Defensive attitude unusual, but sometimes unavoidable. |
The subject of the defensive in small wars affords little scope for exhaustive discussion. A defensive attitude is almost always to be deprecated, and only under certain special circumstances is it to be recommended. The operations of regular troops in such warfare must never be allowed to stagnate; the troops must be up and doing, striking their adversaries when these attempt resistance, hunting them down when they shun combat. An army acting on the defensive tacitly admits a certain superiority on the part of the enemy, and the very essence of the proper conduct of campaigns against irregular and undisciplined foes is bluff. |
Still, defensive tactics are sometimes forced upon the regular troops. In the chapters on squares, hill warfare, &c., some cases which impose upon them a defensive attitude will be referred to. If the enemy attacks in great force and with reckless daring it is usually best to receive the onslaught and not to press forward to meet it. The tactics adopted by the Zulus and Mahdists when flushed with confidence were best met at a halt in close formation, even on ground where arms of precision could tell with full effect. In the jungles of Dahomey the sudden hostile attacks on flanks and rear could be confronted most satisfactorily by the troops on the spot acting on the defensive till the edge was taken off the hostile appetite for combat. In every campaign detachments of regular troops will sometimes have to accept the position of letting the enemy attack them. | |
Where a small force of regular troops is opposed to great hostile masses, no matter how ill-armed or how deficient in |
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morale those masses may be, circumstances render it almost imperative to act on the defensive. Many examples might be cited of small detachments being hemmed in and besieged in these campaigns--it may not be possible for them to fall boldly upon the enemy and fight their way through, there may be women and children to guard, valuable stores to protect too bulky to be moved, some post to be held which can not be abandoned. In such a situation, although the regular troops may spasmodically act on the defensive and teach the enemy to respect them, they must upon the whole maintain a defensive attitude in spite of the drawbacks attendant on that attitude--an attitude which naturally gives encouragement to the opposing warriors, who are as easily roused to warlike enthusiasm by a show of weakness on the part of their adversaries, as they are prone to discouragement and despondency when these show a bold and resolute front. | |
Small bodies of regular troops hemmed in. |
It is hardly necessary to point out that, when a small force of regular troops is cooped up in some post by masses of savages or semi-civilized antagonists, its position is one of great anxiety, because the circumstances of the case are such as to give the enemy a great moral advantage. Under such circumstances the hostile gatherings swell apace and gain in courage from hour to hour. If the body of regular troops be very small the situation becomes especially full of peril from the very fact that, owing to its inability to depart appreciably from an attitude of passive defence, the enemy increases in assurance till he plucks up courage to risk an assault in full strength, when numbers may tell decisively. |
Even then defensive must not be purely passive. |
In such cases it is of supreme importance to maintain as active a defence as possible, to worry the enemy incessantly, to compel him to believe that the garrison is full of fight and that it has not lost heart under untoward circumstances. Even if counter-attack in the shape of sorties makes no material gain, it means a moral gain. The opposing force can probably spare those placed hors de combat in the fight |
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far better than, the regular troops can.--every man counts in a hard pressed garrison. But the flash of enterprise will not have been without its effect if the sortie has been planned with skill and has been executed with vigour and determination. A purely passive defence is improper in warfare of any kind, but in a small war it is absolutely fatal. The enemy must be taught that th* apparently insignificant force of regulars has not lost heart and that it represents an active power to be reckoned with. Fortunately this is a principle which officers commanding small detachments isolated in a hostile land and surrounded by swarms of enemies, seldom forget, as experience shows. | |
Examples of minor counter-attacks under such circumstances. |
During the siege of Potchefstrom in the Transvaal, which was one of the chief incidents of the Boer war of 1881, a sudden sortie by a small party against the hostile trenches which were slowly nearing the little fort, had a most excellent effect. It greatly alarmed the Boers, in addition to achieving its immediate purpose of destroying some of their advanced works. |
During the remarkable defence of Tuyon Kwang in Tonkin in 1880 by the French, which lasted nearly three months, two or three effective sorties by very small parties proved most valuable. Without perhaps achieving any success of importance, these plucky enterprises kept up the spirits of the garrison and prevented the Chinese from growing too confident. | |
A sally by a small detachment under Lieutenant Harley during the siege of Chitral in 1895, was not only brilliantly successful in destroying the hostile approaches, but exercised a great moral effect upon the enemy. | |
Similarly during the siege of Fort Gulistan by the Orukzais in 1897, a gallant sortie under a native officer of the Sikhs had an excellent effect; three hostile standards were captured, and it is said that the three sections of the tribesmen represented by these went off to their homes. The enemy had got up to within 20 yards of the walls. | |
None of these episodes were in themselves great operations of war, but they contributed towards preventing the hostile swarms which were hemming in the small hard pressed garrisons from thinking that they were completely in the ascendant. These bold feats of arms, moreover, served greatly to encourage the troops. They converted the defence for the time being into an active defence. Such counter-strokes |
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must be sudden, and they must be pushed home with decision. There is no need for a large party, the smaller the detachment told off for the enterprise, the better may be. the chance of achieving a successful surprise and the better can the detachment be kept in hand at the critical moment. And even if the sally fails in its object, if the enemy's trenches are not cleared, if his approaches cannot be blown up, if the little force is obliged to regain the defences with nothing to show for the effort it has made, no great harm will probably come of it. "If we fail in only one-third of our enterprises," said the Duke of Wellington, "we should not complain, but make up our minds to this as a general rule." A show of activity raises the spirits of troops driven to adopt a defensive attitude. A counter-attack of this kind shows the enemy that the defenders have not lost heart. | |
A counterattack on a large scale must not miscarry where the army is in difficulties. |
On the other hand, if any considerable portion ot the defending force assumes the offensive for a special purpose, it is very unfortunate if the undertaking miscarries. A failure under such circumstances means that an important fraction of the force has suffered a check, and the moral effect upon the troops, who from the facts of the case are working under depressing influences, may seriously affect their» fighting efficiency in the future. When a counter-attack on an important scale is contemplated, it is imperative that the whole scheme shall have been considered in all its aspects and that its details have been worked out thoroughly. The aortic to Deh Khoja from Kandahar is an example of such an enterprise undertaken on an important scale, failing; it amounted to a disastrous reverse to a force condemned practically to a passive defence, a part of which force had already met with serious mishap at Maiwand. What occurred at Kabul in 1841 is an even more striking illustration of the danger of an ill-considered and badly-executed counter-attack. |
The British army was beginning to find itself in critical circumstances, in consequence very largely of a want of enterprise at the time when the |
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groat hostile movement, which ended by accomplishing the annihilation of the force in the defiles of Jagdalak and Gandamak, had not yet come to a head. This being so, the ill-judged and ill-planned attacks upon the Bemaru heights had most calamitous results. | |
On the first occasion the main object was to capture and carry off two guns which the enemy had planted on the heights; hut the enterprise was only undertaken late in the day, and its execution was hurried and ineffective. One of the guns sent out in support stuck in a ditch, and the other was not given time to make any preparation. The first attack of the infantry on the heights failed, and they were thereupon charged and swept back by masses of Afghan horse. Then the British artillery opened an effective fire, and after a time a second attack partially succeeded and the enemy abandoned the two guns. But it was by this time getting dark and the upshot was that only one of the Afghan pieces was brought in and the affair was really a failure. | |
On the second occasion the attack was made before dawn. The Bemaru village was not captured by surprise simultaneously with the heights, as it should have been, and only one gun was taken out. An attack, later on, upon the village failed This gave time for the enemy to swarm out of Kabul to attack the partially successful British troops in great force, and to drive them off the heights with heavy loss after a keen struggle. The army was demoralised by previous failure, and by the manifest mismanagement of the affair, and the net result of the two attempted counter-strokes against the ever growing Afghan forces was to still further depress the already shaken troops. | |
Evils of passive defence if not imperative. |
With, anything approaching an equality of force to that of the enemy, a passive defence is, of course, wholly inadmissible. It may no doubt occasionally be resorted to for a time--sometimes with great advantage when it is intended to draw the hostile forces on to attack; but it must only be adopted provisionally and as a temporary measure. Passive defence may be adopted as a ruse to tempt the enemy into some rash action even when the regular army is as strong as the enemy. It may sometimes be justifiable so as to afford troops a rest, or to enable supplies to be brought up in anticipation of an active campaign, or to cover the arrival of reinforcements sufficient to act with decisive effect. Otherwise, except under the circumstances dealt with in earlier paragraphs where the regular force only represents an insignificant total in face of a formidable gathering of irregular warriors, passive |
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defence is out of place. The history of British small wars of the present generation, however, unfortunately provides three deplorable examples of serious defeats which can be directly attributable to an attitude of passive defence. In none of these cases did the circumstances restrict the troops to this attitude. There is every reason to believe that in each case active defence, if not actual attack, would have completely changed the complexion of affairs. | |
Examples. |
After the failure of the attack on Laing's Neck in the Boor war of 1881, the enemy began to cut the communications of the British force facing the hostile position, and to raid long distances into Natal. It was decided to march a part of the force back to Newcastle to reopen communications. No sooner had this detachment left camp than the Boers, mounting their ponies, moved round over the hills to intercept it; and in this they succeeded. The British force was compelled to take up a position near the Ingogo river, which proved to be particularly bad--a low undulation was occupied, an undulation fringed below with rocks which gave perfect cover to the enemy while the troops were exposed on the sky line. The Boers, approaching in small parties and making skilful use of the folds of ground to hide their movements, formed a ring round the position and tired on the guns and infantry from behind the rocks, while the British force remained a passive target for the hostile bullets till darkness closed in and put an end to the fight. The losses were very heavy, and the troops only succeeded in withdrawing to where they had come from during the night by extraordinary good fortune. Tho Boors were in no overwhelming force, they were scattered while the British were concentrated, and the distance to be traversed in a rush was small, so that everything pointed to the certainty that a vigorous charge with the bayonet would have groat effect. The Boor* «t the point selected for the effort would have rushed to their mounts, for they had no weapons with which to meet shock tactics, and they would thus have given the rifles of the infantry and the guns a chance which t hey never got throughout the disastrous engagement. |
The circumstances at Majuba hill were somewhat similar a few days later. The British force had during the night gained the summit of this flat topped hill with its steep and broken sides, a hill commanding the Boer position at Laing's Neck, but not within rifle range. After a momentary and not unjustifiable panic on discovering the British at daybreak on the hill above them, the Boors boldly prepared to attack it Its sides afforded excellent cover, inasmuch as terraces gave rise to considerable areas of dead ground. The troops for the most part were drawn up on the summit away from the edges, only a few men being told off to fire down the slopes. The Boers succeeded in creeping up unobserved to immediately below a small |
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detached koppie, held by a party who flanked the face up which the main attempt was being made. A sudden and most effective volley practically cleared this koppie, and following close on the heels of the survivors, the Boers reached the crest. If ever there was an opportunity for a bayonet charge it was this; bat in place of a counter-attack the enemy was met by a mere desultory fusillade, the troops were unaware that their assailants were not numerically a formidable body, uncertainty and the fatal feeling of inferiority which mere passive defence engenders led to panic, and the men broke and fled. It is not a pleasant story, but it is a most instructive one. At the Ingogo river there was the excuse for not delivering a counter-attack that, in crossing the 200 or 300 yards from the British position to where the Boers were crouching behind their rooks, serious loss must have occurred. On Majuba hill it was a mere matter of a rush of a few yards, and of keeping up the confidence of the troops by making them feel that if they were caught in a trap there was a way out of it. | |
The other instance referred to is Maiwand. Here it was not a case of confronting Europeans armed with rifles in the use of which they were trained from childhood, but of fighting Asiatics--Asiatics in considerable force it is true and well supplied with guns, but none the less Asiatics. Tho British force, quitting ground where a purely defensive action might have been fought with some hopes of success, moved out to meet the Afghan army and formed up on a stony plain for battle. Ayoub Khan's force was allowed to slowly deploy from column of route, and to form a line of battle to a certain extent enveloping the troops. The hostile guns were enabled to bring a concentric fire to bear on the British position, which lasted for some hours and demoralised the native troops, infantry and cavalry. When after a period of purely passive defence under trying circumstances, a great ghazi rush supervened, the native troops gave way and the line was completely broken. It is said that Ayoub Khan's Herati regiments suffered so severely from the British shells that they retired twice, and that they would have fled at the first attack. Whether or not this be the case, there is no doubt that a passive defensive under such circumstances was inexcusable. The British Empire in India would have a very different history if a passive defensive attitude had been adopted at Plassey and at Meani, where the hostile superiority of force was far more marked than it was at Maiwand at the outset, and where, when the armies oame in contact, the enemy was drawn up for battle instead of being in motion and in column of route. | |
Active defence. |
It is a relief to turn from the consideration of passive defence, totally opposed as it generally is to the fundamental principles upon which small wars should be conducted, to that of active defence. It is not always practicable to attack, and it is not always desirable to do so. At times regular troops will find themselves acting on the defensive in small wars, even |
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when the disparity between the forces is not so marked as to render this necessary. When this is the case a great chance often presents itself of seizing upon the moment when the enemy is disordered by advance, to deliver a crushing counterattack. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the value of cavalry at such a moment. When irregular warriors get into disorder, or when their heart fails them just when they are about to drive their attack home, the bravest of them are easily thrown into panic, and once a panic sets in they dissolve into a helpless mob. Cavalry then gets its chance; but even if there bo no cavalry a rapid and resolute advance of foot soldiers may achieve much, and all preparations for such an advance should have been made in anticipation of the event. In such cases as Ahmed Khel in Afghanistan, as Ulundi and Gringhilovo in Zululand, and as Abu Klea, where the enemy approaches suddenly in great force and with much ferocity, the force of the attack breaks itself in the assault, and the survivors disperse after their onslaught has failed--they do not give the regular troops time or opportunity to deliver a counter-attack, unless a force of cavalry be at hand and the terrain permit of the action of this arm. As a general rule, however, the hostile attack is not pushed home with such vigour and suddenness, and in consequence there arc more opportunities for a telling counter-stroke. | |
Remarks on defensive order of battle. |
On the defensive a great development of fire is essential, and unless there is risk of a fanatical rush strong reserves are not required. In view of the tendency of irregular opponents to circle round the flanks these should if possible rest on ground very favourable for defence, or else they should be well protected by cavalry or guns; at Maiwand the flanks were quite en Fair, although the cavalry succeeded in keeping the enemy at a respectful distance from the one most exposed. It will sometimes be expedient to keep special reserves intended to deliver the counter-attack, concealed in rear of the fighting fine. No definite rule on this head can be laid down, |
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it is seldom possible to decide in advance exactly bow and where a counter-attack will be delivered; but the force should be so disposed as to ensure that, whenever in the course oi the action it is proposed to change from the defensive to the offensive, there may be troops on the spot to make the counter-stroke with power and effect. | |
The engagement at Kailua ae example of active defence. |
The combat at Kailua in front of Langson where General Negrier defeated the Chinese after the reverse suffered at Bang Bo described on p. 169 is an excellent example of a skillfully planned active defensive. The French position is shown on the rough sketch opposite, the reserve being in rear of Kailua on the right. The small entrenched camp on the left, the two redoubts and the village of Kailua, all formed valuable defensive pivots, so that the position, although commanded, was a formidable one. |
The Chinese were drawn on by the outposts as these retired into the plain, General Negrier having given orders to reserve fire so as to attract them to close quarters. They developed their principal attacks against the left where, encouraged by the cessation of fire on the part of the French, they pressed up close to the line. Fire being then suddenly opened they lost heavily and fell back some distance. They, however, came on again courageously on this side in spite of heavy losses, the French always reserving their fire till it should be thoroughly effective. Then General Negrier ordered part of the reserve to move out round the right of Kailua and to fall upon the enemy in flank from the rear. This decided the day. The Chinese left was rolled up, the reverse on this side immediately caused panic, and the whole force fell back completely defeated. Unfortunately just as the day was won General Negrier was severely wounded, and the victory was not followed up as it should have been. | |
Advantages of a line formation over square, even when the enemy is addicted to shock tactics. |
The advantages of the square formation for meeting enveloping hostile attacks, and for ensuring that a firm front shall be offered to an enemy, the direction of whose sudden onslaughts can never be foreseen with certainty, will be pointed out and dealt with fully in Chapter XVII. But when the direction which the hostile assault will take can be foreseen approximately, and when the ground is fairly open so that the opposing force cannot creep round the flanks and make a sudden rush upon the rear, the need for square formation is not so very apparent even when fighting against savages who charge up recklessly to close quarters. An order of battle in irregular line with flanks thrown back, with the |
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cavalry ready to act on the flanks and with the guns distributed so as to ensure shell fire being brought to bear on any point from which the enemy is delivering a determined attack, is excellent. If there is a fairly good field of fire there should be no fear whatever of the line being broken as long as good fire discipline is maintained, and in such a formation more rifles can be brought into play and a more extended position can be occupied than if square be adhered to. Strong reserves, which seriously reduce the number of rifles in the front line, are always out of place; but small local reserves are desirable, especially towards the flanks. | |
Examples. |
At Ahmed Khel the enemy was found in strong force on high ground to the left, and across the front, of the route which was being followed by Sir D. Stewart's force marching on Ghazni. All the troops available were formed for attack and the guns opened fire. Then a swarm of ghazis suddenly charged down towards the troops, and a mass of hostile cavalry which had been seen on the right of the Afghan position attacked the British loft. The consequence of this was that the British force was at the moment of the hostile onslaught drawn up in a long line with intervals, the guns being on the right. While the Afghan cavalry fell upon the loft of the line, the fanatic swordsmen attacked the front and centre. Tho infantry held their ground. On the right the guns kept the enemy off, although it was found necessary to withdraw them somewhat and to throw book this flank so as to form a front against the hostile onslaught on this side; some squadrons were also sent to prolong the line here. Tho attack of horsemen on the left, in the meantime, had caused considerable confusion, the native cavalry being caught at such a disadvantage that the Afghan horsemen were eventually only checked by the infantry in rallying squares. Finally with the great development of fire which the long lino was able to bring to bear, the enemy was repulsed with overwhelming slaughter. |
Matters had been critical for a few moments because of the tremendously sudden nature of the hostile attack, for which on so large a scale previous operations in Afghanistan had afforded no precedent But a defensive lino of battle, taken up more or less at haphazard, proved excellently adapted to the circumstances. And the reason of this was that it admitted of a great development of fire. | |
At the fight of Tokar in 1891, the Egyptian troops were suddenly attacked by the Mahdists in great force, hut managed at the last moment to occupy a semi-circular position supported by the ruined buildings of the old village. Formed up roughly in line, they boat off the enemy. The Arabs worked round the flanks, however, and caused some havoc among the baggage in rear. |
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Colonel Macdonald's brigade beat off formidable enveloping attacks at Khartum by dint of changes of front in lino. The combat is described on pp. 387, 388. | |
Difficulty as to flanks. |
The flanks are in fact the great difficulty. The enemy instinctively shirks the frontal fire of the fine, and in consequence the attack of irregular warriors is almost always enveloping. Zulus, Sudanese, and Moors are all equally addicted to sweeping round the flanks of their opponents, and at Adowa the Abyssinian attacks were so delivered as to envelope the separate brigades of the Italians. Guns on the flanks are excellent, as shown at Ahmed Khel; but if so placed their fire may be lost to a great extent at the start. Artillery pushed out well to the front of either flank at the outset and withdrawn later to cover the flanks, is an excellent arrangement; the objection to it is that, with troops which cannot thoroughly be depended upon--native auxiliaries for instance--the sight of the guns retiring may have a bad effect, and withdrawing the artillery even a small distance certainly gives the enemy encouragement. At Maiwand the withdrawal of the smooth bore guns from want of ammunition appears to have had a very unfortunate result. |
In discussing defensive tactics in small wars, theory must to a large extent take the place of teachings from actual campaigns. The spirit of attack animates the regular troops and their leaders in this warfare, and defensive actions are therefore the exception and not the rule. History cannot in fact be drawn upon to the same extent as in dealing with offensive tactics. | |
The enemy may decline to attack. |
Occupying a position and awaiting attack in it, leaves to the enemy the choice of fighting or not fighting. Some opponents when in fighting mood may be trusted to attack, but they can never be depended upon to do so with absolute certainty, and if the enemy declines action there is some risk of no fighting coming off, which is of course in most cases a most undesirable consummation. Therefore when a |
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position is held in these campaigns in the hope that it will he attacked, arrangements should generally have been made to quit it and to assume the offensive in case the opponents shirk the engagement. The Mahdists seldom showed disinclination for battle at the outset of a campaign, but the action at Agordat in 1893 shows that even these reckless fanatics could not always be tempted into assaulting a position which had been prepared to meet their attack. | |
In preparation for the advance of a large force of the enemy, the Italian troops had occupied and prepared a position for defence. The Mahdist army approached, but passed by on the other side. The Italian general determined to force a tight, so he moved out of his position towards the hostile army. Under the altered circumstances the Dervishes at once accepted battle. The enemy attacked with great spirit, compelling the Italians to fall back a little with the loss of their guns by the suddenness of the onset. Then, however, the effect of arms of precision speedily began to tell, the troops advanced again, recovering the guns, and in the end completely dispersed the enemy. | |
Conclusion. |
It sometimes comes about that a body of regular troops failing back before irregular warriors, can turn the tide by occupying a strong position. As, however, some special points with regard to retreats deserve notice and can best be dealt with in a separate chapter, defensive tactics under such special conditions will be most advantageously treated under that heading. The whole question of the defensive in small wars is wrapped up very much with that of squares and of defence works. A brave and enterprising enemy acting in masses brings about the system of laagers, zeribas, and squares. But as a rule the antagonists with whom regular troops have to cope in small wars, do not fight in this fashion and they should be attacked without hesitation unless very strong grounds exist for not doing so. Resolute initiative is the secret of success. A defensive attitude is generally unsound in principle, and it is not assumed in practice without good reason by a leader who understands how to deal with irregular warriors. |
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