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SMALL WARS

Chapter XII.
Tactics of Attack.

Offensive tactics generally imperative.

In the majority of small wars the regular troops generally have to adopt the offensive on the battle-field as a matter of course. The enemy declines to attack, trusting to advantages of position and to such cover as nature provides or as can be improvised. The Sikhs, the most formidable fighting race which the British Army has had to deal with in the east, adopted defensive tactics from choice, when engaged on what was essentially an offensive campaign. Brave and fanatical warriors who fight in masses and adopt shock tactics sometimes, it is true, compel the regular army to act on the defensive, to march and to fight in square and to forego the moral advantage of being the attacking side, but such conditions are the exception and not the rule.

 

The great importance of impressing the enemy with the feeling of inferiority, the advantage of a dominating attitude in the theatre of war, the value of moral effect, have been dealt with in earlier chapters. A daring and resolute plan of campaign affords the best guarantee of ultimate success, and the same great principle holds good on the battle-field, as the history of the small wars most unmistakably proves. When decisive victories have been won by insignificant bodies of regular troops over great masses of barbaric foe-men as at Plassey, Isly and Meani, it has almost always been due to the assumption of a bold offensive, and this gives to the study of the tactics of attack against such antagonists, a special interest.

How theory of attack differs in small wars from regular warfare.

As a broad principle of the conduct of these campaigns, the importance of successes in action being decisive has been already pointed out. Since fights are difficult to bring about, and inasmuch as it is on the battle-field that the issue must be

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decided, it is obvious that when an action has been brought on, mere victory is not enough. The enemy must not only be beaten. He must be beaten thoroughly. Let there be no mistake about this--the theory of attack when regular troops are pitted against irregulars, differs fundamentally from the theory of attack designed to meet the case of great operations between armies of the first class.

 

On the European battle-field the end to be attained in attack is, in the ordinary course, to drive the enemy out of his position. The general, intent upon the progress of the action in his coign of vantage, his finger on the conflict's pulse, is no less rejoiced than is the panting soldier in the firing line, when the hostile musketry slackens and dies away--a sure sign that the defenders are going to quit their ground. "By all that is holy he is limbering up! Stole away 1"--King-lake's immortal story of the hillside beyond the Alma exactly presents the spirit animating all ranks in an assault upon a disciplined army in position. Up to the last moment there is painful uncertainty whether the venture will succeed or not. To the columns sheltering in front of the Cemetery Hill at Gettysburg, or below the Grivitza position during the second attack on Plevna, the mere disappearance of the foe to their immediate front would have meant triumph of the most far-reaching kind.

 

But in combat with irregular warriors something more than this is wanted. The issue of the assault will seldom be in doubt, nor will it often entail losses of any military importance. The position which the foe has taken up rarely has any intrinsic importance of its own, and therefore its evacuation by the defenders will seldom appreciably benefit the troops beyond clearing the way for further advance. The mere expulsion of the opponent from ground where he has thought fit to accept battle is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualty list in the hostile ranks--they have been brought up to the scratch of accepting battle, they must feel what

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battle against a disciplined army means. It is this fact which justifies the plan of operating against the line of the enemy's retreat, and which often makes some form of enveloping attack advisable.

Artillery preparation.

But before dealing with this very important subject of the direction which attacks should take, and detailing the reasons for adopting the various courses likely to suggest themselves, the question of artillery preparation, which plays so important a part in modern tactics, deserves attention. It is a question which affects the development of a fight, from whatever side the attack may be directed.

 

The experience of recent great campaigns proves that artillery preparation is generally of great value of attack in regular warfare. The first duty of the guns of the attack is to silence those of the enemy, the next is to overwhelm the defenders with their fire at the point or points selected for assault. In small wars, however, it is only the second phase of this artillery preparation which need generally be taken into consideration, because even if the enemy has guns he seldom can use them with effect. The main object of the artillery preparation in warfare of this nature is as a rule simply to make as it were a^breach in the enemy's line of battle for the infantry to break in, and this is of course under certain conditions an almost indispensable prologue to the assault.

When and when not expedient.

But this procedure is not always necessary and it often is not advisable to adopt it. Artillery admittedly exercises great moral effect in every kind of warfare, and this is especially the case when in conflict with uncivilized forces, owing to their tendency to exaggerate the potentialities of the arm. Asiatics have always set great store on the possession of guns. Irregular warriors who can put a few field pieces into their line of battle are apt to attach a most exaggerated importance to them--it is a characteristic of such opponents, and one which regular troops can at times turn to good account, as will be shown further on. When the antagonist happens to possess

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guns he particularly dreads artillery fire, and even if the enemy has no guns and does not know artillery, he is greatly terrified when the shells begin to seek him out. The consequence is that, in either case, a preliminary bombardment tends to drive the enemy out of his position and to scare him away before the attack develops, which is just the thing that is least wanted. The French attacks on Bacninh and Hung Hua in Tonkin in 1884 ended in the Chinese being driven out by artillery fire with very little loss, when it was most desirable to have inflicted a heavy defeat upon them. Similarly in Madagascar in 1896 the French found that the use of guns made it almost impossible to effectively cut the retreat of the Hovas, who generally fled immediately any shells burst near them. Sometimes in pursuance of some special object it may be expedient to drive the enemy off in this fashion--the tribesmen evacuated the formidable Sempagha position under the fire of artillery in the advance into Tirah. But as a general rule, certainly at the outset of a campaign, the withdrawal of irregular adversaries from a position where they have shown themselves prepared to accept battle, is a distinct misfortune, and on this account it is a mistake to be too free with shell fire in the early stages of a fight.

Objections to it.

Moreover, artillery preparation sometimes shows the enemy what is to be the point of attack, which may be by no means desirable. It is of course incompatible with anything in the nature of a surprise. The sortie from Kandahar against the village of Deh Khoja in 1880, is an example of this; a half hour's bombardment from the ramparts served to alarm the Afghans and to warn them of the project, so that they flocked to the point of danger from all sides. This objection to artillery preparation is, however, by no means so generally applicable as is the objection that premature gunnery tends to frighten the adversary away without a fight. "The effect of artillery," says Lord Wolseley, "is absurdly small upon an enemy who does not fight in large or even in formed bodies,"

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referring of course to actual not to moral effect. The chances of dealing decisively with a timid opponent may be destroyed by the discharge of a few introductory projectiles which inflict little or no loss.

If enemy is strongly posted sometimes very desirable.

But it must not be supposed that artillery preparation may not at times be most essential. If the enemy be strongly posted and be resolved on offering a determined resistance, a preliminary bombardment may be indispensable. A very remarkable example of the value of an artillery bombardment is afforded by what occurred at Omdurman, where the fire of the gunboats and howitzer battery the day before the decisive battle had the effect of driving the Khalifa's army out of the town; it seems in fact to have been largely due to this bombardment that the enemy elected to fight in the open with results so happy for the Anglo-Egyptian army. In the Indian Mutiny the guns did splendid service in most of the actions in paving the way for the infantry, a very favourite manœuvre being to send out some artillery on both flanks so as to enfilade the hostile position to a certain extent; but in that campaign the rebels were well armed and often fought with desperation. The three minutes of concentrated artillery fire previous to the successful assault on the bluff at Dargai appears to have greatly assisted the infantry, although from the nature of the ground it probably caused little actual loss to the tribesmen. If the enemy be posted in a defence work, a preliminary bombardment is most desirable supposing that the resistance is likely to prove formidable--Mahmud's zeriba on the Atbara is a case in point. Instances might be multiplied to show the need of guns to prepare the way for the infantry in such cases. The nature of the hostile position, the fighting qualities of the adversaries, the question whether the actual capture of the ground occupied by the opposing force as affecting the situation at the moment is of more importance than giving the enemy a lesson--these are the points which must be taken into account when deciding

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whether the guns are to be used freely from the outset or not.

It also sometimes saves time.

When it happens to be a matter of urgency to achieve rapid success the use of artillery freely before the infantry can get to work may be most desirable, even if it has the effect of driving the enemy off without his suffering seriously. An example of such a case is furnished by the relief of Fort Gulistan on the Samana ridge in 1897 by General Yeatman-Biggs. The tribesmen had captured another post, that of Saragheri which lay between Fort Gulistan and the relieving army, and, as the force advanced, the hill of Saragheri was found to be covered with hostile crowds. Great anxiety existed with regard to the fate of Gulistan and the tribesmen were driven off by artillery fire. The infantry got no chance and the hostile losses were only slight, but the column was in consequence little delayed and it was soon afterwards seen that the imperilled garrison was still holding out.

Instances of want of artillery preparation.

It is moreover necessary to point out that there have been cases where the failure to carry out a preliminary bombardment has led to most unfortunate results. The story of Chillianwalla is well known. At the battle of Wad Ras near Tetuan in 1859 the Spaniards attacked the village of Amsal without artillery preparation, and they were several times repulsed; they only carried it eventually after losing very heavily. Want of artillery preparation seems to have been a main reason for the very severe losses of the Dutch in their attacks on the Achinese stockades in 1873-74; that guns were very effective against these works is shown by the fact that the Kraton at Kota Raja, the main hostile stronghold, was evacuated under a concentrated bombardment. It stands to reason that it is far preferable to frighten an enemy out of his position by artillery fire alone, than to suffer a reverse owing to attacking without any preliminary bombardment by guns. Artillery preparation is essential at times; it is only when it is not essential that the question arises

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whether the nature of the case renders it expedient or otherwise.

Importance of capturing enemy's guns.

And while on the subject of artillery, an important principle of offensive tactics with reference to the enemy's guns may here be mentioned. This is that, when such opponents as the regular troops have to cope with in these wars bring guns into the field, it is most desirable to capture those guns. The great importance which irregular warriors attach to this arm has been referred to already. Asiatics are inclined to calculate the strength of an army by the number of its guns. It is true that the ordnance which such adversaries bring into the field is seldom formidable. The material is usually obsolete. The ammunition is ineffective. The fuzes are almost always useless. But it is not on account of the assistance which his artillery affords the enemy on the battle-field that it is a valuable prize to strive for. It is on account of the moral effect which the loss of the guns produces in the hostile ranks, that their capture offers so attractive an objective for the regular troops. Retreat can be explained away, and gaps in the ranks waved aside with a pious ejaculation. But the loss of guns is not so easily accounted for. A barbaric host which marches out to war with a great train of cannon--symbols of military power as they are held to be throughout the land--but which returns without them, brings back with it incontrovertible evidence of its own defeat. Artillery is a favourite plaything of the semi-civilized potentate, chieftains put their trust in it, the rank and file regard it as a mighty engine to destroy their foes, and so it comes about that when they see their guns are lost they think that their only hope of victory is gone, and a sauve qui peut is very likely to be the upshot.

 

Moreover, such artillery as these armies bring into the field is not difficult to capture. The battery seldom forms a mobile unit. The guns are dragged up into position somehow, but there is no means of carrying them off at a

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moment's notice when the assailants press the attack home to the spot where they have been placed.

 

1a those actions of the last Afghan war in which the enemy had guns and where the British proved successful--Charasia, the Peiwar Kotal and Kandahar for instance--they were generally all or nearly all captured. In the Indian Mutiny the rebel guns were generally well served and were fought with great tenacity; but the enemy seldom succeeded in carrying them off, and large numbers of them swelled the booty after the later British successes in the field; in that campaign the hostile artillery was really formidable at first, and the rebels with justice had confidence in it, some of their field batteries moving in excellent style. The great losses in guns which the mutineers sustained were no doubt partially due to the resolution with which they were kept in action to the last, but the result of these losses was that the enemy lost all confidence and in the end fought with no hope of victory. During the China war of 1860 the large number of guns captured by the allies at the two actions fought on the march from Tientsin to Pekin--Shankiawan and Palikao--had a most depressing effect upon the Chinese levies.

 

A good example of the moral effect of capture of artillery is afforded by the following incident. In 1854 the Khokandians assembled in great force before Fort Perovski, the Russian advanced post on the Sir Dana, and practically blockaded it The commandant resolved on a bold stroke. He sent out such troops as he could spare to attack the enemy unexpectedly. The small force, however, soon found itself in a critical situation, being threatened from all sides; but in their endeavour to wipe the Russian column out, the formidable hostile forces made the mistake of leaving their artillery almost without protection of other troops. Perceiving this the officer in command of the Russians delivered a vigorous attack upon the guns, and captured them The effect was immediate. The Khokandians took fright, fled in wild disorder leaving many trophies in the hands of the insignificant Russian force, and Fort Perovski saw no more of them for a time.

 

The assailants should be prepared to turn captured guns upon the enemy if possible; in the French attack upon the Hova position covering Antananarivo, their turning force captured two guns on the extreme right of the defenders and used them with good effect, the accompanying batteries having been much delayed by the terrain.

Trust of irregular warriors in their guns.

It is indeed interesting to note that artillery is often not only a source of embarrassment to irregular warriors but

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becomes a real danger. Schamyl's cause declined when he increased the number of his guns; he would not abandon them when attacked in force, and was driven by their possession to abandon his guerilla tactics. In the instruction book of the Bokharan forces occurred the passage, "Special care must be taken of the guns, and it must be remembered that the strength of one gun is equal to that of 1,000 soldiers"; the Russians did not, however, find the Bokharan artillery to be very damaging. General Skobelef in his campaign against the Turkomans used to say, "If I had the right I would present the Tekkes with a few old guns." Still it would rarely be the case that an enemy should be deliberately permitted to carry off his artillery; for even when this compels him to adopt unsuitable tactics it is the result of an exaggerated belief in the virtue of the guns, and if the guns are captured the moral effect is proportionate.

Importance of capturing trophies.

Just as the enemy's artillery is always a most desirable objective on the battle-field in campaigns of this nature because of the prestige gained by taking it, so the capture of trophies should also constantly be kept in view. British troops no longer take their colours into action, although prizing them none the less on this account as emblems of regimental distinction; but Asiatics and irregular warriors in many other parts of the globe generally bring banners into the field. Fanatics prize their standards highly and look on them as sacred, their loss is regarded as a disaster and as prophetic of ultimate overthrow. There is of course no material benefit to be gained by capturing them, but the moral effect of securing them is great. As, in planning the campaign, the seizure of some ancient city or historic stronghold should be rated far above its military importance, so on the battle-field the wresting of trophies of this nature from the enemy is to be accounted as a very proper object to be attained. It must never be forgotten that in small wars moral effect ranks almost before material gain.

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Difficulty of ensuring decisive success.

Desirable as it is to ensure that success in action shall mean not merely the defeat of the hostile forces but their destruction, the conditions of the case will often render such decisive results quite impossible. Rugged, rocky hillsides may be the scene of struggle. The fight may take place in thickets and in tangled jungle growth, where control of the troops engaged is almost impossible. The terrain in which a fight takes place indeed rarely lends itself to decisive tactical combinations. But, quite apart from the topographical conditions which so often prevail in operations of this class, there are two notable characteristics of irregular warriors which tend to hinder the achievement of decisive victory.

Reasons for this.

In the first place such opponents are apt to lose heart prematurely at the spectacle of assaulting columns advancing steadily upon them. The moral effect of deliberate attack of this nature affects the nerves of the best of troops, to irregular warriors it is appalling and uncanny--and they give way before it.

 

In the second place, when such adversaries do give way, they retreat with amazing rapidity. They evaporate and disappear. They disperse in all directions and conceal their arms, and on this account effective pursuit becomes most difficult; cavalry alone can attempt it, and the ground is often unsuitable for mounted men to traverse. The French in Tonkin seldom got to close quarters with the Chinese, even when these had carefully prepared their ground and when their attitude in the preliminary stages of the fight appeared to foreshadow a desperate resistance; so precipitate was their retreat when the^assailants began to drive their attack home, that they got away with little loss. Both at Charasia and Ahmed Khel the Afghans fled so quickly from the field when the fate of the day was decided against them, that from that moment they suffered few casualties.

 

A very good example of the rapidity with which regular warriors effect their escape is afforded by the very successful action at Landaki in 1897, by which Six B. Blood forced an entrance into Swat.

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The tribesmen were defending the "Gate of Swat," a typical military defile, where a great rugged spur from the hills south of the valley of the Swat river stood out like a buttress, allowing only a narrow passage between its declivities and the river. The enemy fully expected that an attempt would be made to force the defile and had gathered in strength at that point, while sangars crowded with hill-men crowned the spur. Sir B. Blood determined to occupy the enemy with artillery fire and with part of his force, to hold the cavalry ready for a swoop through the defile, to send a strong force up the hills under General Meiklejohn to turn the hostile outer flank, and by cutting off the enemy's line of retreat into the hills, to hustle him over the spur down into the plain beyond, whore the cavalry could finish off the job in style.

 

The troops under General Meiklejohn had proceeded a considerable distance up the hills, and were within effective musketry range of the crest of the spur before the enemy seemed quite to realize the nature of the movement. Then, however, the tribesmen broke and fled precipitately, and by the time the spur was captured they were already disappearing over the plain beyond making for the foot hills. The victory was singularly complete, some 200 of the enemy were killed, and an entrance into Swat was forced at a trifling sacrifice; but thanks to their great fleetness of foot the hillmen managed to escape out of the trap which was being laid for them, without their suffering as heavily as had been hoped from the horsemen whom they with good reason greatly dreaded.

Objection to purely frontal attacks, advantage of flank attacks.

The fact is that purely frontal attacks are a mistake because, in the first place, the enemy gives way before them and because, in the second place, from their direction the hostile line of retreat is left unthreatened. Frontal attacks combined with flank attacks are infinitely preferable if circumstances permit of the manœuvre. Or the attack may be solely directed against the flank and even against the rear of the opponent. In regular warfare flank attacks are held to be expedient owing to the heavy loss sustained in frontal attacks when there are modem arms of precision in the defenders' hands; but in small wars, although frontal attacks may sometimes be dangerous for the same reason, the great objection to them is that they do not ensure decisive victory. A case like Dargai is really exceptional, although it is at the same time most instructive. At Dargai the extraordinary strength of the enemy's position as against a frontal attack led, on the one hand, to very heavy loss in the assaulting columns and, on the

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other, to the tribesmen sticking to their ground far longer than they would have done had their flank been threatened; it was the absence of any turning movement on the part of the regular troops which caused the victory to be so decisive, but at such a heavy sacrifice.

Enemy seldom prepared for flank attacks or attack in rear.

It is somewhat singular that, taking into account the tendency of irregular warriors to threaten the flanks and rear of the regular forces, such adversaries seldom seem to be prepared for attacks upon their own flank or rear. When they prepare their positions for defence they do not take the contingency into account. Of course it is not always so--the tribesmen had made especial arrangements for securing their flanks with sangars at the Sempagha Pass when Sir W. Lockhart attacked it in 1897. But an examination of the general course of actions in many campaigns in very different theatres of war and under most varying conditions, shows that it very frequently is the case. The oft-quoted Chinese complaint of the ignorance of the barbarians who did not know that guns could only shoot out of their muzzles and not backwards, and who in consequence attacked the Celestials, not in front as they expected but in rear, may have been mythical; but it has a spice of truth in it. It does not seem to occur to irregular warriors that they may not necessarily be attacked at the point where they have made their most elaborate preparations. It is somewhat singular that it should be so, because such antagonists are always in great terror of having their retreat cut, and if they find the regular troops getting round their flanks they generally abandon their positions in hot haste; still experience shows that it is the case. The following three examples illustrate the unpreparedness of the enemy for attacks in rear and flank; but many others might be quoted.

Examples.

In 1853 a Russian force advancing into Daghestan found the Tavliena in force in a fortified position behind the River Metchik. The bulk of the troops were directed to assault the lines in front, but a part of the force

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was sent to make a detour through the forests and debouch in rear of the enemy. Schamyl's followers were preparing to offer a strenuous resistance to the attack which they saw the troops in front of them preparing, when suddenly they became aware of the movement against their rear. They were completely unprepared for this, although the nature of the country should have suggested its possibility. They incontinently fled, abandoning their works, while the column threatening their rear was still some distance off and before it had fired a shot

 

The forcing of the Khan Band defile by General N. Chamberlain in 1857 also illustrates this. This was a narrow gorge south-west of Dera Ghozi Khan. It hod been the scene of a combat in which the Sikhs some years before hod suffered very severely at the hands of the Bozdar tribe. The route passed through this narrow gorge, the hills on the left being practically inaccessible while those to the right were difficult. Plan III, facing p. 166, shows the enemy's position and the lino followed by the attack. Tho Bozdars had some sangars in the gorge itself, and others on the hills to the right so as to take in flank the troops as they forced the passage--these latter breastworks were close to the defile and formed the left of the enemy's position. General Chamberlain, quitting the trough of the valley with the bulk of his force some distance from where it narrowed into a gorge, advanced against the extreme left of the hostile lino of defence by making a detour over the hills. The sangars on the flank were not arranged to meet such an attack, and were easily captured. Tho hill-men had in fact assumed as a matter of course that the troops would follow the volley and endeavour to force the defile itself, although it was obvious that there .was really nothing whatever to hinder a turning movement such as General Chamberlain carried out with complete success.

 

The battle of Suruj Kund near Multan in 1847, also serves as a good example of this. The Sikhs having taken up a strong position and entrenched it, General Markham was sent with the British and Indian troops, to fall upon the left flank of the enemy, while some Sikh and other troops, auxiliaries to the British, remained in front and eventually assisted to complete the victory. "The battle of Suruj Kund," wrote Major Herbert Edwardes who was with the auxiliaries, "may be described as the most gentlemanly ever fought. A mere manœuvre of fine soldiership turned a large army out of a strong entrenchment, and routed them with the loss of five guns before they understood the attack. It was the triumph of discipline over an irregular army. A regular army in the same entrenchments would have changed its front, but the rebels not being attacked as they intended to be attacked were unable to fight at all General Markham placed his force upon the hostile flank and simply rolled up the line. The hostile Sikhs could make nothing of it"

Flank attacks give better chance of a decisive victory.

As a consequence of the omission on the part of the enemy to protect his flanks, an attack on one, or even on both, of them can generally be carried out without meeting with

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serious resistance. When such a direction is given to the assailants, or to a portion of them, it is clear that its tendency is to bring the regular troops, or some of them, upon the hostile line of retreat. The direction of the attack has in fact the effect of compensating to a certain extent for that precipitancy of retreat which irregular warriors, thanks to their fleetness of foot, can indulge in, and which so greatly militates against a decisive success. The enemy. cannot get away so easily, and if the adversary has guns a flank attack is far more likely to secure their capture than a frontal one. In a word flank attacks tend to bring about decisive victories, to ensure the very objects which in warfare of this nature are the most difficult to obtain, and it stands to reason that, the more the flank attack is directed against the rear of the enemy, the worse is his chance of escape in most cases. Of course peculiarities of terrain may modify this, but as a general rule it will be so. It must however be borne in mind that irregular warriors are always very nervous about their line of retreat--as shown at Landaki, mentioned on p. 160; they are very apt to beat so precipitate a retreat when they feel their flanks threatened, that they get off in spite of the best arrangements.

Containing force, in case of attacks on the flank or rear of the enemy.

When the question arises of attacking a hostile position in flank or rear, it is always a matter for consideration whether a containing force should be left in front, and whether this force should, if existing, join in the attack. If there is any fear of the enemy abandoning his position before the flank or rear attack develops, it is generally well to occupy him in front. At Assaye Sir A. Wellesley brought the whole of his small army upon the Mahratta flank. At Kandahar, on the other hand, the enemy was to a certain extent contained by troops on his front and by artillery fire, although the main attack fell on Ayoub Khan's right flank. At El Teb the British square manœuvred so as to come upon the flank of Osman Digna's entrenchments, no containing force remaining

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in front. At Kirbekan, where the attack was directed against the enemy's rear, a very small containing force was left in front; the guns of this detachment took part in the action but the rest of it was not engaged.

Action of Kirbekan, a rear attack.

This battle of Kirbekan is so remarkable an example of an attack upon the roar of a strong position occupied by irregular warriors, that it deserves to be narrated in some little detail. The Mahdists held a position with their right flank resting on the Nile, which is shown in Plan IV, facing p. 166. Close to the Nile, and at right angles to it, was a chain of rocky knolls on which the enemy was posted, sheltered behind stone breastworks. About 600 yards off, in echelon to the left rear, was a remarkable ridge of trap rock with almost precipitous sides; this also extended on a line at right angles to the Nile, and it was occupied by the Arabs. In rear of the hostile position, at some little distance off, was the mouth of the rocky Shukuk defile; and it was most important to cut the enemy off from retreating into this. General Ear 1c decided to march right round the enemy's left and to attack the hillocks in rear and the ridge at its right extremity. Two guns with an infantry escort were left in front of the hillocks to occupy the enemy, and the camel corps was deputed to demonstrate against the front of the ridge, while the rest of the force was detailed for the turning movement

 

The operation was signally successful. The Dervishes grimly stuck to the position, although they must have seen the march of the column which was to attack them from the rear from the ridge. On reaching the right rear of the hostile position, the knolls and the ridge were attacked simultaneously. Tho Arabs stood their ground well and suffered heavily, although a proportion escaped before the attack commenced. But the victory was complete, and the hostile power in that part of the theatre of war was absolutely broken and destroyed in this one single action.

Co-operation of containing force.

In this fight the small force left in front of the hostile position was merely a containing force. It made no direct attack. As a rule, however, the force in front co-operates more directly in the combat in such operations, and the attack takes the form of a combined assault in front and in flank or else in rear. If it can be arranged that the frontal attack shall occupy the attention of the enemy and keep him on his ground, and that the flank attack shall develop just as the flight begins so that the fugitives can be shot down by the troops working on to their line of retreat, an ideal tactical situation has been created. The action at Ferkeh on the

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Nile in 1896 is a case where the main attack was on the hostile front and where a smaller force appeared on the enemy's line of retreat at the psychological moment; the Dervish force on this occasion was little, if at all, superior in numbers to the regular troops, and it was practically destroyed. General Negrier's method of assaulting the Chinese works in Tonkin, which were generally isolated on hills and knolls, was most effective; while the bulk of the infantry, supported by artillery, moved direct against the objective, clouds of skirmishers pushed rapidly ahead, worked round the flanks and brought a cross fire to bear on the enemy in retreat; the Chinese seldom let the French get to close quarters and, but for this enveloping form given to the attacks, they invariably would have practically all escaped. In the desultory fighting in Burma, where the dacoits and other hostile bodies generally held villages or some form of stockade, the cavalry used to work round both flanks before the infantry attacked, so as to be ready to deal with the fugitives. These minor operations in Tonkin and Burma serve to illustrate the principle of combined front and flank attacks very well.

Main attack on the flank.

If the hostile position is very strong, and if a frontal attack is therefore likely to lead to hard fighting, the main assault is generally best made upon the flank; a minor direct attack upon the front will be very effective when the flank assault has begun to make itself felt. The conditions in this case, of course, differ entirely from those described above as prevailing in Tonkin and Burma, where the enemy was disinclined to offer a determined resistance. As an example of cases where, owing to the strength of the adversary's position, the main attack has been on the flank while the assault on the front has been only a subsidiary and secondary operation, may be cited the attack on the Peiwar Kotal.

Peiwar Kotal

The capture of the Peiwar Kotal by Sir F. Roberts, in 1878, is illustrated by Plan V, facing p. 166, which shows the general course of the action. The Afghans held the pass over a lofty ridge with difficult approaches.

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  A frontal attack upon their position would clearly have entailed severe losses, and so Sir F. Roberts determined to attack the enemy's left with the bulk of his force, the plan being a surprise after a night march. Part of his army was to attack from in front when the main movement against the hostile flank had succeeded. Reaching the extreme left of the Afghan defences at early dawn, the turning force was completely successful, rolling up the left wing of the enemy in great confusion towards the centre. It was however, found, that the advance along the ridge became after a time almost impracticable, and a further turning movement was then undertaken, directed on to the line of retreat of the defenders. The enemy thereupon began to give way all along the line, and this enabled the frontal attack to be drive home. The victory was complete, the enemy's guns were all captured, and the Afghan troops fled in the utmost confusion having suffered considerable losses.
Enemy inclined to draw all his forces to meet the flank attack and so opens the way for a frontal attack. Antagonists of this character, if attacked in flank, are much inclined to draw all the forces over to that side to meet the onset, thus enabling a movement against their font to make great way. As actions in such warfare are seldom on a large scale this is generally quite feasible; the distances are small and the massing of the bulk of the defending force on one side or the other can be rapidly effected. The consequence is that a frontal attack, after the hostile forces have been drawn off to strengthen the threatened flank, may succeed in gaining some great and even decisive advantage, even when made by a relatively small body of troops, if the troops are handled skilfully.
  At Charasia, in 1879, the Afghans had taken up a strong position in the hill, on either side of a defile through which the road led to Kabul, and were especially in strength to the left of it. Sir F. Roberts disposed his forces for the attack so as to launch the greater part under General Baker against the Afghan right, while a small body under Major White was to occupy the enemy in front of the defile. Plan VI, opposite, shows the Afghan position. As General Baker fought his way forward, driving the Afghans off, numbers of the enemy hurried over from near the defile to reinforce their comrades on the threatened right. Major White, finding the enemy in front of him to be no longer very formidable, attacked with great vigour, and he was so successful with his small force that he completely overthrew the hostile left and secured the defile. Hereabouts was posted the enemy's artillery which was all captured by the small force, the rôle of which had in the first instance merely been to contain the enemy on that side.

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Difficulty of ensuring combination between a front and a flank attack. For the execution of combined attacks of this kind careful calculation o time and a correct appreciation of the general probabilities of the action about to take place, are necessary. At Kirbekan, the hour at which the guns of the containing force in front of the enemy's position were to commence firing, was carefully laid down. If combination be essential to success, it is imperative that the two detached forces shall actually co-operate at the proper moment. It may be impossible to communicate between them, and the terrain may be such that neither force knows exactly what the other is doing; at Charasia the two forces, although some distance apart, could watch each other's movements to a certain extent. As a rule it is best to allow the detached commanders some latitude of action, because something unforeseen may at any moment arise; but if mutual co-operation be the essence of the operation it is imperative that there be a thorough understanding between the separate portions of the force engaged. Further on, in discussing the general question of divided forces co-operating to achieve some common object on the battle-field, some instances will be adduced to show how difficult it often is for a commander to handle detached bodies actually in action, and to illustrate the strange mistakes which occur. Everything depends on both the force which is in front, and that which is turning the flank or which is manœuvring against the rear of the opposing army, having been given a correct impulse to start with.
  It has frequently occurred that one or the other has, either owing to some misapprehension or else to unforeseen difficulties, entirely failed to perform its share of the task. Thus General Duchesne during his final advance on Antananarivo in 1895, finding the Hovas in a very strong fortified position on the Amboluminas range, arranged to attack them both in front and on their left rear; the column destined to turn the flank marched off some time before daybreak, while the advance of the columns against the front was

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made ostentatiously in the morning; but the enemy fled precipitately as soon as the frontal attack developed itself and before the turning force could join in; the advanced troops and cavalry of this latter managed, however, to cut in on the hostile line of retreat, and to do good execution.

 

Calculations as to the length of time which will be required for a force to march to a certain point over ground which is often not very well known, are apt to prove inaccurate even if some unexpected action on the part of the enemy has not upset them. Moreover any divided action of two distinct forces moving some distance apart, is always liable to miscarry owing to some misunderstanding. The attack on Ali Musjid in 1878, serves as a good example of a turning force failing to perform its share in an attack owing to its meeting with unexpected difficulties of terrain. The serious reverse suffered by the French at Bang Bo, in 1885, may be cited as an illustration of a mistake with regard to a turning force having a most unfortunate sequel.

Ali Masjid.

(1) Ali Musjid in the Khaibar pass was a well placed and somewhat formidable fort, and the Afghans had made elaborate preparations to hold the position. The plan of operations was to send one force over the hill to the right of the pass, aiming at a point some distance in rear of the position so as to intercept the enemy's retreat: to send another force, moving on a line inside of the first, to assail the position in reverse and on its loft flank, and to move the remainder of the troops up the pass and attack in front. The first force, under General Tytler, started at 6 p.m.; the second, under General Macpherson, at 2.30 a.m.; and the main body at 7 a.m.. this last being under Sir S. Browne, who was in command of the whole. Sir S. Browne arrived before the position, bombarded it, and commenced his infantry attack in the afternoon. But it soon became apparent that the turning forces had not reached their destinations and that the project of striking simultaneously from two sides had failed, so the action was discontinued. General Macpherson's force had been delayed by the almost insuperable difficulties of the road, and was therefore unable to co-operate. General Tytler's force, however, succeeded in striking the defile higher up, and late in the afternoon it managed to out off a considerable part of the hostile which was retiring. During the night the fort was evacuated, and it was occupied next morning without further fighting.

French disaster at Bang Bo.

(2) Bang Bo lies a few miles within the Chinese frontier. General Negrier had pushed the Chinese before him and captured Langson, and had

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followed, them up into their own territory, driving them out of Tonkin by a aeries of brilliant tactical operations.

 

The route beyond followed the trough of a deep depression in the hills. A few miles beyond the frontier the French found the enemy in position on some heights (A in the sketch opposite), stretching across the valley and narrowing it into a gorge, and they carried these by a spirited attack in the afternoon. From the high ground another line of defences was observed about two miles ahead; this consisted of a strong entrenchment (B) right across the sole of the valley, of some works on knolls (C, C), and of a small work on a commanding hill (D). The troops bivouacked for the night, part of the force having pushed on and occupied two abandoned works (E, E).

 

General Negrier determined on a combined turning movement and frontal attack next morning, and he directed his right wing to advance at an early hour and to capture the hill (D) from the right, thus taking in reverse the Chinese line of defence, which was evidently well prepared and strongly held. When this point had been captured the frontal attack was to be delivered.

 

The morning unfortunately broke with a thick fog. The right wing could only advance very slowly, feeling its way to the front for about three hours. Then the fog began to lift and the troops destined for the attack on the hill (D) pressed forward; but they were suddenly brought to a standstill by the deep ravine (F), which it was found impossible to cross. The Chinese, perceiving the movement against their left, sent men to occupy the hill (D) which had not been held by them at all till then, and when the fog completely lifted General Negrier saw these men moving up the hill Hearing no firing he assumed that the Chinese were not holding the eminence, and that the troops he saw were French who had crept close up unobserved in the mist. Under this false impression of the tactical situation at the moment, he at once launched the remainder of his force against the entrenchments in the valley. These proved to be most formidable, and the attack on them failed. The right wing endeavouring to attack the hostile position on its immediate left gained some ground, it is true, but it was compelled to retire before a vigorous counter-attack. The Chinese then advanced over their main entrenchment in pursuit of the troops who had been repulsed in the frontal attack, and the consequence was that the two divided French wings were only withdrawn out of action with such difficulty and after such determined fighting, that General Negrier felt himself compelled to withdraw to Langson, having lost one-eighth of his force.

Cavalry in flank attacks.

Advantageous, in fact, as are flank attacks combined with assaults on the front of the enemy's position, owing to their increasing the probability of gaining a decisive success, there is always a chance of the combination fading unless all goes right If the ground be favourable for cavalry action, mounted

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Plan VII. Affair of Bang Bo.
Plan VII. Affair of Bang Bo.


 

troops are very valuable in flank attacks, thanks to the rapidity with which they can act against the enemy in retreat. The action of Badli ke Serai between the rebels and the force moving from Meerut to Delhi after the outbreak of the Mutiny, is an excellent example of such action by mounted troops; the cavalry and horse artillery were sent to operate against the enemy's flank and rear while the infantry attacked in front, and the result was a completed rout of the mutineers. This war indeed furnishes numerous other instances of the same kind. At Kali Nuddi after the relief of Sir J. Outram, at Lucknow by Sir C. Campbell, the cavalry was similarly sent round by a concealed detour to fall upon the rebels in retreat; the enemy was driven from his position by the infantry, but was retiring in good order till the cavalry swooped down; the effect of the troopers' onslaught was tremendous, the mutineers' force being utterly dispersed and suffering very heavy losses. In the Chitral Expedition of 1895, the cavalry sent round to operate against the flank of the tribesmen on the Swat river, who were occupied by the infantry in front, scattered the enemy like chaff by its sudden appearance, although the ground was by no means favourable for the action of mounted men. The fire of cavalry dismounted may be particularly effective on an enemy's flank.

Artillery in flack attacks.

The effect of artillery accompanying a flank attack is also very great. At the Peiwar Kotal the guns with the turning force did fine execution. A main object of such operations is to act against the enemy in retreat, and as such adversaries are very quick in withdrawing, guns are often the only means of inflicting loss when the hostile force gives way. In the Mutiny the horse artillery performed signal service in this manner, working with the cavalry. When guns get upon the flank of an enemy's position they can moreover often enfilade it with great effect.

Imperative necessity of following up a preliminary success.

In all attacks upon irregular warriors, or upon armies of inferior morale, it is not only essential to drive the assault home with vigour, but to follow up any success gained with

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the utmost energy and decision. The impression created amongst such opponents by even a trifling preliminary success is very great, and once they are got on the move they must be kept upon the move. This is a broad principle of offensive tactics, whether the assault be delivered in front, in flank, or as a combination of both directions of attack. It is at the root of the whole system of conducting operations in warfare of this nature, in which moral effects counts for so much. Of course when the opposing force occupies several distinct lines of defence--a system to which such adversaries, notably the Chinese, are much addicted--infantry may after capturing the first line be able to reach the second in time to come to close quarters with its defenders; but this seldom happens. Once the first line is forced, resistance as a rule collapses to an extent which can never be hoped for when fighting against regular troops. Dash is not only essential to start with, but advance must continue without a pause till the enemy has been driven from his last position. This was the system followed in the Indian Mutiny and by General Negrier in Tonkin. The adversary does not understand it, and becomes hopelessly demoralized.

Need of initiative on the part of subordinates in attack.

In small wars the principle is so clearly established that the enemy once on the move must be kept on the move, that the responsibility assumed by the subordinate commander who presses on, is not so great as in a struggle against regular troops. There is little risk of the enemy rallying. The more quickly and resolutely he is followed up the smaller does the chance become of his showing further fight. In hill and jungle warfare, to be dealt with especially further on, initiative is especially desirable on the part of junior officers. The following striking incident at the battle of Kandahar deserves mention, as it illustrates so walk /the importance of individual initiative in not allowing the enemy to recover from the effects of a first reverse.

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The Afghans held the long ridge, shown in Plan VIII, facing p. 176, and the villages of Ghundigan and Ghundi to its right front. Sir F. Roberts' plan was to attack the right flank of the enemy, and the action commenced by two brigades advancing parallel to each other and capturing the two villages about simultaneously. The enemy retreated round the right of the ridge to the village of Pir Paimal and to the reverse slope of the ridge. As the two brigades advanced, sweeping round the ridge, that on the right struck the village of Pir Paimal and captured it; but then the advanced troops found themselves suddenly in face of nearly the whole Afghan army close to, and on the ridge above, the village.

 

Hostile reinforcements were hurrying up, and the enemy was bringing a heavy artillery fire to bear on the British troops sweeping round the end of the ridge. If the Afghans were to make a counter-attack on the advanced detachments, a serious check might befall the hitherto victorious troops. The situation was critical The enemy was showing unexpected tenacity and was in strong force. There was no time to lose. Major White, whose regiment, the 92nd, was furthest to the front, at once formed it for a final attack. Charging the enemy he drove his men in like a wedge between the masses on the low ground and those on the ridge, and captured two guns. This sudden onslaught completely changed the aspect of affairs, the enemy broke and fled in all directions, and all further resistance practically ceased.

Cavalry to be at hand to complete victory.

The value of cavalry in completing a victory if the ground be at all suitable, can scarcely be exaggerated. In the present day this arm of the service is, at least in regular warfare, accustomed to work in large independent bodies on the battlefield, and experience has shown that under normal conditions this arrangement is the best; the tendency of modern tactical organization is to reduce the amount of divisional cavalry to a relatively insignificant body. But in small wars some bodies of mounted men should generally be kept at various points ready to assist the infantry, in preference to the cavalry being, all practically kept as one force. This is of course speaking of cases where the armies in action are some thousands strong; with very small bodies of troops the cavalry is necessarily on the spot. The reason why this dispersion of the mounted troops is desirable is that there shall be mounted men ready at all points to follow up success at once; the enemy gets away so quickly that if the troopers are not on the spot they may be late.

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Other arms to play into the hands of the cavalry.

When there is ground in rear of the hostile position where cavalry will be able to work effectively, infantry and artillery should endeavour to drive the enemy in that direction so as to give the mounted troops a chance of inflicting heavy losses. It is often the case that a force of irregular warriors will be found occupying rugged hills, on the far side of which are stretches of .level ground; the enemy will endeavour to avoid these stretches of level ground when driven from his position, but with good management the infantry and artillery may make retreat by any other line impossible. At Landaki mentioned on p. 160, the very rapid flight of the Swatis, and the delay which arose in getting the cavalry through the defile by the river owing to the road being broken, saved the tribesmen from the mounted troops, whose prowess they had learnt to dread; when Sir B. Blood had broken out of the Malakand position a few days before, the infantry had driven the tribesmen down on to a level valley, where the 11th Bengal Lancers and Guides cavalry had given them a lesson which will be remembered for years.

 

The great problem when attacking irregular warriors in position is not so much to decide how to capture that position, for the chances are that this will not prove very difficult, as to make certain that the victory shall be a real victory causing the enemy heavy loss. This end may be achieved in various ways under diverse sets of conditions. But, given the suitable situation, no more effectual way of achieving a decisive and lasting triumph can be found than to compel the broken straggling array, which has been driven from the ground whence it bid the troops defiance, to stream across a level tract of country, where the cavalry can deal a coup de grâce.

Importance of the cavalry acting at the right moment.

At the battle of Kandahar the plan was that the whole of the cavalry was to make a wide turning movement outside the infantry, was to cross the Argandhab and was to fall upon the enemy in retreat, but owing to unforeseen circumstances it was greatly delayed and came up very late; a few

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squadrons following the infantry and ready to strike promptly, would have been of the utmost assistance after the last stand was made by the Afghans. In broken intersected country the charge of a small detachment of cavalry may be of great value as a minor episode of the conflict, and it is essential that the troopers should be at hand, to strike when an opportunity offers and thereby to complete what the infantry has begun. The cavalry operations against the hostile flanks and rear in the Mutiny and in the Egyptian campaign of 1882 were admirable, and were highly effective owing to the ground being generally favourable. Under these circumstances massing the cavalry seems to have been a good arrangement. But on battlefields less suited for the combined action of great bodies of horse, and in attacking an enemy who, once the infantry have come to close quarters retires at a rate completely outpacing the trained foot soldier, it is most expedient that the cavalry, or at least some of it, should be distributed so that some of it may be available to strike home then and there.

Artillery to be pushed up to the front to play on enemy when he gives way.

And as with the cavalry so it is with the artillery. Irregular warriors can always escape from infantry, but they cannot so readily escape from the effects of artillery fire. On this account some of the guns ought to be pushed up to close quarters in good time, so as to be at hand when wanted. In a later chapter dealing with artillery the importance of forward tactics of this arm of service will be illustrated by examples. At the battle of Staweli, where the French decisively defeated the forces of the Dey of Algiers which had taken up a strong position to bar their advance on the capital, the artillery was pushed up right into the hostile position, and it completed the rout of the enemy by its fire at short range. In the Mutiny the guns were always handled with great boldness. In warfare against undisciplined opponents or against forces of inferior morale, the rôle of artillery is not so much to prepare the way for the infantry as to complete the work

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which the infantry have been unable to carry through to the end.

Attack often offers opportunities for deceiving enemy as to available strength, and thus for gaining successes with insignificant forces.

One point deserves to be specially noted. Many examples might be cited from campaigns of recent years to show that when dealing with irregular warriors it is often practicable for a commander of disciplined troops to completely impose upon the enemy as to the strength of the force, and to impress the foe with the idea that a far larger body of soldiers is at hand than is actually the case. It is especially in attack that the circumstances lend themselves to deceptions of this kind. Of course such ruses are not prohibited by a defensive attitude--Lieutenant Grant's action at Thobal already mentioned on p. 83, is a remarkable example of one; but from the nature of the case it is when acting on the offensive that they are most likely to succeed.

 

(1) Towards evening on the second day of the final move of the 2nd division of the Tirah Field Force down the Bar a valley, the tail of the rearguard under Major Downman was unable to get into camp before dark, and it found itself towards dusk in a position of considerable difficulty. It happened that a small party °* the Gordon Highlanders was detached to one flank covering the rearguard's retirement, and this came suddenly under heavy fire from some houses. With four of his men Captain Uniacke made a rush for the nearest, shouting words of command and pretending that he had a large force at his back, captured it, and, as the Afridis bolted, he kept up the deception by shouting and using his whistle to attract the attention of the troops further in rear. Major Downman on arriving decided to collect his troops at the houses, and the rearguard eventually passed the night there, isolated but in safety.

 

(2) Lieut.-Colonel Baden-Powell's capture of Wedza's stronghold towards the close of the Rhodesian operations of 1896, is another excellent illustration. It would be hard to find a better example of bluffing the enemy in campaigns of this class. The stronghold consisted of several kraals perched almost on the crest of a mountain some three miles long, which was joined to a range by a neck. A sketch plan of the action faces the next page. While the defenders numbered several hundreds, the entire British force only amounted to 120--the original plan had been for another column to co-operate in the attack which was unable to do so. Colonel Baden-Powell commenced operations by sending 25 mounted men to the neck (A in sketch) with orders to act as though they were ten times as strong; the guns were to bombard the crest, which the rest of the force, some hussars.

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demonstrated against the outer end of the mountain and against the back of it. After some desultory skirmishing the mounted infantry pushed their way up to the point designated, leaving horses below with seven horse holders; but the enemy began to assemble in force and to seriously threaten the hill party.

 

Colonel Baden-Powell perceiving their somewhat critical position, sent to the guns and hussars to make a diversion. But these had been unexpectedly delayed on the road and were not yet at hand, so he took the seven horse holders and with them moved round to C in rear of the position; then, scattering the men, he ordered magazine fire, so as to give the idea that there was a considerable attacking force on this side. The ruse was completely successful The rebels who had been pressing over towards the neck hastily spread themselves all over the mountain, and the arrival of the rest of the troops at this juncture completed the illusion, the guns coming into action at B. The hussars moved round the mountain, and were dispersed to a certain extent, so as to represent as strong a force as possible and to impress the enemy. It was decided that no assault should be delivered that day; but the deception practised by the assailants was carefully kept up during the night. Fires (shown D in the sketch) were lighted at intervals round great part of the mountain, which were fed by moving patrols, and the men forming these patrols had orders to discharge, their rifles from time to time at different points. Everything was done to make Wedza and his followers believe that a whole army was arrayed against them. The next day the kraals were captured with ease, most of the enemy having slipped off in the darkness.

The separation of force on the battlefield.

The question of combined front and flank attacks has been already dealt with; it necessarily involves separation of forces at least temporarily. When the enemy is holding a regular defensive position and accepts battle, the breaking up of the attacking force into distinct bodies working to a certain extent independently of each other will seldom go further than one portion attacking in front and another in flank. But cases sometimes arise when it is necessary, Or when it seems desirable, to attack an enemy from several points, and this generally involves separation with its attendant advantages and disadvantages. It is especially on occasions when the enemy is in small force and not deliberately drawn up for battle that these conditions present themselves--they are constantly occurring in hill and jungle warfare or when the enemy adopts guerilla tactics.

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The reasons for and against tactical separation are analogous in many respects to those already given in Chapter IX for and against strategical separation.

Advantages of this.

A main advantage is the moral effect which it exerts. The enemy finds it very trying to he attacked simultaneously by different columns. Some must menace the line of retreat, and irregular warriors above all things fear a situation where their escape, should it become expedient to fly, is jeopardised. If it is intended to completely disperse a gathering of such opponents no better means can be adopted than to attack them from several points if it be practicable. In the attacks on the Waterkloof group of mountains in 1851-52, several columns were always formed to advance from different sides meeting on the top, and the Kaffirs were always totally dispersed with considerable loss of cattle, &c; but the very difficult nature of the wooded ridges and ravines was such as to prohibit heavy loss being inflicted on the Kaffirs themselves. Another advantage of attacking from several sides--and it is a very important one when some village or stronghold, the exact nature of which is not known, is the objective--is that one or more columns may be unable to effect a lodgment, and that the operation may be successful in spite of this; there is always the chance that one of the detachments may force its way in. Many examples could be cited of successful attacks by several columns marching independently on localities, villages, stockades, &c, and attacking simultaneously, and of the operations proving entirely successful. Of these the following will suffice.

Examples.

(1) For the capture of Nareh near Constantine in Algeria in 1849, Colonel Canrobert divided his force into three distinct columns. One starting at night some hours before the others, was to make a detour in the mountains, and was to occupy high ground on the for side above the collection of villages about to be attacked; it was then to wait till it saw the other two ready to attack. The other two, starting later, moved more directly on the objective, their orders being that they, with the column sent ahead, should fall on Nareh from three different sides soon after daybreak. The operation was completely successful, the timing of the

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Plan VIII. Battla of Kandahar.
Plan VIII. Battle of Kandahar.

Plan IX. Wedza's Stronghold.
Plan IX. Wedza's Stronghold.


 

movements was most happy, and the coup de main had a great effect in the surrounding districts which were all in revolt against the French.

 

(2) The capture of Yangi Kala two miles south of Denghil Tepe by General Skobelef previous to the attack on that stronghold in 1SS0, is another good example of separation prior to an assault. The expeditionary force arrived and halted to the west of the fortified village, which was a straggling place with many enclosures and gardens and a few small mud forts of the usual oriental type. One column was sent round south of the place to attack it on its south-eastern and eastern sides, another was to assault the western side; the cavalry pushed on on both sides so as to threaten the Tekkes' retreat northwards to Denghil Tepe. The operation proved completely successful for the enemy soon became demoralized on finding the Russians advancing from different sides and on perceiving that there was a risk of being out off from the fortress.

 

(3) Another good example is afforded by the capture of the strong stockade of Sittaag, near Pegu, in 1825, during the first Burmese war. The stockade was on an eminence, protected on the left by a river and on the right and rear by dense jungle which made approach on those sides difficult. Three columns of attack were told off, the right and centre to assault and escalade the front face, the left to make a detour through the jungle and to assault the right face. This left column when it reached its destination gave the signal for attack to the others by bugle call. The dispositions proved completely successful, and all three columns practically escaladed the very strong defences simultaneously. The Burmese fired one or two most effective volleys, but they became terrified at the concentric attack and made for the exit at the rear, afraid of being cut off. One-fifth of the storming force was, however, placed hots de combat in the few moments that the defenders stood their ground, showing that had these not become panic-stricken the assault might have failed altogether, and that in any case it would certainly have cost the British heavy sacrifices had the enemy offered a really stout resistance.

Disadvantages.

The dangers of tactical separation ot this kind lie partly in the opportunity which it affords to the enemy to beat the different columns in detail, and partly in the risk of miscalculations as to time. Moreover, success may be imperilled by misunderstandings with regard to orders, or by confusion arising in the various fractions of the force in their endeavours to co-operate with each other. There is always the further danger that detached columns may fire into each other.

Enemy may beat fractions in detail.

Uncivilized opponents and troops of inferior organization and morale seldom understand the principle of working on

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interior lines, or of reaping the advantages which arise when their antagonist divides his forces. But, actually on the battle-field, when the defenders are in a central position which the attackers are approaching from different sides, it is sometimes obvious even to leaders of no great capacity for war, that they may be able to fall upon the various fractions coming against them and crush to a certain extent in detail; they can see what is going on, as sometimes also can their followers, and they are therefore more likely to seize their opportunity of acting on interior lines tactically, than where it is a question of strategical combination against detached forces approaching convergently from points in the theatre of war far apart from each other. Still in those oases where separation of force in carrying out an attack against enemies of this class has resulted in failure or disaster, this has usually been due not to the tactical skill of the adversary but to mistakes or mismanagement on the side of the assailants.

 

A very serious disaster befel a column of United States troops during the Bed Indian wars on the Little Big Horn, which illustrates the danger of tactical separation. The column consisted of 12 troops of cavalry, with a train of pack animals. On getting touch with the Indians it was formed into four parties, one of five troops under Colonel Custer commanding the column, and two of three troops each, one of them under Major Reno; the fourth of one troop farmed the baggage guard. The force was moving down the valley of a stream. When it was reported that the enemy's settlement was only two miles off, Major Reno's party was sent to the front to move rapidly against the enemy, it being understood that Colonel Custer would support. The two other parties had got altogether separated from this main portion of the force. Major Reno found the Indians in great force and being unsupported he was, after a hot fight and heavy loss, compelled to take refuge on a bluff close by, which proved a satisfactory refuge. Fortunately he was joined here by the two parties which had gone astray, and with their assistance was enabled to hold his own against the determined attacks which the Indians kept up for many hours. Colonel Custer's force appears to have moved to the right of the valley--fixing was heard on that side. Apparently it got back eventually to near the river some distance lower down than where Major Reno's force had taken up 'position--this at least was conjectured from the tracks. But what occurred exactly is not known, for the force was annihilated and nothing but the bodies of men and horses served to tell the tale of the disaster. It appears

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to have been the case that the five troops fell in with an overwhelming force of Indians, and that these afterwards oame to attack Major Reno's party. Fortunately that officer secured a good position, and had partially entrenched his men while there was yet time.

Difficulty of manœuvring detached forces effectively.

When several detached columns are intended to co-operate in a combined attack, there is always the danger of an error with regard to time or distance marring the effect. This occurred as already described in the case of the flank attack on Ali Musjid, and also during the first advance on Wedza's stronghold as mentioned on p. 176, although in neither case did harm come of it. The manœuvring of such divided forces by the commander of the whole, is always difficult to carry out successfully once they are started upon the enterprise. The great object to keep in view is to assign to each a task within its powers, taking the nature of the terrain, the amount of opposition to be encountered and so forth into account. It is always better to err on the safe side--to allow too much time rather than too little. To each column a proper impulse should, if possible, be given at the outset, then the less interference there is with their independence the better. Of course unforseen circumstances may arise which render a change of plan at the last moment imperative; but in the absence of such a contingency it must never be forgotten that the secret of success lies in trusting subordinates till they are found to be going wrong, that orders sent from a distance may be issued under a misapprehension of the exact circumstances at the moment, and that there is always great risk of their causing confusion.

 

The unfortunate sortie from Kandahar against the village of Deh Khoja during the blockade in 1880 illustrates this very well. The sortie took place after daybreak, preceded by a short bombardment from the guns on the walls (the plan opposite shows the position of the village relatively to the city). The cavalry moved out of the Idga gate and made a wide detour round to the east and south-east of Deh Khoja. The infantry under General Brooke were formed into three small columns and advanced out of the Kabul gate towards the south-west end of the village, which was held in some

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strength by the Afghans and was prepared for defence. Large hostile bodies were seen hurrying up to reinforce it during the preliminary operations.

 

The centre column, which was accompanied by General Brooke, with part of the right column, forced their way into the village at its southern end The rest of the right column occupied the garden close by, and with the cavalry kept the enemy's reinforcements in check, while the left column lined some walls to the south and west, and acted in reserve; one and a half columns, in fact, penetrated into the place, while the remainder halted outside. By dint of hard fighting General Brooke and the troops with him forced their way along the streets. They had just reached the north end of the village when an order came from Kandahar to retire. General Brooke thereupon gave the necessary directions to those with him, and the dangerous operation of withdrawing from a particularly awkward position in face of a fanatical enemy was at once begun.

 

The troops in the garden, the cavalry, and also the left column, all retired on the Kabul gate under orders from Kandahar. Those in the village were, however, attacked with great determination by the enemy who speedily perceived the retrograde movement, and they only extricated themselves with the utmost difficulty. Some escaped by the north end and some by the south, but very serious losses were suffered in the streets and in retiring back to Kandahar. Half the force in fact was left in the lurch in the village, while the other half, which had been far less heavily engaged, retired practically without fighting. General Brooke himself was killed and the sortie ended in a distinct reverse.

Detached bodies may fire into each other.

This affair at Deh Khoja shows how difficult it is to control detached bodies in action. But there is another danger in such a case, and this is that the troops may shoot into each other by accident, or that one column may mistake another for a hostile body. This actually occurred at the action of Suruj Kund, already mentioned in this chapter; while General Markham's force attacked the Sikh left and rolled up their line, an auxiliary contingent attacked the right front of the hostile position; the contingent was mistaken for the enemy and fired into. The same thing occurred at the first attack on Kimmendine, near Rangoon, in 1824, where the artillery of the flank column fired into the centre one in the jungle from a distance, causing some loss. This sort of misunderstanding frequently occurred on a small scale in the later days of the South African war; little damage was generally done and the mistake was as a rule detected very

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Plan X. Deh Khoja.
Plan X. Deh Khoja.


 

quickly, but an. unrehearsed scuffle of this kind is very apt to give the show away when anything in the shape of a surprise on the enemy is in contemplation.

Risk of misunderstandings.

The following examples are of interest as showing how misunderstandings may arise in operations of this character under varying circumstances and for different reasons. They serve to show that, when separate forces are endeavouring to act in combination in terrain where the view is restricted, there is great risk of some misapprehension either of orders or of the conditions existing at some particular time.

Examples.

(1) In the Maori wax in 1863, Colonel Warre operating in the Taranaki obtained information of a hostile pah, and he determined to surprise it. A party was sent round to arrive in rear of the position at a fixed time. Colonel Warre was to make a demonstration in front to draw the enemy into their rifle pits out of the pah. When that had effected its purpose the detached force was to occupy the pah. Both forces arrived at the right time. That detached to the rear, however, became impressed with the idea that it had been discovered and it did not attack in consequence. The result was that the demonstration drew the enemy out of the pah as had been anticipated, that there were no troops to seize the opportunity and to force their way into it when it was practically deserted, and that in consequence the well concocted plan came to nothing.

 

(2) A very singular instance of a misunderstanding of this kind leading to a serious disaster, is afforded by the Achin war of 1874. A plan of the ground faces page 184. During the operations after the capture of Kota Raja an attack upon a fortified village named Longbatta was arranged for, which was to be carried out by a combined movement of two separate columns; one was to move against the front and the other to make a detour and attack the right The plan shows roughly where clearings existed: elsewhere the jungle was dense, tine thick undergrowth making all movements of troops most difficult

 

The column destined for the frontal attack never reached the place at all. It was delayed by the obstacles in the way, it kept too much to the right and eventually after some hours, got to the Panjoret village much exhausted. The left column after a most trying march reached Longbatta, and captured it after some fighting. It then received an order from Kota Raja to take another village close by; but the order was misunderstood, and the column moved against Lung, a place considerably further on across more open ground. The Achinese at once endeavoured to re-occupy Longbatta, so part of the column hod to go back and hold it while the rest pushed on and succeeded in capturing Lung. Here, however, they were promptly attacked by very superior numbers of the enemy. The officer in command ordered

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a flourish on the trumpets to be sounded to apprise the rest of the force that he was in. difficulties, but this signal was unfortunately misunderstood. The right column had heard the firing and was marching as best it could through the jungle towards the sound of the cannon; but the trumpet call was taken by it to mean a paean of victory, so it marched straight back to Kota Raja.

 

The part of the left column which had moved on to Lung had therefore to fight its way back unsupported to Longbatta, and it suffered very heavily in its retreat. The co-operation between the two columns had failed completely in the first instance. Then the mistake about the village, and the subsequent misunderstanding with the trumpets, caused half of one of the two columns to be left isolated and to be almost annihilated.

 

(3) The combat of the Zlobani mountain in Zululand took place under totally different conditions from those obtaining amid the swampy flats near Kota Raja with their dense tropical vegetation. The Zlobani mountain was one of the singular, flat topped hills with almost precipitous sides which are a feature of the topography of south-eastern Africa. It was, as appears from the sketch facing next page, oval in plan, the longer axis three British miles long running east and west. It lay some miles east of the camp at Kambula.

 

The object of the attack on it was to raid the cattle which it had been ascertained the Zulus were concealing there. Colonel Wood decided to send a mounted force under Colonel Buller along the south to make an assault on the east or further end, as the main attack. Colonel Russell with another mounted force was to create a diversion at the west end and was to act in support. Colonel Buller's force surprised the enemy at dawn, scrambled up with some loss, dispersed the Zulus on the top, and secured the cattle; it was then decided to retire by the western end. Colonel Russell meanwhile had occupied a lower plateau at the western end and had ascertained the success of the main attack. All was going well when a large Zulu army suddenly came in sight, approaching from the south-east and marching towards Kambula past the south of the mountain.

 

Colonel Wood had followed Colonel Buller, and, on ascertaining that all was right, had re-descended and moved along the south of the mountain. Here he became aware of the Zulu army's approach, and he at once sent orders to Colonel Russell to move his force back to the Zinguin Neck west of the mountain, where it would cover Colonel Buller's retreat. Owing to some misunderstanding as to the locality intended, however, Colonel Russell moved off to a point some six miles to his west.

 

Not only the British on the summit, but also the Zulus who were hiding among the rocks and kloofs of the hillside, had seen the impis on their march, and they promptly began harassing Colonel Buller's force. Having no support to fall back upon, and the descent of the western end of the mountain being barely practicable, this suffered very severely. Owing to the great hostile army to the south, which, however, fortunately did not come into action, the situation appeared to be even worse than it was. It was

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only by a supreme effort that panic was allayed and that the force succeeded in reaching the bottom without a very serious disaster. The troops felt themselves to be in the utmost peril Colonel Russell's force, had it taken up the position intended, would have been a moral support of the utmost value to the hard pressed troopers as they scrambled down the steep declivity with the Zulus gathering all round them, even if it had been unable to actually intervene in the fight. Once at the bottom, Colonel Buller's force, consisting as it did of mounted troops, was able to retire without much molestation.

Note on the battle of Adowa.

It may be mentioned here that the unfortunate battle of Adowa furnishes a most striking example of the risks of separation in the field. This combat does not, it is true, illustrate tactics of attack, nor indeed does it illustrate tactics of defence; it was a haphazard affair, the Italians not having intended an assault on the Abyssinians and the opposing armies having come into contact unexpectedly. Still in a work of this kind it would be an omission not to draw attention to what was the most prominent feature of this battle, a battle which ended in the most serious disaster which regular troops have encountered in any modern small war. The fact that the Italian brigades were so scattered when the Abyssinians came out against them arose to a certain extent from a misunderstanding, as has been already mentioned on p. 46. But the upshot was that they were beaten in detail and that an army of 15,000 men, consisting for the most part of European troops, was utterly routed by a host of irregular warriors.

Risk of counterattack.

As will be seen in Chapter XXI dealing with infantry tactics, less depth and fewer reserves are generally necessary in infantry attacks upon irregular enemies than is the case in regular warfare. The same holds good as a broad principle of attack tactics in small wars as a whole. The losses are less severe and the risk of counter-attack is smaller than in attacks delivered against disciplined troops. But although counter-attack has less to be feared, and although the relative strength of reserves as compared to that of troops in front line need not be so great, reserves can never be dispensed

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with altogether. Reserves are especially needed in fighting against fanatics who may make a sudden rush by way of counter-attack. In the main this is a branch of infantry tactics to be dealt with under that head in a later chapter, but the question of absence of reserves when there is risk of counter-attack, to a certain extent involves the other arms also.

Examples of hostile counter-attack.

(1) At Denghil Tepe in 1879, General Lomakin was obliged, owing to the smallness of his force, to deliver the assault with practically no reserves. When the s termers found it impossible to penetrate into the defences and fell away under the heavy fire poured into them by the Tekkes, there were no reserves to lean upon. Fortunately the guns afforded a refuge to the Russian infantry as this was swept back by the defenders, who charged out over their battlements in great force and with much determination. The retreating infantry masked the artillery for a while but cleared the front in time to allow the guns to deliver some rounds of case into the Turkoman swarms. These sufficed to drive the Tekkes back into their stronghold in confusion.

 

(2) At the battle of Tetuan in 1869, where the Spanish army made a direct attack upon the Moors entrenched in a strong position, the enemy unexpectedly charged out over their defences on one flank just as the assault was about to be delivered. This sudden counter-attack, however, in reality favoured the assailants, because it enabled them to fight their way into the position with the flying Moors, who had no chance against the Spanish muskets in the open. But the incident illustrates the possibility of such foes delivering unexpected counter-strokes of a character which may call for a solid front on the part of the regular troops.

 

(3) The charge of the ghazis at the battle of Bareilly in 1868, is another good example of a hostile counter-attack An attack on the rebels was being prepared and the artillery on the British left, which was to take the enemy in flank, had been in action for some time. Suddenly a crowd of fanatic swordsmen charged down upon the extreme right of the British. Fortunately, the infantry, although taken somewhat aback, had time to close their ranks, and they effectually dealt with the ghazis. Scarcely were the ghazis disposed of than a large force of the rebel cavalry swept round the right flank and caused considerable confusion in rear.

 

(4) As instances on a small scale may be cited a sudden charge of spearmen from the bills on the right of Mahdist position at Kirbekan down upon the infantry just preparing to storm them, and a fanatical rush at the action of Kotkai in the Black Mountains Expedition of 1888. The enemy in this latter case was giving way and the attacking troops were pressing forward 'with all speed to complete the victory, when suddenly, out of a masked nullah running diagonally across the battle-field, a body of swordsmen made

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a desperate attempt to break the line; all of them were killed, but they inflicted some loss and might have caused very serious confusion but for the steadiness of the troops.

Need of co-operation between infantry and artillery to meet counterattacks.

The examples cited above serve to show that there is often a chance of a very sudden counter-attack being delivered by a fraction of the hostile force, even if, speaking generally, irregulars are not very prone to attempt such offensive returns. To meet counter-strokes guns are very useful. The case of Denghil Tepe, although rather in the nature of a counter-attack after an assault has failed, illustrates the value of artillery in support; it provides a further argument for the forward action of this arm, the need of which has been already pointed out if a decisive victory is to be gained without a turning movement. Good troops have little to fear from a sudden rush of bodies of fanatics if the ground be open; but in a broken intersected terrain where there is no field of fire, such antagonists may create serious disorder, if they come on with resolution and unexpectedly, and may even break through the line if reserves are not at hand. General Skobelef in his instructions to the troops in the Turkoman campaign of 1880, laid the utmost stress on the artillery being up to support the infantry in attack, and upon the infantry being kept well in band. "The main principle of Asiatic tactics is to preserve close formations." "The artillery must devote itself to closely supporting its comrades without the slightest regard for itself." Such were his maxims, and although such tactics are inapplicable under many of the conditions which small wars present, the rules laid down for guidance by so illustrious a leader command consideration.

Tendency of enemy to threaten flanks and rear of attacking force.

"When the question comes to be considered how a regular force about to attack the enemy should be drawn up in operations of this class, there is a point which at once attracts attention; the fact that irregular warriors are very prone to shirk meeting a direct attack tends to drive them into harassing operations directed against the flanks and rear of the regular

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troops. Their instinctive appreciation, moreover, that the flanks and rear of the troops advancing against them are the most promising points for counter-attack, often causes them to give a great deal of annoyance. In hush fighting, when the enemy does not act purely on the defensive, and when the adversary depends upon stockades and similar defences concealed in the jungle, the flanks and rear of the regular troops are constantly threatened. As will he seen in Chapter XX the French operating against opponents of these proclivities.in Dahomey made considerable use of the square formation while acting on the offensive. At Amoaful and Ordahsu in Ashanti the same kind of tactics on the part of the enemy were experienced, as also in Achin, and in both these campaigns especial arrangements had to be made to guard the flanks and rear of troops advancing to the attack. This enveloping system of undisciplined adversaries is not peculiar to the bush however, the same thing is experienced in the hills on the Indian borders, by the French in Algeria and the Russians in Central Asia, and recently the Somalis have been found to adopt the enveloping method when prepared to accept battle. The Moors employed it in 1859, and in consequence of their tactics Marshal McDonald at the battle of Tetuan advanced in a formation like a wedge, his flanks being thrown back--an order of battle not altogether unlike Marshal Bugeaud's at Isly.

The battle of Isly.

This battle of Isly is of especial interest as it is probably the most decisive victory gained over irregular forces by any troops other than British since the battle of the Pyramids. Marshal Bugeaud drew up his army in the form of, as he himself described it, "the muzzle of a boar"--a triangle in fact with blunted apex; and in this wedge-like order of battle he went straight at an immensely superior force of Moors. The formation was arrived at by echelon of battalion columns--battalion columns being the normal infantry order of attack--and the artillery and non-combatants were within the triangle.

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The marshal had given directions that the battalions were to form battalion square if the Moorish horse charged home. The enemy does not appear to have penetrated through the gaps at any time; the hostile onslaughts were not indeed very formidable, in spite of the enormous numerical superiority of the Moors. And although a formation with great gaps in it will seldom recommend itself as an arrangement for meeting charges of hostile cavalry, especially when there is a great deal with the force which needs protection, it served its purpose extremely well in this case at Isly, the French gaining a brilliant victory at a trifling sacrifice.

An illustration of an echelon formation.

Marshal Bugeaud's battalions having been drawn up in heavy columns, as was the system in those days in all regular armies except the British, robs this battle of much of its interest at the present time. But it is a remarkable fact that what was one of the most decisive battles in any small war of the last century, was won by one of the greatest of masters of irregular warfare with a force drawn up in echelon formation which advanced right into the heart of a huge hostile army and compelled this to attack. When the Moors rushed down upon the French, these of course stood to receive the attack; but their deliberate advance, which moreover was only checked at the moment of impact, created them in reality the assailants and makes the battle of Isly an example of offensive tactics.

Remarks on the echelon formation.

This method of drawing the troops up in echelon has the advantage of assuring a good development of fire, and it protects the flanks. When General Egerton advanced to the attack at Jidballi he formed the infantry in double echelon from the centre, with the mounted troops on the flanks; the echelon however formed square when close to the enemy. An echelon formation does not meet the difficulty of an enveloping attack made in great force and with reckless determination. The very rapid advance of fanatics such as are met with in the Sudan and sometimes in Algeria enables

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these to make sudden onslaughts upon the regular forces from any side, and mere facing about does not satisfactorily meet a hostile counter-attack in great strength upon the rear of a body of troops advancing in echelon formation. Moreover if the enemy succeeds in getting through the intervals there is great risk of the troops firing into each other. On open ground there is little danger of the enemy, however fierce his attack may be, getting to such close quarters; but experience has shown that among thickets and in broken terrain such foemen manage sometimes to reach the muzzles of the rifles. In view of the success which has generally attended the employment of the square formation under these conditions, it seems doubtful whether the echelon order of battle makes an efficient substitute; but in attacking adversaries less prone to rely on shock tactics it would no doubt at times prove very satisfactory even in bush country.

 

A special chapter is devoted later on to the square formation. Marshal Bugeaud's order of battle was not of course a square; but his idea while advancing to attack the Moorish camp was to be prepared for the onslaught of the hostile cavalry from most sides, and the object of the square is the same--to be ready to meet assailants trusting to shock tactics from whatever direction they come. The echelon formation or the square formation--defensive formations in reality--are employed on the offensive where the enemy is in great strength and is inclined to deliver strokes against the flanks and rear. Under such circumstances the regular force must advance in an order of battle which can show front at a moment's notice in any direction, covering its impedimenta. Here, however, we are rather concerned with threats against the flanks and rear of a body of troops acting on the offensive, than with regular attacks upon them.

Importance of pressing and not paying too

Where the flanks and rear of the attacking troops are merely threatened, the sound principle to act on seems to be not to take these threats too seriously. The French when

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much attention to demonstrations against flanks and rear.

attacking very superior forces in Tonkin usually adopted an 6chelon formation, to counteract the overlapping tactics of the enemy and prevent them from becoming a serious danger but except for taking this precaution they pushed ahead disregarding the threats against their rear. It will almost always be found that if the advance be resolute and the assault pushed home, the clouds of foemen hovering on the flanks melt away and cease to be a danger. The case of Ordahsu in the Ashanti war illustrates this; the British troops pushed boldly on, disregarding the tendency of the enemy to harass the flanks and rear, and no evil came of it. This method of combat on the part of the enemy has, it must be remembered, very little in common with the enveloping system of attack which the Zulus employed with such success at Isandlwhana, and with such manœuvring power at Ginghilovo and Ulundi--in Zululand the regular troops acted on the defensive on the battle-field and in square or laager, the enemy being the assailant. The very fact of disregarding feeble tentative hostile operations against the flanks and rear, shows the enemy that the regular army holds him lightly, and, as has been so often insisted upon, moral effect is all powerful in these campaigns.

 

General Romanovski's decisive victory over the Uzbeg army at Yedshar is worthy of mention in this connection. The Emir of Bokhara had about 40,000 men, the Russian force consisted of only 3,000; but in spite of disparity of numbers General Romanovski attacked without hesitation. The enemy enveloped the Russian force and made desperate attacks upon the baggage which was guarded by only a few companies, and these were at times in great peril. But the Russians pressed resolutely on, the baggage escort meanwhile repulsing the hostile onslaughts as best it could and pushing on whenever it had a moment's respite. The enemy could not stand against the determined advance of General Romanovski and the fire of his guns, and at last became panic-stricken and fled.

 

At the battle of Wad Ras, in 1859, the Moors seriously threatened the Spanish flanks while the attack was being developed. But although it was found necessary to detach some troops to make head against them, the main position of the attacking army pressed on, unhindered by the manœuvres of the enemy. When the village of Amsal in the centre of the hostile position was captured the Moors disappeared in all directions. The Sultan's

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army being numerically far superior to the Spanish force, was able to overlap the assailants, while at the same time offering resistance to the main attack.

Attacks on caves in South Africa.

In Chapter XI a passing reference was made to the successful operations in 1897 against the Mashonas in their caves. Inasmuch as it is a not uncommon trick on the part of the natives in that part of the world to take refuge in caves, and as their doing so has baffled troops at times, a short description of the method adopted with such happy results by Captain Hon. F. de Moleyns, who conducted the campaign, may be useful.

 

A rebel gathering having been located in some kraal, the first step towards dealing with it was to get within striking distance of it unobserved-To achieve this end Captain de Moleyns used to make a night march to the close vicinity of the point to be attacked, choosing moonlight nights when possible, because moonlight would be desirable on subsequent nights while experience showed that the enemy kept no look out except close in to the kraal

 

The kraals were situated near the caves, and were generally prepared for defence. If the surprise was complete--as was generally the case--the troops when they advanced to attack at dawn found the Mashonas in the kraals, and the first step was to drive them out. It was always found that after some resistance the defenders fled to their caves, a movement which was not interfered with, it being in fact exactly what the assailants hoped for. As soon as the kraals were cleared, picquets were placed all round the caves and an impromptu siege began. Under a heavy fire directed into the mouths of the caves--these could be gradually located by watching the puffs from the hostile muskets and rifles--the picquets slowly closed in till they had formed as restricted a ring as the amount of available cover admitted of, and then a rigid investment was instituted.

 

The close investment having been completed, the next operation was to blow in the mouths of the caves. Explosives were prepared in heavy and light charges. These were brought up near the cave to be dealt with, care having been taken that its fire was completely silenced. A small charge with a short fuze was then hurriedly placed at the mouth of the oave; on this exploding the heavier charges were deposited before the natives could recover from the shock of the first, and the explosion of these had invariably the effect of bringing out some women and children. These were encouraged to bring out more, and in the end nearly the whole community would gradually be captured, although some used to manage to slip through the ring of picquets at night in spite of all precautions. Of course the

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Mashonas sometimes managed to pull out the fuzes of the charges, and the operation did not necessarily proceed quite so smoothly; but the result was always arrived at by patience and perseverance in from three to five days.

 

After three strongholds had been captured by this method the rebellion was practically crushed. The remaining rebels, finding that their cave fortresses were a source of weakness rather than of strength, gave up their arms and surrendered, and the campaign came to an end.

 

In these operations the broad principles which should guide the conduct of campaigns against irregular warriors were fully observed. The enemy having chosen the guerilla form of warfare was followed up in detail, and the blow against each fraction was driven right home. The point kept specially in view tactically, was to make certain that the foe did not escape when once brought to battle.

Hour for attack.


Attacks at dawn.

One more point with regard to the tactics of attack deserves attention, and this is the question of the hour at which attacks should be delivered. Night attacks arc discussed in a later chapter together with other nocturnal operations, and the objections to them are there set out; they are seldom advisable, but experience has shown how very effective attacks at dawn of day are if practicable. It is a very general custom in undisciplined and irregular armies to withdraw a large part of the force by night and to send it back in the morning. The French army advancing on Algiers in 1830 took full advantage of this at Sidi Khalif, where the Dey's forces were finally overthrown; it had been ascertained that the enemy used to entirely withdraw at night out of the position which had been carefully prepared, so General Bourmont attacked in the early morning and captured it with little difficulty. The same thing was observed at Deh Khoja, already referred to in this chapter; had there been no preliminary bombardment from Kandahar this village would probably have been captured without serious resistance.

 

It is somewhat singular that in view of the inclination which such enemies display for attacking at early dawn themselves, they rarely seem to anticipate danger at this hour.

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The fact, however, remains, that if a body of troops can manage by a night march to arrive before the position of an irregular force, or even of an army modelled to a certain extent on the European system but not ranking as a regular force, it can generally deliver a most effective attack. Owing to the insufficiency of the outposts on the side of the enemy, or of their total absence, the approach of the assailants is seldom discovered if conducted with skill and regularity. The difficulty lies in the night march; if that difficulty is got over successfully there is generally good prospect of a surprise and a victory. It should be noted that one great advantage of attacking at daybreak is that the enemy finds it very difficult to ascertain at once what especial point the assailants are aiming at. The movement of columns round a hostile flank with the intention of falling upon the foe at dawn from all sides are difficult to execute by night, but a sudden concentric attack in the grey of the morning often has achieved a great success--the guerilla phases of the South African war of 1899-1902 provided many examples.

Examples.

A good instance of such an attack at break of day occurred in Algeria in 1845. Abd el Kader had, with the suddenness characteristic of his methods of making war, unexpectedly appeared in the Metija near Algiers, where the whole district had broken out in revolt. News reached the capital that he was at a place called Cherek el Tobul in the hills. General Gentil commanding in Algiers thereupon made a night march to the enemy's camp. The movement was kept secret, the march was swift and sudden, and the force reached the camp before dawn and surprised it at daybreak. The rebels were wholly unprepared and were completely routed, the Emir himself only just managing to escape.

 

Ludlow Castle, outside Delhi, was captured during the siege in 1857 by an attack delivered about dawn; the troops got up unobserved to close distance under cover of the darkness.

 

The attack on the Afghan flank at the Peiwar Kotal already described on p. 166, was delivered at dawn, and Sir H. Kitchener's force arrived before the Atbara zeriba soon after daybreak.

 

The well known case of Tel-el-Kebir is a very remarkable example of such an attack. The movement of a large force in battle formation by night, right up to within striking distance of a formidable line of entrenchments, held by a large army, was a signal achievement of war. Its arrival before the works was admirably timed and the result was a complete victory. The Egyptians were practically surprised,their outpost service had been neglected,

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and the outposts, such as they were, were too close in to give any adequate warning of a contemplated assault.

Attacks early in the day expedient, to allow of effective pursuit.

In fact attacks at daybreak, if they can be managed, afford considerable chance of very decisive success, so this seems to be perhaps the most favourable time for delivering an assault on a strong position.

 

It may be added that, when fighting certain enemies, the only chance of getting at them at all may be by attacking at daybreak after a night march. It was found in the suppression of the Matabili rebellion that approach under cover of darkness was absolutely necessary, otherwise the rebels slipped off and got their cattle and belongings off as well. One of the most successful actions of the campaign was brought about by assaulting the koppies among which a hostile impi was posted at dawn, after a march of 20 miles which lasted nearly the whole night.

 

In any case it is always expedient to attack early in the day if possible, so as to allow time not only for driving the enemy out of his position but also for carrying out an effective pursuit--this is a principle, however^ which applies also in regular warfare. It must never be forgotten that in small wars decisive success, not perhaps as a tactical operation but as an effective operation of war, depends not only upon beating the enemy but also upon following up the success forthwith. The hostile forces must not be permitted to slip away and dissolve when only half beaten if it can possibly be avoided. A decisive tactical victory, won in the afternoon, may have a less lasting effect than a less pronounced triumph on the actual battlefield, achieved early in the day, provided that the success in action has been merely the prelude to an obstinate pursuit and general advance of the victorious troops.

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