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SMALL WARS

Chapter XXVII.
Night operations.

Reason why night attacks find so much favour in the present day.

The ever-increasing power and precision of artillery and: of small arms have of recent years attracted a great deal of attention to night attacks and to night operations generally. It is obvious that the advance of science as regards weapons makes it desirable to deliver attacks under cover of darkness upon opponents who enjoy the advantage of possessing modern arms of precision, provided always that the operation can be carried out without the troops falling into confusion or being overtaken by panic. But the qualification that it is essential that there should be no confusion or risk of panic is an all important one.

General question of their advisability in small wars.

"Night attacks upon good troops are seldom successful," wrote the Duke of Wellington, appreciating the difficulty of J carrying them out owing to the danger of the assaulting! columns becoming disordered, and to the impossibility of controlling the operation beyond a certain point. Against bad troops this objection to nocturnal attacks is not in certain respects so great; they are more likely to be dismayed by the onset and to collapse before a more efficient force, even supposing that this has lost its formation. But on the other hand there is not much reason for undertaking such enterprises when the struggle is against a rabble. Usually the object of a night attack is to drive the enemy from his position without incurring the losses which are inevitable in advancing against well armed and efficient troops by day. Undisciplined forces so rarely get full value out of their weapons that their fire is not of much account, and there is in consequence seldom any temptation to incur the perils almost

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inseparable from assaults undertaken under cover of the darkness. Speaking generally, irregular warriors have not arms of great precision, and if they do possess them they do not employ them to good purpose. On the other hand, the risk of confusion is almost as great in attacking savages in the dark as in attacking picked troops. The consequence is that night attacks are seldom deliberately undertaken, and the reason for it is obvious enough.

Upon the whole the drawbacks decidedly outweigh the advantages.

It may happen on occasions that Uzbegs, or Afghans, or Kaffirs, or Red Indians, may take up a position so strong, or may occupy a post so well fitted for obstinate defence, that an assault by day promises little chance of success or that it exposes the troops to losses which their commander is not prepared to risk. Under such circumstances he may elect to make his attack under cover of darkness. Still such cases are rare. At night the Zulu with his assegai or the Pathan with his knife can fully hold his own against the trained soldier with his bayonet. Hand to hand struggles with such foemen are therefore to be avoided unless it can be assured that they will be carried out with the steadiness which an organized body thoroughly under control alone is capable of. Troops purposely engaging in night combats against irregular foes as a rule deliberately abandon their advantage in weapons and, what is almost worse, they may at the same time abandon the cohesion which is the sheet anchor of a disciplined body of soldiers. To engage in nocturnal operations involving the chance of a melée in the dark is seldom advisable in irregular warfare. In regular warfare there may be abundant justification for night attacks, but in most small wars there is none.

 

But this is assuming that the enemy is indifferently armed. It does not of course at all follow that the enemy is worse armed than the regular troops, and supposing that the weapons in the hands of the adversary are modern rifles the argument against night attacks must be based mainly on the difficulty of carrying out military operations in the dark.

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When the regular troops are operating against adversaries like the Boers, or against opponents such as would sometimes be met with during a rebellion in a civilized country, the enemy may, even in a small war, be so well armed as to suggest nocturnal attacks on him. Small war is an elastic expression covering a great diversity of conditions. But when the enemy is civilized and well armed, one of the best excuses which can be alleged in justification of nocturnal enterprises in irregular warfare, will generally be found not to apply. It has already been pointed out earlier in this volume that irregular warriors are apt to disregard the necessity of having outposts at night, and on this account a night attack upon such opponents may prove a complete surprise. But the guerillas met with in civil warfare are fully alive to the need of keeping a look-out at all times. Such foemen are not easily caught napping, and they are generally almost as difficult to surprise by a night attack as are regular troops.

Risk of confusion and panic.

The danger of confusion in delivering a night attack is extreme, and confusion at such a moment may lead to a, deplorable disaster. The attacking columns may fire into each other. Part of the force told off for the undertaking may lose its way, and may not arrive at the scene of action at all. One body may reach the hostile position prematurely and may have to bear the whole brunt of the battle unaided. If it is difficult for the commander of an attacking force, which is split up into separate detachments, to control the operation by day, it obviously must be far more difficult for him to maintain control at night. Even when the assault is started with a body of troops well in hand, it is by no means easy to keep it in hand in the dark, to detect where a check is occurring, or to prevent dissemination when the encounter is at its height. Then there is also the risk of sudden panic. Napier vividly describes the effect upon some stormers of Badajoz of the sudden cry of "A mine," when there was no mine. The soldier likes to know what he is about, where he

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is going to, where his officer is and where the enemy is. The storming of Kars by the Russians in 1877, and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, which latter, however, did not involve night fighting, have shown that arrangements for an attack can be carried oat by night, and that the attack can sometimes be made at night without confusion or misunderstanding. But they do not prove that there is no danger in such operations, nor do they prove that enterprises of this character should be undertaken except under very special circumstances.

 

The difficulty of controlling troops at night in case of alarm was well shown a night or two after the French army landed at Sidi Feruch in Algeria. About 2 a.m. a loose horse in front of the line startled a sentry, who fired and gave the alarm. The battalions dose by seized their muskets and fired wildly into the darkness, and the blaze of musketry soon extended along the whole line; it lasted fox more than a quarter of an hour. Four men were killed and ten wounded in this panic about nothing.

 

In this case, of course, the French were not attacking, but the principle is the same. Examples of confusion occurring in night attacks made by regular troops in small wars are difficult to find, for the very good reason that such operations are seldom undertaken. It is recognized that they are generally out of place, except on a very small scale and with detachments so restricted in strength that they cannot well fall into disorder. General Reynier's brilliant night attack upon the Turks in 1799 with a considerable force--"Une des plus belles opérations de guerre qu'il soit possible de faire," as Napoleon characterized it--is one of the very few instances of a successful nocturnal attack under these conditions upon an enemy of inferior organization and discipline. Against the remarkable success which attended General Hunter's attack on Gun Hill and that of the Rifle Brigade on Surprise Hill during the defence of Ladysmith, can be set many failures in the same war. Advocates of night attacks like, the Russian General Dragomirof base their arguments upon the overwhelming

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effect of the fire of modem troops upon an attacking force--upon conditions which do not exist in most small wars.

 

At Nui Bop in Tonkin General Negrier attempted a night attack upon the Chinese position with one of his battalions. But this, getting into difficulties in the broken ground, no actual assault took place; one company, however, got close to the hostile lines and separated from the remainder. It was attacked vigorously by the Chinese at dawn, and its position was for a time highly critical; but it stood its ground against very superior numbers till reinforcements arrived.

Objections less serious in the case of attacks on a very small scale.

The objections to night attacks on a small scale are far less serious than when the operation is intended as a great operation of war like General Reynier's attack referred to above, and Lord Cornwallis's storming of Tippoo's lines before Seringapatam in 1792. The smaller the force is the less fear is there of mistakes and disorder. "Not only the risk, hut the difficulty of execution as well," says Clausewitz, "confines night enterprises to small bodies." This perhaps is too arbitrary a dictum, but it will be found correct if it is accepted merely as a broad general rule. There is no great difficulty in moving a small body of troops about in the dark. Their leader can make his voice heard, can exercise close superintendence over the whole of his command, and if the project fails no very great harm will perhaps be done.

Division of force at night almost always a mistake.

It will very rarely be the case that the plan should admit of the force being split up into detachments moving separately. An operation of this kind is a delicate one to execute under any circumstances, and any complications are to be deprecated. Even supposing the different detachments deliver their assault simultaneously there must be great risk of their firing into each other by mistake, which will give the alarm to the enemy even if they do not do each other grave injury. The Boers, it is true, managed to deliver attacks upon bivouacs at night from all sides, which shows that it is not impossible to get several detachments to deliver an assault simultaneously in the dark; but the operation is so difficult that it will

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generally be better not to make the attempt, and to deliver night attacks, when they have to be delivered, on only one side and by a single force.

Need of careful preparations.

When a project of this nature is determined upon the most careful preparations must be made. It is impossible to overrate the importance of the orders being detailed, and of the exact course of action to be taken under all circumstances being clearly laid down. A mistake may lead to most serious disaster. Some trifling blunder may be fatal to success. The night assault upon the Kabul Gate of Ghazni in 1839 nearly failed, owing to the retreat being sounded under the impression that the engineers had not succeeded in blowing in the gateway. It is essential that the obstacles likely to be encountered should have been ascertained by previous reconnaissance, otherwise the troops may lose their way. It has been already stated that irregular warriors do not generally anticipate night attacks and that they rarely have an efficient outpost system to guard against them. But this cannot be assumed as a matter of course. The crafty Arabs in Algeria used to leave their fires burning at night when they expected a French attack, and to draw off; then they would form an ambuscade and would fall upon the assailants as these returned disappointed to their bivouac.

Precautions against assailants mistaking each other for the enemy.

Precautions should be taken that the troops shall recognize each other. In a Spanish guerilla attack upon the French in the Peninsular War their leader made them wear their white shirts over their other clothes. Operating against African savages the white helmet is an excellent distinction, but it is no distinct mark when the troops are fighting Asiatics with their white turbans. These are matters of minor detail perhaps, but nocturnal attacks are risky undertakings and demand the most careful forethought if they are to succeed. Moonlight nights are of course unsuitable, and great care must be taken to prevent the glint of bayonets or of other metal from giving the enemy warning of what is impending.

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The general plan of attack and all the details of it which affect subordinate officers should be made known to them; this is far more necessary in the case of nocturnal operations than in the case of attacks by daylight.

The bayonet the weapon for night attacks.

Finally it cannot be too much insisted upon that the bayonet is the proper weapon for night attacks. It is difficult enough to preserve fire control by day, but by night even the steadiest troops will fire wildly. The opponents with whom regular forces have to deal can rarely stand a bayonet charge of disciplined troops working together. It must always be remembered that by night the moral effect of the initiative increases enormously; if good troops are so liable to panic in the dark, there can be no question that irregular warriors are apt to be scared and to lose all self-control under like conditions. A handful of trained soldiers well led and acting in concert at night, may terrify a host of Asiatics or savages and may achieve a notable triumph without firing a shot or getting home with the bayonet. It must not be forgotten that by eschewing fire there is far less chance of injuring friends--the danger of this is Very great unless a most rigid fire discipline be maintained. Troops belonging to the same side ought not to bayonet each other, they will see their mistake when they come to close quarters; but they will shoot each other for a certainty if the least disorder occurs in the attack, or if in their excitement they fire wildly. Volleys may sometimes be permissible, but independent firing never--the objection to this latter is of course increased by the introduction of the magazine rifle.

Examples of successful night attacks on a small scale.

The following two examples show the efficacy of night attacks on a small scale in warfare of this nature.

During the hostilities in Mexico in 1862, the enemy one night occupied, some heights above the town of Orizaba, held by the French A company was promptly sent to deal with the intruders. This pushed the enemy back for a time, but eventually, when the opposition became too strong, its advance was checked, whereupon the commander ordered the men not to fire so as to conceal his weakness. After waiting for some time another company

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arrived, and the French then charged and drove off the Mexicans. The French, who numbered only 140 all told, placed no less than 250 of the enemy hors de combat and they took 200 prisoners.

 

Morosi's Mountain in Basutoland stands at an elbow of the Orange River with three almost precipitous sides. When the night attack was made on it in 1879, it was strongly fortified on the remaining side. Morosi's men were good shots, and the place was most formidable for a small force to assault which was weak in artillery. It had been decided to make the venture about midnight. A fissure had been discovered on one of the perpendicular sides, and by this a storming party with ladders managed to reach the top, the enemy in the breastworks on the open side being in the meantime kept occupied by artillery fire till the last moment. The result was a complete surprise, the storming party reached the top of the cleft before the Basutos could assemble in large numbers to oppose it, and the formidable stronghold, which had baffled two previous attacks, was captured with very little loss.

 

It should be noted that in both these cases the ground was fairly well known. This was also the case at Gun Hill and Surprise Hill. It makes a great difference if the position to be attacked has been under observation for some tame, or has been carefully reconnoitred beforehand.

Night marches. When especially advantageous.

Although it may be said that upon the whole night attacks are seldom advisable in small wars, the same rule does not hold good with regard to night marches, even when the enemy is close at hand. Night marches, made almost in the presence of the enemy with a view to attack at early dawn, have on many occasions in recent campaigns led to brilliant successes. It was indeed pointed out in Chapter XII that the early morning is generally the best time to deliver an assault, and this almost necessarily involves a previous movement under cover of darkness. Most of the good captures of Boers made in the closing days of the late South African war, before the institution of the drives, were brought about by attacks in the early morning following on night marches sometimes of great length. The veld presented few serious difficulties to columns following a track at night. The darkness in that region is seldom so great that a path cannot be seen and obstacles avoided. There have been

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few campaigns where night operations have played so great a part, even if actual night attacks were seldom attempted by our side.

Risk of movement being detected by some accident.

One of the great dangers of a night march in proximity to the enemy is that, even if the hostile outpost and patrol arrangements are defective, the movement may de disclosed by some accident for which the troops are no wise responsible. Colonel Maurice, referring to the case of Tel-el-Kebir, makes the following observations: "It has happened in the past that some night attacks have failed in consequence of the attacking troops meeting on their route cattle, geese, or other animals, which have aroused the defenders, or roused inhabitants who have given warning to the enemy. By a curiously bad logical deduction a conclusion has been sometimes drawn from this fact that therefore all night attacks are chiefly a matter of chance. An examination of the circumstances and of the orders for the night march upon Tel-el-Kebir will show that an altogether different conclusion may be drawn, viz., that the possibility of meeting dogs, cattle, geese, &c, is an element that has to be taken into account by a commander in arranging his plans for a night march. It was almost as certain that on the night of the 12th September the infantry and cavalry who moved to the north of the canal along the desert would not meet with cattle, geese, or dogs as that they would not meet with whales. It was absolutely certain that the Indian Brigade which moved through the wady to the south of the canal would meet with animals of all sorts before reaching the lines; therefore the hour of the march of the Indian brigade was fixed accordingly." A commander would not however always be so well acquainted with the ground about to be traversed as was the case on this occasion. Horses insist on neighing. In the countries where small wars are carried out there is generally some vexatious form of .bird which emits weird noises when startled out of its repose. There is in fact nearly always a certain element of chance in a night

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march intended to bring a force into position to attack at dawn.

Enemy keeps a bad look-out at night.

The enemy seldom keeps any look-out at night except quite close in to the bivouac or to the locality occupied, and would not, as a rule, lie in wait for the troops on the march unless news of the contemplated movement had somehow leaked out. The Boers, as was pointed out on p. 465, used to have picquets a long way out from their laager, but it was not their practice to form ambuscades at night. Some cases, no doubt, have occurred of attacks by irregular warriors--upon marching columns being made at night the Persian attack upon Sir J. Outram's force the night before the fight at Khushab, and the disastrous episode of the attempted relief of Arrah from Dinapore, referred to on p. 215, may be cited as examples. But the experience of many campaigns tends to show that, except in guerilla warfare in a civilized country, irregular adversaries hesitate to interfere with regular troops during a night march and are not generally prepared for such a move. They do not seem to anticipate nocturnal operations even when the opposing forces are in close proximity. At any rate they generally do not interfere with the march.

 

The case of Sir H. Stewart's advance from Abu Klea towards the Me is a remarkable example of this. The Mahdists must have foreseen that such an advance was certain to take place, either by day or by night. Owing to the column passing through a considerable patch of bush in the dark, it got into great confusion when not far from Metemma where the enemy was collected in force. As the march was very slow it is almost certain that the Arabs must have become aware of it while it was in progress. But no attempt was made to meet it till dawn. Then crowds of Mahdists came swarming up from the river to oppose the British advance. An attack upon the column when disordered in the bush would have had most disastrous consequences, and it is strange that fanatics, who attacked with such desperation by daylight, should have made no attempt to molest the troops at night when they could have depended upon getting to close quarters. But, as has been pointed out earlier in the chapter, opponents of this nature seem to shirk night attacks, and to dread making them.

 

Another notable instance of this in a campaign against an enemy very different from the savage followers of the Mahdi, is afforded by Sir G. Colley's

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safe withdrawal from the scene of his defeat at the Ingogo. When evening closed in on the engagement, the enemy was grouped practically all round the British force. Nevertheless Sir Q. Colley succeeded during the night in withdrawing unopposed out of the dangerous position in which they found themselves, not only his infantry but also his guns. The Boers, when morning broke found only the killed and wounded left, and they were not a little disconcerted to find their opponents gone. They did not commit such blunders two decades later.

 

When General Oughterlony was advancing on Katmandu in 1816, all the passes generally used over the first range of hills above the Terai were held by the Gurkhas, and reconnaissances showed the defences to be most formidable. A route was however discovered which the enemy had neglected, by which the hostile positions could be turned. This route passed through a deep, narrow ravine for some miles, and it offered extraordinary difficulties to a march in the darkness. But one brigade starting after dark one night advanced by it, and reached the crest of the hill unopposed about dawn after an arduous march through most difficult country. The Gurkhas were taken completely aback by this remarkable exploit, and they abandoned all their first positions.

 

The withdrawal of the picquets from the Guru Mountain under cover of darkness during the Ambela campaign is a good example of a retrograde movement of a part of a force in the darkness, unobserved by a particularly vigilant enemy.

 

Sir R. Butter's retirement from Abu Klea, already referred to on p. 245, is a notable instance of a force of regulars withdrawing by night from a position in presence of the enemy without their movement being discovered.

Risk of confusion on the march.

In close presence of an enemy who does not appreciate the need of a proper system of outposts, and who does not recognise that skilfully carried out night marches on the part of the regular forces may entirely alter the strategical and tactical situation, movements under cover of the darkness may achieve most decisive results. But it must never be forgotten that they are exhausting to the troops and transport, and that there is great risk of serious confusion occurring even with the best arrangements if the terrain be unfavourable--some instances of this occurred on a small scale during the Indian frontier campaigns of 1897. In the bush such movements are frequently quite impracticable, and they will always prove difficult to execute; night marches if attempted in a theatre of war of this nature must be carried out with great

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deliberation, the head of the column halting every few minutes to ensure that the column may remain compact. *he practice which to a certain extent prevails in the East of marching by night in very hot weather has almost as many opponents as it has advocates, and a succession of such night marches tends to demoralise a force. Nocturnal movements are upon the whole adapted rather for isolated undertakings than for constant practice. But under certain conditions and when fighting guerillas they may be unavoidable. They were absolutely unavoidable in the later stages of the South African war and it was mainly by constant night work that the nomad Boer commandos were gradually hunted down and stamped out. Many examples could of course be given of columns falling into confusion in the darkness, but the following are perhaps particularly noteworthy:--

 

Early in 1864, during the operations in Bhutan, it was found necessary by the garrison of Dewangniri to evacuate the post by night The arrangements for retreat seem to have been well enough thought out, but the main column somehow lost its way, and a panic ensued. The guns had to be abandoned and the force reached its destination in a state of demoralization.

 

The confusion into which this column fell during its night march from Abu Klea to Metemma upset Sir H. Stewart's plan of reaching the Nile at daylight, and it was in consequence the cause of serious lose to the force.

 

During the night march towards Adowa, two of the Italian brigades which were intended to advance by separate routes, got intermingled and some delay was caused. The contretemps does not, however, appear to have contributed much to bring about the disaster of the following day.

 

The case of Nicholson's Neck naturally comes to mind. On that occasion the ground was no doubt difficult, but it was typical of what may ordinarily be expected in irregular warfare.

Importance of the troops being well disciplined.

There is one point which must not be overlooked when considering night marches in small wars. It is very often the case that the troops employed are not of the highest class as regards training and discipline. Under no conditions does the difference between good troops, and troops which cannot be classed as better than indifferent, become more apparent than on a night march In South Africa there was often a considerable difference even between one regular battalion and

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another on the march in the darkness, and irregular troops and levies are always very difficult to keep in hand at night. Few officers who took part in those nights of marching on the veld in 1901-02, will not remember instances of matches being lighted, of gaps in the column, of men straggling and being left behind, of contretemps arising from lack of discipline, which were only such as might be expected in an army made up so largely of irregular corps, but which were none the less dangerous on that account. In weighing the pros and cons before attempting some nocturnal operation in wars of this class, the discipline and steadiness of the troops to be employed must be taken into account.

General conclusion as to night operations.

Instructions with regard to night marches are to be found in various military works and need not be given here; the necessity for previous reconnaissance of route, for guides, for especial precautions at points where part of the column, might get off the line, &c, of course holds good just as much in irregular warfare as in other campaigns. Looking at such operations from the point of view of small wars, the main thing to be said in their favour is that in such campaigns columns on the march are seldom attacked at night, and that night movements are particularly likely to surprise and perplex the enemy. On the other hand, they generally involve especial risk of confusion in the force owing to the difficulty of moving through roadless country, and for the same reason they are especially likely to exhaust the powers of man and beast. To actually deliver an attack upon irregular warriors in the dark will seldom be advisable, because, even if the want of discipline and cohesion in the hostile ranks gives promise that their resistance in a nocturnal combat will not be very obstinate, the regular troops by fighting in the dark sacrifice their superiority in weapons. In a word, night operations ii irregular warfare are not to be lightly entered upon, although circumstances will sometimes justify and even compel their adoption, and although many examples can be quoted when they have been crowned with brilliant success.

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Arrangements for repelling night attacks.

That night attacks by irregular warriors are upon the whole unusual, has been pointed out in a former chapter, but numerous instances were at the same time given of enterprises of this nature being attempted by the enemy in many parts of the world, and it is always necessary to be well prepared for them. The first safe-guard against any hostile assaults in the dark is of course to be found in an efficient system of outposts. But the advantages of having these close in to the force under normal conditions were noted in the chapter on the service of security, and it will often be the case that the time between the first alarm being given and the actual onslaught of the foe upon the encampment, is a matter of only a few moments.

 

When the picquets are in close proximity to the bivouac or camp it is essential, if the enemy be at hand, that the troops should have their arms beside them, that guns should be in action, that some of the horses should be saddled up, and that the force should be in a position to assume fighting formation at a moment's notice. It is usual indeed for the bulk of the combatant portions of the force to sleep on the perimeter of the camp. All ranks must be ready to spring into their places at once without confusion. It is very important that no firing should take place when the alarm is given except by order of officers, otherwise the picquets may be shot down, ammunition may be wasted, and the noise is sure to add to the excitement and bustle of a moment when good order is essential. It would rarely be the case that a force so situated has not some form of defence work round it, even if this be of a very slight character; but, whether such arrangements exist or not, the troops should bivouac at their fighting posts. In South Africa one of the great difficulties during a night attack was found to be the prevention of a stampede of the horses, of which there were generally large numbers in the bivouac; horses are especially likely to take fright at night when firing suddenly breaks out, and a considerable

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portion of the fighting force may have to remain with them to be ready for eventualities.

Lighting up the ground.

When there is any chance of a night attack, it is of great advantage to have some means of lighting up the ground to the front of the troops. Star shell are excellent, but their illuminating power is transient, and the artillery must husband its small supply of a form of ammunition which is not designed for man-killing purposes. If it be possible to arrange bonfires a little way to the front, to be lighted in case of attack, these may prove invaluable; but care must be taken not to ignite them in case of a mere false alarm as their glare will enable the enemy to fire into the encampment from a distance and to do damage. It must be remembered that lighting up the battle-field will benefit that side which has the advantage in the matter of armament, therefore fires, even supposing they are within the defenders' lines, may aid them more than they aid the enemy should an actual assault be delivered.

 

This was the case at Rorke's Drift the glare of the burning buildings enabled the hard-pressed defenders to use their rifles, with most telling effect upon the swarms of Zulus surging around the epaulments.

After the first two nights of the tribal attacks on the Malakand post in 1897, bonfires were arranged for, to be ignited in case of assault They were placed some distance to the front of the line of defence and proved most efficacious.

Artillery and machine guns in case of night attacks.

It is a good plan if night attacks be at all probable, to train guns and machine guns by daylight upon points where the enemy may be expected to mass, or from which assault is to be anticipated. This was done at the defence of Chakdara in 1897 with excellent results. Experiments have shown that rifles on fixed rests can be similarly trained. It is also advisable, although artillery officers do not always like the arrangement, to fill the intervals between the guns if these be in battery on the perimeter of the encampment with a few infantry men. Cases have occurred where the

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enemy has crept in between the guns by night. This would of course not be necessary if there were some satisfactory form of breastwork in front of the guns.

The question of reserves.

In anticipation of a night attack in this class of warfare, it is generally very important to have a considerable proportion of the whole force told off to act as a reserve--more so than by daylight. In the darkness the blow falls so suddenly, and there is such a probability of isolated strokes being delivered by the enemy on different points, that it is better to sacrifice a certain amount of fire along the whole front, than to run the slightest risk of the confusion and danger which must arise if the line be penetrated by a rush at one spot and if troops be not available to at once fill up the gap. Whether there should be only a central reserve, or whether there should be local reserves, or whether there should be both, depends to a certain extent upon circumstances. With a small compact force one central reserve under the immediate orders of the commander may be the best arrangement. If the encampment covers any extensive area it will almost always be better to have several local reserves. In all positions certain points are especially exposed or especially important, and detachments in reserve should generally be placed near these.

Need of strict fire discipline.

The importance of maintaining a strict fire discipline in case of a night attack or night alarm can hardly be overrated. The case of Sidi Feruch, quoted on p. 484, illustrates the tendency of even well disciplined troops to open a wild fire at night. In the chapter on Infantry Tactics the heavy expenditure of rifle ammunition during the succession of night attacks on the Malakand post, and the danger which arose at one time of ammunition actually falling short, have been referred to. There is of course generally less likelihood of ammunition failing a force in a defensive position than when it is attacking, because the available supply will,, as a rule, be larger. But it is most important that the enemy should

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suffer heavy loss for his temerity in attempting a nocturnal assault, and to bring this about the musketry must be under control. Hostile enterprises of this nature are undesirable, and if irregular warriors are once beaten off with great slaughter there is a reasonable probability that they will not make such an attempt again. Should there be any outlying picquets, careful supervision will be necessary to prevent the troops from firing in their direction, however thoroughly they may have been previously instructed as regards the positions of the imperilled detachments.

Bayonet to be used if the enemy penetrates into the lines.

It was laid down in Chapter XXI that, should the enemy force his way into a position held by regular troops, the best and safest method of expelling the intruders is a bayonet charge, and it has been indicated in an earlier paragraph of this chapter that when troops deliver night attacks upon irregular antagonists the bayonet is the proper weapon to use. Should any fractions of the hostile force which deliver a nocturnal assault upon disciplined troops in one of these campaigns, gain a footing within the position, there is nothing like the bayonet. In the confusion which will occur in such a case any firing may be most disastrous. The signal success Which attended the use of cold steel under these trying circumstances on the occasion of the first night attack on the Malakand position in 1897 has been already referred to on p. 400. It may be accepted as a rule that this will invariably be the right way of dealing with savage opponents who have got within the lines in the darkness. Once the intruders are expelled it might be best to complete their discomfiture by musketry fire, but that would of course depend very much on the circumstances at the moment.

Counterattacks in case of a night attack by the enemy.

It is quite impossible to lay down rules with regard to counter-attacks in case of a nocturnal assault by irregular [ warriors. Offensive returns of this kind when attempted on a small scale have the disadvantage that the troops making them are apt to be fired into by their own side; confusion and

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doubt is an almost inevitable consequence of any sudden movement in the dark. On the other hand, if the enemy establishes himself close to the defensive line and renders the position really critical, the only thing to be done will often be to drive him off with a bayonet charge. But in any case it will generally be advisable to prepare for a vigorous counter-attack at the first break of dawn, when there is a great probability that the assailants will be beginning to make off. After the second night attack on the Malakand defences, a determined advance made by part of the 24th Panjab Infantry as soon as it was light enough to make the movement, proved most effective; the enemy was hunted for a long distance over the hills and suffered such heavy loss that the tribesmen drew off before dawn on succeeding nights, dreading a repetition of it.

Conclusion.

Reference to this incident forms a satisfactory close to this volume. It is an example of the advantages of the offensive when dealing with irregular warriors. The fundamental principle of carrying out operations against antagonists of this class is to assume the initiative whenever it is possible to do so, and to maintain it as long as it is practicable to maintain it. The endeavour of the preceding pages has been to give this principle prominence even when dealing with defensive formations. The commander who takes the field against guerillas, or savages, or hill-men must make up his mind to strike hard, to move rapidly in spite of the impedimenta which encumber him, to pursue relentlessly after a victory has been won and to seize the first possible moment for a counter-stroke should he meet with reverse.

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