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SMALL WARS

Chapter XXII.
Cavalry and mounted troops generally.

Variety in mounted troops employed.

THE NATURE of the mounted troops employed in small wars differs greatly in various campaigns. Sometimes they consist of, or include, picked European cavalry, at other times they consist of Cossacks mounted on mere ponies, at other times they consist of colonial mounted rifle corps, at other times again only mounted infantry are employed. The tactics employed necessarily differ somewhat according to the arms carried by the troops, to the character of their horses, and to the training to which they have been subjected.

Necessity generally of respectable force of mounted troops in these campaigns.

But before dealing with some of the special peculiarities in the tactics of mounted troops in operations of this class, it will not be out of place to point out the imperative importance of a respectable force of cavalry or other mounted troops being detailed to form part of the expeditionary force in most theatres of irregular war. For scouting duties, and for service as an advanced screen concealing and covering the movements of the army, the need of mounted troop in regular warfare is fully acknowledged by all, but there is in some quarters a tendency to doubt the efficacy of cavalry upon the modern battle-field. This question is of course quite outside the scope of this work, but it will be as well to say at once that in small wars it is only in exceptional terrain that cavalry has not a distinct and important place in action. In campaigns against irregular warriors shock tactics are by no means out of date. Cavalry charges remain efficacious in all phases of such struggles as long as the ground permits of their taking place. It is notorious that cavalry has performed its greatest exploits rather in virtue of

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its moral influence than of its capacity for inflicting grievous loss, and it is in small wars that moral influence is an exceptionally potent force. Even in hill warfare, where at first sight the cavalry soldier would appear to he out of place, mounted troops are of great value from the fact that mountaineers have an extraordinary terror of a class of troops which is necessarily rather a novelty to them.

Examples of want of mounted troops.

The necessity for cavalry or mounted troops in pursuits has been already referred to in dealing with that subject, troops. Infantry are helpless owing to the rapidity with which the adversaries retreat, and the incalculable value of horse has been displayed in most theatres of irregular warfare. The lack of cavalry was much felt in the Indian Mutiny during the early stages. The smallness of the active cavalry detachment which accompanied Sir H. Stewart across the desert from Korti to Metemma was a source of much inconvenience. The want of mounted troops in the French expeditionary force which co-operated with the British in the China war of 1860, was most prejudicial on several occasions. The Italians had no cavalry at Adowa, and to the want of mounted scouts may largely be attributed their ignorance of the position and strength of the enemy until the last moment. Experience has proved that the regular army is in small wars often almost helpless without plenty of mounted troops.

 

The Boer war of 1881 is the most remarkable example of this. The small British force took the field with only an insignificant mounted detachment. The Boers proved themselves then, as they proved themselves in the later and greater war, to be the beau-ideal of mounted infantry. Their ponies were inured to hardships and hard work and were trained to stand when their riders dismounted and left them. They themselves were good shots, and, what is almost more important, good judges of distance. Against a force such as this infantry could do little and artillery could do less. The Boers in taking up a position at Laing's Nek

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with the idea of defending it to the last, played their adversaries' game and incurred a great risk, although it was justified by the event. At the Ingogo fight, on the other hand, they employed exactly the tactics best suited to a force constituted as theirs was if operating against infantry and artillery, and they reaped the full benefit of the want of mounted troops on the British side; owing to this absence of mounted troops in the camps of their opponents, they were able to strike without the slightest fear of suffering a serious reverse. Regular troops have seldom in a small war been placed in a more ignominious position than Sir G. Colley's little army. Had the British force included a few squadrons of cavalry the Boers could not have manoeuvred with the freedom they did outside their entrenchments at Laing's Nek, and it is very doubtful if they would have attempted to hold those entrenchments at all had they found a cloud of troopers sweeping round their flank. The presence of cavalry in such conditions would have completely altered the situation.

 

Mounted troops have always proved invaluable in South Africa, where the nature of the theatres of war generally favours their action. Infantry have never been able to catch the Kaffirs except when these retire into some stronghold like the Waterkloof or Sekukuni's Mountain. In the wars against the Red Indians in the Western States the same has been found to be the case. It is indeed only in thick bush or in exceptionally rugged mountains that this arm of the service seems to be out of place when campaigning against irregular warriors.

Need of mounted troops for raids.

For raids such as the French instituted in Algeria, such as the United States troops carried out so successfully against the Red Indians, and such as the Russians frequently employ in the steppes, mounted troops are indispensable. In such cases, and in dealing with guerillas operating over a great extent of country like the rebels in Rhodesia, the need for mounted troops arises from the necessity of mobility, and

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therefore mounted infantry will serve the purpose. But in action against determined opponents who do not confine themselves to guerilla operations but who accept battle, the shock tactics of cavalry are requisite if the mounted force is not to play an altogether secondary role in the fight.

Importance of cavalry shock action.

While mounted rifles and mounted infantry are, speaking generally, only supposed to fight dismounted, cavalry fights both mounted and dismounted. The tendency has been of late years in some armies, anal especially so in the British service, to give to cavalry shock action a very secondary place in tactics and to make the rifle the main arm of the cavalry trooper. Difference of opinion cists whether in this respect the reformers in preparing the arm for the exigencies of regular warfare have not moved too fast, but it may in any case safely be laid down that in campaigns against irregular warriors the time-honoured principles of cavalry tactics still hold good. Indeed the fundamental principle which, except in certain special cases, governs the proper conduct of All small wars affords strong evidence in favour of cavalry shock action on the battle-field. A bold initiative for the plan of campaign, and resolute attack when the enemy is met with, point the way to triumph. The action of cavalry on horseback is necessarily never defensive. It is the special characteristic of the arm that, apart from dismounted work, it always attacks--cavalry in fact incarnates the spirit which should animate the operations wad which does animate them when in proper hands. Th« moral effect of a charge of trained and disciplined horse upon a mob of irregular warriors is tremendous. It is like the bayonet charge of infantry, only .that it generally admits of no esc ape and that it is much more easy to bring about.

 

Small wars offer the cavalry leader magnificent opportunities on a minor scale. On favourable ground there is scarcely a limit to what his command can effect if handled with boldness and skill. The achievements of cavalry in the

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Indian Mutiny were brilliant in the extreme. In that campaign, where the offensive was adopted almost as a matter of course, the mounted troops were in their element; the very fact that the rebels were organized after a fashion and fought somewhat in the European manner, favoured the employment of the arm--there were formations to break, hostile squadrons to be swept away and guns to be captured. In Algeria the French cavalry seldom failed to make its presence felt, and did grand service. For work like this cavalry is far superior to mounted rifles or mounted infantry in any form.

Risk of falling into ambushes or getting into ground where cavalry cannot act.

In considering the tactics of cavalry and of mounted troops generally, it will be convenient to deal with mounted action first. The great risk that cavalry runs in this sort of warfare is that it may fall into an ambush on ground where it cannot act with effect. In all theatres of war there is the danger of coming unexpectedly upon concealed obstacles or upon impracticable ground. The remarkable charge at Ramnugger which routed the Sikhs, ended in the cavalry getting into deep ground and suffering very heavily before it could be withdrawn from action. Such incidents are not uncommon in regular warfare, and they are frequent in conflicts with uncivilized races. Sometimes, as in the action at the crossing of the Swat River in the Chitral campaign in 1895, the approach of cavalry will dislodge irregular warriors from ground where they are in reality perfectly safe from the mounted men; but this cannot of course be depended upon, and experience shows that cavalry pushed too far ^in unfavourable ground may get into very serious difficulties if it falls into an ambuscade or comes unexpectedly under fire of hostile bodies under cover. One ot two examples of this are worth quoting.

 

The affair of Mukur, during General Nott's advance from Kandahar to Ghazni in 1842 is a good instance. A small cavalry force came upon some Afghans in the open, cut them up, and pursued the fugitives to the hills. Here the enemy showed up in force, and the troopers fell back. Hostile

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horsemen thereupon pressed forward and, becoming more and more threatening a part of the cavalry was sent to attack them over rough ground. This suddenly found itself exposed to very heavy fire from Afghans concealed on the flank Retreating in haste it was immediately charged, and being outnumbered and at a great disadvantage it had to seek refuge in flight.

 

At the battle of Castellijos in Morocco in 1859, two Spanish squadrons, carried away by the excitement of a charge, dashed right into the enemy's position up a narrow valley. In withdrawing they suffered very heavily without having apparently achieved any substantial success.

Cavalry able to act effectively on broken ground where it would be useless in regular warfare.

At the same time it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that, opposed to irregular warriors, it is not generally a sine qua non that the ground which mounted troops are to operate over must be such as cavalry can charge over. The best known cases where cavalry have got into serious difficulties owing .to unexpected obstacles have mostly occurred in regular warfare, where this arm of the service must almost of necessity act at a high rate of speed. Instances can be quoted where troops and squadrons have gone headlong over precipices to their destruction. But such disasters only befall the troopers when they are acting in formed bodies with the reckless dash which is traditional with the cavalry soldier. There is an idea very generally entertained in other branches of the service, and it is one which is to a certain extent encouraged by writers on tactics, that cavalry is of little use in broken, rugged country. That this is by no means the case in operations against undisciplined forces was shown in the campaigns of 1895 and 1897 in the valleys of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers. Some of the most effective work performed on horseback by the mounted troops during the operations against the Mamund clan was carried out at a deliberate trot in awkward, rocky ground, where a gallop would often have been wholly impracticable and would always have been dangerous. Savages, Asiatics, and adversaries of that character have a great dread of the mounted man, and they are apt to lose their nerve on his approach, even when the ground is unfavourable to him and when he can go little faster than

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they can. It is quite different in regular warfare, where cavalry can effect little against infantry except by surprise, and where in broken intersected terrain it would be sacrificed if it attempted to approach foot soldiers.

 

It is, however, only right to point out that the mounted troops which performed such signal service during the advance towards Chitral and during the operations of the Malakand field force, enjoyed the advantage of great experience in irregular warfare. Because regiments like the Guides and the 11th Bengal Lancers were able to play an important tactical rôle in theatres of war so awkward to traverse by mounted men as Swat and Bajacur, it does not follow that corps trained on more favourable ground and accustomed only to ordinary cavalry manoeuvres, would do as well under the same conditions. Still, although the services of less practised corps might not be so valuable, they would yet be far from useless, and it seems to be definitely settled that in irregular warfare the trooper has a well established place, on a rugged battle-field cut up by nullahs and full of pit-falls as well as upon ground more congenial to his ordinary mode of fighting.

Irregular hostile formations militate against effective cavalry charges.

One of the greatest difficulties which in these campaigns cavalry has to contend with when delivering a charge is the dispersed straggling formation in which the enemy so generally fights. In regular warfare the main object of the charge is to throw the adversary into just such confusion as constitutes normal battle order of Pathans, Sudanese, Somalia and their like. Loose crowds of this description can be ridden through without their fighting efficiency being much affected, although the moral effect cannot fail to be considerable. One of" the reasons that the memorable charge of the 21st Lancers at the battle of Khartum was so effective was that the hostile force ridden through was massed thickly together. Sudanese throw themselves down to avoid the troopers' sabres, and jumping up, ham-string the horses. At El Teb a great throng

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of the Mahdists was charged through several times by the cavalry brigade, but from the want of lances--this question of lances will be referred to later--no very serious loss was inflicted upon them. On the other hand at the fight of Khushk-i-Nakhud two native squadrons charged a considerable gathering of Afghans, mostly footmen, on open ground and killed no less than 163 of them, thus showing that even under the unfavourable circumstances of charging through dispersed gatherings of irregular warriors cavalry can sometimes strike a heavy blow.

 

In pursuit the results are of course more satisfactory. The enemy is demoralised, and individuals are less adroit in avoiding the sabre and the lance. Even here, however, the tendency of such antagonists to disperse in all directions, defeats to a certain extent the object which the cavalry have in view. In campaigns where the enemy fights in formed bodies, such as the Indian Mutiny and the Egyptian War of 1882, cavalry in pursuit have of course a well defined rôle to perform in breaking up any semblance of formation which the fugitives may try to maintain--in operations such as these, where the hostile troops adopt the form of modern tactics without enjoying the confidence and cohesion of a modern army, cavalry is indeed seen almost at its best. Operating against forces of this nature the Hussar and Lancer find exceptional opportunities for distinction. In the Indian Mutiny the cavalry even broke rebel squares, and by its determined efforts and restless energy it assumed in the open field an extraordinary importance.

Cavalry and horse artillery.

Small wars seldom lend themselves to a happy co-operation between cavalry and horse artillery. The terrain does not as a rule admit of guns manoeuvring at a high rate of speed. When the ground is suitable, however, this combination has a great opening for decisive action owing to the freedom with which the artillery can work. The Indian Mutiny afforded some splendid examples in those phases of

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the campaign, where the enemy, acting in formed units, was brought to bay in the open field. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss the form which such tactics take, because they are described and illustrated in most works on the military art, and are practised on the manoeuvre ground.

Cavalry acting against hostile mounted troops.

The opponents met with in irregular operations can often boast of mounted forces deserving of respect. In some cases the hostile cavalry is formed in squadrons and works effectively as an organized body, in others it merely represents a mass of horsemen ready to follow a few acknowledged chieftains. Good cavalry, boldly handled, has not much to fear in either case. Still it is generally of great importance, where the enemy's mounted forces are really worthy of consideration, that the troopers should be kept thoroughly in hand and should work in compact formation, because it is in their discipline and cohesion rather than in any superiority of armament that their advantage over the hostile horsemen lies.

Importance of discipline and cohesion in such work.

It was a saying of Napoleon's that two Mamelukes could defeat three French horsemen, that 100 French horse could hold their own against an equal force of Mamelukes, that 300 French would defeat the same number, and that 1,000 French would defeat 1,500 Mamelukes. For the Mamelukes were better armed, better mounted and individually more skilful than Napoleon's troopers; but as the size of the respective forces grew, tactics, order, and the power of manoeuvring grew more and more decisive, gradually turning the scale in favour of the trained and disciplined cavalry. The horsemen met with by the French in Algeria and by the British in many Indian campaigns have been individually most formidable; they have been well mounted, have been generally very well armed apart from firearms, have been dexterous swordsmen, and have been experts in the handling of the lance. It is moreover worthy of note that when mounted irregular foemen are inclined to assume the initiative they will often act

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with great boldness. Owing to the hardy constitution and good condition of their horses, they can in addition to this lay claim to considerable, and sometimes to quite remarkable, mobility. Id many respects they are in fact really formidable, and the only point in which, speaking generally, they are found to fail is in the power of using concentrated force at the bidding of their leaders in the right direction. That being so, it is essential that this one point, in which the trained cavalry holds them at so great a disadvantage, should be profited by to the full.

 

To enumerate instances where small bodies of regular cavalry have overthrown far superior numbers of irregular horsemen would be tedious. As long as the trained troopers are handled with skill and vigour, and as long as they reap to the full the advantage which they hold in virtue of their superior discipline, they will seldom fail to win success even when the odds are enormously against them. It is not, however, always so, as the following example shows:--

 

In 1864, a French squadron suddenly found itself in presence of a body of about 1,000 hostile Arabs at a place called Ain-el-Khata in the undefined territory known as Southern Algeria. The small French force at once boldly charged the formidable lost. The Arabs let it come on and dash right in among them, but they then surrounded their bold assailants and cut them down.

 

Still, considering the number of cases where small bodies of regular cavalry have utterly defeated and dispersed masses of brave, well-armed and well-mounted horsemen, and the very few instances of failure except from bad management, it may almost be accepted as a principle that the regulars should not shirk an encounter even with very superior forces of hostile horsemen on suitable ground.

Difficulty of meeting a reckless charge of fanatical horsemen.

A wild charge of fanatical horsemen is not always easy to meet satisfactorily, and it is essential that the cavalry subjected to such an onslaught should be ready to act in a decisive direction and at a moment's notice. The theory of

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tactics when cavalry fights cavalry is to attack the enemy in flank, and regular squadrons always endeavour to work on this principle. Irregular cavalry is not so dexterously handled, nor is it sufficiently under control to enable it to carry out evolutions directed by its leaders at a critical moment. Charging in dispersed order, as such horsemen do, an onslaught on their flank is no doubt in some respects less effective than a similar manoeuvre directed against a force of regular cavalry would be, because they are in confusion as a matter of course, while the great object of regular cavalry is to avoid being thrown into confusion. Still a flank attack of this kind on a swarm of irregular horsemen is very likely to put them to flight, inasmuch as they have not the manoeuvring powers to meet it and they have not the pace to escape it. In theory indeed, some part of a force of cavalry taken at a disadvantage by a sudden onslaught of a swarm of irregular horse ought always to be able to deliver a flank attack on the enemy, even supposing that the bulk of it is obliged to retire for the moment. Experience nevertheless shows that such manoeuvres are not always possible at a critical juncture. Thus at the commencement of the fight at Ahmed Khel some native cavalry on the left flank of the British line were thrown into serious confusion by a mass of Afghan horsemen who swooped down from the hills upon them very suddenly, and caught them when in difficulties.

Enemy's horse inclined to use firearms from the saddle.

Moors, Tartars, and some of the Asiatics of the Steppes fire from horseback, and the Cossacks adopted the plan of firing mounted in the days when their guerilla tactics made them so formidable. In the later stages of the South African war of 1899-1902 the Boers did the same with some success. This mode of fighting on the part of irregular horsemen gives regular cavalry a great chance of operating against them with deadly effect. At the battle of Isly the Moorish horse charged in enormous masses of successive lines close up to the French infantry and then discharged volleys, the lines in rear fired

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in the air, numbers of the French being hit by spent balls; but no impression was made and the hostile cavalry soon began to give way under the steady infantry fire. Thereupon Marshal Bugeaud sent out his squadrons and these really completed the victory, capturing the hostile artillery and camp. On two occasions small cavalry detachments charging at an opportune moment overthrew largo masses of Tartar horse in the China war of 1860, the efforts of the Tartars to beat off the attack by firing from horseback proving quite ineffective. Horsemen who trust to their firearms as a principal weapon when in the saddle, are of little use in a cavalry combat, and cannot therefore be proceeded against too energetically.

Cavalry if rushed to keep away from the infantry.

A very important point in campaigns where the enemy is addicted to sudden rushes, is for the cavalry to keep well away from the infantry; otherwise the mounted troops may be borne back on the infantry in one of the hostile onslaughts, may mask its fire, and may perhaps throw it into confusion. At the attack of the Arabs on General McNeill at Tofrek in 1885, the vedettes galloping in caused considerable disorder on one side of the zeriba. It should always be clearly understood that when the force is opposed to this class of enemy, the cavalry must if possible withdraw to a flank if obliged to fall back.

Cavalry dealing with horsemen who fight on foot.

It used to be thought--and in earlier editions of this work the view was maintained--that cavalry opposed to mounted rifles or mounted infantry would certainly be able to act with great effect against the horses which mounted troops must leave under charge of horse holders when they fight dismounted. It must be confessed, however, that the South African war of 1899-1902 affords little evidence in support of this theory. The Boers were no doubt exceptionally skilful and well-armed fighters. But they were mounted rifles who fought dismounted, and the result of months of warfare in which some of the finest cavalry in. the world was pitted against them, was that they,

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irregulars as they were and to all intents and purposes untrained in the art of war, compelled that cavalry to transform itself into mounted rifles. In the later stages of the war some crack regiments of Dragoons and Hussars and Lancers abandoned the arme blanche altogether as a useless encumbrance--it is not suggested that such action was right, but it is necessary to record the fact. It is impossible to disregard the teachings of that war when the question of cavalry versus mounted rifles is considered, even if the lessons are not accepted as final.

 

The Boers were, of course, a very different class of foe from most of the irregulars against whom civilized armies have to operate. Antagonists of this kind rarely possess the grit displayed by our opponents in South Africa, and they are not as a rule armed with Mausers. The old theory that cavalry ought to overthrow mounted infantry on anything like level terms, would probably be found still to hold good in action when campaigning against an enemy armed with inferior weapons who is mounted but who fights on foot. The business of the cavalry is of course to go for their antagonists' horses if it can possibly be managed, these offer a fine opportunity to a quick-eyed squadron leader, and if they can be captured, or even if they can be stampeded, the enemy is in a very awkward position. Supposing the circumstances to be favourable, it should often be possible to occupy the attention of the hostile horsemen with dismounted fire, while a troop or detachment works round their flank and makes a dash for their horses. But antagonists who depend upon scrambling on to horses, or mules, or camels during the battle if the day goes against them, and who when they have mounted have no arms to defend themselves with, have an instinctive terror.of the cavalry soldier when he looks like business, and they are always very anxious about the safety of their mounts, so much so that capturing or stampeding these requires deft and sudden movements.

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Importance of lance.

Although it is, of course, outside the scope of this work to treat of arms and equipment except incidentally, the desirability of cavalry being armed with lances in such warfare has been too frequently and too clearly demonstrated of recent years for the subject not to be referred to here. The lance has obvious objections in regular warfare, owing to its inconvenience when the trooper fights on foot. But in campaigns against savages or guerillas or against troops of very inferior class it is a splendid weapon. Asiatics know this well. In pursuit of an enemy who scatters in all directions, who lies down so that only the most expert swordsman can get at him effectively, who becomes panic stricken in the moment of defeat, the lance is simply invaluable. This was well shown at Ulundi. After the experiences of his charges at EI Teb, Sir H. Stewart armed his Hussars with Arab spears. At Kambula the mounted rifles in their pursuit armed themselves with Zulu assegais. Just as in small wars it is often necessary to resort to old shoulder-to-shoulder formations for infantry, so it is also necessary to give to shock action of cavalry a great prominence in such campaigns, and to depend largely upon the lance, however inconvenient it may be when the cavalry takes to dismounted work.

Skobelef's views on the action of Russian cavalry in the Turkoman campaign.

Before dealing with the question of the dismounted action of cavalry and of mounted troops it is only right to notice that the views expressed in an earlier paragraph as to the desirability of cavalry acting with great boldness in warfare of this nature, had an opponent of undoubted authority in the person of General Skobelef. His instructions to his cavalry in the Turkoman campaign throughout breathed the spirit of caution. "As long as the enemy's cavalry is unshaken and is not in an unfavourable position, e.g., with an obstacle in rear, in a hollow, &c, our cavalry must not enter on a combat with it. Pursuit of a retreating Turkoman cavalry is useless, as it only breaks up the tactical formations--our one strong point and sheet anchor." Such were his orders, and they

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sound strange enough, for, in a word, General Skobelef taught his cavalry to be afraid of the Turkoman horse. It must, however, be remembered that the Russian cavalry operating beyond the Caspian was ill adapted for shock tactics, and that with mounted troops of a different class at his disposal the general might have held other views. Such a leader's recorded opinions are always entitled to respectful attention even when not accepted as necessarily sound.

Dismounted action of cavalry.

It is necessary now to refer to what in small wars is for cavalry a secondary rôle--dismounted action. It is of course practically the only tactical rôle of mounted rifles or mounted infantry.

 

Should mounted troops, unsupported by infantry, come upon a hostile gathering on ground where charging is impracticable, they have no option except to dismount and to act on foot. On ground where there is a good field of view there is no objection to cavalry doing this; but it is most dangerous when there is any fear of a sudden rush of determined foemen directed either against the dismounted troopers or the horse-holders, and under these conditions mounted rifles always have an awkward task. At the action of Hashin, near Suakin, in 1885, some cavalry were dismounted in country partly overgrown with bush; they were unexpectedly attacked in force by the Arabs and suffered some loss in escaping. In the case of cavalry it would very rarely be judicious to dismount the whole of the available men except the horse-holders, supposing the ground to be such that the enemy may manage to creep up close; there ought to be a party of men on horseback ready to charge and to cover the mounting of the remainder should these or the horse-holders be rushed.

Risk to horse-holders and horses.

When mounted troops are acting dismounted there is always this risk that the horse-holders may be attacked if the enemy be enterprising. The more broken the ground the greater chance is there of a hostile counter-stroke of this nature succeeding, because it may be possible for parties of the

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enemy to approach unperceived from different sides. In any case the horses are apt to get frightened in the event of a sudden scare and to become unmanageable. Clustered together as they are they present a good target and a number of them may be shot before the dismounted men can get back to them--as happened at Owikokero. It is needless to say that under such conditions a careful look-out must be kept. In the affair of "Petrusvitch's Garden," related later on on p. 421, the horse-holders were seriously threatened; and the following example from the operations near Inyat Kali, in 1897, will be of interest in this connection:--

 

A determined attack had been made by the tribesmen on the camp at night, and as soon as day broke a squadron of cavalry started in pursuit of the assailants who were overtaken and charged with great effect. The squadron then dismounted and opened fire, the tribesmen having got on to impossible ground. The enemy thereupon turned and made a bold dash for the led horses. One man was wounded and two horses were killed, and the troopers rushed back to their horses; but in the confusion four of these broke away and galloped off, and altogether six men were left dismounted. These six wore taken up in front of other troopers, and after the squadron had got out of range the loose horses were re-captured. The tribesmen, as soon as they saw the cavalry in the saddle again, fled to the hills.

 

This tends to show that in cases where the irregulars with whom the cavalry is dealing have a special dread of mounted troops, dismounted action should not be resorted to too readily, and that in any case a proportion of the men should remain mounted and unencumbered with led horses because of the moral effect which they will produce.

Combination of mounted and dismounted-work suitable in certain conditions.

The art of combining mounted and dismounted work when the enemy is not very daring is a most valuable one to possess on the part of a cavalry leader, especially when acting on the defensive. The art has been brought to great perfection in some of the Indian regiments. The system is to work in small groups, the men composing some groups being on foot, those composing others remaining on horseback. Spread out in this fashion a comparatively small

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force of cavalry will cover a great extent of ground. An unenterprising foe dare not close with, the dismounted men for fear of those in rear who are on the watch, ready to charge 5 and small mounted groups can generally manage to find cover from the not very damaging hostile fire till they are required to act. Of course such an arrangement is adapted only to somewhat broken ground where a charge on a great scale could not be carried out. The great principle to observe is that of constant co-operation between the mounted and dismounted groups.

 

The most awkward part of such operations is the retirement, should this for any reason become necessary. While the dismounted men are getting into the saddle there is no fire to hold the enemy in check, and hostile parties profiting by the ground may push forward and bring a damaging musketry to bear alike upon the groups which are mounted and on those which are mounting. Those which have been on foot would as a rule retire first, covered by the others; the withdrawal when all are mounted would be carried out in extended line and at a rapid pace. Should the enemy be very aggressive it may be necessary to threaten a charge, or even to deliver a charge, so as to gain time to get away.

 

It may on occasion become necessary for cavalry, engaged in covering a considerable stretch of broken ground by means of the combination between mounted and dismounted tactics described above, to carry out a slow, deliberate retirement in face of the enemy as a part of some general operation. A retreat of this kind demands no little skill and judgment on the part of all concerned. In principle it should be conducted on the lines of an infantry withdrawal, part of the troops always covering the retirement of the remainder by fire, and the groups passing alternately through each other's intervals. But the enemy will probably be pressing on the rear, and it is always a critical moment when those men who are dismounted and in close

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contact with the pursuers have to scramble into the saddle and ride off. If possible there should be always some mounted parties ready to charge at a moment's notice so as to extricate the rearmost detachment, and to recover wounded men should the hostile fire take effect. Cavalry sent out on foraging duty, or detailed to cover other troops engaged in foraging, is often called upon to work out movements of this character, movements which may prove very trying owing to the easy target which the horses offer to the enemy.

 

Higgling sort of work this may seem to be, and out of keeping with the traditions of an arm accustomed on the battle-fields of last century to shine in more dazzling episodes. But small wars often present such peculiar conditions as regards the fighting methods of the foe and the broken character of the scene of combat, that cavalry may find no opportunities for shock action on an extensive scale. In many of the minor campaigns which take place in various quarters of the globe, troopers who are unskilled in these irregular manoeuvres do not justify their presence with the expeditionary force. Nor do regiments which excel in such petty warfare seem to lose their capacity for reverting in a moment to those time honoured manoeuvres by which bodies of horse have so often won renown in struggles of a higher class.

Dismounted action the only possible action of cavalry in very broken ground.

In spite of the experiences in the Mamund country to which special reference was made on p. 406, it will often be the case that, when the terrain is greatly cut up and broken, cavalry cannot act at all otherwise than dismounted. Charging may be out of the question. Even operations such as have been sketched in the preceding paragraphs may be impracticable. The cavalry is then compelled to fight entirely on foot--it may indeed be obliged to act mainly on the defensive, especially should it be unsupported by infantry; but even at purely dismounted work troopers can, of course, perform valuable services. Occasions must constantly arise in the ever changing conditions of irregular warfare where

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cavalry, unable to act on horseback, can by its fire afford very appreciable assistance to hard pressed infantry especially now that it is armed "with the magazine carbine.

 

As an example of this may bo cited the behaviour of the small force ot cavalry at the action of Umbumedi, in Dahomey. The mounted troops were forming the rear of the square in which the French were advancing through the bush. The Dahomeyans, while offering a stubborn resistance in front, worked round the Hank and on to the rear. Part of the cavalry thereupon dismounted and kept the enemy at bay till some infantry by means of a counter-attack put an end to an "offensive movement which for a few moments gave ground for anxiety.

 

Near Ben Metir in Tunis in 1885 a reconnaissance sent out came under a heavy fire from the Kroumirs concealed in the wooded ground. Nearly the whole of the cavalry dismounted to assist the French firing line, and a prolonged musketry action ensued at the end of which the Chasseurs d'Afrique, the squadrons engaged, had nearly exhausted their ammunition. But the opportune arrival of infantry reinforcements enabled the French to attack and drive the enemy off.

Valuable where judiciously used against hostile masses otherwise engaged.

Dismounted action by a detachment of cavalry posted on a flank may be highly efficacious in a hot action, and this is especially the case when the enemy collects in masses intent upon attacking or holding in chock the main body of the regular troops. The smallness of the forces engaged in most fights of this class often admits of the detachment's fire sweeping the whole front. The mobility of the cavalry and its independence of the other arms enables it to take up a satisfactory position, from which it can in security bring a heavy carbine fire to bear on a well defined target. At Tamai in 1884, while the disordered square was gradually retiring before the Arab onset, a squadron of cavalry was rapidly brought up so as to take the enemy in flank, and it greatly assisted the hard pressed infantry by its fire, playing an important part in the action without ocurring any appreciable loss. The charge of the 21st Lancers at Khartum did not completely break up the formidable body of Arabs attacked, so a proportion of the troopers were dismounted and completed the job by their fire, which illustrates what a difference

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there is between cavalry tactics in small wars and. in regular warfare; cavalry can rarely charge unbroken infantry, but, for it to charge through a great body of infantry and then to finish this off with dismounted fire is an operation almost unheard of on the modern battle-field.

Dismounted action in general.

We now have to consider dismounted work by mounted troops in general when there is no question of shock action or of alternating between fighting on foot and fighting on horseback.

Mounted troops when dismounted sometimes able to pose as a large force and so deceive the enemy.

Small bodies of mounted troops acting dismounted will often get openings for performing most valuable service in posing as larger forces. Their mobility lends itself to the employment of this very effective ruse. The plan was, as already mentioned on p. 176, tried with most satisfactory results at the attack on Wedza's stronghold. In the later stages of the South African war the Boers proved themselves adepts at this sort of bluff, and made full use of their mobility. It was almost impossible to tell whether they were in strong force or not. A few shots would be fired. Then, if the troops were rushed into attack, if often turned out that the enemy was present in considerable numbers. But if, on the other hand, elaborate arrangements were made for outflanking the enemy and time was lost, it generally transpired that there were only a few snipers about.

 

After Sir R. Buller had withdrawn from Gubat to Abu Elea in 1885, the enemy became more aggressive. One evening large hostile bodies occupied a hill commanding Abu Klea and inconveniently near the wells. From this position the Madhists were driven in the following morning, chiefly owing to the action of Major Wardrop and a few troopers who, appearing successively at different points, made the hostile leaders believe that they were threatened by large bodies of troops from the rear.

Mounted troops attacking, dismounted.

In campaigns against undisciplined forces opportunities will often occur for mounted troops to actually attack on foot. Occasions for such action rarely present themselves in regular warfare because opposed to infantry even in small bodies, armed with weapons of precision, the horses are likely to suffer very severely unless they can be satisfactorily got under

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cover, and because in the nature of things the chances are that the opposing troops will be in superior force. But in small wars these dangers do not arise as a rule, or at least do not present themselves to at all the same extent, and some interesting examples of attacks of this nature are to be found in the records of these campaigns.

 

Near the Shuturgurdan Pass during the advance to Kabul in 1879, a party of native cavalry coming unexpectedly on a gathering of Afghans in broken and hilly ground, ousted them from their position by the attack of a portion of their number dismounted.

 

The affair of "Petrusvitch's Garden," near Denghil Tepe in 1880, is an admirable illustration of this sort of work and of its dangers. The enclosure was held by the Tekkes in some force. At dawn the whole of the cavalry and some guns moved in this direction under General Petrusvitch in obedience to orders to that effect. When at about 180 yards from the enclosure the general ordered his men to dismount and to attack, the horse-holders retiring some distance, while a mounted troop remained in reserve. The dismounted men cleared the enemy out with the bayonet (the cavalry had bayonets), but General Petrusvitch was mortally wounded at their head and there was some confusion in consequence. The Tekkes now issued out round their flank and threatened the horse-holders, but a portion of the reserve troops dismounted and, assisted by the guns, repulsed this offensive movement Very severe fighting continued about the enclosure for some time, but the cavalry managed to hold their own till infantry reinforcements, which had been urgently asked for, hurried up and secured what had been won,

 

Wedza's stronghold was captured by detachments of the 7th Hussars. But the Skilful operations previous to the final assault which have been already detailed on p. 176, had the effect of reducing the resistance at the last to a minimum.

 

There is of course no reason whatever why mounted troops on foot should not attack if occasion for it arises, as long as the horses are secure; it was constantly done during the late South African war. The great difficulty is that, as the troopers advance, they get more and more separated from their mounts. Horse-holders are always left, but these, hampered with reins and so forth, have no means of properly defending their charges. If there be any chance of a sudden rush on. the part of the enemy, whether mounted or on foot, it will always be dangerous for the troopers to go far from their horses.

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Mounted rifles and mounted infantry as compared to cavalry.

In any sort of warfare mounted rifles and mounted infantry are inferior to cavalry, provided, of course, that the cavalry has been thoroughly trained to fight on foot as well as to fight on horseback. But in small wars this inferiority will generally be especially marked, because mounted troops are likely to get such fine opportunities for shock action, and the only excuse for employing the inferior class of troops is generally to be found in the fact that they may happen to be on the spot. In the British service mounted infantry is cheaper to maintain in peace time than cavalry, and it is sometimes convenient to keep up small forces of it on foreign stations in preference to breaking up regiments of cavalry. Mounted rifles and mounted infantry are very generally mounted on cobs or ponies which are preferable to horses for dismounted work, are more suitable in very rough country, and require less forage; but there is nothing to prevent cavalry troopers being mounted on cobs or ponies for a special campaign. When it comes to charging, or to pursuing a flying enemy, it is, of course, better to have horses than smaller animals. But even when mounted on cobs or ponies, cavalry are necessarily more valuable than troops without lances or swords who are similarly mounted, because the former can fight both mounted and dismounted. The horse of the mounted rifleman or mounted infantryman is merely a means of transporting him rapidly from place to place with a view to his fighting as an infantry soldier when he gets to his destination. While in the saddle, he is just as useless for fighting purposes as the gun is when it is limbered up and in movement.

 

But between the cavalry trooper proper and the mounted infantryman proper there are really several intermediate grades. The Russian dragoon is a cavalry soldier trained especially to fight on foot and provided with a rifle and bayonet. Some irregular corps raised in the colonies have had swords, although destined in the main for fighting dismounted. As already mentioned the irregular mounted troops who were

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unsupplied with side arms at Kambula used assegais with great effect. During the operations in Rhodesia the mounted infantry on one occasion charged with fixed bayonets. The fact is that although the function of mounted rifles or mounted infantry is to fight on foot, small wars produce such strange situations and afford such scope for boldness and dash that it is well for them to be prepared to fight on horseback on occasion. Were mounted infantry ever to be employed in the heart of the hill country north of the Panjab they would probably be quite as useful on horseback as on foot without ever attempting to charge home, simply owing to the moral effect which cavalry has been proved to exert among these tribesmen and to the recollections of what the cavalry did in the Swat valley in 1897.

Final remarks on dismounted work.

The instructions contained in "Cavalry Training" as to dismounted service are in general applicable to small wars, but there are certain special points to note. In operations of this class the mounted troops are likely to be working in small bodies and isolated, and they will often be in very bad ground. If there is a sudden rush of the enemy in great force the situation of the dismounted men may become very awkward. There is always the tendency on the part of the enemy to work round the flanks and to try to cut the dismounted men off from their horses, or to cut the detachment as a whole off from the rest of the force. Great vigilance is in fact required, and in terrain where there is not a clear view it is generally unwise to get the dismounted men far from their horses. It is here assumed that the mounted troops are only armed with the rifle or carbine, and that they cannot therefore keep ready a small body to charge the enemy supposing the situation suddenly to become critical.

 

The general rule as to reserving fire till it can tell, for fear of frightening the enemy prematurely and preventing a fight, of course holds good just as much with mounted troops acting dismounted, as it does with infantry. If attacking,

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the great point to bear in mind should be that the main object is to inflict loss and that this can be best effected either by getting part of the force round the flank so as to bring fire to bear when the opponents take to flight, or else by bringing up the mounts as the dismounted men advance,'so that they can get promptly into the saddle and follow up.

Need of dash when on foot.

It cannot be too much insisted upon that for this kind of work the men must have dash while on foot as well as while on horseback; the Boers in this respect were nothing short of a revelation, they were busy with their rifles almost the instant they were off their horses. Half the tactical mobility possessed by mounted troops is thrown away in a fight, if this important principle has not been inculcated into all ranks, and if it has not constantly been put in practice on the manoeuvre ground. This, of course, applies just as much in the case of regular as of irregular warfare, but the importance of the point was especially brought to notice in the guerilla stages of the South African war, and it is therefore only right to draw attention to it here.

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