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SMALL WARS

Chapter XVI.
Surprises, raids, and ambuscades.

Surprise a favourite weapon of the enemy, but one which can also be used against him.

"To conquer," wrote General Skobelef, when preparing for his campaign against the Turkomans, "you must know how to surprise." Although in small wars the enemy is generally well fitted by nature and temperament for devising ambuscades and carrying out surprises, it is by no means so difficult to put this method of warfare in force against him as might be supposed.

Best time of day for surprises.

It has already been pointed out in Chapter XII that the forces which the regular troops are called upon to fight in these campaigns seldom protect themselves with outposts at night, and that on that account early morning attacks on them frequently meet with brilliant success. A night march followed by an assault upon the hostile position at dawn is perhaps the most effectual means of carrying out a surprise. The history of irregular warfare supplies abundant evidence of the fine opportunities which surprises at break of day afford a commander of regular troops. The capture of Kassala by the Italian troops in 1893 is an excellent example of this, and the affair of Cherek el Tobul and the capture of Ludlow Castle, both quoted on p. 193, are also notable examples of the same thing. The virtual annihilation of the Mahdist force at Ferkeh in 1896 was the result of the night march of two separate columns which at daybreak caught the unsuspecting enemy in a trap. In the latter part of the South African war the most remarkable successes gained by the British forces over the nomad commandos were gained by attacks at dawn after long night marches.

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The question of carrying out surprise attacks at night can best be treated generally under the head of night attacks, dealt with in Chapter XXVII. But it may be pointed out here that while these are generally most objectionable in small wars if they are made on a large scale, it may often be expedient to annoy the enemy by small parties in the dark carrying out surprises of a harassing kind.

By day a rapid march from a distance is generally necessary.

Irregular warriors seldom keep a good look out by night, but on the other hand they are generally thoroughly on the alert by day if they imagine the regular troops to be in their proximity. Therefore, if a surprise by day is contemplated it is almost always essential to lead up to it by a rapid march from a distance. Special troops must in fact as a rule be employed, and the enterprise must be conducted with dash and boldness. The Due D'Aumale's surprise of Abd el Kader's smala described on p. 82 is a fine illustration of this class of operation; the Arabs had no idea that a French force was anywhere near them; the duke had made a forced march with his troopers, and the blow was as heavy as it was unexpected. For carrying out such enterprises a good knowledge of the theatre of war, careful preparation and bold execution are essential. In the campaigns against the Red Indians the United States troops succeeded on more than one occasion in surprising the wary enemy by making forced marches. But in the guerilla days of the late South African war it was found that something more than forced marches by day was necessary if the enemy was to be caught unawares; it was only by forced marches by night and attack in the early morning that a surprise could be effected.

Mobility essential in troops employed.

Cavalry, mounted infantry and camel corps are well suited for a surprise by day owing to mobility being so essential for such work Remarkable results have moreover on occasion been achieved by cavalry carrying infantry on their horses. The Turkomans adopted this method in their sudden attack on the Russians in the Khiva campaign; Abd el Kader on

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the day after his defeat of the French at Macta in 1835, mounted 1,500 foot soldiers behind horsemen so as to fall upon the beaten troops at a favourable place; Dost Mahomed in Afghanistan in 1841 made use of this same device. The plan has seldom been adopted by a regular army in irregular warfare, although the military history of Europe supplies many remarkable examples of such procedure in regular campaigns. It is true that on one occasion, in 1871, an attempt was made by the French to surprise some Arab insurgents by mounting infantry on mules by pairs, but the men were so exhausted when they reached the goal that they could do little fighting.

 

Another very effectual method of rapidly moving a force so as to effect a surprise is to put the men into carts; but this can of course only be done in certain theatres of war. Colonel Skobelef moved two infantry companies in this manner in 1875 across Khokand. In the Mexican campaign in 1865 a small French force was conveyed 60 miles in 24 hours to relieve Monterey when threatened by the insurgents. The United States infantry have made forced marches to surprise the Bed Indians by using carts. The Indian "ekka," familiar to all who have soldiered in the east, is a ready means of rapidly transporting troops.

Importance of keeping the project secret.

But to carry out a surprise in warfare of this nature, whether by day or by night, whether it be merely some minor episode or whether it takes this form of a momentous operation affecting the whole campaign, the most important point of all is to keep the plan secret. Officers who took part in the mobile operations on the veld which gradually wore down the Boer resistance, will realise the truth of this. "Aucun préparatif, aucun ordre ne fera soupçonner l'expédition. Les troupes seront spontanément assemblées a l'heure convenable. Des ordres écrits a l'avance et des instructions verbales seront alors donnés aux commandants des détachments"--so ran Marshal Bugeaud's instructions. There is always an element

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of uncertainty in under takings of this kind, and it is essential that steps should be taken to prevent the secret from leaking out. Napoleon went so far as to ascribe success in such operations entirely to luck. "La réussite d'un coup de main depend absolument du bonheur, d'un chien ou d'une oie," he wrote in his Commentaires; but this applies rather to night attacks than to surprises by day. These latter depend especially upon their being unforeseen by the enemy, upon his being unaware that any movement is contemplated and his being ignorant that a force of regular troops is near him.

 

In Chapter V the difficulty of hiding movements and intentions from the enemy in small wars was commented upon. The mysterious manner in which secrets leak out in such warfare render it of the utmost importance to conceal to the last any scheme which may be on foot to surprise the foe. "Faire sentir la foudre avant qu'il ait vu l'éclair," was Montecuculli's maxim. The first condition requisite to score a success is that the plan shall remain undivulged as long as possible--it is to a rigid adherence to the policy of secrecy that the remarkable sequence of successes by which the Sudan was recovered may largely be attributed. It is astonishing how quickly the rumour spreads abroad, if the slightest inkling is given to the force at large that it is to undertake some operation of a special character. Silence in such cases is golden indeed, and this applies alike if the surprise takes the form of an important operation of war like the transfer of the British force from Alexandria to the Suez Canal, or if it be merely some petty affair of intercepting an insignificant hostile detachment or seizing some paltry stronghold.

 

In 1891 a small Italian force was told off to surprise and capture a troublesome chieftain named Debeb on the borders of Eritrea. The secret of what was intended was not kept, the whole party were apprised of what was afoot, and a trifling unnecessary delay also occurred. The consequence was that Debeb and his following were found quite prepared for all eventualities, and that the small force sent to effect his capture was beaten off.

 

Great care must be taken that the enemy does not learn

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what is impending by premature discharge of firearms. Rifles should not as a rule be loaded till the last moment, as a careless soldier may upset the most skillfully devised surprise by inadvertently firing off his weapon. During Sir F. Roberts's night march to surprise the Afghan flank on the Peiwar Kotal two native soldiers treacherously discharged their rifles in the hope of warning the enemy of the intended attack. A horse given to neighing when momentarily deprived of companionship is a serious danger. Close attention to details on the part of commander and officers, and a realization by the troops of the nature of the game they are playing, are essential if the coup is to succeed.

Enemy to be put on a false scent if possible.

It is indeed always desirable to put the enemy on a false scent by every possible means when a surprise is contemplated. This can be done by various means. At night leaving the fires burning in the camp of a force which is to carry out some enterprise, will often lull the enemy into false security. The troops intended for the task may actually march in a false direction to start with--a good capture was made at Roos Senekal in the Transvaal by a column which quitted the place one day and which doubled back on its tracks that night. No undertaking offers greater opportunity for the employment of stratagem and artifice than a surprise. Guerillas such as regular troops meet with in campaigns like those of La Vendée, in the Peninsula, in Poland, and in 1901-02 in South Africa, are fully alive to this. In Algeria, the Caucasus, New Zealand, Somaliland, and other theatres of desultory war, the alertness and cunning of the enemy has been constantly demonstrated. A leaf might well be taken out of the book of some of the partisan leaders whose surprises and ambuscades have so often in small wars wrought confusion among bodies of trained troops.

 

General Philebert on one occasion in 1881, when operating against insurgents in Algeria, intended to surprise a place to the north of his camp; in furtherance of this object he deliberately marched at night southwards, Bounding his bugles, whereupon lights on the hills showed that the enemy was on the watch; then General Philebert ordered complete silence and

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turned his column, northwards again. Another time when on the march to surprise some villages, he found that his advance was observed, so he halted, encamped, and made a show of stopping where he was; then, as Boon as he was sure that the Arabs were no longer on the look out, he sent off a light column which was completely successful in its raid. Sir E. Buller in 1885 withdrew his force by night from Abu Klea, where it was blockaded by a large force of Mahdists, without molestation; he left his camp fires burning and sounded the usual bugles so as to deceive the enemy.

Raids a form of surprise.

The value of raids has been pointed out in the chapter on guerilla warfare; they are often the only means of punishing the enemy and of bringing hostilities to a conclusion, and some point bearing upOn these operations deserve a passing mention. Raids are a form of surprise. The idea of a raid is to affect captures or to do damage to the enemy's property by the action of a small force boldly handled and capable of covering a considerable distance in a short space of tune. British troops have rarely attempted enterprises of this nature on a large scale and therefore the subject is to us an interesting one.

Raids on the live stock of the enemy.

About raids undertaken to bum the villages or destroy the crops of recalcitrants there is not much to be said, to carry out such work it may indeed not be necessary to surprise the enemy. But when the object of the raid is to carry off live stock, secrecy and suddenness of execution are essential, otherwise the enemy will have driven off his flocks and herds and nothing will be found worth capturing. Experience has shown in South Africa that a native tribe about to commence hostilities mil always send as much of its grain as possible, and the whole of its cattle, to some place of security beforehand; the great object therefore is to ascertain where the tribal possessions have been concealed and to pounce down on them by a rapid well executed movement. The Arabs of Algeria, the Kirghiz and Turkomans of the steppes, and the Red Indiana--all warriors enjoying in virtue of their horses or camels great mobility--have always displayed remarkable prowess in their forays. These wild uncivilized races may

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indeed be said to have taught the regular troops opposed to them how such operations are best conducted.

The French "razzias" in Algeria.

The French proved apt pupils in Algeria. Adopting the Arabic name of razzia for their enterprises, they showed the enemy that this was a game both sides could play at. The capture of Abd el Kader's smala mentioned on former pages amounted to considerably more than a mere raid, it involved the overthrow of a considerable fighting force. It was the most remarkable example of an operation of this kind which occurred during the many years of desultory warfare which were needed to pacify the great African province, and the course of action which in that remarkable episode of war proved so signally successful--a forced march followed by intrepid attack when the enemy turned out to be present in force--may be taken as typical of the system of punitive raids which the French made their own. The idea of a raid is however rather to effect captures of hostile property than to fight, and the strength of the force detailed for the enterprise is not generally calculated with the idea of its giving battle to strong hostile forces.

 

For a razzia the force was in most cases composed mainly of cavalry, but a nucleus of infantry was generally found desirable. The general idea of an undertaking of this class is that the cavalry is detailed to surround the encampment or locality against which the enterprise is directed, the infantry then rushes in, cuts down all who resist, carries off women, children, flocks, and herds, and seizes any other booty which can be removed, burning the remainder. There is of course always considerable risk of a raid finding itself confronted by very superior numbers, by hostile forces so formidable that the plan of making a daring assault adopted by the Duo d'Aumale may be out of the question. The only thing for the raiders to do then is to retire as rapidly as they came. For success it is absolutely necessary that the foray should be a complete surprise. General Yusuf used to make a parade of marching

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in the opposite direction by day and would then march back by night and fall on the Arab encampment when this was totally unprepared. Great care must be taken not to let the men get out of hand, for fear that the enemy should receive reinforcements and fall upon the raiders when scattered and unprepared. Soldiers detailed for pillage are very liable to become somewhat unmanageable, and, from the purely military point of view, this is one of the strongest objections to raids. A disciplined detachment which from any cause degenerates, even if it be only for the moment, into a gang of marauders is exposed to all manner of dangers, and finds itself in a sorry plight if the enemy suddenly turns upon it. A bold initiative is, however, the surest road to success in all such operations, and is the best means of hindering the enemy from gathering for a counterstroke.

 

In 1842 a column under General Changarnier in Algeria came upon a mass of Arab nomads, horsemen, camels, women, children, flocks and herds, all streaming along, protected by 1,500 horsemen. The General despatched 220 sabres supported by infantry to fall upon the Arabs. The odds against the regulars were enormous; but the French onslaught was so sudden and was delivered with such dash that they succeeded in capturing 2,000 camels, 80,000 cattle, many prisoners and a huge booty, and bringing them into camp.

Difficulty of bringing in captured cattle, etc.

Bringing in the captured animals is one of the great difficulties which follow upon a successful raid. This has often been found to be the case by the Russians in Central Asia, by the United States cavalry in their raids upon the Red Indians and by British troops in South Africa, as well as by the French in Algeria and Tunis. The force told off for a raid is almost necessarily small and it succeeds in the venture by the suddenness of its attack; but when the prize is secured the troops detailed for the undertaking become converted into an escort for the captured five stock. Even if the enemy makes no attempt to recover his property, driving great herds of camels or cattle or vast flocks of sheep to some place of safety is by no means an easy task--sheep move so slowly that they are especially troublesome. The

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booty seems to melt away unaccountably. After some of their raids on the Turkomans and Kirghiz ending in the capture of quantities of live stock, the Russians were often within the space of a few days short of meat rations for the troops. The camels, cattle, sheep, or whatever the spoil may consist of, stray away at night even if the enemy makes no attempt to recover them.

 

If the enemy assemble in force while the booty is being brought back to camp, and if there be any risk of having to abandon it, the best plan will often be to kill the animals which have been captured if there is time to do it. Two very successful raids were effected by the punitive expedition against the Ogaden Somalis in 1898; the first time over 500 head of cattle were carried off; but the second time, owing to the approach of night and the pursuit of the enemy, it was found necessary to kill all that had been taken. Slaughtering great herds of cattle or flocks of sheep is however a troublesome undertaking when a raiding force is being hustled. It must always be remembered that a raid may have been in the first place successful and that the party detailed for the purpose may be conveying its prize back to camp in triumph, but that if the enemy then assembles, attacks the convoy and defeats the troops hampered as they are, the operation as a whole will have been disastrous. The recovery of even a fraction of the booty will be interpreted by the enemy as a victory. The enemy will have had the last word, and may at the close have had the best of the exchange.

 

The raid upon the Zulu cattle on the top of the Zlobani Mountain already referred to on p. 183, was successful in the first instance, 2,000 head of cattle were captured and driven to the end of the mountain at which the descent was to be made. But the whole of the capture had to be abandoned when affairs took an unfavourable turn.

Ambuscades.

The question of forming ambuscades in small wars is one which has hardly received the attention which it deserves.

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Stratagems of this kind have hardly been so often attempted by regular troops in operations of this class as they might have been, considering that the terrain and conditions are often favourable to their successful execution. In the chapters on hill and jungle warfare it will be seen that in such theatres of war the enemy is constantly forming ambushes, and that being prepared for them is a matter of the first importance; and it will also be shown that it is not impossible for the regular troops to lay traps of the same kind. But it is only on outpost service that the devising of ambuscades has up to the present been taken very seriously in campaigns against irregular forces.

Ease with which the enemy can sometimes be drawn into them.

The question of ambuscades is in reality nearly related to that of feints, already discussed in Chapter XV. Some of the cases quoted on pp. 230 to 233 are illustrations of this combination of ambuscades with feints, and show that it is often practicable to draw undisciplined opponents into a snare. It must be admitted that in campaigns against irregular warriors the regular troop fall into ambuscades more often than their adversaries do; still many interesting cases have occurred when the enemy has been enticed into a trap and discomfited. The characteristics of a tumultuary assemblage of fighting men rather expose them to getting into pitfalls if they are cunningly devised. The eagerness with which such opponents at first follow up any success they may have gained has been noticed in earlier chapters, and the good results which may be obtained from tempting the adversary on by pretended retreat have been touched upon. Savages and semi-civilized races, fond as they are of stratagems, are not nearly so difficult to deceive as might be imagined. Opportunities often present themselves for preparing ambuscades for such foes, and when these have been skillfully planned remarkable results have sometimes been achieved. A good example of such action is afforded by an incident during General Sale's retreat from Gandamak to Jellalabad, which is thus graphically described by Kaye.

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"Clever were the manoeuvres by which on that day Dennie drew the enemy into his toils and heavy the retribution which descended upon them. Placing his cavalry in ambush he brought up Mb infantry, ordered them to advance firing and then wheeled them about as if in panic flight. The stratagem succeeded to admiration. The enemy, after a brief pause of wonderment, believed they had accomplished a great victory, sent up a wild shout and then rushed in pursuit of the flying Feringhees. They were soon on the clear open space to which Dennie had designed to lure them. The cavalry whom they had laughed at on the hills, able now to operate freely, dashed at them with sudden fury. The slaughter was tremendous the rout was complete."

 

But if savages and semi-civilized races are prone to be drawn into ambushes if judiciously arranged, it must be admitted that the insurgent in a civilized country, and the higher type of guerilla, are uncommonly wary birds. It did not prove particularly easy to catch the Boers napping, they seemed to have a miraculous instinct for scenting out an ambuscade. The Cubans seldom fell into a trap, and the veteran soldiers of France set their snares in vain for the Spanish guerillas during the Peninsular war, and for Fra Diavolo's banditti in Calabria. The operations of partisan warfare tend to stimulate the cunning and resource of the guerilla, and to place him on an altogether higher plane than the savage or the normal irregular when it comes to setting and to avoiding traps.

Remarks on the arrangement of ambuscades.

When cavalry and infantry are combined in an operation of this nature, it is usually the mobile cavalry which draws the enemy on, while the more easily concealed infantry falls upon the hostile detachments at the right moment. The Cossacks, when they were purely irregulars in the Russian service, were wonderfully skilled in the art of luring on an enemy, and they practised these manoeuvres with equal success upon the splendid cavalry of Napoleon and upon the Tartar horsemen of the steppes. Parties of them used to spread out over a wide area, would worry the enemy into following them up by their fire from horseback, and would draw them on with marvellous patience to the point where, concealed in some hollow or behind some wood, a mass of these intrepid lancers

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was hidden, ready to dash out. Sometimes the Cossacks played into the hands of Russian infantry, but they seem to have preferred playing the game by themselves in their own way. The Boers were also very successful in using mounted men in this way; it was always dangerous to indulge in a vigorous pursuit of their detachments, except on a very broad front overlapping any ambush which might be intended; their skill in concealing their mounts was remarkable. To achieve success in any operation of this kind it is essential that the troops in ambush shall be thoroughly in hand and that there be no excitement. As in the case of effecting a night surprise, precautions must be taken against the premature discharge of fire-arms, and the enemy should be allowed to come close up before any attack is made on him. If the bayonet can be brought into play so much the better.

 

General Bugeaud arranged a very successful ambuscade at Takdempt in Algeria in 1841. He was withdrawing his forces from the place after destroying the works, but be left some troops concealed. As soon as they saw the French evaluating the town the Arabs entered it at the other side. They were quite unprepared to find troops hidden, and they suffered heavily when these attacked them.

 

General Prim after his victory over the Moors at Castellijos in 1869, drove the enemy some distance into the hills, but was then obliged to fall back as the evening was closing in. In doing so he posted two strong bodies of infantry among rooks on either side of the route which he foresaw the enemy would take in following him up. The Moors fell into the trap and suffered severely from the unexpected Spanish fire.

 

Drawing the enemy on is not of course a necessary part of arranging an ambuscade, although it tends to make irregular warriors throw off their caution and suspicions. "Without some sort of feint to induce the enemy to press forward more or less recklessly the chances of bringing off a successful ambuscade are not bright. There is no more effective kind of ambush than one on the flank of a route which antagonists are about to follow; but undisciplined forces on the march are very much on the alert if they have any idea that regulars are in the neighbourhood, and there is scarcely an instance to be found

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in military records of a body of trained soldiers ambuscading the enemy under these conditions.

Points to bear in mind.

The forming of an ambuscade requires skill and eye for country. The great object to bear in mind of course is that the enemy shall not become aware of its presence till the concealed party is actually in a position to strike. In operations in the bush and jungle or on very broken ground this is not difficult to accomplish, especially if the hostile body can only move by one route; but when the terrain is more open and the enemy moves on a wide front, great skill is required. If it be intended to act against a column on the march it will often be advisable not to deliver the blow till this has partially crossed the front, so as to cut it in half. Sometimes it may be expedient to delay attack till this can be delivered against the rear. When the moment for action arrives the concealed troops must be handled with the utmost boldness and dash, and it is essential that arrangements shall have been made beforehand for signalling when the time has come for the blow to fall. Several ambuscades some distance apart can at times be employed with great effect, although this arrangement has of course the disadvantage of involving a separation of force with its attendant risks. When several ambuscades have thus been formed, it is imperative that all the details shall have been carefully worked out and that the commander of each party shall know exactly what to do in any circumstances that may arise.

 

In 1813 a band of Prussian guerillas watching for a French convoy near Zwickau was disposed in two separate ambuscades. The parties were half a mile apart in two distinct woods, and it was calculated that when one attacked the advance guard, the other would find the rear guard about opposite to it The arrangement was completely successful and practically the whole convoy was captured, rear and front being attacked and rolled up simultaneously.

Skill of the enemy in devising ambuscades in small wars.

Before concluding this chapter on surprises and ambuscades a few examples of successful ambuscades on the part of the enemy in small wars may be given. Very numerous

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instances could be adduced, for in wars of this class the enemies against whom the regular troops are operating excel in such tactics. Some remarkable cases have of late years occurred in West Africa in the case of minor naval boat expeditions against petty potentates, and in the expedition against the Yonnis near Sierra Leone in 1891, the enemy showed much skill in devising ambushed stockades, and in making use of obstacles so as to bring the troops to a standstill under their fire.

 

The following are interesting illustrations of the cunning with which irregular warriors will at times entice troops into a trap even in comparatively speaking open country.

 

In the early days of the French occupation of Algeria a squadron one day engaged on reconnoitring duty perceived a number of Arabs on a wide plain driving herds in front of them. The cavalry, thinking they had an easy prize in their hands, charged down upon the enemy, but fell into a carefully prepared ambush. They were received with a very heavy fixe from a swarm of Bedouins concealed among some scrub, and the troopers would have oome to utter grief but for the opportune arrival of another squadron which managed to extricate them.

 

A somewhat similar incident occurred in the campaign in Tunis in 1886. A reconnaissance party of French cavalry came upon a number of camels guarded by a few Arabs, who at once mounted and drove off the camels into a sort of defile. The troopers followed them up and fell into an ambuscade which cost them dearly.

 

Some very successful ambuscades were devised by the Anti-Republicans of La Vendée and by the Spanish guerillas in the Peninsular war. In small wars of more modern date, the Moors, Khivans, and others have displayed great dexterity in this kind of warfare, even when the terrain has not especially lent itself to such operations. Irregular warriors with their natural aptitude for creeping about and their instinctive capacity for stalking unsuspecting adversaries, are really formidable in this branch of the art of war; military records prove that even when, as in Burma and Rhodesia, they have no intention of committing themselves to a stand-up

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fight, they will manage by their stratagems to inflict loss and to create confusion.

The ambuscade at Shekan.

The most striking example of an ambuscade of recent years is supplied by the disastrous engagement at Shekan, in which a whole army was involved and was wiped out.

 

Complete and authentic details of the destruction of Hicks Pasha's army will probably never come to hand; but from various sources it has been found possible to obtain a general idea of what occurred. Learning from spies the direction that the Egyptian force was about to take, the Mahdi moved the bulk of his followers to a volley through which it must pass, when he concealed them in the woods on either side of the route and in a wooded depression crossing the line of advance. Other contingents wore told off to attack in rear.

 

All remained quiet till Hicks Pasha's squares reached the wooded depression. Then the fanatical Arabs sprang up and swarmed down from all sides. The troops, already somewhat demoralised, became panic-stricken at this terrifying onslaught and in a few minutes all was over. The most striking feature of the action was indeed the manner in which a great gathering of undisciplined warriors was bestowed and was kept silent and concealed till the moment of action arrived.

Other examples.

The following examples of ambuscades occurring under very various circumstances and in totally distinct theatres of war may be cited in conclusion.

 

In 1840 the Russian General Golosocef, advancing with a force of about 6,600 men against the guerillas of the Chechnaya, fell into a cleverly prepared trap and suffered heavy losses, although ultimately successful. The enemy had arranged a most skilful ambush along the banks of the little river Valerik and in the neighbouring thickets. The Russian troops were on the march suspecting no evil and without elaborate precautions Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon them when they were quite unprepared, and by its unexpectedness nearly caused a panic. In the end after a severe hand to hand encounter the regular troops proved victorious, but not before they had lost large numbers of killed and wounded at the hands of a numerically insignificant adversary.

 

In 1883 the French were practically blockaded in Hanoi, their settlement in Tonkin. It wag determined to make a reconnaissance, and a force of 400 men with three guns marched out for the purpose. Some distance out, the road crossed a stream by a bridge and beyond this were some villages and enclosures. The advanced guard had crossed the bridge and the guns were actually on it, when fire was suddenly opened from all sides beyond the stream. The surprise was complete. The advanced guard retreated in disorder. The guns could not be turned where they were and

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they had to advance over the bridge and turn on the far side; one stuck in the mud, and in the gallant and successful effort to save it Captain Riviere, the French Governor, and many others were killed. This disaster heralded the Tonkin war of 1884-85.

 

In the affair at Pish Creek during the suppression of Kiel's rebellion in 188S the half breeds had taken skilful advantage of ravines and opened a heavy fire unexpectedly on the advanced guard of the Canadian troops. The ambuscade was not successful: the ground had, however, been judiciously chosen, and had the rebel fire been better directed at first the advanced troops might have suffered considerably.

 

The disaster which befel Major Glasenapp's detachment early in 1904 at Owikokero in German South-West Africa is a remarkable example of an ambuscade.

 

The force consisted of 11 officers and 35 mounted men with a machine gun. It was on the march following up the Herreros through bush grown country when it came upon a herd of cattle which was promptly captured, those of the enemy with it who did not take flight being shot. Some men were left with the cattle and the force advanced, capturing two more herds; to take charge of these some more men had to be left behind. Then the detachment, now reduced to 11 officers and 25 troopers with the machine gun, pressed on, hoping to come up with the fugitives and believing them to be merely a small rear guard.

 

The bush got thicker and thicker. On reaching a more open place the detachment was, however, suddenly fired on. An attempt to outflank the enemy disclosed the fact that the Herreros were in greatly superior numbers, and were endeavouring to surround the force. Retreat became absolutely unavoidable, and in this the little body of German troops lost very heavily. The machine gun had to be abandoned, many horses were shot; the total casualties amounted to 10 officers and 22 troopers, and the enemy recovered their cattle.

 

The Herreros in fact appear to have drawn the detachment cleverly into an ambuscade. The detachment had been in pursuit of them for some days and officers and men were naturally eager to have a brush with the enemy who seemed always to be running away. The place selected for the ambuscade was admirably chosen, and it is possible that the herds of cattle were left to a certain extent as a bait--their capture certainly appreciably reduced the number of men in the German firing line. That the little band was not annihilated was due to the fine behaviour of officers and men under untoward circumstances.

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