Importance of the service of security. |
IN WARFARE against irregular forces the service of security is a subject of paramount importance. Owing to the lines on which such foes conduct their operations, it follows almost is a matter of course that the safeguarding of the troops Erom the surprises and ambuscades to which they are so greatly exposed, whether they be on the move or at rest, is a matter to which exceptional care and attention must be devoted. The theatre of war is often little known, its broken intersected character usually favours the hostile plan of causing petty annoyance to the troops, information is untrustworthy, and in consequence the regular soldiers must ever be on the alert and must constantly be prepared for the unexpected. At the halt an effective system of outposts is essential. On the move precautions must be taken lest the troops fall into some snare or be thrown into confusion by the sudden attack of an enemy who disappears as soon as they recover from their surprise. All this forms a very important branch of military art in operations of this class. |
The service of security always divides itself into two great branches. When the force is halted, outposts have to be arranged for. When it is on the march the protection of the column must be assured by means of mobile detachments!--patrols, advanced and rear guards, and so forth. And the former being upon the whole the more important and the more difficult to arrange, will be treated of first. | |
Outposts. Hour at which the |
The first point to refer to in considering the question of outposts is the hour at which irregular warriors like to make |
enemy is most likely to give trouble. |
their attacks. It is somewhat singular that, as experience proves, foemen of this class generally have a marked disinclination for night attacks. Some observations will be included in Chapter XXVII on the best methods of repelling nocturnal assaults when they are attempted, but it may be taken as a general feature of small wars that the enemy is much less disposed to undertake such enterprises than might be supposed from the conditions of the case. Operations in the dark would seem naturally to favour forces which so rarely possess an armament comparable to that with which the regular troops are supplied. By night arms of precision lose much of their value, and there is therefore often a chance for irregular warriors with their swords and spears to rush in to close quarters and in the melée to gain the upper hand by force of numbers. History nevertheless shows that the opponents with whom the trained and disciplined soldier has to deal in small wars rarely display much keenness for such undertakings. |
Hostile night attacks unusual. |
Examining the records of the numerous campaigns of the last few decades it is surprising how seldom regular night attacks have been attempted by the enemy. In the Persian campaign of 1857, a resolute attack was made upon Sir J. Outram's force the night before the action at Khushab. A desperate onslaught was made by the tribesmen one night on the celebrated Crag Picquet in the Ambela campaign. A few cases occurred in Algeria and Tunis. The Bed Indians made some effective night attacks on the United States troops. The Maoris made one on Sentry Hill; and during the operations against the Mohmunds and Swatis in 1897 the tribesmen showed a disposition to undertake nocturnal attacks upon the British forts and camps which is rarely evinced by the Pathans in hill warfare--it is noticeable that this should have occurred in territory adjacent to Ambela. In the early days of the Tonkin war, when the Black Flags were still to the fore, these made some desperate night attacks upon the |
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French. During General Skobelef s siege of Denghil Tepe the Tekkes made some most determined sorties under cover of darkness against the Russian trenches. The remarkable night attacks of the Boers upon British camps and columns in 1901-02, to which especial reference will be made further on, are fresh in the memory of us all. But these cases are the exceptions, and it is a noteworthy fact that, except in the case of the Boer operations, there is scarcely an example to be found of such an enterprise on the part of the enemy succeeding. Not many instances can indeed be quoted of such night attacks even causing serious danger. | |
The Kaffir wars, the Russian campaigns in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Indian Mutiny and the Chinese war furnish scarcely a single illustration. There were no cases in the Spanish war of 1859 against Morocco. Ashanti, Dahomey, and Achin afford no instances, and Burma scarcely any. In the last Afghan war the enemy attempted only two night attacks, each of them on isolated posts--Fort Battye and Dubrai; they succeeded in the latter, but these were very minor episodes of the campaign; in 1841, on the other hand, a determined night attack was made on one of the gates of Kandahar. The Mahdists made no such attempts in the Sudan, although the Khalifa appears to have contemplated attacking Sir H. Kitchener under cover of the darkness, as already related on p. 56. In the Zulu war the onslaught upon the little garrison of Rorke's Drift was carried on for many hours into the night, but the fight had been initiated in the afternoon, and except on this one occasion the Zulus made no night attacks in force. | |
This disinclination of the enemy for assaults in the dark is merely pointed out here as a fact proved by experience. It is not, of course, suggested that because of it precautions should be relaxed at night--quite sufficient instances of nocturnal enterprises by irregular warriors have occurred to render any want of vigilance inexcusable. It must be |
understood moreover that it is only actual night attacks which are unusual, not attacks at dawn. Attacks at daybreak are of very frequent occurrence in these campaigns. | |
Comparatively small site of force helps enemy in preparing for night attacks. |
It should be noted that the small size of the force as a whole, or of its various detachments and columns supposing it to be, broken up into fractions, greatly assists the enemy in making his preparations for a night attack. In regular warfare one side can generally only approach the other at night along its front, or to a certain extent on its flanks. But in small wars the camp or bivouac of the troops seldom occupies a large space and it can be approached from all sides. The consequence of this is that a very effective reconaissance can be made by the enemy in the early hours of the night, aided by the lights of the fires and by the noise of the men and animals. Weak points can be thus detected, the vigilance being exercised by the outposts can be gauged, and plans can be perfected for taking advantage of any favouring circumstances. |
This was well illustrated in the closing guerilla stages of the late South African war. Isolated columns roamed about a theatre of war which generally presented few intricate topographical features. After being on the move all day they would often only reach the bivouac towards evening, or sometimes not till after dark. Then, having come to a halt, the force would gather itself into a comparatively speaking restricted space and would start the necessary cooking and camp duties. A dull roar audible afar off in the stillness denoted its presence. Its position was clearly defined and unmistakeable, and its limits and any defences hastily constructed were easily detected in the bright starlight of a subtropical climate. | |
The Boer night attacks. |
The Boers turned this situation fully to account, and it is a remarkable fact that those admirably executed night attacks of theirs were only initiated when the campaign had ceased to possess any resemblance to regular warfare. Their success in some of their bold undertakings was little short of astonishing. |
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But, while giving them all credit for the skill with which the operations were conducted, and for the dash, resource and foresight with which they were carried out, it must be pointed out that their success was almost invariably the consequence of inefficiency in the service of security on our side. Sometimes the most ordinary precautions were neglected. Sometimes the outposts generally, or individuals forming part of them, failed to exercise vigilance which the conditions of the case imperatively demanded. The troops consisted largely of detachments and bodies of men untrained to war and fortified with only a vague knowledge of the responsibilities which it imposes alike on the commander and on the private. Circumstances undoubtedly favoured the Boers; but the art of war consists in the main of taking advantage of circumstances, and by the way in which the Boers did this and seized their opportunities, they afforded illustrations of the manner in which night attacks should be carried out and of how they should be provided against, for which few campaigns, regular or irregular, afford any parallel. | |
Attacks at dawn very frequent. |
"Whatever may be the case as regards night attacks, it may be accepted as a broad rule that early morning is a specially favourite hour for savages, Asiatics, and irregular opponents of that class in general, to deliver their assault upon regular troops. The reason for this seems to be that, even when such warriors have a perhaps, superstitious dread, of fighting actually in the dark, they are able to creep up mute and unobserved so as to get close to the outposts.. They can gather close to the camp ready to rush forward on the given signal at the first signs of break of day; they hope--there is rarely any justification for the hope--to find the regular forces at that time asleep and unprepared. Antagonists of a higher type again such as insurgents in civilized countries, prefer attacking at dawn to attacking actually at night, because it is easier to carry out the operation when there is some little light. They fully realise the advantage of getting to fairly close quarters under cover of the night. |
Many examples of such early morning attacks could be given--they are so frequent indeed that in most small wars the regular troops stand to their arms shortly before dawn as a matter of course. A few days after the disembarkation of the French expeditionary force in Algeria, in 1830, the forces of the Dey made a most determined attack upon the invaders' camps at daybreak. The first attack upon the Crag Picquet in the Ambela campaign was made at dawn, the important point being temporarily captured by the enemy; it was retaken shortly afterwards. After the capture of Khiva in 1874 by the Russians, the Turkomans, during some operations to the south, delivered a desperate assault on the Russian camp just before daybreak, the footmen were brought up almost to the bayonets seated behind the mounted men and the enemy was only driven off after a severe conflict. The Zulus attacked early in the morning, although by daylight, at Ginghilhovo; they also surprised a detachment on the Intombi river at dawn and nearly destroyed it. On the other hand, it is very noteworthy that the mutineers at Delhi made only one of their many attacks on the ridge at dawn; they knew that they would find the British force ready for them at that hour, so many of their leaders being perfectly well acquainted with the routine of regular troops on active service. The abortive attempt to break into the Sherpur cantonment at Kabul after the British force had been blockaded there for some days in 1879, was made at daybreak. The Dahomeyans twice made attacks upon the French at this hour, at Kotonou in 1891 and at Dogba in 1892 when General Dodds first advanced. In 1882 the Egyptian army advanced in force to attack the British position near Kassassin early in the morning. Sir H. Stewart's force advancing from Abu Klea to the Nile was not molested during its night march, but immediately after daybreak the enemy began to gather and fighting commenced. The Matabili attacked the British laager on the Shangani river in the grey of the morning. |
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The Hovas attempted a daybreak surprise at Tsaratsora on the French advanced troops in 1895--it was almost the only occasion on which they showed any enterprise or on which their leaders showed the slightest military skill during the campaign. Dawn is in fact the time at which a hostile assault is especially to be anticipated in these wars, and preparations should be made accordingly. Even if the whole force does not stand to arms the whole of the outposts should do so if there is the slightest reason to suppose that any hostile forces are in the vicinity. | |
Annoyance by marauders and email hostile parties at night very common. |
Although night attacks are unusual, marauders and small hostile parties are fond of causing annoyance, and their methods call for vigilance on the part of the outposts. In most small wars these irritating acts on the part of the enemy cause a great deal of inconvenience and frequently give rise to scares and confusion. Sniping has of late years become a very serious matter in Indian warfare, causing appreciable losses owing to so many of the tribesmen being armed with efficient rifles. These enterprises on the part of individuals are no menace to the force as a whole, but they are very harassing to the troops and they interfere with the repose which is necessary to keep the men in good condition for the fatigues of active service. There is no certain means of preventing them, no assured specific against the evil; but much can be done by vigilant sentries who keep cool and use their rifles with effect, and small ambuscades have proved at times a sovereign remedy. This question is referred to again later on. |
Principle of outposts. |
The general idea with which outposts are pushed forward to protect an army is the same in every class of warfare. A fraction of the force is detailed to act as a screen to the bulk of the force, enabling this to rest and to temporarily abandon fighting formation even when in proximity to the enemy. The detachments forming the outposts are so arranged and are of such strengths as to be able to offer sufficient resistance to a hostile attack, should one be attempted, for the whole |
of the force to get under arms and play its part. The detachments on outpost duty remain on the alert and more or less ready to act at a moment's notice. This is the principle, whether the troops they are safeguarding are engaged in operations against disciplined and regular forces or are opposed to semi-civilized adversaries, guerillas or savages. But the fundamental system of the organization of an outpost service differs very materially in the case of small wars from what is generally considered right and proper in great campaigns. Most treatises on the military art include chapters on how to arrange the outposts on the lines sanctioned by the custom and experience of regular warfare, and the principles governing their arrangement are laid down authoritatively in "Combined Training." But much which is accepted on the subject as beyond dispute in the case of modern operations of war, is quite inapplicable to small wars. | |
Difference between the system in regular warfare and in small wars. |
A very little consideration suffices to show that considerable modification of the elaborate system of picquets and supports required in great campaigns is permissible in irregular warfare. When engaged in hostilities against trained troops with modern arms, it is clearly essential that these should be kept at a considerable distance from the bivouacs of the main body. The outposts are pushed out a long way so as to form a cordon some miles outside of the area on which the remainder of the enemy is drawn up, and form a screen facing towards the side where the hostile enemy is known to be. The organization of the outposts is designed with the view that, while the most advanced detachments hold their ground as best they can till supported, other portions, withdrawn further from first contact with the approaching enemy, hurry to the assistance of the advanced detachments; this gives the bulk of the army time to prepare and in consequence of this the outposts must necessarily have a considerable depth. Inasmuch as an army almost always covers its communications in regular warfare and is so disposed |
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as only to run risk of contact with the enemy to its front and partly to its flanks, the outposts are only pushed forward in the shape of a fan which covers a small arc of a circle, or at the most a semicircle. | |
But in most small wars the duties of outposts are entirely different from this, even when the campaign is against well armed guerillas such as the Boers were in 1901-02. The purpose for which they exist and the method on which they are arranged are different. And in practice, the conditions governing their organization, rarely have much analogy to those which call for the system customary in campaigns between disciplined armies. | |
Liability to attack from any side. |
In small wars forces of relatively insignificant numerical strength move forward into the enemy's country, they are not in a position to prevent their opponents from approaching them in flank and rear, and when at the halt they are often liable to attack from every side. They must, therefore, as security against surprise and molestation, push out a ring of outposts all round them, which absorbs a large number of men. On the other hand the outposts need have no great depth, because in the event of attack a small army can be very rapidly drawn up for battle, and because on that account a long warning of impending advance on the part of the enemy is not so necessary as is usually required in regular warfare. Moreover, inasmuch as it is seldom the case that the adversary is supplied with weapons likely to do much damage at long range, they need not be kept at so great a distance from the main body as would be thought necessary in a modern campaign--it is true, however, that nowadays when we find warriors like the Afridis armed with Lee-Metfords, this must be taken as in some cases referring rather to artillery than to small arm fire. Instead of groups and detachments extending far out ahead of the army on one side, as is the case in the normal outpost system of regular warfare, outposts in small wan usually consist rather of a narrow ring all round the army and at no very great distance from it. |
It may be assumed that, in the matter of the drain in men which the outposts create, the relatively small depth called for in small wars counterbalances that necessity of extending them all round the force, a necessity which does not arise in great campaigns. In respect to the normal proportion which the strength of the outposts bears to the strength of the army, the question of outposts does not, therefore, perhaps differ greatly in regular and irregular warfare. | |
Outposts generally close in, and not intended to offer serious resistance. |
The test of actual experience in operations all over the globe, against opponents most diverse in their methods of fighting, goes to show that outposts, at least by day, need generally only consist of a chain of sentries, found by picquets which need not generally be strong unless the ground be intersected or overgrown with scrub. Supports are seldom required, reserves scarcely ever. The distance of the chain of sentries, or of vedettes when these are used, from the main body need not generally be great. Fighting a well-armed antagonist like the Boers it is, of course, necessary in daylight for the outposts to be some distance off so as to give ample warning of the enemy's approach, and under such conditions it may be desirable for the picquets to be strong enough to hold their own till supported. As is pointed out in "Combined Training," everything depends upon the nature of the enemy, the character of the country, and the strength and composition of the force. The procedure necessarily varies greatly by day from that suitable at night, and in hill warfare a special procedure must frequently be adopted. |
Units to be protected generally find their own outposts. |
One point of difference between the system of outposts in regular and in irregular warfare, is that while in the former special units are detailed for the service of security, in the latter each infantry unit in the force generally finds the sentries and picquets to protect its own front. The reason for this is that in small wars the army at any point is generally small, and the outposts are seldom very far out. It would obviously be most inconvenient to encircle the bivouac of |
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a brigade with a ring of sentries and picquets all found by one battalion, the picquets being probably only a very short distance from the defensive line. No absolute rule of course exists on this point--in hill warfare it is sometimes found best to detail all the picquets from one or two units, no matter where their posts may be with reference to their own and other corps. But the supply of food and all questions of relief are simplified if each regiment finds its own picquets, and there is moreover less danger of the outposts being fired into from the bivouac at night because each corps knows exactly where its picquets and sentries are posted. | |
Arrangement of outposts, however, varies according to the nature of the enemy. |
Before proceeding further it will be well to point out that, looking at the warriors usually opposed to regular troops in these wars from the point of view of what outposts are best suited to act as a buffer against them, they practically may be divided into two distinct and very different classes:--those who in consequence of their courage or their numbers may be expected to deliver actual attacks upon the "troops when these are halted, and those who will merely seek to annoy the force by firing into the bivouacs, by cutting off stragglers, and by any similar device which their ingenuity suggests to them. Of course the antagonists met with in small wars sometimes partake of the characteristics of both classes--the tribesmen with whom Sir B. Blood had to deal in 1897 for instance. In the Malakand campaign the hillmen did not shrink from attempting bold night attacks upon fortified camps, although they were also constantly on the prowl in the darkness by night, sniping, stalking'sentries, and worrying the soldiery and followers. |
It stands to reason that the service of security must be conducted on different lines according as the enemy belongs to one or the other of these two classes. Foes like the Dervishes or Zulus cannot be kept at a distance by a weakly ring of picquets which merely mask the fire of the troops in case of attack. On the other hand Pathans well supplied with modern |
firearms or guerillas like the Boers must not be allowed to approach a bivouac close enough to fire into it with telling effect. Picquets several hundred yards from any support would be soon effaced by a rush of fanatics in force. Picquets close in afford no protection whatever against the sniper. There is in fact quite as much difference between the two systems of outposts adopted to meet these two sets of circumstances as there is between either of them and the method employed in ordinary modern warfare. Again, the antagonists whom regular troops are confronted within small wars, are sometimes supplied with fairly effective artillery, fight in formed units, and incline to the tactics of the European battle-field; obviously neither the form of outposts adapted to the circumstances of the Zulu war, nor the very different form which was called for by the Afridi guerilla methods in Tirah, would afford a satisfactory shield to the troops in a campaign like that against Arabi Pasha in the Wadi Tumilat. | |
Extent to which the rapid movements of irregular warriors influence outposts. |
There is one characteristic of irregular warriors which must necessarily greatly influence the organization of a system of outposts designed to frustrate their enterprises--the great rapidity with which they generally move. This point is of especial importance when the campaign is being carried on against antagonists coming under the first heading detailed above, viz., those who boldly attack the troops in masses and who try to overwhelm them by shook tactics. Infantry sentries if advanced far from the main body when the operations are being carried out in enclosed country, against Zulus, Sudanese and warriors of that class cannot get back in case of a sudden rush, and they are of course quite powerless to withstand it. Even vedettes can scarcely get in, as was shown at Tofrek where the spearmen charged through the bush almost at the same pace as the cavalry did, who were retreating before them towards the zeriba. Moreover, in these cases the outposts as they rush back for safety mask the fire of the main body, just as skirmishers do when pushed |
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out in advance of a square. So much is this the case that it becomes a question whether infantry outposts are not in the daytime a mistake when fighting against such reckless and agile opponents, in close country. In open country they are scarcely required, and in any case vedettes serve the purpose far better if sufficient cavalry be available. | |
The system of outposts adopted during the daytime by the force which crossed the desert to Metemma in 1885 is worthy of study; it may be taken as typical of what is required in fairly open country where the enemy belongs to the recklessly charging class. No fixed rules were laid down, but the same general principle was observed throughout. The system adopted by night is detailed on p. 462; in the daytime the arrangements were generally as follows:-- | |
The force depended very much upon vedettes; the terrain was generally open, which enabled the approach of an enemy to be readily descried; the cavalry force being very small, camel men sometimes assisted. The system usually adopted was that of keeping two men together, who were pushed out from 600 to 1,500 yards according to circumstances; one man could ride back and report if anything unusual occurred. There was no need for picquets as the small column could always fall in for action very rapidly, and the vedettes could be trusted to give sufficient warning. | |
Difficulties of outposts in jungle and bush and in the hills. |
As in the Bayuda desert so also generally in fairly open ground, the arrangement of outposts by day seldom gives grounds for much anxiety. It is in the jungle and the bush or in broken ground that regular forces must when at the halt be especially on the look out against surprise. A camp or bivouac of trained soldiery when it is steeped in repose, appeals irresistibly to the militant instincts of the savage and tile cutthroat, and it is in rough broken country overgrown with scrub and trees, that such adversaries have the best chance of approaching close, unobserved. Irregular warriors when they think fit move almost noiselessly, and there is great risk of the camp being exposed to a sudden onslaught unless a"[sharp look-out is kept by the sentries. Operating |
in such terrain the regular troops are very unfavourably situated supposing the enemy to be brave and determined, and the outposts require to be very vigilant in the performance of their duty of safe-guarding the force. | |
Tofrek. |
The attack on the Tofrek zeriba near Suakin in 1885 illustrates the difficulty of outpost duties under such circumstances. The bush all round the clearing where the zeriba was being formed, was high and thick. Vedettes were pushed out into this about half a mile, but they could see little. Nearly all round the dear space where the parties were at work were small infantry picquets, about 150 yards to the front When the Mahdists attacked, they advanced so rapidly that they oame on at the heels of the vedettes as these galloped in. The infantry picquets had practically no warning and they had to rush back on the main body as best they could, proving of no use whatever. The outposts were in fact of very little service, the enemy had got to close quarters before their warning could be acted upon, and they moreover masked the fire of the troops to a certain extent. |
In such a case as this no system of outposts that could be devised would .give perfect security of the force while defences are being constructed. Picquets cannot check a fanatical rush; it is not very clear indeed what purpose they fulfil, as they in any case mask the fire. The troops must be ready to protect themselves as soon as the vedettes give notice of impending attack. Tofrek no doubt represents a somewhat extreme case, since experience shows that races living in theatres of war overgrown with jungle are not generally addicted to resolute onslaughts upon well-armed troops. The operations in Burma, Sierra Leone, Achin, and among the kloofs of Kaffirland, afford no examples of the enemy attacking with such ferocity, and it is usually found in districts where the field of view is much restricted that the enemy confines his efforts to more desultory attempts directed against sentries or stragglers. In hill warfare and bush warfare alike, the arrangements for the service of security have often to be of a special kind, differing altogether from what is ordinarily suitable on more open ground. | |
Picquets by day. |
In regular warfare where outposts consist of picquets, supports, and reserves, it is very generally accepted as a |
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tactical rule that by day the line of the picquets roughly represents the line of defence which the army will take up. The idea is that sentries and picquets fall back on this in case of attack, that reserves close up on it, and that the army moves up to it from the rear. But in small wars, where supports and reserves very rarely form part of the outposts, the question arises what action the picquets are to adopt if the enemy approaches. The very fact that picquets will generally form a mere ring of small detached posts all round the army, seems to point to the desirability of their being very close in if they are to fall back, or to their being strong enough to be self contained and able to hold their own for a considerable time if they are to remain where they are. In open country picquets, far out, are rarely required by day. But in hilly country they sometimes cannot well be dispensed with, otherwise the approach of an enemy would not be observed in time. | |
Objections to the plan of outposts falling back at once on the main body. |
Circumstances may sometimes render it necessary by day for outposts to fall back on the approach of the enemy, This would indeed always be the case with vedettes, or where the hostile tactics take the form of determined onslaughts. It may happen that they are obliged to retreat in face of a hostile attack in force which has not been anticipated, when they have originally been sent out rather to keep marauders at a distance. But it must always be remembered that, if the outposts are pushed out on the understanding that they are to fall back on the main body if attacked in force, the spirit of their instructions militates against their offering a determined resistance even to small hostile detachments. Moreover the very fact of their retreat tends to precipitate the hostile attack, owing to the great encouragement which it gives to the enemy. At the action of Nukumaru in the Maori war the enemy crept up close to the sentries in the high fern and flax and overpowered the picquets by a sudden rush; the picquets were reinforced, |
but they could not stay the enemy's advance on one side till the guns and cavalry were brought into play, and considerable confusion resulted, attended by some loss. If it is intended that in case of attack the troops shall move out and fight on the line taken up by the picquets, it is essential that preparations should be made with this in view. | |
Picquets in hill warfare by day. |
In hill warfare a ring of picquets at some considerable distance from the camp or bivouac is almost a necessity. The army will generally be halted in a valley or on level ground commanded by neighbouring hill tops, and unless these hill tops are occupied by parties strong enough to keep at a distance the bands of marauders who attempt to approach and fire down upon the force, serious losses may result. It is just as necessary that the hills should be crowned while the troops are at a halt as it is while they are on the move. The improved armament of Pathan tribesmen of late years has rendered this desultory musketry of theirs most dangerous to troops and transport in their bivouacs, and the increased range of the weapons in their hands has made the pushing out of picquets to considerable distances compulsory. The great disinclination of the enemy to attack well posted parties in the hills makes the position of such picquets fairly secure. But, in the hills as elsewhere, it must always be clearly understood beforehand, exactly what course picquets are to pursue if they are assailed. They must know whether they are to hold their ground until help arrives, or whether they are to fall back. Owing to the difficulty of retreating before an antagonist who can move with such rapidity and whose valour so greatly increases should success crown his efforts at the start, it is obvious that isolated picquets must almost always stop where they are, and that they must therefore be strong enough to hold their own. Picquets of this kind consisting of from a section to a company, can be pushed out a long way from the bivouac, and, if the ground be reasonably favourable and be taken proper advantage of, |
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they will almost entirely secure the troops against sniping and annoyance during the day. | |
If the enemy is inclined to adopt bold offensive tactics, it-will often be very doubtful what course to pursue. If the picquets are close in, the camp is sure to be sniped even if the tribesmen attempt nothing worse. On the other hand if the picquets are pushed too far to the front, it will be impossible to reinforce them quickly enough. As long as the picquets are entrenched and have a satisfactory field of fire enabling them to use their rifles to good purpose, they may be able to hold their own without support, even against a fanatical rush. It is fortunately not generally the case that hill-men have much stomach for a bold offensive by daylight, and outlying picquets can generally be placed a good distance from the force which they are protecting. | |
Outposts is the bush by day. |
In bush warfare against ill-armed savages who adhere to guerilla tactics, the question of outposts presents considerable difficulties. Then difficulties are greater by day than by night, because in the darkness the sudden volleys which savages deliver on creeping up within range are very likely to prove harmless, while by day such volleys may do appreciable damage. In terrain of this nature there is rarely any object in thrusting out picquets and sentries to any considerable distance from the bivouac. The enemy cannot open fire except at short range, and, inasmuch as the hostile enterprises will most likely be confined to attempts of isolated parties to slip through the chain of outposts so as to bring this short range fire to bear, it is obviously important that the spaces between sentries and between picquets should be small. |
When there are timid antagonists to deal with, quite small picquets will generally suffice. Very often all that is really required under such circumstances is a chain of double sentries, the picquets in rear merely fulfilling the object of supplying the reliefs. Patrolling affords security very effectively in the bush; if employed freely the strength of the stationary outposts can |
safely be reduced, and in any case either the picquets or else special patrol parties should occasionally move out some distance in different directions to search the thickets. The enemy will be much less likely to attempt approaching the force if he fears that he may unexpectedly meet with small parties of troops. Of course great care must be taken that the sentries do not fire upon patrols; when returning towards the line of outposts these should signify their movements by calling out. This of course assumes that, as sometimes occurs, the force is halted actually in thick jungle. Generally speaking a bivouac would be arranged with a clearing round it. In that case the line of outposts would more or less coincide with the far side of the clearing, supposing the belt to be so narrow as to admit of the enemy firing into the troops from the fringe. | |
In thick bush sentries and picquets should not move about unless specially detailed to do so; they should keep absolutely still and listen. It is often best for the sentries to kneel or sit down, and they should carefully conceal themselves. Sentries should be double. Savages can crawl through the thickets almost noiselessly; but if the air be very still and if, as is often the case in the tropics, there is no sound of animal-life, their approach may be detected in spite of this. Any talking on the outposts should be strictly forbidden, and their existence should be as far as possible kept concealed from the hostile parties which may be working their way through the undergrowth. If the enemy observes the sentries and picquets without being observed, the result is very likely to be a sudden volley which may cause casualties in the outposts. If, on the other hand, the enemy, creeping forward towards where the sounds of the bivouac announce the troops to be, is unexpectedly fired upon by the outposts the situation is reversed. | |
Need of even small parties always keeping a look-out in enclosed country. |
In country overgrown with bush or scrub it is essential that even the smallest parties should always post look-out men, for fear of surprise. This is so obvious that it would seem almost unnecessary to touch upon the point, were it not for |
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the numerous instances which have occurred in small wars of negligence in this respect leading to loss. | |
Near the Gate Pah during the Maori war, a party sent to destroy some Indian corn, having no guard and taking no precautions, and being suddenly attacked by the Maoris, suffered very heavily; the men were scattered and quite unprepared. In Achin in 1874 a Dutch picquet, in rear of their position while a fight was actually going on in front, was surprised in broad daylight; it was only saved from destruction by the timely arrival of reinforcements. On a historic occasion in the Zulu war a mounted party reconnoitring halted on open ground close to tall grass; no outlook was kept and it was surprised with most unfortunate consequences. At the Matabili attack on the Imbembesi laager, which was situated on an open apace with extensive bush some distance off, a picquet of two troopers had dismounted close to the thickets; the two men not being on the alert when the enemy delivered their onslaught, were surprised, but one of them managed to get away. | |
Regular troops to a certain extent at a disadvantage in outpost work in small wars. |
The fact is that at outpost work in irregular warfare regular troops are scarcely a match for their adversaries, and their inferiority is especially noticeable when the operations are taking place in the hills or the bush. The enemies met with in these wars may not be very formidable in the open against disciplined bodies, but at creeping and crawling about, at lying low for hours waiting till a sentry they have stalked grows drowsy, they are more than a match for the most highly-trained European soldier. The greater be the confidence of the force, the more certainly will it be victorious on the battle-field, and the bolder be the scheme of operations, the greater as a rule will be the chance of decisive success--it is the fundamental principle of conducting such campaigns. But when it comes to the minor details which concern the service of security, irregular warriors must be treated with respect. Here the trained soldier has to cope with a cunning and wary foe. The teachings of the barrack square do not tend to place him on the same level as his opponent in craft and instinctive watchfulness, he has the advantage in arms but in nothing else. Sentries must keep their wits about them and must keep their eyes and ears open. Picquets must be prepared for sudden emergencies, and must act with coolness and self-reliance--it may |
be laid down as an invariable rule that arms are never to be piled. The system of outposts differs very materially in small wars from that accepted in modern tactics as the correct one, but the duties are to the full as important and as difficult to carry out in the former case as they are in the latter. | |
General remarks on outposts at night. |
So far, outposts have been considered chiefly from the point of view of their organization by day. The question of outposts at night must always be a difficult one, and the service of security is almost invariably more exacting in the dark than by daylight. It was stated at the commencement of this chapter that irregular warriors do not show that taste for nocturnal attacks on disciplined troops which it might be supposed they would. But some system of outposts by night is absolutely indispensable in small wars, and to decide what is the system best suited to the circumstances is often a matter on which there may be considerable diversity of opinion. Even if there be little fear of a hostile onslaught in force, it is essential for the well-being of the troops that they shall not be disturbed by marauders. Armies engaged in these irregular operations are moreover generally accompanied by numbers of non-combatant camp followers who have to be protected from harm. Experience proves that, should the enemy pluck up courage and deliver a night attack, there may be very serious confusion, and that there may be considerable danger should the force not have time to occupy its alarm posts before the rush. |
The arrangements of outposts by night of course differs considerably according to the nature of the terrain and to the character of the enemy. It is in hill warfare that the security of the troops during the dark hours is especially a source of anxiety owing to the sniping in which mountaineers so generally indulge. But in bush warfare an efficient outpost service at night is also most difficult to devise, unless the force to be protected is camped in an extensive clearing. Even on open ground the stealth and activity of irregular warriors |
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makes them individually very formidable in the dark when they get to close quarters. | |
Outposts at night on open ground. |
On open ground the arrangement generally adopted is that the army surrounds itself with a ring of small picquets close in, with sentries pushed out a very short distance to the front to give warning of the enemy's approach. If attacked in force the sentries and picquets rush in within the line of defence. This assumes that the plan of a "perimeter camp" is not put in force. In a perimeter camp the combatant part of the force forms a ring all round the impedimenta, horses and so forth, and sleeps there. But if there be a defensive perimeter to the camp--a breastwork or fence of any kind--the sentries, would be inside of this even if the troops do not sleep in the perimeter. The object of the picquets is not merely to provide sentries, but also to ensure that a few men shall instantly line the perimeter if the enemy should deliver an attack. The system of outposts adopted at night by the Desert Column in 1885 may be taken as typical of the arrangement which experience has proved to be the best in open country. It was as follows:-- |
By night the force was generally in some form of a zeriba. The picquets. were either in the zeriba or immediately outside of it Each picquet--the zeriba being usually roughly in form of a square, there was one as a rule to each side, making four altogether--found two or three double sentries. These were posted from 100 to 400 yards to the front, but as a rule not much over 200 yards. A picquet would thus find four or six sentries at a time. Visiting patrols were sent out from the picquet, an officer or non-commissioned officer going out every hour, or oftener if there were any grounds for alarm. It was understood that in case of an attack the sentries fired their rifles and then rushed in on their picquets. | |
The position occupied at Qubat consisted of a zeriba on the Nile, and of a little fortified village on higher ground about one-third of a mile off from the river. At first a chain of outposts--picquets and sentries--in the form of a horse shoe was hied, including the whole position. But this was found to take up too many men, so later on each position had its own outposts. The plan adopted by the Guards' Camel Regiment who held the little village was very economical of men. There were eight groups out, each of three men, one on sentry and the other two asleep alongside of him; the officers and non-commissioned officers on outpost duty slept just outside the village. |
An arrangement like tins seems upon the whole the best suited to these conditions, and it is certainly preferable to a system of picquets far out which are very likely to be overwhelmed Still, when the outposts are so very close in, there is little time for the force to get under arms in case of a hostile onslaught. At Tellinouet in Algeria the French were very nearly rushed one night, the Arabs being upon the zeriba ere the troops could man the defences; General Bugeaud himself, bursting out of his tent in scanty apparel and a night-cap, restored order and discipline then soon prevailed, the enemy being beaten off by charges with the bayonet. In the Matabili war of 1894 the plan generally adopted was to have several small picquets making a ring round the laagers; each picquet found one double sentry, and about 10 such picquets generally sufficed. In the Zulu war, and in the Sudan when zeribas have been formed, the sentries have often been placed actually inside the enclosure at night. | |
Outposts at night in the South African War. |
Reference has been made in certain paragraphs to the Boer night attacks in the later stages of the South African war. The best security against them was found to be the perimeter camp, with outposts a little way to the front if there were any koppies or suitable undulations available to put them on. If no such rising ground existed the picquets and sentries were placed either in or very little in advance of the perimeter. The difficulty about this arrangement was that when columns came to consist entirely, or nearly entirely, of mounted troops, there were not men enough available to form a satisfactory perimeter round the extensive area which the horses and transport took up |
Owing to the nature of the terrain it was generally possible to place the bivouac in a position where rising ground, close at hand, offered itself for the posting of picquets--the undulations often created a sort of horseshoe in which the bivouac could nestle, which was very favourable for the distribution |
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of outposts in fair proximity to the force. In the closing days of the South African War the enemy was very short of ammunition, and at no time did the Boers attempt sniping at night to any appreciable extent. The compact perimeter camp with its mass of animals and its outposts not far from its outskirts, presented an admirable target to the sniper; other adversaries as well armed might have made themselves a great nuisance. The clear atmosphere and bright starlight was, however, a great assistance to sentries, who were almost generally doubled. The Boers generally left those columns where vigilance was displayed and where proper precautions were taken, severely alone. In an army containing so large a proportion of irregular troops as that which finally conquered the Boers, outpost duties are certain to be from time to time neglected, and to this is to be mainly attributed the success which so often attended the hostile night attacks. | |
Distant picquets it night. |
Dispensing with outlying picquets has the great advantage that there is do fear of the outposts being fired into by the main body in case of a scare, the danger of which is well illustrated by what occurred on the occasion of a false alarm at Fort Newdigate in the Zulu war. |
The ordinary arrangements for security at night were that the camp was surrounded by groups of infantry with supports in rear, small parties of natives being stationed between these groups. At 9 p.m. on the 6th June, the natives forming one of these parties thought they saw a Zulu creeping towards them. They promptly fired three shots, which was the recognized signal that the camp was attacked. The groups on either side of the party ran in on their supports, the officer in charge of which, after firing two volleys, retired with his men into one of the unfinished forts. The troops at once struck tents and manned the wagon laager. The "close" was sounded to bring hi the outposts. Then fire wag opened from all faces by infantry, and two rounds were also fired by the artillery. Orders were soon issued to cease firing, but five men of the outposts had been wounded by the fire of their friends in withdrawing, when apparently there was no enemy at all | |
Objectionable as they are, outlying picquets must often be absolutely indispensable by night--as will be seen further on |
they have been latterly employed to a very large extent in hill warfare. It will sometimes be the case that certain lines of approach have to be especially watched and. that the only means of doing so is to send out a party to act as an outlying picquet a long way from camp. If the enemy is determined and enterprising it will generally be necessary to establish some kind of fortified post for this, because the picquet must be prepared to hold its own against all comers unsupported. Picquets retreating at night towards the camp or bivouac they are supposed to be protecting, axe very likely to get a warm reception from their own side. As long as they remain stationary the troops in rear, if previously warned of their exact position, ought not to fire into them; but this cannot possibly be guaranteed once they quit the spot assigned to them. | |
The great point to remember in detailing a party for an isolated duty such as this, is that it must be capable of offering a stout resistance to any attack to which it may be exposed. It is not a question of how many sentries the picquet has to find--that is a mere question of detail--it is a question, of thrusting out a small force far to the front to spend the night isolated and without support. It should be noted that outlying picquets would generally not be relieved till after daylight; movements in the dark are so dangerous that the plan of relieving them at dawn does not answer. It is interesting to note that the Boers depended for protection very largely upon picquets posted on routes and tracks a long way from their laager. They recognized that a force coming to attack them by night must inevitably follow a route till it got close to their position, and their picquets were sometimes several miles from the bivouac of the commando. | |
It is always desirable to keep up communication between the outlying picquets and the main body in case of any unforeseen move on the part of the latter. The importance of this is illustrated by the following episode :-- | |
One night during the operations in Rhodesia, news reached a camp that there was a party of Matabili some miles off, so a party of 50 hussars was |
--465--
hastily despatched to try and catch them. There was a picquet over some water close by which was not informed. This fired on the hussars, without however doing any damage. The officer in charge of the picquet was found fault with, not for opening fire, but for failing to do any execution. | |
Ambuscades as outposts. |
General Bugeaud recommended small parties under an officer sent out far to the front by night to act as ambuscades and he employed them with some success; the enemy coming unexpectedly upon them is apt to think he is in contact with the main body, and retires. General Lewal strongly advocates this system in his "Etudes de Guerre"; he recommends that the party should not fire but should use the bayonet. The idea is a good one, and, as will be seen further on, it is largely put in force in Indian hill warfare. The enemy, having reconnoitred the camp by day, creeps up intending to surprise it or to molest the sentries, but is suddenly attacked himself when he least anticipates it. In Algeria and Tunis the French occasionally made very happy use of this method of protection, and the Russians have also tried it successfully in Central Asia. Good native troops are very well suited for such work, as they have natural cunning and they delight in stratagems. Indian troops recruited in the hills are particularly good at the game. The great object of outposts at night in these wars is not so much to give warning of impending attack, which is the exception, as to prevent the main body from being worried and disturbed, which is the rule. |
General Yusuf's system peculiar. |
It is interesting to note that the very able and experienced General Yusuf, who saw probably more service in Algeria than any of the great French leaders reared in that theatre of prolonged warfare, used to push his outposts out far further at night than by day. This is exactly the opposite of the normal practice on ordinary ground. Placed 150 yards from the faces of the square by day they were sometimes sent out as far as 1,000 yards by night. Small parties so far from support of course run risk of annihilation if the |
enemy comes on in force and really means mischief; but the terrain in Algeria was often such that an enemy coming to attack had to follow certain routes, and picquets a long way out were therefore a great convenience. The arrangement is mentioned as that adopted by a past master of the art of irregular warfare, but its merits seem to be open to question. It is only fair to mention that the Kabyles rarely delivered regular attacks in the darkness, although parties.of them sometimes approached the encampments. | |
Outposts by night in bush warfare. |
The arrangement of outposts by night in bush warfare should be much the same as that described on p. 458 as suitable for such terrain by daylight. Picquets and sentries must, however, be very close in. It is absolutely necessary that a clearing should be made round the force, and if this be 50 yards wide or more, the picquets and sentries should be close to the perimeter of the bivouac--there is no object in pushing them out beyond. A force benighted in thick jungle should keep as still as possible and should have a ring of double sentries close in all round it. |
In such country the lighting of fires at night is very objectionable when the enemy can creep up near to the bivouac; a volley aimed at random towards the light is very likely to cause casualties, even if the hostile weapons are only charged with slugs. Isolated picquets sent out for some special purpose should never light fires, or at least should never lie down by fires which they have fit. A neat form of ambuscade has been occasionally used with effect in the bush; a fire is lighted and the party moves off a few yards and watches; hostile marauders crawl up near to the fire, but when they discharge a volley at it under the impression that troops are lying round it, these fall upon them with the bayonet; it is capital if it comes off. | |
Outposts by night in hill warfare. |
The necessity for out-lying picquets by day in hill warfare when the enemy is armed with modern rifles has been already explained. Till recently it was the practice to withdraw |
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these picquets from the heights towards nightfall, and to rely upon the close-in system of outposts round the immediate precincts of the camp or bivouac, which is usual in small wars when the terrain is open. But experience has led to a great change being introduced in this respect of late years. The process by which the new system was arrived at is so well explained in Captain Peach's "Handbook of Tactics--Savage "Warfare," that the passage deserves to be quoted. | |
"It is not to be supposed that the full system .. . was reached at once. On the contrary, at first, the practice of picqueting distant heights from which the camp was fired into, was regarded with suspicion. Much more so the idea of leaving the picquets out at night. | |
"But the losses inflicted in camp by the long range fire of the tribesmen were so severe, that it was found absolutely necessary to deny to the enemy these commanding positions and to occupy them ourselves. Accordingly the distance of day picquets was gradually extended, bat the nuisance was, as might be expected, much greater by night than by day. Gradually it was seen that picquets well placed and protected by sangars, easily held their own against all attacks, and that indeed the chief losses occurred in the withdrawing and taking up of the positions. | |
"It was therefore decided to leave them out all night in spite of the fact that they could neither retire nor be reinforced till daylight. That they would be attacked was only to be expected, and at first the enemy charged in some cases right up to their breastwork, but in no single case did they ever succeed in overpowering a picquet, or indeed in doing any material damage to any one of them, however isolated or distant. | |
"The relief to the camp was very great, as the enemy used to occupy the position of the day picquets immediately on their withdrawal, and even opened fire on the retiring picquets themselves. As the picquets had to be retired early in the afternoon owing to the danger of moving in and out of camp in the dark, there were always some hours of daylight in which the whole camp could be overlooked and all our movements observed, and the best "positions noted on which to fire after dark. Many of the above evils were manifestly at once removed by the system of night picquets. | |
"The picquets thus drew a good deal of the enemy's attention that had previously been bestowed on the camp. But it was not to be expected that the system could pat a complete stop to all night firing into camp, nor did it; but it lessened it greatly, and moreover the mere presence of the picquets was calculated to raise the apprehensions of the tribesmen, who invariably disliked having any of our troops behind them. Finally it will be readily understood that the fire from the lower ground often went over the camp, instead of into it as formerly." |
This explains the reason for the system of outlying picquets which played so conspicuous a part in the outpost arrangement by night in Tirah. When a column marched into camp, the heights were in the first instance crowned by picquets from the advanced guard; these were relieved if possible by detachments from the main body when this reached the ground, and the new picquets held their ground all night, their posts being rendered as defensible as possible. The picquets may have to be as much as 1,500 yards from the perimeter of the camp, if the enemy is supplied with long range weapons; they must be well posted, and should if possible occupy commanding positions not overlooked at close range by spurs and crests further out. The sangars should if possible be shoulder high, with large stones here and there round the top to make their outline irregular; the enemy is apt to creep up very close, and the sentries' heads are distinctly visible if the sky-line of breastworks was not broken. As a general rule the sentries and picquet are close together, if possible within one single sangar. If there are buildings or villages near the camp it is almost always desirable to place picquets in them, otherwise the enemy will occupy them and fire on the troops, and even small hostile parties who shelter themselves in such favourable places for defence may not be easy to turn out. | |
In addition to the distant outlying picquets, it is often very desirable to have some picquets on lower ground and within 800 to 500 yards of the perimeter of the encampment. But these should not take up their positions till after dark, as a rule, so that the enemy may not know where they are. The stealthy tribesmen like to creep in through the intervals between the outlying picquets on the heights, and to open a desultory fire from points within the ring of outposts; but if they come suddenly upon an inlying picquet they are liable to receive an unpleasant surprise. Nothing so much disturbs the plans of these skulking marauders as the idea |
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that detached parties of troops may turn up in unexpected places. It must be understood, however, that picquets oŁ this kind are only applicable when the enemy adheres entirely to guerilla tactics; having no sangars to rely upon and not having the advantage of command which, as has already been mentioned in Chapter XIX, influences hill-men to so singular an extent, they run great risk of being overwhelmed in case of a determined night attack. | |
The system of distant picquets at night not always adopted in hill warfare |
It is interesting to note that while the system above described was very generally employed in Tirah, the Malakand field force, the operations of which were going on almost simultaneously, adhered to the old system of depending mainly upon picquets close to or actually within the perimeter of the encampment; Sir B. Blood's plan of making neighbouring villagers responsible for any worry at night (mentioned further on on p. 474), tended to relieve his bivouacs from sniping. The tribesmen of the Swat, Bajaour and Mohmund countries were not nearly so well armed as the Afridis; but, on the other hand, they showed an usual inclination for resolute night attacks during which the position of picquets far from support might have been very precarious. Operating against many of the Pathan tribes, or against the mountaineers of Sikkim and other hill districts of the Indian borderland, there might be no need for the system of outposts adopted in Tirah. It was the excellent armament of the Afridis and Orukzais, their skill as marksmen and their cunning and military insight, which compelled the expeditionary force to leave out picquets on the hill tops far from support; adversaries with less formidable weapons and who were worse shots would not require such precautions to be taken against them at night. |
In the absence of distant picquets, the system of sentries and picquets close in, or even actually within the lines, should be adopted in hill warfare just as in open country. There are many mountain races scattered over the globe, the Berbers |
of the Riff country for instance, the Kurds and some of the tribes of Indo-China, with whom regular troops may have to fight. It should be clearly understood that the arrangement of outposts would in most cases be rather that adopted by the Malakand field force, than that which circumstances rendered necessary in Tirah. All hill-men aTe inclined to snipe into the troops at night, but their fire is generally a nuisance rather than a danger. The great difficulty involved in employing far off picquets by day only, lies in the operations of withdrawing them in the evening and of their re-occupying the posts which have been abandoned overnight on the following morning; there is always risk of loss on both occasions. | |
Were troops to be engaged in operations against hill-men as well armed and as skilled in the use of rifles as the Afridis, but who also did not hesitate to attempt night attacks in force such as the Swat tribes led by the Mad Mullah tried against the defences of Malakand, it would be a very difficult question to decide whether or not to employ distant picquets. These picquets, unless they are very strong and are posted in well constructed defences, would be in great jeopardy. On the other hand, were there no picquets thrown out a good way from the camp, the troops and transport would certainly suffer very severely from the snipers. In a campaign against such antagonists, the outpost system at night would in fact become a very difficult problem, and it is not certain what would be the best arrangement to adopt. It must be remembered that in a case like this the plan of sending out stalking parties to harass the marauders and snipers who approached the encampment might not be practicable, and that thus, what is perhaps the most effective method of frustrating hostile designs, might be lost to the force. | |
Remarks on dealing with snipers at night. |
It is most important that snipers should not be fired at: from the camp. Shots aimed at random at the flashes are moat unlikely to take effect, and reply to their fire only; |
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impresses the enemy with the idea that their efforts to cause anxiety and annoyance have been successful. If ignored there is always a chance that the hostile marksmen may take their departure. Unless they are cautioned sentries are very much inclined to reply to this sniping, and this only encourages the marauders to persist. | |
The best method of dealing with the nuisance is to dispatch small parties out to stalk the snipers, or else to arrange ambushes for them such as were mentioned on p. 469. These stalking parties do not shoot, they trust to the cold steel. The Gurkha scouts in Tirah revelled in enterprises of this nature and were most successful in surprising the Afridi sportsmen. The European soldier is not at his best at this sort of work, but Gurkhas and Pathans are great adepts at hoisting nocturnal prowlers with their own petard. Lord Roberts relates how in the Ambela campaign the tribesmen used to call out to the Gurkhas and Pathans when on outpost duty, "We do not want you! Where are the Sikhs and Europeans; they are better sport." When the adversary falls back on this essentially guerilla mode of fighting, he is very careful of himself; if he thinks he is being stalked he will probably sneak off, hoping for a better and safer opportunity. | |
Whenever there is a chance of this annoying and sometimes deadly fire into camp at night, care should be taken that, as far as possible, the position of head-quarters and similar points of importance be not made obvious to the enemy by daylight. It is surprising how readily guerillas detect and note such matters, and what accurate fire they sometimes deliver at night when they can creep up to effective range. | |
Sentries at night. |
Sentry duty on active service is always an anxious and unpleasant task at night, and is even more so in small wars than in regular campaigns between disciplined armies. The kind of performance which the sentry goes through in peace time |
is utterly opposed to what he will have to do campaigning against irregular warriors--it is the worst conceivable training for the soldier, although the spectacular effect is good. It is not the custom for regular troops to undertake cutting up of isolated sentries and to prowl about at night in small parties, little would be gained by such manoeuvres; but guerillas and Asiatics and savages practice such tactics largely, and are often extremely clever at them. For this reason single sentries are almost always a mistake in irregular warfare at night; double and even treble sentries are a much better arrangement. General Yusuf, in Algeria, used to have posts of four men under a corporal, all required to be on the alert. Sentries should rarely move about. They should stand still or even sit, and should be off the skyline and so placed as not to afford a good target to the enemy. It is always an important point that they should have an easy line of retreat to their picquet. They should, moreover, be close to their picquet; it will rarely be advisable or necessary for them to be more than 50 yards off, and if they can see what is required they should be quite close to it. | |
Owing to the tendency of sentries to fire at nothing, and to thus cause alarm, some officers go so far as to recommend withdrawing their ammunition. This would hardly seem to be a wise course to adopt, but it must, nevertheless, be impressed on them strongly that they are never to fire without good cause, and only when they feel that they have a reasonable chance of hitting something. | |
Posting of picquets at night. |
In this kind of warfare it is generally most important that picquets should be concealed and should shun the skyline. A picquet should if possible be to a certain extent an ambuscade. In South Africa it was often arranged that picquets should be on the reverse slope so that an approaching enemy would to them appear on the sky line; this had the advantage that any defences thrown up by the picquet were not observed beforehand by the Boers. There is of course |
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no need for a clear view to the front from a picquet, nor is there much reason for an extensive field of fire. | |
Defensive arrangements in front of outposts at night. |
Some sort of breastwork in front of picquets, and even of sentries, is often very desirable for fear of their being rushed at night. Sangars can only be arranged if the necessary stones exist. Abbatis will sometimes serve the purpose. The most trifling obstacle may prove to be of use, cover from view being in itself a matter of considerable importance. It is at times a good plan to fight a fire some 50 yards or so in front of a post, so as to light up the ground which the enemy must cross; the light must be far enough out not to expose the post. In hill warfare it is a good plan if the ground fall sharply in front of a post, to collect some large stones ready to roll down if hostile parties try to approach. Wire entanglements are of course admissible if there is time to construct them. In Algeria a system of laying down firearms in advance of the outposts with tight cord stretched across, and attached to, the triggers was tried with success, the discharge giving the alarm. The plans of attaching tins which rattle to a strand of wire was made plentiful use of in South Africa. |
Sir B. Blood's plan of using villagers as outposts. |
It is deserving of mention that in the frontier campaign of 1897, Sir B. Blood made considerable use of the villagers near camp for outpost work. By threatening to burn their villages--a threat which was carried out once or twice--they were not only deterred from marauding at night themselves, but they also prevented others from marauding. The effect of this system is demonstrated by the fact that in six months there was only one casualty due to sniping, and only one follower was cut up. This plan of using the inhabitants of the country in this fashion might be utilized in other theatres of war. |
Service of security on the march. |
The service of security when on the march necessarily differs considerably in small wars from what is customary for |
purposes of protection in great campaigns. In small wars it generally consists merely of small parties detached as advanced guard, rear guard, and to either flank. In regular warfare it is only necessary to push out a detachment in one direction--that where the enemy is known to be; but the detachment will often represent a considerable fraction of the whole force. It has already been pointed out that in irregular warfare a force has generally to be prepared for attack from any side, and it must act accordingly. Buonaparte's army of experienced campaigners marching from Aboukir to Alexandria was at first completely non-plussed by the tactics of the Bedouins and Mamelukes hanging about the flanks, till they learnt that flanking parties were indispensable in such operations. Charette on more than one occasion fell upon the flank of the Republican columns on the march in La Vendée, throwing them into complete confusion. Irregular warriors and guerillas are far more inclined to operate against the flanks and rear than the front of troops on the march, therefore the rear guard and the flanking parties assume a special importance, and the ordinary rules laid down for the march of an army are scarcely applicable. | |
Effect of hostile tendency to operate against flank and rear. |
The tendency of the enemy in these campaigns, even in the heat of action, to avoid decisive collision with the front of the regular troops but to work against their flanks and rear, has been enlarged upon in former chapters. In Algeria, in, Morocco, on the Indian frontier, in Ashanti, in Afghanistan and in Somaliland, this characteristic hostile method of making war has displayed itself constantly. The Boers adopted the same tactics as soon as they escaped from the spell thrown over them by the guns and paraphernalia with which they entered upon their great contest. It is a favourite and effective plan when the enemy desires to harass and delay columns of regular troops on the march. While refraining from engaging the advanced guard he will watch for a favourable opportunity to attack the advancing force in flanks and rear, and unless |
--475--
precautions are taken much confusion may ensue even when the foe does not push his attacks home. Therefore the vedettes and flankers must be pushed as far out as possible consistent with reasonable safety, so that they may give early warning of impending attack and may give notice at once if there be any sign of the enemy. The great speed at which irregular warriors advance must always be kept in mind. | |
A column on the march is, of course, very badly situated to withstand a flank attack. Its train in small wars is always large relatively to the strength of the force. The route is generally indifferent, and straggling is most difficult to avoid. In a great modem campaign the cavalry screen in front of the advancing army ensures it against unexpected demonstrations against the flanks of its columns. But in small wars an effective cavalry screen is very often out of the question. | |
Service of security when marching in square. |
The square formation dealt with at length in Chapter XVII, to a certain extent obviates the need of advanced guards, flanking parties, or rear guards. Still even in this order of march it is usual to move with a cordon of vedettes all round the force. Baker Pasha and Sir G. Graham in their advances from Trinkitat in 1884 adopted this plan; the objection to vedettes and still more to skirmishers is, as has been explained in Chapter XVII, that they may mask the fire of the square. |
Flanking parties and rear guards. |
It is in hill and bush warfare that this safeguarding of the flanks and rear is especially necessary--the question of how best to assure this in such terrain has, however, been already dealt with fully in Chapters XIX and XX. On more open ground the army on the march will look especially to its cavalry and mounted infantry or, where such troops exist to its camel corps, to give timely warning of any danger. The more open the country is, the easier it is as a general rule to keep the column compact, and flanking parties and patrols can both move out further and travel faster. In such country the risk of attacks on the flank and rear are much less serious than in a more intersected and broken terrain. |
When there are ravines or hills near the line of march, it is indispensable that these should be reconnoitred before the transport passes them and that they should be watched during the time that this is in their vicinity. If, owing to circumstances, flanking parties cannot march parallel to the column, it becomes necessary to send out detachments from the advance guard to hold points from which the flanks can be protected. The detachments so sent out join the rear guard as the force moves past them as in hill warfare; to meet the drain the advance guard must be strengthened sufficiently to ensure that it shall remain able to perform its duties efficiently up to the completion of the march. | |
Nothing can be more discreditable than for a force of adequate strength, moving in moderately easy country, to be surprised on the march. No amount of precautions will ensure that it shall not be attacked. Planking parties and rear guards cannot be expected to stem a really formidable hostile advance. But they should at least be able to give sufficient warning of what is impending, to give the bulk of the force time to form up so as to repel the enemy. | |
Convoys. |
In case of a convoy, i.e., a column of non-combatants guarded by a comparatively speaking small escort, the main rule to observe is to keep the protecting troops in parties, and to make these parties of sufficient strength to afford every probability that they will be able to make head against such attacks as, from the circumstances of the case, the enemy may be able to deliver. It may be necessary to scatter part of the escort along the column to maintain order and to prevent gaps from occurring; but the rest of the troops should on no account be allowed to straggle. Flankers must generally be detached, and all the ordinary precautions usual on the line of march must be taken. Commanding points should be occupied while the convoy passes them and held till it is clear of them. Artillery in a convoy is very useful because it will often scare away hostile parties who might give a great deal of trouble; |
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the object of the escort to a convoy is to get its convoy to its destination in safety, and, that being the case, long range rifle or shell fire is fully justified. It may be assumed that a convoy will not be despatched with a weak escort through any district where the enemy is likely to appear in strength, and that the duty of the escort will not go beyond repulsing the onslaughts of small marauding parties. | |
Importance of keeping columns on the march well closed up. |
Owing to the great rapidity and suddenness with which irregular warriors deliver their assaults, it is most necessary that the force on the march should be kept well closed up. A long straggling column is an invitation to the enemy to attempt a surprise. Its flanks cannot be properly guarded, nor can a proper look-out be maintained. At Shellala in Algeria in 1881 the head of a French column was defeating the Arabs and putting them to flight, at the same time that marauders were delivering their attacks upon its convoy far in rear with such effect that the whole column was obliged to return to Greyville for supplies. It was fortunate at Ahmed Khel that the Afghans attacked the troops leading the advance and not the transport in rear, which formed a long and somewhat straggling column and which might have suffered very severely. General Philippovitch in Bosnia in 1878 always moved with strong detachments on his flanks to repel the guerilla attacks of the people of the country, foreseeing that his column was sure to extend over a great distance. The very rapid movements of the nomad Boers made the protection of the flanks of long columns on the march a service of considerable difficulty in 1901-02. Important as it ever is to avoid undue intervals on the march and to keep the force compact, it is especially so in irregular warfare where raids against the flanks are always probable. The possibility of adequately safeguarding the column against hostile enterprises by flanking detachments will generally depend entirely upon this. |
Duties of the advanced guard. |
Tactical works rightly attach great importance to the composition of advanced guards and to the explanation of |
their duties. An advanced guard is generally in great campaigns supposed to fight, it acts as a spring to break the first shock of contact with the enemy. In small wars, on the contrary, the duty of the advanced guard is rather that of observation, its purpose-is to protect the column from ambuscades and surprises. On obtaining touch of hostile bodies, it warns the main body and then retires upon it should the hostile gathering be on a large scale. The great principle of campaigning against irregular warriors is to keep the army concentrated till it is about to strike; owing to the inevitable exposure of its flanks, there will generally be serious risk of the advance guard being cut off from the main body if thrust out a long distance to the front, and there is rarely much object in pushing it very far ahead. Even on the rare occasions when the enemy can put guns in the field, their fire is not formidable; the question of giving the main body time to form up out of range of the enemy does not therefore arise to the same extent as in regular warfare. There is not the danger that the force on the march will suddenly be enfiladed by judiciously-placed guns, which is always present in regular warfare unless there is an efficient advanced guard and unless this be well to the front. In irregular warfare the advance guard is rather a feeler than a buffer. | |
Conclusion. |
The service of security is a subject of great importance in all classes of warfare, and it is impossible to pay too much attention to ensuring its efficiency in campaigns such as this volume deals with. It is worthy of note that the more desultory the operations of irregular warriors are, the more difficult as a rule is it for regular forces to carry out this service satisfactorily. In campaigns like those against the Sikhs, like the Zulu war, and like the prolonged struggle against the forces of Mahdism, no very heavy strain has generally been thrown upon the detachments pushed out to guard the regular forces by day or by night, whether they were on the march or at the halt. It is in |
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guerilla warfare, whether it be in the Indian hills ox in the African bush, whether the theatre of war be Cuba ox the Caucasian forests, whether the adversary be the mounted and well armed Boer or the prowling West African savage, that disciplined troops learn by bitter experience the dangers of any inefficiency in the service of security, of any errors of judgment on the part of individuals, or of any carelessness in performance of outposts and similar duties. |
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