Uncertainty as to how best to employ them. |
THE PLACE of machine guns in tactics is now fairly well established. In the British service, at least, they are regarded as an adjunct of infantry and of cavalry. It is generally recognized that the plan of forming them into batteries in charge of artillery personnel is a mistake for regular warfare, and the same thing really holds good in small wars. |
Their frequent failure till recently. |
It is indeed only comparatively recently that machine guns have proved a success in any kind of warfare. The older forms, approximating to the mitrailleuse upon which the French in 1870 placed so mistaken a value, are not suitable as a rule. In the terrain usually met with the weapon, unless light and portable, is quite out of place. Moreover, till within the last few years, no dependence could be placed on machine guns at a critical moment. They jammed at Ulundi, they jammed at Dogali, they jammed at Abu Klea and Tofrek, in some cases with most unfortunate results. A weapon which fails just when it is most wanted is a distinct danger. It may do good work when all goes smoothly, winning thereby a confidence to which it is not entitled and causing it to be depended on to secure a vital point of which it is incapable; but if it proves a broken reed in some moment of supreme crisis later on, its presence with the force may have done incalculable harm. |
On the other hand Maxims, which can be easily handled and moved, have done excellent service in East Africa, in Matabili-land, and in the campaigns on the North West frontier of India. There can be no doubt that machine guns of an easily portable and thoroughly trustworthy class may be most valuable in |
small wars, and they will probably be freely used in such operations in future, especially when the enemy is inclined to attack in mass. In hill warfare these weapons scarcely get a proper chance, as they are not very well suited for picking off individuals, and as it is dangerous to thrust them too far to the front with the small parties which are so much used in operations of this class. In bush warfare also the want of a fair target is unfavourable to them, and when the shooting is at short range the personnel is likely to be put hors de combat, as it offers such a good target--this happened at Owikokero. An open field of fire, and a well defined object to aim at, are almost more necessary to machine guns than to artillery. | |
During General Hunter's reconnaissance of the Atbara zeriba four days before the attack on it was delivered, the enemy's horsemen moved out in great strength and endeavoured to surround the force. The fire of the four machine guns, however, proved extraordinarily effective, and kept the foe from charging home. They fired 4,000 rounds. | |
Their value on the defensive. |
On the defensive, machine guns can hardly fail to be valuable. In laagers, zeribas, and detached posts of all kinds they are always likely to be of service, and they may to a certain extent take the place of guns for such work. During the operations in Rhodesia in 1896 they were found very useful as a protection to the small laagers left behind by the columns when they moved out for a fight. Two of them did tremendous execution in Chakdara Fort during the siege of that post in 1897. It is interesting to note that at the fight on the Shangani river in Matabililand after the attempt to capture the King had failed, the troops, although they were in a bad position, could not move to a better one for a while, simply because the machine guns would have been thrown out of action during the change of position. Against rushes of Zulus, ghazis, or other fanatics the effect of such weapons is tremendous as long as their fire is well maintained. In the excitement of the moment the best infantry may fire unsteadily; but machine guns can be absolutely trusted to commit destructive havoc in the hostile throng provided that their mechanism does not go out of order. |
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