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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
\ WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060

SMALL WARS

Index.

Abattis. Zeribas consist of enclosures of, 280. Employment of, for protecting picquets and sentries in small wars, 474.

Abd el Kader. French adapted methods of, in Algeria, 40. Capture of the smala of, as an example of dash and audacity, 82, 83. Most decisive reverse suffered by, received at hands of a few troops of horse, 83. Difficulty found by French in getting, to fight, 88. Successes of, against French owing to guerilla tactics, 128. Bugeaud turned methods of, against himself, 129. French operations against, drifted on for years, 128. Sudden arrival of, in the Metija, 193. Sikak the only regular battle which, attempted with French, 230. Skill of, in surprises and ambuscades, 232. Capture of smala of, more than a mere raid, 241. Use made of camels by, 426.

Abomey. Benanzin's forces destroyed in barring the way to, 36 Thanks to Wômô river French were easily able to advance half way from coast to, 63. Nature of bush near, 356. Formation of French column in final actions before capture of, 357.

Aboukir. Pretended attack in 1882 on, 55.

Abu Hamed. Plan to convey supplies across desert from Korosko to, 69. Surprise of, by General Hunter, 89.

Abu Klea. March of Sir H. Stewart from, to Nile, 44. Desperate attempt of Dervishes to prevent Sir H. Stewart from reaching wells at, 62. Effect of fight at, as regards supply, 69. Retreat of desert force to, 70. Effect of heavy losses sustained at, 107. When enemy found in force at. convoy left in a zeriba, 120. Sir R Buller's retreat from, as an example of stratagem of putting out lights, 245. Movement of the square at, compelled enemy to attack, 259. The battle of, as an example of difficulty of keeping square closed up, 260, 261. Reason for skirmishers at, 261. Guns run out to the side attacked at, 263. Danger of wheeling forward side of square as at, 267. Difficulties at, caused by square not being properly formed, 269. The advance to, wells as an example of a march in square, 273. Position of cavalry during march on, 275. At, encumbrances left in zeriba while troops went out to fight, 282. The fanatics who had penetrated square at, cleared out with the bayonet, 400. Ruse of Major Wardrop for clearing enemy off hill near, 420. The machine gone jammed at, 440. Sir R. Buller's successful retirement at night undiscovered from, 491.

Abyssinia. Size of movable magazine in British expedition to, 59.

Abyssinian, Abyssinians. Expedition of 1868, 28. Unexpected meeting with, host at Adowa, 46. In, campaign Theodore trusted to strength of Magdala, 106. Enveloping attacks of, at Adowa, 205. After Adowa, made no attempt at organized pursuit, 215. Baggage offered a tempting prey to, at Arogee, 233.

Achin. Dutch in, 32. First Dutch expedition to, 46. Deadly climate in, 98. During campaign in, villages often captured and then abandoned, 101. Suited guerilla tactics, 127. Enveloping hostile tactics experienced in, 187. Difficulty of pursuit in, 211. No hostile night attacks in, 444. Surprise of a Dutch picquet in, 400.

Achinese. Dutch not prepared for warlike qualities of, 48. Want of artillery preparation one reason for heavy Dutch losses at, stockades, 155. Re-occupation of Longbatta by the, 183. Failure of, as pursuers, 369.

Achupa. The affair of, as an example of a small force compelling enemy to attack it under favourable circumstances by employing the square, 260. Expenditure of ammunition at, 397.

Adowa. Battle of, brought on partly by mistake as to locality, 46. Italians underestimated hostile strength at, 48. Battle of, a striking example of risks of separation in the field, 184. Battle of, the most serious disaster which regulars have suffered in any modern small war, 184. Enveloping Abyssinian attacks at, 205. Enemy after, made no attempt at organized pursuit, 215. Italians had no cavalry for scouting before, 402. Confusion between two brigades during the night march before, 492.

Advanced guard, guards. Method of dropping off flanking picquets from the, in hill warfare, 295. Duties of, with reference to guarding baggage when retreating in hill warfare, 338. Duties of the, as regards protecting the baggage column when advancing through the hush, 359. Risk of the, being too much reduced in dropping off flankers, 360. In small wars enemy avoids engaging, 475. In regular and irregular warfare, 479. Risk of, being out off from main body in small wars, 479. In small wars the, is a feeler and not a buffer, 479.

Afghan, Afghans. Wars of expediency, 28. At beginning of last, war enemy had some organization, 29. Armament most inferior, 30. Difference of, from Zulus and Matabele, 30. War as example of fall of capital not closing campaign, 36. Twice during last, war strength of, under-estimated, 47, 48. Large hostile forces met unexpectedly in, campaigns, 53. Movable magazines in last, war, 60. Army for a time dominant about Kandahar, 74. Disasters of first, war traceable to want of boldness and vigour, 77. Always two objectives, in wars, 108. Recognition by, that British leaders were vacillating, 113. Number of troops on Khaibar line in, campaign, 117. Last, war furnishes example of abandoning communications in Sir F. Roberts's first advance to Kabul, 122. Rapid flight of, from Charasia and Ahmed Khel, 159. In first, war firearms of enemy as good as those of regulars, 398. Driven out of position by attack of cavalry dismounted, 421. Only two cases of hostile night attacks in last, war, 444.

Afghanistan. In prolonged campaign in, there was much loss from sickness, 98. Flying columns in, 135. Tendency of enemy to work against flanks and rear constantly felt in, 476.

Afridi, Afridis. Boast of, that Tirah had never been invaded, 38. Deception of, by Capt Uniacke, 175. Conflicts with the, prove that the hill man is a fighter, 289. Martial instinct and excellent arms of, 289. Attack of, in 1841, on rear brigades in Khaibar Pass, 298. Attack of, on General Westmacott's rear guard in the Bara Valley, 296, Attack of, on McCaskill's brigade, 816. Attack of, on baggage in the Arhanga Pass, 319. Some caught in a ravine near the Arhanga Pass, 323. The, unprepared for General Westmacott's return from Dwatoi and Bagh, 323. Troops pressed back by, on to a precipice, 336. Operations in the, country, presented difficulties such as troops have not in living memory met with in mountainous country 346. Armed with Lee-Metfords modify theory of outposts in small wars, 460. Some tribesmen are not so well armed as. but more inclined for night attacks, 470. Armament and marksmanship of, and Orukzais necessitated outlying picquets far out, 470. Difficulty of outposts were enemy as well armed as, and also inclined for night attacks, 471.

Agagi. Failure to find water at, in Benin, 62.

Agordat. Affair of, as example of regulars having to quit a strong position, 206.

Ahmed Khel. Great moral effect of victory at, 104. At, necessity of guarding convoy prevented an effective pursuit, 120. Rapid flight of Afghans at, prevented their suffering any further loss, 159. When enemy pushes attack right home as at, his forces are destroyed, 202. Battle of, as example of meeting a formidable attack in irregular line, 204. Value of guns on flanks shown at, 205. Extension of line by supports and reserves at, 381. Expenditure of rounds at, 396. Native cavalry thrown into confusion by Afghan horsemen at, 411. Swordsmen beaten off by guns at, 436. Fortunate that the Afghans attacked head and not tail of column at, 478.

Ain-el-Khata. Disaster to French cavalry at, owing to its acting too boldly, 410.

Akbar Khan. Disaster to army retreating from Kabul due rather to tribesmen than to forces of, 216.

Alexandria. Ruse under cover of which British army was moved from, to Ismailia, 55. Need ot secrecy in a great move Like that from, to the Suez canal, 243.

Algeria. Much to be still learnt from conquest of, 24. Expedition to, overturned despotic military power, 25. Opponents of French in, 26. Nature of enemy in, 30. Cause of French troubles in, 33. French experiences in, 36. French raids in, 40. In, French could not catch Kabyles, 52. Main difficulty in later French campaigns in, to get enemy to fight, 103. First phase of invasion of, gave regulars lime trouble, 105. French operations in, illustrate right and wrong way of dealing with guerillas, 128. French in, had to deal with nomads, 135. French in, dealt severely with enemy, 148. Enveloping hostile tactics experienced in, 187. Tendency of enemy in, to make sudden onslaughts, 188. French feints in, 232. Skill of enemy at stratagems in, 233, 244. General Philibert's operations in, 244, 245. Skill of Arabs of, in forays, 245. French razzias in, 246. Difficulty found in bringing in captured cattle in, 247. In, masses of horse rushed down on all sides, 258. The square a success in, 269. French adopted squares in, to beat off masses of horse, 272. French sometimes obliged to march in square in, 272. Use of zeribas for bivouacs in, 278. French troops have found value of bayonet in, 399 Need of cavalry for raids in, 403. Great service of cavalry in, 405. Horsemen met by French in, individually but not collectively formidable, 409. On the defensive in, troops had to be ready for attack at close quarters, 439. A few cases of hostile night attacks in, 443. Attack on French at dawn a few days after landing in, 447. French outpost ambuscades in, 466. General Yusuf s services in, 468. General Yusuf s posts of four men in, 467. Firearms with cords attached laid down in, to give alarm, 474. Enemy's attacks on flanks and rear of columns in, 475. Shellala in, 478. Incident at night near Sidi Feruch in, to illustrate difficulty of controlling troops at night, 484. The Arabs in, used to leave their fires burning and slip off when they expected a French night attack, 486.

Algiers, Capture of, put an end to organized resistance, 36. Mistake with regard to map before capture of, 46. Forces of Dey concentrated to defend, 105. Decisive defeat of Dey of, at Staweli, 174. Victory at Sidi Khalif of French army advancing on, 192. Sudden appearance of Abd el Kader near, 193. Skill of French commanders in warfare after capture of, 232.

Ali Musjid. Attack on, in 1878 as example of turning force not performing its share owing to difficulties of terrain, 168. A somewhat formidable fort, 168. Attack on, an example of combination failing through error in time, 180. Risk of force detached to cut in on enemy's line of retreat not reaching its place in time, exemplified by, 209.

Alison, Sir A. Description of Ordahsu by, 366.

Allahabad. Want of cavalry for pursuit during Havelock's advance from, to Cawnpore, 208.

Ambela. Campaign as illustrating doubt which arises as to attitude of tribes adjacent to theatre of war, 44. Troops brought to a standstill in, campaign by unexpected threat on communications, 49. Campaign shows danger of undertaking war insufficiently prepared, 73. Losses in, campaign proportionately heavier than in Tirah, 346. Noticeable that night attacks in Malakand were in a district adjacent to, 443. Lord Roberts's story of the, tribesmen and the outposts, 472.

Amboluminas. The attack on the Hovas on the, range as an example of a turning force being too late to join in attack, 167.

Ambuscades. See Ambushes.

Ambush, ambushes. Enemy skilled in, 54, 99. In campaigns where hostile tactics have been confined to surprises and, energetic action necessary, 129. Necessity of looking out for, when in pursuit, 209. Successful, at Kwintana, 232. Abd el Kader's skill in, 232. Question of forming, has hardly received sufficient attention, 248. Frequency of, in hill and bush warfare, 249. Only on outposts that question of forming, has as yet been taken seriously, 249. Analogy between, and feints, 249. Successful, during General Sale's retreat, 249, 250. The Cossack, 250. General Bugeaud's, at Takdempt, 251. General Prim's, at Castellijos, 251. Drawing enemy on not always necessary for an, 251. Forming, requires skill and eye for country, 252. Principles to be observed in, 252. Question of having several separate, 262. Examples of successful, by the enemy, 252 to 256. The, at Shekan, 254. Other examples of, 254, 255. Risk of falling into, in hill warfare, 320. Checking pursuit in hill warfare by, 333. Successful, by the 3rd Gurkhas at Saran Sar, 334. The bush offers enemy groat facilities for forming, 349. Bush warfare essentially an affair of surprises and, 350. Detachments constantly falling into, in bush warfare, 353. Question of avoiding, in bush warfare, 368. Sir F. Roberts's instructions with regard to dealing with, in Burma, 368, 369. Risk of cavalry falling into, on bad ground, 405, Examples of, 405, 406. Risk of artillery boldly used falling into, 432. Importance of safeguarding regulars against, 442. Small, a sovereign remedy against snipers, 448. Employment of, as outposts, 465. Form of, in the bush by lighting a fire to draw volleys, 467.

Ammunition. Replenishing of, one cause of fettering regulars, 85. Heavy expenditure of, in bush warfare, 871. Waste of, in Waganda, 371. Waste of, one of the most difficult questions in bush warfare, 371, Heavy expenditure of, arising from precautionary volleys, 372. Examples of expenditure of, 396, 397. Difficulty as to, on the Indian frontier, 397. Replenishment of, 397. Heavy expenditure of, during night attacks on Malakand, 397, 398. Heavy expenditure of, during Boer night attacks, 397.

Amoaful. Enveloping hostile tactics at, 187. At, different commands lost all touch of each other, 353. Force formed up roughly in square to start with, at, 357. Guns pushed up into firing fine at, 431.

Amsal. Attack on, without artillery preparation at battle of Wad Ras, 155. Flight of Moors when, was captured, 190. Angoni Zulus. Operations against, 141.

Anglo-Egyptian. Advance on Bed Sea littoral at one time always insured a hostile gathering, 40. Value of efficient intelligence department shown by successful, advance from Wady Haifa to Omdurman, 50. Khalifa not prepared for rapid advance of, forces to Omdurman, 89. Happy results for. army of bombardment of Omdurman, 154. Chance of decisive victory obtained by army by reconnaissance before Atbara, 235.

Annam. French campaign in, of 1861, 38. Experience of French in, 38.

Antananarivo. Duchesne eventually made short work of Hovas. before, 45. Transport column with army detailed to capture, 60. Distance from coast to, 116. Final advance to, as a flying column, 120. At attack on, turning force turned two captured guns upon enemy, 157. Attack on Amboluminas position during final advance on, 167. Official account of expedition to, dwells on effect of volleys, 395. Ammunition nearly gave out when rear guard was severely pressed near, 397.

Arab, Arabs, of the Barbary States, 32. Effect of the, razzias in Algeria, 129. Stout resistance of, at Kirbekan, 167. Attack of, upon baggage at Tokar, 204. Barbarossa drew, out of their camp at Millel by a feint, 230. Proverb as to stratagem and war, 232. Successful ambuscade of, by French at Muzaia, 233. Failure of an attempt by French to surprise, 242. Deception of the, by General Philebert, 245. Skill of the, of Algeria at forays, 245. The, ambuscaded at Takdempt, 251. French cavalry ambuscaded by, 253. The, at Shekan, 254. Bear face of a square broken by, the day before Shekan, 262. The, attack at Tofrek, 283. 21st Lancers did not completely break up, mass by their charge, 419. The, reached the zeriba at Tellinouet before the troops could man the defences, 463. The, in Algeria, used to leave fires burning and slip off before an expected night attack by French, 486. The, must have been aware that Sir H. Stewart was making his night march towards the Nile, 490.

Arabi. Troops of, 30. Difference of forces of, from Zulus and Matabili, 30. First heard of move from Alexandria and Ismailia when in Ceylon, 55. Had Sir G. Wolseley not made a direct attack on Tel-el-Kebir, would have avoided an engagement, 92.

Arcot. An example of effect of boldness and vigour, 78.

Argandhab. Cavalry sent to make a wide detour beyond, at Kandahar, 173.

Arhanga Pass. Transport out at night on the, 314. Action of Lance-corporal Simpson on baggage guard in the, 319, 320. Afridis caught in a ravine near the, 323.

Armament. When regulars operate against enemy of inferior, this constitutes a small war, 22. Tactics mainly a question of, 23. Effect of improved, of enemy on small wars, 24. Of enemy to be considered, 29. Excellence of, overburdens regulars with non-combatant services, 85. Advantage in, gives regulars upper hand in battle, 90. How improvement in, of hill-men has affected the distance to which flanking picquets and sent out, 297, 298.

Arms. Relative progress of, of regulars and of enemy, 23. Of enemy some-times efficient, 23. Of enemy often not well known, 43. Enemy when defeated conceals, 159.

Arnold, Major. Victory of, at Bids, 269.

Arogee. Battle of, as an example of enemy being unintentionally drawn out of position by hope of plunder, 233. Hill-men may be trapped as the Abyssinians were at, 324.

Arrah. The relief of, by Major Eyre, 82. Attempt to relieve, from Dinapore, 215.

Artillery. Portable, scarcely existed in Abd el Kader's day, 136. Bugeaud's objection to wheeled, 136. Portable, in Rhodesia, 13P Preparation usual in regular warfare, 152. Only second phase of, preparation need generally be taken into account in small wars, 152. Great moral effect of, 152. Importance attached by enemy to. whether he possesses it or not, 152, 153. Unfortunate use of, fire in Tonkin and Madagascar, 153. Preparation sometimes shows enemy point of attack, 153. Main objection to, preparation that it drives enemy away, 153. Lord Wolseley on effect of, 153. Occasions when, preparation is desirable, 154. Results of, bombardment of Omdurman, 154. Value of, in Mutiny, 154. Assistance of infantry of concentrated, fire at Dargai, 154. Points which govern decision as to, preparation, 154. When it is a matter of urgency to achieve rapid success it may be desirable to use, before infantry can get up, 155. Use of, at relief at Gulistan, 155. Instances of want of, preparation, 155. Importance of capturing hostile, 156, 157. Inefficiency of hostile, 156, Turning of captured, upon the enemy, 156. Ease with which hostile, can be captured, 166. Examples of capturing hostile, 157. Sometimes a source of embarrassment to enemy, 158. Capture of hostile, likely to be brought about by flank attacks, 163. Use of horse, with cavalry in the Mutiny, 170. Effect of, accompanying flank attacks, 170. If there be ground suitable for cavalry, infantry and, should endeavour to drive enemy in that direction, 173. To be pushed to the front to play on the enemy when he gives way, 174, 175. Use of, at Staweli, 174. Denghil Tepe as an example of, beating off a counterattack, 186. Skobelef on duty of, in Turkoman campaign, 186. On the defensive, flanks to be protected with, 202. Advantage of formation in line with, well distributed, 204. Value of, on flanks shown at Ahmed Khel, 205. Advantages of and objections to, being pushed well to the front on the flanks to be withdrawn later, 205. value of horse, and cavalry if enemy retreats in good order, 211. Bad effect of withdrawing smooth bore, at Maiwand, 214. Value of some, at the commencement of a retreat, 216. Employment of, on rear guard, 221, 222. Employment of, by Colonel Macdonald to draw enemy on to Khartum, 234. Generally moves at a different pace from rest of square, 260. Position of, with regard to squares, 263, 264. Examples of, with squares, 264. Effect of hostile, on squares at El Teb and in Dahomey, 266, 267. Position of, with squares on the march, 274. To merely clear hill-men off crests, will do the work as well as infantry and save them a climb, 306. In attack in hill warfare, 307. Small effect of, firing up at sangars, 307. To get up on high ground where it can play on retreating enemy, 307. Question of, being benighted in hill warfare, 315 to 317. Use of, against stockades in bush warfare, 364. The, with Macdonald's brigade at Khartum, 387, 388. Cavalry and horse, in small wars, 408, 409. Question of, preparation, 429. To be handled with boldness in small wars, 429. To be used at as close quarters as possible, rarely has much to fear from firearms of the enemy, 430. Examples of forward, tactics, 430, 481. In small wars, rarely runs the risk of being actually silenced, 432. Tendency to hold, back, 432. Massing of, unusual in small wars, 433, 434. How to deal with hostile, 433. Great object of, that it should, be at hand when wanted, 433. Dispersion of, 434 to 436. Should generally be able to move as fast as infantry, 434. Question of breaking up, units in small wars, 434, 435. Necessity of being ready to act at any point tends to split up, units 434. Massing of, at the Sempagha Pass, 435. Massing of, at the Atbara and Tel-el-Kebir, 435. Dispersion of, on the defensive, 435, Great value of, on the defensive, 436, 437 Able to protect its own front, but its flanks most be guarded, 436. Value of, in defence of isolated posts, 437. Powerlessness of, against mud villages, 437. Need of high explosive shells for, in small wars, 438. Necessity of, material being light, 438, 439. Portable, generally more suitable for small wars than horse and field, 438, 439. Must be prepared for firing at very close quarters, 430. Question whether machine guns should be attached to, 440. On convoy duty, 477. No formidable hostile, in small wars to necessitate strong advanced guards, 479. To be in action ready for night attacks if picquets are close in, 494. Can only carry a small supply of star shell, 495. To be trained by daylight on likely points in anticipation of hostile night attacks, 495. Question of putting infantry into intervals of, at night, 495. See also mountain Artillery. Ashanti War of 1874, 28. In, war British aimed at the capital, 105. Illustration from, war of effect of advancing in several columns, 111. Severance of British communications in, 117. In, enveloping hostile tactics were experienced, 187. Difficulty of pursuit in, 211. Corps of scouts organized in 1874 in, 350. The, war of 1874 as illustrating bush warfare in general, 353, 354. Sections in the, war, 353, 354. Heavy loss of officers in the, war, 354. Nature of enemy in, 855. Bush not generally be thick in Dahomey as io, 358. Tendency of enemy to counter-attack in bush fighting as in, 360. Heavy expenditure of ammunition in, 396. Affords no instance of hostile night attack, 444. Tendency of enemy to work against flanks and rear constantly felt in, 475.

Ashantis. Willingness of to accept battle, 32. A people under a despotic sovereign, 35. Tactical formation of, a loose skirmishing order, 353. At Quarman the, closed in on rear of column, 358. Counter-attack of the, at Ordahsu, 366.

Assault. See Attack.

Assaye. At, whole army brought upon Mahratta flank, 163.

Atbara. Neglect of their communications by dervishes before, 87. A case where preliminary bombardment was most desirable, 154. Sir H. Kitchener arrived before, zeriba at dawn, 193. Reconnaissance before, probably helped to keep the enemy in position, 235. The attack on the, zeriba, 379, 380. Independent fire at, 391. Hostile guns silenced at the, before the attack, 433. Concentrated artillery fire on the, zeriba, 435. General Hunter's reconnaissance to, 441.

Attack, attacks, attacking. Upon enemy preferable to manœuvre, 91. Enemy generally declines to, in small wars, 150. Special interest of study of, in small wars, 160. Difference between theory of, in small wars and in regular warfare, 150, 161. Question of artillery preparation in, 152 to 156. Moral effect upon enemy of deliberate, 159. Purely frontal, generally undesirable, 160. Object of flank, in regular warfare, and in small wars, 161 to 163. Frontal, at Dargai an exceptional case, 160. Enemy seldom prepared for, on the flank and rear, 161. Examples of unpreparedness of enemy for, on their flanks and rear, 161, 162. In case of, on flank and rear troops brought on hostile line of retreat, 163. Flank, bring about decisive victories, 163. Question of a containing force in case of lank, 163. Action of Kirbekan as example of rear, 164. As a rule containing force assists in, 864. In Tonkin enemy would all have escaped, as a rule, but for direction given to French, 165. If frontal, likely to lead to hard fighting, had better be in flank, 165. Peiwar Kotai as example of flank, being principal, 165, 166. Tendency of enemy to draw all his forces over and meet flank, 166. Points to keep in mind in case of combined, 167. Need of artillery in flank, 170. Effect of artillery with a flank, 170. In all, upon irregulars it is necessary to drive assault Lome with vigour, 171. When troops have been launched to the, subordinates must be prepared to assume responsibility, 171. Opportunities for bluff in, 172. Importance of cavalry in, 172 to 174. Desirability sometimes of, from several points, 176, 177. Moral effect of, from several sides, 177. By, in several columns enemy's line of retreat certain to be threatened, 177. If, from several sides failure of one of the columns may not matter, 177. Examples of, from several sides, 177, 178. When separation of forces in, has led to a reverse this has generally been due to mistakes or mismanagement, 179. Danger in, from several points of errors as to time and distance, 179. Examples of misunderstandings in, from different sides, 182 to 184. In, in this class of warfare the fine of battle seldom has much depth, 184. Denghil Tepe shows value of artillery after, has failed, 185. Because enemy generally shirks, he operates against flanks and rear of regulars, 186, 187. When flanks and rear of troops in, are merely threatened the threats should not be taken too seriously, 189. Hour at which, should be delivered, 192 Enemy seldom seems to expect, at dawn, 192. Examples of successful, at daybreak, 193, 194. At daybreak offer considerable chance of decisive success, 194. Only chance of getting at certain enemies to, them at daybreak, 194. Feints can be used both in, and in defence, 227. Point selected for, may be concealed by feints and stratagems, 236. Principles of, in hill warfare, 304 to 308. The Gurkha scout at Thati as an example of, in hill warfare, 305. Artillery in, in hill warfare, 307. In small wars, can generally be pushed home by firing line, 376. In, extension rather than depth to be sought for, 376. Question of, on hill positions, 377. Comparison of British and French methods of, 377, 378. Dashing, as compared to deliberate, 378. The formation for, at Tel-el-Kebir, 379. The formation for, at the Atbara zeriba, 379, 380. Comparison of, at Tel-el-Kebir and Atbara to, in hill and bush warfare, 380, 381. Fundamental principle of, formation in small wars is to get close up to the enemy, 381. Great importance of not hurrying infantry in, 383, 384. Question of crossing a dangerous zone is, 385, 386. In, fire should generally be reserved, 94. Hostile, at dawn very usual, 446 to 448. An, at dawn almost invariably involves previous night march, 488. See also Night Attacks.

Austrians. In Bosnia, 31.

Ayoub Khan. Advance of, from Herat, 48. Investment of Kandahar by, 74. Practically whole attack fell upon, flank at Kandahar, 163. Troops of, at Maiwand, 201. Defeated troops at Maiwand suffered little from troops of, on way back to Kandahar, 215. Appears to have been induced to hold his ground at Kandahar by reconnaissance, 235.

Bac Le. Treacherous ambush near, 51.

Bacninh. French advance from Hanoi to, 55. French advance on, as an example of manœuvring enemy out of position, 94. Failure of one of the. two columns advancing on, to arrive in time, 114. Chinese were driven out of, by artillery fire with little loss, 153. Nam near, 395, 397.

Badajoz. The panic at, 483.

Baden-Powell, Lieut.-Col. Operations of, against Wedza's stronghold as an example of bluff, 175, 176.

Badli-ke-Serai. Action of, an excellent example of mounted troops in flank attacks, 170.

Baggage. Special danger ot junctions of valleys to, in hill warfare, 335. In hill warfare if rear guard stops enemy slips round flank and harries, 337. The position of, in retreats in the hills, 338. Management of the, columns in advancing through a bush country, 359, 360. To be sent on in case of retreat in bush warfare, 370.

Bagh. Afridis trapped on return march from Dwatoi to, 323.

Bajaour. All cavalry might not be able to act in, 407. Tribesmen of, not so well armed as Afridis but more inclined for night attacks, 470.

Baker, General. Attack of, on Afghan right at Charasia, 166.

Baker, Pasha. The disaster to force under, at Trinkitat, 262, 271. Advance of, with cordon of vedettes all round, 476.

Balkan, Balkans. Wars of, liberation exemplify insurrections, 27. Turks and Montenegrins before last Russian intervention in the, 127.

Banditti. Struggles against, in case of insurrections, 26. Great commanders of irregulars mostly leaders of, 126.

Banners. Asiatics and enemy generally bring, into the field, 158. Fanatics prize their, highly, 158. Moral effect of capturing, 158.

Bang Bo. Action of, an example of a mistake as to a turning force, 168. Narrative of the action at, 168, 169. As an example of readiness of enemy to profit by a success, 214. Feeble pursuit of the Chinese after, 215.

Bara. Anxiety caused by transport column during move down, valley, 120. Example of bluff in the, valley, 175. Flanking picquets on the march down the, valley, 290. Examples of troops being benighted in the, valley, 317, 318. Incident in the, valley illustrates necessity of main body in retreat guarding the baggage, 339.

Barara Tangi. Action of, as example of infantry being hurried and then attacked by fanatics, 384.

Baratieri, General. Leading brigade at Adowa advanced further than, intended, 46.

Barbary States. Horsemen of the, 32.

Barbarossa. Successful feint of, at Millel, 230.

Bareilly. Ghazi charge at, 185. The ghazis at, charged right on to the bayonets, 309.

Barkai. General Westmacott's rear guard action on last day but one of the march to, 317.

Barnes, Lieut. On the failure of the Spanish forces to suppress the Cuban rebellion, 132, 133.

Base, bases. Importance of the army being as short a time as possible away from its, 61. Theory of keeping the army at its, and pushing supplies ahead, 65 to 67. Excellence of armament and completeness of equipment helps to tie regulars to their, 85. Regulars if beaten must fail back on their, 86. Enemy has no, 86. Route leading back to, requires separate force as guard, 116. Flying columns in guerilla warfare must have, 135.

Basutos. Surprise of the, at Morosi mountain, 488.

Basutoland. The night attack on Morosi's mountain in, 488.

Batoche. Affair of, an example of feints misleading enemy as to intended point of attack, 236.

Battalion, battalions. Bugeaud considered that in Algeria flying columns should include three or four, 136. Formation at Isly échelonned, columns, 187. Ordered to form, square when charged at Isly, 188. Flanks of, not to coincide with corner of a square, 263. Question whether flanking picquets should or should not be formed for both flanks from the same, 296. Formation of a, for attacking hill positions, 377. S&e also Infantry.

Battery, batteries. Enemy sometimes possesses formed, 29. Even when enemy has, these dissolve in case of defeat, 88. A hostile, seldom a mobile unit, 156. Pursuit by a field, after Cawnpore, 209. Breaking up of, unsound in regular warfare, 434. Necessity of splitting up, in small wars, 434. Question of breaking up, in attack, 434. Massing of, 435. Splitting up of, on the defensive, 435. Questions of forming, of machine guns, 440. See also Artillery.

Bavarian. French and, troops defeated by Tyrolean peasants, 287.

Bayonet, bayonets. Value of the, when forming ambuscades, 251. Picquets to climb knolls with fixed, 208. Small parties in the bush to march with, fixed, 362. Enemy will seldom stand to receive a, charge, 376. To be fixed as crest of hill is approached, 377. Great value of the, in . spite of enemy's skill in use of spears and swords, 399, 400. A, charge hardly ever fails, 399. Value of, charge when in difficulties, 399. The, on the defensive, 399. If front is pierced it is generally best to drive out enemy with, 400. Examples of enemy being ejected with the, 400. The, the proper weapon for night attacks, 487. The, to be used in expelling hostile bodies which have penetrated within the lines, 497.

Bayuda Desert. Heavy losses of column in the, reduced it to such an extent that it could barely guard the transport columns, 107. Sir H. Stewart's force in, not absolutely a flying column, 120, 121.

Bedouins. Ambuscade of French cavalry by, 253. Camels forming rear face of French square at Shott Tigri carried off by, 257. Buonaparte's army at first nonplussed by tactics of, 475.

Beluchis. No one remembers who led the, in Scinde, 126.

Bemaru. The disastrous attacks upon the, heights as examples of defeat of counter-attacks made on a large scale, 199. The, village not captured, 199. Neglect of the Afghans to pursue after second attack upon, hills, 215.

Ben Metir. The action of, as example of cavalry acting dismounted, 419.

Benanzin. King, obliged to expose his troops to battle in defending capital, 36, 105.

Benin. Consequences of failing to find wells at Agagi in, 62. Deadly climate of, 98. Searching bush with volleys in, 371.

Benis. The, depended chiefly upon slugs which were stopped by the foliage, 372.

Berber. Supplies of River Column believed to be sufficient to take it to, 63. Abandonment of attempt to capture, 63. Supplies with River Column insufficient to take it to, and back, 70.

Berbers. Abd el Kader's ascendancy over the, hill-men, 128. Lured out of position by Barbarossa at Millel, 230. Question of night outposts in campaigning against, 471. Bhutan. Incident in 1864 in, war, 46. The evacuation of Dewangniri in 492.

Bhutias. Supposed stronghold of the, 46.

Bida. The battle of, as an example of moving in square to induce the enemy to attack, 268, 269.

Bilot. The night engagement at, as an example of difficulty in which artillery is placed when benighted, 316.

Bishensing. March to, 46.

Black Flags. Fortified positions of, near Bacninh, 55. Warriors like the, win always accept battle, 103. Desperate night attacks by, on French, 443.

Black Mountain. Separate columns invaded the, in 1888, 110. Fanatical rush at Kotkai in, 186. Peculiar conditions of hill warfare admirably illustrated in the, 346.

Blood, Sir B. Attack on rear brigade of, by Mamunds, 96. Forcing of "Gate of Swat" by, as an example of rapidity of enemy's retreat, 159. Work of 11th Bengal Lancers after, broke out of the Malakand position, 173. Communications of, with Malakand threatened by the Mamunds, 301. Hillmen against whom, operated in 1897 did not shrink from bold night attacks, 452. Successful employment of, of villagers near camps as outposts, 474.

Boer, Boers. Characteristics of, 31. Causes of reverses in, war, 33. In, war, theatre of war well known, 47. Fighting qualities of, underrated, 47. Commencement of the, war of 1881, by treachery of the, 51. Effect of Sir E. Wood's reconnaissance on the, 78. Good treatment of wounded by, 95, 96. Threats against Sir G. Colley's communications in the, war led to fight near the Ingogo, 117. Effect upon the, of the sortie from Potchefstrom, 197. Bails of, into Natal after Laing's Neck, 200. Pursuits by, 215. Skill of, at ambuscades, 251. Skilful marksmanship of, gives some excuse for too rapid advance at Laing's Neck, 384. In the, war the enemy had the advantage as regards musketry, 398. The, war of 1881, a great example of want of cavalry, 402, 403. The, the beau-ideal mounted infantry, 432. Risk incurred by, in holding Laing's Neck, 403. Had British had a few squadrons the, would not have found it so easy to operate outside their trenches at Laing's Neck, 403. Sometimes fired from horseback 411. Compelled cavalry to transform itself into mounted infantry 412. Skill with which, concealed numbers, 420. Quickness of, when dismounted, 424. The, kept at a distance at Potchefstrom by the guns, 437. The night attacks, 444, 445, 446. Fighting, outposts must be far out, 451. Gave vigilant columns a wide berth at night, 464. Operating against adversaries like the, night attacks might be advisable, 483. Failure of the, to prevent the British forces escaping from the Ingogo, 491.

Boguslawski, General V. Quotation from, as to La Vendée campaign, 140.

Bokhara. Russian campaign against, 30. Yedahar fought against large army marching from, to recover Tashkend, 104. Almost every episode which brought Cossacks to, an important operation of war, 104. Army of the Emir of, at Yedahar, 190.

Bokharan, Bokharans. Value attached by, force to guns, 158. Artillery not formidable, 158.

Bolan. Marris flanked the, route to Kandahar, 61.

Bombardment. A preliminary, tends to drive enemy out of his position, 153. Unfortunate consequences of preliminary, at Deh Khoja, 153. Occasions when preliminary, may be indispensable, 154. Results of, of Omdurman, 154. It resistance likely to prove formidable a preliminary, is most valuable, 154. Examples of disaster owing to failure to carry out a preliminary, 155.

Bosnia. Austrians in, 31. General Philippovitch's method of marching in, with strong detachments on flanks, 478.

Botha. Reference to, 128.

Bourmont, General. As soon as, effected landing Dey's forces were concentrated, 105.

Bozdar. Defeat of the, tribe by General Chamberlain at Khan Band, 162.

Brackenbury, General. Lord Wolseley's difficulty in communicating with the detached column of Sir R. Buller and, on the Nile, 123.

Breech-loaders. Savages now often armed with, 24. Enemy in the bush rarely has, 349.

Breastworks. Need of some sort of, in front of picquets and sentries in small wars, 474.

Brenner Pass. Disaster to the French near the, as an example of enemy throwing down trees upon regulars, 290.

Brigands. See Banditti.

Brittany. Terrain in, suitable to guerilla warfare, 127. Hoche dealing with Chouans of, 130. Hoche's system of espionage in, 143.

Bronker's Spruit. Boers at, 51.

Brooke, General. Operations of, at attack on Deh Khoja, 180, 181. Death of, 181.

Browne, Sir S. Commanded main attack on AH Musjid, 168.

Buffs. The party of the, at Bilot, 316.

Bugeaud, General (Marshal). Effect of arrival of, in Algeria, 128. Plan of campaign of, 129. Institution of razzias by, 129. Russians in Transcaucasia lacked the decentralized rigour of, 130. System of, in Algeria not new, 135. Objection of, to wheeled guns, 136. Motto of, as to parleying, 144. Order of battle of, at Isly, 187, 188. Battalions of, drawn up in heavy columns, 188. Order of battle had idea of square, 189. Successful feint of, at Sikak, 230. Instructions of, with regard to surprises, 242. Successful ambuscade by, at Takdempt, 251. Sent his cavalry out at Isly to complete destruction of Moorish horse already broken by infantry fire, 412. At Tellinouet, 463. Recommendation as to ambuscades as outposts by, 466.

Buller, Sir R. (Colonel). Lord Wolseley's difficulty in communicating with detached forces of, and General Brackenbury on the Nile, 123. Capture of Zlobani mountain by, and perilous retirement of, from the position, 183, 184. Sent out from Kambula to draw on Zulus with mounted force, 229, 230. Retreat of, from Abu Klea as example of stratagem, 245, 491. Aggressive action of enemy against, after withdrawal from Gubat to Abu Klea, 420. Night march of, from Abu Flea, 491.

Buluwayo. Desultory fighting after the capture of, 36. Effect of advance on, 40.

Boners. Intervention of, in Ambela campaign, 49, 73. Conflicts with the prove that the hill man is a fighter, 289.

Bunerwals. See Buners.

Burma. Pacification of Upper, 22. Thebaw's attempt to oppose annexation of, 25. War in upper, example of two stages of campaign of conquest, 26. Losses from sickness in, 9& Difficulty experienced by British to get enemy to fight in, 100. Suited for guerilla tactics, 127. Flying columns in, 135, 141. Sir F. Roberts's instructions for, 142. Care taken in, not to exasperate the people, 147. In, cavalry worked round both flanks to be ready to pounce on fugitives, 165. Minor operations in, illustrate principle of combined front and flank attacks, 165. Enemy in. disinclined for determined resistance, 165. Loss inflicted by hostile ambushes in, 253. Sir F. Roberts's instructions with regard to meeting ambuscades in, 368, 369. Scarcely any instances of hostile night attacks in, 444.

Buonaparte. See Napoleon.

Burmese. Main difficulty with, to get them to fight, 103. Capture of Sittang in first, war, 178. The, could be trusted to take to flight, 369.

Burnak. The affair of, as an illustration of camel corps work, 427, 428.

Bush. Maoris and Kaffirs fought mostly in, 32. Examples of savages inhabiting, offering battle, 32. Actions in, 32. Impossible to keep up with »enemy in night io, 211. Suitability of the, for ambuscades, 252. In the, some sort of defence work round] camp indispensable, 279. Movements of regulars in the, cannot be so well watched as in hill warfare, 349. The, offers enemy great opportunities for ambushes and surprises, 349. Necessity of sometimes cutting way through, makes operations in it slow, 350. Scouting in the, an art in itself, 350, 351. Sections and groups must look to their own leaders in advance through the, 352. Group organization imperative owing to characteristics of an engagement in the, 352. Nature of the, in Ashanti, 353. Sir G. Wolseley's view that for fighting in the African, an exceptionally large proportion of officers is required, 353. loss of officers heavy in most campaigns in thick, 354. Planking parties can be mobile if, is not very thick, 354. Use of elastic square if owing to thickness of, the force is moving very slowly, 355, 356. Thickness of the, in advance to Abomey, 356. Nature of, at Amoaful, 357. Not generally so thick in Dahomey as in Ashanti, 358. Arrangement of baggage columns in the, 359. Very small columns in the, 362. Moving flankers almost impossible in hilly country covered with, 362. Attack of stockades in the, 362, 363. Enemy in the, does not generally recognise the advantage of having stockades supporting each other in echelon, 364. In very thick, enemy can build fresh stockades as rapidly as troops advance, 364. Hewing paths in very thick, 364. Sometimes there is no time in very thick, to cut paths for flanking parties, 365. Columns never to file along clearings in, unless far side has been cleared, 307. If force has to be divided up in the, each column must be self contained, 367. Risk of separate columns firing into each other in the 368. No possibility of avoiding ambuscades altogether in the, 368. Sir F. Roberts's instructions for dealing with ambuscades in the, 368. In the, a retirement can easily be concealed, 369. Retreating in the, 369, 370. System of "searching the, with volleys," 371. Only in very thick, that precautionary volleys should be used, 372. Firing the, by the enemy, 372. It has generally been found that the thicker the, the more cowardly is the enemy, 372. In the, especial need exists for vigilance at the halt, 454. Value of patrolling in, as part of out-post work, 458. Sentries and picquets not to move about in thick, 459. In, even small parties should always post look-out men, 459. Arrangements to be made by a force benighted in thick, 467.

Bush fighting, operations. See Bush warfare.

Bush warfare. Value of initiative on part of junior officers in, 171. Instances of attack on enemy from several points likely to occur in, 176. Tendency of enemy towards enveloping tactics in, 187. Difficulty of following up victory in, a chief obstacle to decisive campaign, 211. Ruse of pretended retreat frequently employed in, 231. Elastic form of square used in, 258. Difficult to say where hill warfare ends and where, begins, 340. Presents many characteristics similar to hill warfare, 348. Enemy in, is rarely warlike, 348. Enemy met with in, is generally badly armed, 349. Troops not exposed to long-range sniping in, 349. Theatres of, are almost always unhealthy, 350. Essentially an affair of surprises and ambuscades, 350. Value of scouts in, 350. Special organization necessary for, 352. In, it is generally found that the enemy shirks opposing advance of troops directly, but works round their flanks, 354. Elastic square formation in, 355 to 359. Management of baggage and supply trains in, 359. In, troops fired upon suddenly should generally promptly charge, 360. Troops used in, often ill disciplined, 361. Very small columns in, 362. In certain regions small wars combine the characteristics of hill warfare and, 362 In, it is generally indispensable to be well supplied with guides, 365. Difficulty of following up successes in, 365. In, enemy generally shops inclination for counter-attack, 366. Inevitable that parties will sometimes expose flank in, 366. In, special dangers attend the division of force, 367. Retreats not so much a feature of, as of hill campaigns, 369. One great advantage of, that a very few rifles may impose upon the enemy, 370. Heavy expenditure of ammunition in, 371. The troops employed in, often mere levies, 371. No branch of irregular warfare more difficult to discuss tactically than, 372. Crossing dangerous zones in, 386. Machine guns do not get a chance in, 441. Arrangements for service of security have to be of a special kind in, 464, 465. Difficulty of outposts in, 458. Outposts by night in, 467. Safeguarding of flanks and rear on the march especially important in, 476.

Cairo. 3,000 Egyptian troops sent to Aboukir from, on same day as transports sailed from Alexandria for Ismailia, 55. Capture of, as an example of boldness and audacity, 83. Importance of securing, by a sudden coup, 92.

Calabria. Fra Diavolo and Massena in, 126.

Camel Corps. Object of the, in the Nile Expedition, 69. Well suited for surprises, 241. Have many of the properties of mounted infantry, 425. Object of, 425. Have the idea of strategical rather than tactical mobility, 425. In action, 426. Good service of the, at Kalpi, 426. Difficulty of, working with cavalry in action, 426. Lord Wolseley's instructions to, 427. Difficulties of, if attacked mounted, 427. Affair of Burnak as an example of, work, 427, 428. Can only be used under certain conditions, 428.

Cameron Highlanders. The, at the Atbara, 379, 380.

Camels. Bear face of square at Shott Tigri formed of, 257. Examples of use of, by the enemy, 425. Cannot travel as fast as irregular warriors, 426. Principle of forming square round the, of camel corps, 427. Peculiarities of, 428.

Campbell, Sir C. Mutineer attack on Cawnpore while, was relieving Lucknow, 112. Kali Nuddi after relief of Lucknow by, 170. Pursuit by, with a field battery and his staff after Cawnpore, 209. Action of, against Mohmunds at Shabkadar, as illustrating readiness of enemy to at once turn on regulars when they fall back, 214. On Captain Peel's action at the Shah Nujeef, 431.

Canadian. Forces dealing with Riel, 31. Attempted ambuscade on the, troops at Fish Creek, 255.

Canrobert, Colonel. Successful attack of, upon Nareh, 177, 178.

Cape Coast Castle. Real line of attack on Kumasi along road from, 111.

Capital. Capture of, may paralyse resistance, 35. Importance of, as objective, 35. Generally centre of communications, 35. Usual nature of, in small wars, 35. Capture of, may not effect people at large, 35. Importance of, of a petty chieftain, 36. Organized resistance sometimes ceases with fall of, 36. Objective may be, 36.

Carrington, General. Operations of, to suppress the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, 138, 139.

Carlist, Carlists. Wars exemplify insurrections, 27.

Case shot. Need of a large supply of, in small wars, 439. Heavy expenditure of, at Khartum, 439.

Caspian. Russians beyond the, 25. Skobelef s fear that reinforcements would be sent him across the, 60. Failure of column based on, to reach Khiva, 61. Lomakin's army detailed to advance from, against Turkoman's, 66. Lomakin's failure to keep his troops west of, 66. Krasnovodsk on the, 427.

Castellijos. Successful ambuscade by General Prim at, 251. Two squadrons pushed too far at, 406.

Castillo. Terrain in, suitable for guerilla warfare, 127.

Cathcart, Sir G. Quotations from, as to queuing revolts, 41. Exception taken by, to elaborate works, 135.

Caucasia. Russian troops in, have found the value of the bayonet, 399.

Caucasian. Danger to regulars of any inefficiency in the service of security when campaigning in the, forests, 480.

Caucasus. Cause of Russian failures in, 101. Skill of guerillas in the, at stratagems, 244. Russian experience in, proves that the hill man is a fighter, 289. Campaigns in the, have illustrated hill warfare, 346. Guerillas whom Russians had to deal with, in the, as daring as any on the Indian border, 346. Use of elastic square on northern slopes of the, 355. Russian campaigns in the, provide scarcely a single example of hostile night attack, 444.

Cavalry. Want of, a cause of reverses in first Boer war, 33. Efficiency of United States, at surprise marches, 137. Alone can attempt effective pursuit, 159. Sir B. Blood at Landaki wished to catch enemy in retreat with his, 100. Action of, at Badli-ke-Serai, 170. Action of, at Kali Nuddi, 170. Dispersion of tribesmen on the Swat River in 1895 by, 170. Value of, to complete a victory, 172. Question of disseminating the, on the battlefield, 172. Other arms to drive enemy on to ground where, can act when the terrain is suitable, 173. Excellent way of achieving decisive victory to drive enemy on to level ground where, can finish him, 173. Failure of, to catch enemy in retreat at Kandahar, 173. Examples of massing, 174. Should be on the spot to strike home, 174. Disaster to the United States, on the Little Big Horn, 179. When enemy pushes attack right home only, can generally manage a counter-attack, 202. On the defensive flanks should be protected with, or guns, 202. On the flank at Maiwand, 202. Need of, on the spot owing to enemy's rapid retreat, 207, 208. Instances of want of, for pursuit, 208. value of guns and, if enemy retreats in some semblance of order, 211. value of, and mounted infantry at commencement of a retreat, 217. On rear guard, 221. Value of, for feints, 231. Value of, for surprises, 241. Examples of, carrying infantry, 241. Force for a razzia generally consisted mainly of, 246. Sometimes inside square, 259. Position of cavalry with regard to squares, 264, 265. Examples of, and squares, 264, 265. Kept outside of square on the march, 275. Action of, in hill warfare, 307. Services of, in the Mamund country, 307, 308. The, at Zagai, 308. Rear face of elastic square in Dahomey sometimes formed of, 356. Infantry opposed to irregular, 388. Irregular horsemen of little use as, on the battlefield, 388. How nature of, employed varies in small wars, 401. Imperative importance of having » respectable force of, in small wars, 401. Moral effect of, 401, 402. Value of, even in hill warfare, 402. Examples of want of, 402. Disastrous consequences of lack of, in the first Boer war, 402, 403. Value of, in South Africa, 403. Need of, for raids, 403. Importance of, shock action, 404, 405. Achievements of, in small wars, 405. Risk of, falling into ambushes, 405, 406. Examples of, falling into ambush, 406. Not necessary to, that ground should be such as can be charged over, 406. Effective work of, at a trot in the hills in 1895 and 1897, 406, 407. Difficulty caused to, when attacking irregulars by their want of cohesion, 407, 408. Advantages to, when enemy adopts modern tactics, 408. Co-operation of, and horse artillery, 408, 409. Napoleon's comparison of Mamelukes to French, 409. Enemy's, formidable individually not collectively, 410. Regular should seldom shirk encounter with irregular horse even in superior numbers, 410. Meeting a charge of fanatical 410, 411. Enemy's firing from horseback, 411. Horsemen firing from the saddle incapable of meeting, charge, 411. To keep away from infantry if there is risk of being rushed, 412. Dealing with horsemen who fight on foot, 412, 413. Question of, lances, 414. Skobelef s views on, in the Turkoman campaign, 414. Acting dismounted, 414, 415. Danger to, acting dismounted in close country, 415. Question of horseholders when, dismount, 415, 416. Affair near Inyat Kali as example of, horseholders in difficulties, 416. Combination of mounted and dismounted work by, 416 to 418. Importance in small wars of, being able to combine mounted and dismounted work, 418. On very broken ground, often useless except dismounted, 418. Examples of valuable action by, acting dismounted, 419. Effective action of, firing on hostile masses otherwise engaged, 419. At Tamai and Omdurman, 419, 420. Dismounted, posing as a large force, 420. Dismounted, in attack, 420. Examples of dismounted, attacking, 420, 421. Difficulty as to horses when, attacks dismounted, 421. Distinction between mounted infantry and, 422. Intermediate grades between the mounted infantryman and, trooper, 422. Need of dash on part of, when on foot, 423. Camel corps not well adapted for working with, on the battlefield, 423. Question whether machine guns should be attached to, 440. Question of employment of, screen, 476. On open ground troops on the march look to the, and mounted infantry for security, 476.

"Cavalry Training." Reference, 8, 423.

Cave, caves. Only method of dealing with Mashonas to capture them in their, 138. Operations of Captain de Moleyns against Mashonas in their, 191, 192 Mashonas not actually attacked in their, 192.

Cawnpore. Treachery at, 50. Cause of failure to relieve, 74. Havelock's advance from, on Lucknow, as example of wisdom of avoiding engagements when very weak, 107. Skilful combination of mutineers against, 112. Example of pursuit by a field battery after Sir C. Campbell's victory at, 209. Failure of troops detached to fall on line of retreat at battle of, 209.

Celestials. See Chinese.

Celestial Empire. See China.

Central Asia. Nature of enemy in, 32. History of conquest of, 36. Vigour displayed by Russians in campaigns in, 79. Russians in, fortunate in finding enemy ready to accept battle, 104. Russian raids in, 145. Enveloping system of enemy noticeable in, 187. Difficulty found by Russians in, in bringing in captured cattle after raids, 247. Russians generally kept their mounted men outside squares in, 265. Experience in, proves that even bad marksmen can hit a square, 266. Russians sometimes marched in square in, 272. Use of zeribas for bivouacs in, 278. Successful employment of principle of laager and zeriba warfare in, 285. The horsemen of, not formidable as cavalry upon the battlefield, 388. Russian troops have found the value of the bayonet in, 899. Russian campaigns in, scarcely furnish an example of a hostile night attack, 444.

Central Asian. Campaigns of Russia, 79. The Russians in their, campaigns calculate strength by number of companies, 382.

Central Indian. Camel corps used in the, campaign, 426, 427.

Central Provinces. Sir H. Rose's campaign in the, 79. Guerilla warfare only a feature in, 148.

Chagru Kotal. The, with reference to Dargai, 302.

Chakdara. Great execution done by machine guns during siege of, 441. Good results obtained at, from training guns on likely points in anticipation of hostile night attack, 496.

Changarnier, General. Skill of, in surprises and ambuscades, 232. Great capture of cattle by, 247.

Chamberlain, Sir H. (General). Campaign of, around Ambela, 49. Compelled to await reinforcements, 73. Forcing of the Khan Band defile by, as example of the enemy's unpreparedness for flank attacks, 162.

Chamkanis, Chamkani. The attack of Lieut. Lucas on the, at Thati, 305. Visit of Sir W. Lockhart to country of, 318. Disaster to the Kapurthala infantry in the, country, 333.

Chamla. The, valley in the Ambela campaign, 44, 49.

Charasia. Battle of, as illustrating effect of a victory upon waverers in hostile ranks, 76, 77. Hostile artillery captured at, 157. Rapid flight of Afghans from, saved them from further loss, 159. As example of enemy drawing off forces to meet a flank attack and allowing small force in front to gain a decisive advantage, 166. At, detached forces could see each other, 167. Case of, as an example of hostile bodies holding aloof to await result of a fight, 212. Expenditure of ammunition by 72nd at, 396.

Charette. A master of one form of the art of war, 126. Successful attacks by, on the Hanks of Republican columns on the march, 475.

Chasseurs d'Afrique. Effective action of, dismounted in support of infantry at Ben Metir, 419.

Chechen, Chechens. How Russians were harassed by, 101. Use of elastic square in operations against the, 355.

Chechnaya. Ambuscade of a Russian force in the, on the Valerik, 254.

Chelmsford, Lord. Move of, to relieve Ekowe, 76.

Chengo River. The cavalry in the Portuguese square on the, 264, 265

Cherek-el-Tobul. Successful surprise of Abd el Kader's camp at, by attack at dawn, 193, 240.

Chermside, Colonel. Effect of prompt action by, at Sarras, 75.

Chikislar. Base of Lomakin's army, 66. Whole army collected at once at, 66. Skobelef did not collect army at, till last moment, 66.

Chillianwalla. An example of want of artillery preparation, 155.

China. Struggle between Japan and, practically a small war, 21. War of 1860, 28. Moral effect in, war of 1860 of capture of guns, 157.

Chinese. Partially organised in Tonkin, 29. In, war of 1860 fall of Pekin decisive, 36. Treachery of, at Bao Le, 61. Treachery of, during Anglo-French advance on Pekin, 51. Driven with little loss out of Bacninh and Hung Hua by artillery fire, 153. Complaint of, at ignorance of barbarians who attacked them in rear, 161. General Négrier's method of assaulting, works, 165. Seldom let French get to close quarters, 165. Tendency of, to occupy and entrench distinct lines of defence, 171. Vigour ot, in following up French at first after Bang Bo, 214. Silencing of the, guns in Tonkin, 433. The, war furnishes scarcely an example of a hostile night attack, 444. Counter-attack of, at Nui Bop, 485.

Chitral. Special objective in, campaign, 42. Colonel Kelly's advance to, 80. Colonel Kelly's advance for relief of, 94. Campaign illustrates advantage of moving in several columns, 112. Cavalry on Swat River in 1895 during, expedition, 405. Lieut. Harley's sortie from, as an example of effective counter-attack, 197. Action on the Swat River in the, campaign, 405. Signal service of cavalry during advance towards, 407.

Chitralis. Bewilderment of the, by Colonel Kelly's methods, 80. Aptitude of, for selecting formidable positions, 94.

Chouan, Chouans. Hoche's operations against, 40, 130.

Churchill, Lieut Winston. Quotation from, illustrating effect of counterattack by troops in retreat and in difficulties, 334.

Circassians. How Russians were harassed by, 101.

Clausewitz. Dictum of, that night attacks are confined to small bodies, 485. Clearing, clearings. To be formed as stages in dealing a way through bush, 365. Precautions to be taken at, 367. Dealing with, when in retreat, 370. In thick bush bivouacs to have, round them, 459. Clery, General. Account of the forcing of the Khaibar pass in "Minor Tactics" of, 294.

Clive. Since days of, victory has in India been achieved by vigour and dash rather than by force of numbers, 78.

Cochin China. Value of rivers in, for supply purposes, 63.

Colley, Sir G. General expectations that Boers would disperse before, 48. Effect of, communications being threatened by Boers, 117. Ignominious position of force of, owing to want of cavalry, 403. The safe withdrawal of his force from the Ingogo by, at night, 490, 491.

Colorado. Affair of Milk River in, 283

Columns. Size of, in hill warfare, 290, 291.

Combined training. References, 222, 396, 449, 451.

Commissariat. See Supply.

Communication, lines of. See Lines of Communication.

Communications. Insurrections in countries where, are bad involve troublesome operations, 27. Capital generally centre of, 35. In civilized countries, generally well known, 43. Absence of, adds in difficulties of supply and transport, 58. Only in theatre of war with good, can supply problem be worked out with certainty, 62, 63. Generally most indifferent in countries where small wars take place, 62. Necessity of, in case of reverse, 86. Enemy does not need, 86. In European campaigns an army can generally as it advances cover its, 106. Troops brought to standstill in Ambela campaign owing to danger to, 117. Numerous forces absorbed in guarding, 117. Liberty of action enjoyed by army cast loose from its, 118. Abandonment of, in Tirah, 119. Drawbacks when an army abandons its, 119. Difference between oases of armies abandoning, for short and for long time, 120. Abandonment of, is often not complete, 120. Examples of abandonment, of, 121. An army without, which meets with reverse is in very evil plight, 122. Difficulty of co-operation between an army which has abandoned its, and other forces, 123. Conclusions as to abandonment of, 124. Company, companies. The, formed too large a unit for bush warfare, 352. In the bush, get broken up into small parties, 353. Each, broken up into permanent sections in Ashanti, 353. Tendency to make, the unit in small wars, 382, 383. Strength of foreign, 382. Russians count their strength by, 382. See also Infantry.

Containing force. Question of, when hostile position is to be attacked in flank or rear, 163. At Kirbekan, made no attack, 164. Convoy. Question of, forming supply column, 60. When a, has to be protected it may be unwise to accept action, 107. Square adopted on march to safeguard the, 271 to 273. Inconvenient nature of the, at Suakin, 273. System of, at Suakin, 273, 274. Stationary picquets usual when a, has to pass along a valley, 298. Protection of, on the march, 477.

Cornwallis, Lord. Night attack of, on Tippoo's lines at Seringapatam, 484.

Correspondents. War, are all on side of regulars, 54.

Cossacks. Need of, on the steppes, 137. The skill of the, in forming ambuscades and their method of working, 250, 251. The, used to fire very much from horseback formerly, 411.

Counter-attack, counter-attacks. Energetic, required in guerilla warfare, 128. Need of reserves when attacking for fear of, 184. Examples of hostile, 185, 186. Enemy seldom cares to quit position to deliver, 186. Enemy realizes that flanks and rear of regulars when attacking are the best points for, 187. Mere facing about may not suffice to meet a, in rear, 189. Value of, in shape of sorties when a small force of regulars is cooped up, 196. Moral affect of by garrisons, 197, 198. The unsuccessful attacks upon the Bemaru heights as examples of failure of» 198, 199. Chance of delivering, when enemy is advancing, 202. If enemy pushes attack right home there is generally no opportunity for 202. It cannot be laid down when, should be delivered, 202, 203. Value of when a rear guard is severely pressed, 223. Col. Haughton's action at Tseri Kandao as an example of, by a rear guard when in great danger, 224, 225. A bold, often test way out of a difficulty in retreating in hill warfare, 325. Advantage of a sudden, to check pursuit in hill warfare, 331, 333. Effect of, when in retreat in hill warfare sometimes to drive enemy round flanks, 334. Great results achieved by, in hill warfare, 334. Example of, by the 35th Sikhs, 334, 335. Tendency of enemy to, in bush warfare, 366. Value of, in retreat in bush warfare, 369. Idea of attack formation in small wars is extension with sufficient rigidity to be safe against a, 376. Question of delivering, in case of a hostile night attack upon regulars, 497, 493.

Counter-stroke. See Counter-attack.

Crag Picquet. Night attack on the, 443. First attack on, made at dawn, 447.

Crowning the heights. Necessity of, in hill warfare, 202. Examples of failure to, 292, 293. Importance of the enemy's dislike of attacking uphill and being commanded in connection with, 293. Principle of, in attacking a defile, 294. Constant necessity of, and trouble caused thereby, 294. Explanation of method of, 295, 296. Analogy of the system of, to square formation, 299.

Cuba. Spanish operations in, 131, 133. Lack of intelligence service in, 144. Impossibility of avoiding ambuscades in, 368. In guerilla warfare in, regulars find that any inefficiency in the service of security may lead to disaster, 480.

Cuban. Nature of the, insurgents, 132. Failure of Spanish in dealing with, insurgents partly due to lack of self-reliant subordinate leaders, 134.

Custer, Colonel. In command of column on the Little Big Horn, 179.

Dackoits. Operations in Burma directed against, 147. The, generally held villages or some form of stockade, 165. Dakka. Action of Gara heights near, 381.

Daghestan. Action on the Metchik in, 161. Difficulty of pursuit in, 211.

Dahomey. French campaign in, 36. Savages in, fighting in bush offered battle, 32. In, organized resistance ceased with fall of Abomey, 36. French in, not prepared to find enemy had guns, 48. Advantage of Wémé River to French in, 63. Deadly climate in, 98. In war, French aimed at the capital, 105. Adoption of square formation in, 187. In, enemy's attacks on flanks and rear were met best by a temporary defensive, 196. Victories nearly completed by successful pursuit in, 211. Affair of Achupa at commencement of, war, 260. Inconvenience caused to French square in, by enemy's guns, 267. Cavalry with reference to squares in, 275. Employment of zeribas in, 281. French in, made the section the unit, 352. Nature of enemy in, 255. Enemy never got inside square in force in, 356. Bush not so thick in, as in Ashanti, 358. In bush fighting as in, the enemy generally inclined for counter-attack, 366. Impossible to avoid falling into ambushes in, 368. The company and afterwards the section made the unit in, 382. French infantry in, depended almost entirely on volleys, 395. Portable artillery alone of use in, 438. Affords no instance of hostile night attack, 444.

Dahomeyans. Advance of, in force against Porto Novo, 260. The, gradually gave way before the French, 356. The, worked round the French flank at Umbumedi, 419. The, made two attacks on French at dawn, 447.

Damaraland. German difficulties as to water in, 61.

Dargai. Enemy misled previous to second attack upon, 65. Victory of British at, greatly impressed tribesmen, 104. Assistance given to infantry at, by artillery fire, 154. Extraordinary strength of position at, caused assailants heavy losses but also caused enemy to hold his ground, 160. The two attacks on, as an illustration of the question of capturing and of holding captured positions in hill warfare, 302, 303. Losses in attack generally insignificant except when crossing a dangerous zone as at, 376. The case of, as an example of how to cross a specially dangerous zone, 385.

Darotaleh. Ammunition nearly ran out at, 394.

Dawn. Although enemy often attacks at, does not seem to be ready to be attacked at that time, 192. By attacking at, enemy cannot tell exact point aimed at, 192. Examples of attacks at, 193, 194. Attacks at, offer chance of decisive success, 194. Only way of getting enemy to fight may be by attack at, 194. Night march and attack at, probably the most effective form of surprise, 240. Examples of surprises at, 240. The enemy's inclination to attack regulars at, 446, 447. Examples of hostile attacks at, 447, 448. Night marches necessary to bring off an attack at, 488. Counter-attacks at, on enemy making a night attack, 498.

Daybreak. See Dawn.

D'Aumale, Duc. The capture of Abd el Kader's smala by the, 82, 83. Capture of the smala by, a good illustration of surprise, 241. If a raid meets with important opposition the plan of, may be the best, 246.

De la Rey. Reference to, 126.

De Wet. Reference to, 126.

Debeb. Failure of Italians to capture, as an example of necessity of keeping intended surprise secret, 243. de Moleyns, Capt. Operations of, against Mashonas in their caves, 191.

Defence. See Defensive.

Defence Works. See Fortifications.

Defensive. Strategical offensive not incompatible with tactical, 76. Sikhs adopted, tactics from choice, 150. Bluff not prohibited by, attitude, 175. Lieut. Grant's action at Thobal as example of bluff on the, 175. Square and echelon formations in reality, formations, 189. Subject of, affords little scope for discussion, 195. Attitude almost always to be deprecated, 195. Army acting on, tacitly admits superiority of enemy, 195. Tactics sometimes forced upon regulars, 195. When a small force of regulars is opposed to great hostile masses it is almost imperative to act on, 196. When small force is besieged it can only spasmodically depart from attitude of passive, 196. To be as active as possible, 196. Purely passive, absolutely fatal, 197. Passive, inadmissible with anything approaching to equality of force, 199. Passive, excusable as a ruse, 199. Examples of British disasters due to passive, 200, 201. Result had, been adopted at Plassey and Meani, 201. Question of active, 202. On, a great development of fire essential, 202. Kailua as an example of active, 203. Actions the exception and not the rule, 205. Whole question of, in small wars wrapped up with squares and defence works, 206. A, attitude generally unsound in principle, 206. In laager and zeriba warfare, tactics superimposed on offensive strategy, 277. Employment of laagers and zeribas means an attitude tending towards passive, 278. Infantry formations on the, 386 to 388. Khartum the first example of use of magazine rifle on the, against masses, 389. Importance of fire discipline on the, 393, 394 Magazine fire only allowable at last moment on the, 394. Artillery on the, 435 to 437. Value of machine guns on the, 441.

Defile. Importance of capturing the heights in attack on a mountain, 294. General Pollock's attack on the entrance of Khaibar as example of forcing a, 294.

Deh Khoja. Sortie against, as example of artillery preparation warning enemy of point of attack, 153. Affair of, as example of difficulty of managing separated columns in attack, 180, 181. Enemy's withdrawal of troops from, at night, 192. An example of an unsuccessful sortie, 198.

Delhi. Army before, never allowed mutineers to dominate surrounding country, 77. Only at, that rebels were for a time able to hold their ground, 79. Hodson's exploits after capture of, 82. Defenders of, ready to accept battle, 103. How capture of, by mutineers was of a certain advantage to British troops, 105. And Lucknow formed distinct gathering points for rebels, 108. The mutineers at, made only one attempt at dawn on the ridge knowing that the British would be alert, 447.

Denghil Tepe. A clear objective for Russians, 38. Small force able to be brought by Lomakin against, 06. Skobelef s plan of ensuring that he would have effective army to bring against, 66. Force collected at, compared to force on communications, 118. Lomakin obliged to attack, without reserves, 185. Case of, illustrates value of artillery in support, 186. Readiness of Turkomans for counter-attack at, 213. Number of rounds fired by Russians during unsuccessful attack on, 396. Turkomans checked by guns at Lomakin's unsuccessful attempt upon, 436. Guns placed in advanced posts on road to, 437. Turkoman sorties from, at night, 444.

Dennie. Successful ambuscade by, near Jellalabad, 250.

Dervish, dervishes. See Sudanese.

Desert column. In operations of, it was greatly hampered by convoy, 120. The outpost system adopted by the, at night, 462.

Desultory warfare. Of U.S. troops against Red Indians, 22. A usual consequence of campaigns following on conquest, 26. Years of, in Algeria, 126. Examples of, 27. Fall of Algiers merely prelude to years of, 38. After capture of capital in Zulu and Matabili wars, 36. Conspicuous by its absence in Central Asia, 37. Importance of preventing struggle from degenerating into, 97. Usual cause of operations being prolonged is their having been allowed to drift into, 99. Indefinite operations by regulars bring on, 100.

Dewangniri. The retirement from, as an example of confusion occurring on a night march, 492.

Dey. Armies of the, of Algiers, 22. Nature of troops of, 30. Forces of, concentrated to bar line of advance on Algiers, 105. Determined attack of the forces of the, on French at daybreak, 447.

Dinapore. Mutineers from, attack Arrah, 81. Defeat of relieving column from, 215. The unsuccessful attempt to relieve Arrah from, as an ex-ample of enemy's disinclination to pursue, 215. The night attack on the relieving column from, 490.

Dismounted. Cavalry acting against horsemen who fight, 412, 413. Difficulties of mounted men fighting, 415, 416. Danger of acting, if liable to be rushed, 415. Risk or horseholders being attacked if cavalry act, 415. Affair near Inyat Kali showing risk run by horseholders when cavalry act, 416. Combination of mounted and, work, 416 to 418. Risk to, men when retiring, 417, 418. In very broken ground cavalry must act, 118. Examples of, action of cavalry, 419. Effect of, action of cavalry on a flank, 419. Troopers after the charge of the 21st Lancers at Khartum, 419. Cavalry, posing as a larger force, 420. Cavalry in attack, 420. Examples of, cavalry attacking, 421. Tactics of mounted infantry similar to those of cavalry when acting, 422, 423. See also Cavalry. Mounted Infantry.

Division of force. See Separation.

Dodds, General. Quotation from, 44. WÔme River enabled, to advance confidently, 63. Inconvenience caused to, force by its large convoy, 120. Formation of, force at the outset, 356. Force of, worked first by companies afterwards by sections, 382. Fight at Dogba when, first advanced, 447.

Dogali. Cause of Italian reverse at, 48. The machine guns jammed at, 440.

Dogba. Attack on the French at dawn at, 447.

Dogras. Knowledge among, of hill warfare, 321.

Dorsets. The, and Sikhs at the rear guard action of Tseri Kandao, 224, 225. Cause of disaster to party of, 319. Advice given to Northamptons and, in Tirah by Sir W. Lockhart, 320. The, at Saran Sax, 342 to 344.

Dost Mahomed. Placing foot soldiers behind horsemen by, 242.

Downman, Major. Rear guard action of, in the Bara valley, 175, 318, 339.

Dragomirof. Views of, as to night attacks, 484, 485.

Drives. The, in S. Africa, 93, 143.

Dubrai. The Afghan night attack on, 444.

Duc d'Aumale. See d'Aumale, Duc.

Duchesne, General. Advance of, on Antananarivo with fraction of his force, 44, 45, 120. Plan of attack of, on Amboluminas range, 167. Instructions of, as to retreats, 217. System of, not applicable to an enemy like Zulus or ghazis, 218.

Dutch. Experiences of, in Achin, 32. First, expedition against Achin, 45, 48.. Value of Achin River to, for supply, 63. In, campaigns in Achin villages often captured and then abandoned, 101. Incident of a, patrol, 102. Heavy losses of, in attacks on Achinese stockades partly due to want of artillery preparation, 165. Surprise of, in broad daylight, 460.

Dwatoi. Length of time taken on first march from Maidan to, 313. Rear guard halted and baggage parked for the night during first march to, 317. Trapping of a party of Afridis on return march from, 323. Clear start got by force on returning from, owing to the movement not being expected by the enemy, 329. Fate of the Afridi party trapped between, and Bagh took all sting out of hostile pursuit, 334.

Earle, General. Plan of, for attack on Kirbekan, 164.

Echelon. Formation at Isly, of battalion columns, 188. One of the most decisive battles of the century won in, formation, 188. Remarks on formation, 188, 189. Formation defensive in reality, 189. French adopted, in Tonkin.

Edwardes, Major Herbert. Description of the battle of Suruj Kund by, 162.

Egerton, General. At Jidballi, 188. Quotation from as to independent fire of marksmen and volleys in hill warfare, 392.

Egypt. Enemy in, in 1882 partially organized, 29. French adopted square in, to beat off masses of hostile horse, 259. French forced to adopt square on the march in, by the Mamelukes, 272. French in, bivouacked in square, 276. On the sands of, mountain artillery proved as mobile as field artillery, 438.

Egyptian, Egyptians. Position of, forces at Tel-el-Kebir, 92. Possibility that, works might have been captured by assault after Kassassin, 100. Surprised at Tel-el-Kebir, 104. At Tokar, troops beat off Sudanese in line, 204. Two, brigades at the Atbara, 379. Formation of the, infantry at the Atbara, 380. Difference between effect of British and, rifles at Khartum, 390. Independent fire of, infantry at Atbara, 391.

Egyptian Army. British operations against, in 1882, 22. Attack of, on British at Kassassin, 106. Ambuscade prepared by the Mahdi for the, at Shekan, 254. Camel corps used with cavalry in the, 426. Good service performed by the camel corps of the, 428. The, attacked British lines at Kassassin at dawn, 447.

Egyptian war, campaign. Of 1882 a campaign of expediency, 28. As illustrating principle of pushing on supplies ahead of bulk of army, 67. Full recognition of the principle of striving for decisive battle in the, of 1882, 92. Cavalry operations in the, 174. In campaigns like, the cavalry charges have a well defined role, 428.

Ekowe. Advance to relieve, 76.

El Obeid. Hicks Pasha's march to, 44. Wells closed up by enemy in rear of Hicks Pasha on march to, 62.

El Teb. Square at, got on the flank of Osman Digna, 163. Square used in attack at, 259. Position of guns at, 263. Losses caused in square ax, by hostile guns, 266. Shows that it is not impracticable to assault a position in square, 267. Value of cavalry when enemy has been driven off by square shown at, 275. Number of rounds expended at, 396. Want of lances at, 408. Hussars armed with spears after, 414.

Eleventh Bengal Lancers. Efficiency of the, in irregular warfare on bad ground, 407.

Elles, General. Broaching of tanks in 1897 one of chief difficulties, had to contend with, 62.

Eritrea. Attempted capture of Debeb by Italians in, 243.

Essaman, Sir G. Wolseley's despatch after engagement at, 353.

"Etudes de Guerre." System of ambuscades as outposts advocated in, 469.

Eyre, Major. Relief of Arrah by, as an example of boldness, 81, 82.

Fanatics. Risk of counter-attack when fighting, 185. Good troops on open ground have little to fear from, 186. Very rapid advance of, enables them to make their onslaughts from any side, 188, 189. Tendency even of, to disperse in all directions when once defeated, 210.

Feint, feints. That adversaries so addicted to, should be deceived them, selves is due to their contempt for stolid methods of regular warfare 227. Impressionable nature of enemy a potent factor in question of 228. Kambula a typical example of a successful, 229, 230. Other examples of, 230.231. Enemy can he misled by, as to intended point of attack, 236. Enemy sometimes cannot be drawn on by, 237. Question of, dealt with at some length because it might be supposed that enemy was difficult to impose upon, 238. Effect of, when in retreat in hill warfare, 334.

Ferkeh. Action of, a case where main attack was frontal, but smaller force appeared on enemy's line of retreat, 164, 165. The result of night marches of two columns, 240.

Fifteenth Sikhs, The. At Tseri Kandao, 224, 225. At Saran Sar, 342.

Fifth Gurkhas, The. At Thati, 305.

Fifty-eighth Regiment. The attack of the, upon Laing's Neck, 384

Filipinos. Unexpected appearance of guns with, at Kalumpit, 48.

Fire discipline. With good field of fire there should be no fear of line being broken if good, is maintained, 204. Thorough, can generally be maintained in square, 270. Difficulty of maintaining, in the bush, 371. Maintenance of, one of the chief causes of adopting small units for infantry in bush warfare, 371. Stricter, of the French than of the British, 377. Great importance of, 389. Want of, in some small wars, 389. Necessity of maintaining, when delivering a night attack, 487. Importance of maintaining, in case of a night alarm, 496, 497.

Fires. Use of, by Colonel Baden-Powell to deceive defenders of Wedza's stronghold, 176. Lighting of, at night in the bush objectionable, 467. Employment of, as ambuscades, 467. Use of, in front of posts at night, 474. Use of, in case of hostile night attacks, 495. Examples of, assisting defence against hostile attacks at night, 495.

First Sikhs, The. At Shah Alam Kaghza, 328.

Fish Creek. Ambuscade at, 255.

Flankers. Question of moving, in hill warfare, 298, 299. Must be stationary if slopes are covered with dense forests, 340, 341. Necessary to move with, on either side in bush warfare, 354. No need for, to be at any great distance from column in bush warfare, 355. If enemy be discovered in the bush, can rapidly be reinforced, 358. Management of, to a baggage column in the bush, 360. In hilly bush country moving, almost an impossibility, 362. Necessity of paths being hewed for, in very thick jungle, 364. Difficult position of, in retreat in bush warfare, 370. In a harassed retreat, may have to be dispensed with, 370. To be pushed well out when safe on the march, 476. Question of, to protect convoys, 477.

Flying column, columns. Reason why system of, is so largely adopted in small wars, 118. Small, form effective protection for line of communications, 118. Each division marched out of Tirah as a, 119. Difference between an army being a, for a considerable time and its being merely cast loose from its communications for a few days, 120. Disadvantages of an army becoming a, 122 to 124. Conclusions as to advisability of army advancing as a, 124. Haphazard action of Spanish, in Cuba, 132. General Bugeaud's, in Algeria, 135. Advantage of, in, guerilla warfare, 136. Nature of troops in, in guerilla warfare, 136. Guns with, 136. On the prairie and steppes, consist of mounted troops, 136, 137. Effect of small, in the Kaffir war of 1877, 137. General Carrington's, in Rhodesia, 137. In S.A. war, 139, 140. Size of, 141. Disasters to very small, in Mexico, 141. To be as independent as possible, 142. Leaders of, to be allowed independence, 142, 143. When a force is moving as a, in an inhospitable theatre of war its transport becomes too large to surround in square, 274.

Formosa. French operations in, undertaken with inadequate force, 73.

Fort Battye. The night attack on, 444.

Fort Newdigate. False alarm, at, as illustrating objection to outlying picquets, 464.

Forty-fourth (44th) Regiment. Last stand of the, on the retreat from Kabul, 322. Forty-second (42nd). The, at Ordahsu, 190.

Fra Diavolo. And his brigands almost a match for Massena's veterans, 126.

Fulahs. Defeat of the, at Bida, 269.

Futtehabad. Action of, as an example of drawing enemy into attack, 231.

Galkas. Effect of defeat of Galikas upon the, 76. The, drawn into a fight at Kwintana in spite of efforts of Sandilli to hold them back, 232.

Galikas. Defeat of the, at Ibeka, 76. The, drawn into ambush at Kwintana, 232.

Gandamak. Disaster to British army in denies of, 199, 216.

Gara. Action on the, heights as example of supports filling a gap in the firing line, 381.

Gaselee, General. Disposition of his forces by, when unable to get his whole brigade over a pass before night, 318. Gatacre, General. Attack formation of brigade of, at the Atbara, 379.

Gate Pah. Party surprised near the, owing to taking no precautions, 460.

Gaza. Action between the Portuguese and the, rebels on the Chengo River, 264, 265.

Gentil, General. Surprise of Abd el Kader's camp by, 193.

Georgia. Sherman's march through, solitary instance of such operation in regular warfare of late years, 121.

Georgians. How Russians were harassed by, 101.

Germans. Difficulties of, as regards water, 61. Operations of, against Herreros in Waterberg, 93. Slow movements of, against guerillas, 130. Failure of to form a proper intelligence service in S.W. Africa, 148. Disaster to, at Owikokero, 255.

Ghazis. Attack of, at Bareilly, 18. Charge of, at Ahmed Khel, 204. Retreating before, some form of square formation almost indispensable, 21 m. Rushes of, avail nothing against two-deep line, 387. The, at Bareilly rushed on to the bayonets, 399. Effect of artillery when standing on defensive against, 436. Guns lost at Maiwand owing to, rush, 437. Value of machine guns against rushes of, 441.

Ghazni. Narrow escape from failure of the night attack on the Kabul gate of, owing to a mistake, 4486.

Ghilzai. The, tribesmen during retreat from Kabul, 322.

Ghundi. Village of, at battle of Kandahar, 172.

Ghundigan. Village of, at battle of Kandahar, 172.

Gilgit. Colonel Kelly's advance from, to Chitral, 80. Nature of country between, and Matsuj, 94.

Ginghilovo. Battle of, a defensive fight, 76. Zulu enveloping system of attack at, 190. When enemy pushes attack right home as at, his force is destroyed, 202. Position of laager at, deliberately selected, 283. Number of rounds expended at, 396. The Zulus attacked at dawn, 447.

Glasenapp, Major. Disaster to, 255.

Golosojef, General. Ambuscade of a Russian force under, on the Valerik, 254.

Gordon. General. Camel corps sent across desert to open communications with, 69.

Gordon Highlanders. Action of party of, under Capt. Uniacke in the Bara valley, 175. Party of Zakka Khels caught by Madras sappers and, inn a ravine, 323.

Gough, Major. Action fought by, at Darotaleh, 394.

Graham, Sir G. Advance of, from Trinkitat surrounded by a cordon of skirmishers, 476.

Grant, Lieut. Advance of, to Thobal as an example of dash and audacity 83. Successful bluff of, when on the defensive, 83, 175.

Greece. Failure of Ottoman Empire to subdue the highlanders of, for years, 287.

Greeks. Victory of, at Thermopylae over Turks, 293.

Grenfell, General. Reconnaissance of, at Toski, 237. Nejumi compelled to fight by, 230, 238.

Greyville. French column obliged to return to, owing to marauders attacking its convoy in rear, 478.

Guards Camel Regiment. The system of outposts adopted by the, at night at Gubat, 462.

Gubai. Arrival of desert column at, 69. Effect of heavy losses about, 107. Enemy at Abu Klea after Sir E. Boiler's withdrawal from, 420. The outposts at night at, 462.

Guerilla, guerillas. Throughout regarded as enemy, 23. Examples of methods of, being adopted by civilized enemy, 31. Ferocity of, in La Vendée, &c, 96. Great leaders of irregulars were commanders of, and banditti, 126. The, ever a thorn in the Bide of the organized force, 126. Abd el Kader a, leader of the foremost rank, 128. Good intelligence department important in war against, 143 to 145. Raids sometimes only means of bringing, to book, 145. Skill of, in La Vendée, the Peninsula, and Poland at stratagems, 244. Successful ambuscades of the Spanish, in the Peninsular war, 244. The, of the hills plays the game in his own way, 289. Need of mounted troops for dealing with, spread over a great extent of country, 403, Inclination of, to operate against flanks and rear of a column on the march, 475. The, met with in civil warfare are just as alive to the need of keeping a look out at night as regulars, 483.

Guerilla warfare. Constitutes a form of small wars, 21. Later stages of South African war typical, 31. Operations on north-west frontier afford examples of, 32. In, in civilized countries wounded cannot be abandoned, 95. The most unfavourable shape which a campaign can take, 99. Inclination of enemy for, 99. Merely an aggravated form of desultory warfare, 100. In, regulars must be split up into fractions, 109. Flying columns largely employed in, 119. Only strategical aspects of, dealt with in Chap. XI, 125. Is what regular armies always have to dread, 126. Terrain has much to say to effective conduct of, 127. Means petty annoyance, 127. French operations in Algeria illustrate right and wrong method of meeting, 128. Bugeaud's early experience of, in Spain, 128. Hill campaigns in India well illustrate, 130. Parcelling out theatre of war in, 130, 131. The, in Cuba, 131, 132. The dealing with sections in, 133, 134. Fortified posts and depôts in, 134, 135. Flying columns in, 135, 136. Need for mounted troops in, in certain theatres, 136, 137. Rhodesian rebellion, an example of, 137, 138. During South African war, 139, 140. "Drives" to meet the case of, 143. Need of good intelligence in, 143 to 145. Use of reprisals in, 146 to 147. Hoche's's method of conducting, 147.

Guides. Necessity of having, in bush warfare, 365.

Guides, The. Attack of the, cavalry on the tribesmen when Sir B. Blood broke out of Malakand, 173. Sikh company rescued by, in first day's fighting in Mamund country, 312. The retirement of, after rescuing the Sikhs, 316. Efficiency of the, cavalry in irregular warfare on bad ground, 407.

Gulistan. Relief of Fort, as an example of occasion when use of artillery was desirable without waiting for the infantry, 155. The sorties from, as an example of effective counter-attack, 197.

Gumburu. Effect of, on Somalia, 103. Ammunition failed at, 394.

Gun, guns. See Artillery.

Gun Hill. The attack on, 484.

Gurkha, Gurkhas. The, at Tseri Kandao, 224. The, scouts in attack above Thati, 305. The, know that hill warfare differs from what is learnt in manœuvres, 321. Skill of. at ambuscading hill-men, 325. Service of the, scouts in Tirah, 345. Skill of the, in constructing stockades in Nepaul, 363. Skill of, scouts at stalking snipers, 472. The dread of the Ambela tribesmen of, and Pathans on outpost, 472. The, defences in 1816 turned by the night march of a brigade, 491.

Guru Mountain. The successful withdrawal of the picquets from the, in Ambela campaign, 491.

Gwalior. Characteristics of the campaign of, 79. Affair of Jaora-Alipore after battle of, 211.

Hadendowa. Nature of the, 30. Onslaughts of masses of fanatical, beaten off easily in square in the bush near Suakin, 273.

"Handbook of Tactics--Savage Warfare." Quotation from explaining how system of outlying picquets at night in Tirah was arrived at, 498.

Hanoi. French advance from, to Bacninh, 55. French advance from, on Bacninh an example of manœuvring enemy out of position, 94. Ambuscade of the French near, 254.

Hamdab. Starting point of river column, 63. Nile between Third Cataract and, 08. General Hunter's rapid march from, to Abu Hamed, 89.

Harley, Lieut. Sortie of, from Chitral, 197.

Hashin. Action of, followed by retirement, 101. Cavalry dismounted at, rushed by Arabs, 415.

Hastings. Normans employed feint of a pretended retreat at, 230.

Haughton, Lieut-Col. The rear guard action of Tseri Kandao under, 224, 225. Death of, at Shin Kamar, 311. Action of, when benighted with the rear guard on the first march to Dwatoi, 317. Action of, in joining hit two parties at Tseri Kandao before daylight, 319.

Havelock, Sir H. (General). Advance of, on Cawnpore, 74. The advance of, on Lucknow as example of avoiding engagements under certain circumstances, 107. Want of cavalry for pursuit during, advance from Allahabad to Lucknow, 208. Successful feint of, at Onao, 231.

Henry IV. Dictum of, as to supply and strength of armies in Spain, 60.

Herat. Ayoub Khan's advance from, 48.

Herreros. Water a great difficulty in operations against, 61. Operations against, in Waterberg, 93. Ambuscade of, 265.

Hicks Pasha. Disaster to, illustrates danger of not knowing route, 44. Wells filled in by dervishes in rear of, 02. Although force of, destroyed at Shekan it could probably not have got back to the Nile in any case, 122. Had no cavalry for pursuit at Marabia, 208. Beaten army of, had no retreat, 216. The ambuscade of, army at Shekan, 254. Bear face of square under, broken by enemy and position retrieved by front face wheeling round, 262. Victory of, at Marabia in square, 269. The force under, at Shekan encumbered by a mass of transport, 272. Kept cavalry outside squares, 275.

High explosives. Desirability of introducing shells with, for small wars, 438. Effect of shells with, from howitzer battery at Omdurman, 438.

Highland Brigade. The, at Tel-el-Kebir, 379.

Hill campaigns. See Hill warfare.

Hill warfare. In Indian, sudden gatherings and dispersions of enemy a feature, 88. Of India illustrates guerilla warfare, 130. Value of initiative on part of junior officers in, 171. Attacks on enemy from several points likely to occur in, 176. In, difficulty of following up successes one of chief obstacles to decisive campaign, 211. Especially In that the system of rear guard retiring in driblets holds good, 222. Counter-attack by rear guard especially hazardous in, 223. Ruse of pretended retreat frequently used in, 229. A form of elastic square used in, 208. A special branch of the military art, 286. Genuine, is campaigning against hill-men fighting in guerilla fashion in their own country, 286. Operations on Punjab frontier of 1897-98, have shown need of training troops for, 286. Present features of exceptional difficulty to regular armies, 286. The special difficulties of, 287. Difficulty earned by wounded in, 288. Special risk to officers in Indian, 288. In, regulars have to contend against missiles which nature provides, 290. Size of columns in, 291. Length of marches in, 291. "Crowning the heights" in, 292, 293. Difficulty caused by retirements being so often necessary in, 299. Need of reconnaissances in, 300. Retirement from captured crests in, 302. Experience shows the importance of making a good bag in, 304. Too much stress laid on turning movements in, 306. Principle of forward tactics of artillery especially important in, 307. How cavalry can act in, 307, 308. Destruction oi villages in, 308. Difficulty of communication of orders in, 310. Examples of mistakes as regards orders in, 311, 312. When heavy loss occurred at night in the, of 1897, it was due to misunderstanding, or to fact that approach of darkness was not soon enough taken into account, 316. Retirements in, 324. The troops generally retreating down hill in, 326. Quotation from Lieut.-Colonel Pollock's "Notes on, " 328, 329. In retirements in, it is impossible to insist too strongly on touch being kept between front and rear, 336. Effect of hills being covered with trees in, 339. Scouts in, 345. Why the campaigns of 1897-98 have been specially considered in discussing, 346. Importance of a knowledge of theoretical principles of, 347. Liability of British troops to be engaged in, 347. System of infantry attack in, 377. Value of cavalry in, 402. Plunging artillery fire may be best in, 430. Machine guns scarcely get a proper chance in, 441. Sniping a serious inconvenience at night in Indian, 448. In, a quite different system of outpost has frequently to be adopted from what is usual in small wars, 453. Picquets in, by day, 457. Picquets pushed well out in, will secure bivouac from sniping by day, 457. The bush warfare, 458, 459. Ambuscades on outpost used in Indian, 466. Distant picquets at night in, 467 to 470. In many theatres of, the same outpost system as that usual in open country would be best, 470. Use of stones in front of outposts in, to roll down on hostile parties approaching, 474. Safeguarding of flanks and rear on the march especially necessary in, 476.

"Hill Warfare on the Indian Frontier." Quotation from, as to independent fire and volleys in hill warfare, 392.

Hindu Khush. Detachment of troops from Kabul to the, in 1841, 113.

Hindustani fanatics. The, at Malka cause of Ambela campaign, 49.

Hoa Moe. Forward artillery tactics at, 431.

Hoche. Attitude of, towards Chouans, 41. Cause of Republican disasters before arrival of, in La Vendée, 113. Method of, in Brittany, 130. On mobile columns, 136. Methods of, adapted to Rhodesia, 138. Independence of subordinate commanders under, 142. System of espionage, 143. Description of, methods by Thiers, 147.

Hodson. Action of, after capture of Delhi as an example of dash and audacity, 82.

Holer. A master of one form of the art of war, 126.

Horse, horsemen. See Cavalry.

Houssa. Precautionary volleys of the, force in Benin, 371.

Hova, Hovas. French expedition against of 1883, 28. Campaign of 1895 against, as example of bad intelligence, 44. Unexpectedly feeble resistance in 1895 of, 43. Loss of French in campaign against, from disease, 98. Unprepared at outset in 1883, but became formidable when French failed to tackle them effectively, 99. Flight of, when shells burst near them, 153. The, completely demoralised by French melinite shells, 438. Attempted surprise of, on French at dawn at Tsaratsora, 448.

Hung Hua. Failure of separate columns to arrive simultaneously at, 114. Chinese driven out of, with little loss by artillery fire, 153.

Hunter, General. Strategical surprise of Abu Hamed by, 89. Great effect of the machine guns during reconnaissance of, to the Atbara zeriba, 441. Attack of, on Gun Hill, 484.

Hunza-Nagar. The, campaign as illustrating difficulty of concealing movements from enemy, 54. In fighting in, after capture of Nilt, the frequent frontal attempts on enemy's position served to attract his attention entirely to that point, 236.

Ibeka. Fight at, as illustrating effect of a victory upon the waverers among the enemy, 76.

Idga. Cavalry issued by, Gate for attack on Deh Khoja, 180.

Ikan. Great effect upon Khokandians of petty Russian victory at, 103.

Imbembesi. Great effect on Matabili of fight at, 104. At, the position of the laager was deliberately selected, 283. Surprise of a picquet at the attack on the, laager, 400.

Indian Mutiny. See Mutiny.

Infantry. For flying columns in bush, only can be used, 136. In Indian campaigns of United States, sometimes carried in wagons, 137. Object of artillery preparation in small wars to make a breach for, to break in, 152. Assistance afforded to the, by guns in Mutiny, 154. Great assistance to, at Dargai by artillery fire, 154. Free use of artillery before, can get to work most desirable if it is a matter of urgency to achieve success rapidly, 155. General Negrier used to send bulk of, at front of Chinese works, 165. In Burma, attacked in front while cavalry worked round flanks, 105. Attacked in front at Badli-ke-Serai while mounted corps worked round flanks, 170. No need for, to despair of coming up with retreating enemy after a time, 2<W. At tail of rear guard, may have to retreat at the double, 232. Examples of, carried behind cavalry, 241, 242. Examples of, being carried in carts, 242. Usual role of cavalry and, in ambuscades, 250. Cossacks sometimes played into hands of Russian, 251. Importance of, not getting into clusters in hill warfare under fire except when about to charge, 304. To merely clear crests of enemy artillery fire better than employing, 306. Special organization of, desirable in bush warfare, 352. The universally accepted fighting formation of, 375. How chief features of stereotyped, formation disappear in small wars, 375. Small depth of, formations in attack, 375. Difference as regards method of carrying out, attacks in small wars in different armies, 377. British and French, 377, 378. Importance of reserving fire in, attack, 378. Formation at Tel-el-Kebir, 379. Formations at the Atbara, 379, 380. Comparison of, formations at Tel-el-Kebir and Atbara to those in hill and bush warfare, 380. How even in normal, formation supports and reserves are drawn into fighting line, 381. Advance to be deliberate in, attacks, 383, 384.. Question of. crossing dangerous zones, 384, 385. Formation of, on the defensive in Zululand and the Sudan, 387. Macdonald's brigade at Khartum as example of two-deep line formation for, on the defensive 387, 388. Battle of Khartum the first example, of, with magazine rifles on the defensive, 387. Superiority of new weapon over old shown conclusively at Khartum, 388. As opposed to irregular cavalry, 388. Good fire discipline the final test of, efficiency on the battle-field, 389. How losses suffered by, in regular warfare affects question of fire discipline, 392. Importance to, of fire discipline when on the defensive, 393. Expenditure of ammunition by, 396 to 398. Expenditure of, ammunition in night attacks, 397, 398. Value of bayonet in spite of superiority of, to enemy as regards musketry, 398, 399. Question whether machine guns should be an adjunct of, 440. In small wars each, unit covers its own front with outposts, 451. See also Battalion, Company.

"Infantry training." On squares, 259, 263.

Ingogo. Fight of the, brought on by Sir G. Colley's communications being threatened, 200. The fight of the, as an example of disaster arising from passive defensive, 200. Compared to Majuba hill, 201. Judicious tactics of the Boers at, 403. Safe withdrawal of the British force from its dangerous position at, by a night march, 490, 491.

Initiative. Enemy to be overawed by bold, 24. Importance of seizing, an established canon of the art of war, 71. Generally belongs to regulars as a matter of course, 71. Massacres or isolated outbreaks do not constitute seizure of, 71. Seizure of, not generally in dispute, 72. Need of maintaining the, 72. In spite of, regulars have the worst of it as regards strategical conditions, 85. Need of, on part-of subordinates in attack, 171. On part of junior officers especially desirable in hill and jungle warfare, 171. Major White at Kandahar as example of, 172. Resolute, the secret of success, 206. In laager and zeriba warfare regulars maintain strategically the, 277.

Insurrection, Insurrections. Campaigns undertaken to suppress, constitute small wars, 22. Regulars queuing, give rise to guerilla warfare, 26. Features of campaigns for suppression of, 27. Involve troublesome operations, 27. Object when campaign takes form of quelling, 41. In an, enemy generally makes the first move, 71.

Intelligence. Importance of, work recognised nowadays, 43. Accurate, about civilized countries easier to obtain than about theatres of small wars, 43. Absence of good, a characteristic of small wars, 44 to 46. Examples of evil effects of want of, 44. Absence of, as regards resources, 45. Effect of want of, as to exact position of localities, 45, 46. As regards enemy invariably defective, 47, 148. Difficulty of correctly interpreting, brought by spies, 49. Reconquest of Sudan exemplifies what a good, department can effect, 50. Advantages enjoyed by the enemy as regards, 53. Enemy has no organized, department, 53. Spreading fictitious, 54. Examples of spreading false, 55, 56. Need of good, department in guerilla warfare, 143 to 145.

Interior lines. Skilful commander works on, 109. Enemy in small wars generally incapable of working on, 109. In guerilla warfare if there is any chance of enemy acting on, against columns, these must be strong enough to beat any force which will come against them, 141. Although enemy does not understand principle of working on, he can, actually on the battlefield, see columns coming up from different sides, 179.

Intombi River. Surprise of a detachment by Zulus at dawn on the, 447.

Inyat Kali. Skirmish near, as an example of horseholders getting into difficulties when cavalry act dismounted, 416.

Isandlwhana. Disaster of, 33. Owing to, wastage greater from battle than from sickness in Zulu war, 98. Shook confidence of Zulus, 103. Enveloping tactics of Zulus at, 190. At, the Zulus captured the camp in rear of the troops, 258.

Isly. At, victory won against great odds by adopting bold offensive, 150. The battle of, 187, 188. Success of echelon formation at, 188. An example of offensive tactics, 188. Principle of compelling enemy to attack by advancing in square illustrated at, 259. Failure of the masses of horse at, to effect anything against infantry, 388, 411, 412.

Ismailia. Ruse under cover of which British army was moved from Alexandria to, 55. Bulk of army remained at, while fraction pushed ahead to guard supplies and seize canal, 67.

Italian, Italians. Reverse to, troops at Dogali, 48. Under-estimated hostile forces before Adowa, 48. Had not intended to assault Abyssinians at Adowa, 184. Dispersion of, brigades at Adowa partly a result of misunderstanding, 184. The, obliged to quit their position at Agordat so as to bring on a fight, 206. The, troops ceased to be molested after retreating a very few miles from Adowa except by inhabitants, 215. Unsuccessful attempt of an, force to surprise Debeb, 243. Strength of, companies in small wars, 382. Crossing of two, brigades during night march before Adowa, 492.

Jagdallak. Annihilation of British army in 1841 in defiles of, and Gandamak 199.

Jakdul. Proportion of camels to men in Sir H. Stewart's advance from, on Abu Klea, 871.

Joara-Alipore. Affair of, an example of horse artillery and cavalry in pursuit, 211.

Japan. Struggle between, and China practically a small war, 21.

Jeffreys, General. Difficulties of, owing to wounded, 96. Punishment of Mamunds by, 308. System of surprise employed by, in dealing with Mamund villages, 388.

Jellalabad. Action of Futtehabad near, 231. Example of ambuscade from Sale's retreat to, 250.

Jidballi. Formation of force at, 188.

Jomini. Account of French feint at Naples by, 230.

Jungle. See Bush.

Jungle warfare, Jungle operations. See Bush warfare.

Kabul. Fall of, 35. Result of under-estimating strength of enemy round, Sir D. Stewart's train on march to, 60. Afghan dominance near Kandahar would have led to serious result but for move from, 74. In Afghan wars both, and Kandahar always aimed at, 108. Disastrous termination to first occupation of, due largely to separation of force, 113. Strength of, field force, 117. in Sir F. Roberts's march from, to Kandahar force absolutely abandoned communications, 121. Sir P. Roberts's abandonment of communications during first advance to, 122. Capture of, a signal exploit, 122. Retreat from, in 1844, illustrates difficulty of retreat if communications have been lost, 123. Afghans at Charasia guarded defile leading to, 106. On the retreat from, in 1841-42. losses due to tribesmen rather than to Akbar Khan's forces, 216. The closing scene of the retreat from, exemplifies the doggedness of hill-men in pursuit, 320. Night attack on the, gate of Ghazni, 486.

Kabyles. French never could catch the, 52. Lured out of position at Millet by Barbarossa, 230. The, rarely delivered regular attacks in the darkness, 407.

Kaffir, Kaffirs. Rebellion, 27. Method of fighting of, 33. Procedure in, wars, 40. In aerations against, main difficulty to bring on a decisive struggle, 103. War of 1851-52 of a guerilla character, 130. Mobile columns in, campaign of 1877, 137. In 1851-52 large forte existed during, war, 135. Burning of, villages, 148. Dispersion of, in Waterkloof mountains by attacks from several sides, 177. Small losses suffered by the, owing to terrain in Waterkloof, 177. Savages like the, can impose upon regulars by stratagems  .

Kaffirland. Kloofs of, suited to guerilla tactics, 127. In, only mounted troops generally of use, 137. In 1877 raiding of cattle adopted in, 146. Impossibility of avoiding ambuscades in parts of, 368. Kloofs of, afford no example like Tofrek, 455.

Kahan. Attempt to relieve, as an example of disaster owing to failure of water, 61. Incident in the relief of, as example of hostile bodies holding aloof to see result of fight, 212.

Kailua. Action of, as an example of active defence, 203. French fire discipline at, 305.

Kali Nuddi. Action of, as example of cavalry falling on enemy in retreat, 170.

Kalpi. Important influence exercised by camel corps at, 426.

Kalumpit. Unexpected presence of guns with Filipinos at, 48.

Kambula. A defensive battle, 76. Zlobani mountain some miles east of, 183. The battle of, as a typical example of a successful feint, 229, 230. Mounted rifles at, armed themselves with assegais in pursuit, 414.

Kandahar. Advance of Ayoub Khan on, 48. Sir F. Roberts's supply train on march to, 60. Marri country flanked route to, 6J. Investment of, by Ayoub Khan, 74. In Afghan wars both Kabul and, always aimed at, 108. In Sir F. Roberts^s march to, communications absolutely abandoned, 121. Capture of enemy's guns at, 155. Containing force at, 163. Major White's action at, 172. After battle of, enemy concealed arms and pretended to be peaceful, 209- Reconnaissance the day before battle of, had effect of keeping Afghans in their position, 235. Night attack in 1841 on one of the gates of, 444.

Kapurtuala. Disaster to, infantry, 333.

Karina. Heavy expenditure of ammunition owing to precautionary volleys near, 372.

Karmana. Reconnaissance up the, defile in the Chamkani country, 333. Kars. The storming of, at night by the Russians, 484.

Kassala. Capture of, by Italians an excellent example of surprise at dawn, 240.

Kassassin. Vital importance of securing, lock, 67. Attack of Egyptians on British at, 106. Attack of Egyptian army on British lines, at, early in the morning, 447.

Katmandu. Remarkable night march of a brigade round Gurkha flank during General Oughterlony's advance on, 491.

Kaye. Account of an ambuscade under Dennie near Jellalabad by, 250.

Kelly, Col. Advance of, from Gilgit to Chitral, 94. Advance of, for relief of Chitral as example of manœuvring enemy out of position, 94. Had the column of, failed to reach Chitral doubtful if force from south would have been in time, 112. Example of unintentional feint during march of, force to Chitral, 233, 234.

Ketchwayo. Armies of, 28. Although, impis were well organized, invasion of Zululand at three points prevented him from invading Natal, 111.

Khaibar. Number of troops on, hue in 1880, 117. Consequence of failing to crown the heights in 1841 during the retirement through the, 293. General Pollock's forcing of the entrance of the, as an example of seizing the heights in forcing a defile, 294. Temporary loss of two guns owing to McCaskill's brigade being benighted in the, 316.

Khalifa. Mustered more men for his last stand at Omdurman than the intelligence department expected, 50- Contemplated night attack before Omdurman, 56. Not prepared for Sir H. Kitchener's rapid advance, 89. Bombardment caused, army to quit Omdurman, 154. Reconnaissance before Atbara had effect of encouraging forces of, to hold their ground, 235. The, appears to have contemplated attacking Sir H. Kitchener at night, 444.

Khan Band. Forcing of the, defile as an example of unpreparedness of enemy for flank attack, 162.

KhankI Valley. The, with reference to the actions at Dargai, 303.

Khartum. Relief of, objective of Nile Expedition, 42. Critical situation at, obliged column to cross the desert, 69- Result of fall of, 69. Not difficulty of getting troops themselves up to, in time but of supplying them which caused failure of relief expedition, 70.

Khartum, Battle ot. Evening before, news arrived that Khalifa contemplated a night attack, 56. Formidable rushes met by Macdonald's brigade in line at the, 205. Colonel Macdonald's success in drawing the enemy on by artillery fire at, 234. Colonel Macdonald's brigade at the, 387. The, the first example of infantry on the defensive with magazine rifles against masses, 389. Exceptional as a defensive battle, 303. The charge of the 21st Lancers at the, 407. Incident at, showing danger of exposing camel corps to attack of rapidly moving enemy, 425. Great effect of artillery fire during first phase of, 436. Heavy expenditure of case shot when Macdonald's brigade was attacked at, 439.

Khiva. Russian campaign against, 45. Movable magazine at conquest of, 59. Failure of Caspian column to reach, owing to want of water, 61. Example from, campaign to show advantage of advancing in several columns, 111. In campaign against, one column hod to turn back, 112. Turkomans carried infantry behind horsemen in the, campaign, 241. Russians marched in square while suppressing Turkomans in, 272. Desperate assault of Turkomans at dawn on Russian camp after the capture of, 447.

Khivan, Khivans. Withdrawal of, force opposing the Russian column from Turkestan, 111. Skill of, in ambuscades, 253.

Khokand. Russian campaigns against, 30, 103.

Khokandians. Effect of Ikan upon the, 103. Advance of, and defeat before Fort Perovski, 157.

Khushab. Force bivouacked in square the night before, 276. At battle of, troops in rear were hit by enemy firing at the fighting line, 376. Persian night attack before, 490.

Khushk-i-Nakhud. Heavy loss inflicted by two squadrons at, armed with sabres, 408.

Kimmendine. At first attack on, artillery of flank column fired into the centre column in the jungle, 181.

Kirbekan. Attack directed upon hostile rear at, 164. Action of, .as illustration of attack upon the rear of a strong position, 167. Hour at which guns of containing force were to open fire carefully laid down at, 167. Sudden counter-attack of spearmen at, 1851. Heavy expenditure of ammunition by two companies at, 306.

Kirghiz. Russian methods of coercing, 40. Skill of the, at forays, 245. Russians often short of meat a few days after raids on, 248. Effective raids by, on camels against Russians, 427.

Kitchener, Sir H. (Lord). Ruse of, to prevent Khalifa from attempting night attack, 56. Rapid advance of, disconcerted Khalifa, 89. Operations of, against Boor guerillas, 131. Force of, arrived before Atbara zeriba at daybreak, 193. The Khalifa appears to have contemplated attacking, at night, 444.

Koffee, King. Obliged to commit his troops to battle in defending capital, 105.

Kohat Pass. Incident near the, of troops being pushed back on a precipice, 336.

Konoma. Forward artillery tactics at, 431.

Kopet Dagh. Along foot of, horse and field artillery can manœuvre freely, 438.

Koragh. The disaster in the, defile caused by Chitralis hurling down stones on the party, 290.

Korosko. Plan of sending supplies from, to Abu Hamed, 69. Convoy organized for moving from, to Abu Hamed, 70. Reason why move of convoy from, presented no special difficulties, 70.

Korti. River column started from Hamdab beyond, 68. Nile campaign proper began at, 68. Lord Wolseley's plans for supplying army beyond, 69. Delay in collecting supplies north of, 69. Cause of sending column across the desert from, 69. Difficulties which arose in communicating between, and the flying columns, 123, 124. Smallness of the cavalry detachment which accompanied Sir H. Stewart from, 402. On march from, to Metemma camels of camel corps left behind before fighting, 425.

Kota Raja. Capture of, object of first Achin expedition, 45. Failure of Dutch to capture, 45, 46. Kraton at, evacuated under bombardment, 155. Attack on Longbatta after capture of, 182. Difference between terrain at, and at the affair of the Zlobani mountain, 183.

Kotkai. Fanatical rush at, as example of counter-attack, 185.

Kotonou. Attack of Dahomeyans at dawn on French at, 447.

Kraft, Prince. In hill warfare a few maxims known to every Gurkha havildar are worth a whole folio of, 347.

Krasnovodsk. Failure of column from, to reach Khiva, 61. Failure of force from, to participate in attack on Khiva an illustration of advantage of advancing in several columns, 112.

Kraton. At Kota Raja evacuated under bombardment, 155.

Kroumirs. Fight with the, at Ben Metir, 419.

Kumasi. Separate column reaches, after its destruction and abandonment by Sir G. wolseley, 111. Final advance to, from Amoaful made as a flying column, 120. The battle of Ordahsu and capture of, 190. Corps of scouts formed in 1895 during the unopposed advance to, 350.

Kurrum Valley. Sir F. Roberts s advance from, on Kabul without maintaining communications, 122. Reconnaissance by the, movable column up the Karmana defile, 333.

Kutebar. Difficulty Russians found in dealing with, 137.

Kwintana. Insufficient force of mounted men at, for effective pursuit, 208. The action of, as an example of drawing enemy into an ambuscade, 232.

La Vendée. Hoche's campaign in, 41. Cause of disasters to Republican troops prior to arrival of Hoche, 113. Consequences of separation in early days in, 141. Boguslawski on lessons of, 142. System of pacifying a district as exemplified by, 147. System adapted to, out of place among fanatics and savages, 148. Enemy in, understood stratagems, 244. Skill of anti-Republicans at ambuscades in, 253. Charette's successful attacks on flanks of Republican columns on the march in, 475

Laager, laagers. Wagons in, formed bases for flying columns in Rhodesia, 135. In Zululand regulars acted on the defensive in, or square, 190. Brave enemy acting in masses brings about system of, zeribas and squares, 206. Conducting operations under shelter of, and zeribas peculiar to small wars, 277. And zeribas an extension of principle of the square, 277. And zeribas possess attributes of fortifications, 278- And zeribas do not breathe the spirit of attack, 278. If regulars are hampered by transport and the enemy is enterprising, and zeribas are almost compulsory, 279. Use of, and zeribas as bases of mobile columns in guerilla warfare, 280. Formation of, demands certain conditions, 280. Formed of wagons, 280. Have always been a special feature of warfare in South Africa and North America, 281. Examples of formation of, 281. Outposts economised by, and zeribas, 282. And zeribas generally enable commander of regulars to select his ground and time for fighting, 282. The, or zeriba can shelter encumbrances of force while it fights, 284. Regulars can obtain repose within, and zeribas, 284. General conclusions as to, and zeribas, 285. Value of machine guns in, 441.

Laing's Neck. Boers raided into Natal after, 200. Majuba Hill commanded, but not within rifle range, 200. As an example of infantry advancing too rapidly to attack, 384. Danger incurred by Boers in taking up position at, 403.

Lamoriciére. Acquired great skill in surprises and ambuscades, 232.

Lance. Groat importance of, to cavalry in small wars, 414. Examples showing value of, 414.

Lancers, 11th Bengal. Work of, when Sir B. Blood broke out of Malakand, 173.

Lancers, 21st. See Twenty-first Lancers.

Landaki. Action at, an example of rapidity of enemy's retreat, 150, 160. An illustration of enemy's anxiety as to line of retreat, 162. Causes of cavalry being unable to act effectively at, 173.

Langson. Capture of, by General Negrier, 168.

Lewal, General. Advocacy of system of ambuscades on outposts by, 466.

Lincolns. The, at the Atbara, 379, 380.

Line of Communications. In small wars dealt with in various works, 22. Circumstances which compel regulars to have, 85. A necessary consequence of conditions tinder which regulars fight, 86. Organization of, not within scope of work, 115. Object to draw attention to drain which, are upon army and to consider when they can be dispensed with, 115. Often lead through districts where population is very hostile, 116. Experience shows that, are often of great length, 116. Behind fighting force, requires a separate force as guard, 117. Examples of, being threatened and severed, 117. Large force on, seldom required in desert campaigns, 118. Small flying columns form effective protection for, 118. Sometimes a matter of opinion if a, really exists, 120. Serves as a line of retreat in case of need, 122. As the force advances zeribas often become links on the, 284, 285. On a, through mountainous country picquets generally sent from station at either end of march which a convoy is undertaking, 298. See also Communications.

Little Big Horn. Affair on the, as an example of dangers of tactical separation, 179, 180.

Lobengula. British advance on Buluwayo obliged impis of, to fight, 40.

Lockhart, Sir W. Duty of army of, in the Tirah campaign, 38. Transport columns a constant source of anxiety during march of, down Bara valley, 120. Plans of, at Dargai, 303. Visit of, to the Chamkani country, 318. On the difficulties of the Tirah operations and how to meet them, 320. Principle inculcated by, to avoid ravines, 320. Orders of, as to supporting troops in rear guard, 336.

Logerot, General. Habit of marching in square of, in Tunis, 272.

Lomakin, General. Campaign of, against Turkomans as illustrating .necessity of pushing supplies ahead of army in inhospitable country, 66. Obliged to attack without reserves, 185. Little army of, would have been destroyed but for the guns, 213. Expenditure of ammunition during unsuccessful attempt of, on Denghil Tepe, 396. Guns checked the Turkomans at, unsuccessful attack on Denghil Tepe, 436.

Longbatta. The affair of, in Achin as an example of a misunderstanding with detached columns, 182, 183-

Low, Sir R. Storming of the Malakand Pass by, 286.

Lucas, Lieut. Handling of the Gurkha scouts by, at Thati as an example of attack in hill warfare, 305.

Lucknow. Cause of failure of Havelock's first advance on, 107. Delhi and, formed two distinct gathering points for the rebels, 108. Attack on Cawnpore while Sir C. Campbell was relieving, 112. Forward artillery tactics at, 431.

Ludlow Castle. Capture of, at dawn, 193, 240.

Long. Error of detached force in advancing from Longbatta on, 182.

Lushai. In, the enemy placed stockades to lank the line of advance of the troops, 341.

McCaskill. Loss of two guns of brigade of, owing to being benighted in the Khaibar, 316.

McDonald, Marshal. Wedge formation adopted by, at Tetuan, 187.

McNeill, General. The attack on, at Tofrek, 412.

Macdonald, Colonel. Brigade of, at battle of Khartum as example of meeting shock tactics in line by changes of front, 205. Method employed by, to draw the enemy on to attack at Khartum, 234. The manœuvres of, at Khartum as an example of value of two-deep line against masses of ill-armed warriors, 387. Change of front executed by, 388. Expenditure of case shot by batteries with, 439.

Machine guns. Value of, in guerilla warfare, 136. Employed in Rhodesia, 138. Position of, in squares, 263, 274. Place of, in tactics now fairly well established, 440. Question whether, should be attached to infantry, cavalry, or artillery, 440. Hill warfare and bush warfare do not give, a proper chance, 441. The, at General Hunter's reconnaissance of the Atbara zeriba, 441. Great value of, on the defensive, 441. Incident at the fight on the Shangani showing importance attached to, 441. Value of, in case of fanatical rushes, 441. Training of, on likely points in anticipation of hostile night attacks, 495.

Macpherson, General. Operations of, in attack on Ali Musjid, 168.

Macta. French defeat at, 242.

Mad Mullah. The tribesmen led by the, 471.

Madagascar. Operations in, in 1883-85, as illustrating how enemy becomes more formidable if not effectually tackled, 99- In 1896 French found in, that use of guns made it almost impossible to out enemy's retreat, 153. General Duchesne's memorandum on campaigning in, 217.

Madras sappers. Afridis caught in a ravine by, and Gordons, 323.

Magdala. Theodore stood his ground at, 105. Distance from Zula to, 116. Abyssinian forces quit position before, in hope of booty, 233.

Mahdi, The. Decision of British Government that, must be crushed at Khartum, 123. The ambuscade formed by the, at Shekan, 254.

Mahmud. Zeriba of, at the Atbara, 154.

Mahrattas. Sir A. Wellesley's whole army brought on to flank of, at Assaye, 163.

Maidan. Length of time taken on march from, to Dwatoi, 313. Reason for moving back from the Waran valley to, in a single day, 314. Afridis caught by the Sikhs in a gorge on the return march to, from Dwatoi, 323.

Maiwand. The battle of, as an example of disaster following upon passive defence, 201. Flanks at, en Pair, 202. Bad moral effect of withdrawal of smooth-bore guns at, 214. Feeble pursuit after, 215. Two guns lost at, owing to Ghazi rush, 437.

Majuba Hill. The fight on, as an example of disaster arising from passive defence, 200, 201. Compared to Ingogo, 201.

Majunga. Distance from, to Antananarivo, 116.

Malagasy. See Hova.

Malakand. Effect of Mamund intervention during advance from, 96. Work of 11th Bengal Lancers after Sir B. Blood broke out of the, position, 173. Large proportion of defenders of, Pass trusted to dislodging boulders, 290. Heavy expenditure of ammunition during night attacks on, 397, 398. Rounds brought up to, from the plains by Lancers, 398. Enemy driven out of, position at night with the bayonet, 400. Hill-men In, campaign did not shrink from bold night attacks, 462. Outposts at night in, campaign, 470, 471. Difficulty of dealing with well-armed hill-men as ready to attack at night as those who assaulted, 471. Employment of bonfires during tribal night attacks on, 495. Expulsion of enemy out of the, position at night with the bayonet, 497. Counter-attack at dawn after second night attack on, 498.

Malka. Advance against, 40.

Mamelukes. Use of square by French in Egypt in the time of the, 272. Napoleon's estimate of relative value of, and French cavalry, 409. Buonaparte's's experienced campaigners at first non-plussed by tactics of, 475.

Mamund, Mamunds. Intervention of, in Mohmund campaign, 96, 301. The first attempt against the, as an example of the dangers attending a minor punitive expedition which attempts to do a great deal in a short time, 301. Success of methodical operations against, 301. Great effect of cavalry in, country, 307, 308. In final destruction of, villages these were generally surprised, 309. First day's fighting in, valley, as an example of an error in transmission of orders, 312. Loss caused in first day's lighting with, by force being benighted, 313. The first day's operations against, as an example of guns being benighted, 316, Cavalry work in operations against, carried out at a trot, 400.

Manipur. Lieut. Grant's advance into, 83. Invasion of, in several columns, 110.

Manipuris. Effect on, of Lieut. Grant's action, 83.

Maori, Maoris. Peculiar system of war of, 32. Main difficulty of operations against, to bring on a decisive struggle, 103. Want of energy a cause of desultory character of the, war, 120. Example from the, of a misunderstanding as to co-operation between detached forces, 182. Exceptional loss of officers in the, war, 364. Difficulty of capturing the, stockades, 363. Night attack by the, on Sentry Hill, 443. Affair of Nukumaru in the, war, 450. Detachment surprised by, owing to having no lookout, 400.

Marabia. Case of, as example of want of cavalry for pursuit, 208. Hicks Pasha's victory at, in square with untried troops, 269.

Markham, General. Victory of, at Suruj Kund, as an example of enemy being unable to meet a flank attack, 102.

Marris. Operations against the, during attempted relief of Kahan, 61.

Martin, Lieut-Colonel. On strength of picquets in hill warfare, 297. Quotation from, as to crossing dangerous zones, 385.

Mashonas. Nature of, in 1896, 137. Attacks on, in their caves, 138. Raids on, in 1897 had little effect, 146. Captain de Moleyn's operations against the, in their caves, 191, 192

Massawa. Italian reverse at Dogali, near, 48.

Massena. Fra Diavolo's brigands almost a match for veterans of, 126.

Massuzai. Sir W. Lockhart's visit to the, country, 318.

Mastuj. Nature of country between Gilgit and, 94. Affair of Nis Gol near, 233.

Mastura. The Arhanga Pass between the, valley and Bara valley, 314.

Matabili. Method of fighting of, 30. Effect of advance on capital in, war, 36. Power of, broken by their attacks on laagers, 104. Burning of, kraals, 148. In suppression of, rebellion it was found that the only chance of getting the enemy to fight was by surprise at dawn, 194. Failure of all attempts to draw, out of bush, 237. Use of laagers in the wars, 283. Success of system of laager and zeriba warfare among the, 285. Operations of, in Matoppos do not illustrate genuine hill warfare, 286. The, attacked the British laager on the Shangani River at dawn, 447. Surprise of a picquet at, attack on Imbembesi laager, 460. Plan of outposts at night adopted in the, war, 463.

Matabililand. Value of machine guns in, 440.

Mathias, Colonel. Method of, of crossing the dangerous zone at Dargai, 385.

Matoppo Hills. Matabili accepted battle in, 138. Operations in the, not genuine hill warfare, 286.

Maurice, Colonel. Quotation from, as to need of soldiers firing in a modern fight, 392. Quotation from, as to night operations with reference to Tel-el-Kebir, 489.

Maximilian. Early days of insurrection against, 141.

Maxims. See Machine guns.

Meani. An example of the effect of boldness and vigour, 78. At, victory gained by assumption of bold offensive, 150. Action of Sir C. Napier with regard to entrenching camp after, 278.

Meiklejohn, General. Turning of enemy's flank by, at Landaki, 160.

Melinite. Great effect of French, shells in Madagascar, 438.

Menelek. Italians under-estimated forces of King, before Adowa, 48.

Metchik River. Fight on the, as example of unpreparedness of enemy for attack on rear, 161.

Metemma. Lord Wolseley's decision to advance straight on, 69. Transport crippled before reaching, 69. Reserves in square during Sir C. Wilson's final advance to Nile near, 262, 263. Camels of camel corps left behind before action on march to, 425. System of outposts by day adopted by desert column on march to, 454. Night outposts at, 462 The night march of Sir H. Stewart's column towards, 490, 492.

Metija. Sudden arrival of Abd el Kader in the, 193.

Mexican, Mexicans. French force conveyed in carts in, war, 242. Defeat of the, at Orizaba, 487. Mexico. Losses of small French and Imperial columns in, 141. French night attack at Orizaba in, 487.

Middleton, General. Successful feints of, at Batoche, 236.

Milk River. Affair of the, as an example of a suddenly improvised laager under unfavourable circumstances, 283.

Millel. Successful feint of Barbarossa at, 230.

"Minor Tactics." The forcing of the entrance of the Khaibar Pass by General Pollock described in, 294.

Miranzais. Conflicts with the, prove that the hillman is a fighter, 289.

Mobile columns. See Flying columns.

Mohmund, Mohmunds. In, campaign hill-men broached the tanks, 62. Intervention of Mamunds in, campaign, 96. Effect upon, of invasion in two columns, 110. Sir C. Campbell's action with the, at Shabkadar, 214. Conflicts with the, prove that the hillman is a fighter, 280. Inclination shown by the, to attack at night, 443. The, not so well armed as the Afridis but are inclined for night attacks, 470.

Montecuculli. Maxim of, as to surprises, 243.

Montenegrins. Turks found, more difficult to overcome than the Servian armies, 127.

Montenegro. War in, of a guerilla character, 31, 100.

Monterey. Relief of, by troops brought in carts, 242.

Moorish. At Isly, battalions formed square when, horse charged, 188. Bugeaud when advancing on, camp was prepared, for attack from all sides, 189. The, horse tired from horseback at Isly, 411, 412.

Moors. French operations against, 1844, 28. How the, drew the Spanish forces into purposeless engagements, 101. Counter-attack by, at the battle of Tetnan, 185. Employed enveloping system in 1869, 186. Bugeaud's attack upon, at Isly, 187. Addicted to sweeping round flanks of opponent, 205. The, ambuscaded by Spanish troops at Castellijos, 251. Skill of, at ambuscades, 253. Movements off against flanks and roar of Spaniards at Wad Ras, 257. Small results of Moorish horse against infantry in campaign of, against; Spain, 398. The, as well armed as the Spanish, 398. The, fire from horseback, 411.

Moral effect. Important of, 37. Napoleon on, in war, 72. Advancing in several columns has great, 109. Of capturing banners, 158. In small wars, of almost more importance than material gain, 158. Of attacking in several columns, 177. Of artillery fire, 420.

Morocco. Spanish invasion of, in 1850, 21. In Spanish campaign against, enemy used to disappear after every fight, 88. Spanish forces drawn into purposeless engagements in, 101. Effect of exposure of communications during Spanish invasion of, 117. Value of bayonet found by Spanish troops in, 399. On the defensive in, troops must be ready for attacks at close quarters, 439. No cases of hostile night attacks in Spanish war against, 444. Tendency of enemy to work against flanks and rear shown in, 475.

Morosi's mountain. The night attack upon, 488.

Mount Prospect. Hostile demonstrations against communications of Sir G. Colley's force at, 117.

"Mountain and Savage Warfare." Quotation from, as to strength of picquets in hill warfare, 207. Quotation from, as to crossing dangerous zones, 385.

Mountain artillery. Mobility of, sometimes overlooked when attacking in hill warfare, 307. Has little effect on Pathan villages, 308. On sands of Egypt the, possessed mobility equal to field artillery, 438. See also Artillery.

Mountain guns. See Mountain artillery.

Mounted Infantry, rifles. Value of, at beginning of a retreat, 217. Value off, for feints, 232. Use of, for surprises by day, 241. Compared to cavalry, 422. The distinction between, and cavalry, 422, 423. Charged with fixed bayonets in Rhodesia, 423. Value of, in hills north of the Panjab, 423. Tactics of, 423. Similarity of camel corps to, 425.

Mounted men, troops. On the prairie and steppes guerilla warfare confined to, 127. Need of, for guerilla warfare on the prairies, 127. If live stock is to be raided, an essential, 136. Chiefly used in Rhodesias, 138. Nature of, varies in different campaigns, 401. Cavalry sorting against, of the enemy, 410, 411. Tendency of hostile, to fire from horseback, 411. See also Cavalry.

Mpseni. Operations of 1898 in, country, 141.

Mukur. Action of, as an example of cavalry falling into ambush, 405.

Multan. Suruj Kund near, 102.

Mutiny, The. In, enemy made first move, 71. Rebels for a time secured initiative in, 74. Examples of overawing; the enemy by dash and audacity taken from the, 81, 82. Remarkable for readiness with which enemy accepted battle, 104. During, Delhi and Lucknow formed two distinct gathering points of rebels, 108. Assistance afforded by artillery to infantry in, 154. Signal services of horse artillery and cavalry in, in flank attacks, 170. Successes always followed up in, 171. Cavalry operations against hostile flanks and rear in, 174. In, guns handled with great boldness, 174. Want of cavalry for pursuit in early days of, 208. Great results achieved in, largely due to extraordinary efforts to make each victory as complete as possible, 209. Happy combination of horse artillery and cavalry in pursuit in the, 211. Want of cavalry much felt in early stages of the, 402. Achievements of cavalry in the, owing to the enemy being organized, 405. Rebel squares broken by cavalry in the, 408. Examples of horse artillery and cavalry in the, 408, 409. Examples of forward artillery tactics from the, 430, 431. Scarcely furnishes an example of hostile night attack, 444.

Muzaia. Affair of, as an example of drawing enemy into an ambuscade, 233.

Naga hills. Attack on Konoma in the, 431.

Nam. Independent fire and volleys at, 395. Great expenditure of ammunition at, 397.

Namaqualand. Difficulties of Germans as to water in, 61.

Napier, Colonel. Pursuit of rebels by, after Gwalior, 211.

Napier, Sir C. Would not put his men in entrenched camp after Meani for fear of bad moral effect, 278.

Napier, Sir W. Vivid description of a panic at Badajoz by, 483.

Naples. Successful feint of French in 1799 when attacking, 230.

Napoleon. Quotation from, as to moral effect in war, 72. Quotation from, as to bringing superior force to bear at decisive point, 108. Quotation from, as to surprises, 243. Estimate of relative efficiency of Mamelukes and French Cavalry by, 409. Description by, of Reynier's night attack, 484.

Nareh. Capture of, by means of attack from three sides, 177.

Natal. Ketchwayo's armies a menace to, 28. Prevailing opinion in, mistaken as to Boers, 47. Reason for Ketchwayo not invading during the Zulu war, 110.

Naval Brigade. Guns of the, at Shah Nujeef, 431.

Negrier, General. Method of, of assaulting Chinese works, 165. Advance of, to Langson, 161. At Bang Bo, 169. Victory of, at Kailua, 203. Wounded at Kailua, 203. Attempted night attack of, upon Nui Bop, 485.

Neill, Colonel. Advance of, on Cawnpore, 74.

Nejumi. Flank march and final defeat of, 87. Determination of, not to be drawn into action at Toski, 237, 23S.

Nepaul. Failure of Anglo-Indian troops in, 287. Cause of failure of several columns in, due to not crowning the heights, 292.

New Zealand. Difficulty of pursuit in, 171. Enemy's skill in stratagem and surprise shown in, 244. Tendency of enemy to counter-attack in, 366. See also Maori.

Newcastle. Force moving back to, caught at Ingogo by the Boers, 200.

Nicholson, General John. A famous advocate of boldness and vigour, 75.

Nicholson's Neck. An example of confusion on night march, 492.

Night. Custom of enemy to withdraw part of his forces at, 192. Examples of enemy withdrawing forces at, 192. Difficulties of troops moving at, in the hills, 313. Troops about to be benighted to take up position before, sets in, 315. When losses occurred at, in 1897, it almost always arose to misunderstanding as to the approach of darkness not being taken into account soon enough, 316. Conduct of movements by, in hill warfare, 318, 319. Trouble caused to troops by marauders at, 319. Outposts at, 461. Outposts by, in bush warfare, 467. Outposts at, in Mil warfare, 467 to 471. Dealing with sniping at, 471, 472. Sentries at, 472, 473. Defensive arrangements in front of outposts at, 474. At, the enemy individually can hold his own with soldiers, 482. Troops engaging in, combats against irregular foes abandon advantage in weapons and in cohesion, 482. To engage in, combats rarely advisable in small wars, 482. Difficulty of controlling troops at, illustrated by incident in Algeria, 484. Clausewitz on, enterprises, 485. Enemy seldom keeps any lookout at, except close to his bivouac, 490. Operations not to be lightly entered upon in small wars, 493. Bayonet to be used at, if hostile parties get into the camp, 497.

Night attacks. Not objectionable on a small scale, 241. Heavy expenditure of ammunition during, on the Malakand position, 397, 398. Enemy's disinclination to attempt, 443, 444. Examples of hostile, 444. Serious danger if hostile, finds troops unprepared, 461. Danger to out-lying picquets if enemy is inclined for, 470. Difficulty of devising outposts to moot case of well-armed hill-men inclined for, 470. Improvement of modern weapons suggests, 481. The Duke of Wellington on, 4SI. Objection to, against bad troops not so great, 481. Little object in, on badly armed troops, 481. Seldom deliberately undertaken in small wars, 482. Occasions when in small wars, may be advisable, 482. Guerillas mot with in civil warfare are just as difficult to surprise by, as regulars, 483. Danger of confusion in, 483. General Reynier's, on the Turks, 484. Arguments in favour of, 484. Confusion in the, on Nui Bop, 485. Objections less serious to, on a small scale, 485. Division of force in, almost always a mistake, 485. Necessity of careful preparations for, 486. Enemy does not generally anticipate, 486. The bayonet the proper weapon for, 487. Examples of, on a small scale, 487, 488. Colonel Maurice on the, on Tel-el-Kebir, 489. By the enemy not usual, 494. Lighting up the ground if there is risk of hostile, 495. Training guns, rifles, and machine guns by day-tight on likely points in anticipation of hostile, 495. Reserves in view of hostile, 496. Importance of strict fire discipline in ease of a hostile, 496, 497. Bayonet to be used if hostile bodies penetrate the lines during a, 497. Question of counter-attacks in case of hostile, 497, 498.

Night march, night marches. Advantage of reaching hostile position at dawn after a, 192. A, followed by assault at dawn perhaps the most effectual mode of surprise, 241. Advantage of keeping in groups during a, in the hills shown by incident on the Arhanga Pass, 319. Successes against Boers very largely due to, followed by attack at dawn, 488. Risk of a, in proximity to the enemy being disclosed by some accident, 489. Success of, in close proximity to the enemy, 490. Examples of attacks by enemy on columns during, 490. Experience shows that enemy rarely interferes with, 490. Examples of successful, close to the enemy, 490, 491. Especial difficulties of, in the bush and precautions to be taken in such case, 491. Importance of troops being well disciplined in, 492. Unavoidable in later stages of South African war, 492. Examples of dangers of, 492. General rules as to arrangement of, hold good in small wars, 493.

Nile Expedition, 1884-85. Special objective in, 42. Example of unforeseen difficulty as to supply from, 63. Boat system during the, 64. Supply question fixed the theatre of war in the, 67. A campaign against nature, 68. The, as an example of influence of supply in small wars, 68 to 70 Question of time in, 98. Latter part of fighting phase of, illustrates difficulty of communicating with a force acting as a dying column, 123.

Nilt. Position of British force after storming of, 54. Frontal attacks on enemy after capture of, induced him to attach all importance to that point, 230.

Ninety-second. Major White and the, regiment at Kandahar, 172.

Ninety-third. Guns dragged up to the Shah Nujeef by sailors and, 431.

Nis Gol. Incident at, showing how enemy may be brought to expose themselves by an accident, 233, 234.

Nocturnal. See Night

Normans. Employed feint of pretended retreat at Hastings, 230.

Northampton Regiment. Disaster to part of, at Saran Sar due to retiring down, a shallow nullah, 819. Sir W. Lockhart's advice to, and Dorsets 320. The, at the reconnaissance to Saran Sar, 342 to 344.

"Notes on Hill Warfare." Quotation from, 328. Quotation from, to show necessity of sending on reconnoitrers of route when retiring in the hills by an unknown route, 335, 336.

Nott, General. Affair of Mukur during advance of, to Ghazni, 405.

Nukumaru. Pickets unable to stop the Maori advance at affair of, 456.

Nul Bop. Attempted night attack upon, by General Negrier, 485.

Number 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. Experiences of, when benighted at Bilot, 316.

Objective. Selection of, in small wars, 34. Generally clearly defined if enemy has a government, 35. Capital as, 35. Absence of distinct, in guerilla warfare, 36. Advantage of having clear, 37. When enemy is a dangerous military power, 39. When there is not capital and no army, 40. In suppressing rebellious, 41. Special, 42. Existence of more thou one, in small wars causes separation, 108.

Obstacles. Value of, to stem a rush of fanatics, 279. Idea of laagers and zeribas rather to oppose, to attack than to give cover to defenders, 280.

Offensive. Strategical, the only possible attitude to assume, 75. Strategical, not incompatible with defensive on the battle field, 75. Alarm which a resolute, creates in small wars, 79. Plassey, Isly, and Meani won by assumption of bold, 150. Broad principles of, tactics to keep enemy on the move, 171. Laager and zeriba warfare illustrates defensive tactics superimposed on strategy, 277.

Ogaden Somalis. The successful raids in 1898 on the, 248.

Omdurman. Khalifa meant to oppose Sir H. Kitchener two marches short of, 89. Bombardment of, induced enemy to fight in the open, 154. Great effect of high explosive shells at bombardment of, 438.

Onao. Feint at, 231.

Ordahsu. Enveloping system of enemy at, 187. As an example of pushing on and disregarding flank counter-attacks, 190. Gearing made by enemy at, on purpose to attack the troops in rear, 257. At, a whole company suddenly opened fire at nothing, 354. The fight at, as an example of enemy's inclination to counter-attack in the bush, 36(>. Forward tactics of one gun at, 431.

Orizaba. The French night attack at, 487.

Orukzais. Boast of, as to Tirah, 38. Siege of Gulistan by the, 197. It was the armament and marksmanship of the, which brought about the outpost system of Tirah, 470.

Osman Digna. Obliged to fight decisive battle to defend Tokar, 105. At El Teb square moved on to flank of, entrenchments, 163. Sudden rush arranged by, at Tokar, 213.

Oudh. During Mutiny rebels for a time gained complete ascendancy in the, 74.

Oughterlony General. Night march of a brigade during advance of, on Katmandu, 491.

Outposts. Owing to insufficiency of hostile, an attack at dawn very likely to oome as a surprise, 193. An effective system of, essential when halted, 442. Importance of question what hour enemy attacks at in considering, 443. When attacking at dawn enemy soon get close to, 446. General idea of, the same in all classes of warfare, 448. Difference between theory of, in small wars and in regular warfare, 449. In small wars, generally surround force hut need not have much depth, 450, 451. Men absorbed in, 450. Usual arrangement of, by day in small wars, 451. In small wars each unit generally finds its own, 461. How nature of enemy affects, 452, 453. Mobility of enemy greatly affects arrangement of, 453. Question whether in the bush against a reckless enemy infantry, are not a mistake, 454. System of, adopted by day by Desert Column, 454, 402. On open ground, by day do not give cause for much anxiety, 454. Question of, to a force in bush country where enemy attacks in great force, 455. Difficulties of, in the bush, 455. Objection to plan of, falling back on main body at once if attacked, 458. Disadvantages under which regulars labour in, work, 460, 461. Question of, at night, 461 to 472. On open ground, 402. System of, employed in later days of South African war, 403. The Boers' system, 405. By night in hill warfare, 467 to 471. Arrangement of, by night in bush warfare, 407. Sir B. Blood's plan of using villagers as, 474. See also Picquets, Service of security.

Outram, Sir J. At Khushab, drew up hie force in two lines, 370. Night attack upon, before the action of Khushab, 413. Attack of Persians on force of, on the march, 490.

Owikokero. Disaster at, 255, 362. Difficulties of German retreat at, 349, 416. Machine guns silenced at, 441.

Palikao. Effect on Chinese of loss of their guns at, 157.

Panjaret. Village of, at affair of Longbatta, 182.

Panjkora. Effective cavalry work in the valley of the. river, 406.

Partisan, partisan warfare. See Guerilla, guerilla warfare.

Passive defence, defensive. See Defensive.

Pathan, Pathans. Charge of, swordsmen formerly a customary mode of fighting of, 224. The most truculent, clans do not show the reckless bravery of Zulus and dervishes, 280. Small effect of mountain guns, upon, villages, 308. Presence of women and children in a, village indicates that men do not mean to fight, 310. The, does not run unnecessary risks in a night foray, 320. Downhill charges of swordsmen a favourite manœuvre formerly of, clans, 320. Skill of the enemy at Saran Sar shows the genuinely warlike character of the borderland, 345. Hill warfare has been illustrated in most expeditions into the highlands where the, is found, 346. Absurd to place the races of West Africa on the same platform as, and Gurkhas, 349. Normal loose order of, makes effective cavalry action difficult, 407. Disinclination of, for night attacks, 443. Improved armament of, has made their musketry dangerous to troops and transport in bivouac, 457. Operating against most, tribes there will be no need for the outposts system adopted in Tirah, 470. Skill of, in stalking snipers, 472. The, a match individually for the soldier at night, 482.

Patrolling. Value of, in the bush as part of outpost work, 450.

Peach, Captain. Quotation from, as to methods by which system of outlying picquets was arrived at in Tirah 408.

Peel, Captain. At the Shah Nujeef, 431.

Peiwar Kotal. Enemy's guns captured at the, 157. Attack on, as an example of main attack being on the flank and frontal attack only secondary, 105, 100. Work of guns with turning force at the, 170. Attack on, at dawn, 103. Great parade of throwing up batteries in front of hostile position made so as to deceive enemy at, 236. Rifles treacherously fired off at the, 243.

Pekin. Effect of arrival of allies before, 36. Effect of capture of guns on march from Tientsin to, 157.

Peninsular war. Influence exerted by Spanish guerillas on the, 120. The guerilla ambuscades in the, 253.

Perimeter Camp. Explanation of term, 462.

Perovski, Fort. Great effect of capture of hostile guns during fight near, 157.

Persian, Persians. Loss caused to troops in rear by misdirected fire of, army, 376. Night attack on Sir J. Outram in the, war, 443. Night attack of, on Sir J. Outram's force on the march, 490.

Peshawar. One column advanced against Mohmunds from, 110. Distance from, to Kabul, 116. Number of troops between Kabul and, 117.

Petrusvitch, General. Attack by, on Petrusvitch's garden, 421. Death of, 421.

Petrusvitch's Garden. Horseholders threatened at affair of, 416. Account of the affair of, as an example of cavalry acting dismounted, 421.

Philebert, General. Stratagems of, to ensure surprises being successful, 244, 245.

Philippines. Operations in, 100. Impossibility of avoiding ambuscades in the, 368.

Philippovitch, General. Method of, in Bosnia for safeguarding his columns, 478.

Picquet, picquets. In hill warfare, can hold knolls far out of reach of support because hill-men will not attack up hill, 293. Stationary, flanking line of march in the hills, 295, 296. Question whether one battalion should find, for both flanks, 296. Strength of flanking, 297. Distances out of flanking, 297. Occupation of knolls by, 298. Stationary, used to protect convoys, 298. In retreats the flanking, must almost of necessity retire down hill, 326. Withdrawal of, in hill warfare, 329, 330. Bulk of, to slip off unobserved if possible in driblets, 330. Principle of one, covering retirement of another, 330. If the, is overlooked it may have to retire simultaneously with a rush, 331. Importance of, nearest the enemy getting timely notice of intended retreat, 332. In retiring, should follow the line of spurs and take a line in conformity with general movement, 333. If the hills are covered with forests flanking, must be stationary, 340. The stationary flanking, need not be pushed far out if there is undergrowth, 341. Size of, if there is undergrowth, 341. Flanking, not required to be pushed out far in bush warfare to keep off snipers, 349. Question of units finding their own, 451. Question of, in case of different kinds of enemy, 451. Cannot check a fanatical rush, 452. Question of, by day, 455 to 459. In bush warfare, 455, 458, 459. The hill warfare by day, 457. Arrangement of, at night on open ground, 462. Risk of having, too close in, 463. In the Matabili war, 463. Distant, at night, 464, 465. The Boer system of, 466. Need of keeping up communications between main body and distant, 465. At night in bush warfare, 467. Need for distant, by night in hill warfare, 467 to 470. Process by which system of distant, at night in hill warfare was arrived at, 468, 469. Close in sometimes desirable in hill warfare, 470, 471. When there are no distant, in hill warfare the, must be close in, 470, 471. Difficulty as to distant, at night if enemy is well armed and inclined to attack in force, 471. Selection of positions for, at night, 473, 474. Defensive arrangements in front or, 474. See also Flankers. Outposts.

Pir Palmal. Fighting at, during battle of Kandahar, 172.

Plassey. An example of boldness, 78. At, victory gained against great odds by bold offensive, 150.

Plunkett, Colonel. Disaster to, at Gumburn, 103.

Poles. Fatal error of, in 1863, in assembling in formed bodies, 100.

Pollock, General. Brigade of, got through Khaibar unmolested owing to heights being crowned, 293. Forcing of entrance of Khaibar by, as example of capturing heights in attacking a defile, 294.

Pollock, Lieut-Colonel. Quotation from, as to action of Shah Alam Kaghza 328. Quotation from, as to a retreating party going astray and being pressed back on to a precipice, 335, 338.

Porto Novo. The affair of Achupa brought on to cover, 260.

Portuguese. Action on the Chengo River between, and Gaza rebels, 264.

Potchefstrom. The sortie from, as an example of counter-attack, 197. At siege of, guns helped to keep Boers at a respectful distance, 437.

Price, Colonel. At Shah Alam Kaghza, 328.

Prim, General. Successful ambuscade of, 251.

Prince Kraft. See Kraft Prince.

Prince Woronzoff. See Woronzoff, Prince.

Pursuit, pursuits. Groat importance of vigour in, 80. Rapidity of enemy's retreat makes effective, most difficult, 150. Attack at dawn allows plenty of time for, 194. How question of, is influenced by peculiarity of irregular warriors, 207. Mobility of enemy renders effective, very difficult, 207. Examples of want of cavalry for, 208. Great importance of vigorous, 209. Action of Sir C. Campbell at Cawnpore as example of, 200. Effective, rendered difficult by tendency of enemy to disperse, 210. Although dispersion makes, difficult it enables small parties to act with great daring, 210. Terrain often renders effective, impossible, 211. If enemy retreats in any semblance of order object of, is to convert retreat into a rout, 211. Eagerness of enemy ha, to start with, 213, 214. Examples of immediate, by enemy, 213. Ardour of enemy in, soon slackens, 211. Examples of enemy soon abandoning the, 215, 210. Exceptional persistency of hill men in, 216. Hill-men of Indian frontier cm {tonally formidable in, because they are generally above the troops, 32ii. To be steady and deliberate as a rule in bash warfare, 300.

Pyramids. Isly compared to the battle of the, 187.

Quarman. Attack of the Ashantis on the rear of the convoy at, 358.

Raid, raids. French, in Algeria, 120, 246. Bugeaud institutes, on the Arab lines, 120. Principle of, 245. Mounted troops required for, 245. Turkoman and Kirghiz, on camels against Russians, 245. Objection to, as a matter of principle, 247. System of, on cattle, 247. How force making, should generally act if confronted by superior numbers 217. Difficulty of bringing in oat tie after a, 247. If booty cannot be brought back after, it is best to kill the cattle, 248.

Ramnuggur. The cavalry charge at, ended in the troopers getting into deep ground, 105.

Rawson, Admiral. Incident during advance of, on Benin, 62.

Razzia. See Raid.

Rear-guard, rear-guards. How troops covering retirement become the 218. Difficulty of, duties, 210. Seldom called upon to sacrifice itself in small wars as in regular warfare, 219. If, gets .separated from main body apt to be cut off altogether, 210. Relations between, and main body, 219. Cannot be left in the lurch, 220. Occasions may occur when a small, will be left to hold some particular point, 220. Principle of retreat of, in small wars, 220. Rearmost parties of, often must retire at full speed, 222. In South Africa in 1901-02, 222, 223. If, finds itself cut off a bold counter-attack may be the best course, 223. Risks attending a, turning on the enemy, 223. Method of sweeping up flanking picquets by the, in hill warfare, 295. The, becomes rather a heterogeneous body in hill warfare, 296. If, is to be benighted, its commander and his subordinates must know what the programme is to be, 316. In hill warfare, may have a difficult job whether the army be advancing or retiring, 324. As a whole should retire slowly in hill warfare, 325, 326. In hill warfare, affairs generally only a single day's work so enemy has not time to weary of pursuit, 326. Theory of duty of, in regular warfare totally inapplicable to hill warfare, 336. If, halts in hill warfare enemy cuts it off from main body, 337. Main, body must support the, 337. In the bush columns must always move with a sufficient, 364. The, in bush warfare to be spread out, 370.

Rebellion. See Insurrection.

Reconnaissance, reconnaissances. The, before Kandahar and the Atbara helped to keep enemy in position, 235. In hill warfare, almost necessarily involve subsequent retirement, 300. Difficulty of conducting a, far into hostile territory in hill warfare and withdrawing before enemy can collect, 302. Dargai as illustrating the difficulties of, in hill warfare, 303.

Red Indians. Operations of U.S. troops against, 40. Theatre of war well known in campaigns against, 47. Always risk of treachery in campaigns against, 50. In, campaigns great difficulty to find enemy's camps, 52. Campaigns furnish examples of advantages of promptitude, 75. Flying columns used against, 135. Mounted troops chiefly used against, 136. The engagement with, on the Little Big Horn, 179. Notorious for craftiness, 227. Surprises of, by U.S. troops, 241. Skill of, at forays, 245. Use of laagers in operation against, 281. Example from the, campaigns of a suddenly improvised laager, 283. Necessity of mounted troops for raids against the, 403. Effective night attacks of, upon U.S. troops, 443.

Red River Expedition. The boat system on the, 64.

Reno, Major. Operations of, at the fight on the Little Big Horn, 179, 180.

Residency, The. Cause of failure of Havelock's first advance to relieve, 107. The signals to, from the Shah Nujeef, 431.

Retirement. See Retreat.

Retreat, retreats. Question of pursuits and, in small wars influenced by peculiarity of irregular warriors, 207. Conduct of a, held to be most trying of all operations of war, 2U. In face of irregulars especially difficult, 211. Difficulty caused by wounded in, 212. Waverers drawn down by, of regulars, 212. Eagerness of enemy to take advantage of, of regulars, 213. Examples of energy of enemy at first to follow up, 213, 214. Examples of enemy abandoning pursuit after a time when regulars, 215, 216. When regulars have been annihilated, has generally been impossible, 216. In hill warfare, often mere local movements, 216. Critical time of the commencement of the, 216. Essential to conduct, as a whole with deliberation, 216. General Duchesne on conduct of, 217. General principles of conducting, 218. General Duchesne's system not applicable to, before Zulus or Ghazis, 218. In, before enemies like Zulus compact formation is indispensable, 218. Duty of rear guard of an army in, most trying, 219. When in, before irregulars main body must conform to rear guard, 219, 220. La, it is especially important to keep force well in hand, 220. Method of, of rear guards, 220, 221. During later stages of South African war, 222. Especially awkward position of regulars in, in small wars, 225. Quickness of enemy at discerning any signs of, 228. How enemy can be drawn on by simulating, 228. Enemy gets out of hand if he sees regulars, 229. Pretended, at Kambula, 230. Examples of pretended, 230. In hill warfare, in the main should be conducted slowly, 325, 326. Troops in hill warfare will generally, down hill, 326. At commencement of, in hill warfare it may be desirable to hurry off, 327, 328. If army has been advancing it is desirable to gain some distinct success before turning to, 328, 329. Intention to, to be concealed to the last moment, 329. General Westmacott's, from, Dwatoi to Bagh undisturbed at first because not expected by enemy, 329. Of picquets, 330. In, picquets and parties should follow spurs and not nullahs, 333. Value of counter-attacks in, 33, 334. Nullahs to be avoided in, 335. In, down a valley junctions, of minor valleys to be specially held, 335. Need of sending men on to reconnoitre in, over unknown ground in hill warfare, 335, 330. In, touch must be kept from front to rear, 330. Column in, should feel pressure on its tail along its whole length, 337. Position of baggage in, in hill warfare, 338. In hill warfare regulars know that when they, the enemy is almost certain to give trouble, 339. The, from Saran Sar, 343, 344. Rare in bush warfare, 369. A, in the bush can easily be concealed, 369. In case of a harassed, in the bush best to march in a compact body, 370. Difficulties of, by cavalry combining mounted and dismounted work, 417.

Retreating. See Retreat.

Retrograde movements. See Retreat

Reynier, General. Night attack of, upon the Turks, 484.

Rhodesia. Flying column used in, 135, 142. Losses caused by ambushes in, 253. Use of laagers in, 280. Mounted infantry once charged with fixed bayonets in, 423. Machine guns found very useful in, as protection to laagers, 441. Incident of picquet firing into hussars in, 465, 466.

Rhodesian. Raiding cattle in the, rebellion, 146.

Riel. Canadian operations against, 31. Defeat of, at Batoche, 236. Use of laagers during suppression of rebellion of, 281. System of laager and zeriba warfare employed with success against, 285.

Riff. Outposts which would be adopted against the hill-men of the, country, 471.

Rifle Brigade. Attack of, on Surprise Hill, 484.

River Column. Result of one-third of biscuits of, being found unserviceable, 63. Lord Wolseley's design of capturing Berber by combined movement of, and desert force, 70. Rendered inoperative by break down of supply, 70.

Riviere, Captain. The death of, in an ambuscade near Hanoi, 254.

Roberts, Sir F. (Lord). Despatch of, from Kabul saved situation near Kandahar, 74. Attack by, at Charasia with available force prevented wavering tribes from joining the Afghans, 76. No opposition offered to, near Ghazni, 104. Had a beleagured fortress for objective when marching to Kandahar, 121. During first advance of, on Kabul communications were abandoned, 122. Instructions of, in Burma, 142. Dispositions of, at Charasia, 166. Plan of attack of, at Kandahar, 172. Instructions of, as to meeting ambushes in Burma, 308, 369. Only took portable artillery with him from Kabul to Kandahar, 438. Story by, of the Ambola tribesmen and outposts, 472.

Rockets. Use of, at very short range in thick bush, 364.

Romanovski, General. Decisive victory of, over Uzbegs at Yedshar, 190.

Roos Senekal. Successful surprise at, 244.

Rorke's Drift. Zulu attack upon, carried on for many hours into the night, 444. Assistance derived at, by the glare of the burning buildings at night, 495.

Rose, Sir H. Ambela campaign undertaken against advice of, 73. Vigorous campaign of, in Central India, 79.

Runjeet Singh. Armies of, 34.

Ruse. See Stratagem.

Russell, Colonel. Operations of, during the affair of the Zlobani mountain 183, 184. Zulus drawn into premature attack by mounted forces under, at Kambula, 229, 230.

Saadat Khan, Ressaldar. Successful feint of, at Tank, 232.

Sahamafi. Affair of, as illustrating the tendency to blame any exposure of guns, 432.

Saigon. French capture of, 38.

Saint Arnaud. Quotation from, as to Bugeaud in Algeria, 129. Skill of in surprises and ambuscades, 232.

Sale, General. Example of an ambuscade from retreat of, to Jellalabad 249, 250.

Samana. Belief of Fort Gulistan on the, ridge, 155.

Samarkand. Tchernaieff's abortive attempt to reach, 61. Consequences of decisive battle fought at, 104

Sandilli. Gaikas held back by, before Kwintana, 232.

Sangar, sangars. Tribesmen protected flanks with, at Sempagha Pass, 161. Small effect of guns firing up at, 307. Stockades replace, when hills are overgrown with forests, 341. Employment of, for sheltering distant picquets in hill warfare, 409. Nature of, 469.

Satan Sax. Disaster to Northampton at, due to their getting into a shallow nullah, 319. Illustrates question of following spurs or ravines, 322. Gurkha ambuscade at, 334. The reconnaissance to, as an example of a typical day of hill warfare, 342 to 345.

Sarras. Action at, an example of advantage of promptitude, 75.

Saskatchewan. Position of Biel's forces at Batoche on the, 236.

Schamyl. Russians kept at bay for years by guerilla tactics of, 100. In operations against, great difficulty to bring enemy to battle, 103. Figures as one of the great soldiers of the age, 126. Decline of, when he increased number of his guns, 158.

Scinde. Conquest of, involved hostilities against comparatively organized forces, 25. Sir C. Napier in, formed an entrenched camp but would not put his troops in it for fear of injuring their confidence, 278.

Scout, scouts. Importance of a corps of, in guerilla warfare, 144. The question of, in hill warfare, 346. Incorrect use of the term, 345. Services of the Gurkha, in Tirah, 345. Necessity of, in bush warfare, 350. Object of, in bush warfare to see and not be seen, 351. The, in bush warfare not intended to fight, 351. Difference between the, in bush and in hill warfare, 351. How troops should act if, are suddenly fired into, 361. Employment of, as flankers, 365. Use of infantry, general now, 374. Out of place in front of firing line in ordinary small wars, 376.

Seaforths. The, at the Atbara, 379, 380.

Second Gurkhas. The, mixed up with General Westmacott's rear guard when attacked, 296.

Section, sections. Working in, found to answer in bush warfare, 352. French made the, the unit in Dahomey, 352. Breaking up of companies into, in Ashanti, 353. Company first then the, made the unit in Dahomey, 382.

Sekukuni's. Effect of capture of, stronghold, 36. Infantry can only catch Kaffirs when they retire into strongholds like, mountain, 403.

Sekunderbagh. The guns at the, 431.

Sempagha. Tribesmen evacuated, position under artillery fire, 163. Tribesmen protected their flanks with sangars at, 161. Massing of artillery at the, pass, 435.

Senegal. French camel corps in, 425.

Sentry, sentries. Need of vigilant, to keep off marauders, 448. To be close in the bush, 458. Chain of double, in bush warfare, 45S. To be double in thick bush and may kneel or sit down, 459. Disadvantages under which, labours in small wars, 460. Position of, at night on open ground, 462. Outlying, and picquet sometimes in the same sangar, 400. Inclination of, to reply to snipers, 471. Duty at night, 472, 473. Question of depriving, of ammunition, 473.

Sentry Hill. Night attack of Maoris upon, 444.

Separation. In the theatre of war, generally held to be bad strategy, 10S. In small wars, is often unavoidable, 10S. Often desirable, 109. Moral effect of several invading columns makes, often expedient, 109. Only justifiable when each faction can hold its own, 112. Great danger of, if the superiority of regulars is in doubt, 113. Fatal to Republicans in early days of La Vendée, 113. Combined front and flank attacks involve, of force, 17(1. Examples of successes obtained by, of force, 177, 178. Dangers of tactical, 178. Disasters arising from, of force have generally been caused by mistakes, 179. Affair of the Little Big Horn as example of dangers of tactical, 179. Deh Khoja as an example of dangers of tactical, 180, 181. Examples of misunderstandings when there has been tactical, 182, 183. Battle of Adowa illustrates dangers of, in the field, 184. Dangers of, in bush warfare, 367.

Seragheri. Capture of, caused great anxiety as to Gulistan, 155.

Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis's night attack upon Tippoo's lines at, 485.

Service ot security. In small wars the, is a subject of special importance, 442. The, divides itself into two branches, 442. The, on the march, 474 to 479. The, a subject of great importance in all classes of warfare, 470.

Seventh Hussars. Wedza's stronghold captured by, dismounted, 170.

Shabkadar. Sir C Campbell's action at, as an example of readiness of enemy to fall upon regulars when these withdraw, 214.

Shah Alam Kaghza. Action of, as illustration of need of gaining some success in hill warfare before turning to retire, 328.

Shah Nujeef. The guns at the, 431.

Shangani. Position of laager at, deliberately selected, 283. Great importance of machine guns at fight on the, 441. Attack on the, laager made at dawn, 447.

Shankiawan. Effect of capture of Chinese artillery at, 157.

Shannon. Captain Peel's action at the Shah Nujeef as if he had been laying the, alongside an enemy's frigate, 431.

Shekan. Strategical position of Hicks Pasha's army at, 122. The battle of, the most striking example of an ambuscade of recent years, 254. Action the day before, 202. The army formed up in three squares at, and these fired into each other, 2(10. The squares at, encumbered by a mass of transport, 272.

Shellala. The action of, as illustrating effect of enemy attacking convoy far in rear of the force, 478.

Shendi. Position of Mahmud on the Atbara owing to the capture of, 87.

Sherman, General. March of, solitary instance of the kind in regular warfare of late years, 121.

Sherpur. Uprising of tribes which led to siege of, 48. The attack on the, cantonment was made at dawn, 447.

Shin Kamar. The affair of, as an example of a mistake in transmission of orders in hill warfare, 311.

Shinawarri. First advance from, against Dargai a reconnaissance, 302.

Shinwarris. Defeat of, at Futtehabad, 231.

Shock, shock action, shock tactics. Necessity of forming front in all directions to meet, tactics, 189. When enemy employs, retreat must be in some sort of square formation, 218. Rigid square necessary to meet, tactics, 258. In campaigns against irregular warriors, are not out of date, 404. Great importance of cavalry, action on the battlefield, 405.

Shott Tigri. Rear face of French, square at, formed of camels which enemy carried off, 257.

Shuturgardan Pass. Successful attack of a body of dismounted cavalry on Afghans near the, 421.

Sidi Feruch. Incident at night a few days after French landing at, 484 496.

Sidi Khalif. French attack at dawn at, 192. At, French took advantage of knowing that enemy withdrew part of his forces by night, 484.

Sierra Leone. Difficulty found in, in 1898, as regards communicating with columns, 142. Skill of the Yonnis in, at ambushed stockades, 252. Companies divided into sections of ten in, 352. Turning stockades in, 363.

Sikak. Battle of, an example of inducing enemy to quit his ground, 230.

Sikhs. Adopted defensive tactics from choice, 150. Defeat of, at Suruj Kund, 162. When main body attacked, left at Suruj Kund auxiliaries attacked in front and were fired into by mistake, 181. Sortie of, from Gulistan, 197. Isolation of a, company in Mamund valley owing to mistake in transmission of orders, 312. Knowledge of, of hill warfare, 321. Charge at Ramnuggur which routed the, 405. Lord Roberts's story about the preference of the Ambela tribesmen for, on outpost as compared to Gurkhas and Pathans, 472.

Sikkim. No need for system of outposts adopted in Tirah in, 470.

Simpson, Lance-Corporal. Action of, on baggage guard on the Arhanga Pass as an example of importance of keeping men together at night, 319.

Sir Daria. Almost every episode which brought Cossacks to sources of, an important operation of war, 105. On the steppes by the, horse and field artillery can manœuvre freely, 438.

Sitana. Plan of Ambela campaign to drive fanatics to, 49.

Sittang. Capture of, as an example of capture of a formidable stronghold by attack from different sides, 178.

Sixty-sixth Regiment. Overwhelming losses of, at Maiwand, 215.

Skobelef, General (Colonel). Fear of, lest his army against Turkomans would be made unwieldy, 60. Plan of campaign of, against Turkomans, 66. Difference of methods of, in dealing with Turkomans and with the Turkish troops, 67. Quotation from, as to need of resolute action in Asia, 72. Quotation from, as to skirmishes, 102. Views of, as to effect of guns with Tekkes, 158. Maxims of, as to artillery, 186. On importance of surprise, 240. Took infantry across Khokand in carts, 242. Strong objection of, to dispersed formations in Asiatic warfare, 382, 383. Laid particular stress on company being the unit, 382. Insisted on volleys as against independent fire in Turkoman campaign, 895. Instructions of, to his cavalry in the Turkoman campaign, 414. Told off several guns to each advanced post on road to Denghil Tepe, 437.

Smala. Capture of Abd el Kader's, 82, 83. Meaning of word, 82.

Snipers, sniping. Wear and tear caused by, in hill warfare, 287. Loss of transport owing to, 287. Every wounded man creates a cluster affording a target to, 288. Absence of, in bush warfare, 349. Flanking parties need not he pushed out far in bush warfare to keep off, 349. Trouble caused to outposts by, 448. Picquets close in afford no protection against, 453. Picquets well pushed out will almost secure troops by day against, 468. Dealing with, at night, 471, 427. Stalking, 472. Necessity of concealing position of head quarters, &c, from, 472.

Sobraon. No one remembers who led Khalsa armies at, 126.

Somaliland. Use of zeribas in, 281. Somalis. Enveloping attacks of, 187

South Africa. Crashing of Zulus indispensable to peace of, 28. False impression in, as to Boers, 47. Even in healthy climates like, troops suffer wastage from exposure, 97. Difficulty found in bringing in cattle after successful raids in, 247. Laagers a feature of warfare in, 281. Value of mounted troops in, 403. Position of picquets in, 473.

South African war, 1899-1002. Wrong estimate of strength of enemy in, 47. Supply in later stages of, 0, "). Rapid movements, not manœuvres required in, 93. Abandonment of communications in, 121. Size of columns in, 130. Driven in, 143. Importance of intelligence department In, 145. Early morning attacks in, 193. Boer pursuits in, 215. Guns during retreats in, 210. Need of forced marches at night in, 210. Use of mounted mon in, for ambuscades, 251. Cavalry mul mounted infantry in, 412, 413. Skill with which Boers concealed numbers in, 420. Boer night attacks in, 444, 445. System of outposts employed in later stages of, 408. Difficulty as to use of irregular troops on night marches in, 493. Difficulty of preventing stampedes of horses in, during night attacks, 494.

Spain. Henry IV's dictum as to campaigning in, 60. Bugeaud had served an apprenticeship in guerilla warfare in, 123. Hill warfare has been illustrated in campaigns in, 346.

Spanish. How the, forces were drawn into purposeless engagements by the Moors, 101. Effect of exposure of their communications on the invasion of Morocco, 117. Effect of, guerillas in the Peninsular war, 120. Want of subordinate leaders one cause of, failure in Cuba, 143. Moorish counter-attack upon, army at Tetuan, 185. Successful ambuscade by, troops at Castellijos, 251. Ambuscade of the, guerillas in the Peninsula, 253. Want of fire discipline of, troops in 1850 against the Moors, 389. In, campaign against Moors small arms of enemy an good as those of regulars, 398. Disaster of two, squadrons at Castellijos, 400. No case of hostile night attack in, war against Morocco, 444. Precaution taken by the leader of a, guerilla attack at night to prevent his men from mistaking each other for the enemy, 488.

Spear, spears. Fanatics generally have, 30. Rigid square required to meet enemy who trusts to, and knives, 259. Efficiency of enemy in use of, 399.

Spy, spies. Doubt as to information derived from, 51. Enemy has no regular corps of, 54. In guerilla warfare camp of regulars full of, 144.

Square, squares, square formation. Reasons for employment of, 189. Bugeaud's order of battle at Isly practically the, 189. Need for, on the defensive under certain circumstances, 203. In retreat before Zulus of Ghazis some sort of, is almost indispensable, 218. Used as battle formation both offensively and defensively, 256. Importance of subject of, 250. Raison d'etre of, to enable troops to show a fighting front in all directions, 256. Have sometimes only three sides, 257. At Shott Tigri one face of, formed of camels, 257. Enveloping attacks of enemy bring about, 257. In reality two kinds of, rigid form and elastic form 258. Elastic form of, employed in bush warfare, 258. Form of elastic, used in hill warfare, 258. Usual formation of rigid, 259. Object of the rigid, 259. Cavalry sometimes inside, 259. As a rule, acts on defensive till enemy is beaten, 259. Formation analogous to, at Isly 259. Achupa as example of, compelling enemy to attack under circumstances favourable to regulars, 259, 260. One side of, at Achupa left open by men getting out hand of and attacking, 260. Difficulty of manœuvring in, 260. Abu Klea as example of, getting disordered in movement, 261. Question of skirmishers with the, 261. Question of preventing gaps from occurring in, 262. Risk of rear face of being "bulged out by non-combatants, 262. At fight the day before Shekan enemy driven out of a broken, by intact face turning round, 262. Dangerous position of a broken, 262. Value of reserves in a, 262, 263. Enemy recognises that corners are the weak points of a, 263. Question of the corners, 263. Position of artillery or machine guns in, 263, 264. Examples of guns in, 263, 264. Advantage of guns at some distance from, 264. Position of cavalry with reference to, 264, 265. Examples of cavalry and, 264, 265. Question of single, as against two or more, 265. Two, at Tamai, 265. At Shekan fired into each other, 266. Single, necessary if enemy completely envelopes army in great force, 266. The target which a, presents to the enemy, 266. Limited development of fire of, 267. Danger of attacking in, 267. Battle of Tamai as illustrating danger of offensive in, 267, 268. The capture of Bida as an example of offensive tactics in, 260. Examples to show value of, in small wars, 268, 270. Success of, in scrub round Suakin, 270. Inconvenience of marching far in, 270. If possible on the march, shall only be assumed at last moment, 271. At disaster to Baker Pasha near Trinkitat, not properly formed when enemy attacked, 271. Use of, on the march by the French and Russians, 272. Use of, by British in the Sudan on the march, 272. Slow progress of army marching in, 272. Hicks Pasha's, at Shekan impeded by transport, 272. Ordinarily convoy left in zeriba while troops go out to fight in, 273. The use of, near Suakin, 273, 274. Impossibility of surrounding large convoys by, 274. Artillery in, on the march, 274. Cavalry, with reference to, on the march, 275, 276. In Dahomey cavalry sometimes formed rear face of, 275. Bivouac in, 276. Conclusion as to, 276. Analogy of principle of crowning heights to that of, 299. In bush warfare column moves in form of an elastic, 355. Employment of elastic by Prince Woronzoff, 385. The elastic, in Dahomey, 356, 357. Advantage of elastic, in attack, 356. Force at Amoaful formed up in a kind of, 357, 358. Advantages of elastic, in bush fighting, 358, 359. Very small columns cannot form a, in the bush, 362. French marched round stockades near Abomey in, 363. Question whether magazine rifle admits of substituting a more elastic formation for the, 390. Employment of a cordon of vedettes round a, 476.

Star Shell. Value of, in case of hostile night attack, 495.

Stawell. Results achieved by forward tactics of artillery, at, 174.

Stewart, Sir H. March of, from Abu Klea to Nile, 44. Desperate attempt of dervishes to keep, from wells at Abu Klea, 62. Force of, in Bayuda desert not absolutely a flying column, 120, 121. Compelled to form zeriba on unfavourable ground, 282. Inconvenience caused to, by smallness of cavalry force, 402. Hussars armed with spears by, after El Teb, 414. Left camels of camel corps in zeriba when going out to fight, 425, 426. March of, to the Nile as an example of a night march, 490. Confusion on night march of, towards Nile upset plan of reaching river before dawn, 490.

Stewart, Sir D. Transport animals with, on march to Kabul, 60. Force of, at Ahmed Khel hampered by its convoy, 120. Difference between conditions in march of, to Kabul and march from Amoaful to Kumasi, 120. The attack upon, at Ahmed Khel, 204.

Stockade, stockades. Guns very effective against Achinese, 155. Advantage of attacking, in several columns, 177. Ambushed, in Sierra Leone, 252. The, in Lushai flanked the line of advance of the troops, 341. In hill warfare when slopes are covered with forests sangars give place to, 341. In the bush the enemy has materials at hand to run up, 350. The attack of, in bush warfare, 362, 363. Turning flanks of, 364. Enemy can construct, in thick bush as fast as the troops advance, 364.

Stratagem, stratagems. Of imposing upon enemy as to strength, 175. Lieut. Grant's, at Thobal, 175. Captain Uniacke's, in the Bara valley, 175. Colonel Baden-Powell's, at capture of Wedza's stronghold, 176. Strange how often enemy con be drawn into action by, 227. Enemy's liking for, 227. Enemy underrates capacity for, of regulars, 223. Examples of, 230 to 232, 234. Regulars can employ, of pretended retirement with good effect in suppressing insurrections, 231. Enemy can be misled by, as to intended point of attack, 235, 236. Instances might be multiplied to show value of, 236. Failure of, directed against Boers, 238. Advantage enjoyed by regulars in carrying out, 238, 239.

Suakin. Action of Hashin in reference to campaign of, of 1885, 101. During campaigns near, Osman Digna always based on Tokar, 105. Skirmishers generally dispensed with by squares near, 262. Success of square formation near, 270. The immense difficulties of the movements in square in 1885 near, 273. Depots and convoys near, 274. Position of cavalry with reference to squares at, 275. Uso of zeribas near, 281, 285.

Sudan. Large hostile forces unexpectedly met with in, campaigns, 53. Sudden onslaughts of enemy met with in the, 188, 189. Impetuous attack of enemy in the, 259. Cavalry almost always kept outside squares in the, 265. Success of the square formation in the, 269. Troops compelled to march in square in the, 272. Prominence assumed by zeribas in the, 280. Mahdists attempted no night attacks in the, 444. Sentries often placed inside the zeribas in the, 463.

Sudanese. In face of, old orders of battle resumed, 30. Cause of, victory over Hicks Pasha, 44. Desperate attempt of, to keep Sir H. Stewart from wells, 62. Occupation of Sarras by a force of, 75. Tactics of, compelled regulars to adopt the defensive, 195. Sudden attack of, upon Egyptian troops at Tokar, 204. Seldom showed disinclination for battle, 206. Signal defeat of, by Hicks Pasha at Marabia, 208. At Tokar only part of the assemblage attacked, the rest watched the result, 213. Difficulty of keeping, troops of the Egyptian army in hand in times of victory, 229. Colonel Macdonald's success in drawing, on to attack by artillery fire, 234, 235. The, in the battle of Toski, 237. At El Teb the, entrenchments were turned, 259. Guns at El Teb, 266. The, concealed in a ravine at Tamai, 267. Determined, attack beaten off by Hicks Pasha with untried troops in square at Marabia, 269. Baker Pasha's square near Trinkitat not completed when, attacked, 271. Hicks Pasha's force when annihilated by, at Shekan, 273. Zeribas a simple method of meeting the tactics of the, 281. Rushes of, fanatics avail nothing against good troops in two-deep line, 387. The, attacks on Macdonald's brigade, 387. Different effect of magazine and single loading rifles on, at Khartum, 390. Loose battle array of, as a rule renders cavalry action difficult, 407. Throw themselves down and hamstring horses, 407. A mass of, charged through several times at El Teb, 408. Tremendous effect of artillery fire upon, when they attack, 430. The, attempted no night attacks, 444. In close country sentries cannot get back in case of a rush by, 453. The attack of the, on the Tofrek zeriba, 455. The action of the, with reference to Sir H. Stewart's march at night from Abu Klea to the Nile, 490.

Suez Canal. Advance of British troops from, to the Nile Delta, 66.

Supply, supplies. Unfortunate results of ignorance as regards resources of theatre of war in, 45. All importance of question of, 57. Intimately bound up with transport, 58. Organization of, service in regular warfare, 58. In small wars few, exist in theatre of war, 58. Immense quantity of transport required to convey, 59. Difficulties as to, oblige force employed to be out down, 60. Water as a question of, 60 to 62. Of food and water a matter of calculation, 62. River column as example of unexpected difficulty arising as to, 63. Navigable rivers as channels for forwarding, 63. System of boat, in Red River and Nile expeditions, 64. Necessity of pushing on, ahead of troops, 64 to 67. As illustrated in South African war, 65. Question of pushing on, considered, 65. Failure of General Lomakin to form depôts of, in advance, 66. Skobelef s plan of pushing on, 66. Pushed up Sweet Water Canal to Kassassin in advance of troops, 67. At time of Nile expedition, decided the theatre of war, 67. Nile expedition as an example of importance of, in small wars, 68 to 70. Evils when miscalculation as to, brings force to a standstill, 73. Bonds which fetter regulars arise partly from, question, 85. Enemy has no fixed system of, 86. Question of, affords additional reason for avoiding desultory warfare, 98. Question of, sometimes necessitates separation, 109. Liberty of action enjoyed by an army cast loose from its communications because it is independent as regards, 118. When army becomes a flying column It becomes burdened with great, columns, ^ 119. For a flying column for a short time do not become a serious encumbrance, 120. Care of, one reason for squares, 257. Laagers and zeribas afford shelter for, 277. Value of laagers and zeribas when the army is merely an escort for its own, 279. The system of zeribas affords a means of pushing, ahead of an advancing army, 284. Difficulties as to, in hill warfare, 287.

Surprise, surprises. War of, replaces organized resistance in second stage of campaigns of conquest, 26. Enemy skilful in effecting, 99. Artillery preparation incompatible with, 153. French learnt art of, from Abd el Kader and his satellites, 233. Skobelef as to importance of knowing how to, 240. Although enemy well fitted for carrying out, he can also be surprised, 240. At dawn, 240. Examples of, at dawn, 240. Night, 241. Rapid march necessary for a, by day, 241. The, of Abd el Kader's smala, 241. Red Indians dealt with by, after forced marches, 241. Mobility essential for a day, 241. Mounted infantry for, 242. Putting men in carts for a, 242. To carry out a, the first point is to keep the plan secret, 242, 243. Napoleon's views as to, 243. Failure of Italian, owing to secret leaking out, 243. Risk of intended, being discovered by discharge of firearms, 244. Desirability of putting enemy on false scent when, is intended, 244, 245. General Philebert s methods of disguising plans when intending a, 244. Raids a form of, 245. Importance of reconnaissances in hill warfare partaking of nature of a, 300. Advisability of, when acting against villages in hill warfare with only a small force, 309. Bush offers enemy opportunities for carrying out, 349. Bush warfare essentially an affair of, and ambuscades, 350. Importance of a system of safeguarding regulars against, 442. Discredit of regulars being taken by, on the march, 477.

Surprise Hill. Attack on, 484.

Suruj Kund. Battle of, as an example of incapacity of enemy to meet a flank attack, 162. Auxiliary contingent fired into at, by mistake, 181.

Swahili. Waste of ammunition by the, levies in Uganda, 371.

Swat. Sir B. Blood's forcing of entrance into, 159. Description of the "Gate of, " 160. All cavalry might not be able to act in, 407. The tribesmen of, not so well armed as Afridis but inclined for night attacks, 470. Night attacks of the, tribes, 471. Swat River. Cavalry fight in 1895 on the, 405. Effective work of cavalry on bad ground in the valley of the, 407. Swati, Swatis. Rapid flight of, saved them from cavalry at Landaki, 173 Takdempt. General Bugeaud's ambuscade at, 251.

Taku Forts. March of Anglo-French force from, on Pekin, 51.

Tamar. Position of machine guns in broken square at, 262. Good service performed by cavalry at, 205. Effective support afforded by one square to the other at, 265. Inconvenience caused at, by one square firing into the other, 266. The battle of, as illustrating the danger of attacking in, 267, 268. Zeriba at, in which non-combatants were left, 283. Number of rounds fired at, 390. Effective action of cavalry dismounted on a flank at, 419. Battery at, beat off an Arab rush, 430.

Tamu. Advance of Lieut. Grant from, 83.

Tang Chow. Agreement that Anglo-French force might advance to, 51.

Tank. Successful feint of Ressaldar Saadat Khan at, 232.

Tantia Tope. Causes of great reputation of, 126. Affair of Jaora-Alipore after the defeat of, at Gwalior, 211. Taranaki. Incident in the, 182.

Tartar, Tartars. Consist largely of irregular cavalry, 32. Success of Cossack ambuscades against, horsemen, 250. Fire from horseback, 411. Failure of, horse in China in 1860 firing from horseback, 412.

Tartary. In, it is the practice for masses of horse to charge down, 258.

Tashkend. Tchernaieff's coup de main on, 81. Capture of, facilitated by Russian success at Ikan, 103. Army marching from Bokhara to recover, defeated at Yedshar, 104. Capture of, gave Russians a firm footing in Turkestan, 104.

Tavliens. Defeat of the, on the Metchik River, 101.

Tchernaieff, General. Attempt of, in Samarcand, 61. Capture of Tashkend by, 81.

Tekke, Tekkes. Russian expeditions against, Turkomans, 28. Whole power of, Turkomans concentrated in Denghil Tepe, 38. Skobelef 8 operations against, Turkomans, as compared to his conduct with Turkish troops, 67. In Russian expedition against, there was much loss from sickness, US. Evil consequences of sending small Russian columns against, in 1876, 101. The, at the assault of Lomakin on Denghil Tepe, 185. Mistaken estimate of, power of counter-attack by Skobelef, 382. The, at the affair of Petrusvitch's garden, 421. The raid of the, upon Burnak, 428. Determined sorties of, at night, 444.

Tel-el-Kebir. Importance of Egyptian position at, 92. Question whether, could have been captured after repulse of Egyptians at K assassin, 106. A remarkable example of attack at dawn, 194. The infantry formation at, 379. Comparison of formations at, to hill warfare, 381. British guns massed at, 435. The night operations previous to the attack on, 484. Colonel Maurice's remarks on night operations with reference to the march on, 489.

Tellinouet. The French nearly rushed one night at, owing to outposts not giving alarm in time, 463.

Terai. The Gurkha defences in masses out of the, turned by a night march, 491.

Terillion, Col. Successful action of, at Achupa, 260.

Tetuan. The objective of the Spanish, 39. Moorish counter-attack at 185. Marshal McDonald advanced in formation like a wedge at, 187. That!. The Gurkha scouts at, 305. Thebaw. Effort of king, to prevent annexation, 25. Theodore. King, stood his ground at Magdala, 105. Orders issued by to his troops to rush down and seize the baggage column at Arogee 233.

Thermopylae. Disaster to Turkish forces at, as an example of failing to crown the heights, 293.

Thiers. On Heche's system in La Vendée, 147.

Third GurKhas. Ambuscade by the scouts of the, at Saran Sar, 334.

Thirty-fifth Sikhs. Successful counter-attack of two companies of, when in great danger, 334.

Thirty-sixth Sikhs. The, at Tseri Kandao, 224. Afridis caught in a gorge by, the, between Dwatoi and Maidan, 323. The, at Saran Sar, 342 to 344.

Thobal. Lieut. Grant's exploits at, as example of dash and audacity, 83. Lieut. Grant's bluff at, when acting on the defensive, 83, 175.

Tientsin. Effect of capture of Chinese artillery on march from, to Pekin 157.

Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis's night attack upon lines of, at Seringapatam, 485.

Tirah. Campaign in, affords example of peculiar objective, 38. Campaign in, affords example of large forces moving as flying columns, 119. The memorable campaign in, a typical example of hill warfare, 286. Circumstances which made, campaign one of the most arduous British struggles since the Mutiny, 289. Experience of, campaign all in favour of small picquets, 297. Example of troops being benighted from the, campaign, 314. Sir W. Lockhart's visit to the country west of, 318. The petty disasters in, 321. Examples of catching hill-men in ravine? in, 323. The only occasion on which hostile swordsmen charged in, 340. Service? of the Gurkha scouts in, 345. Losses in the Ambela campaign severer than in, 384. In the, campaign the fire of the enemy was seldom found formidable when being attacked, 384. Only portable artillery can be satisfactorily used in, 438. System of outposts adapted to, not suitable for campaign against Arabi Pasha, 452. The outpost arrangements at night in, 469. Contrast of outpost system employed at night in. and by the Malakand field force, 470. In most hill warfare the system of outposts employed in, would not be adopted, 471.

Tofrek. Determination of enemy at, showing how small was moral effect of Hashin, 101. Site of zeriba deliberately selected at, 283. Confusion caused by vedettes at, 412. The machine guns jammed at, 440. The vedettes could scarcely get in at, 453. The attack on the, zeriba as an example of difficulty of outposts in bush with a reckless enemy, 455.

Tokar. Importance of, to Osman Digna, 105. Importance of the engagement at, 106. The fight at, as an example of beating off a formidable attack in line, 204. Part of hostile forces held aloof at, 213.

Tonkin. Chinese forces in, partially organized, 29. Example of misleading enemy from campaign in, 55. Advantage derived by French from rivers in, 63. Moral effect in of capture of Bacninh, 94. Deadly climate in, 98. Black flags of, ready to accept battle, 103. Failures of the French in, on two occasions to bring separate columns together at the right time, 114. Unfortunate use of artillery by French in, 153. Difficulty found by French in getting to close quarters with Chinese in, even when these had prepared their ground, 159. Negrier's method of assaulting Chinese works in, 165. Enemy in, disinclined for determined resistance, 165. French adopted echelon in, in attacking very superior forces, 190. Difficulty found in, of keeping native troops in hand at moment of victory, 229. The ambuscade of the French at Hanoi which brought on the, war, 254. Strength of companies in the, campaign, 382. French in, depended almost entirely on volleys, 395. French in, have found value of bayonet, 399. Silencing Chinese guns in, 433. Draught artillery found an encumbrance in, 438. Determined night attacks of Black Flags in early days of, war, 443.

Toski. Campaign of, as illustrating disregard for communications shown by enemy, 87. The battle of, as giving an instance of enemy refusing to be drawn into action, 237, 238.

Transkei. Kaffirs of, 33.

Trans-Caucasia. Terrain in, suitable to guerilla warfare, 127. Want of decentralised vigour on part of Russians in, 130. Difficulties of pursuit in, 211.

Trinkitat. Desperate attempt of Osman Digna to stop Egyptian advance from, on Tokar, 100. In Baker Pasha's disaster near, the rear face of the square was in a state of chaos when attacked, 262. Baker Pasha's force had not time to complete formation of square near, 271. Failure of fire discipline at, 304. Cordon of vedettes round forces advancing from, 470.

Tsaratsora. Attempted surprise of the Hovas on French at, at daybreak, 448.

Tseri Kandao. The rear guard action of, as an example of value of counter, attack when in difficulties, 224, 225. The withdrawal over the, pass a movement which could not be completed in one day if enemy gave trouble, 314. Disaster to Dorsets at, due to getting into a nullah and straggling, 310. Junction of the two parts of the rear guard at, before daylight, 310. Result of the Zakka Khel charge at the, Kotal, 333. At, after suffering loss the hill-men worked round the flanks, 334. The only occasion when in Tirah swordsmen charged, 340.

Tunis. French invasion of, an example of separation, 110. Difficulty found by French in bringing in captured cattle after raids in, 247. French cavalry ambuscaded in, 253. In, it is the practice for masses of horse to charge down, 25ft. French practice of marching in square in, 272. Uso of zeribas in bivouac in, 278. Masses of hostile | horse in, gave the infantry little trouble, 388, Ambuscades used as outposts in, 465.

Turco. The, officers in Tonkin used to make their men lie down and cease firing to keep them in hand, 229.

Turkestan. Inhabited largely by nomads, 37. Yedshar decided fate of 104. Withdrawal of Khivan force opposing the Russian columns from 111.

Turkish. Skobelef's procedure against Tekkes compared to his procedure against, troops, 67. Successful, feint in the Wallachian insurrection, 231. Disaster to a, force in pass of Thermopylae, 293.

Turkoman, Turkomans. Russian campaigns against, as illustrating principle of pushing supplies on in advance of army, 66, 67. Difference of Egyptian campaign of 1882 from, campaigns, 67. Swarms pursuing Lomakin's infantry checked by artillery, 185. Counter-attack of, as an example of eagerness of enemy to follow up at first, 213. Saying of Skobelef s as to surprises when preparing for campaign against, 240. Carried foot soldiers behind horsemen in the Khiva campaign, 241. Skill of, in forays, 245. Russians marched in square during suppression of, in the khanate of Khiva, 272. Effective raids of, mounted on camels on Russians, 425. The, at Burnak, 427.

Turks. In Montenegro, 31. Montenegrins found more difficult to subdue by, than Servian armies, 127.

Tuyen Kwang. The sorties from, as examples of effective counter-attacks, 197. Incident at Hoa Moe on march of relieving column to, 431.

Twenty-first Lancers. Charge of, at Khartum effective because enemy was massed, 407. The action of the, very remarkable, 419.

Twenty-fourth Panjab Infantry. Expulsion of the enemy who had penetrated into the bazaar at Malakand by a company of the, 400. Successful counter-attack of, at dawn from Malakand, 498.

Tyrolese. French and Bavarian troops defeated by, peasants, 287. A French column destroyed by, by throwing down trees, 290. The, found hurling down trees very effectual, 339.

Tytler, General. Operations, of force under, intended to reach defile above All Musjid, 168.

Uganda. Difficulty of communicating with distant columns during campaign in, 142.

Ulundi. Occupation of, 36. At, regulars acted strategically on the offensive adopted tactically the defensive, 76. Zulu enveloping tactics at, 190. No skirmishers out at, 261. Position of guns in square at, 264. The cavalry at, 264. Success of square formation at, 269. Zeriba near, in which non-combatants were left, 283. Number of rounds fired at, 396. Value of lance shown at, 414. The machine guns jammed at, 440.

Umbumedi. Bear of square closed by cavalry at, 419.

Uniacke, Capt. Bluff of, in the Bara valley, 175.

Utrecht. Sir E. Wood's reconnaissance to, 78.

Uzbegs. Romanovski's victory over the, at Yedshar, 190.

Valerik. The ambuscade of the Russians on the, 254.

Vedette, vedettes. Confusion caused by the, at Tofrek, 412. Distance of chain of, in outposts from main body relatively small in small wars, 451. In close country may not be able to escape a fanatical rush, 453. The, at Tofrek, 455. Must be pushed well out when safe, 476. Employment of a cordon of, to safeguard troops on the march, 476.

Village, villages. Question of destruction of, 41. Advantages of attack in several columns on, which is not well known, 177. Destruction of, in hill warfare, 306, 309. Little effect of mountain guns on Pathan, 308. Reasons why destruction of a, takes time, 309. Destruction of, to be carried out by working parties if possible unmolested, 309. If force be small expediency of giving to destruction of, the character of a surprise, 309. General principle of attack on a. in hill warfare, 309. Presence of women and children in, show that men do not mean to fight, 310. Extent to which mud, resist shell fire, 437. Desirability of shells with high explosives for bombarding, 438.

Villagers. Sir B. Blood's plan of using, as outposts Volley, volleys. General plan of enemy in bush warfare to deliver a, and then scuttle off, 349. Question whether troops should fire a, before charging when fired at in the bush, 360. Question of precautionary, in bush warfare, 371, 372. The system of precautionary, adopted in Benin, 371. Objections to, 372. Ammunition expended in precautionary, in Sierra Leone, 372. Great execution done by French, in attack, 378. Question of, 390, 391. General Egerton on, in hill warfare, 392. Question of, in hill warfare, 392. French depended almost entirely on, in Tonkin and Dahomey, 395. General Skobelef on, 395. Official account of expedition to Antananarivo, on, 395. Hostile, in the bush more dangerous by day than by night, 458. Sometimes permissible during a night attack, 487.

Wad en Nejumi. See Nejumi.

Wad Has. Village of Amsal at, attacked without artillery preparation, 155. As an example of regulars pushing on disregarding threats of enemy on flanks and rear, 190. Moorish attacks on flanks and rear of troops at, 257.

Wadi Haifa. Reason for, being considered as base of Nile Expedition, 68. Troops held back below, 69. Advance of Nejumi past, 87.

Waganda. Waste of ammunition by, levies in Uganda, 371.

Wallachian. Example of successful feint from the, insurrection, 231.

Waran valley. Rear-guard action of Tseri Kandao brought on as brigade retired from the, 224. Dwellings destroyed in, found rebuilt in three weeks, 300. Reason for moving back from, to Maidan in a single day Wardrop, Major. Successful ruse of, at Abu Klea with a few troopers, 420.

Wane, Colonel. Attack of, on a pah as example of misunderstanding between detached columns, 182.

Warwicks. Formation of the, at Atbara, 379, 380.

Wastage. Fact of troops being on active service causes, 97, 98. In Zulu war, by battle greater than by sickness owing to Isandlwhana, 98.

Water. Importance of knowing resources of theatre of war in, 45. Question of, as affecting supply, 60, 61. Examples of failure of expected, supply, 61. Supply of food, and, a matter of calculation, 62. Advance up Nile relieved troops of all anxiety as to, 68.

Waterberg. Operations in, 93.

Waterkloof. Attacks on, group of mountains in 1851-52 always made in several columns, 177. Heavy loss of officers in the, 354. Infantry could only catch Kaffirs when they retired into strongholds like the, 403.

Waziris. Drawing of, out of hills by a feint near Tank, 232. The, at the action of Shah Alam Kaghza, 328. Waziristan. Hill warfare well illustrated in, 346.

Wedza's Stronghold. The capture of, by Col. Baden-Powell as example of successful bluff, 175, 176. Error as regards time in first advance on, 175. Capacity of cavalry for posing as a large force illustrated at, 420. Captured by hussars on foot, 421.

Wellesley, Sir A. At Assaye, brought whole army upon the Mahratta flank, 163. Remark of, as to failures in enterprises, 198. Views of, on night attacks, 481.

Wellington, Duke of. See Sir A. Wellesley.

Wémé. Advantage conferred on French by the river, 63.

West Africa. The ambuscades in, 252. Absurd to place races of, on same platform as Pathans and Gurkhas, 349. Difficulty of achieving success in some parts of, were the enemy brave, 373.

Westmacott, General. How crowning the heights makes the rear-guard a heterogenous body exemplified by attack on rear-guard of, in the Bara valley, 296. The great rear-guard action of, in the Bara valley, 317. Retirement of, from Dwatoi to Bagh unexpected by the Afridis, 329. Afridis crept up close to rear-guard of, under cover of bush, 340. The reconnaissance under, to Saran Sar, 342 to 345.

White, Major. Successful frontal attack of, upon defile at Charasia, 166. Action of, at Kandahar as example of individual initiative, 172.

White River Agency. The affair of the Milk River while a column was moving to, 283.

Wilson, Sir C. Final advance of, to Nile near Metemma, 263.

Wodehouse, Colonel. Attack of, on Wad en Nejumi, 87.

Wolseley, Lord (Sir G.). Quotation from, on objective, 40. Plan of. for Nile Expedition, 67. Decides to send camel corps across desert, 69. Disappointed in hopes of capturing Berber, 70. Quotation from, as to need of prosecuting operations vigorously, 73. Line of advance in Egypt selected by, 92. Object of, was to fight a decisive battle in the desert, 92. Arrival of detached column at Kumasi after withdrawal of, main body, 111. Decision of, that an autumn campaign would be necessary to crush the Mahdi at Khartum, 123. Consequences of, not knowing condition of River and Desert Columns, 123, 124. Decision of, to recall columns to Korti, 124. On effect of artillery, 153. Quotation from, as to importance of vigorously following up success over an undisciplined enemy, 207. Despatch of, as to bush warfare after fight at Essaman, 353. Intentions of, with regard to the formation for attack at Tel-el-Kebir, 379. Instructions of, to the camel corps in the Nile Expedition, 427.

Wood, Col. (Sir E.). Force of, at Kambula acting strategically on the offensive although tactically on the defensive, 76. Moral effect of reconnaissance of, to Utrecht, 78. The attack of, upon the Zlobani Mountain, 183, 184.

Woronzoff, Prince. Employment of elastic square formations by, in the Chechnaya, 355.

Wounded. Sending, to the rear one cause of strategical disadvantage under which regulars labour, 85. The question of the, 95, 96. Effect of presence of, with General Jeffrey's force operating against Mamunds, 96. Difficulty caused in retreat by necessity of carrying off, 212, Care of, one reason for squares, 256. How greatly the, impede the regulars in hill warfare, 288. Importance in hill warfare when in retreat of preventing the enemy from getting near enough to, to get an easy shot, 331.

Yakoub Khan. Overthrow of troops of, 38.

Yangi Kala. Capture of, as an example of separate attacks on a position, 178. Skobelef's instructions previous to attack on, 382.

Yeatman-Biggs, General. Relief of Fort of Gulistan by, 155.

Yedshar. Importance of the battle of, 104. Battle of, as an example of regulars pushing on and disregarding hostile threats against flanks and rear, 190-

Yonnis. Skill of the, in devising ambushed stockades, 252.

Yusuf, General. Stratagem of, prior to a raid, 246, 247. System of outposts adopted by, 466, 473.

Zagai. Services of the lancers at, 308.

Zakka Khels. Rapid rebuilding of dwellings in the Waran valley, 309. The, know that native regiments of the Panjab are not to be trifled with, 321. Party of, caught in a ravine by the Gordons and Madras Sappers, 323. The fire of the 15th Sikhs on the, when they charged at Tseri Kandao so effective that rear guard able to withdraw unmolested to the foot of the hill, 333.

Zeriba, zeribas. A brave enemy acting on defensive brings about system of laagers, and squares, 206. Formation of, preferable to marching with a large convoy in square, 273. Desirability of forming, round bivouac, 276. Conducting operations under shelter of laagers and, peculiar to small wars, 277. Laagers and, really an extension of principle of square, 277. Bivouacs in square in Algeria, Tunis, and Central Asia generally accompanied by construction of some form of, 278. Laagers and, possess from tactical point of view all attributes of fortifications, 278. In the main a formation of laagers and, has same effect on troops as acting on the defensive, 278. Laagers and, do not breathe the spirit of attack, 278. If regulars are encumbered by a mass of transport and the enemy is enterprising, laagers and, are almost compulsory, 279. Value of laagers and, as bases for mobile columns in guerilla warfare, 280. Requirements for formation of, 280. Prominence assumed by, in, the Sudan, 280. In Dahomey, 281. Laagers and, economise outposts, 282. Laagers and, enable commander of regulars to select his own ground and time for lighting, 282. Hasty construction of laagers and 283. How laagers and, relieve force of encumbrances in action and serve as a refuge if it is defeated, 283, 284. Value of laagers and, when troops want rest, 284. How, come to form links on the line of communications of an advancing force, 2S4, 285. Use of, at Suakin, 284. General conclusions as to laagers and, 285, Value of machine guns in, 441.

Zinguin Neck. The misunderstanding about the, at the affair of the Zlobani mountain, 183, 1S4.

Zlobani mountain. The affair of the, as an example of a misunderstanding occurring with detached forces, 183, 184. Cattle captured at raid on, had to be abandoned, 248.

Zula. Distance from, to Mogdala, 110.

Zulu, Zulus. War a campaign to overthrow dangerous military power, 28. Characteristics of, impis, 30. Comparison of, to Kaffirs and Boers, 33. Fought in organized armies, 34. Desultory fighting after capture of Ulundi in, War, 36. Difficulties caused to British by mobility of, impis, 52. War illustrates combination of strategical offensive with tactical defensive, 70. In, war wastage from battle greater than from sickness owing to Isandlwhana, 98. War a campaign marked by general actions, 104. In, war advance of separate British columns prevented Ketchwayo from invading Natal, 110. Enveloping tactics of the, 100. Tactics of, compelled regulars to stand on defensive, 196. Tendency of, to sweep round flanks of opponents, 205. Discipline of the, 229. Part of, army drawn into premature action at Kambula, 220, 230. Enveloping tactics of the, 257, 258. Enveloping tactics of the, necessitated the cavalry going inside the square at Ulundi, 264. Employment of laagers in the, war, 281. The, swarms could effect nothing against two-deep lines, 387. Tremendous effect of artillery when standing on the defensive against, 436. Value of machine guns against rushes of, 441. The attack of the, upon Rorke's Drift, 444. The, attacked Ginghilovo and detachment on Intombi River at dawn, 447. Outposts suited to, war would not suit campaign against Arab! Pasha, 453. Sentries if far out in close country cannot escape a, rush, 453. Incident in the, war of a disaster to a party owing to no outlook being kept, 460. Sentries placed inside zeribas in, war, 463. False alarm at Fort Newdigate in the, war, 464. Assistance derived at Rorke's Drift from glare of burning buildings for firing by the, 495.

Zululand. Objective in, 39. In, regulars acted on the defensive on the battle-field, 190. Impetuous attack of enemy in, 202. In, where enemy attacked in great force and enveloped a single square was best, 266. Experience in, showed that even bad marksmen could damage a square, 266. System of laager and zeriba warfare adopted with success in, 285. Infantry two deep in square in, 387.

Zwickau. Ambuscade of the French by Prussian guerillas at, 252.


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