THIRD EDITION.
LONDON:
PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
By HARRISON and SONS, 15-47, St. Martin's Lane, W.C.,
PRINTERS in Ordinary to His Majesty.
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E. PONSONBY, Ltd
(Reprinted 1914.)
Price Four Shillings.
In preparing this new edition for the press, advantage has been taken of experiences gained in campaigns which have taken place since the book was originally compiled. These include the French advance to Antananarivo and their later operations in Madagascar, the guerilla warfare in Cuba previous to the American intervention, the suppression of the rebellions in Rhodesia, the operations beyond the Panjab frontier in 1897-98, the re-conquest of the Sudan, the operations of the United States troops against the Filipinos, and many minor campaigns in Bast and West Africa.
Some of the later chapters have been re-arranged and in part re-written, and new chapters have been added on hill warfare and bush warfare. Useful hints have been obtained from the notes which Lieut.-Colonel Septans, French Marine Infantry, has incorporated in his translation of the first edition. An index has been added.
My acknowledgments are due to the many officers who have afforded valuable information, and who have aided in revising the proofs.
Chas. E. Callwell,
Major, R.A.
July,1899.
This book has now been revised and brought up to date by the author, Colonel C. E. Callwell. It is recommended to officer as a valuable contribution on the subject of the conduct of small wars. It is full of useful facts and information on all the details which must be considered in the management of those minor expeditions in which the British Army is so frequently engaged. But it is not to be regarded as laying down inflexible rules for guidance, or as an expression of official opinion on the subjects of which it treats.
N. G. LYTTELTON,
Chief of the General Staff.
CHAPTER I. Introduction. |
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Page | ||
Meaning of the term "Small War" | 21 | |
General scope of the work | 22 | |
Arrangement adopted | 22 | |
General treatment | 23 | |
CHAPTER II. Causes of small wars as affecting their conditions. The various kinds of adversaries met with. | ||
Classes into which these campaigns may be divided | 25 | |
Campaigns of conquest and annexation and their characteristics | 25 | |
Examples | 25 | |
The suppression of insurrections and lawlessness, and its features | 26 | |
This, a frequent sequel to conquest and annexation | 26 | |
Examples | 27 | |
Campaigns to wipe out an insult or avenge a wrong | 27 | |
Examples | 28 | |
Campaigns for the overthrow of a dangerous power | 28 | |
Campaigns of expediency | 28 | |
The great variety in the natures of enemy to be dealt with | 29 | |
Opponents with a form of regular organization | 29 | |
Highly disciplined but badly armed opponents | 30 | |
Fanatics | 30 | |
The Boers | 31 | |
Guerillas, civilized and savage | 31 | |
Armies of savages in the bush | 32 | |
Enemies who fight mounted | 32 | |
The importance of studying the hostile mode of war | 32 | |
CHAPTER III. The objective in small wars. | ||
Selection of objective in the first place governed by the cause of the campaign | 34 | |
Cases where the hostile country has a definite form of government | 34 | |
The question of the importance of the capital as an objective | 35 | |
When the capital is a place of real importance in the country its capture generally disposes of regular opposition | 36 | |
The great advantage of having a clear and well defined objective | 37 | |
Tirah, a peculiar case | ||
Objective when the purpose of hostilities is the overthrow of a dangerous military power | 39 | |
Objective when there is no capital and no army | 40 | |
Raids on live stock | 40 | |
Destruction of crops, etc | 40 | |
Suppression of rebellions | 41 | |
Special objectives | 42 | |
Conclusion | 42 | |
CHAPTER IV. Difficulties under which the regular forces labour as regards intelligence. The advantage is usually enjoyed by the enemy in this respect, but this circumstance can sometimes be turned to account. | ||
Absence of trustworthy information frequent in small wars | 43 | |
Want of knowledge may be as to the theatre of war or as to the enemy | 43 | |
Illustrations of effect of uncertainty as to routes | 44 | |
Illustrations of effect of uncertainty as to resources of theatre | 45 | |
Illustrations of effect of uncertainty as to exact position of localities | 45 | |
Uncertainty in the mind of the commander reacts upon his plan of operations | 46 | |
Effect of doubt as to strength and fighting qualities of tho enemy | 47 | |
Examples | 47 | |
Uncertainty as to extent to which the hostile population itself, and the neighbouring tribes, etc., will take part in the campaign | 49 | |
Example of Ambela | 49 | |
Difficulty of eliciting correct information from natives | 49 | |
Treachery | 60 | |
Uncertainty as to movements and intentions of enemy prevails in all classes of warfare | 51 | |
Difference in this respect between regular warfare and small wars; reasons for it | 51 | |
Advantages enjoyed by the enemy as regards intelligence | 53 | |
Knowledge oi theatre of war | 53 | |
The enemy seems always to know the movements of the regular army | 53 | |
This can be turned to account by publishing false information as to intentions | 54 | |
Conclusions arrived at in chapter only to be considered as generally applicable | 55 | |
CHAPTER V. The influence op the question of supply upon small wars and the extent to which it must govern the plan op operations. | ||
Small wars when they are campaigns against nature are" mainly so owing to supply | 57 | |
Reasons for this | ||
Connection between supply and transport | 58 | |
Supply trains in small wars | 58 | |
Difficulties as to supply tend to limit the force employed | 60 | |
The question of water | 60 | |
Supply a matter of calculation, but there is always great risk of this being upset by something unforeseen | 62 | |
Rivers as affecting supply in small wars | 63 | |
The boat expeditions to the Red River and up the Nile | 64 | |
Principle of holding back the troops and pushing on supplies ahead of them | 65 | |
Examples illustrating this | 66 | |
Example of a theatre of war being selected owing to reasons of supply | 67 | |
The Nile Expedition a remarkable illustration of the subject of this chapter | 68 | |
Sketch of this campaign from the point of view of supply | 68 | |
CHAPTER VI. Boldness and vigour the essence op effectively conducting such operations. | ||
The initiative | 71 | |
Forced upon the regular army to start with | 71 | |
Promptitude at the outset of less moment than the maintenance of the initiative when operations have begun | 72 | |
Reasons for this | 72 | |
Examples of evil consequences which arise from insufficient organization when the campaign is in progress | 74 | |
Examples of decisive results being obtained by promptitude at the outset | 74 | |
Strategical offensive essential | 75 | |
This not incompatible with tactical defensive | 76 | |
Effect of decisive action upon waverers in the hostile ranks and upon those hesitating to throw in their lot with the enemy | 76 | |
Even when the regular army is obliged to act strategically on the defensive this must not be a passive defensive | 77 | |
Great impression made upon the enemy by bold and resolute action | 78 | |
The importance of following up successes with vigour | 70 | |
Small forces can at times perform exploits of great subsequent importance by means of bluff | 80 | |
Examples | 81 | |
Conclusion | 83 | |
CHAPTER VII. Tactics favour the regular army while strategy favours the enemy, therefore the object is to fight, not to manoeuvre. | ||
The regular forces are at a disadvantage from the point of view of strategy | 85 | |
Communications a main cause of this | 85 | |
Enemy has little anxiety as to communications, and operations cannot be directed against them | 86 | |
Examples of this | 87 | |
The enemy's mobility benefits him strategically | 87 | |
His power of sudden concentration and dispersion | 88 | |
Note that the mobility of the enemy does not necessarily prevent strategical surprises by the regulars | 89 | |
The hotter organized the enemy the less does he enjoy the strategical advantage | 90 | |
On the battle-field the advantage passes over to the regular forces | 90 | |
Reasons for the tactical superiority of the organized army | 90 | |
Since tactical conditions are favourable, while strategical conditions are the reverse, the object is to bring matters to a tactical issue. Usually better to fight the enemy than to manoeuvre him out of his position | 91 | |
Example of Tel-el-Kebir | 92 | |
Objection to elaborate manoeuvres as compared to direct action | 92 | |
Circumstances when this principle does not hold good | 94 | |
The question of the wounded | 95 | |
How this may hamper the regular troops strategically | 96 | |
CHAPTER VIII. To avoid desultory warfare the enemy must be brought to battle, and in such manner as to make his defeat decisive. | ||
Prolonged campaigns to be avoided | 97 | |
Reasons for this | 97 | |
Troops suffer from disease | 97 | |
Supply difficulties render protracted operations undesirable | 98 | |
Enemy gains time to organize his forces | 98 | |
Desultory operations tend to prolong a campaign | 98 | |
Guerilla warfare very unfavourable to regular troops | 99 | |
Indecisive conduct of campaign tends to desultory warfare | 100 | |
Examples | 100 | |
Skirmishes should be avoided | 102 | |
Sometimes desirable to conceal strength so as to encourage enemy to fight | 102 | |
General engagements the object to bo aimed at | 103 | |
Examples | 103 | |
Campaigns where circumstances oblige the enemy to adopt a decisive course of action arc the most satisfactory | 105 | |
Owing to difficulty of getting enemy to accept battle, it is expedient to ensure a decisive victory when he does so | 106 | |
Battles sometimes to be avoided if losses cannot be risked | 107 | |
CHAPTER IX. Division of force, often necessitated by the circumstances, is less objectionable rn these campaigns than in regular warfare. | ||
Usual objections to division of force | 108 | |
Conditions of campaign often render it unavoidable in small wars | 108 | |
Moral effect of numerous columns | 109 | |
Enemy unable to profit by the situation and confused by several invading forces | 110 | |
Examples | 111 | |
Several columns have advantage that, even if some fail to make way, others succeed | 111 | |
Separation only permissible if each portion can stand by itself | 112 | |
Difficulty of judging requisite strength | 112 | |
Separation dangerous when superiority is not established | 113 | |
Difficulty of calculating upon exact co-operation between two separated forces intended to unite for some particular object | 113 | |
CHAPTER X. Lines ok communications, their liability to attack, the drain they are upon the army, and the circumstances under which they can be dispensed with. | ||
Organization of lines of communication need not be considered in detail | 115 | |
Their length and liability of attack | 116 | |
Need of special force to guard them | 116 | |
Examples | 117 | |
Large numbers of troops absorbed | 117 | |
Abandoning communications altogether | 118 | |
Liberty of action which the force gains thereby | 118 | |
It involves the army being accompanied by large convoys | 119 | |
Question greatly affected by the length of time which the operation involves | 120 | |
Partial abandonment of communications | 120 | |
Examples of armies casting loose from their communications for a considerable time | 121 | |
Sir F. Roberts' daring advance on Kabul | 122 | |
Risks attending this | 122 | |
Inconvenience which may arise from the force being unable to communicate with bodies with which it may be co-operating | 123 | |
Conclusion as to abandonment of communications | 124 | |
CHAPTER XI. Guerilla warfare in general. | ||
Guerilla warfare in general | 125 | |
Influence of terrain | 127 | |
Promptitude and resolution essential to deal with guerillas | 127 | |
Abd-el-Kader | 128 | |
General Bugeaud's mode of crushing him | 128 | |
Campaigns when want of mobility and decision on the part of the regular troops against guerillas has had bad effect | 129 | |
The broad principles of the strategy to be employed against guerillas | 130 | |
The war in Cuba | 131 | |
The sub-division of the theatre of war into sections | 133 | |
Fortified posts and depots | 134 | |
Flying columns | 135 | |
Their strength and composition | 136 | |
Columns of mounted troops in certain theatres of war | 136 | |
Suppression of the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia | 137 | |
The columns in the South African War | 139 | |
Danger of very small columns | 140 | |
Need for independence | 142 | |
Difficulty of controlling movements of separated columns | 142 | |
The South African "drives" | 143 | |
Need of a good Intelligence department in guerilla warfare, and of secrecy | 143 | |
Carrying off cattle and destroying property | 145 | |
Objection to the principle of raids | 146 | |
Pacification of revolted districts | 147 | |
Hoche in La Vendee | 147 | |
Upper Burma | 147 | |
Severity sometimes necessary | 148 | |
Conclusion | 148 | |
CHAPTER XII. Tactics of attack. | ||
Offensive tactics generally imperative | 150 | |
How theory of attack differs in small wars from regular warfare | 150 | |
Artillery preparation | 152 | |
When and when not expedient | 152 | |
Objections to it | 153 | |
If enemy is strongly posted sometimes very desirable | 154 | |
It also sometimes saves time | 154 | |
Instances of want of artillery preparation | 154 | |
Importance of capturing enemy's guns | 156 | |
Trust of irregular warriors in their guns | 157 | |
Importance of capturing trophies | 158 | |
Difficulty of ensuring decisive success | 159 | |
Reasons for this | 159 | |
Objection to purely frontal attacks, advantage of Hank attack" | 160 | |
Enemy seldom prepared for flank attacks, or attack in rear | 161 | |
Examples | 161 | |
Flank attacks give better chance of decisive victory | 162 | |
Containing force, in case of attacks on the flank or rear of the company | 163 | |
Action of Kirbekan, a rear attack | 164 | |
Co-operation of containing force | 164 | |
Main attack on the flank | 164 | |
Peiwar Kotal | 165 | |
Enemy inclined to draw away his forces to meet the Hank attack and so opens the way for a frontal attack | 166 | |
Difficulty of ensuring combination between a front and a flank attack | 167 | |
Ali Musjid | 168 | |
French disaster at Bang Bo | 168 | |
Cavalry in flank attacks | 169 | |
Artillery in flank attacks | 170 | |
Imperative necessity of following up a preliminary success | 170 | |
Need of initiative on the part of subordinates in attack | 171 | |
Cavalry to be at hand to complete victory | 172 | |
Other arms to play into the hands of the cavalry | 173 | |
Importance of the cavalry acting at the right moment | 173 | |
Artillery to be pushed up to the front to play on enemy when lie | ||
gives way | 174 | |
Attack often offers opportunities for deceiving the enemy as to available strength, and thus for gaining successes with insignificant forces | 175 | |
The separation of force on the battlefield | 175 | |
Advantages of this | 177 | |
Examples | 177 | |
Disadvantages | 178 | |
Enemy may beat fractions in detail | 178 | |
Difficulty of manoeuvring detached forces effectively | 180 | |
Detached bodies may fire into each other | 181 | |
Risk of misunderstandings | 182 | |
Examples | 183 | |
Note on the battle of Adowa | 184 | |
Risk of counter-attack | 184 | |
Examples of hostile counter-attack | 185 | |
Need of co-operation between infantry and artillery to meet counterattacks | 186 | |
Tendency of enemy to threaten flanks and rear of attacking force | 186 | |
The battle of Isly | 187 | |
An illustration of an echelon formation | 188 | |
Remarks on the echelon formation | 188 | |
Importance of pressing on, and not paying too much attention to demonstrations against flanks and rear | 189 | |
Attacks on caves in South Africa | 191 | |
Hour for attack | 192 | |
Attacks at dawn | 192 | |
Examples | 193 | |
Attacks early in the day expedient, to allow of effective pursuit | 194 | |
CHAPTER XIII. Tactics of defence. | ||
Defensive attitude unusual, but sometimes unavoidable | 195 | |
Small bodies of regular troops hemmed in | 196 | |
Even then defensive must not be purely passive | 196 | |
Examples of minor counter-attacks under such circumstances | 197 | |
A counter-attack on a large scale must not miscarry where the army is in difficulties | 198 | |
Evils of passive defenoe if not imperative | 199 | |
Examples | 200 | |
Active defence | 201 | |
Remarks on defensive order of battle | 202 | |
The engagement at Kailua as example of active defence | 203 | |
Advantages of a line formation over square, even when the enemy is addicted to shock tactics | 203 | |
Examples | 204 | |
Difficulty as to flanks | 205 | |
The enemy may decline to attack | 205 | |
Conclusion | 206 | |
CHAPTER XIV. Pursuits and retreats. | ||
Enemy not prepared for a vigorous pursuit if beaten, or for following up their victory with energy if triumphant | 207 | |
Their mobility makes them difficult to pursue | 207 | |
Infantry in pursuit | 208 | |
Need for great vigour | 209 | |
Detached force to strike in on line of retreat | 209 | |
Tendency of the enemy to disperse in all directions | 210 | |
Use of cavalry and horse artillery in pursuit | 211 | |
Retreats | 211 | |
Difficulty caused by carrying off wounded in retreat | 212 | |
Retreat draws down upon the troops the waverers in the hostile ranks | 212 | |
Enemy's eagerness at first to follow up a retiring force | 213 | |
Examples | 213 | |
Although irregular warriors at first keen in pursuit their ardour soon cools | 214 | |
Examples | 215 | |
Annihilation of regular forces due generally to their being completely isolated or to special causes | 216 | |
Beginning of retreat the critical period | 216 | |
General organization of a retreat | 217 | |
General Duchesne's orders | 218 | |
Note as to retreat in face of very determined adversaries who rely on shock attacks | 219 | |
Rearguards | 219 | |
Importance of main body keeping touch with the rear guard withdrawal of rear guards counter-attack sometimes the wisest course when a rear guard is in serious difficulty | 220 | |
Lieut.-Col. Haughton at the retreat from the Tseri Kandao pass | 224 | |
Conclusion | 225 | |
CHAPTER XV. The employment of feints to tempt the enemy into action and to conceal designs upon the battlefield. | ||
Drawing the enemy on | 227 | |
Reasons why this can so often be carried out | 227 | |
How enemy's eagerness to follow up a retiring force can be turned to account | 228 | |
Hostile leaders cannot control their followers | 229 | |
The Zulus drawn into a premature attack at Kambula | 229 | |
Other examples | 230 | |
Value of the stratagem of pretended retreat in insurrectionary wars | 231 | |
Cavalry especially well adapted for this sort of work | 231 | |
Enticing tho enemy into an ambuscade | 232 | |
Enemy sometimes drawn on unintentionally | 233 | |
Examples of Arogee and Nis Gol | 233 | |
Drawing the enemy on by exposing baggage, &c | 234 | |
Drawing enemy on by artillery fire | 234 | |
Inducing the enemy to hold his ground when inclined to retire | 235 | |
Feints as to intended point of attack | 235 | |
In some cases the enemy cannot be drawn into action | 235 | |
The action of Toski as an illustration of this | 237 | |
Conclusion | 238 | |
CHAPTER XVI. Surprises, raids and ambuscades. | ||
Surprise a favourite weapon of the enemy, but one which can also be used against him | 240 | |
Best time of day for surprises | 240 | |
By day a rapid march from a distance is generally necessary | 241 | |
Mobility essential in troops employed | 241 | |
Importance of keeping the project secret | 242 | |
Enemy to be put on a false scent if possible | 244 | |
Raids a form of surprise | 245 | |
Raids on the live stock of the enemy | 245 | |
The French "razzias" in Algeria | 246 | |
Difficulty of bringing in captured cattle, &c | 247 | |
Ambuscades | 248 | |
Ease with which the enemy can sometimes be drawn into them | 248 | |
Remarks on the arrangement of ambuscades | 250 | |
Points to bear in mind | 252 | |
Skill of the enemy in devising ambuscades in small wars | 252 | |
The ambuscade at Shekan | 254 | |
Other examples | 254 | |
CHAPTER XVII. Squares in action on the march and in bivouac. | ||
Square formation cannot be satisfactorily treated under the head either of attack or defence | 256 | |
Object of square formation | 256 | |
Enemy's tendency to operate against the flanks and rear of regular troops | 257 | |
Two forms of squares, the rigid and the elastic. The rigid form here dealt with | 258 | |
Usual formation | 259 | |
Squares in action. A formation at once offensive and defensive | 259 | |
Example of Achupa in Dahomey | 259 | |
Organization of squares in action | 260 | |
AbuKlea | 261 | |
Question of skirmishers | 261 | |
How to deal with gaps | 262 | |
Suggestion as to reserves in squares | 262 | |
The corners | 263 | |
Position of artillery | 263 | |
Position of cavalry | 264 | |
Question of forming two or more squares | 265 | |
Square affords a target for the enemy | 266 | |
Limited development of fire from a square | 267 | |
Square in attack | 267 | |
Tamai | 267 | |
Capture of Bida | 268 | |
Square formation has frequently proved most effective | 269 | |
Square formation as an order of march | 270 | |
Forming square on the move | 270 | |
Difficulties of marching in square | 272 | |
Suakin 1885 | 273 | |
Artillery and cavalry with reference to squares on the march | 274 | |
Bivouac in square | 276 | |
Conclusion | 276 | |
CHAPTER XVIII. Principles of laager and zeriba warfare. | ||
General principles of laager and zeriba warfare | 277 | |
Tactically a defensive system | 278 | |
Objections to this | 278 | |
Situations where laagers and zeribas are very necessary | 279 | |
Their value in dealing with guerillas | 279 | |
Conditions necessary for their construction | 280 | |
Campaigns in which laagers and zeribas have been largely used | 280 | |
Their special advantages | 282 | |
Economy of outposts | 282 | |
Security at night | 282 | |
They generally, but not necessarily, enable the regular troops to select their ground and time for fighting | 282 | |
They afford the troops repose during prolonged operations | 284 | |
may become defence posts upon the line of communications, or may serve as supply depots in advance of an army | 284 | |
General conclusions | 285 | |
CHAPTER XIX. Hill warfare. | ||
Explanation of the term "hill warfare" | 286 | |
Its difficulties in all parts of the world | 286 | |
"Sniping" | 287 | |
Retirements unavoidable at times | 287 | |
Care of the wounded | 288 | |
Special risk to officers in Indian frontier fighting | 288 | |
Enemy generally warlike and nowadays well armed | 289 | |
Stones and trees can be thrown down on the troops | 289 | |
Size of columns | 290 | |
Several columns usual | 291 | |
Length of marches | 291 | |
The troops generally on the lower ground, the enemy on the heights | 292 | |
"Crowning the heights" | 292 | |
Examples of neglect of this | 292 | |
Enemy's dislike of attacking up hill and of being commanded | 293 | |
Seizing the high ground in attacking a defile | 294 | |
Occupying the heights in moving along a valley or defile | 294 | |
Moving flanking parties, and stationary flanking piquets | 294 | |
General arrangement when stationary picquets are adopted | 295 | |
Remarks on flanking picquets | 296 | |
Remarks on moving flanking parties | 298 | |
Comparison of system of crowning the heights to square formation | 299 | |
Retirement a necessity at times, but general conduct of operations should be such as to render them as infrequent as possible | 299 | |
Reconnaissances, in reference to this | 300 | |
Forces detached for particular objects, in reference to it | 300 | |
Holding capture heights, in reference to it | 302 | |
The case of Dargai | 302 | |
Troops not to get into clusters under enemy's fire | 303 | |
Remarks on attack in hill warfare | 304 | |
The Gurkha scouts attacking above Thati | 305 | |
Turning movements not to be undertaken too readily | 306 | |
Mountain guns and cavalry in attack in hill warfare | 307 | |
Remarks on the destruction of villages | 308 | |
The work must be carried out deliberately | 308 | |
Principle of attacking a village | 309 | |
Presence of women and children in villages | 310 | |
Stone throwers | 310 | |
The difficulty of communicating orders during action in hill warfare | 310 | |
Precautions to be observed | 312 | |
Importance of avoiding being benighted | 313 | |
Course to be pursued if troops are benighted | 315 | |
An early decision to be arrived at as to intended course of action when night approaches | 315 | |
Guns to be sent on | 316 | |
Examples of troops being benighted | 317 | |
Troops on the move at night | 318 | |
Sir W. Lockhart's maxims | 320 | |
Advantages which experienced troops enjoy in this class of warfare | 320 | |
Danger of even small ravines unless the heights are held | 321 | |
Value of counter-attack when troops get into difficulties | 322 | |
Examples of catching the enemy in ravines | 322 | |
General question of rear guards and retirements | 324 | |
Persistency of hill men in pursuit | 325 | |
The fact that the retirement is generally down hill tells against the regulars | 326 | |
Advisability of a sudden start and rapid movement at first when retiring | 327 | |
Changing a movement of advance into one of retirement | 328 | |
Details of retirement operations | 329 | |
Withdrawal of picquets | 329 | |
Picquets covering each other's retirements | 330 | |
Importance of parties nearest the enemy getting timely notice of intended retirement | 332 | |
Direction to be followed by retiring picquets | 332 | |
Pursuit often checked completely if enemy is roughly handled at the start | 333 | |
Value of counter-attacks when in retreat | 334 | |
Ravines to be avoided, and junctions of these with valleys to be specially guarded | 335 | |
Men to bo sent on ahead to find the route in unknown country | 335 | |
Pace of column to be regulated by that of rear guard | 336 | |
The theory of rear guard duties in hill warfare | 336 | |
Position of baggage in retreats | 338 | |
Remarks on operations in forest-clad hills | 339 | |
Flankers in such terrain | 340 | |
Stockades | 341 | |
The first reconnaissance to Saran Sar in Tirah as an example of hill warfare | 342 | |
Scouts | 345 | |
Outposts | 346 | |
Conclusion | 346 | |
CHAPTER XX. Bush warfare. | ||
Comparison between the general features of bush warfare and of hill warfare | 348 | |
The question of scouts | 352 | |
Special infantry organization necessary | 353 | |
Sectional organization in Ashanti | 354 | |
Tendency of the enemy to attack flanks and rear | 354 | |
Flanking parties | 355 | |
This leads to a kind of square formation being very generally adopted | 355 | |
Its employment in Dahomey | 355 | |
Example of Amoaful | 357 | |
Advantages of this formation in bush fighting | 358 | |
Baggage and supply train | 359 | |
Arrangement of marches in the bush | 359 | |
Action of troops when fired upon | 360 | |
Small columns in the bush | 362 | |
Remarks on operations in a hilly country covered with jungle | 362 | |
Attack of stockades | 362 | |
Movement through very thick jungle | 364 | |
Guides | 365 | |
Difficulty of following up success in the bush, and consequence of this | 365 | |
Danger of dividing force in such country | 367 | |
How to avoid enemy's ambuscades. Impossibility of doing so in some theatres of war | 368 | |
Sir F. Roberts's instructions for dealing with ambuscades in Burma | 368 | |
Retreats in the bush | 369 | |
Heavy expenditure of ammunition | 370 | |
Searching the bush with volleys | 371 | |
Firing the bush | 372 | |
Conclusion | 373 | |
CHAPTER XXI. Infantry tactics. | ||
Scope of this chapter | 374 | |
Object of normal infantry fighting formation | 374 | |
Reasons why this is not altogether applicable to small wars | 375 | |
Deep formation unusual in attack | 375 | |
Reasons | 375 | |
Proportion of supports and reserves can generally be reduced | 379 | |
Attacks on hill positions | 377 | |
British and French methods | 377 | |
Reserving fire in attack | 378 | |
Formation at Tel-el-Kebir | 379 | |
Attack on the Atbara zeriba | 379 | |
Tendency to draw supports and reserves forward to extend the firing line | 381 | |
General Skobelef s peculiar views | 381 | |
The company frequently made the unit | 382 | |
Attacks should usually be carried out at a deliberate pace | 383 | |
Infantry crossing especially dangerous zones | 384 | |
Compact formations desirable on the defensive | 386 | |
Macdonald's brigade at the battle of Khartum | 387 | |
Infantry opposed to irregular cavalry | 388 | |
Great importance of thorough fire discipline | 388 | |
Magazine rifle in the case of fanatical rushes | 389 | |
The question of volleys and of independent fire | 390 | |
Fire discipline in hill warfare | 392 | |
The conditions which in regular warfare make unrestrained fire at times almost compulsory, do not exist in small wars | 392 | |
Fire discipline on the defensive | 393 | |
Advantage of reserving fire for close quarters | 394 | |
Foreign methods | 395 | |
Remarks on the expenditure of ammunition | 396 | |
Expenditure of ammunition during night attacks | 397 | |
The bayonet of great value, although theoretically the superiority of the regulars should be more marked as regards musketry than in hand to hand fighting | 398 | |
Great effect of bayonet charges | 399 | |
On the defensive the bayonet is less certain | 399 | |
CHAPTER XXII. Cavalry and mounted troops generally. | ||
Variety in mounted troops employed | 401 | |
Necessity generally of a respectable force of mounted troops in these campaigns | 401 | |
Examples of want of mounted troops | 402 | |
Need of mounted troops for raids | 403 | |
Importance of cavalry shock action | 404 | |
Risk of falling into ambushes or getting into ground where cavalry cannot act | 405 | |
Cavalry able to act effectively on broken ground where it would be useless in regular warfare | 406 | |
Irregular hostile formations militate against effective cavalry charges | 406 | |
Cavalry and horse artillery | 408 | |
Cavalry acting against hostile mounted troops | 409 | |
Importance of discipline and cohesion in such work | 409 | |
Difficulty of meeting a reckless charge of fanatical horsemen | 410 | |
Enemy's horse inclined to use firearms from the saddle | 411 | |
Cavalry if rushed to keep away from the infantry | 412 | |
Cavalry dealing with horsemen who fight on foot | 412 | |
Importance of lance | 414 | |
Skobelef s views on the action of Russian cavalry in the Turkoman campaign | 414 | |
Dismounted action of cavalry | 415 | |
Risk to horse-holders and horses | 415 | |
Combination of mounted and dismounted work suitable in certain conditions | 416 | |
Dismounted action the only possible action of cavalry in very broken ground | 418 | |
Valuable where judiciously used against hostile masses otherwise engaged | 419 | |
Dismounted action in general | 420 | |
Mounted troops, when dismounted, sometimes able to pose as a large force and so deceive the enemy | 420 | |
Mounted troops attacking-mounted | 420 | |
Mounted rifles and mounted infantry as compared t cavalry | 422 | |
Final remarks on dismounted work | 423 | |
CHAPTER XXIII. Camel corps. | ||
Camel corps a form of mounted infantry | 425 | |
Object to be able to traverse long distances | 425 | |
Difficult position of camel corps in action | 426 | |
Their helplessness when mounted. How to act if suddenly attacked | 427 | |
The affair of Burnak as illustrating camel operations | 427 | |
Camel corps only suitable in certain theatres of war | 428 | |
CHAPTER XXIV. Artillery tactics. | ||
Artillery preparation | 429 | |
Guns to push up to close range | 429 | |
Examples | 430 | |
Chief risk run by guns pushed well to the front | 432 | |
Massing of guns unusual and generally unnecessary | 433 | |
Question of dispersion of guns in attack | 433 | |
Dispersion of guns on the defensive | 435 | |
Value of guns on the defensive against fanatical rushes | 430 | |
Comparative powerlessness of guns against mud villages | 437 | |
High explosives | 438 | |
Guns must be light and generally portable | 438 | |
Question of case shot | 439 | |
CHAPTER XXV. Machine guns. | ||
Uncertainty as to how best to employ them | 440 | |
Their frequent failure till recently | 440 | |
Their value on the defensive | 441 | |
CHAPTER XXVI. The service of security. | ||
Importance of the service of security | 442 | |
Outposts | 442 | |
Hour at which the enemy is most likely to give trouble | 442 | |
Hostile night attacks unusual | 443 | |
Comparatively small size of force helps enemy in preparing for night attacks | 445 | |
The Boer night attacks | 445 | |
Attacks at dawn very frequent | 446 | |
Annoyance by marauders and small hostile parties at night very common | 448 | |
Principle of outposts | 448 | |
Difference between the system in regular warfare and in .small wars | 449 | |
Liability to attack from any side | 450 | |
Outposts generally close in, and not intended to offer serious resistance | 451 | |
Units to be protected generally find their own outposts | 451 | |
Arrangement of outposts, however varies according to nature of enemy | 452 | |
Extent to which the rapid movements of irregular warriors influence outposts | 452 | |
Difficulties of outposts in jungle and bush and in the hills | 454 | |
Tofrek | 455 | |
Picquets by day | 455 | |
Objections to the plan of outposts falling back at once on the main body | 456 | |
Picquets in hill warfare by day | 457 | |
Outposts in the bush by day | 458 | |
Need of even small parties always keeping a look-out in enclosed country | 459 | |
Regular troops to a certain extent at a disadvantage in outpost work in small wars | 460 | |
General remarks on outposts at night | 461 | |
Outposts at night on open ground | 462 | |
Outposts at night in the South African War | 463 | |
Distant picquets at night | 464 | |
Ambuscades as outposts | 466 | |
General Yusuf's system peculiar | 466 | |
Outposts by night in bush warfare | 467 | |
Outposts by night in hill warfare | 467 | |
The system of distant picquets at night not always adopted in hill warfare | 470 | |
Remarks on dealing with snipers at night | 471 | |
Sentries at night | 472 | |
Posting picquets at night | 473 | |
Defensive arrangements in front of outposts at night | 474 | |
Sir B. Blood's plan of using villagers as outposts | 474 | |
Service of security on the march | 474 | |
Effect of hostile tendency to operate against flanks and rear | 475 | |
Service of security when marching in square | 476 | |
Flanking parties and rear guards | 476 | |
Convoys | 477 | |
Importance of keeping columns on the march well closed up | 478 | |
Duties of the advanced guard | 478 | |
Conclusion | 479 | |
CHAPTER XXVII. Night operations. | ||
Reason why night attacks find so much favour in the present day | 481 | |
General question of their advisability in small wars | 481 | |
Upon the whole the drawbacks decidedly outweigh the advantages | 482 | |
Risk of confusion and panic | 4S3 | |
Objections less serious in the case of attacks on a very small scale | 485 | |
Division of force at night almost always a mistake | 485 | |
Need of careful preparations | 486 | |
Precautions against assailants mistaking each other for the enemy | 486 | |
The bayonet the weapon for night attacks | 487 | |
Examples of successful night attacks on a small scale | 487 | |
Night marches. When especially advantageous | 488 | |
Risk of movement being detected by some accident | 489 | |
Enemy keeps a bad look-out at night | 490 | |
Risk of confusion on the march | 491 | |
Importance of the troops being well disciplined | 492 | |
General conclusions as to night operations | 493 | |
Arrangements for repelling night attacks | 494 | |
Lighting up the ground | 495 | |
Artillery and machine guns in case of night attacks | 495 | |
The question of reserves | 496 | |
Need of strict fire discipline | 496 | |
Bayonet to be used if the enemy penetrates into the lines | 497 | |
Counter-attacks in case of a night attack by the enemy | 497 | |
Conclusion | 498 | |
INDEX. | 499 |
PLANS. | ||
Page | ||
I. | The Ambela Campaign | 49 |
II. | Communications to Khartum | 70 |
III. | Fight at Khan Band | 166 |
IV. | Kirbekan | 166 |
V. | The Peiwar Kotal | 166 |
VI. | Action at Charasia | 166 |
VII. | Affair of Bang Bo | 169 |
VIII. | Battle of Kandahar | 176 |
IX. | Wedza's Stronghold | 176 |
X. | Deh Khoja | 180 |
XI. | Affair of Longbatta | 184 |
XII. | The Zlobani Mountain | 184 |
XIII. | Action of Kailua | 203 |
XIV. | Saran Sar | 344 |
XV. | Macdonald's Brigade at Khartum | 387 |
2011