Comparison between the general features of bush warfare and of hill warfare. |
Bush warfare presents many characteristics similar to those which are found to arise in operations against hill tribes. In the first place the enemy adheres, as a general rule, rigidly to the guerilla mode of fighting. Then again it is the serious obstacles constantly opposed in the way of the troops by the topographical features of the country which constitute one of the main difficulties of such warfare. Moreover, it is found that in the bush as among the hills, a regular force must be ever on the watch against hostile enterprises directed upon its flanks and rear, whether it be halting or be on the move. Campaigns in such terrain are almost always prolonged, they are rarely marked by brilliant episodes of war, and they are extremely tedious and harassing to a disciplined soldiery. In all these respects bush warfare resembles the hill warfare treated of in the last chapter. But in other respects, the operations of regular troops when they take place in districts covered with undergrowth and jungle, must of necessity differ widely from the mode of fighting adopted when in conflict with mountaineers. |
In the first place the adversaries against whom the trained soldiers find themselves pitted in bush warfare are rarely by nature very warlike. They no doubt fight bravely enough at times. They are quick of movement, are cunning, and often display astonishing endurance. But, on the other hand, they have not the love of war for its own sake nor the sporting instincts--if they can be so described--of the hill-man. This comparison is, of course, merely a general one. The Maories in their day were certainly to the full as warlike as |
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most of the hill tribes of highland Burma; but it would be absurd to place the races of West Africa on the same platform as warriors with the Pathans and Gurkhas of the Indian frontier. The savage denizen of the tropical forest is, it must be confessed, rather a poor creature as a fighting man, and this is a fact which necessarily influences the conduct of operations in bush and jungle as a whole to a remarkable^ extent. Moreover the adversaries usually met with by regular troops in bush warfare are very badly armed--this does not, needless to say, follow as a matter of course, but it is usually found to be the case. Having no breech-loading rifles, and being obliged to let the troops approach fairly close to them before they can fire with any hope of doing harm, their usual plan is to blaze off a sudden ill-aimed volley and then to scuttle away to a place of safety. | |
In the last chapter "sniping" has several times been referred to. There is none of this in bush warfare. The troops are seldom exposed to the long range fire of individual foemen, and there is in consequence no need for flanking parties thrust out to considerable distances to protect the force from snipers. Any fighting which takes place must indeed almost necessarily be at comparatively speaking close quarters, and thus the disciplined soldiers are given better opportunities of striking home than they are likely to get on rugged hill sides. Moreover it will always be the case that, however well the savage may know his way through his thickets, the movements of columns of regulars in the bush cannot be observed by the enemy as effectively as in a mountain country. | |
But against all this has to be set the fact that forests and jungles offer great opportunities to the foe for forming ambushes and for carrying out petty but harassing and damaging surprises. In such terrain the range of firearms is of necessity restricted, and in consequence the weapons of precision with which the regulars are supplied lose much of their efficacy. The physical features of the arena of conflict render the |
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maintenance of tactical control in action most difficult for commanders, and in consequence the disciplined force is apt to lose that cohesion and that power of concentrated exertion of its strength, which constitute the sheet anchor of a regular army when operating against savages. In addition to this, the obligation of actually cutting their way through thick undergrowth, which is so frequently imposed upon the troops, renders progress at times slow and most exhausting. Transport often offers especial difficulties, owing to the narrowness of the tracks to be followed, and to animals being prone to all manner of sickness and to destruction by the bite of insects. The enemy, acting it may be assumed on the defensive, has constantly at hand the materials necessary for running up stockades, a form of fortification which is in reality far more efficacious than the sangar of the hills. Lastly, theatres of bush warfare are almost always unhealthy, noisome, fever-stricken tracts of country, where officers and men become enervated by the heat, and where a disciplined army is soon decimated by disease. | |
The question of scouts. |
Bush warfare is essentially an affair of surprises and ambuscades, and experience has shown that corps of scouts--natives of the country--are a great assistance to the disciplined troops, if they can be organized. In the Ashanti campaign of 1874, and again during the unopposed advance to Kumasi in 1895, small corps of this kind, recruited from friendly tribes, were got together and proved simply invaluable. For work of this kind trained European soldiers are of little use, and even disciplined levies are unsatisfactory. Natives of the country can by day creep about the forest paths, stealthy and watchful, bringing back news of danger. By night, working in very small parties, they form an excellent outer line of picquets--experience proves, however, that they dislike moving about alone in the dark, and patrolling in parties is generally a mistake. |
Scouting in the bush is an art in itself, an art which can only |
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be learnt by experience and a duty for which all are not fitted. Natives of jungle-grown countries have a natural talent for wood craft, for detecting footmarks and for noting details not observable to the uninitiated eye. The objects of the scouts is to see and not to be seen, to discover in advance where the enemy is gathering his forces, where he is erecting stockades, and where he is cutting clearings. The lithe savage can swarm up trees to obtain a look out--a very necessary precaution at times; and if blue-jackets have on occasion vied with the aborigines in climbing, it must be admitted that the trained soldier does not shine at such work. Bush warfare is, it must be remembered, a form of guerilla warfare, and therefore it is all important that when the presence of hostile parties has been ascertained, they should be hit hard and should if possible be surprised. That being the case it is essential that the scouts should not be seen, that they should creep about with stealthy footfall, and should use to the full the natural cunning which the lowest classes of humanity are rarely deficient of. A strong and justifiable prejudice exists against special corps of any kind, and as has been already pointed out in considering the question of the so-called scouts in hill warfare, it is certainly desirable that troops in general should be trained to perform every sort of work if possible. But scouting in the bush is exceptional; it is best left to irregulars enlisted on the spot, and this principle is now very generally accepted when a bush campaign is in contemplation. | |
The scout who proves so useful in bush warfare differs, it must be remembered, altogether from the scout or skirmisher known to all who took part in the campaign in Tirah, because he is not under ordinary circumstances intended to fight. His weapon is rather given to embolden him and to put him on good terms with himself, than with any idea of his effectively using it against the enemy. Scouts in the "bush have for their duty the discovering of the hostile detachments before |
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the troops come in contact with them. Once the foe is detected, they are supposed to stand fast or to fall back after notifying what they have seen, otherwise they are liable to get in the way, and may even run risk of being fired at by friends as well as foes. Of course occasions will sometimes arise when the scouts may attack the enemy on their own account. To lay down that they are never to do so would act as a drag upon them, and it might seriously hamper the freedom of tine officers who are undertaking the leadership over a class of levies who are not very easily managed. But such action would be exceptional, and would generally only be justifiable when the scouts are far from support and when the opposing forces are of small account. | |
Special infantry organization necessary. |
Owing to the peculiar conditions of bush fighting, conditions which also sometimes obtain in combats in woods during conflicts between disciplined armies, a special organization of the infantry is very desirable when such operations are about to take place. Companies of fifty to sixty files have been proved to be too large a unit, and it has generally been found that working by sections, or in even smaller groups, is the most satisfactory arrangement to meet the case. The French in Dahomey practically made the section the permanent unit; in that campaign a section meant about twenty men. In Sierra Leone in 1898 companies were divided into sections of ten men. Once committed to action in attack the sections or groups must be independent, and they must look to their own leaders as they advance through the bush. If the troops are acting on the defensive the same difficulty of control does not arise as in attack, the force being almost necessarily in a more compact order of battle; but even so the small unit will generally prove serviceable. |
When the conditions usually presented by an engagement in the bush to regular troops acting on the offensive come to be considered, the arguments in favour of a group organization permanent during the operations, will be appreciated. |
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Companies get involuntarily broken up into parties, which nay miss their proper direction and which are very liable to fire into each other. Such combats are most trying to the troops, the leadership is a strain on the nerves of the commanders, and it is only by a system of thorough decentralization and by a plentiful supply of capable subordinate leaders that the men can be kept in hand. Detachments once committed bo a fight cannot be extricated, nor can their progress be watched by the commander; they are constantly falling into ambuscades where they are received by a volley, which at close quarters cannot fail to do some damage. After the volley the adversary evacuates his lair at once and gets away before the men can charge in with the bayonet, unless these are resolutely handled by subaltern officers actually on the spot. | |
Sectional organization in Ashanti. |
The Ashanti war of 1874 presented all these characteristics to an exceptional extent. The theatre of operations beyond the Prah consisted for the o most part of forest land, the feet of the gigantic trees draped in a dense u undergrowth difficult of passage. Paths were hewn through the bush in the heat of action with sword bayonets. The topographical character of the country was such as to illustrate in every engagement the difficulties and uncertainty that beset disciplined troops when fighting in woods and copses. The normal tactical formation of the Ashantis was a loose skirmishing order, which permitted them to display their aptitude for concealment and for rapid movements through thickets apparently impenetrable, to great advantage. "One point," wrote Sir G. Wolseley in his despatch after the first brush at Essaman, "stands forward prominently from the experience of this day--viz., that for fighting in the African bush a very exceptionally large proportion of officers is required Owing to the dense cover an officer can only exercise control over the men close to him, and for this kind of work there should be at least one officer to every twenty men." |
With a view to decreasing the tactical unit as far as possible, orders were given for each company to be broken up into sections, each section to be permanent during the war as regards command and for administrative purposes. In action three sections were extended, one remained in support from 40 to 80 yards in rear. This sectional organization worked to perfection, and by its means the men were kept well in hand under circumstances of exceptional difficulty. The various groups were allowed a good deal of independence, and they used it to good advantage. At Amoaful the different commands lost all touch of each other, and although the total |
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ignorance as to the position of neighbouring detachments rendered co-operation most perplexing, the group system prevented any serious disintegration of the force at any point. On one occasion at Ordahsu a whole company suddenly opened fire in all directions when there was absolutely nothing to fire at, misled by the sound of musketry which seemed close by. Officers were directed to work by compass, and the success that crowned their efforts in keeping the rank and file under control, showed the value of the especial organization devised to meet the case. | |
In the Ashanti war, as also in the bush fighting in the Waterkloof in 1851-52, in the Maori war, and in most campaigns in thick undergrowth, the loss in officers has been disproportionately heavy. The reason for this is that they have to be in front and that hostile marksmen are able to pick them off at close range, and it adds considerably to the difficulties of such warfare. It cannot well be avoided, but it is a strong argument in favour of having plenty of subordinate officers. The modern principle of forming the infantry permanently into very small groups should work very well in this class of warfare, but it has hardly yet been put to the test of practical experience by well disciplined regular troops under these conditions. | |
Tendency of the enemy to attack flanks and rear. Flanking parties. |
In bush warfare it is generally found that except when very strongly posted, the enemy instead of opposing the advance of the regular troops by barring the road directly, endeavours to operate against their flanks and rear. As troops moving through such country are always accompanied by large transport columns, and as they must be attended by stretcher bearers, spare ammunition, and other impedimenta, even when going into action, it is always necessary to move with flankers on either side of the line of route, and with a sufficient rear guard. The column moves in fact in the form of an extended, elastic square. |
The flanking parties may be stationary, detached from the advanced guard as this moves forward; or they may move parallel to the column if the country admits of it. If the rate of march is fairly rapid and if the bush is not very thick,, small groups moving parallel to the column may be the best |
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arrangement. But if progress is slow the flanking parties will often merely consist of a number of double sentries who remain stationary while the column passes. The procedure to meet the case very much depends upon the nature of the opposition, the enterprise of the enemy, and so forth; but if there is any chance of a sudden attack, the flanking parties should in any case be strong enough to keep the enemy at bay for the moment without being reinforced. Touch must be carefully preserved, and great care must be taken that no extensive gaps are left through which the enemy might penetrate. There is, however, no need for the flankers to be at any great distance from the central line of the column, as in such terrain the enemy will rarely be able to bring long-range fire to bear. Should the system of stationary flankers be adopted in very thick country, it may be desirable to have a second and even a third line of them, so as to ensure proper observation and to afford support to the groups most exposed. If the enemy be formidable and enterprising, it may become necessary to contract the whole force into a fairly compact square and to advance very slowly. | |
This leads to a kind of square formation being very generally adopted. |
This elastic square formation was employed largely by Prince "Woronzoff in his operations against the Chechens amid the extensive forests on the northern slopes of the Caucasus, to cover the working parties which slowly hewed: clearings through the woods. In such fighting the arrangement is advantageous at times, even when the enemy's attacks are merely of a desultory kind. It may be necessary when owing to the thickness of the bush the force is moving very slowly--as must often he the case in certain parts of tropical West Africa. In Dahomey and Ashanti the French and British forces found themselves operating against determined savages in very thick bush, and the enemy at times pressed up in strength close to the columns. |
Its employment in Dahomey. |
During the French operations against King Benanzin the elastic form of square was their normal battle formation and |
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it was employed with, signal success. A formation which could fairly be described as an elastic square, was only taken up "when an action actually commenced; the troops did not march in square, they marched in parallel columns so arranged that by deploying certain bodies a formation approximating to that of square was arrived at. The final operations in the advance on Abomey took place for the most part through country densely overgrown with jungle and bush, often so thick that it was only possible to see a few feet to the front; it was most difficult for the columns to keep their intervals, their relative positions being often only known to each other by shouts. On coming in actual contact with the enemy, square formation was at once adopted; but there were often considerable intervals in the paces owing to the difficulty of rapidly taking up this order of battle in such country. It was found that the Dahomeyans gradually gave way before the French advance .and did not show much inclination to attack their antagonists in rear; only a small detachment was therefore generally detailed for the rear face, while sometimes there was no rear face at all, or this was formed by the cavalry. | |
This elastic form of square offered the great advantage that different faces or portions of faces could if desirable advance against the enemy by rushes without causing confusion--the effect was merely to enlarge the gaps. The enemy trusted to fire, not to shock tactics, so that as long as the gaps did not grow very largely there was no great risk of hostile bodies penetrating through the spaces into the interior of the square; their movements were not quick enough, nor were their onslaughts pushed with sufficient determination, for that very awkward situation to arise--the enemy getting inside the square in force. | |
When General Dodds first organized his expedition he formed his column into three groups, each complete in itself. In the earlier actions square formation was not always adopted, although during their progress the force as a rule gradually |
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assumed an approximation to the formation. Later on, when square became the normal order of battle, it was arranged that two groups should form the front and rear faces, while the remaining one formed the two side faces. When the expeditionary force approached the hostile capital it became necessary to march in square, and the column was then reorganized and broken up into four groups instead of three, one to form each side of the square. It was in this formation that the final actions before the capture of Abomey were fought. The square would at times open out, one or more of the groups working off to a flank if circumstances rendered it desirable; but the formation was always resumed again as soon as possible. The principle kept in view throughout was that the square was to be maintained till the action had developed sufficiently to make the enemy show his hand--the normal order of battle was not departed from till it was clear that attacks were not to be anticipated on the flanks or on the rear. The enemy had prepared entrenchments barring the route which the column was following, and it happened from time to time that in the thick bush, where reconnoitring was difficult and hazardous, the square would arrive within close range of these hostile barricades before they were detected. | |
Example of Amoaful. |
At the action of Amoaful in the Ashanti war the force was, to start with, formed up roughly as a square of large dimensions. The bush was very thick and, as had indeed been foreseen, the sides lost touch very much in the end of the front face which bore the brunt of the fighting. The rear face during the progress of the action reinforced the front face. But although the square formation gradually dissolved during the course of the fight, it served its purpose in that only small hostile bodies were able to work on to the rear of the front face, through the intervals between it and the troops to the flanks which had originally formed the side faces. That the enemy was inclined to attack the column in rear, |
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was shown by the righting which took place at the same time at Quarman a few miles further back, where the convoy had been left under escort; the Ashantis moreover closed in between the main column and Quarman. | |
Advantages of this formation in bush fighting. |
In this sort of bush fighting against fairly well armed savages who can muster in large numbers, and where the terrain is practically unknown, the elastic square formation seems excellent, at least at the commencement of an action. An advance in line affords no protection to the non-combatant services. An advance in column of route has a restricted front and permits of the enemy delivering a sudden attack from a flank, thereby cutting the column in half; this formation moreover admits of no protection for the convoy which always accompanies a regular army in these campaigns. The bush was not generally as thick in Dahomey as in Ashanti, so that it was far easier in the former country for touch to be kept up between the different sides of the square, and for the commander to keep the movements of the whole under control. But in any case the principle of the square formation is sound in this kind of fighting, because the flanks are always to a certain extent in danger. Even if these are merely protected by stationary flankers while the troops are on the march, there still always is a line of detached posts on either hand which to a certain extent represent the sides of a square, and there is, all round the column, a sort of fighting line which can offer some show of resistance to hostile attack from whatever direction it may come. If the enemy's presence be detected the flankers can be rapidly reinforced, the advanced guard can be deployed, and the rear guard can spread out so as to complete the square. |
But, once it has been formed, the square is generally an elastic square, not a rigid square such as regular troops adopt to meet the onslaught of fanatics. The sides, or the front face, or the rear face, can safely advance short distances to attack the enemy, should such a course be desirable--only |
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they must take care not to move more than a very short distance at a time. There should be detachments in support of a firing line, no matter what direction it advances in, which should be ready to extend if necessary and to take its place, so as to prevent the square formation being altogether lost. To ensure, however, that there may be no serious confusion nor complete disruption, it is essential that each of the groups shall know beforehand what its particular function is in the different situations likely to arise. | |
Baggage and supply trains. |
The baggage and supply train are nearly as great a trouble in bush warfare as they are in the hills. The transport consists generally either of pack animals or carriers--the latter being the more common. As the paths are usually very narrow, only allowing of coolies or animals moving in single file, the columns stretch out to great lengths even if the force be small. In some respects coolies are even more inconvenient than animals as transport, because if scared they throw down their loads and bolt. One result, however, of narrow tracks and of pack or coolie transport is that, as in hill warfare, the fighting portions of columns must be small, otherwise the length of the whole on the march becomes excessive. |
Arrangement of marches in the bush. |
As the baggage column must necessarily occupy a lengthy stretch, it is generally best to leave this behind parked under escort and to clear the route for some miles ahead before moving it. Should this course be for any reason impracticable it will generally be best to break up the whole force into detachments, each moving with its share of the baggage, with intervals in between. Up to a certain point the smaller the column is the more compact and manageable it is. |
Moving with baggage the advanced guard must travel very slowly, making constant halts to ensure that the carriers or animals keep well closed up, and that the flankers, whether they be stationary or moving, are in their places. If the flankers are stationary they join the rear guard when this comes abreast of them. But after a time it obviously becomes |
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necessary for troops to move up from rear to front as otherwise the advanced guard would be reduced to an unsafe extent by this constant drain. If the flankers are moving parallel to the column this difficulty of course does not arise; but their advance will often be very tedious and slow as compared to that of the rest of the column, which will almost certainly be Mowing some sort of path. In any case there should be troops in the centre told off beforehand to reinforce the flankers if necessary, who must move outwards at once if any emergency arises. If the enemy is met with, the bulk of the head of the column should halt and the baggage should close up, every effort being made to get the whole column as compact as possible. When a column is thus impeded with baggage, commanders of detachments whether in the advanced guard, in the rear-guard, or on the flanks, should be cautioned against pushing forward at once more than a few yards towards the enemy. Too great eagerness at first may lead to gaps in the different firing lines just when the baggage is probably in some little confusion, and hostile parties may penetrate through these spaces and do damage. It must be remembered that the force is really acting as an escort, and its primary duty is to ensure that the transport under its charge shall be unmolested. | |
Action of troops when fired upon. |
On the other hand, it is a broad general tactical rule that in bush warfare troops when suddenly fired into should promptly charge towards the spot whence the fire comes. To stand still is the worst thing they can do. Some difference of opinion exists as to whether a volley should precede the charge, although officers experienced in bush warfare generally favour this procedure because it is often the only way of causing casualties among the enemy. If the troops are armed with magazine rifles, magazine fire for a few seconds to start with would generally seem the wisest plan. But above all things the enemy must not be allowed time to fire a second volley, and to prevent this a prompt bayonet charge is almost |
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always expedient, a charge which, however, must not mean more than a short sharp rush. Supposing the force to be moving in the form of a rough square, the main point to bear in mind is not to rush too far, and if necessary to fall back after the charge, should touch be lost--this is especially necessary when safe-guarding baggage, or when the hostile musketry opens without any warning of the enemy being at hand, and the hostile strength cannot therefore be gauged. Time should always be allowed for the baggage to close up before the troops adopt any aggressive tactics beyond the preliminary charge over 30 or 40 yards, which will ordinarily be the distance of the enemy's ambuscade. | |
Of course if there be no impedimenta troops can act with much more boldness; but even so they must try and keep touch with the nearest detachments. Considering what a theatre of war covered with bush and jungle means, and how difficult it is to see what neighbouring groups are doing or where the hostile shots are coming from, it is obvious that warfare of this nature offers extraordinary difficulties. It can only be carried out effectively if subordinate commanders use forethought and judgment, and as long as they keep their parties thoroughly in hand. The experience of wood fighting on the Continent of Europe goes to show that even with the best of regular troops, the men are likely to get out of hand. In bush warfare it is often the case that the force consists of native soldiers of excitable temperament and of limited discipline, and this makes the task of the subordinate commanders all the more difficult. | |
All this presupposes that the scouts, if there are any, have fallen back on getting touch of the enemy. If the scouts are suddenly fired into it is seldom incumbent upon the nearest troops to support them--never if such a movement would tend to disintegrate the general formation of the advancing force. The scouts should fall back so as to unmask the fire of the troops. Having detected the presence of |
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hostile bodies and warned the force they have performed their task. | |
Small columns in the bush. |
It is often the case that very small columns are employed in bush warfare. It will be remembered that the German column which met with disaster at Owikokero, as mentioned on p. 255, consisted of under fifty mounted men. Very small columns cannot of course adopt any formation analogous to the square on the march; they have not the necessary men to spare for flankers. Therefore when bodies of troops consisting of only a company or two have to penetrate through jungle, they must trust to vigilance and to constant preparedness for all eventualities for safety. Infantry should march with bayonets fixed, and parties should be told off to charge in any given direction at a moment's notice. Sir F. Roberts' instructions, quoted further on on p. 368, were designed to meet such cases as this, which were constantly occurring in Burma. |
Remarks on operations in hilly country covered with jungle. |
In the last chapter it was pointed out that small wars in some regions combine to a certain extent the characteristics of hill warfare and bush warfare, and some remarks as to the ordinary course to be followed when these conditions present themselves are to be found on pp. 339 to 341. In such terrain moving flankers become almost impossible, and owing to the topographical features troops are of course liable to be fired down upon from knolls and eminences if the jungle be not too thick. Even in this sort of terrain, however, the broad principles of bush warfare hold good, in that the enemy generally confines himself to sudden volleys at comparatively speaking close quarters, and that the best mode of meeting such tactics is a quickly delivered charge up to the spot whence the fire proceeded. It is also worthy of note that in broken ground stationary flankers, as long as they keep still and act with judgment, have a better chance of detecting hostile parties who may be prowling about or lying in ambush, than they would have were they on the level. |
Attack of stockades. |
The attack of stockades in the jungle is always a somewhat awkward operation. Natives make great use of such |
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defences in their local quarrels, and are generally adepts in their construction--it is interesting to note that the Gurkhas, now so famed for their offensive tactics on the hill sides, showed remarkable aptitude in the rapid construction of stockades in the days of the Nepaul Wars. Stockades are by no means easy to break into, without the help of guns, so much so indeed that it may become necessary to turn them. The French advancing on Abomey used to march right round the stockades in square, but this plan has the objection that the enemy suffers little or no loss. It seems better to occupy the attention of the defenders by a show of activity in front while parties creep round the flanks to act effectively when the foe attempts to escape. A direct attack is generally met by a volley which will probably do some damage, and after that, while the assailants are clambering over the defences, the enemy slips off into adjacent thickets and is gone before the troops can get a shot. A combined frontal and flank attack is likely to achieve the best results, especially if the turning movement be confined to a few picked shots who await the cheer with which the main body delivers its onslaught. | |
Of course if the force be small and if its reaching its destination in good time be of paramount importance, it will be best to manoeuvre the enemy out of his stockades. | |
In Sierra Leone in 1898, a small force destroyed twelve stockades in a single march by employing flanking parties to take them in rear. Paths were cut from the main road round to the rear of the stockades by carriers, who had been provided with especial tools for the purpose. | |
Stockades of course vary in different theatres of war as regards solidity of construction and ingenuity in securing a field of fire. In the Maori war the stockades or pahs were very skillfully constructed, and were often of extremely solid construction. Direct attacks upon them caused serious losses on several occasions; but the fighting assumed its most determined character when the enemy's retreat was completely |
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blocked; the Maoris, brave as they were, generally fled as soon as they found that there was a risk of being cut off. Fortunately it is not often the case that irregular warriors in the bush recognize the value of having several stockades supporting each other in echelon, each preventing the next to it from being outflanked. But if the enemy is wide awake enough to make such an arrangement, it may be necessary for part of the regular force to make a wide turning movement, so as to manoeuvre the defenders out of at least some of their works; | |
In very thick jungle, where the troops have to cut their way through the bush with hatchets, one of the greatest difficulties which they have to contend with is that the enemy can build fresh stockades as rapidly as the force advances, and that this may in consequence find it impossible to avoid direct attacks on the defences from time to time. In dense thickets the stockades are come upon very suddenly, it is therefore generally advisable for one or more guns, if there are any with the force, to be pushed up well to the front during the advance so that some artillery may come into action at once. If from the nature of the case guns cannot be got along, rockets at very short range may prove effective; their tubes are always easily carried. | |
Movement through very thick jungle. |
When the bush is so thick that it is necessary to carve a way through it before the army can move, the convoy should always be left behind under escort, in some form of zeriba if possible. The force can then advance without any anxiety concerning it. Having opened the route the troops, or some of them, return to bring the convoy along. It is generally advisable in very dense jungle to hew three parallel paths, those on the flanks for the flanking parties when the column advances, that in the centre for the main body and convoy, which latter should therefore be wider than the others. While the parties are actually at work they must be protected by covering parties with fixed bayonets, ready to act at a moment's notice. Clearings should be made |
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at certain points or existing clearings should be improved, to act as it were as stages on the line of advance. |
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If a comparatively speaking rapid movement is to be undertaken along a narrow path through dense undergrowth when there has been no time to cut flanking paths, it will inevitably happen sometimes that, owing to swamps and so forth, it is impracticable for the column to be protected by flanking parties. When such conditions obtain, flanking patrols of natives trained to act as scouts and intended to give warning of danger rather than to fight, may be found of considerable use. They should be directed to retire along their own track after firing rather than to close on the central path, otherwise they are very likely to be shot by their own friends--the scout always does run this risk. The natives of Africa with a rifle and with a few rounds of ammunition concealed in his scanty raiment, can creep through the thickest jungle and can traverse any swampy ground where an enemy can go. But when a column depends on this kind of flank protection alone, it must be very much on the alert and it must not put too much trust in a form of side armour which may fail it at any moment. |
Guides. |
In bush warfare it is generally indispensable to be well supplied with guides, and to keep a sharp look upon the movements of these. They are very likely to make off if the enemy is suddenly met with or if any confusion occurs. Steps must always be taken to insure that they do not escape and leave the troops in the lurch. A corps of scouts, if these know the country being traversed, may of course entirely do away with the need for guides; but if the scouts are recruited from another district than that which is the immediate scene of operations, they cannot be depended upon. |
Difficulty of following up success in the bash and consequence of this. |
It is always difficult to promptly follow up a success in this kind of warfare, and this tends to tempt an enterprising foe to try the effect of counter-strokes. It is a remarkable fact, and one which enforces the importance of keeping pressing on, |
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that it is in typical bush fighting such as occurred in New Zealand, Ashanti, and Dahomey, where rapid advance is impossible, that irregular warriors generally show a special liking for attempting counter-attacks, even if these be not driven home with much resolution. This tendency is often observable even after some distinct success has been in the first instance gained by the regular troops. | |
In the final fight at Ordahsu before Kumasi in 1874, when after the village of that name had been captured by a resolute advance, a pause occurred in the action, the Ashantis, after a short lull, developed a most vigorous and determined counter-attack. A fresh regiment was thereupon brought up from the rear to drive the attack home. "Then followed," wrote Sir A. Alison, "one of the finest spectacles I have ever seen in war. Without stop or stay the 42nd rushed on cheering, their pipes playing, their officers to the front; ambuscade after ambuscade was successfully carried, village after village won in succession, till the whole Ashantis broke and fled down the pathway on their front to Kumasi." | |
Such an intrepid advance is not always permissible in the bush, even when success is assured and the foe is giving way at all points. The troops in attack may have to feel their way, and the enemy thus gets breathing-time and attributes the failure of the soldiery to follow up their victory to timidity or weakness. It is due to the deliberation which is usually necessary in pursuit through the jungle that the adversary, gaining courage, will often attempt counter-attacks at some inconvenient moment. Such counter-attacks are liable to cause a certain amount of loss and confusion if the troops have been allowed to get at all out of hand and disseminated--it is inevitable, indeed, that in bush fighting individual detachments will from time to time expose their flank to a wary and enterprising foe. For this reason pursuit should as a general rule be steady and deliberate, and, unless the enemy is clearly on the run, the general direction followed by all groups should be the same. If hostile parties attempt to stand they should be charged at once by the troops in contact with them, but these should then allow the general line to come up with them before they proceed further. |
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The advance as a whole should in fact be deliberate, but on the other hand long pauses are to be avoided. On the outskirts of a clearing it is generally judicious to call a momentary halt so as to secure cohesion, because the enemy is very likely to be found in strength on the far side, and because the open ground had better be crossed by a rush in considerable force--a rush of this kind will disturb the aim of the opposing marksmen and will probably render their volley harmless. As regards clearings, it may be laid down as a rule that columns must never file along one side of an open space unless the bush on the far side has been occupied. | |
Danger of dividing force in such country. |
In the remarks made above with regard to attack on stockades, the advisability of sending parties round the flanks has been pointed out. It must however be remembered that in bush warfare special dangers attend division of force. In this sort of country touch between detached bodies of troops can only be maintained within restricted limits. Communication by signal is generally impossible. Detachments, even when within a few hundred yards of each other, are entirely cut off from each other, and do not know each other's rate of progress nor movements. |
On p. 182 a very remarkable episode which occurred in Achin was quoted to show how in a country overgrown with tropical forests, a force was almost annihilated within a very short distance of support. That similar cases have not occurred oftener is probably due to the fact that the need for keeping forces of regulars compact when campaigning in such a country, is universally recognized; moreover, foemen so warlike and so well armed as the Achinese are not generally met with in bush warfare. Circumstances will no doubt often render it desirable and even necessary to divide up a force which is operating in jungle country and in actual touch with the enemy, into separate columns for some special purpose; but, where such an arrangement is decided upon, each column should be self contained, so that no risk of its being beaten |
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when unsupported shall be incurred. Great care must, moreover, be observed that separate columns do not fire into each other; this is one of the greatest dangers of campaigning in the bush. | |
How to avoid the enemy's ambuscades. Impossibility of doing so in some theatres of war. |
By a happy arrangement of flanking parties or patrols, and if the force is accompanied by efficient scouts, it may be possible to avoid ambushes. But in spite of all precautions the force must be prepared for falling unexpectedly into traps, and must be ready to act with vigour the moment such an accident occurs. In campaigning in parts of Kaffirland, in Cuba, in Dahomey, and in the Philippines it has often been found impossible to avoid being ambushed from time to time. No precautions have availed to prevent the unexpected volley out of th«3 bush which in these theatres of war the enemy rightly looks upon as his best means of inflicting injury upon regular troops, in anticipation of such tactics on the part of the enemy the whole force must be ever on the alert, ready to assume the offensive in any direction and at a moment's notice. |
Sir F. Roberts's instructions for dealing with, ambuscades in Burma. |
In the instructions issued by Sir F. Roberts in 1886, for the guidance of the columns operating for the pacification of Burma, the following passage occurs--"To meet ambuscades, which usually take the form of a volley followed by flight, and which, jn. very dense jungle it may be impossible to discover or to guard against by flankers, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would like the following plan to be tried Supposing, for instance, the fire of the enemy to be delivered from the right, a portion of the force should be ready to dash along the road for 100 yards or so, or until some opening in the jungle offers itself. The party should then turn, to the right and sweep round with a view to intercepting the enemy in his flight. A party in rear should similarly enter the jungle to their right with the same object. The centre of the column would protect the baggage or any wounded men. The different parties must be previously |
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told off, put under the command of selected leaders, and must act with promptitude and dash. Each party must be kept in compact order, and individual fire must be prohibited except when there is a clear prospect." The Burmese, it must be remembered, could be trusted to take to flight. But more warlike races could not safely be dealt with in quite such uncompromising fashion when the strength of the party forming the ambuscade was unknown; there would be the danger of the enemy falling in overwhelming force upon one of the detached parties, or upon the baggage. | |
Retreats in the bush. |
Owing to the normal conditions obtaining in a bush campaign, retreats and retirements are not so marked a feature of the operations as is the case in hill warfare. Retreats in face of the enemy are indeed so rare in jungle fighting that in discussing the subject the lack of examples makes it difficult to deal with it effectively. |
The warriors whom regular troops have to act against in this kind of terrain seldom seem to pursue with much resolution or vigour, and, should they come up with a retreating body of soldiers, a smart counter-attack would probably bring them to an abrupt halt if it did not throw them into panic flight. Even the Achinese seem to have failed completely in the role of pursuers. Moreover in the bush a retirement can easily be concealed, and a retrograde movement would generally proceed a considerable distance before the enemy was aware of it. Then again the retiring force will generally be moving along a known track while the pursuers may have to work through the thicket. But it must be admitted that a really enterprising foe should be able to make it very unpleasant for a force of soldiers retreating in this kind of country, and this was found to be the case by the German party ambuscaded at Owikokero. Creeping round the flanks and discharging sudden volleys from unexpected points, the savage inhabitants of a tropical forest could greatly retard the movement of the troops, and the same |
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difficulty would be very likely to arise with, regard to the wounded as has so often caused anxiety in the hills. Flankers would be very likely to be shot when falling back to join the column, and bringing them in, if wounded, might turn out to be almost impossible. | |
In case of a harassed retreat it would probably be best to dispense with flankers and simply to march in as compact a formation as possible, certain units being told off to charge on the instant should a volley be fired by the enemy. Baggage, carriers, &c, should be sent on as rapidly as possible escorted by part of the force, and moving by a path these should be able to outstrip pursuers obliged to work their way through the jungle. Troops in retreat when they have to cross a clearing should leave a party to hold the edge of the clearing next the enemy till the rest of the force has got across; the men left behind should of course rejoin the remainder at a double. The fringe of a clearing, away from the enemy, should generally be held for some little time, and during such pauses a convenient opportunity is afforded for reorganizing the column. Guns would generally move in the middle of the column well protected. | |
It must be remembered that in bush fighting a very few rifles may impose upon the enemy and may induce him to imagine that he is confronted by a strong body of infantry. For this reason troops on rear-guard should be well spread out, and should be instructed to shift their positions so as to deceive the enemy. When retreating in the bush, ambuscades might be employed with great effect. But the dread which irregular warriors always show of having their retreat out off, and the uncertainty which must prevail in their ranks as to the exact position of the troops which they are pursuing, are, perhaps, the greatest safeguard which a force of regulars enjoys in a retrograde movement of this kind. | |
Heavy expenditure of ammunition. |
In Chapter XXII the essential importance of infantry fire discipline will be referred to, and some of the main |
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points tending towards its maintenance will be touched upon. But it must be remembered that in bush warfare it is very often the case that the "troops" consist, largely or wholly, of hastily enlisted native levies with rudimentary notions of discipline of any kind. To keep the fire of such soldiers under some sort of control in the surprises and uncertainties of jungle fighting is a most difficult matter, and one to which it is impossible to pay too much attention. The Swahili and Waganda levies wasted ammunition to an alarming extent during the suppression of the Uganda mutiny, and it is generally found that such troops cannot be got to husband their rounds. | |
The maintenance of a rigid fire discipline is one of the chief reasons for adopting the small units tor infantry which have been found so satisfactory in the case of regulars. But in the case of levies an organization of this kind is impracticable unless there are numbers of trained officers and non-commissioned officers told off to the various corps. This question of waste of ammunition is a very serious one in the hush warfare which so frequently occurs in parts of Africa, and one for which it is not easy to find a solution. | |
Searching the bush with volleys. |
This question of expenditure of ammunition leads naturally to the question of "searching the bush with volleys," a method which was freely made use of in the advance to Benin in 1897. In that campaign the enemy was scarcely ever actually seen, but the columns were constantly fired into out of the jungle by individuals. It was found that while marching along bush paths, occasional volleys fired into the thickets had the effect of hurrying the enemy's fire. They caused the hostile marksmen to shoot at random and at longer ranges than they had intended to, and this made their fire comparatively harmless. These precautionary volleys were made use of both by the Houssa force and by the naval brigade, and to save ammunition they were delivered generally by a few files, not by whole sections or companies. In spite of this |
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precaution they, however, gave rise to liberal expenditure of ammunition; but it was probably well expended ammunition, considering the results achieved by the system. | |
During the operations of 1898 against the insurgents in Sierra Leone, a place called Karina was blockaded by the rebels for some days. A small force moving out to a locality some miles off adopted this system of pre. cautionary volleys in the bush. But it expended so much of its ammunition that it was obliged to return to Karina to replenish. It so happened that the conditions at the moment were such as to render a successful offensive movement very desirable, the failure was therefore somewhat unfortunate. | |
It is only in very thick jungle and when fighting an enemy who will not stand, that precautionary volleys would be used. The Benis were very ill-supplied with bullets and depended largely upon slugs. It was therefore very important to get them to discharge their muskets at some little distance from the troops, because the slugs were then prevented from doing any harm by the luxuriant foliage; they were well aware that their arms were of little use firing through zones of thicket, and they only assembled in force at clearings, where they could be satisfactorily tackled. The precautionary volleys really aimed rather at keeping the snipers at a distance than at driving off hostile bodies of appreciable strength. | |
Firing the bush. |
It may be mentioned that in bush warfare the enemy can sometimes bring advancing troops to a standstill by setting the bush on fire. This is of course only possible in the dry season. The tropical jungles of West Africa do not burn readily at any time of the year. |
Conclusion. |
There is, perhaps, no class of irregular warfare which it is so difficult to discuss tactically as that which takes place in the bush. So much depends upon the thickness of the bush and the general nature of the vegetation that many elements enter into the problem. But it has generally been found that in the dense tropical jungle, where advance is most difficult and where the maintenance of control over troops in action becomes almost an impossibility, the enemy is cowardly and is unsupplied with weapons of precision. Were |
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the inhabitants of some of the theatres of recent wars in West Africa brave fanatics like the Sudanese, ox were they supplied with magazine rifles as were many of the Afridis in 1897, it is not easy to see how operations could be brought to a successful issue without a deplorable loss of valuable lives. | |
Happily the warlike instincts of races inhabiting bush-grown territories almost seem to vary in direct proportion to the thickness of the cover. When the country is fairly open they are enterprising and courageous. When its whole face is clothed in almost impenetrable thickets they are timid and unskilled in war. The elastic square formation, which may be indispensable to security when antagonists are formidable, is therefore generally in practice only required in those theatres of war where the terrain does not forbid its employment. On the other hand in districts where flankers are an impossibility, and where the column must feel its way forward depending perhaps entirely on a rabble of scouts for intimation of the enemy's presence, the enemy will, as likely as not, never venture upon anything more audacious than a volley followed by precipitate flight. |
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