Drawing the enemy on. |
It is strange that the commanders of regular forces should 3 so often succeed in small wars in drawing the enemy into action by subterfuge and stratagem. Irregular warriors individually possess the cunning which their mode of life engenders. Their chieftains are subtle and astute. All orientals have an inborn love of trickery and deception, the Red Indians have won an evil notoriety by their duplicity and craftiness, and even mere savages like the Maoris and the Kaffirs are constantly imposing upon regular troops by many forms of tactical artifice. But in spite of this, history affords numerous examples of such antagonists being lured out of strong positions or enticed into unfavourable situations, by bodies of trained soldiers handled skillfully--so much is this indeed the case that the subject merits a special chapter, the more so because the system can be turned to account both in attack and in defence. |
Reasons why this can so often be carried out. |
That adversaries so strongly addicted to the employment of ruses and feints should often be so easily deceived themselves is, no doubt, in no small degree due to their contempt for the stolid methods of regular warfare. They see how cramped the movements are of the troops who have come to fight them. Lying in ambush to out off stragglers, lurking by night around outposts, watching the camp routine of the regular army, they perceive that it is by the system of partizan warfare that they can best offer it resistance. Experience shows them that at this sort of work they often prove |
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more than, a match for the trained soldier, and so they come to underrate the capacity of their antagonists for turning the tables upon them and for employing stratagem and artifice upon their side. | |
The great importance of moral effect in these wars has been already dealt with in earlier chapters, and the impressionable nature of the opponents whom the regular troops have to combat b such operations, becomes a potent factor when this question of feints comes up for consideration; it exposes them to be enticed into premature attacks, or to be drawn out of positions which they may have taken up deliberately and with a sound appreciation of the military conditions obtaining. If they are readily cowed by the steady advance and resolute bearing of the regular army on the march and in attack, they are also singularly quick at discerning signs of wavering or of retrogression on its part, and this a resourceful commander when he has such foes to deal with will from time to time be able to turn to account. | |
How enemy's eagerness to follow up a retiring force can be turned to account. |
Examples illustrating the promptitude with which the enemy turns upon the regular troops if these fall back, and of the spasmodic intrepidity with which they throw themselves into a pursuit in the first flush of triumph, might be multiplied--this characteristic has already been dealt with in considering retreats. It is a feature of their mode of war and one always to be reckoned with. Following an enemy up persistently may not be understood by irregular warriors; but they start a pursuit full of vigour and eagerness for the fray. Now a wary commander who has his forces well in hand can sometimes reap distinct benefit from this peculiarity of savage and semi-civilized foemen. By simulating a retreat, or by a well-timed show of hesitation, he can induce the hostile forces to place themselves in a position of tactical disadvantage. With some adversaries it is only by some such plan as this that they can be got to put up a fight at all. Hill-men and savages of parts of Africa dwelling in the bush are very difficult |
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to meet in open ground, they stick to their cover obstinately and never give the troops a chance unless, in hope of loot or excited to it by seeing the troops fall back^ they rush out, carried away by an uncontrollable impulse. | |
Hostile leaders cannot control their followers. |
Even when the adversaries are well disciplined and thoroughly under the control of their leaders, the excitement of seeing the regular troops wavering or in retreat snaps the ties which place them in subordination. In the enthusiasm of supposed victory they get out of hand. It is indeed noteworthy that this loosening of the bonds of discipline in a moment of success is not confined alone to the side opposing the regular forces. Most European nations employ native soldiers and local levies to a certain extent in the small wars which they become involved in. Experience has proved that the Sudanese troops of the Egyptian army, splendid fighting material as they are, can scarcely be controlled when they see the enemy on the run. In Tonkin the Turco officers used in the heat of action to make their men He down and cease firing to make them tractable. The leaders may suspect a trap, but they cannot always check the rush to the front of men not thoroughly trained as soldiers, who see a prize almost within their grasp and fear to lose it. This being so, it is little wonder that bands of fanatics, of cut-throat mountaineers or African savages, cannot be kept in hand under such circumstances by their Chieftains. |
The Zulus drawn into premature attack at Kambula. |
A typical example of a successful feint is afforded by the battle of Kambula. The incident about to be related is an excellent illustration of the manner in which a commander of trusty troops may draw an enemy into premature attack, and by doing so may render a 'signal service to the entire force of which his detachment forms a part. It must be borne in mind that the Zulus, ill-armed and poorly organized as they were, were comparatively speaking highly disciplined and that they ordinarily obeyed implicitly those set in authority over them. |
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The Zulu army marching to attack Kambula divided into three columns as it drew near the camp. One circled round the. position to the right, another took a direction to the left, the centre moved straight on it. Tho right column reached its position first and halted out of range of the guns, whereupon Colonel Wood sent out the mounted nun under Lieutenant-Colonels Russell and Buller to engage this right column. They rode up close to it, dismounted, and opened fire Zulu discipline could not restrain the mass from springing up and bearing down upon the party of horsemen; these promptly remounted, and keeping up a running tight with the impi drew it on till it was close to the laager. There the Zulus came under heavy fire from the infantry on very open ground, and they lust so severely that they were compelled to fall back under the cover of name rocks and took no more part in the action. A third of the hostile army was, in fact, disastrously defeated before the regular attack upon the British position began. | |
Examples. |
This drawing the enemy on by pretended retirement or by sending out a small force to entice the hostile forces into premature action, as at Kambula, has been frequently practised with great success in this sort of warfare. At Sikak, the only regular battle which Abd el Kader attempted with the French troops, the fact that General Bugeaud was compelled to shirk engagement for a time on account of the need of getting his convoy into a place of security, really drew the Emir's forces on and committed them to a definite trial of strength so that the general was able to light them on ground favourable to himself. The manoeuvre is a time-honoured one and was often practised in the days when armies fought in compact masses under the absolute control of their chief. The Normans employed it with conspicuous success at Hastings. Regulars have generally used it with best results against less organized bodies. In 1521 Barbarossa lured the Arabs, Berbers, and Kabyles out of their entrenched camps at Millel by this ruse, and then inflicted a crushing defeat upon them. Jomini relates how in 1799 the French attacking Naples, which was being defended by the populace, pretended to retreat after they had gained a footing in the city, drawing the lazzaroni after them; having got the rabble clear of the streets the troops turned upon the defenders, beat them in the open, and forced their way through the streets at their heels. |
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Modem small wars afford some excellent examples of feints of this kind. They have often been practised in hill warfare and jungle operations, which will be dealt with in later chapters. They have been found practicable even in engagements on an important scale, and of this the following incident in the Mutiny may be quoted as an instance:-- | |
Sir H. Havelock on his first advance from Cawnpore for the relief of the residency at Lucknow, found the rebels holding the village of Onao and drove them out of it. The space was somewhat restricted by swamps on either side of the high road by which he was advancing. Perceiving strong-hostile reinforcements pressing up, he withdrew some way from the village to a favourable position where his troops were partially concealed. The enemy, encouraged by his retreat, came on to attack him, and so fell into the trap. The British suddenly opened fire, detachments wading through the swamps demonstrated against the hostile flanks, and the rebels fled, abandoning 15 guns. | |
Value of the stratagem of pretended retreat in insurrectionary war. |
In suppressing insurrections regular troops may be able to use this stratagem with good effect even when their opponents are intelligent and well armed; those in revolt have not the cohesion or the trust in their leaders requisite to enable these to hold them back. A. remarkable example of this occurred in 1821 during the Wallachian insurrection against Ottoman rule. |
The commander of a Turkish force, learning that a rebel battalion, specially noted as the holy battalion, was in the vicinity, sent some dismounted troopers to seek it out The party of horsemen on coming up with the enemy left their horses under cover and advanced on foot. The battalion, taking the troopers for infantry, charged them at once and pursued them back to the village where their horses were. The Turks then mounted and suddenly fell upon the rebels, scattered as they were, and with their muskets unloaded. Being almost defenceless the Wallachians were nearly all cut down. | |
Cavalry especially well adapted for this sort of work. |
In this case it is seen how well adapted cavalry is for this sort of work. At the action of Futtehabad near Jellalabad in 1879 the cavalry and horse artillery were very successful in drawing a formidable body of Shinwarris out of a strong position while the infantry were coming up. The case of |
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Kambula already mentioned shows how effectively mounted infantry assumes the rôle of decoy, for in most cases the cavalry must act dismounted to produce a good result. Cavalry is, however, almost always preferable, because if the horses can be kept concealed there is not only a good chance of drawing on the enemy but opportunity may also offer of delivering very-effective charges upon the adversaries when these are advancing in disorder. The Mowing two examples may be given in support of that from the Wallachian war of independence, which has been quoted above :-- | |
In 1860, a large body of Waziris without provocation made a raid from their hills into the plain near Tank, with the intention of sacking that town. Bessaldar Saadat Khan commanding the troop of cavalry at Tank collected some other mounted levies and advanced to meet the Waziris. He found them in awkward ground near the hills, but by retiring he gradually lured them right out into open country. Then suddenly he turned, first cut them off from the hills and then with his 200 sabres charged them. The enemy numbering 3,000 was thrown into complete confusion. The whole mass fled precipitately. 300 were killed, and many were wounded including the head man of the tribe. The cavalry in this brilliant exploit only lost one man killed, and a few wounded. | |
At the end of the Kaffir war in 1878, a mixed British and Colonial force was in position at a place called Kwintana. It was threatened by both the Galekas and the Gaikas, of which the latter (it afterwards transpired) were being held back by their chief Sandilli who did not think an attack opportune. To bring on a fight the mounted troopers were sent out with orders to advance and to then retire in haste before the enemy. The stratagem proved perfectly successful. The Galekas eagerly followed up the mounted troops as they fell back, and the Gaikas could no longer be restrained and joined them The infantry was kept concealed in trenches till the Kaffirs were within easy range, then a few volleys sufficed to utterly defeat them. | |
Enticing the enemy into an ambuscade. |
In this latter case the enemy was really drawn into a skillfully planned ambush. The French in Algeria managed on several occasions to profit by similar artifices, their commanders whose names grew famous in the years of warfare which followed on the capture of Algiers--Lamoriciere Changarnier, Saint Arnaud, &c.--acquiring great skill in operations of this class. "War," says an Arab proverb, "is stratagem applied by force." Abd el Kader and his |
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satellites were past masters in the art of carrying out surprises and planning ambuscades, and the French learnt this method of conducting war from those who they had come to conquer. One illustration from these operations will suffice. | |
Four battalions were, marching over the pass of Muzaia in 1840, when they learnt that the Arabs were at hand in force. The baggage under one battalion was quickly sent off, two battalions were hidden in a fold of the ground close to the route, the fourth battalion, by getting touch with the enemy and then retreating rapidly, drew the hostile forces after them into the ambuscade which had been prepared. The two battalions which had been concealed suddenly charged out with the bayonet upon the Arabs, and threw them into complete confusion. | |
Enemy sometimes drawn on unintentionally. |
By a show of weakness, accidental or intended, irregular forces are often completely misled. That the enemy may sometimes be drawn on to a certain extent unintentionally was well shown at the action of Arogee in Abyssinia in 1868. In this engagement the Abyssinians were enticed out of a formidable position by a disposition of the regular forces which had not been ordained with the idea of drawing the enemy into the open. |
King Theodore's forces occupied some heights very difficult of access, covering the approaches to Magdala and overlooking a plateau upon which the British force necessarily debouched as it advanced upon the Abyssinian stronghold. The baggage of the leading brigade, moving by a different route to the bulk of the brigade, approached this plateau practically abreast of the rest of the troops. King Theodore, observing that the train of mules was apparently unprotected, ordered his soldiery to rush down and seize the booty. The British troops were hurried across to confront the enemy and to protect the baggage, and they moved so rapidly that they met the hostile swarms on the plateau where there was no advantage of position favouring the Abyssinians. The result was a decisive victory with trifling loss, which completely demoralized the Kong's farces and which paved the way for the capture of the mountain fortress a few days later without encountering serious opposition. | |
The march of Colonel Kelly's force to relieve Chitral in 1895 affords an interesting illustration of an unintentional feint on a small scale. | |
The enemy was holding some groups of sangars on the far side of the Nis Gol ravine near Mastuj barring the road to Chitral. The fire of the |
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troops was beginning to have its effect, and when it was perceived that the Chitralis were preparing to evacuate their defences arrangements were made to cross the ravine, which was a very awkward precipitous sided nullah. The sappers and one company began scrambling down at one point with the assistance of ropes and ladders, but, after a few of the party had descended it so happened that a bullet struck some gun-cotton on the top and ignited it; the remainder of the men were thereupon ordered to retire a short way for fear of an explosion. Seeing this the enemy at once advanced defiantly out of their sangars on the other side. On quitting their cover the tribesmen came under so heavy a fire from companies preparing to descend by the road, that they fled right across the open, and numbers of them were shot down. | |
Drawing the enemy on by exposing baggage, etc. |
The case of Arogee shows how the enemy will sometimes be drawn into attack by the hope of booty. The baggage column appeared to offer a tempting prey to the Abyssinians, although its march was not designed by the British commander with the idea of drawing them down from their formidable position. What occurred on that occasion shows that such opponents can sometimes be lured into action by exposing baggage, transport, cattle and so forth, apparently inviting capture. The undisciplined fighting man revels in pillage, and is difficult to restrain in any case if he sees booty apparently at his mercy; in rebellions the enemy may bo moved by patriotism or may be stirred to action by some supposed wrong, but in most small wars the forces which the regular troops meet on the battle-field are really fighting mainly from the love of loot. Plunder is their motive in keeping the field, they fight for fighting's sake because a victory means spoil, and such adversaries can be trapped readily if the bait be tempting enough and if the escort be kept out of sight. |
Drawing enemy on by artillery fire. |
Although not exactly a feint Colonel Macdonald's use of the guns with his brigade at Khartum for drawing the enemy on deserves mention here. |
The problem was to induce a man of Dervishes who were preparing to attack from the west to deliver their onslaught before another mass to the north, also preparing to attack, delivered theirs. Colonel Macdonald ordered his batteries to open fire on the western force, and the effect was instantaneoUs. The Dervishes swarmed down from that side and the artillery and |
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infantry fire just succeeded in breaking the force of the attack in time for part of the brigade to be formed up facing the southern mass when this advanced. As described further on, on page 387, the western attack was finally disposed of and the whole brigade formed up on a new front by the time the southern attack fully developed. | |
Inducing the enemy to hold his ground when inclined to retire. |
But there is another form of feint which is often as useful in warfare of this class as the feint designed to get the enemy to come out into the open. A show of indecision or a temporary retirement will sometimes induce opponents who are not very skillful in appreciating a military situation, to hold their ground when there is danger of their withdrawing and escaping an engagement. A great display of force may, as pointed out in an earlier chapter, have the effect of frightening the enemy away; conversely, concealment of strength tends to encourage the foe to risk an action. The results of the reconnaissance in force which was carried out by a part of Sir F. Roberts's force the day before the battle of Kandahar illustrates this very well; when the reconnaissance had achieved its purpose and the troops fell back, the Afghans followed them up some distance under the impression that the demonstration meant a real attack upon their position, and they were much encouraged and elated at their supposed victory; Ayoub Khan appears to have been largely influenced by the events of the day in his resolve to hold his ground. Thus the reconnaissance not only gained much valuable information for the battle of the morrow, but it had the further effect of assisting to keep the Afghan army in the position which it had taken up, and it thereby ensured a decisive engagement. The reconnaissance in force previous to the battle of the Atbara drew strong detachments of the enemy out of their zeriba; it probably served to greatly encourage the Khalifa's forces to stand their ground and to give the Anglo-Egyptian army a chance of utterly defeating them. |
Feints as to intended point of attack. |
Just as such adversaries can, in spite of the wariness and cunning characteristic of races not wholly civilized, often be tempted into premature action, or can be enticed out of |
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ground favourable to their method of war, they can also be misled by feints and stratagems designed to give them a false impression of the point selected for attack by the commander of the regular forces. Guerillas often resort to such ruses, and they frequently succeed by these means in deceiving practised officers. Still they can at times be repaid in their own coin. In the fighting after the capture of Nilt Fort in the Hunza-Nagar country the frequent attempts upon the centre of the hostile position had drawn the attention of the enemy mainly upon that point; when, by a daring scramble up the precipitous hills, a party of the troops reached the extreme left of the tribesmen's position these were taken completely aback. On the afternoon before the attack on the Peiwar Kotal a great parade was made of throwing up batteries in front of the Afghan position to induce the enemy to expect a frontal attack. An interesting example of a successful feint of this kind is afforded by the fighting at Batoche in 1885, where the rebels collected by Biel were finally dispersed. | |
General Middleton found the half-breeds holding a long line of rifle pita stretching across the land enclosed by a wide salient angle formed by the Saskatchewan. The Government forces encamped opposite one end of this line of defence, formed a zeriba and remained facing the enemy four days engaged in skirmishes. On the third day the mounted troops made a demonstration against the hostile centre, and it was observed that a part of Riel's followers were withdrawn from that end of the line which was opposite the zeriba, to strengthen the threatened point. On the following day this demonstration was repeated by the mounted men, assisted by two guns, and these then returned quietly to camp. In the afternoon the whole Government force attacked the end of the rebel line in front of the zeriba. It had been greatly weakened there, and the troops had little difficulty in breaking through and in reaching Batoche. The undulating nature of the ground and the patches of woods and copses enabled the feint to be carried out in very effective fashion. | |
In some oases the enemy cannot be drawn into action. |
Instances might be multiplied to show how valuable artifices of this nature may prove upon the battle-field in these wars, how the enemy can be induced by skilful manoeuvring to forego the advantages he may enjoy as regards position, how he maybe led to precipitate his attacks, |
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The action of Toski as an illustration of this. |
and how he may be bluffed into withdrawing his forces from the decisive point. But before concluding the chapter it may be mentioned that episodes have occurred proving that irregular warriors cannot always be deceived or lured on in this fashion. The British frontier campaigns in India show that it is generally quite impossible to attract hill-men down to fight on the plains. All attempts to draw the Matabili out of the bush failed, and they showed clearly that they would choose their own time for attacking the colonial force. The remarkable action at Toski in 1899 is worth quoting as an example of a force which consisted largely of Moslem fanatics--warriors especially prone to allow themselves to be carried away in pursuit of a retreating foe--declining battle even after a portion of it had actually been tempted into action, simply as a consequence of the whole being dominated by a resolute will. |
Wad en Nejumi's singular march northwards past Wadi Haifa has been already referred to on p. 87. His goal was Egypt. Regardless of his threatened line of retreat and of the sufferings of his force from want of food and water, shutting his eyes to the hopelessness of the enterprise upon which he had embarked, unterrified by the imposing concentration of troops which he must have known were assembling to give him battle, he doggedly pressed on to near Toski. A little further on were some low rugged rocky hills where he would be in a position to offer effective resistance to the Egyptian forces. General Grenfell determined to prevent his reaching these, and as the event proved, the Dervish chieftain was equally resolved to gain their shelter. | |
Moving out from Toski to reconnoitre the Dervish position in the desert, General Grenfell found that the ground which the enemy must cross on his next advance was very open and favourable for an action. As all the troops which were mustering for the fight had not yet reached Toski, a reconnaissance of the mounted troops was determined on for the following day. The troops were ordered to show as broad a front as possible so as, if possible, to induce the Dervish leader to delay his advance. | |
When this reconnaissance got touch of the hostile forces next day, these were found to be just preparing to march. On sighting the Egyptian troops the enemy at once moved out against them, and the troops were com. polled to retire gradually, drawing the fighting men of the Dervish army after them. General Grenfell thereupon sent for the infantry which had been, held in readiness in camp; but before the infantry arrived Nejumi had |
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evidently determined to avoid a battle and to make for the broken ground. The mounted troops were therefore sent to bar his way by making a long detour which brought them athwart the hostile line of march, and the infantry were hurried up with all speed. In the end the enemy was forced to fight and was, after a severe struggle, completely routed. | |
To start with, in fact, the Dervish force was tempted into a partial engagement. But Nejumi was so determined to effect his purpose of marching on, that he actually began a flank march past the mounted troops, covering his exposed flank by clouds of skirmishers. By his handling of his forces he showed himself a singularly resolute and capable leader, and, but for General Grenfell's promptitude in bringing the infantry up, and for his rapidly taking decision to force a general engagement, the strangely constituted Dervish army would have passed Toski, would have reached the broken ground further on, and might have given much trouble there. | |
Conclusion. |
This question of feints and stratagems meant to goad the enemy into action has been dealt with at some length because, as it is notorious that the adversaries with whom regular troops have to cope in irregular operations are much addicted to ruses and deception, it might be supposed that they would naturally be difficult to impose upon. But the numerous instances quoted serve to show that this is not really the case. |
It must be confessed that in the late South African war neither Boers nor rebels were easily deceived. As the campaign wore on and the cunning alike of commandants and individuals was shown in the hundreds of skirmishes which were taking place, it became more and more common to try feints and ruses so as to get the wary enemy at a disadvantage. But the stratagems seldom succeeded. The adversary was too wide awake. It is one of the many respects in which the contest for supremacy south of the Zambesi stands apart. In conflicts with a lower type of antagonist it is different. In spite of his native cunning the savage can be over-reached, the crafty bill-man can be deceived, and it is due to no fortuitous circumstance that occasions so frequently occur where irregular adversaries are brought to confusion by a trick. The discipline and cohesion of trained soldiers enables a skilful general to handle his force in such a manner as, without |
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risk, to induce in the opposing forces the belief that they can east prudence aside and can engage themselves on ground where the tactical superiority of the regular army has full scope. It is an important point to bear in mind in combats against irregular warriors, for to decisively beat such opponents it is almost always necessary to catch them in the open. |
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