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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
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SMALL WARS

Chapter XXIV.
Artillery tactics.

Artillery preparation.

IN AN earlier chapter it was pointed out how, what is known as artillery preparation, is often entirely out of place in such battles as occur in small wars, but that this depends very much upon the circumstances of the particular case. If the enemy be strong or be posted in a formidable position it may be desirable for the guns to make an impression before the infantry can safely attack. In almost all actions which occur in warfare of this nature the principle of pushing the guns well to the front, however, holds good, even if they do not necessarily at once come into action. Whether it be in the preliminary phases of the fight, or during the period when the attack is being fully developed, or at the crisis of the battle, artillery can be and should be as a general rule handled with a boldness not always permissible in combats between regular armies. Artillery preparation presents in fact somewhat different characteristics from the prolonged concentrated fire of masses of guns which used to be understood by that expression in military phraseology.

 

The moral effect of artillery is very groat against irregular enemies. The high esteem in which Asiatics hold guns was referred to in Chapter XII, and if the adversary be so posted or be of such strength as to demand respect, the utilization of this moral effect may be very desirable. But material effect is still more desirable, and if the enemy does not happen to be formidable it is essential that, if the guns are to be used at all, they shall inflict loss.

Guns to push up to close range.

Bearing this in mind it may be taken as a broad principle < governing artillery tactics in campaigns against irregular J warriors, that throughout an engagement guns should be used

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at as close quarters as possible, so that their full value may be got out of them and so that they can push up into the enemy's position and bring shell fire to bear as soon as this has been evacuated. Of course close range is not always the most effective range--in hill warfare plunging fire will frequently be more destructive; but where casualties in the hostile ranks will be increased by pushing the artillery well up to the front, forward tactics will almost always be expedient. The enemy's fire in such warfare is rarely really dangerous, even at comparatively speaking close quarters. Exceptions to this of course occur, as in the case of the Boers. In Tirah the Afridi fire was often fairly effective as long as the enemy could fire from points of temporary security. But in the majority of cases guns have not very much to fear from the firearms of the adversary in small wars, and they can therefore be manoeuvred with a, boldness which in regular warfare would only be justified on very special occasions and to achieve very special objects. In the normal conditions which prevail in struggles against uncivilized foes or guerillas, the guns can safely advance to ranges at which they would inevitably be silenced by regular infantry unless this had been previously shaken by artillery preparation or by other means. Of course difficulties of terrain often greatly limit the choice of positions; but except for this and for the fact that artillery when in motion is out of action, it might almost be laid down as a broad rule that the proper place for the guns is little in rear of the infantry firing line, whenever plunging fire is not required. The nearer they get to their work the better. If they are required to prepare the way for the infantry they should, as far as circumstances permit, be in action at the point where the infantry has come to a standstill, and this is the principle upon which, when the regular forces are acting on the offensive, the artillery usually does act if in efficient hands.

 

The Indian Mutiny affords some notable instances of these forward artillery tactics. Out of numerous striking examples may be quoted the

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cases of the Sekunderbagh and Shah Nujeef at Lucknow. Before the infantry could attack the Sekunderbagh, the guns were dragged up to within 100 yards of its loop-holed walls, and they had to be fought for some time in the open at this close range before the breaches were practicable and before the infantry could get at the rebels. After the Sekunderbagh had been stormed, it became necessary to capture the equally formidable Shah Nujeef. The guns of the Naval Brigade were dragged up by the sailors and 93rd to within 20 yards of the massive walls of the building. "Captain Peel" as Sir C. Campbell wrote in his despatch, "behaved very much as if he had been laying the Shannon alongside the enemy's frigate." The mosque long resisted all efforts of the assailants, and it was night before it was in British hands; early next morning, however, signals and the bugle call from the roof of the great edifice told the expectant garrison of the Residency lines that all was going well and that their weary vigil was to be exchanged for action. The bringing of the guns up to the very walls of the Sekunderbagh and the Shah Nujeef is a splendid example of forward artillery tactics.

 

At Amoaful the guns had to be pushed up into the firing line in the bush to break down the enemy's resistance on several occasions, and they caused great slaughter among the Ashantis at this very close range. At Ordahsu one gun with the infantry, advancing a short distance at a time, gradually worked right up to the village. It was very nearly silenced, it is true but it did its work.

 

At the attack upon Konoma in the Naga hills in 1880, after the capture by storm of the first hostile work, the two guns with the force moved into it and opened fire from it upon another fort only 50 yards off, breaching it. Three assaults on this failed. The retreat of the storming party after the last failure was effectually covered by the guns, which fired over the stormers' heads as they lay down. Their fire promptly cleared the walls, which had been reoccupied by the Nagas when the guns were masked by the infantry.

 

A French column which was moving to the relief of Tuyen-Kwang in Tonkin in 1885 made an attack upon the Chinese works at Hoa Moe. The defenders fought with great determination, and one of the redoubts held out after the others were captured. Two mountain guns were promptly brought up within 50 yards to batter down the parapet of this, and they very soon effected their object

 

These episodes have been cited as good illustrations of the principle of pushing artillery to the front in this sort of warfare. Bold initiative and seizure of every opportunity of getting to close quarters with the enemy, are the surest means of making the guns tell. The enemy generally does not understand daring and resolute tactics whether on the part of infantry, of cavalry, or of artillery, and they demoralise him.

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Battles may be won by long range bombardments in the sense that the adversary quits his position, but they are not so won in the sense that the adversary is crushed, cowed, and convinced that unless he lays down his arms he will be utterly destroyed. Owing to the configuration of the ground or to some special reason, it may sometimes be necessary that the guns should open fire at ranges of 2,500 and even 3,000 yards. But such procedure must be looked upon as exceptional and one only to be adopted under unusual circumstances.

Chief risk run by guns pushed well to the front.

It must be remembered that in these campaigns the guns if they push weD to the front, rarely run any risk of being actually silenced. Experience proves that there is little chance of the casualties among the gun detachments being so heavy as to put the pieces out of action. The chief danger that they incur is that of falling into an ambush or of being rushed on ground where they cannot act effectively; for protection against this they look to the infantry with which they are working. Artillery has no more title to immunity from losses than have cavalry or infantry, and it cannot be used too boldly as long as it is supported by other troops, a principle which happily is very generally recognized in the British service. To show, however, that difference of opinion on this point exists among military men, the action of Sahamafi in the French campaign against the Malagasys in 1885 may be cited. In this affair a battery of artillery was pushed up to within 550 yards of a palisaded earthwork. It suffered considerable losses, for which the admiral in command of the attack was somewhat harshly criticised. In the end the hostile position proved too strong to be stormed and the French force was withdrawn. The incident is mentioned as showing that a tendency exists to blame the exposure of guns, even when the issue of a fight is more than doubtful. In such theatres of operations as small wars usually take place in, guns are somewhat of an encumbrance to a force except on the battle-field, therefore when they get a chance of striking hard even serious losses must be accepted as the fortune of war.

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Massing of guns unusual and generally unnecessary.

Although, the importance of massing artillery in action is not now considered so great as it was a few years ago, the principle of concentration of ire is still under most conditions an axiom of modem tactics, and it is, to a certain extent, the basis of the normal action of the arm on the battle-field. In small wars this massing of guns will seldom be applicable. Large numbers of guns are unusual in the combats which occur. The very fact that artillery preparation at long range should be the exception and not the rule, militates against the concentration of the artillery at any particular point of the battle-field, inasmuch as the space is sure to be limited when the guns are drawn up at short ranges. But, on the other hand, concentration of fire may be very desirable, even if that concentration be carried out by isolated sections or guns. If there is any point where the enemy is offering a sturdy resistance or which will clearly be difficult to carry by storm, a convergent artillery fire may have a very decisive effect.

 

Supposing the enemy to have guns, it may sometimes be desirable to crush these as a preliminary, and a concentrated shell fire will soon achieve this object. At the Atbara the hostile guns were completely silenced before the assault, the Dervish gunners being found dead round their pieces. The Chinese guns in Tonkin were often treated in this fashion, although their fire generally seems to have been ineffective. But in dealing with hostile artillery it must never be forgotten that the end to be kept in view is its capture, and that, although a heavy fire of shells will almost certainly silence it, the result may be that the enemy finding it overmatched will manage to withdraw it.

Question of dispersion of guns in attack.

The primary duty of artillery in warfare of this nature is to ensure that it is at hand at the critical moment and well to the front. Difficulties of terrain in some cases, and the fact that the guns are so often portable guns and not guns moved by horse traction in others, render very rapid movements impossible at times. Still the artillery should generally

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be able to move as fast as the infantry. If the guns are kept concentrated at one spot, none of them may be able to get to the point where they are really wanted at the proper moment, and for this reason it will generally be best to keep them to a certain extent dispersed. In regular warfare this would be quite wrong, the breaking up of batteries being rightly held to be unsound, under ordinary conditions, on the modern battle-field. But in combats against adversaries whose gun fixe and musketry are not much to be feared, the necessity for keeping the battery intact as a fighting unit is not so great. The accepted system of fire discipline makes it desirable that the battery should not be split up if it can be avoided, but this system is designed to meet conditions which seldom present themselves in small wars. Speaking generally there is not the same necessity for rapid ranging when coming into action against irregular warriors, as there is when the battery has to be prepared for accurate and perhaps concentrated hostile fire the moment that it shows itself.

 

Of course if the battery can be kept intact, so much the better--should there be several batteries on the battle-field the requisite dispersion will rarely necessitate half batteries or sections working independently, or lead to the tactical unit being broken up. But as a rule the available guns are not numerous. It is when the force is accompanied by only one or at most two batteries that the necessity arises for detaching groups of two and three guns to various parts of the field, even at the cost of loss of accuracy and rapidity of fire. On very open ground where field or horse artillery can move about rapidly, there is little chance of the infantry at any point being unable to get guns to help them on emergency, or of shell fire failing at some moment when the enemy offers a good target. But on broken ground, or when only portable guns are available, there must be no question of gun fire failing wherever it may suddenly be required. On this account the splitting up of batteries into sections may be not

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only judicious but may be absolutely indispensable. Experienced mountain artillery officers in India are perfectly well aware of this, and they deprecate the tendency on the part of commanders to stick to text book theory when dealing with conditions to which the theory does not apply.

 

Plenty of examples have of course occurred in small wars where the massing of several batteries for purposes of concentrated fire has been most effective. At the attack on the Sempagha Pass leading into Tirah the two brigade divisions of mountain artillery were for a considerable time kept intact, and their fire was most effective in clearing the successive lines of sangars. At the battle of the Atbara--one of those cases, so rare in warfare of this nature, where a regular artillery preparation was necessary--the guns poured a concentrated fire upon the Dervish zeriba, doing great damage to the defences and to the. hostile personnel. At Tel-el-Kebir the British guns were massed in the original order of attack in the centre, acting as a pivot on which the infantry divisions on either flank might rely in ease of reverse; but concentration gave way to dispersion on that occasion, as soon as the infantry poured into the Egyptian lines; there was no massing of fire.

Dispersion of guns on the defensive.

The principle of dispersion of guns applies just the same on the defensive as it does in attack. From the point of view of the other arms there is rarely any justification for collecting the guns at any particular spot, even admitting that fire discipline suffers if batteries are split up. The main object to keep in view is that there should be one or two guns ready to meet the enemy wherever he may endeavour to push his attack home. The tendency of irregular warriors when acting on the offensive being generally to envelope their antagonist, a dispersion of the artillery becomes almost inevitable. The position of guns in squares has already been referred to in the chapter dealing especially with that formation, and it has been shown that in practice they have often

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been put singly at the corners, although there are objections to this plan. In laagers and zeribas it is of course necessary to disperse the guns so as to ensure artillery fire in all directions. Defensive actions are so often fought by regular troops in broken or bush grown terrain in this kind of warfare, and the field of fire is so frequently restricted, that the splitting up of batteries can seldom be avoided.

Value of guns on the defensive against fanatical rushes.

The effect created by artillery is tremendous when troops are called upon to receive the attack of warriors like Sudanese, or Zulus, or ghazis who approach in masses, provided always that there be a satisfactory field of fire. Of this the first phase of the battle of Khartum afforded signal proof, disastrous havoc being caused in the Dervish ranks long before they came within effective range even of the magazine rifles. It is very seldom the case that as long as they are in groups, guns cannot defend their own front unless the field of fire is very restricted. During the determined Afghan attack at Ahmed Khel the efforts of the swordsmen to rush the guns only led to their being mowed down pitilessly at the most effective range. At Tamai a battery was in the open between the two squares at the critical juncture, but it beat off the Arab rush against it and stood its ground. On the other hand, a single gun, or even a section, may be unable to defend its own front if unsupported by rifle fire.

 

When a force is acting on the defensive, the support of artillery is invaluable to the other arms at a critical moment--for instance when the infantry are in difficulties owing to a sudden hostile attack. On such occasions the moral effect of the shells bursting and of the noise of the discharges, may create an influence out of all proportion to the actual number of the enemy struck down. Thus after General Lomakin's unsuccessful attempt to storm Denghil Tepe, the guns effectually checked the Turkomans who were pursuing the shattered assaulting columns as they withdrew in disorder. What the artillery has most to fear at such times is that its

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own flank may be turned; at Maiwand two horse artillery guns were lost owing to the infantry on their flanks being rolled up by the ghazi rush. As long as the flanks are secure the front should be secure if the guns are not in a hopelessly unfavourable position. It should be noted, however, that this does not altogether hold good at night, when it may be desirable to post infantry groups in the intervals between the guns.

 

In the defence of isolated posts guns are of course invaluable. General Skobelef in forming the advanced depôts on the line his troops were to follow towards Denghil Tepe, told off several guns to each, the infantry garrisons being very small. During the defence of the improvised fort at Potchefstrom in 1881, the guns did much to keep the Boer at a respectful distance, and many similar cases could be quoted. In such fortified positions artillery can very largely take the place of infantry; and as only the guns themselves, with their detachments and ammunition are required, permanent arrangements for their transport can often be dispensed with.

Comparative powerlessness of guns against mud villages.

Although the question of artillery material and organization is really outside the scope of this work, there are certain points affecting this subject which arise in small wars and which deserve a passing notice. The first of these is that in Asiatic warfare mud villages have been found by experience to resist shell fire very effectually. The walls do not splinter, and the tiny rooms which are the leading characteristics of the dwellings, absorb the explosion of the projectile and cramp its effect. This is an important fact to bear in mind, because a heavy bombardment prior to an attack on such a village may not have demoralized its defenders as much as the noise and expenditure of ammunition would have seemed to imply. This clearly points to either guns or howitzers of large calibre, firing heavy shells with large bursting charges, being best suited for such work; hut the exigencies of this class of

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warfare in other respects generally forbid the use of such ordnance.

High explosives.

The unsatisfactory effects obtained from artillery against mud villages suggests the use of shells with high explosives, and it will probably be found that these will give good results if they can be adapted to the class of gun suited to such campaigns. The melinite shells used by the French against the Hovas demoralized them and gave every satisfaction during the campaign; but as in that conflict the enemy was always ready for flight on the first possible excuse, it would not be wise to attach too much importance to experiences gained in operations so very one sided. The high explosive shells used by the howitzer battery in the bombardment of Omdurman caused rare havoc in the metropolis of Mahdism; but ordnance of this ponderous kind is not well adapted to conditions of irregular warfare. It remains to be seen what effect this nature of projectile, when fired from field and mountain guns, will have upon hill-men sheltered in sangars or ensconced among crags on mountain crests.

Guns must be light and generally portable.

Owing to difficulties of terrain, it is almost invariably the case that lightness of artillery material is imperative. It is becoming more and more recognized that in the majority of cases draught artillery is out of place. On the plains of India or of the Pehio basin, on the steppe land by the Sir Daria or along the foot of the Kopet Dagh in the land of the Tekkes, on the rolling downs of Zululand, and in many parts of Morocco and Algeria, horse and field artillery can manoeuvre as freely as in Belgium or Lorraine. But in most theatres of small wars it cannot act. On the sands of Egypt in 1882, mountain guns were found to possess mobility fully equal to that of field artillery. In Tonkin draught artillery was constantly found to be a .great encumbrance. Sir F. Roberts, on his march from Kabul to Kandahar, took only mountain guns. In Madagascar, Dahomey, Tirah, and most theatres of recent operations portable artillery alone could

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satisfactorily be used. An army which, owing to national conditions, is liable to be called upon at almost any moment to take part in irregular warfare, and which does not comprise in its normal peace organisation a proportion of mountain batteries ready at short notice for the field, lacks an important item in that aggregate of services which constitute a force genuinely adapted for conducting a campaign against savages, or hill men, or guerillas operating in broken ground. It must be remembered that the guns of portable artillery can never be very powerful--their lightness renders it impossible; but they can go where the infantry can go, and that is, as a general rule, the chief aim of this arm in irregular warfare.

Question of case shot.

Inasmuch as the leading principle governing artillery tactics in these campaigns is for the guns to push up to close range, and as, when regular troops have stood on the defensive in Morocco and Algeria, in the Sudan, in China, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, experience has proved that the guns must be prepared to check attacks at very close quarters, a supply of case shot used generally to be very desirable before the introduction of quick-firers; with the modern gun, however, it is doubtful if any need remains for including them in a battery's equipment. It is remarkable what very frequent examples have occurred in small wars of late years of the use of this form of projectile. The three batteries supporting Colonel Macdonald's brigade when it was attacked at the battle of Khartum, fired an immense number of rounds--one battery used up sixty-nine during the day. Case shot is held to be quite out of date in regular warfare; the tactics of the present day demand that artillery shall work at what would half a century ago have been considered an absurd range. But in small wars guns, whether in attack or defence, will always be liable to find themselves in action at short and even at close range, and they should be equipped accordingly.

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