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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
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SMALL WARS

Chapter XVII.
Squares in action, on the march, and in bivouac.

Square formation cannot be satisfactorily treated under the head either of attack or defence.

There are certain questions of tactics in small wars, apart from retreats and pursuits, or feints and surprises, which cannot be satisfactorily treated under the head either of attack or defence and which do not especially affect any one of the three arms. These can best be dealt with by themselves in special chapters, and under this heading come squares.

 

The square is adopted by regular troops in small wars as a battle formation to meet special situations, and it can be used both offensively and defensively. The formation is also often employed upon the march under certain circumstances. Recourse is had to it under many differing conditions, both as regards the terrain in which the operations are taking place and as regards the method o f fighting of the enemy. Although common enough in the old days in what was then regular warfare, it now-a-days is a formation peculiar to small wars. It has been employed so largely in irregular warfare in modern times, the conditions which have brought it into favour vary so greatly in different cases, the experiences gained in actual practice where it has played a part have sometimes been so inconclusive, that the subject is really a very large one and deserving of careful study.

Object of square formation.

The raison d'ére of the square, whether it be used as an order of march, as an arrangement for bivouac, or as a formation for battle, is to be found in the necessity which may be at times imposed upon a body of regular troops of being able to show a fighting front in any direction, and in the obligation which it incurs of protecting its supplies and wounded. In its military sense the term does not necessarily mean a rectangle

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of four equal sides. It simply means a formation showing front to flanks and rear as well as to the proper front. Such squares have sometimes only three sides, the rear face being left entirely or practically open--it all depends on circumstances . It is worth noting that a French square at Shott Tigri in 1882 was arranged with its rear face formed of camels, but that the Bedouins succeeded in carrying these off and upsetting the whole arrangement.

 

The reason why a formation which offers a fighting front in all directions may have to be adopted, is that in these campaigns attack or counter-attack has from various causes often to be expected from any point. Sometimes this is due to the fact that, owing to superior numbers, the enemy can surround the regular troops. It may result from the position of the enemy not being known and from the conditions not admitting of its being ascertained. It may arise from the great mobility which irregular warriors enjoy upon the battle-field. The cause may be found in the necessity of protecting supplies, or stores, or wounded against marauding parties. But-some sort of square formation is constantly being imposed upon the regular troops in these wars, because the nature of the case demands an order of battle calculated to offer an all round defence.

Enemy's tendency to operate against the flanks and rear of regular troops.

Irregular forces are fond of threatening the rear of regular: troops, partly because they anticipate that they will be offered less resistance there, and partly because they hope < to loot the supplies and stores which they know will be following the army. At Ordahsu the enemy had made a clearing in the bush, on purpose to attack the troops in rear after they had passed the clearing, and they closed in as the column fought its way forward. At Wad Ras, the final engagement of the Spanish army in the war against the Moors in 1859, the Moors pressed in on the rear of the invaders although these were at the very time driving the bulk of the Sultan's army from its position. The Zulus always endeavoured to envelope the

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British forces--at Isandlwhana they captured the camp in rear of the troops who were only formed up with the idea of meeting a frontal and flank attack. In Algeria, Tunis, and Tartary it has been the practice from time immemorial for masses of horse to charge down from all sides. It is these enveloping attacks and these hostile demonstrations against the flanks and rear, which oblige the commander of the regular troop to draw them up in square formation in spite of its manifold drawbacks. The formation is adopted on the march, at the halt when resting or when bivouacking for the night, and as an order of battle, and because, even when the troops are not actually in action it is always employed with the idea in view that an engagement may occur at any moment, it will perhaps be best to consider it first as a battle formation.

Two forms of square, the rigid and the elastic. The rigid form here dealt with.

Before proceeding further it must be pointed out here that there are in reality two kinds of square formation-the rigid form and the elastic form, and that it is the first with which we are here concerned. The clastic form of square is employed in bush and jungle warfare, its essence consists in the army moving or being drawn up in groups or detachments more or less all round the convoy, the guns, the wounded, or whatever impedimenta may be accompanying it, and this kind of formation can best be dealt with in the chapter on bush and jungle warfare. Indeed, a form of elastic square is often employed on the march in hill warfare, when the heights are crowned and the force as a whole consists of an advanced guard of these flanking detachment and of a rear guard; the idea then is the same--security against attack from any point. In the present chapter it is the rigid square, designed to. meet the charge of horse or the fanatical rush of footmen which has to be considered, a defensive order of battle forced upon regular troops by irregular warriors who adopt shock tactics and who enjoy superiority as regards numbers.

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Usual formation.

In the rigid square formation the combatant troops forming the square are drawn up practically shoulder to shoulder, as is laid down in principle in "Infantry Training." It is designed to meet the onslaught of adversaries who trust rather to spears and knives than to firearms. In Zululand and the Sudan the brave warriors with whom the British and Egyptian troops had to deal, came on impetuously in vast numbers and with great rapidity and suddenness. The French adopted the formation in Egypt and in Algeria to beat off the onslaughts of great masses of horse. The square is in fact employed under somewhat the same circumstances as battalion squares were formerly used in regular warfare, but with the great difference that when it is employed in small wars non-combatant services, wounded, and all that is not self-protecting with the force are collected inside the square. Even the cavalry is sometimes inside the square.

Squares in action. A formation at once offensive and defensive.

In actual battle the square, as a rule, acts mainly on the s defensive till the enemy is beaten. Still it often happens that the action of the regular troops takes in part the form of an attack. This principle is well illustrated by the case i already quoted of Isly where the French, in a formation on the principle of the square, moved straight towards the centre of the Moorish position and compelled the hostile forces, consisting largely of mounted men, to charge. At Abu Klea the British square moved close past the position which the Mahdists had taken up in a dry river bed, and induced them by so doing to attack. Sometimes, but more rarely, the square is actually used in attack, as at El Teb where the Mahdist entrenchment was turned and then attacked in this inconvenient formation. But in the main the square is an order of battle which is employed when acting on the defensive.

Example of Achupa in Dahomey.

An excellent example of the use of a square as a formation enabling a small force to compel the enemy to attack it; without great risk, and bringing about thereby an action in a

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position favourable to the regular troops, is afforded by the affair of Achupa in 1891 in the early days of hostilities between France and Dahomey.

 

The French only held a few points on the coast at this time, of which Porto Novo was the most important. The Dahomeyans were known to be advancing in force against this town. It was a straggling place with only one fort to defend it, and its garrison of 400 men was, owing to its extent, quite insufficient to hold it against a determined attack. Colonel Terrillon who was in command determined to march out and fight the enemy a few miles off. When the forces came in contact the French formed a square. In this order of battle they beat off the attacks of the Dahomeyans numbering several thousands, and they inflicted such severe losses upon their savage opponents that these retreated and that Porto Novo was relieved from all fear of attack. It is interesting to note that in this fight the native troops forming one side of the square, got out of hand in the excitement of victory and charged, leaving that side completely open for a short time.

Organisation of squares in action.

The difficulties which arise in the manoeuvring and the organization of the square are obvious. A shoulder to shoulder formation can be maintained easily enough upon the drill ground; but when the terrain is uneven or intersected the forces very apt to get into confusion. The most careful supervision will not prevent gaps from occurring, the pace of the artillery and of the machine guns is not as a rule the same as that of foot soldiers, in the interior of the square are the non-combatant services impeding the view of the commander, and, the larger the square is, the more difficult is it to keep it intact. The great point to keep in mind seems to be to check the pace of the front face constantly so as to make sure that the sides are kept closed up and that the rear face is in its place. Frequent halts are desirable and the transport inside the square must be very carefully supervised. If the enemy threatens, the square should halt at once, the sides facing outwards and the rear face turning about. How bard it is to manoeuvre one of these rigid squares and to keep the ranks closed up so as to leave no weak point for the enemy to profit by, is well shown by what occurred at Abu Elea.

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Abu Klea.

The force forming the square consisted of 1,200 men, with three guns dragged by hand. Inside the square were the camels for carrying the guns, and others for water, ammunition, and wounded. Its advance was covered by skirmishers. The ground was open but undulating. The hostile position in the dry river bed already mentioned was well marked by banners. It so happened, however, that when about 600 yards from the flags, the rear face became bulged out by the camels, and that at this moment the enemy, to the number of about 6,000, suddenly sprang up from the khor where they were concealed to the left front, and charged the square on its left side.

 

The skirmishers ran for the square and by so doing masked its Are at first. The guns were hurried out on the threatened side. The fire of the front and left faces and of the guns was so severe, that the enemy swerved to the right and brought the whole weight of their charge to bear on the left rear corner of the square where--partly due to the bulging out caused by the camels--there was a gap, and where the fire was in consequence not so effective as on the flank. The confusion at this point appears to have been increased by the tendency of the camel corps to push forward and meet the enemy. The result was that the fanatical spearmen broke into the square and that a desperate melee ensued, in which the British force lost heavily and which only ended when all the Arabs in the square had been killed in a hand-to-hand fight

Question of skirmishers.

The first point which suggests itself when considering this remarkable conflict of Abu Klea is the question of the Skirmishers. Now it is obvious that a rigid square of this kind covering a very narrow front has no means within itself in at all broken ground of discovering if foemen are lurking near its path. Moreover, the best way of replying to casual hostile fire directed at such a square is by independent fire of skirmishers, because great delay must ensue if the troops forming the square reply to it--this was indeed at Abu Klea the main reason for the skirmishers being sent out. But if the enemy delivers a sudden attack they are terribly in the way, and so much is this the case that upon the whole it seems far better to dispense with them. When, two days after the action of Abu Klea, the square made its final advance from the zeriba which had been formed three miles from the Nile to reach that river, there were no skirmishers out. At Ulundi there were no skirmishers in front of the square although the mounted troops acted to a certain extent in this

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capacity. It was the same at EI Teb, and when the square formation was employed near Suakin skirmishers were generally dispensed with.

How to deal with gaps.

How to prevent gaps from occurring in a square is a question which is easily answered in theory. It is simply a matter of careful supervision and of constantly halting the front face to enable the sides and rear to close up. But in practice these intervals occur in spite of the most strenuous exertions. There is always the risk of the rear face being bulged out by the non-combatants as occurred at Abu Klea. In the disaster which occurred to Baker Pasha's Egyptian force near Trinkitat in 1884, the rear face of the square was in a state of chaos when the Arabs made their onslaught. That it is a matter of supreme importance to prevent the square from being broken stands to reason. Once the enemy penetrates it, it becomes a thoroughly bad formation. If the faces which remain intact turn round and fire on the intruders, they are liable to shoot into each other. It is, however, interesting to note in this connection that, the day before the disastrous fight as Shekan in 1883 in which the force was annihilated, the rear face of Hicks Pasha's square was broken by an Arab charge, but the enemy was driven out by the front face wheeling round. A square penetrated by an active and determined enemy is liable to be thrown into complete confusion and the whole aim and object of the formation is defeated when it is broken through. Gaps are so dangerous and so difficult to obviate altogether that it seems advisable to provide especially for the case of their occurring.

Suggestion as to reserves in squares.

The best way of providing against gaps which may occur at a critical moment affording the enemy a passage into the square, would seem to be by detailing a reserve, or several reserves, within the square. The reserves should be distributed so as to ensure that they can at a moment's notice be pushed into an interval if one occurs at a critical juncture. After the experience of Abu Klea this system was adopted by Sir C.

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Wilson, when commanding the final advance of the desert column from that place to the Nile near Metemma. Probably the best arrangement is a small reserve at each corner, for experience shows that a rush of fanatics or savages is generally directed at a corner--such warriors recognise instinctively that this is a weak point both because less fire can be developed and because there is most likelihood of confusion here. Of course there is a very serious objection to reserves, in that they withdraw men out of the firing line in a formation which at,the best only admits of a limited development of fire except when the enemy attacks from all sides simultaneously. No instances appear to have occurred of recent years of a square being saved from being broken into by the action of a reserve; but on the other hand when squares have been broken there never seems to have been a reserve at hand to thrust into the gap.

The corners.

At Abu Klea the gap occurred at a corner. Corners are obviously a weak point because there is a loss of fire even if the square remains intact, and because the tendency in the sides of a square is for the men to feel inwards. "Infantry Training" lays down that the flanks of a battalion should not meet at an angle, with the especial idea of providing against this. As observed above, it is a good plan to place reserves at the corners, and it might be desirable to detail a senior officer to have a special control over each of the four angles of the square.

Position of artillery.

As regards the position of artillery or machine guns in a square it used to be thought advisable to place them at the comers, partly because the corners are weak points and partly because the plan admits of fire all round except one quarter of a circle; but it is very doubtful if this is necessarily the best arrangement. As already mentioned they were run out to the side attacked at Abu Klea. At El Teb the guns were kept in battery and run out when required. At Tamai the machine guns were in front of the square which was broken, and

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they fell for a time into the hands of the enemy. At Ulundi, on the other hand, the guns were for the most part at the corners. Of course when the enemy is not close at hand the guns can be run out to any side where their fire may happen to be desirable. But when the enemy actually charges, there is something to be said for their being at the corners, as long as they are in pairs; a single gun may somehow be put out of action just at the critical moment, and machine guns are always somewhat precarious weapons to depend on in a rush. It never seems desirable therefore to place a single gun or machine gun at a corner; if they are to be worked singly they are best in the centre of the sides.

 

When it is possible to place the guns at some distance from the square they may give the square great assistance should it be assailed. Their fire necessarily takes the assailant in flank. But this arrangement of course exposes the guns themselves to be rushed unless they are under special protection of other troops.

 

When the final advance to the Nile was made by the desert column from the zeriba which had been formed at the Abu Klea wells after the fight, it was decided to have the guns behind. They proved of great service to the force as it moved on towards the Nile by their effective fire on masses of the enemy who wore preparing to charge it. Although firing at longer range than they would have been if with the square, they probably had far greater effect than had they been with it.

Position of Cavalry.

Cavalry are generally best outside the square, this arm is of course for the time being merely an encumbrance when actually inside the square; it would indeed often happen that there was no room for cavalry inside. At Ulundi the cavalry after reconnoitring to the front and obtaining touch of the enemy retired inside of the square; but the Zulu system of attack was always enveloping, and had the mounted troops remained outside when the action developed they would have inevitably masked the fire of the square. At the fight on the Chengo river in 1897 between the Portuguese troops and the Gaza rebels, the small party of cavalry was kept

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inside the square; the enemy came up near the square on all sides, hut the cavalry suddenly issued from it, and, charging home, scattered the enemy in all directions. In the Sudan the cavalry has almost invariably been kept outside and quite independent of the square; so placed, they can reconnoitre effectively, and mounted troops who can gallop away clear in case of emergency seem to be better adapted for acting as a screen under the circumstances, than infantry skirmishers who have to get back into the square if the enemy closes. The Russians when employing this formation in Central Asia have generally kept their mounted men outside the square. After one of the two squares was broken at Tamai the dismounted fire of the cavalry operating some way off, was of great assistance, taking the enemy in flank from a position of practical security. The distance which the cavalry should be from the square depends of course upon circumstances; it should not be too far off to render prompt assistance, but it should not, on the other hand, be so near as to run the risk of masking effective fire from the square.

Question of forming two or more squares.

The question whether a single square is preferable to two or more squares is a difficult one to decide. When the non-combatant services to be protected are proportionately large, a single square is preferable because the actual available space in the interior of a single square is larger than that in two squares formed of the same number of men. Moreover, a single square will generally, but not under all circumstances, afford a greater volume of fire, inasmuch as the enemy will seldom attack more than one square at the same time.

 

But on the other hand two or more squares mutually flank each other. If one square should be broken the others can afford it considerable support by their fire, and if it is thrown into complete confusion the disaster, however serious, does not involve the destruction of the whole force. Thus at Tamai, where the British force was formed into two squares, one of them, broken and thrown into disorder, was obliged

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to fall back some distance; the other then became of the greatest assistance in retrieving the fortunes of the fight, not only by its fire but by its moral support. Moreover, two or more squares are much more easily manoeuvred than a single square formed of the same number of men. There is, however, always the risk of squares firing into each other if the enemy penetrates between them; sonic slight inconvenience was caused by this at Tamai. At Shekan the army was formed up in three squares, and it appears that these fired into each other in the confusion which occurred when the Mahdists made their sudden onslaught and thereby greatly added to the tenors of the moment.

 

When the enemy attacks in great force and envelops the regular army as in Zululand, a single square is clearly preferable; for if there are two or more squares the fire of certain of their faces must be lost to a great extent. But upon the whole, especially in close country when the hostile tactics take the form of sudden rushes, there is much to be said for having more than one square, if it be only on the principle of not putting all the eggs in one basket.

Square affords a target for the enemy.

The great objections to the square formation are the limited development of fire it admits of--this has been already touched upon--and the fact that it offers a particularly good target for the hostile fire. Even bad marksmen armed with indifferent, antiquated weapons can do damage when they have a square to aim at. Experience in Central Asia, in Zulu-land and in the Sudan shows that this is so. But, after all, the losses incurred from the enemy's small arms are seldom very appreciable even at comparatively speaking short range, and when the hostile tactics are such as to call for the adoption of a square formation, the enemy rarely is supplied with guns. It may, of course, happen that the opponents of the regular forces have guns and know how to use them; in that case a rigid square formation certainly affords them an excellent mark Thus at El Teb the Mahdists had some guns,

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and until these were silenced they caused loss in the British square as it advanced. In Dahomey some inconvenience was caused to the French squares by the enemy's guns, which made good practice and which might have caused serious havoc had the shells burst. Still upon the whole this objection to the square, that it offers a target to the enemy, does not prove a very serious drawback to a formation which has been proved by experience so very efficacious in certain circumstances.

Limited development of fire from a square.

The limited development of fire which this order of battle admits of is a more serious matter than the target which it presents to the enemy, and there seems to be no safe plan of increasing this at a critical moment. Wheeling forward the sides in the direction where the enemy may be, cannot be attempted at close quarters in face of active warriors, who would be round the flanks in a moment--as appears indeed actually to have happened at Abu Klea. The restriction which it puts on the fire of the men, is in reality the greatest objection to the square formation, and there seems to be no remedy for this.

Square in attack.

The square has occasionally been used in actual attack as at El Teb already referred to, although the formation certainly does not readily lend itself to such action. A charge in square is obviously difficult to carry out, there is always a risk of confusion and of the ranks becoming broken, and the chance that the enemy may profit thereby to break into the interior. The square is essentially a defensive and not an offensive arrangement for combat; still the case of El Teb shows that it is not impracticable to assault a position with troops drawn up in this formation. The battle of Tamai on the other hand affords a striking illustration of the dangers which may arise out of the assumption of the offensive in square.

Tamai.

The story of this fight is briefly as follows:--A large gathering of Mahdists was concealed in a ravine. The two squares advanced in echelon about

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1,000 yards apart, that formed by the 2nd Brigade leading. As this drew near the ravine, groups of the enemy rushed out from its shelter to attack, but were mowed down by the fire of the square. Then a charge was ordered, and the front face of the square sprang forward to a point close to the edge of the declivity, halted, and began an irregular fire against the enemy on the opposite slopes of the ravine. The machine guns were run out to the right front corner of the square. There may have been some gaps due to the right side of the square not having moved so fast as the front face, or to the troops being unsteadied by their rapid advance. Whatever was the cause, it came about that when a mass of hostile spearmen suddenly rushed up out of the ravine against the right front comer, the fire of the square at that point was unable to check their onslaught They captured the machine guns and rolled up the front and right faces. The rear face promptly closed up; but it was unable to stem the torrent of Arabs, and the square formation was completely lost in the melee which ensued.

 

The square was in fact disordered by its own charge and, getting too close to the ravine, its fire proved ineffective at a critical moment. The Arabs, who were concealed in great force in the ravine, took advantage of these circumstances to deliver a determined counter-attack which throw the square into complete confusion.

 

It is of course essential that gaps and intervals should not occur, and in the rapid movements which always take place in delivering an assault, it is practically impossible to prevent their occurrence. If feasible, there should be a pause to induce the enemy to charge home--a feigned retreat might bring this about at such a moment. If marked disinclination to attack be shown by the adversary, and if the hostile position be so strong that it is dangerous to take risks, a move of the square towards a flank may bring about the desired forward movement on the part of the enemy. Even supposing that the enemy declines to be "drawn," a move like this towards the flank will probably cause the position to be evacuated; then, while the opponents are in retreat, the square may be broken up, the, troops may advance in line or echelon formation, and it may be possible to bring artillery fire and musketry effectively into play against the fugitives.

Capture of Bida.

The square formation does not in fact readily lend itself to offensive action beyond what is involved in advancing upon the enemy and leading him on to charge. This employment

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of the square is well illustrated by the tactical conduct of tb operations which resulted in the capture of Bida by Major Arnold early in 1897--an operation which admirably show the advantage of the square when regular troops are acting against masses of foemen whose musketry fire is not very alarming.

 

Major Arnold's force consisted of under 600 constabulary, with sever guns and six maxims, the guns being dragged by hand at great labour The attack on Bida was carried out as follows:--The infantry advanced ii square with the guns in the centre, the movement necessarily being very slow owing to the delays caused by hauling these latter along. A halt was made on commanding ground near the town and the guns were brought into action upon masses of the enemy thronging its outskirts. Thereupon the square was surrounded by hostile swarms who hurried up from a! sides, but the steady musketry and maxim fire kept the Fulahs at a distance, and their fire was of the wildest description. Then after a time the square advanced afresh, took up a good position within 600 yards of the town, and a bombardment of this by the artillery was begun which lasted some hours The enemy could not stand this, the hostile parties gradually broke up and lost heavily from the long range fire of a 12-pr. which was with the force as they took to flight The battle of Bida was one of the most signal successes ever won by British arms in Africa.

Square formation has frequently proved most effective.

Before considering squares on the march it will not be out of place to point out that in spite of its obvious inconveniences, this order of battle has proved admirably suited to the conditions on many occasions. In the form in which it has on occasions been employed in Algeria, which was adopted at Ulundi, and which has played so great a part on the battle fields of the Sudan, it has undoubtedly been a success. When good troops drawn up in this formation have got into difficulties, as at Tamai and Abu Klea, it has generally been attributable to difficulties of ground, or else to the square not being properly formed at some critical juncture. On open ground even indifferent troops have with comparative ease beaten off formidable attacks--at Marabia, south-east of Khartum, Hicks Pasha, in 1883, completely defeated a most determined Mahdist attack with untried Egyptian troops formed in square, and he moreover inflicted tremendous loss

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upon the enemy. When troops even of poor quality are drawn up in this compact formation, a thorough fire discipline can generally be maintained as long as the terrain is fairly open and as long as the hostile onslaught has none of the features of a surprise. The consequence is that arms of precision are made the most of, and that the fanatics or savages as they make their daring charges are mowed down by scores. If there is a fairly clear field of fire, the enemy as a rule indeed never reaches the square. The masses of infuriated assailants melt away under the rain of bullets. The leaders are shot down, and the onslaught of the intrepid warriors is brought to a standstill before they can get close enough for the hand-to-hand struggle which they are striving for.

 

Even in the scrub and bush around Suakin, where the field of fire was most limited and where the maintenance of the rigid square formation was most difficult, it invariably proved triumphant in 1885. In those operations the hostile rushes used to be very sudden, and the rifles of the troops had not full scope; but even so the square was found an order of battle which commanded success. However unsound and ill adapted to the circumstances'^ the formation may have seemed in theory, it met the case on every occasion in that campaign in spite of the scrub and bush. Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way; the objections of the square are manifest, but it has scores of times fulfilled its purpose.

Square formation as an order of march. Forming square on the move.

Having dealt with the square as an order of battle or in actual presence of the enemy, it now becomes necessary to regard it as an order of march. The formation is obviously 9 inconvenient for any prolonged movement. On this account commanders will generally, when it can be considered safe, arrange their order of march not actually in square but rather in some formation which will allow the troops to rapidly assume square if the enemy be met with in force. As long as the

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transport and non-combatants are kept well closed up, and provided that there is a strong compact rear guard to form a rear face, the flanks can easily be drawn in to form the sides, and the square is then complete. But if there be the slightest risk of a sudden fanatical onslaught, if the country be overgrown, or if nullahs abound where the enemy can muster unobserved, an arrangement of this kind is not very safe. A hostile charge may be delivered while the force is in the act of changing from the marching formation into square, and pressed home at such a moment may throw everything into confusion.

 

In this connection it is interesting to note that the disaster which occurred to Baker Pasha's force near Trinkitat in 1884 seems partially to have been due to the foot that his troops had not time to complete the square when they were attacked by the Mahdists. His men were, however, so untrustworthy and so insufficiently trained, that there is not much to be learnt from that disastrous fight. The force would probably have been rolled up no matter what formation it was in.

 

When there has been a probability of very sudden hostile attack, the square formation has frequently been adopted as an order of march as the only means of safe-guarding the convoys which accompany the regular force, and the troops have marched great distances so drawn up. Even when a force is going deliberately into action, there are always non-combatant services to be protected in these wars--the safeguarding of these is one main cause of the adoption of the square as an order of battle. But a moment's consideration will show that when a force is on the march the numerical strength of the non-combatant services, and the area of ground which they occupy whether in movement or at the halt, must be far greater than when the force has cast off all possible impediment preparatory to engaging deliberately in a fight. Supplies for days and even for weeks involving a, relatively to the size of the army, gigantic transport column, may be accompanying the force on the march. The convoy will sometimes be so great that the number of combatants are quite insufficient to

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form a square round it possessing any semblance of cohesion. On the march the square formation is in fact most cumbersome and is most difficult to maintain.

 

In spite of its drawbacks, however, the French have made considerable use of this order of march in their small wars. In Egypt when operating against the Mamelukes, in Algeria and in Tunis, the liability to very sudden attack of formidable bodies of horse often left them no choice except to march in square. General Logerot in Tunis always marched in square with an advanced guard in front. The Russians have sometimes adopted it as an order of march in Central Asia, notably during the suppression of the Turkomans in the khanate of Khiva after the occupation of the oasis in 1874. In the Sudan, and especially around Suakin, the British and Egyptian troops have often been compelled to carry out marches in square under most unfavourable circumstances.

Difficulties of marching in square.

It is, of course, highly inconvenient when regulars have to march in square with a mass of non-combatants and transport inside. Progress must inevitably be slow. The baggage animals, crowded together as they are, get into disorder. From the very fact of their being in a restricted space their supervision is most difficult. The pace of the whole force is reduced to that of the slowest animal. But in spite of its manifold disadvantages, marching in square is often the only plan by which a movement can safely be carried out, and the inconveniences inseparable from the arrangement have to be accepted. The advance to the Abu Klea wells is an example of such a march, although in that case the bulk of the transport had been left behind in a zeriba there nevertheless was a mass of camels inside the square.

 

Hicks Pasha's three squares at Shekan had inside of them the enormous mass of transport which the carriage of 50 days' supplies of food and a few days' store of water for his force necessarily involved. This huge train of animals must have been a terrible incumbrance in that last desperate fight with

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the Dervish hordes, and it probably contributed towards bringing about the fatal results of the hostile attack. Such a case would no doubt seldom arise in war--it is obviously an extreme case for an army to abandon its communications and to launch out many days' march into a theatre of operations, destitute of supplies and even of water and held by an enemy so formidable as to compel the adoption of square formation. Under ordinary circumstances the method which would be employed in such conditions is that of forming a zeriba or fortified bivouac in which the convoy is left under protection of a fraction of the force, while the rest of it goes out as a fighting square to give battle to the enemy, as was done at Abu Klea.

Suakin, 1886.

The history of small wars of recent times probably affords no example of the employment of square formation upon the march, under conditions so unfavourable as was the case in 1885 at Suakin. The sudden rushes of fanatical spearmen in this bush-overgrown theatre of operations made it obligatory that the square should be of the rigid form with ranks closed up. The convoys to be guarded consisted of camels--a most inconvenient form of transport when the animals are crowded together. Water, a most difficult thing to carry, was a main item of supply to be conveyed by the camels. The mimosa scrub greatly hampered movement and tended to break up the ranks. The heat and dust were most trying to the troops. Everything seemed to conspire against success. But the square formation was found to work, and resolute onslaughts by masses of fanatical Hadendowas were beaten off with comparative ease, although progress was very slow. One reason for this was that from the nature of the operations the size of the convoys could be satisfactorily apportioned to the numerical strength of the forces guarding them.

 

At Suakin the method adopted was to form depôts a few miles apart along the line of operations which it was proposed to follow. Convoys were sent out guarded by troops

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told off for the purpose, who formed square round the transport. On reaching the depôt the supplies and stores were deposited and the convoy returned. By working on these lines the strength of the convoy could be kept within limits which did not exceed what the troops could safeguard in this formation, and the system was strictly in accordance with the principle, already referred to in Chapter V, of holding back the troops and of pushing supplies ahead of them. But when a force is moving as a flying column for some considerable distance in an unproductive theatre of war, its transport for supplies soon grows into an unwieldy mass, which occupies more space than the troops can possibly surround in shoulder-to-shoulder square formation. When Sir H. Stewart's force advanced from the Jakdul Wells on Abu Klea, it had with it nearly 3,000 camels; the number of combatants in the force was, including officers, only about 1,500 men--a number quite insufficient to have formed a square round such a mass of transport on the move without leaving numerous gaps.

Artillery and cavalry with reference to squares on the march.

Artillery in motion is defenceless. When therefore the square is adopted as an order of march to meet the case of very sudden hostile onslaughts, it is obvious that the guns should be inside; outside they run the risk of being rushed before they can get into action. Whatever position the guns are to take up when they come into action, whether at the angles or in the faces, this should be fixed in advance; on the move they should march inside the square close to the positions they are to take up, so as to be ready to get to work at once if the enemy makes a rusk They should be kept well dear of the transport, and when hostile attack seems imminent it has been found best to drag portable guns along by hand. Machine guns would be treated in a similar manner.

 

Cavalry on the other hand will of necessity always be outside the square on the march. Mounted troops are invaluable

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for reconnoitring purposes and can be of great assistance in this manner to the square. Their retirement inside the square in case of attack will seldom be advisable unless, as at Ulundi, the enemy is in great strength and surrounds the force, or unless there is plenty of time for the retirement to be effected deliberately and in good order without masking the fire of the square. Under ordinary circumstances, in fact, the cavalry keeps quite independent of the square. During the advance to the Abu Klea wells, and also at Suakin in 1885, the cavalry moved at some distance from the squares. Hicks Pasha seems to have adopted the same arrangement. Should the square be attacked, the cavalry, if remaining outside, must be guided by circumstances; it is in a position to act very effectively against the enemy when beaten off, as was well illustrated at El Teb. It can threaten the flanks and rear of the enemy while actually attacking the square. When cavalry vedettes are scouting in front of a square on the march, they should be instructed to retire to a flank in the event of coming upon a formidable hostile gathering, so as to unmask the fire of the infantry and artillery. In Dahomey, where the nature of the terrain and the weakness of the cavalry detachment militated against the effective action of this arm, the mounted troops were generally on the flank on the march; when the enemy showed in force the troopers sometimes retired behind the column and formed the rear face of the fighting square; but in that campaign the square was rather of the elastic order suitable to bush warfare, than the rigid square designed to meet shock tactics.

 

In a case where the square formation has been adopted on the march as security against the risk of attack by strong bodies of fanatical horse, the position of the cavalry must be something of a puzzle. Presumably the force of cavalry will be small. It may be obliged to scout ahead of the square. If it bolts for the square to escape a hostile onslaught it gets in the way. If it gallops away the enemy will pursue and perhaps disperse it. Under such conditions the cavalry

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will necessarily have an anxious time and the proper course for it to pursue is not easy to determine.

Bivouac in square.

As regards forming bivouac in square there is not very much to be said. When this is found to be necessary it is almost invariably also desirable to convert the bivouac into a temporarily fortified post or zeriba, or, in case the force is accompanied by wagons, into a laager. The French in Egypt generally bivouacked in square. Sir J. Outram's force bivouaced in square on the night before the fight of Khushab in Persia, after it had been attacked unexpectedly by the enemy. It is a very good arrangement if no means exist of making a zeriba, or if the circumstances are such as to necessitate provision against very sudden and dangerous rushes from all sides. As a rule however, owing to the very cramped space left inside, it is very inconvenient to bivouac in rigid square formation, the men simply lying down where otherwise they would be standing. Still it might under certain circumstances become necessary to so pass the night, as, for instance, in a case where the force has been overtaken by darkness before it can form any defences.

Conclusion.

Square formation has been treated of at considerable length, more with a view of illustrating under what varying conditions it has been employed in irregular warfare, than of laying down rules for guidance as to when it should be adopted and how it can best be organized. It is not popular in certain quarters. In theory there is indeed much to be said against it. But as long as regular troops burdened with the impedimenta with which they cannot dispense, are pitted against warriors who, whether as a consequence of their great numerical superiority, or of their rapid movements, or of the nature of the theatre of operations, can attack them at close quarters from any side at will, it will not be easy to substitute for it a better formation.

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