating weather data and fixing standards for safe and reliable winter operations. The information accumulated by the crews of these aircraft filled the last gaps on the weather map and contributed materially to the safe use of the route through the winter months.34

Meanwhile, on 4 September, Maj. Gen. Barney M. Giles, then acting in General Arnold's absence as commanding general of the AAF, directed the Air Transport Command to plan for the ferrying of three hundred four-engine bombers over the North Atlantic during each winter month. Two-thirds of these aircraft were to be delivered by ATC ferrying crews, one-third by combat crews. Within the Air Transport Command and the Second Air Force, it was feared that the use of combat crews would entail excessive losses, but the objections raised were overruled by General Giles.35

As it proved, the general's judgment was completely vindicated. Nearly 350 four-engine bombers were delivered by way of the North Atlantic route in November, 295 in December, 280 in January, 235 in February, and 333 in March. The pilots of the ATC's Ferrying Division flew only a minor fraction of the bombers which traveled the North Atlantic route that winter. In January a little more than a third of the total were delivered by Ferrying Division crews. The unexpectedly high degree of success experienced by combat crews led to the virtual withdrawal of the Ferrying Division's pilots from the route. They made only 6 per cent of the deliveries in February, and only 3 per cent in March.36

Although the winter record of the North Atlantic was most creditable, still larger quantities of aircraft were ferried to the United

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Kingdom by the long South Atlantic route. As late as April 1944, 742 ferried aircraft reached Britain by that airway as against 464 by the North Atlantic route. For May the proportions were almost exactly reversed, with 742 arrivals over the North Atlantic and only 469 over the southern route. In June only 9 planes trickled in from the South, while 633 passed through the North Atlantic stations of the ATC. Ferry traffic during the first five months of 1944 exceeded the total for the previous year.37

In spite of its large-scale winter ferrying over the North Atlantic, the Air Transport Command was still reluctant to run regular westbound flights over the route during the winter months. The chief objection lay in the tremendously strong head winds facing a westbound plane, necessitating an inordinately heavy load of gasoline to insure a proper margin of safety. Accordingly, the ATC in mid-November 1943 put into effect a round-robin schedule for the normal route of C-54 transports during the winter. Eastbound, these aircraft, still flown by TWA and American Airlines under contract with the Army, were to follow the usual course from Newfoundland to the United Kingdom. They were to proceed homeward by way of Marrakech, Dakar, and the established South Atlantic route.38

Almost immediately, however, the Azores became available as a way station on eastward flights from the United States to North Africa and as an alternative to the South Atlantic route for westbound planes.* The first regularly routed ferried aircraft to go that way, a B-17, landed at Lagens Field on Terceira on 9 December 1943; twenty days later a C-54 made the first regularly scheduled eastbound transport flight through Lagens. By the middle of March all transports flying between the United States and Great Britain or North Africa were returning by way of the Azores. Bermuda was used on this run as a weather alternate to Newfoundland.39

Through the winter of 1943-44, the Air Transport Command provided a sizable eastward lift for the movement of key personnel, mail, and critical cargoes to the European and Mediterranean theaters. In January 1944 over 350 tons, including 785 passengers, were flown from the United States to those theaters. By June the lift had been increased to 1,178 tons, of which roughly 70 per cent went to the United Kingdom and 30 per cent to North Africa and destinations farther east. In July over 1,900 tons, including 2,570 passengers,


* See above, pp. 87-89.

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moved eastward over the North Atlantic routes. The basic transport schedule then in effect called for eleven C-54 flights daily each way, connecting the United States and the United Kingdom.40

In July the regular North Atlantic route transport operations of C-54's flown by TWA and American Airlines crews was supplemented by the establishment of SNOWBALL, the third in a series of military transport operations flown by crews belonging to the Ferrying Division.* The establishment of this new service reflected the obvious need for an increased airlift to the United Kingdom, the availability of additional numbers of C-54 aircraft, and the existence within the Ferrying Division of a reservoir of crews experienced in four-engine operation. The original routing of the flights was from Presque Isle through Stephenville in Newfoundland to Valley in Wales and back through Meeks Field in Iceland to Stephenville and Presque Isle.41

The routine schedule of services of ATC constituted its most important contribution to victory, but the potentialities of air transport were dramatically demonstrated by more than one of the special cargo lifts that were made, often on very short notice and with an overriding priority. In the summer of 1943, for example, two lots of incendiary-bomb fuzes required by the Eighth Air Force were picked up in the United States and started by air for the United Kingdom within twenty-four hours after the receipt of the request at ATC headquarters. In the late autumn of 1943, when the Eighth Air Force was striving to extend the range of its fighter escorts as a means of reducing the inordinately large losses incurred in its heavy-bomber missions over Germany, the solution was sought through the use of jettisonable fuel tanks. Seventy-five tons of auxiliary tanks and related fittings were hurried to Britain on ATC transports between the last week of October and the end of the year. The first regularly scheduled cargo plane under ATC control to use Lagens Field in the Azores carried five sets of pontoons, shipped at the urgent request of Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, together with other cargo for the Mediterranean theater. Within a half-month, in June and July 1944, Air Transport Command aircraft transported to Great Britain approximately 125 tons of equipment designed to combat the robot bomb.42


* The earlier Foreign Military Transport operations of the Ferrying Division, the FIREBALL and CRESCENT runs, are discussed above, p. 89, and below, pp. 129-30.

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The Last Year of the European War

The Allied landings in Normandy in June, 1944, marked the beginning of the final offensive which was to bring an end, in another eleven months, to the European war. The daylight bombing attack against Germany grew in intensity and fury, while tactical operations reached an unprecedented pitch. The need of the attacking ground and air forces for replacement aircraft and for cargo borne by air from the United States continued to grow. Thanks to the augmentation of its fleet of four-engine transports and the improvement of its facilities along the North Atlantic route, the Air Transport Command was able to supply an increased airlift over that route to the European and Mediterranean theaters. While the weight of air cargo and passengers landed in those theaters grew generally during the last year of the war, it fluctuated considerably from month to month. The North Atlantic lift to the European theater, which had passed 950 tons in July 1944, dropped to 779 tons in the following month. In October for the first time it exceeded 1,000 tons, with nearly 600 tons carried to the United Kingdom and over 460 directly to France. This record was not broken until March, when 1,500 tons followed the North Atlantic route to Europe. During the final drive, in April 1945, the total lift passed 1,650 tons, more than half of it to destinations on the Continent.43

The peak of ferrying operations was reached a little earlier. During 1944 a grand total of approximately 5,900 aircraft was flown over the North Atlantic to the European theater. In the first three months of 1945 nearly 1,100 were so delivered. In April, however, as the end came in sight, only 158 ferried aircraft made the eastward run over that route. Successive cancellations stopped the delivery, first of all, of B-17 and B-24 aircraft not radar-equipped, then of all heavy bombers, and, finally, of light and medium bombers, transports, and pursuit aircraft destined for either the European or the Mediterranean theater.44

The tempo of ferrying operations is not adequately measured by taking the total number of arrivals within a theater, month by month, and dividing it by the number of days in the month. The bases en route and those at the ultimate destination experienced alternate periods of activity and idleness. The ferried planes were held up, especially during winter months on the North Atlantic, by bad weather

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and then dispatched in large numbers. Even in the summer, the flow was very erratic. In July 1944, of the 256 ferried aircraft received at Prestwick, 50 per cent arrived on three days, 57 in a single day. At St. Mawgan 120 planes arrived between 9 and 16 November 1944; the next week only 10 appeared. Then came another week in which there were over 100 landings; the next saw only 3. During the lulls maintenance personnel and others had little to do. During the surges they were overworked, and all the facilities of the receiving bases were severely taxed.45

The pattern of air transport service over the North Atlantic changed rapidly in response to the Allied successes in land warfare on the Continent. On 31 August 1944, only four days after the last of the German troops left Paris, the Air Transport Command landed its first aircraft at Orly Field, nine miles away. Orly began almost at once to sustain a heavy traffic between the United Kingdom and France. Hardly a month later, on 4 October, the first scheduled ATC plane on the New York-Paris run landed at Orly. By the middle of the month the ATC's C-54's were averaging three round trips daily between the homeland and France, with Stephenville and Lagens as stopping points. As the campaign continued, this route became of increasing importance. Until December the U.S.-Paris flights were handled by military aircraft flown by Ferrying Division crews, thereafter with the additional use of contract carriers. Schedules in effect on 1 April 1945 called for fifteen round-trip flights daily between the United States and the European theater, seven between the United States and Prestwick, and eight between Paris and either Washington, Presque Isle, or New York.46

The first C-54 to make the New York-Paris flight carried a typical cargo, which included aircraft repairs, medical supplies, G.I. mail, and other mail for Paris and Brussels. Less conventional was the service inaugurated in mid-October, with the highest priority, for transport of 3,570 pounds of whole blood daily from New York to Paris. Interservice co-operation is illustrated by the ATC's delivery to Great Britain of a 2,500-pound blade for an American naval vessel's propeller. To combat the German breakthrough in December, 1944, ATC planes delivered 35 tons of mortar propellant charges to Paris from the Edgewood Arsenal. Other cargoes included such diverse and non-military items as vegetable seed to be used by American troops in growing some of their own food, cylinder heads required to put

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French locomotives back into service, and 100,000 nipples for feeding French and Dutch infants.47

Victory in Europe was foreshadowed by the inauguration during the late winter of 1944-45 of a guaranteed schedule passenger service on the eastbound run, three days a week, Washington to Paris, via Newfoundland and the Azores; four days a week, Washington to Prestwick via Newfoundland. This was a "plush" service, in which the passengers, having duly made their reservations as for a commercial flight, enjoyed the comfort of airline seats.48

ATC's Intratheater Service

Until late in 1943 the Air Transport Command's responsibility for air operations between the United States and the United Kingdom had regularly ended at the aerial ports of arrival in Britain, first Prestwick alone and subsequently Prestwick, Valley, and St. Mawgan. Usually, aircraft flown by ATC and replacement crews were there turned over to the Ferry and Transport Service of the VIII Air Service Command, which in July 1942 had established its own air transport service within the theater. This operation supplied a vital air link between the headquarters and depots of the Eighth Air Force. The personnel and aircraft used in rendering this service were organized in April 1943 into the 27th Air Transport Group.49

Col. Paul E. Burrows, first commanding officer of the European Wing of the Air Transport Command, had been interested, since March 1943 at least, in establishing a service within the United Kingdom whereby aircraft would be ferried all the way to the using organizations, while high priority mail and passengers would be delivered to London, and a regular shuttle maintained between the several bases utilized by ATC in the United Kingdom. This proposal was rejected by ATC headquarters at Washington in April, but the portion of it which called for an internal transport run ultimately received the approval of General George. At the request of General Eaker, such an internal shuttle was established by the European Wing in October 1943. Initially three aircraft of the DC-3 type furnished the schedules, and Hendon, near London, was added for this purpose to the bases utilized by the wing. The new service was called the Marble Arch Line, in reference to the Hyde Park Marble Arch located just across the street from wing headquarters in London. By the end of the year additional aircraft made possible two daily round

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trips between Prestwick and Hendon, one between St. Mawgan and Hendon, and periodic flights to other ATC stations in the British Isles. During the first half of 1944 the operations of the Marble Arch Line more than doubled both in passenger-miles and in ton-miles flown. By far the heaviest traffic was carried on the run between Prestwick and Hendon, which was in effect a continuation of the transatlantic service.50

The Marble Arch Line foreshadowed operations which the European Division performed after it gained a foothold on the Continent in September 1944. In planning for these operations, the echelons of the War and State Departments participated and laid down the general principles summarized in a letter to General Arnold from Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson on 11 September 1944:

The State Department and certain other Government agencies have recently brought to the attention of the War Department the fact that at the present stage of the war there is an increasing need for air transportation from this country to and between various parts of Europe, including areas liberated and to be liberated.

It has been pointed out that our over-all war purposes will be served, and the overseas period of duty of our troops shortened, by making foreign air transportation available as far as possible not only to individuals whose travel is necessary in connection with the military effort, but also those whose travel will contribute to relief or rehabilitation activities in war-affected areas or to a resumption of economic or other activities, disrupted by the war, that are necessary for the re-establishment of peacetime conditions.

I know that your plans provide for extending the operations of the Air Transport Command to the various important cities and areas of the European Continent, and that all appropriate steps will be taken to facilitate air transportation of our own personnel and others engaged on military missions. I believe that we should also endeavor, on a basis subordinate to all of our purely military requirements, to make air transportation available to other individuals whose travel comes within the categories described in the preceding paragraph. . . .

It is important, in my opinion, that the Air Transport Command not carry traffic other than military traffic or traffic involved in the military effort if it can be reasonably handled by a United States civil air carrier, and I believe that any transportation of such non-military passengers by the Air Transport Command should be regarded as an interim or emergency matter until such time as the civil airlines are qualified and are operating over the various routes involved.

Subject to all the foregoing, I believe that it is in our interest to expedite the initiation of suitable air transportation by the Air Transport Command to all of the European points where our interests are involved. The service should operate with economy, but it should be so organized as to demonstrate the efficiency of this country in the air transportation field and should compare favorably with the air transport service operated by any of the other nations.51

Especially interesting is the concern shown here for the competitive position of American civil aviation at the end of the war.

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Detailed plans for carrying out the program were necessarily tentative in character and changed from time to time in response to the changing situation and the expressed desires of interested agencies. As approved at ATC headquarters on 1 November 1944, the plan called for an extensive network of trunk routes and feeder services, all in effect extensions of the transatlantic routes originating in the United States: (1) a line from Iceland into the Scandinavian countries, with Stockholm as the terminus; (2) another from the United Kingdom and Paris to Berlin, thence by one extension to Warsaw and by another to Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Istanbul, Ankara, and Cairo; (3) a line from Paris via Rome and Athens to Cairo, or via Marseille to Algiers; and (4) a route from Paris via Bordeaux and Madrid to Casablanca. The key points on the trunk lines were to be linked with each other and with certain intermediate points by a series of feeder lines, with the responsibility for development divided between the Air Transport Command and the air transport groups of the VIII Air Service Command. The latter, augmented as the need arose by troop-carrier aircraft and personnel, were to fly local feeder and distribution services on the Continent for the benefit of American Air Force units, as they had been doing within the United Kingdom. The ATC, within the limits of its capacity, was to provide local services for the American ground forces and for other official and civilian agencies.52

All this planning in the autumn of 1944 remained dependent on the course of military operations. For the moment, the Air Transport Command had quite enough to do in its efforts simply to meet immediate military needs. Water and rail connections between Britain and Paris were re-established so slowly that in late October a contingent of 65 troops required for guard duty by the ATC in France was reduced to landing on OMAHA beach (after a two-day wait offshore), sleeping nearby on the ground without blankets, and at length cadging a ride to Paris in British trucks driven by French soldiers. The pressure on the shuttle service which the Air Transport Command inaugurated between the United Kingdom and Paris was tremendous, and a host of special calls was made upon the European Division's resources. Ten planes were supplied on 2 September, for example, to carry gasoline to General Patton's Third Army. Toward the end of the month the Division set up a 75-flight special movement of SHAEF personnel from London to Versailles.53

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The badly bombed airfield at Orly soon became the hub of a network of shifting air routes. Through it ran the Division's main trunk line, extending from Prestwick through London to the Mediterranean terminus at Marseille. A secondary direct route ran from St. Mawgan to Marseille and on to Naples. Lesser routes served other military purposes. Passenger weight in November and December was almost equal to that of both mail and cargo combined. The passengers included military and civilian VIP's, communication specialists, war-weary troops homeward bound, cadres for new continental bases of the ATC, and combat infantrymen on their way to the front. By the end of the year sixteen flights a day were scheduled to Orly from Bovingdon, which had replaced Hendon as ATC's base in the London area.54

Planning for the Air Transport Command's continental operation was complicated by the requests which various organizations within the theater made for local air transport services. For a time all requests for air service had been submitted to General Spaatz's USSTAF headquarters. As the requests multiplied, an agreement was reached in November that the Division need not establish new routes within the European theater without the approval of SHAEF and the concurrence of the Commanding General, USSTAF.55

During the early months of 1945 the rapid advance of the Allied lines led nevertheless to the approved extension of ATC's services. Some routes, like that from St. Mawgan to Naples, were dropped, while others were added. By early June the close of hostilities had made it possible to establish a series of schedules comparable to that contemplated during the previous autumn. In addition to the regular routes flown within the United Kingdom, and to the numerous London-Paris flights, the Division's schedules called for one flight daily between London, Brussels, and Frankfurt; another between London, Paris, and Frankfurt; still another originating at Paris, with stops at Frankfurt, Munich, Rome, and Naples; and a fourth serving Paris, Rheims, and Frankfurt. In addition, there was one flight weekly between Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon. By July a daily schedule from Paris to Stockholm, with stops at Brussels, Bremen, Copenhagen, and Oslo, had been inaugurated. Naples had become the starting point for limited services through Bari to Belgrade, Bucharest, Tirana, and Sofia and for a direct run, twice weekly, to Budapest.56

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Scandinavian Operations

A postwar ATC route from Paris to the three Scandinavian capitals had some precedent in a number of special wartime missions. The first, the SONNIE project, began early in 1944, nominally to transport from Sweden to Great Britain some 2,000 Norwegian aircrew trainees and such American aircrew internees as the Swedish government might release. Within fifteen months, aircraft attached to the project removed over 4,300 passengers from Sweden, furnished the only dependable means of communication with the American legation in Stockholm, and brought to American aircrews in Sweden the supplies and equipment which enabled them to repair and prepare for flight to the United Kingdom nearly two-thirds of the American combat planes which had force-landed in that country. This project helped to pave the way for ATC's postwar service into the Scandinavian countries and for the ultimate entry of American civil aviation into that region.57

The consent of both the British and the Swedish governments was required. Sweden was concerned, of course, with the protection of its status as a neutral power. The British, with good reason, feared that an American operation into Sweden might develop into a dangerous postwar rival of British aviation interests. In consequence they tried to prevent its inauguration. Unsuccessful in this, they failed, likewise, in their efforts to bring the service to an early end.58 To save Sweden's position as a neutral, SONNIE was put on a nominally civilian basis. Its unarmed Liberators were divested of military markings; both their crews and the ground echelon which the ATC placed at Stockholm wore civilian clothes. In form they were working for a civilian organization termed the American Air Transport Service.59 Though the SONNIE aircraft were unarmed, they operated over enemy-held Norway. Based from March until November 1944 on the RAF station at Leuchars, near Aberdeen, Scotland, and thereafter at Metfield in Suffolk, they normally made a long detour northward before crossing Norwegian territory. Although enemy interception was a constant threat, the only aircraft lost during the project crashed into a mountain near Göteborg, Sweden, in October 1944.60

Col. Bernt M. Balchen, veteran polar aviator and prewar operator of a Norwegian civil airline, had a major part to play in the project as an officer assigned to AC/AS, Plans in AAF Headquarters.

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He helped to make the necessary arrangements with the Swedish government and eventually was placed in command of the operation. His acquaintance with numerous persons of consequence in the Scandinavian countries, his knowledge of the weather and terrain, and his outstanding personal qualities of leadership made him an admirable choice. His letters of instruction as commanding officer designated him as the personal representative of the commanding general of the ATC's European Wing (Division) and of USSTAF. The latter organization had in fact had rather more to do with plans for the project than had the European Wing and had secured from units of the Eighth Air Force the necessary aircraft and most of the subordinate personnel for SONNIE.61

A second enterprise which came under Colonel Balchen's command was the BALL project. This was a program for dropping weapons, ammunition, food, radios, and equipment with which to carry on sabotage into the hands of the Norwegian underground and for dropping secret agents and radio equipment behind enemy lines in northern Norway. The project, undertaken for Special Force Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, London, lasted from July until September, 1944. Six war-weary B-24's, specially equipped for the job, and painted with black, light-absorbent paint, dropped approximately 120 tons of cargo and personnel at designated points, mostly in southern and central Norway. Enemy opposition was encountered on fifteen of the sixty-four dropping missions undertaken. Although no direct damage was suffered as a result of enemy action, operational hazards thwarted many of the missions and caused the death of twelve men and the total loss of two of the six aircraft assigned to the BALL project. Later the task of supplying the Norwegian underground by air passed to the Eighth Air Force and then to the British.62

The WHEN AND WHERE project was begun in January 1945 at the request of the Norwegian government-in-exile, which made the necessary diplomatic arrangements with the Swedish and Russian governments. The mission was the delivery of Norwegian military personnel and cargo to various points in northern Norway, there to carry on the fight against the occupying German forces and to counteract any tendency of the Russians to retain the small foothold which they had won there. Ten C-47's were assigned to the project and based at Luleå, a Swedish town some 450 miles north of Stockholm. WHEN

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AND WHERE was a frankly military operation; the aircraft bore AAF markings, and the crews wore uniforms, which they were supposed to conceal with coveralls while on Swedish military airfields. The ten transports flew a total of 572 missions and delivered 1,418 persons and 1,223 tons of freight. Several hundred Norwegian police troops and a field hospital with all its medical supplies and personnel were included in the airlift. Most of the freight consisted of food and forage for winter-bound communities. The larger part was landed at regular, if primitive, airfields, but some use was made of improvised landing fields, one of which was cleared on the ice of a northern river. Where even improvised landing fields were not available, personnel and cargo were dropped, as in the BALL project.63

These three Scandinavian operations were only distantly related to the normal mission of the Air Transport Command. The three projects had little in common beyond the fact that each involved operations over the Scandinavian peninsula and that each was directed by Colonel Balchen, nominally as an officer of the Air Transport Command.

During the summer of 1944 the British opposition to the continuance of the SONNIE project took shape in a movement to deny the project the use of the Leuchars base. So important had the operation become, however, that Colonel Balchen suggested that it be conducted by way of Iceland, if the Leuchars-Stockholm route had to be abandoned. As it turned out, the ATC was permitted to continue its operations at Leuchars until late November, when a reasonably satisfactory substitute was provided at Metfield. Although the urgent need for opening an Iceland-Stockholm route had passed, the project was not abandoned. Indeed it—with a possible extension to Moscow-formed a significant part of the long-range thinking of ATC and AAF headquarters, well indoctrinated with the idea of paving a way in the postwar world for American aviation. In October the North Atlantic Division of the ATC became responsible for the detailed planning of such a service. Diplomatic negotiations with Sweden delayed the final action, but a satisfactory agreement allowing both American and Swedish use of the route was reached in March 1945. A further obstacle lay in the inadequate communications facilities available at Stockholm, a factor which had always hampered SONNIE operations. Only after V-E Day was the needed AACS* equipment set up at


* Army Airways Communications System.

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Bromma Airport. Finally, on 1 June 1945 the first scheduled flight to Stockholm from Presque Isle via Meeks Field was undertaken. Thereafter, until late August 1945, when American Export Airlines, operating as a contract carrier, took over the run, military crews of the North Atlantic Division operated one round trip a week on this route.64

Nearly 900 aircraft were ferried through the North Atlantic bases to active combat theaters in 1942, approximately 3,200 in 1943, over 8,400 in 1944, and approximately 2,150 in the last five months of the European conflict in 1945; in all nearly 15,000 planes. Equally important, and indeed fundamental to the fulfilment of the ferrying mission itself, was the development of a safe, dependable service for strategic air transportation between the United States and the United Kingdom. During the last five months of the war in Europe, over 10,000 tons of air cargo were moved by ATC.65

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Contents * Previous Chapter (3) * Next Chapter (5)


Footnotes

1 Hist., North Atlantic Div., ATC, I, Pt. 1, pp. 285-86.

2 Ibid., p. 287; Hist., Ferrying Div., ATC, III (20 June 1942—14 Feb. 1943), 151-56.

3 Hist., North Atlantic Div., I, Pt. 1, pp. 207-8, 313-26, 341-44, and passim.

4 Ibid., pp. 210-13, 218-20, 232, 262.

5 Hist., North Atlantic Div., The Crimson Route, pp. 1-12.

6 Ibid., pp. 6-46; memo for CG ATC from Lt. Col. George F. Brewer, sub.: Daily Report—North Atlantic Ferry Route Project, 28 Aug. 1942.

7 Hist., North Atlantic Div., I, Pt. 1, pp. 281-83, 285, 351-52, 373, 387-89; Table appended to ATC Wkly. Rpt., 9 Oct., 23 Oct., 13 Nov., 27 Nov., 24 Dec., 1942; 1 Jan., 8 Jan., 1943.

8 On the recommendation of ATC, the AAF in the spring of 1943 abandoned the airfields at The Pas, Churchill and Southampton Island while those at the CRYSTALS and Mingan were reduced to emergency status. Save for five RAF planes which followed the CRIMSON routes to the United Kingdom in the summer, virtually no other use was of the route by either ferried or transport aircraft. Memo for Captain Bolles from Lt. Col. Robert A. Logan, 3 Dec. 1942; ltr., Maj. George H. Shafer to CG NAW, ATC, sub.: Report of Survey Flight over Crimson Route, 13 Dec. 1942; ltr., Brig. Gen. C. R. Smith, C/S. ATC, to Brig. Gen. Robert W. Harper, AC/AS. A-3, 11 Mar. 1943; memo for C/AS from Brig. Gen. T. J. Hanley, Jr., sub.: Crimson Route, 21 Mar. 1943; memo for C/S from Hanley, sub.: Modification of Crimson Project, 19 Apr. 1943' memo for Senior U.S. Army Member, Permanent Jt. Bd. on Defense, Canada-United States from Brig. Gen. J. E. Hull, Actg. AC/S, sub.: Modification of the Crimson Project, 23 Apr. 1943; 2d ind. (ltr. AC/AS, Plans, to CG ATC sub.: Crimson Route, 12 Nov. 1943), CO NAW, ATC, to CG ATC, 20 Dec. 1943.

9 Directive memo for CG ATC from C/AS, 22 June 1942.

10 Hist., North Atlantic Div., I, Pt. 1, pp. 215, 225, 227-28, 229-32, 242-44, 277, 279.

11 Ltr., Brig. Gen. B. F. Giles to CG ATC, sub.: Operating Control of the North Atlantic Ferrying Route, 13 Sept. 1942.

12 Memo for Gen. Wedermeyer from Maj. Gen. H. L. George, sub.: Control of North Atlantic Air Route, 12 Nov. 1942.

13 "Discussion between R.A.F. Ferry Command, R.A.F. Delegation, and the Air Transport Command with Respect to Operation over the North and South Atlantic Routes."

14 Ibid., Tab. A.

15 Ibid., Tab. B.

16 Ibid., Tabs, C, E, F.

17 Memo for Gen. Arnold from Maj. Gen. H. L. George, sub.: Meeting of RAF and AAF Representatives at Montreal, Canada, November 16 and 17, 1942—North Atlantic Operations, 18 Nov. 1942.

18 Hist., European Wing, ATC, Early 1943 to D Day 1944, pp. 8-10, 22-24, 39-45.

19 Mag., #6042, Spaatz to Arnold, 18 Jan. 1943, in ATC General's Log; see also Army Air Forces in World War II, II, 619.

20 Msg., Smith to George, 20 Jan. 1943; msg., AMSME 4301 Arnold to George 18 Jan. 1943, in ATC General's Log; Weekly Report of the Activities of the Air Transport Command.

21 Mag., ATC #522, George to Smith, 27 Jan. 1943; msg., ATC #1005, George to CG AMEW, 6 Feb. 1943, in ATC General's Log.

22 See AAF in WW II, II, 615; mag #7756, Andrews to George, 9 Mar. 1943 msg., #7866, Andrews to George, 13 Mar. 1943; Weekly Report of the Activities of the Air Transport Command.

23 Msg., Wiley to EW and other ATC Wings, 23 Mar. 1943; msg., ATC #1 to A, George for CG NAW, 8 Mar. 1943, in ATC General's Log; ltr., Fritz to CG NAW, sub.: Planned Transport Operation—North Atlantic Route—March, April and May 1943, 7 Mar. 1943; Rpt. of Activities of the ATC for the month ending 15 July 1943.

24 Ltr., Love to Brig. Gen. C. R. Smith, Chief of Staff, ATC, 20 Apr. 1943; Hist., North Atlantic Wing, ATC, II, Pt. 1, p. 131; Hist. of the European Wing from Early 1943 until D Day 1944, p. 29.

25 Ltr., Love to Smith, 20 Apr. 1943; msg.; ATC #3953, George to CO EWATC, 9 Apr. 1943; msg., ATC #1472, Burrows to CG NAWTC and CG ATC, 1 [May] 1943; msg., ATC #5506, George to Craig, 15 May 1943, in ATC's General's Log; Report of Activities of the ATC for the month ending 15 July 1943; Narrative Report Survey Flight C-54A Airplane #137273 for the Air Transport Command by American Airlines, in 29 Apr. 1943, MATS Hist. File.

26 See AAF in WW II, II, 308-9, 373-74.

27 Summary of Operations of the Air Transport Command, Annual Chartbook, 1943, p. 15; Report of Activities of the ATC for the month ending 15 Jan. 1944; Hist., North Atlantic Wing, ATC, II, Pt. I, pp. 131-32; Hist., European Wing, 1943-44, p. 99. It should be noted that the historians of the European and North Atlantic Wings, each relying upon his own organization's statistical control section, came up with slightly different figures for aircraft deliveries. During the summer of 1943 the North Atlantic route was used for the delivery of those aircraft, capable of negotiating the route, which were destined for the Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth and Fourteenth Air Force. Report of Activities for the Air Transport Command for the month ending 15 June 1943.

28 Hist., North Atlantic Wing, II, Pt. 1, p.132.

29 Ibid., p. 120; Hist., 1386th AAF BU Meeks Field, Iceland, Sept. 1942—Oct. 1944, ch. 4, pp. 7-10; Hist., ATC in Greenland, pp. 41-44.

30 Hist., North Atlantic Wing, II, Pt. 1, p. 132.

31 Ibid., pp. 139-44; Hist., Ferrying Division, IV, 218-33.

32 Ltr., Capt. F. H. Cannon to CG ATC, sub.: ATC I&S Division Intelligence Digest, 13 Aug. 1943; ltr., Maj. W. R. Walner to CG NWA, sub.: Experimental Convoy Flight of P-47 Aircraft 14 Aug. 1943; ltr., Col. G. D. Campbell, Jr., to CG ATC, sub.: Reports on First Overseas Flight of P-47 Aircraft, 25 Aug. 1943; ATC Intelligence Digest, 24 Aug. 1943.

33 Hist., North Atlantic Wing, II, Pt. I, pp. 127-28, 147. Cf. Vol. I, Pt. I, pp. 284-85; Hist., Ferrying Division, IV, 269.

34 Hist., North Atlantic Wing, ATC, II, Pt. II, pp. 241-43, 245-56. Appropriately, Colonel Fritz was appointed commanding officer of the North Atlantic Wing of the ATC in October 1943.

35 Memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. C. R. Smith, sub.: Policy—Ferrying Operations over the North Atlantic Route during the Winter Season of 1943-44, 26 Aug. 1943; memo for Asst. Chief of Air Staff, OC&R, from Smith, sub.: Operation of Combat Type Aircraft over the North Atlantic Route during the Winter Season of 1943-44, 4 Sept. 1943; memo for Lt. Col. Flynn from Maj. Hamilton Heard, sub.: Meeting regarding Winter Ferrying over the North Atlantic, 1 Oct. 1943, in MATS Hist. File.

36 Reports of Activities of the Air Transport Command for the months ending 15 Sept. 1943, 15 Dec. 1943, 15 Feb. 1944, 15 Mar. 1944, 15 Apr. 1944; Hist., North Atlantic Wing, ATC, II, Pt. 1, p. 132; Hist. of the European Wing from Early 1943 to D Day 1944, p. 187. See ltr., Col. R. H. Kelly, OC&R to CG ATC, sub.: Operation of Combat Type Aircraft over the North Atlantic Route during the Winter Season 1943-44, 27 Jan. 1944.

37 Hist. of the European Wing from Early 1943 to D Day 1944, pp. 186-87.

38 Ltr. Col. Harold R. Harris, Asst. Chief of Staff, Opns., ATC, to CG's SAW, AMEW, EW, CAW, NAW, sub.: Winter Operations over the North Atlantic Route, 11 Nov. 1943; memo for CG AAF from Maj. Gen. H. L. George, sub.: Temporary Suspension for the Winter Season of Passenger Flights from the U.S. to the U.K. over the North Atlantic route, 22 Nov. 1942, in MATS Hist. File; Report of Activities of the Air Transport Command.

39 Reports of Activities of the Air Transport Command for the months ending 15 Dec. 1943, 15 Jan. 1944, 15 Mar. 1944.

40 Ibid., 15 July 1944, 15 Aug 1944 Hist. Record Report European Division, July 1944, p. 8.

41 Hist. of the Ferrying Division, ATC, V, 222-53, 588th AAF BU, Hist. of Snowball, May through September 1944.

42 Reports of Activities of the Air Transport Command for the months ending 15 Aug. 1943, 15 Nov. 1943, 15 Jan. 1944, 15 July 1944. See AAF in WW II, II, 345, 654-55.

43 ATC Office of Stat. Control, ATC-SR-2, Traffic, 29 Aug. 1945, p. TF-3; ATC Monthly Reports, 16 June 1944—16 June 1945, incl.

44 ATC Monthly Report, 16 May 1945; ATC Office of Stat. Control, ATC-SR-2, Ferrying Operations, 21 June 1945, p. F-3; ibid., 21 Feb. 1945, p. F-6; ibid., 22 May 1945, p. F-6.

45 EURD, Historical Record Report, July 1944, p. 10; Historical Record Report, November and December 1944, pp. 77-78.

46 ATC Monthly Report, 16 Oct. 1944, 16 Dec. 1944; EURD, Historical Record Report, September and October 1944, pp. 14-16; Historical Record Report, January to V-E Day 1945, pp. 47-48.

47 ATC Monthly Reports, 16 Oct. 1944, 16 Jan. 1945.

48 Ibid., 16 Mar. 1945. Flight traffic clerks, enlisted men whose major function was to promote the comfort and safety of passengers, had been placed on ATC transports in 194. See correspondence between General Arnold and General George in 1109th AAF BU, Early History of the Air Transport Program, Sept. 1942—Oct. 1944, Exhibit XV.

49 See AAF in WW II, II, 618-19; History of the European Wing from Early 1943 to D Day 1944, pp. 5-12.

50 Hist. of the European Wing from Early 1943 to D Day 1944, pp. 31-34, 79-84, 189-91; msg., ATU 1198, Burrows for CG, ATC, 24 Sept, 1943.

51 EURD, Historical Record Report, September and October 1944, App. 24. See also pp. 45-55 and documents reprinted in Volume I of the appendixes thereto.

52 EURD, Historical Record Report, September and October 1944, pp. 48-55, and documents appended thereto, esp. ltr., Lt. Col. Kenneth F. Montgomery, Actg. AC/S, Plans, ATC, to DC, ATC, et al., sub.: Current Approved Plans for ATC Operations in Continental Europe, 1 Nov. 1944, and attached report, dated 31 Oct. 1944; ltr., Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz to Gen. H. H. Arnold, 20 June 1944.

53 EURD, Historical Record Report, September and October 1944, pp. 4-5, 106, and App. 56.

54 EURD, Historical Record Report, September and October 1944, pp. 14-17, 67-73; November and December 1944, pp. 36-50. The St. Mawgan-Naples run was the successor of the earlier shuttle linking the United Kingdom with North Africa.

55 EURD, Historical Record Report, November and December 1944, pp. 13-14..

56 EURD, Historical Record Report, January to V-E Day 194, pp. 55-57; ATC Monthly Reports, 16 June 1945; 16 July 1945.

57 EURD, Scandinavian Operations of the European Division, Air Transport Command, 1944 and 1945, pp. 1-3, 13-14, 94, 151-52.

58 Ibid, pp. 12-27, 82-94..

59 Ibid., pp. 25-27, 34-37.

60 Ibid., pp. 53-64.

61 Ibid., pp. 7-9, 13-15, 27-33.

62 Ibid., pp. 4, 113-28.

63 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 129-44.

64 Ibid., pp. 53, 83-94, 153-54; EURD, Historical Record Report, September and October 1944, Apps. 21-29; NAD, History of the North Atlantic Division, ATC, 1 October 1944—1 October 1945, Pt. I, pp. 310-14. This last is based upon a NAD monograph, United States to Sweden Air Transport Service, to which is appended a valuable collection of documents fundamental to the study.

65 ATC Monthly Reports, 16 Aug. 1944—16 June 1945, incl.


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