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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
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SMALL WARS

Chapter XVIII.
Principles of laager and zeriba warfare.

General principles of laager and zeriba warfare.

Conducting operations under shelter of laagers and zeribas is peculiar to small wars. Even in irregular warfare it is a method of carrying on a campaign which is only practised under certain special conditions--it is indeed only applicable to some cases. But in many of these campaigns improvised defences have been constantly constructed whenever a force halts, the principle of employing laagers and zeribas on all occasions has been a distinctive feature, and their constant utilization has occasionally indeed governed the whole course of hostilities to a very remarkable extent.

 

The principle is an excellent illustration of defensive tactics superimposed upon offensive strategy. The regular troops invade hostile territory, or territory in temporary occupation of the enemy, and in doing so they maintain strategically the initiative. But, no sooner do they find themselves in presence of the irregular forces prepared for battle than they form the laager or zeriba as the case may be, and either await attack or else leave their impedimenta in it and go out to fight without encumbrances. In any case they have a secure bivouac and adequate protection during the hours of darkness.

 

Laagers and zeribas are really an extension of the principle of the square. They afford fines of fire in all directions, and they offer resistance to attack from any side. They provide security for the baggage, for the transport, for the food, and for .the non-combatant services. Under favourable circumstances they can be formed so quickly that they may be said to represent a defensive battle formation assumed

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actually in the presence of the enemy. The arrangement of bivouac in square so largely adopted in Algeria, Tunis, and Central Asia, was generally accompanied, when it was possible, by the construction of some defences approximating to what is understood by a zeriba.

Tactically a defensive system.

Laagers and zeribas possess from the tactical point of view all the attributes of fortifications, their employment means a defensive attitude--an attitude tending indeed towards passive defence. Where shelter is improvised merely to ensure the safety of the non-combatant portion of the force while the remainder gives battle in the open, this is not objectionable. It is when the fighting force surrounds itself with abattis or with rings of vehicles on every possible occasion, that what is here called laager and zeriba warfare has such drawbacks, because such a method of conducting operations is in the main an adoption of the defensive when in action. And even when the troops are not actually in action, the formation of laagers and zeribas has the same effect upon them as acting on the defensive has--it heightens the respect which they entertain for the antagonists whom they are going to fight.

Objections to this.

It is perhaps to some extent a matter of opinion whether this system of constantly shutting up the force within a kind of fort, which has been so largely adopted in many campaigns, has an injurious moral effect upon good troops. But the natural inference which all ranks are inclined to draw therefrom is that the army cannot in the open cope on level terms with the foe, and many experienced leaders hold that this must have a depressing influence upon their men. Sir C. Napier, after his brilliant success at Meani in Scinde, felt himself compelled to form an entrenched camp, because formidable bodies of Beluchis were still in the field; but he camped his force outside fearing lest the troops, flushed though they were with victory, might infer from their occupation of the lines that their cause was a

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failing one. Trusting to fortifications during the day time--at night it is different--undoubtedly argues inferiority to the adversary. Laagers and zeribas do not breathe the spirit of attack. The soldier who daily fences himself round with abattis and obstacles to keep the enemy off, may come to think that deprived of this shelter he is no match for the savage whom he has come to beat. Putting the moral factor on one side, this method of making war has in many cases much to recommend it; but in war the moral factor can rarely be ignored with safety.

Situations where laagers and zeribas are very necessary.

On the other hand, when the regular army is hampered by the responsibility of safeguarding a great column of transport, when in fact it is merely an escort for its own supplies, laagers or zeribas are almost compulsory, supposing the adversary to be strong and enterprising. In the jungle and the bush where the hostile forces may creep up unseen and pounce down suddenly, some form of defence work round the camp, or even during a midday halt, may be indispensable. To stem the rush of swarms of fanatics, or to check the onslaughts of savages who swoop upon the regular troops regardless of losses caused by modern arms of precision, obstacles are invaluable. In theatres of war where sudden attacks of masses of irregular horse are to be expected, the constant formation of laagers or zeribas may be obligatory. But even then it is to a certain extent a contravention of a broad principle governing the whole art of war--the principle that success should be sought for in attack, in preserving the initiative in tactics as in strategy, and in reaping to the full the benefit of moral effect by assuming and maintaining a dominant bearing.

Their value in dealing with guerillas.

It was laid down in Chapter XI that the right method of dealing with antagonists who adhere to the guerilla system of warfare, is the organization of mobile columns capable of going considerable distances and designed to follow up the hostile parties and give them no rest. The temporary bases

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of these columns generally require defensive arrangements of some kind, and therefore in operations of this class laagers or zeribas will generally he made considerable use of. Moreover, mobile columns are almost necessarily small and they must be to a certain extent hampered by transport. By making use of laagers or zeribas this transport can often be left behind while some especial dash is being made. During the suppression of the rebellion in Rhodesia, columns were often separated from their wagons for two or three days at a time, these were formed into laagers and a small guard rendered them practically secure; maxim guns in them were found very useful, adding greatly to their defensive strength. It is, of course a most important point in these cases to reduce the numbers left behind in charge of the impedimenta of the column to a minimum, so as to have as many rifles as possible for the active operations which are being undertaken; and with this in view, some form of defensive post for the temporary depôt is, as a rule desirable.

Conditions necessary for their construction.

The formation of zeribas and laagers demand the existence of certain conditions. Zeribas, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, are enclosures fenced in by abattis and thorn bashes, and to construct them there must be jungle, bush, or scrub on the spot. Laagers, on the other hand, are formed of wagons, and it is only in certain small wars that wheeled vehicles accompany the troops. These temporary defensive enclosures are sometimes supplemented by breast-works of pack saddles and stores, by shelter trenches, and so forth. But the idea of this class of rapidly improvised fortification is (to use the phraseology of the engineer) not so much to provide cover for the defence as to oppose obstacles to the attack. It is designed to secure the regular troops against the shock action of their antagonists, rather than against their fire.

Campaigns in which zeribas and

Zeribas assumed great prominence in the campaigns in the Sudan. Here the hostile tactics consisted chiefly in sudden

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laagers have been largely used.

rushes of reckless fanatical spearmen. As a rule mimosa bushes and scrub were available on the spot. Around Suakin the thick jungle growth favoured the unseen approach of large bodies of the enemy, but, thanks to it, the construction of brushwood fences offered was simple and they provided the best method of meeting the tactics of the Mahdists. Hastily improvised defensive enclosures of this kind can, of course, be supplemented by trenches and parapets, and they may eventually be converted into fortified posts which can be held by a small number of men. In Dahomey the French, bivouacking in square, protected themselves with shelter trenches and abattis having the character to a certain extent of zeribas; these defensive enclosures were, however, formed chiefly as a protection for the night. Zeribas were made free use of during the Somaliland campaign of 1903-04.

 

Laagers have always been a special feature of warfare in South Africa and North America. On the veld and prairie the pioneers of civilization moved in small bodies, with their families and property borne in great wagons adapted to these roadless rolling downs, and often found their vehicles a sure bulwark when attacked. Sheltered behind the bulwark which the wagons formed, their firearms had full play and the hostile charges were stemmed and broken. It became the regular programme after a move to draw up the wagons in the form of a square or oblong enclosure, the cattle, horses, &c, being picketed or fastened up in the interior, and saddles and other gear being used to form a breastwork between the wheels. Regular troops campaigning in these countries have adopted the same method and have found it to answer. The United States troops when operating against Red Indians were constantly forming laagers, or corrals as they were called. During the suppression of Riers rebellion in 1885, laagers were generally established by the Government troops when they got into camp after a march. In the Zulu and Matabili wars laagers were always constructed when at the halt, if wagons

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were available, as long as there was any possibility of attack.

Their special advantages. Economy of outposts.

One great advantage of forming laager or zeriba is that it economises outposts. The troops bivouac along the faces, and can man them at a moment's notice. The line to be defended is clearly defined. Each unit has its place. The line of defence is practically identical with the line of outposts, and a mere fraction of the force serves to secure it against surprises--a point which is of great advantage both by day and night.

Security at night.

At night the fact of being within a defensive enclosure gives security to the troops, and gives, what is of almost equal importance, a distinct sense of security. In a later chapter it will be seen that although night attacks by the enemy are somewhat unusual, irregular warriors are given to harassing their opponents under cover of darkness and that marauding is always to be expected. The wagons, abattis, &c, serve to check this, and to avert what is a great annoyance even if it is not a serious danger.

They generally, but not necessarily, enable the regular troops to select their ground and time for fighting.

Another great advantage of forming laagers and zeribas is that they generally enable the commander of the regular forces to select his own ground, and to a certain extent his own time for fighting. This may not of course necessarily be the case, but it usually is so. Sir H. Stewart's force marching from Abu Klea for the Nile, was practically compelled by the enemy to form a zeriba on unfavourable ground; but, under the shelter of this zeriba, the column was able to transform itself into a purely fighting force and was enabled to march out to fight, selecting its own time. The result of this was that the column brought of its fight on favourable ground, and that it was effectively supported by the guns in the zeriba without being hampered by their presence when in movement. The following example from the Red Indian campaigns may also be quoted; in this case a laager, which had to be formed under sudden pressure of the enemy

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in an unsuitable position for defence, saved the troops from destruction when in a most critical situation.

 

A small cavalry force with a convoy of wagons was marching in 1879 to the White River Agency, in Colorado. The cavalry moving in front of the wagons came suddenly upon the enemy in strong force near the Milk River, and the mounted troops were speedily obliged to fall back Thereupon the vehicles were hastily formed into a laager close to the river, and to complete the ring, for which there were not wagons enough, wounded horses were shot and the carcases were used to form a sort of breastwork on one side. The position was most unfavourable for defence, but, thanks to the wagons, the troops held out for a week till they were finally relieved, having been reinforced in the meantime. The losses in men and horses were very heavy in the interval, but the force was saved.

 

Sir H. Stewart's force and the United States troops in these cases bad to form a defensive host as best they could in a hurry on unfavourable ground. There is always the chance that small bodies moving about a theatre of irregular warfare may be suddenly attacked by superior forces, and may be obliged to construct a zeriba or some kind of laager on the spot. But the most remarkable examples of attacks on laagers and zeribas of late years have been where these have been deliberately established, and where in consequence the commander of the regular troops has chosen his own battle-field. At Ginghilovo in the Zulu war, and at Imbembesi and Shangani in the Matabili war, the position of the laagers had been deliberately selected. At Tofrek near Suakin in 1885, the site of the zeriba had been carefully chosen. By having a temporary fortress of this kind the commander of the force may elect to fight inside of it, most favourably placed if the enemy can be induced to attack, or he may prefer merely to use the laager or zeriba to shelter the non-combatants while the fighting portions sally forth and give battle in the open. This latter plan was the one adopted at Ulundi, at Tamai, and at Abu Klea. The French in Dahomey frequently left their stores and transport under improvised cover of this nature, issuing out of their zeribas to fight in their own time and on

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ground practically selected by themselves. When this arrangement is adopted the laager or zeriba relieves the force of the encumbrances which hamper it at other times, and it serves, moreover, as a refuge, should the fates prove unpropitious on the battlefield.

They afford the troops repose during prolonged operations.

An army penetrating far into the territories of a brave, and warlike race must occasionally have some rest and security from alarms. For rest it must come to a halt; but the very fact of its coming to a standstill is in a manner a confession of weakness and the enemy, taking it to mean a want of confidence, gathers courage. For this reason the regular troops are especially exposed, during a halt of any duration, to onslaughts of their adversaries who will have been emboldened by the temporary inaction. But within laagers and zeribas the troops rarely have much, to fear, and if the enemy is tempted to attack them he is generally beaten off with comparative ease. In fact, when the soldiery really need repose the assumption of an attitude of defence, and even of passive defence, may not be unjustifiable; it may indeed at times be almost imperative.

Zeribas may become defence posts upon the line of communications, or may serve as supply depôts in advance of an army.

When, as is so often the case, the broad plan of campaign at the outset is to push supplies into the heart of an enemy's country under limited escort, with the idea of forming great depôts for the army which is eventually to crush the resistance of the enemy, some plan of constantly forming laagers or zeribas and fighting on the defensive is imperative. With time, zeribas--not laagers if these are taken to mean enclosures formed of wagons, camels, and so forth--develop into defensive posts. As the force advances they remain behind it--links upon the chain of communications. Sometimes, as observed above, zeribas afford a means of pushing the supplies ahead of an advancing army, a system the necessity of adopting which at times was dealt with fully in Chapter V. Thus, in 1885, when it was decided to advance south-westwards from Suakin, a convoy strongly guarded was sent out with

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orders for the troops to construct a zeriba in which to leave the loads under the protection of a portion of the force, the troops were then to return with the transport to the base. The zeriba was formed, in spite of a desperate attack upon it when half constructed, and then relays of convoys were sent out to it daily till sufficient supplies had been collected for the force to advance beyond it. In this case the zeriba acted at first as a secure supply depôt thrust out in advance of the army; then, when the army passed it, it served as a fortified post on the line of communications. This well illustrates one phase of what may be called laager and zeriba warfare.

General conclusions.

The truth is that adequate reasons exist in certain theatres of war, and under certain conditions, for adopting this method of making war temporarily, and sometimes for adhering to it throughout the campaign. In many struggles of recent years the practice has invariably been to form laager and zeriba whenever the troops were halted by day, or halted for the night or longer. In Dahomey, in Zululand and among the Matabilis, in the campaign against Biel, and in Central Asia in many cases, the regular army has adopted the system and has adapted it to varying circumstances with great success. Some.think it to be derogatory, some fear its evil moral effect upon the troops. But if kept within limits, if employed only when clear necessity arises, if not permitted to cramp their energies or to check judiciously applied offensive action on the part of the troops, there is much to be said for a military system which safeguards the supplies of an army and which grants it temporary repose.

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