1. Unless otherwise indicated, hours and dates used throughout this volume refer to the local time of the specific area under discussion.
2. The Japanese themselves realized the important effect of the protracted resistance in the Philippines. "Politically it stood as a symbol to the Filipinos and encouraged them to continue their resistance even after the fall of Corregidor," said Maj. Moriya Wada of the Fourteenth Army Staff. Lt. Col. Yoshio Nakajima, Intelligence Staff, Fourteenth Army, expressed the same opinion: "There was an influence, a spiritual influence, exerted by the American resistance on Bataan. Not only did the Japanese at home worry about the length of the period of American resistance on Bataan, but it served as a symbol to the Filipinos that the Americans had not deserted them and would continue to try to assist them." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
3. Navy Operation Plans and Orders, 1941-1944, Recovered from CA NACHI, ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Limited Distribution Translation No. 39, Part VIII.
4. Lt. Gen. Torashro Kawabe, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, stated that an important factor in Japan's decision to go to war and to invade the Philippines was the fear on the part of the Japanese General Staff of General MacArthur's ten-year plan for the defense of the Philippines. The plan was in its sixth year and a potential menace to Japan's ambitions. The Japanese had to intervene before it was too late. Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, voiced virtually the same opinion: "General MacArthur's program among the Filipinos was a potential obstacle to the Japanese plan of expansion in Asia.... If the Philippines were fortified and the defense strengthened by additional troops, Japan could not have undertaken war with the United States." Lt. Col. Hikaru Haba, Intelligence Staff, Fourteenth Army, said: "If there had been 50,000 additional men in the Philippines, and had the defenses been completed, we would have had to reconsider carefully the consequences of going to war." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
5. Navy Plans and Orders, 1941-1944, Recovered from CA NACHI, ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Limited Distribution Translation No. 39, Part VIII.
7. Homer Lea's accurate forecast of the basic strategy which the Japanese would use in their invasion of the Philippines reads: "As the conquest of Cuba was accomplished by landing forces distant from any fortified port, so will the Philippines fall. Lingayen Gulf on the north coast of Luzon, or Polillo Bight on the east coast, will form the Guantanamo Bays of the Japanese.... Japan, by landing simultaneously one column of twenty thousand men at Dagupan and another column of the same size at Polillo Bight, would, strategically, render the American position untenable. These points of debarkation are almost equidistant from Manila, and are connected with it by military roads, while a railroad also connects Dagupan with the capital. The impossibility of defending Manila with the force now stationed on the islands is seen in the strategic advantages inherent in Japan's convergent attack. These two columns, more than double the strength of the American force, converge on Manila at right angles.... If the American forces, on the other hand, should remain behind their lines at Manila, they would, in two weeks after the declaration of war, be surrounded by overwhelming numbers. The lines about Manila, as was demonstrated during the Spanish-American War, are incapable of prolonged defense. An aggressive enemy in control of the surrounding country can render them untenable in a short period of time." (Harper's 1942 edition) ppp. 174-176. [Which is why War Plan ORANGE--which MacArthur discarded in favor of a forward defense--called for a retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and holding the entrance to Manila Bay to prevent its use by the Japanese! --HyperWar]
8. The strategy followed in general War Plan ORANGE III, which envisaged holding the entrance to Manila Bay.
9. Military Intelligence Division (MID), War Department (WD), The World at War, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1945), pp. 109-110.
10. The general plan to support the Atlantic theater was previously crystallized in the Anglo-American staff conferences that had begun in Washington in the spring of 1941.
11. Ibid., pp. 105-107. Prime Minister Curtin, Ltr to CINCSWPA, 30 May 42, AG GHQ 381, Aust Req B SWPA, (MS).
12. MID, WD, op. cit., pp. 109-110.
13. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 23 Jan 42. There has been some speculation as to what might have happened if our bombers had duplicated these pre-hostilities flights and attacked the Formosan airfields. The answer is that they would in all probability have run into a hornet's nest of 300-700 planes. See footnote 14. [Versus the certainty of their destruction on the ground at Clark Field! --HyperWar (Not a great admirer of MacArthur, as you can probably tell.)]
14. In the scattered notes which Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma wrote during the subsequent fighting on Bataan, the following statement is pertinent: "One of our greatest advantages is that we have complete control of the air." ("General Homma's Notes During the Battle of Bataan,") Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.) Against the weak Far East Air Force [the same force that MacArthur relied on when scrapping War Plan ORANGE! --HyperWar] the Japanese used 307 first-line army planes in the Philippine operation and 444 navy planes (land-based and carrier)--a total of 751 aircraft. (Japanese First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureau Reports, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.) The American air strength in the Philippines had been closely watched by the Japanese, and it figured heavily in their military calculations before Pearl Harbor. Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, formerly of the Navy General Staff, offered a significant opinion on this subject: "The Japanese through long experience learned that they must have a 3-1 ratio in the air to attain supremacy; if General MacArthur had had an air force which exceeded 500 planes, Japan would never have been able to strike the Philippines." The statement of Col. Monjiro Akiyama, Organization and Order of Battle Department, Imperial General Headquarters, is also of interest: "In my opinion, the presence of a well-equipped air force in the Philippines would have had a great effect on the decision to attack Pearl Harbor and to begin a war with the United States." Important too, is the statement of Lt. Col. Tokutaro Sato, Fourteenth Army Staff Operations: "We had estimated that there were 200 planes available to General MacArthur in the Philippines before the opening of hostilities. Had there been twice this amount, I doubt that it would have been possible to attack the Philippines successfully. Had General MacArthur had this additional air power, the Japanese might not have been able to attack the Philippines at all, and possibly would have been unable to open hostilities elsewhere." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. [Methinks the General doth protest too much: Ten thousand B-29's would have done no good if MacArthur left them on the ground to be destroyed by the first Japanese strike--11 hours after Pearl Harbor. --HyperWar]
15. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 10 Dec 41.
16. The troop transports for the Legaspi invasion left Palau on the morning of 8 December. The attack force which accompanied the transports consisted of one cruiser, six destroyers, and numerous auxiliary craft. Indirect support was provided by the seaplane carriers (twenty-plane capacity) Chitose and Mizuho. Additional units of the Japanese fleet cruised in the waters east of Legaspi. They consisted of the three heavy cruisers Myoku, Haguro, and Nachi (each with three catapult planes), the aircraft carrier Ryujo (thirty-six planes), and a number of destroyers. (Combined Fleet Headquarters Report, Operational Study of the Philippines No. 1, Philippine Invasion Operation, 8 December--29 December, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.) The plane capacity of the Japanese ships in the Legaspi landing and the adjacent area alone was over half the number of the entire operational air force which General MacArthur had had at his disposal when the Japanese first struck the Philippines.
17. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 12 Dec 41.
18. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 14 Dec 41.
19. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 18 Dec 41.
20. The Davao invasion force consisted of fourteen transports which sailed from Palau on 17 December. The transports were escorted by a cruiser, six destroyers, and numerous auxiliary craft. The actual invasion was supported by the seaplane carriers Chitose and Mizuho. Additional units of the Japanese fleet stood by in the waters east of Davao. These consisted of the three heavy cruisers, Myoko, Haguro, and Nachi, the aircraft carrier Ryujo, the destroyer Shiokaze, and the patrol boat Shirataka. These units had also supported the Legaspi landings on 9 December. Combined Fleet Headquarters Report, Operational Study of the Philippines No. 1, Philippine Invasion Operation, 8 December--29 December, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.)
21. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 21 Dec 41.
22. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 22 Dec 41. The huge invasion force which entered Lingayen Gulf on 22 December consisted of three transport echelons. The first echelon was composed of twenty-seven transports from Takao under the command of Rear Adm. Kensaburo Hara; the second echelon of twenty-eight transports from Mako was under the command of Rear Adm. Yoji Nishimura; the third echelon of twenty-one transports from Keelung was under the command of Rear Adm. Sueto Hirose. This force of seventy-six transports was supported by three escort units of cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliary craft which had been previously used in the landings at Vigan, Aparri, and Batan Island. The American estimate of eighty transports was within four of the actual number used by the Japanese in Lingayen Gulf. War Department Intelligence (WDI, G-2, GHQ, AFPAC, Document 19692C (WDI-113), Operations of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines. Combined Fleet Headquarters Report, Operational Study of the Philippines No. 1, Philippine Invasion Operation, 8 December-29 December, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
23. The force of twenty-four transports which made the landing at Atimonan left Amami Oshima on 17 December. It was escorted by the light cruiser Nagara, the 24th Destroyer Division, the 1st Section of the 16th Destroyer Squadron, subchasers, gunboats, minsweepers, and other minor vessels. Combined Fleet Headquarters Report, Operational Study of the Philippines No. 1, Philippine Invasion Operation, 8 December-29 December, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
24. Japanese estimates on the length of time it would require to destroy or capture General MacArthur's forces varied from one to two months. [War Plan ORANGE called for MacArthur to withstand a six-month siege. -HyperWar] Lt Gen. Moriji Kawagoe, former Chief of Staff, 48th Division, Fourteenth Army, stated: "Imperial General Headquarters, Fourteenth Army, and I estimated that Luzon could be taken in one and one-half months after landing." Col. Kotoshi Nakayama, Senior Operations Officer, Fourteenth Army Staff, said: "Prior to the campaign, we estimated that we could annihilate the greater part of the American forces in one or two months." Lower estimates came from officers of the Fifth Army Air Force. "It was estimated by the Fourteenth Army," said Maj. Tsutomu Mizutani, "that the Philippines could be taken in one month." Maj. Koroshi Doba reported that the Japanese believed that General MacArthur's forces "could be annihilated within twenty days after the landings at Lingayen." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
25. In peace-time maneuvers, the great commercial bus transportation companies operating in the major provinces of Luzon had already been organized as provisional motor transport battalions, utilizing the company personnel as officers and men. It is interesting to note that General MacArthur's G-2 in this period had previously served as G-4 of the Philippine Department, 1939-1940, and developed the motorization program.
26. Bataan had been quickly organized for a protracted defense through the hasty construction of depot areas in the primeval forests west of Lamao, the development of docks at Cabcaben, Limay, and Lamao, and the improvement of the road net, especially along the west coast; this organization of Bataan also cam under G-4 Philippine Department. [Of course, this "hasty construction" was only required because MacArthur had rejected the pre-war plans for the defense of Bataan in favor of a forward defense at the beaches, moving the bulk of his supplies to forward depots, which were overrun by the Japanese. Had Bataan been properly organized for defense, MacArthur would likely have met ORANGE's six-month target for resistance. --HyperWar]
27. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 27 Dec 41. The Japanese nevertheless continued to bomb the city [which remained MacArthur's military headquarters, and a transit point for the forces retreating from the east--a legitimate target--until the 31st. --HyperWar], and on the 28th a press release reported: "Nothing new since this morning from the fronts. Until Manila was declared an open city it was noticeable that the Japanese did not attempt to attack civil installations from the air, but as soon as the army, including antiaircraft protection, withdrew, they immediately raided hitting all types of civilian premises including churches, convents, the cathedral, business houses and residences. Manila will no longer be blacked out. Tonight and all nights in the future Manila will be lighted."
28. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 31 Dec 41.
29. Most of the Japanese commanders who opposed General Macarthur in the Philippines generally agreed that the withdrawal into Bataan was an excellent strategical maneuver. "The fact that the Americans entered Bataan where there were well-prepared positions was a brilliant move strategically. American resistance was very fierce," said Lt. Gen. Susumu Morioka, Commanding General, 16th Division. While some of the Japanese commanders thought that General MacArthur would move into Bataan, the operation caught the bulk of them unawares, for they did not anticipate that it would be done so soon or so efficiently. The following statements are typical of their reactions: "We were completely surprised by General MacArthur's withdrawal to Bataan. We thought the Americans were cowards at the time. However, later studying the move objectively, I have come to believe that it was a great strategic move," said Colonel Akiuyama, Organization and Order of Battle Department, Imperial Japanese Headquarters. "The Japanese had never planned for or expected a withdrawal to Bataan," said Colonel Sato, Fourteenth Army Staff Operations. "If had been anticipated that the decisive battle would be fought in Manila. The Japanese commanders could not adjust to the new situation caused by the withdrawal of General MacArthur's forces into Bataan which they learned about from wireless, intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance around 28 December." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
[MacArthur's self-serving historical revisionism, while hardly surprising, is still appalling. War Plan ORANGE had always called for denying the use of Manila Bay to the Japanese by holding Bataan and Corregidor. It was MacArthur who delayed fortifying the peninsula. It was MacArthur who rejected ORANGE in favor of a forward defense of the beaches ("forward" for the troops, not MacArthur, who remained comfortable in his luxury Manila apartment until finally relocating to Corregidor--well after improperly declaring Manila an "open city"). It was MacArthur who ordered the supplies for the prolonged defense of Bataan forward--to temporary depots that were overrun by the Japanese advance, leading to starvation among the troops who had to hastily retreat to the peninsula. It was also MacArthur who ordered "WPL-41 (ORANGE) is now in effect!" as soon as his forward defense met, and was routed by, the Japanese offensive. It was MacArthur who delayed until the very last moment moving his troops to Bataan. If the Japanese were truly surprised by the move to Bataan, it seems logical that this was the result of either  extremely poor pre-war intelligence, coupled with incredible ignorance of the strategic value of Bataan and Manila Bay; or  confusion resulting from MacArthur's "brilliant" indecision regarding defense of Manila vs. Bataan; or  post-war interviewees telling MacArthur what he wanted to hear. A properly planned defense of Bataan might well have provided MacArthur with the opportunity for a counter-offensive in January against a weakened Japanese force beginning to suffer from exhaustion and malaria that would have seriously upset their entire timetable. (Reinforcements would have overwhelmed MacArthur eventually; but those reinforcements would have been taken from the forces assigned to the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks, and Solomons campaigns. --HyperWar]
30. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 1 Jan 42.
31. Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story (Garden City, N.Y., 1946), p. 48.
32. The shrewd enemy applied pressure and accelerated the influx of these refugees. This influx became an important factor in the logistics of defense. Under existing war plans, General MacArthur undertook to hold the entrance to Manila Bay--Bataan--for six months, presumably sufficient time to organize a relief expedition from the United States. Consequently, supply stockage, especially food, was calculated for 180 days only. Obviously, the defending forces could not stand heavy inroads into their limited supplies by thousands of homeless refugees. [Of course, even without the refugees, there was no longer a six months' supply of anything: MacArthur's substitute "war plan" had dispersed the Bataan supplies to the front, where they were promptly overrun by the Japanese. The "existing" war plans were, in fact, the original ones that MacArthur was forced to revert to after the Japanese landings; but plans are not supplies. --HyperWar]
33. "At first, General Homma thought that the 65th Brigade could occupy Bataan by continuing the pursuit of the American forces which had retreated to Bataan," said General Morioka, Commanding General, 16th Division. "However, they met fierce resistance at Hermosa and were stalled. General Homma studied documents captured in Manila and realized that Bataan was very strongly defended and so changed his plans. General Sugiyama, Chief of Staff, Imperial General Headquarters, personally came to Bataan in the middle of February to investigate. It was realized that Bataan could not be taken with what troops were present. As a result of General Sugiyama's visit, Imperial General Headquarters transferred the 4th Division and one brigade of another division from China plus the Kitajima Artillery Group (about 150 guns) from Hong Kong to Bataan. Several aerial bombardment groups from Burma and Malaya were also recalled to Bataan for the subsequent operations. These units arrived in the first part of March and underwent about three weeks of jungle training. On 3 April, the attack was resumed." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
34. General MacArthur's G-2, on a staff visit to I Corps, became involved in this landing attack in the sector of the 71st Division. When all United States officers had become casualties, he took command of the 1st Philippine Constabulary, defending Agloloma Pt. and reestablished the position by a sharp counterattack.
35. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 28 Feb 42. The situation was summarized as follows: "The enemy has adopted a defensive attitude. This is definite indication that his heavy losses have shaken him. He begins to show signs of exhaustion. We are probably entering upon a phase of positional warfare of indecisive character. In North Luzon our mountain troops have forced him to evacuate the Abras Valley from Cervantes to Bangued...."
36. GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 28 Feb 42.
37. The embattled American and Filipino troops, partially trained, inexperienced, and ill-equipped as they were, numbered less than half the Japanese forces, many of whom were battle-tried veterans from China. These handicaps, together with the complete control of the air enjoyed by the Japanese and the supremacy of their Navy, which kept their all-important supply lines open and America's closed, spelled the final word of doom for General MacArthur's forces in the Philippines.
38. CINCSWPA Radio No. 3, 21 Mar 42, to WARCOS, 323. 36 AG GHQ (S). General MacArthur's order of battle was purposely designed to meet the varied and special problems involved in the Philippine situation. In clear recognition of the geographical division of the Philippines and the tactical isolation of Luzon, General MacArthur carefully designated three separate command entities, with a view toward protracted warfare in each, in one should be lost. By this arrangement he hoped to prevent the Japanese from forcing a surrender of all the islands by the capture of any single headquarters.
39. General Macarthur's estimates and plans were outlined to General Marshall in a radio sent from Australia on 4 April 1942. "In an endeavor to permit passage of supplies from Cebu to Corregidor, I prepared prior to my departure detailed plans for an air attack by B-17 from here to Mindanao.... I believe there is a chance for blockade runners from the United States to reach their destination if they approach by the route around the north of Luzon.... When I left on March 11, I estimated that serious shortage would not develop before May 1 at the earliest, allowing sufficient time for the arrival of blockade runners from the United States... ["serious shortages" after May 1st? "His" troops on Bataan were starving at least a month earlier than that. Typical of Macarthur's self-serving fantasies that served as "intelligence" and "estimates"! --HyperWar]
I am utterly opposed, under any circumstances or conditions, to the ultimate capitulation of this command. If it is to be destroyed, it should be on the field of battle in order to exact full toll from the enemy. To this end I had long ago prepared a comprehensive plan for cutting a way out if food or ammunition failed. [Too bad his "plan" didn't include training the Filipino Army, or providing the very food and ammunition needed, either to execute the "plan" or avoid the necessity! This magical thinking, which included his "plans" for the defense of the Philippines, borders on psychosis. --HyperWar] This plan contemplated an ostentatious artillery preparation on the left by the I Corps as a feint and a sudden surprise attack on the right by the II Corps ... taking the enemy's Subic Bay positions in reverse simultaneously with a frontal attack by the I Corps. If successful, the supplies seized at this base might well rectify the situation. This would permit them to operate in Central Luzon where food supplies could be obtained and where they could still protect Bataan and the northern approach to Corregidor. If the movement is not successful and our forces defeated, many increments thereof, after inflicting important losses upon the enemy, could escape through the Zambales Mountains and continue guerrilla warfare in conjunction with forces now operating in the north....
I would be very glad if you believe it advisable for me to attempt to rejoin this command temporarily and take charge of this movement. The pressure on this situation could be immeasurably relived if a naval task force with its own air protection could make some kind of threat in that general direction...." CINCSPWPA Radio, 4 Apr 42, to WARCOS, Rec Sec, GHQ, 384.3 420404-C (S).
40. Report of Organization and Activities, United States Army Forces in Australia, AG GHQ 314.7, USAFIA.
41. Ibid. See also Operation Journal of 19th Bomb Grp, 8 Dec 41-2 Feb 42, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
42. WD, The World at War, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1945), pp. 109-123. WARCOS Radio, 23 Feb 42, to CG USAFIA, AG USAFFE.
43. WD, The World at War, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1945), pp. 122-123. COMINCH, Our Navy at War (Washington, 1944), pp. 28-29.
44. WD, The World at War, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1945), pp. 123-125.
45. Australian Chiefs of Staff, "Probable Immediate Japanese Moves in Proposed new Anzac Area," 5 Mar 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal File prior to 5 Apr 42 (MS).
46. Allied estimates of enemy intentions were accurate. As early as 2 February 1942, Imperial General Headquarters had ordered the South Seas Detachment to prepare for the invasion of Port Moresby in coordination with the Fourth Fleet. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeastern Area Operations Record, Part III, "Operations of the Eighteenth Army," Vol. I, pp. 4-6, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. The reports of the Japanese First and Second Demobilization Bureaus are operational histories prepared by former Japanese Army and Navy officers, all of whom participated in some phase of the war. The purpose of these reports is to document fully the history of the Japanese Armed Forces in World War II.
47. Australian Chiefs of Staff, "Defense of Australia," 27 Feb 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal File prior to 5 Apr 42 (MS). USASOS, Report of Organization and Activities, United States Army Forces in Australia, 9 Jul 43, AG GHQ 314.7
48. "Appreciation by Australian Chiefs of Staff," 27 Feb 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal File prior to 5 Apr 42 (MS).
49. WARCOS Radio No. 739, 18 Mar 42, to CG USAFFE, AG GHQ 323, 26 Supr Com (S).
50. "Appreciation by Australian Chiefs of Staff," 27 Feb 42; GOC Home Forces Memo, for Minister for the Army, 4 Feb 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal File prior to 5 Apr 42. Report of Organization and Activities, United States Army Forces in Australia, AG GHQ 314.7, USAFIA.
51. "Appreciation by Australian Chiefs of Staff," 27 Feb 42 and 5 Mar 42, G-3, GHQ SWPA Journal File prior to 5 Apr 42 (MS).
53. Report of Organization and Activities, United States Army Forces in Australia, AG GHQ 314.7, USAFIA.
1. CINCSWPA Radio, 17 Mar 42, to WARCOS, AG, GHQ, 370.05 No. 1 (S). Note comments by Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, A. C., then Commander of United States Army Forces in Australia:George H. Brett, "The MacArthur I Knew," True (October 1947), pp. 139-140.
"I received a radiogram from Gen. Marshall informing me that Gen. MacArthur would call on me to send a flight of long-range bombers to Mindanao before March 15th.... MacArthur had been ordered out.
From the wreckage of Java I had brought a dozen B-17s of the 19th Group. They were in pretty bad shape. In a fully equipped air force they all would have been scrapped.... But they were all we had, and we had to keep them flying, if we tied them together with chewing gum and baling wire.... I looked over my B-17s.... There wasn't a bomber in the lot fit for the Philippines trip.... There was only one way out. Twelve new Flying Fortresses had just arrived in Australia, but they were assigned to the Navy.... I went to Admiral Herbert Fairfax Leary, and told him I had to get MacArthur out of the Philippines.... Could I borrow three of his planes to bring him to Australia? Leary had the reputation of saying no to all requests, unless he could see that the Navy would benefit by his acquiescence. 'I'd like to help you, Brett,' he said, 'but it is quite impossible. We need those planes here, and can't spare them for a ferry job, no matter how important it is....'
I had no jurisdiction over the Navy, and could not commandeer those planes.... Leary was...determined to hang on to his B-17s come hell or high water. There was nothing else to do but send the best of our combat-shattered group. We did all we could with them mechanically, which, I'll be the first to admit, wasn't too much.... Only one of the planes...was able to get through.... Of the other three I had dispatched, two experienced engine trouble, and turned back. The third fell into the sea, but the crew was picked up.... The problem remained exactly the same as it had been in the first place.... Back I went to Adm. Leary. I expected the same answer I'd had before, but was prepared to get tougher. But Leary didn't give me a single 'no'. Perhaps he had heard directly from Washington ... the Admiral loaned me four beautiful new bombers.... "
2. The following editorial is typical of the reactions of the Japanese press:
"The fact that the general public in the Allied countries is hailing MacArthur as the only man now capable of leading the Allied forces is a clear evidence of the pitiful dearth of Allied leadership. That one general can mean so much to the Allied cause is a damaging confession that the rest of their leaders are unworthy of confidence. Hysterical emphasis laid on the supposedly miraculous qualities of this one man reveals how worried the British and Americans are over their continued reverses and how frantically they are clutching at this one straw represented by MacArthur."
Japan Times and Advertiser, Tokyo, March 20, 1942.
3. Radio from MacArthur to Beebe, 21 Mar 42, 000.75, AG, GHQ (S): "The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines. I came through and I shall return."
4. In a letter to the Secretary of the Defense Committee, Australian Department of Defense Coordination, on 1 April 1942 (323.36, AG GHQ), General MacArthur explained his position in the following words: "At the present time I am operating not as Commander of SWPA which is to be established, but as the Commanding General of all United States troops in the Far East to which have been attached Admiral Leary's naval forces. With the Australian forces, I am functioning by coordination and cooperation."
The tactful assistance and discreet intervention of the Australian Defense Secretary, Sir Frederick G. Shedden, one of the ablest of Australian civil servants, should be noted in this connection. Sir Frederick maintained a liaison office directly with GHQ which aided greatly in the co-operative effort.
5. JCS Directive to CINCSWPA, 30 Mar 42, G-3, GHQ JCS/CCS 42-43 (S).
6. Ibid. Also JCS Directive to CINCPOA, 30 Mar 42, G-3, GHQ JCS/CCS 42-43 (S).
7. JCS Directive to CINCSWPA, 30 Mar 42, G-3, GHQ JCS/CCS 42-43 (S).
8. Ibid. Also JCS Directive to CINCPOA, 30 Mar 42, G-3, GHQ JCS/CCS 42-43 (S).
9. GHQ General Order No. 1, 18 Apr 42, AG, GHQ 300.4 GO (S); GHQ General Order No. 2, 19 Apr 42, AG, GHQ 300.4 GO (S).
10. Except for General Chamberlin and Cols. Whitlock and Fitch who were members of the Staff of USAFIA, these officers were with General MacArthur in the Philippines before the outbreak of the war.
11. Radio No. AG 381 from MacArthur to AGWAR (for Marshall), 20 Apr 42, WD (28) C/S. Of the 11 divisions of Australian forces, only about 2 divisions and 1 brigade could be considered available for operations. General MacArthur reported: "The Australian Army has 1 division and 1 division less 2 brigades which have returned from the Middle East which are ... effective troops. One additional division in the home force is approaching combat condition. The remainder of the Army is composed of a militia in a very indifferent state of training and equipment which can be prepared for combat only by prolonged and intensive efforts...." CINCSWPA Radio No. 558 to WARCOS, 1 May 42, AG GHQ 384 No. 1 (S).
12. GHQ General Order No. 1, 18 Apr 42, AG GHQ 300.4 GO (S); WARCOS Radio No. 1167 to CG USAFIA, 8 Apr 42, C/S GHQ WD 10 (S). Forces of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army in Australia then consisted chiefly of one infantry company which was assigned to Allied Land Forces in May.
13. GHQ General Order No. 1, 18 Apr 42, AG GHQ 300.4 GO (S). WARCOS Radio No. 1188 to CG USAFFE, 9 Apr 42, C/S GHQ WD 10A (S). CINCSWPA Radio to WARCOS, 24 Apr 42, AG 5AF 322.99 Dutch Units (S). CINCSWPA Radio No. 558 to WARCOS, 1 May 42, AG GHQ 384 No. 1 (S). It would take many months for this allocation to become effective. See n. 18.
14. GHQ General Order No. 1, 18 Apr 42, AG GHQ 300.4 GO (S). Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston, 1948), p. 261, and Vol. IV, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942 (Boston, 1950), p. 15. General MacArthur repeatedly urged that an aircraft carrier be provided, "even of the smallest type", to give these naval units offensive power. He stated that "the surface element of our naval force is unbalanced because of lack of integral air units, in consequence of which its value as a striking force is nullified, reducing it to the execution of minor missions." If the necessary carrier protection were provided, it "could transform the force from an ineffective element into a powerful offensive weapon.... The enemy's lines are partially uncovered and carelessly defended due to the fact that he has been practically unchallenged. This opportunity will not continue indefinitely; when he consolidates his position, the situation will be much more difficult. I consider it a waste of our potentialities to operate such an unbalanced force at the point of immediate contact." CINCSWPA Radio No. 453 to WARCOS, 24 Apr 42, WD 35, C/S GHQ (S).
15. JCS Directive to CINCSWPA, 30 Mar 42, G-3, GHQ JCS/CCS 42-43 (S). Report of Organization and Activities, United States Army Forces in Australia, AG GHQ 314.7, USAFIA. CINCSWPA Radio to WARCOS, 24 Apr 42, AG 5AF 322.99 Dutch Units (S).
16. GHQ (Aust) Opn Instr No. 1, 10 Apr 42, and No. 3, 12 Apr 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal and G-3, GHQ, SWPA Admin 370 (S). AHQ Opn Instr No. 50, 9 Apr 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Admin 370 (S).
17. "In the spring of 1942 the Japanese did not think that General MacArthur would establish himself in New Guinea and defend Australia from that position," said Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, IJN, Senior Staff Officer, Southeast Area Fleet at Rabaul, June 1942-December 1943. "They also did not believe that he would be able to use New Guinea as a base for offensive operations against them. The Japanese felt that General MacArthur could not establish himself in Port Moresby because he did not have sufficient forces to maintain himself there and because the Japanese Navy was confident that it could control the Coral Sea and keep him out of New Guinea. In view of the successful air attacks against Darwin and Townsville, the Japanese reasoned that General MacArthur's forces were weak or they would have staved off the attacks. Such was the attitude of the Japanese Army and Navy High Command before the battle of Midway." This opinion was corroborated by other Japanese commanders who fought in the New Guinea area. For example, Colonel Jinmatsu Morifuji, Eighth Area Army Staff Officer, stated: "The Japanese did not anticipate that General MacArthur would attempt to defend Australia by establishing his forces in New Guinea. For this reason the Japanese did not stress the importance of New Guinea at the beginning of the campaign." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
18. General Brett, Allied Air Force Commander in Australia, commented on these problems as follows:
"We had flown what was left of our planes out of Java, just as Brereton had flown his out of the Philippines. I took over as commander of the American forces. The situation was, to put it mildly, muddled and unhappy. Australia's defenses were weak, and Australia expected an invasion. There are no better fighting men in the world than the hard-bitten soldiers of the island continent, but there were too few of them. The Royal Australian Air Force was equipped with almost obsolete planes and was lacking in engines and spare parts, as well as personnel. We had only one American infantry division, and that was incompletely trained. When Gen. MacAthur arrived, he was extremely disappointed in what he found. He had not wanted to leave the Philippines.... However, his better judgment prevailed, influenced, possibly, by reports that a great American army was being gathered in Australia for him to lead. It did not take long for him to find out how erroneous these reports had been. There was no great army, and the air force consisted of a few battered planes, and combat-weary men....
I knew MacArthur was thoroughly dissatisfied with what he was getting, and he could not be blamed for that.... We...were fighting in the air over New Guinea, on a starvation ration of planes and ammunition and men.... We were working sixteen and eighteen hours a day.... The airmen found it difficult to understand why their country, the greatest industrial nation on earth, could not give them the tools with which to fight. What seemed almost as bad was the fact that our country seemed more concerned with the German phase of the global conflict than with the Japanese. There was only a comparative handful of Americans in the Pacific theater. We didn't have much to fight with, but we were hopeful that plenty would come through sooner or later. But, nothing much came through in those dreary months, and this unescapable fact, as well as the danger and monotony and bad living conditions, had our boys very badly down.... On my way back Stateside, everywhere I went I saw bombers and fighters stacked up waiting to move to Australia. Many had been waiting for a long time.... Our effectiveness was curtailed, our losses higher than they should have been, because those men and planes were held back. I was compelled to send into combat fighter pilots with less than ten hours' experience on the type of plane assigned them, when there were available men with hundreds of hours of flying time in the same type of aircraft...."
Brett, Op. Cit. pp. 26, 27, 139, 149.
19. CINCSWPA Radio No. 588 to WARCOS, 1 May 42, AG GHQ 384 No. 1 (S).
20. In order to delay the Japanese even longer, General MacArthur had planned to continue resistance as long as possible in the southern islands of the Philippines after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. His plan is illustrated by a radio sent to General Sharp, CG, Mindanao Force on 9 May: "Since his surrender, orders emanating from General Wainwright are no longer valid. Insofar as possible, separate your force into small elements and initiate guerrilla operations. You, of course, have full authority to make any decisions required by immediate emergency. Keep in communication with me as much as possible. You are a gallant and resourceful Commander and I am proud of what you have done."
21. CINCSWPA Radio No. 176 to WARCOS, 8 May 42, WD C/S (S).
22. General MacArthur's estimate of the strategic situation was correct; the Japanese were making plans to complete the isolation of Australia.
"In the spring of 1942, the Japanese Navy, eager to capitalize on Japan's initial success in the war, hoped to invade Australia. It was thought that such key areas as Darwin in the north and Townsville, Brisbane, and Sydney on the east coast should be occupied," said Captain Ohmae. "The Navy was responsible for defending New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomons, so Australia figured heavily in its plans.... The Navy realized that Australia would become not only the base from which counterattacks would be launched against Japanese forces, but the steppingstone for an invasion of Japan itself.... By invading Australia the supply of war materials, particularly airplanes, gas and oil which had already begun to flow from the United States would be stopped. The Navy suggested the idea of invading Australia to the Army in March 1942. The Army estimated that it would require at least ten or twelve divisions to carry out such a large-scale operation. The Army, however, felt that it could not adopt the Navy's suggestion because it did not wish to move that many troops from Manchuria and other occupied areas at that time. Adequate transportation and supplies were also lacking. The Navy then proposed a countermeasure because it was determined to isolate Australia and prevent the shipment of American war materials. A master plan was accordingly prepared during April and May 1942 which provided for the occupation of Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. Submarine and air bases were to be set up to cut the supply lines from America, isolate Australia, and force her out of the war.... At the insistence of Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, however, the invasion of Midway received priority and as a result the plan to occupy New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa was postponed."
Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
23. General MacArthur's insistence on offensive action was contrary to Japanese hopes and expectations. They planned to secure their positions, occupy other key areas, and force the Allies into the hopeless Maginot psychology of the defensive. In March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters published the following principles for the conduct of future operations: "Mopping up in the areas already occupied will be completed as soon as possible, and our combat troops in those areas will become garrison troops.... The strategic initiative obtained from the operations at the very beginning of the war will be maintained. Positions will be established which will withstand an extended period of enemy attacks and which will force the United States and British forces into a negative defensive position. In order then to hasten the termination of the war, the necessary operations will be prepared and carried out at key points along the outer perimeter of the occupied areas." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, "Seventeenth Army Operations," Vol 1, p. 2, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
24. The strategic importance of Australia and the Southwest Pacific Area was fully realized by Japanese Imperial General Headquarters as revealed in their estimate of the situation in October 1942: "The South Pacific seems to be the most likely position from which the enemy may carry out an offensive counterattack. The reason for this is that Australia and its surrounding islands are connected to the United States by a chain of islands, thus making the South Pacific a very potential position. The enemy will be able to threaten our command of the sea in the West Pacific from this area, recapture our southern occupational area, and occupy our South Sea Islands. Air raids can be carried out easily against our areas of important resources. After a thorough study of the situation we have decided that the enemy will probably attack this South Pacific area and will enforce regular counterattack measures after deploying his strength. The decisive battle between Japan and the United States will be the occupation of this strategic region." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, p. 64, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
25. "Appreciation by Australian Chiefs of Staff," 27 Feb 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal prior to 5 Apr 42, (MS). PM Curtin Ltr to CINCSWPA, 28 Apr 42, AG GHQ 385 Aust Req B (MS). CINCSWPA Ltr to PM Curtin, 10 May 42, AG GHQ 381 Aust Req B (S).
26. WARCOS Radios Nos. 1188 and 1499 to CINCSWPA, 9 and 24 Apr 42, C/S GHQ WD 10A, 35 et seq (S). PM Curtin Ltr to CINCSWPA, 4 May 42, C/S GHQ Aust 14. PM Curtin Ltr to CINCSWPA, 30 May 42, AG GHQ 381 Aust Req B (MS).
27. The psychological effect of the New Guinea terrain on combat troops was well described by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, Commanding General of the Buna Forces: "The psychological factors resulting from the terrain were ... tremendously important. After a man had lain for days in a wet slit trench, or in the swamp, his physical stamina was reduced materially. This reduction served to make him extremely nervous and to attribute to the unfamiliar noises of the jungle, spectres of Japanese activities. These reactions preyed on his mind until he was reduced often to a pitifully abject state, incapable of aggressive action." Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, Dec 1, 1942-Jan 25, 1943, p. 64.
1. GHQ, SWPA. Opn Instr No. 2, 25 April 42, G-3 Admin, 370 (S) and CINCSWPA Radio No. 719 to WARCOS, 13 May 42, C/S GHQ, WD No. 68 (S).
2. The Japanese landings were carried out under orders of the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet, Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inouye, who wanted an advanced seaplane base established at Tulagi to cover the forthcoming operations against Port Moresby. Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau, Southeast Area Naval Operations, Part I, p. 1, G-2 Historical Section. GHQ, FEC.
3. The exact composition of the Japanese Fleet Units participating in this operation may be found in Document No. 18865 F (WDI 56), ATIS, GHQ, SCAP, Full Translation of the Port Moresby Operation, Vol 5, 22 May 46.
4. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Naval Analysis Division, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 52.
5. GHQ, SWPA, G-2 Information Bulletin, Special Bulletin, 5 May 42.
6. Gilbert Cant, America's Navy in World War II (Rev. ed., New York, 1944), p. 200.
7. Adm. Ernest J. KING, USN, Our Navy at War, A Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 27 Mar 44, p. 30.
8. CINCSWPA Radio No. 719 to WARCOS, 13 May 42, C/S, GHQ, WD No. 68 (S). AAF DOI, Brief Appreciation of Coral Sea Battle, 5 to 8 May 42, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
9. "The loss of the Battle of the Coral Sea affected our strategy in New Guinea to a great extent," said Lt. Col. Shiro Hara, Eighth Area Army Staff Officer, Operations Section. "After the loss, we realized that our offensive assault against Port Moresby by sea was blocked. This made it obvious that if we were to attack our objective it would have to be made overland via the Owen Stanleys." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
10. The Japanese assault troops en route to Port Moresby were not affected by the action in the Coral Sea but returned to Rabaul. Japanese strategists by no means abandoned the plan to seize Port Moresby but only decided to postpone the next attempt until additional preparations could be completed.
11. New Guinea Force, Opn Instr No. 7, 23 Apr 42, G-3, GHQ Admin NGF (S).
12. CINCSWPA Ltr to General Blamey, 1 May 42, 385 (Plan 3) G-3, GHQ Admin (S).
13. GHQ, SWPA, Memo to Comdrs. ALF, AAF, ANF and CG USAFIA, 12 Jun 42, 385 (4) (Fall River), G-3, GHQ Admin (S). Also New Guinea Force, Opn Instr No. 17, 15 Jun 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
14. GHQ, SWPA, Memo to Commanders AAF, ALF, ANF and CG USAFIA, 22 Jun 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
15. CINCSWPA Ltr to Comdr. ALF, 9 Jun 42, AG, GHQ, 384, No. 1 (S).
16. To carry on their offensive in the Southwest Pacific after the Battle of the Coral Sea, Imperial General Headquarters rushed plans for the organization of the Seventeenth Army under the command of Lt. Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake. In spite of the Japanese losses at Midway, which postponed other operations in the Southwest Pacific, the Seventeenth Army renewed preparations to seize Port Moresby. On 1 July the Commander of the Seventeenth Army ordered the 15th Independent Engineer Regiment and an infantry battalion of the South Seas Detachment to land at Buna and conduct reconnaissance to determine the feasibility of an overland assault on Port Moresby. On 11 July the Seventeenth Army was given final orders to attack and occupy Port Moresby. General Hyakutake intended to carry out this order by having the South Seas Detachment infiltrate over the Owen Stanleys to Port Moresby while the Aoba Detachment carried out simultaneous amphibious operations. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, "Seventeenth Army Operations," Vol. I pp. 1-20, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. This detailed study of Japanese strategy after the Coral Sea and Midway battles reveals the emphasis placed by the Japanese on isolating and defeating the Allies in the Southwest Pacific.
17. New Guinea Force, Opn Instr No. 18, 21 Jun 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
18. CINCSWPA Ltr to Comdrs. AAF, ALF, ANF and CG USAFIA, 15 Jul 42, G-4, GHQ, Admin (S).
19. The formation and administration of these agencies were the responsibility of the G-2 Section which had begun their organization, in Melbourne, in May. The principal agencies and their fields of coverage were: (1) Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) which trained, organized, and sent into the field linguist detachments to interrogate prisoners of war and translate captured documents; (2) Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) which conducted clandestine operations, sabotage, and espionage behind the enemy lines and in enemy-held territories; its European counterpart was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which was never employed in the SWPA; (3) Allied Geographical Section (AGS) which gathered and published geographical information on areas within the SWPA; its Washington counterpart was Joint Army Navy Intelligence Service (JANIS); (4) Central Bureau (CB) which was an inter-Allied cryptanalytical service, co-ordinated with British and United States establishments.
20. By the end of the war, AGS had published 110 Terrain Studies, 62 Terrain Handbooks and 101 Special Reports on virtually every phase of the geographic features of New Guinea, the Philippines, and adjacent areas. Indicative of the wide variety of topics covered by AGS are such typical publications as "The Native Carrier," "Getting About in New Guinea," "Vegetation Study, Eastern New Guinea," and "Sailing Directions, New Guinea Areas." These studies were designed especially for use in Allied operations and every effort was made to insure widest dissemination. The demand was so great that by 15 September 1945 almost 200,000 copies had been distributed to the different services of the Allied Command as shown in the following table:
Totals Terrain Studies 21,349 16,674 14,817 12,988 65,828 Terrain Handbooks 50,345 21,487 25,432 17,092 114,356 Special Reports 5,416 1,737 918 5,300 13,371 Totals 77,110 39,898 41,167 35,380 193,555
AGS, GHQ, SWPA, Final Progress Report, 15 Sep 45.
21. Part of the success of Allied operations was directly attributable to the fact that the Australian and American soldiers were well informed while their Japanese adversary was not. AIB and the other intelligence agencies provided information which the Japanese commanders chronically complained was never furnished to them in important combat areas. Maj. Gen. Kazuo Tanikawa, Staff Officer of the Japanese Eighth Area Army, stated,
"We did not have information about the terrain in New Guinea.... Allied intelligence was far above what we could attain." Colonel Hara, Eighth Army Staff Officer, Operations Section said, "Allied intelligence activities were responsible in great part for our losses in New Guinea. They were very effective and the Allies seemed to know our strength and dispositions beforehand for it always seemed to me that they continually attacked our weak points and by avoiding our concentrated strong points managed to obtain their objectives with minimum losses. I always felt that Allied intelligence gained its great effectiveness through the failure of our own intelligence to combat it."
Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
22. During the war ATIS issued thousands of printed documents, falling into 13 different main classes or categories. They included ATIS "Publications," "Bulletins," "Inventories," "Interrogation Spot Reports," "Current Translations," "Enemy Publications," "Interrogation Reports," "Research Reports," "Philippine Series Bulletins," and "Philippine Series Translations."
ATIS average monthly production was as follows:
Nov 1942 Sept 1945 Documents received, examined, and listed 1,000 33,500 Documents translated 750 19,000 Documents printed and published 0 17,000
23. CINCSWPA Radio No. 913 to WARCOS, 8 Jun 42, C/S GHQ, WD No. 101 (S).
24. CINCSWPA Radio No. 248 to WARCOS, 24 Jun 42, C/S GHQ, WD No. 118 (S).
25. JCS Radio to CINCPAC, CINCSWPA and COMSOPAC, 2 Jul 42, C/S SOPAC No. 33 (S).
26. CINCSWPA Radio to WARCOS, 27 Jun 42, C/S GHQ, WD No. 121 (S). Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions May 1942-August 1942, p. 256.
27. General MacArthur pointed out that Japanese policy was to maintain front-line air elements at peak efficiency by constantly bringing in their ablest pilots developed in 2nd and 3rd line echelons. This was one of the reasons why the Japanese air force had consistently made such a good showing since the beginning of the war. General MacArthur, therefore, firmly opposed any exchange plan which would replace his experienced pilots with partially trained personnel, thus using the Southwest Pacific Area as an indoctrination school and training ground. Such a plan, he insisted, would only result in pitting inexperienced personnel against the best that Japan had to offer. The only outcome would be heavy losses in personnel and equipment by the American air forces. CINCSWPA Radio to WARCOS, 27 Jun 42, 321 AC Personnel, AG, GHQ, (S).
28. GHQ, SWPA, Opn Instr No. 14, 26 Jul 42, G-3 Admin 370 (S).
29. "This was the type of strategy we hated most," said Lt. Col. Matsuichi Iino, Senior Intelligence Officer, Eighth Area Army Staff. "The Americans, with minimum losses, attacked and seized a relatively weak area, constructed airfields and then proceeded to cut the supply lines to troops in that area. Without engaging in a large scale operation, our strong points were gradually starved out. The Japanese Army preferred direct assault, after the German fashion, but the Americans flowed into our weaker points and submerged us, just as water seeks the weakest entry to sink a ship.... We respected this type of strategy for its brilliance because it gained the most while losing the least."
Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
30. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-7 to WARCOS, 2 Jul 42, AG, GHQ 332 No. 2.
31. CINCSWPA Radio No. Q-147 to WARCOS, 2 Aug 42, C/S GHQ, WD No. 173 (S).
32. General Hyakutake, Commander of the Seventeenth Army, was notified of the cancellation of this offensive on 14 June while in Manila. At the same time, he was informed that Imperial General Headquarters desired a land offensive against Port Moresby. Accordingly, he ordered Lt. Gen. Tomitaro Horii, Commander of the South Seas (Nankai) Detachment, at Rabaul to make the required preparations for such an assault. Initial units left Rabaul on 20 July bound for Basabua, 6 miles northwest of Buna, to make a reconnaissance in force. The detailed composition of the Japanese task force may be found in ATIS, GHQ, SWPA, Current Translations No. 5, 3 Dec 42, pp. 58-59.
33. GHQ, SWPA, Opn Instr No. 14, 26 Jul 42, G-3 Admin 370 (S).
34. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence No. 112, 13 Jul 42.
35. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-382 to WARCOS, 30 Aug 42, C/S GHQ, WD No. 215 (S).
36. Captured Japanese documents reveal that the Japanese on these barges had intended to land at Taupota, cross the Stirling Range, and attack Milne Bay from the rear in conjunction with the amphibious assault. The barges landed at Goodenough Island at 1130 on 25 August, intending to set sail for Taupota. At about 1230, ten fighters (RAAF) made a slashing attack which sunk all the barges and left over fifty casualties among the helpless Japanese. Their mission had resulted in complete failure. ATIS, GHQ, SWPA, Current Translations No. 14, 18 Jan 43, pp. 3-4.
37. The difference between Allied and Japanese staff work was clearly demonstrated by the fighting at Milne Bay, as related by Comdr. Minoru Yano, IJN, Commanding Officer of the Kure 3rd Special Landing Party (SLP) and the senior Japanese officer at Milne Bay when the original task force commander, Comdr. Masajiro Hayashi, was killed. A substantial part of the Japanese troops used at Milne Bay was at Kavieng when the first Japanese landing took place. These troops were the 3rd Kure SLP, which had been formed at Kure in January 1942 for the purpose of invading Port Moresby. After the Battle of the Coral Sea these troops were sent back to Kavieng, where they stayed until sent to Milne Bay. When the Japanese troops who landed at Milne Bay on 25 August ran into totally unexpected opposition, the 3rd Kure SLP was sent to Milne Bay without the slightest intelligence about either the opposition, terrain, or climate. The Commanding Officer of the 3rd Kure SLP declared that when his unit was sent, it was supposed to get information which should have been known beforehand for a successful invasion. When the 3rd Kure SLP landed, the men were to attack immediately but they were too tired so the attack was postponed until 30 August. There was need for reconnaissance but no one was able to carry it out. The Japanese nevertheless proceeded with their operation, completely unaware of Allied ground strength at Milne Bay. Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. This account is in keeping with General MacArthur's early analysis of the victory at Milne Bay in which he pointed out that "the decisive factor was the complete surprise obtained over him [the enemy] by our preliminary concentration of superior forces." CINCSWPA Radio to C/S WD, 6 Sep 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
38. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 140, 31 Aug 42.
39. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 151, 10 Sep 42.
40. ATIS, GHQ, SWPA, Current Translations No. 2, "Message of Instruction to South Seas Detachment," 20 Sep 42.
41. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-381 to WARCOS, 30 Aug 42, C/S WD No. 216 (S).
1. CINCSWPA Radio to C/S WD, 6 Sep 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
33. CINCSWPA Ltr to CG, I Army Corps, 4 Sep 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
4. The U.S. 32nd and 41st Divisions, the 147th Field Artillery, and the 1st Battalion of the 148th were assigned to I Corps. General Order No. 30, 5 Sep 42, GHQ, SWPA Special File No. 3, Folder 4 (S).
5. CINCSWPA Ltr to PM Curtin, 28 Sep 42, C/S Aust 161.
6. MID, WD, Papuan Campaign, The Buna-Sanananda Operation, p. 4
7. Ibid., p. 20.
8. During 1942, only fifteen percent of all Allied military resources were channelled into the war against Japan. This pitifully small allotment had to be parcelled out to the Southeast Asia Command, China, and to the North, Central, South, and Southwest Pacific areas.
In September 1942, General MacArthur requested enlisted filler and loss replacements at a rate of 3,500 a month for the succeeding six months. This amount was necessary in order to bring his units to table of organization strength, provide for estimated losses other than battle casualties, and establish a replacement pool equal to ten percent of unit strength. The African invasion preparations, however, hungry for manpower, swallowed the entire output of the replacement training centers in the United States during the months of September, October, and November. It was not until the end of January 1943 that troops could be spared for shipment to Australia.
9. The extreme difficulties encountered in supplying Allied forces in New Guinea are well illustrated by the ingenious means employed by the Australian 7th Division in supporting its units just prior to their drive across the Owen Stanleys. Shipments were loaded on six 3-ton trucks, and transported from Port Moresby to the roadhead at Koitaki. A transfer was then made to ten 1/4-ton jeeps and carried to Owers Corner, a distance of only three miles. Here another transfer was made and the supplies, distributed on 60 pack animals and 1,000 native carriers, were moved over steep, treacherous trails to Uberi, three miles on, and thence by porters to the front line units. These 16 motor vehicles, 60 animals, and 1,000 porters, delivering at maximum capacity over a comparatively short line of supply, were still insufficient to move enough materiel to support a force of 3,500 troops. G-2, GHQ, Gen. Willoughby Pers, Circ 22 Sept 42 (S).
10. Establishment of Combined Operational Service Command in New Guinea, 5 Oct 42, GHQ, SWPA, AGO 323.36.
11. OCE, GHQ, AFPAC, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945, Vol VII, "Engineer Supply," p. 55.
12. GHQ, SWPA Opn Instr No. 19, 1 Oct 42, G-3 Admin 370 (S).
13. GHQ, SWPA, Communiques Nos. 171 and 172, 30 Sep 42 and 1 Oct 42.
14. In September General Horii, Commander South Seas Detachment, after receiving orders from the Army Commander to assemble his main force near Isurava and Kokoda, redistributed his troops. On 25 September the detachment withdrew from Ioribaiwa and an element of the unit, the Stanley Detachment consisting of the 3rd Battalion of 144th Infantry as its main force, was posted in commanding positions in the area of The Gap. As the Stanley Detachment had been under attack since the early part of October, the main force of the South Seas Detachment had been sent forward from Kokoda to give it assistance. The enemy continued to send more units to the scene of battle. Allied air attacks on his supply routes, however, in addition to heavy rains which made overland transportation impossible for the Japanese, left the Stanley Detachment without the means to carry on. On 28 October it retreated to Kokoda. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol I, p. 14, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
15. CINCSWPA Radio No. XC853 to General Blamey, 14 Oct 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
16. CINCSWPA Radio to C/S WD, 27 Sep 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
17. WARCOS Radio No. 2283 to CINCSWPA, 30 Sep 42, WD No. 245 C/S GHQ (S).
18. The movement would have been long delayed except for General MacArthur's foresight and advance planning. Early in October he had directed an aerial engineer reconnaissance of the Pongani area to select small boat landing points for a move along the northeast coast of Papua by sea and to determine possible beachhead lines and inshore routes north to Buna. CINCSWPA Radio No. XC731 to Matthews, 3 Oct 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
19. Adv LHQ Report, "Operations, Goodenough Island, 22-26 October 1942," 23 Nov 42, AG, GHQ 370.2. (S).
20. CINCSWPA Ltr to General Blamey, 10 Dec 42, ALF No. 43, C/S GHQ (S).
21. CINCSWPA Radio to SECWAR, 18 Oct 42, C/S GHQ WD 257 (S).
22. An example of the effect of General MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea on Japanese operations in Guadalcanal is shown by a statement of Colonel Kazuyoshi Obata, Supply Staff Officer of the Japanese Eighteenth Army: "Due to the Allied advance in New Guinea, engineer, air, and anti-aircraft units meant for Guadalcanal were deployed to New Guinea. At this time also submarines and sea trucks were bringing supplies to New Guinea instead of Guadalcanal as it was impossible to use them there. One example of a unit deployed to New Guinea that was meant for Guadalcanal was the 51st Division." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
23. CINCSWPA Radio No. C731 to WARCOS, 17 Oct 42, WD No. 255 C/S GHQ (S).
24. The effectiveness of these "coast watcher" parties is well illustrated by the results during the first days of the Allied landings. Four hours after United States forces launched their attack on Guadalcanal, AIB agents warned that twenty-four enemy torpedo bombers were speeding to counterattack. The bombers arrived and were met by Allied fighter planes in position. Only one enemy plane escaped. Early the next morning, the AIB agent at Buka Passage reported forty-five Japanese bombers and fighters heading southeast. Within thirty minutes preparations were underway at Tulagi to intercept the expected attack. The same afternoon the AIB agent at Buin reported more aircraft. Again the American fighters met them and again the intended blow was smashed. An enemy attack the next day met disaster in like manner. Crippled by losses in the air, the enemy was unable to mount another strike for several days, giving the Allied forces precious time in which to consolidate their beachhead gains. In the afternoon of 20 August, the first Grumman "Wildcats" flew into Henderson Field. The following day, warned by "coast watchers" that Japanese planes were on the way, they soared aloft, intercepted at the most favorable altitude, and shot down a number of enemy craft. The same routine was carried out the following day with equally satisfactory results. Thereafter, almost daily for a month, forewarned "Wildcats" intercepted the oncoming enemy, shooting them out of the sky in large numbers. Eric Feldt, The Coast Watchers (New York, 1946), pp. 58-103.
25. Ibid. See also: G-2, GHQ, FEC, Intelligence Series, Vol. IV, Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA.
26. Adm. Ernest J. KING, Our Navy at War, A Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 27 Mar 44, pp. 35-36.
27 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
28. The correctness of General MacArthur's assumption is demonstrated by a message which Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi, Commander of the Japanese Eighteenth Army in New Guinea, gave to his troops on 26 November 1942: "The East New Guinea and Solomon Island areas are very important not only for the immediate protection of the important southern areas, which we occupied at the beginning of the Great East Asia War, but also for the security and defense of Japan Proper. Therefore, it is necessary for us to occupy these areas as the first line. Furthermore, these are the most strategic areas, and the absolute control of them as offensive bases is necessary in order to cut the communication line between the United States and Australia and thus disrupt the enemy's plans. For this very reason, the United States and Britain ... have been making a serious full-scale counteroffensive for the past four months in order to recapture these bases.... The area of operations in which we are participating [New Guinea] is as extremely important as that of the Solomons Islands. In view of the situation of the whole war, the first objective of our army is to secure the strongholds in East New Guinea." ATIS, GHQ, SWPA, Current Translations No. 13, Spot Report No. 45.
29. To cope with the imminent threat to their holdings, Imperial General Headquarters on 16 November 1942 had established the Eighth Area Army under which defense of each geographical region was entrusted to a separate army. The new Eighteenth Army was to take over all operations in New Guinea while the Seventeenth Army was directed to concentrate its resources entirely on combating the Allied attack in the Solomons. At the same time plans were made to increase their air power and augment the shipment of troops and supplies to the Southwest Pacific Area. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol I, pp. 16-18, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
30. The Australian 7th Division was to strike from Kokoda, one part of the United States 32nd Division from Kinjaki, and the other part from Pongani. The date was dependent upon developments in the Solomons struggle and upon the speed with which supplies could be placed behind each column of advance. Memo AC/S G-3, 3 Nov 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal. (S).
31. This frontal attack and double envelopment by the Australian 16th and 25th Brigades is described in the official Japanese war records as follows: "Since the latter part of October, the main force of the South Seas Detachment occupied positions in the Oivi Sector (southeast of Kokoda) and resisted enemy attacks. The enemy not only came in contact with our defensive lines but also cut off our retreating route north of Ilimor and occupied Ilimor Hamlet. This disrupted the line of communications between the frontal and reserve units of the South Seas Detachment. The commander of the Detachment decided to retreat to the right of the Kumusi River, and on 10 November the Detachment left the battlefield for Papaki." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol I, pp. 14-15, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
32. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 214, 12 Nov 42.
33. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 216,14 Nov 42.
34. New Guinea Force, Opn Instr No. 42, 14 Nov 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
35. Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, Dec 1, 1942-Jan 25, 1943, pp. 2-9.
36. The 126th Infantry at Pongani, Bofu, and Natunga moved forward on Embogu and Inonde. The 128th Infantry at Embogu, Eroro, and Embi advanced on Cape Sudest and Dobodura. New Guinea Force, Situation Report 280-281, 17 Nov 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal.
37. The "Old Strip" at Buna, for example, which was enlarged by the Japanese to 1300 x 90 yards and protected by blast bays, was a valuable military asset for either side. If the Japanese could defend and secure Buna, the "Old Strip" would provide a base from which they could attack nearby Allied installations with fighter cover. Conversely, if it were in the hands of the Allies, it would give them an air base unhampered by the limitations of the Port Moresby bases, which were subject to the hazards of the Owen Stanleys and their unpredictable weather. Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, Dec 1, 1942-Jan 25, 1943, p. 3.
38. The occupation of the limited dry areas was a great advantage to the enemy when the weather in the Buna area is considered. During the closing stages of the Papuan Campaign, eight inches of rain were recorded on one day (11 January 1943) in the Buna area. Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, Dec 1, 1942-Jan 25, 1943, p. 5. The heavy rains may be cited as an example of climatic conditions which constantly hampered combat operations and which were utterly foreign to the experience of all troops entering the New Guinea combat areas. The mean annual rainfall in the Buna area, for example, is about 120 inches with an average of 163 rain days a year; even these figures are exceeded by those of several other key points in New Guinea. AGS, GHQ, SWPA, Terrain Study No. 27, Buna and Plains of Northern Division, pp. 23-25. The heavy rainfall of New Guinea can best be appreciated by a comparison with the United States where about 40 percent of the land area receives less than 20 inches of rain annually, about 35 percent receives from 20 to 40 inches a year, and 25 percent receives from 40 to 60 inches a year.
39. General MacArthur's reliance upon air transport for the conduct of operations is shown in his radio of 24 November: "My campaign in northern Papua is being supported and supplied entirely by air; in view of enemy reinforcement and increased resistance the situation of my air transport is serious. Do not feel I should call for assistance upon SOPAC, which is also hard pressed; believe assistance should be supplied from theaters not engaged in active operations; request two groups each of 3 troop carrier squadrons be dispatched here as soon as possible; advise if this can be done." CINCSWPA Radio No. P-289 to WARCOS, 24 Nov 42, WD No. 296, C/S GHQ (S).
40. ALF Operations Report No. 222, 19 Nov 42, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal.
41. Attacks by enemy planes on 16-17 November put this seaborne supply line out of operation for about three weeks. MID, WD, Papuan Campaign, The Buna-Sanananda Operation, p. 22.
42. Disease riddled the Allied ranks throughout the entire New Guinea campaign. In the Buna operation, for example, the total number of casualties of all kinds in the U.S. 32nd Division was 10,960. Of this total, 8,286 were disease casualties, 5,358 of them caused by fever, principally malaria. Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, Dec 1, 1942-Jan 25, 1943, p. 105. The same story is told by an Australian report: "The sickness rate at least doubled the battle casualties, proving that, in some respects, the country was an enemy as formidable as...the Japanese. In this phase of the first New Guinea campaign, of every nine men put out of action, three were battle casualties-one killed; two wounded-and six were sickness casualties. Any reserve force was, therefore, suffering two-thirds the wastage of manpower of those engaged in actual battle." The Jap was Thrashed, An Official Story of the Australian Soldier, (Director General of Public Relations, Melbourne), p. 85.
43. The casualty rates for the Japanese forces in New Guinea also present a grim picture. The Papuan Campaign destroyed the myth, born during the Malayan operation, that the Japanese were unbeatable jungle fighters. Referring to New Guinea, a Japanese Army report stated: "Epidemics are numerous and the climate is bad.... The large number of patients is caused by malaria, diarrhea, skin disease, beri-beri, and malnutrition.... It is preferable to replace personnel at least every five or six months.... In the first month and a half, malaria manifested itself and by the end of the second month and a half the strength of the active force engaging in
the operations decreased to half. After three and a half months the strength had decreased to a third, and by the fifth and sixth months, the fraction of men physically fit became less than a seventh...." Imperial Japanese Headquarters, Army Section, Lessons from Actual Experiences in Eastern New Guinea Operations, July 1942-April 1943, published 18 Jan 42 as Enemy Publication No. 285, ATIS, GHQ, SWPA.
44. General Blamey Ltr to CINCSWPA, 26 Nov 42, ALF No. 32, C/S GHQ, SWPA (S).
45. Vice Adm. Arthur S. Carpender, COMSOWESPACFOR reported: "I do not favor sending destroyers north of Milne Bay for protection of small ships proceeding to Buna via Ward Hunt Strait and Cape Nelson, and strongly recommend against their being so employed. The area involved is poorly surveyed and charts unreliable. Shallow draft vessels [only] can proceed via coastal routes from Cape Nelson-this entire area is filled with reefs to such an extent that there is little or no sea room available for destroyers to maneuver. On the other hand, via the northern approach route, from Gasmata, the enemy can readily move destroyers and cruisers via deep water areas against the Buna area. To put a minor surface force to the Buna area would be of no value against a heavy force which the enemy might easily send in." COMSOWESPACFOR indorsement, 10 Nov 42, to Comdr ALF Ltr to CINCSWPA, 7 Nov 42, ANF No. 5, C/S GHQ, (S).
46. Col. Clarence A. Martin became the commander of Warren Force and Col. John E. Grose, of Urbana Force. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, took over the lines on the Sinemi-Buna trail south of the bridge; the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry occupied the Plantation position; the 3rd Battalion 128th Infantry went into reserve on the coast behind the right flank. MID, WD, Papuan Campaign, The Buna-Sanananda Operation, p. 37.
47. The Division Commander, General Waldron, was wounded during the attack of 5 December and was replaced by Brig. Gen. Clovis E. Byers.
48. Brig. Wootten of the Australian 18th Brigade, took over command of Warren Force upon his arrival on 14 December.
49. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 247, 15 Dec 42. The conclusion in this report was later confirmed from Japanese sources. Two Japanese landing forces had each made two attempts to bring aid to their besieged comrades in Papua. This second landing force was composed of the 25th Field Machine Gun Company and the 1st Battalion (less two companies), the 9th Company, and the Regimental Gun Company of the 170th Infantry. It was also accompanied by personnel from all sections of Eighteenth Army Headquarters including Staff Officer Col. Aotsu. On its first attempt the landing party was scheduled to land at Gona on 8 December but was so pounded by Allied planes that it was forced to return to Rabaul. It left again on 12 December in another largely unsuccessful effort to bring in reinforcements. The elements that succeeded to escaping Allied bombs landed about forty miles to the north of Gona, too distant and too late to render effective assistance. Gona had fallen to the Allies on 9 December, one day after the original landing force of enemy reinforcements was scheduled to arrive. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol 1, pp. 25-28. G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
50. When the Triangle was finally evacuated by the enemy and occupied by units of the 32nd Division on 28 December, it was found to be honeycombed with no less than 18 bunkers. These defensive strongholds were powerfully fortified, mutually supported by connecting trenches and almost impervious to artillery bombardment. MID, WD, Papuan Campaign, The Buna-Sanananda Operation, p. 57.
51. As the Papuan campaign came to a close, the Japanese made several desperate attempts to aid their sorely pressed force at Buna, but their efforts to land reinforcements at Lae for transfer south were repeatedly thwarted by the alert Allied Air Forces. The forced march of a hastily assembled rescue force from Gona and Giruwa failed to arrive in time to be of any effect. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol I, pp. 27-29. G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
52. Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, Dec 1, 1942-Jan 23, 1943, p. 36.
53. SECWAR Ltr to CINCSWPA, 6 Jan 43, WD No. 328, C/S GHQ (S). Prime Minister Curtin also expressed his gratitude in a letter of commendation dated 11 January 1943 which General MacArthur published to his troops: "Dear General MacArthur: The Order of the Day issued by you at the concluding stage of operations in South-Eastern New Guinea marks a notable historic stage of the war in the Pacific.... I would express to you, your commanders and all ranks of Australian and American Forces, the thanks and admiration of the Australian people and the Government for their magnificent services. The campaign has been fought under most trying conditions in one of the most difficult regions in the world. The forces under your command have not only overcome these immense natural difficulties but have decisively defeated a tenacious and stubborn foe. The campaign has been a demonstration of comradeship in arms and cooperation between the forces of the United States and Australia which I am sure will continue until the common foe is totally defeated." GHQ General Order No. 6, 13 Jan 42, AG, GHQ, SWPA No. 430113.
54. This block, established on 30 November, became known as "Huggins Block" after Captain Huggins who commanded the United States group which held it under ceaseless enemy attack until relieved by the Australian 39th Infantry Battalion on 22 December.
55. The Japanese defending Gona were under specific orders to fight to the bitter end. A bulletin of 19 November 1942 from the Commander of the Yazawa Unit at Gona Village read: "It is not permissable to retreat even a step from each unit's original defensive position. I demand that each man fight until the last. As previously instructed, those without firearms or sabers must be prepared to fight with sharp weapons such as knives or bayonets tied to sticks, or with clubs." ATIS, GHQ, SWPA, Current Translations, No. 15, p. 40.
56. CINCSWPA Radio to Gen. Blamey, 4 Jan 43, ALF No. 61, C/S GHQ, SWPA (S).
57. Alert handling and rapid interrogation of a captured Japanese soldier disclosed that a withdrawal had been ordered from the enemy's forward positions along the Soputa-Sanananda track. This valuable information enabled the Allies to catch the Japanese at a decided disadvantage as they were about to begin their evacuation. MID, WD, Papuan Campaign, The Buna-Sanananda Operation, pp. 73-74. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 298, 14/15 Jan 43.
58. The extreme plight of the enemy at this point is vividly described by Maj. Gen. Kensaku Oda, who had replaced General Horii as commander of the South Seas Detachment, in his report to the Chief of Staff, Eighteenth Army; "Enemy aircraft flying above all day and bombing and strafing everything in sight; entire enemy artillery in action and fire being concentrated on us.... Communications disrupted between our first line and central positions since yesterday. Strong enemy force has penetrated into our central positions. Coast also being battered by enemy gunfire. Fresh enemy force from Buna area very active. Our short supply line leading from the coast already on verge of collapse. Most of the men stricken with dysentery. Those not kept in bed with illness are without food and too weak for hand-to-hand fighting. As the days go by, starvation is taking many lives, and it is weakening the already extended lines. We are doomed...." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol I, pp. 29-30. G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
59. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 271, 8 Jan 43.
60. Enemy aircraft identified as lost or destroyed since 23 July, the opening date of the Papuan Campaign, were as follows: 333 destroyed, 89 probably destroyed, 117 damaged; total 539. Naval losses inflicted by Allied aircraft were as follows: sunk, destroyed, or seriously damaged: 6 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 1 destroyer tender, 2 seaplane tenders, 2 gunboats, 44 large to medium merchant ships, 39 small to medium merchant ships, 150-200 landing barges. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 271, 8 Jan 43.
61. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 24 Jan 43.
62. General MacArthur cited a number of officers for their conduct of the Papuan Campaign in his Order of the Day on 9 January 1943: "It is my high honor to cite to the Order of the Day, for extraordinary courage, marked efficiency and precise execution of operation during the Papuan Campaign, the following officers: General Sir Thomas Blamey; Lt. General Kenney; Lt. General Herring; Lt. General Eichelberger; Major General Sutherland; Major General Vasey; Brigadier General Willoughby; Brigadier General Whitehead; Brigadier General Walker; Brigadier Wootten; Brigadier Father; Group Captain Gating. The victory which has been achieved would have been impossible of accomplishment without the invincible leadership which they have provided. I have directed that each be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross of the United States, the highest decoration at my disposal, with appropriate individual citation. This award will serve for all time and for all eyes as the outward symbol of the devotion and gallantry with which they have performed their dangerous and difficult duty. The magnificent conduct of the troops and elements of this command, operating under difficulties rarely, if ever, surpassed in campaign, has earned my highest praise and commendation. In spite of inadequate means in many categories, their resourcefulness, their ingenuity, their adaptability, have produced a self-reliance that has overcome all handicaps and deficiencies. Through skill and courage and an indomitable will for victory they have defeated a bold and aggressive enemy possessing a marked superiority of resources and potentialities in the areas of campaign and combat.... To Almighty God I give thanks for that guidance which has brought us to this success in our great Crusade. His is the honor, the power and the glory forever, Amen." GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 9 Jan 43.
1. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 21 Sep 43.
2. Lt. Col. Masaru Shinohara, Senior Intelligence Officer of the Eighth Area Army, commenting on General MacArthur's tactics, said: "I believe that, more or less, all of the Allied operations depended on deception by landing in places where we thought a landing and the building of airfields impossible." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
3. In emphasizing the particular importance of New Guinea to their new defensive positions, the Japanese said "New Guinea especially, was the strategic point on the right flank of the defensive line, and if it should fall into the hands of the enemy, who had already secured firm operational bases in Australia and in one corner of the Solomon Islands, it would be a case of giving the enemy the best possible route to penetrate into the Philippines and any part of the South Co-Prosperity Sphere. This would be a great menace to the foundation of our general defense system. It was clear that the northern coastal area of New Guinea Island was of great importance to the enemy for his offensive bases and for conducting his operations, and also because of the difference in the terrain of the northern and southern areas of New Guinea. The strategic value of the Lae and Salamaua areas in the present stage of the operation was of immense importance." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol. I, p. 54, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
4. Ibid., pp. 54-56.
5. The main enemy force sent against Wau was the Okabe Detachment of the Japanese 51st Division. This unit, consisting of 7 infantry companies, 1 artillery battalion, and 1 engineer company, had assembled at Salamaua from Lae, and was ordered to begin its advance against Wau on 14 January. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol I, pp. 59, 65-67, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
6. "Although there had been some experience in reinforcement of ground troops by air previously, the risk calculated and assumed in this operation demonstrated that such employment of air transport provided a mature and potent weapon." Air Evaluation Board, SWPA, Air Transport Operations, Battle of Wau, 10 Jun 45, p. 2.
7. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, ELKTON II, 28 Feb 43, Obsolete Plans, G-3, GHQ Planning (S).
8. The Japanese Eighth Area Army, with headquarters at Rabaul, was commanded by Lt. Gen. Hiroshi Imamura and consisted of General Hyakutake's Seventeenth Army in the Solomons and Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi's Eighteenth Army in New Guinea and New Britain.
9. The 7th Amphibious Force was a component of the Seventh Fleet, which prior to 15 March 1943 had been designated Southwest Pacific Force.
10. CINCSWPA Ltr to ALF, AAF, ANF, 1st Mar Div, USASOS, SWP Amph F, S Feb 43 AG, GHQ, SWPA (S). An integrated, collateral feature of this amphibious training was the increasing development, for issue to staffs and troops of "Terrain Studies" and pocket size "Handbooks" of the landing areas and beaches of contemplated operations.
11. General MacArthur, having felt early the need for a United States Army in the Southwest Pacific Area, sent the following message to General Marshall: "Experience indicates the necessity for a tactical organization of an American Army. In the absence of such an echelon the burden has been carried by GHQ. I recommend the U.S. Third Army under General Krueger, which would provide an able commander and an efficient operating organization. I am especially anxious to have Krueger because of my long and intimate association with him." CINCSWPA Radio to C/S, WD, 11 Jan 43, WD No. 321, C/S GHQ (S); CINCSWPA Radio No. C-149 to C/S, WD, 16 Jan 43, WD No. 324, C/S GHQ (S). In response to General MacArthur's request, Headquarters Sixth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, arrived in the Southwest Pacific Area and all American combat units were assigned to it on 16 February 1943. GHQ General Order No. 17, 16 Feb 43, AG, GHQ No. 322 (S).
12. HQ USAFFE, General Order No. 1, 26 Feb 43, AG AAF 323.3 (S).
13. JCS Radio No.2407 to GHQ, SWPA, 29 May 43, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 30 May 43 (S).
14. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-4369 to WARCOS, 31 Jul 43, AG, GHQ 323.36 (S).
15. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 337, 22/23 Feb 43 stated the following: "Merchant shipping at Rabaul has reached a new high. Fifty-nine vessels of this type were in the harbor 22 February, totalling 299,000 tons. About 200,000 tons of merchant shipping appears normal for Rabaul. In view of the comparative inactivity in the Solomons, this increase over the normal assumes serious aspects, in relation to possible employment against New Guinea." The following was also reported: "Enemy interest in the Gasmata and Cape Gloucester bases at this time strengthens other indications of impending landing operations, possibly simultaneously, at Wewak, Madang and Lae. The airdromes at Cape Gloucester and Gasmata provide staging and refueling points for air cover over the Vitiaz Straits." G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 335, 20/21 Feb 43.
16. On 2 March, two destroyers of the convoy picked up the survivors of the sinking ship and carried them at forced draft to Lae. After disembarking the rescued troops, these two destroyers then returned to the scene of action on the morning of 3 March.
17. Referring to the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, Vice Adm. Gunichi Mikawa, Commander of the Japanese Eighth Fleet, said: "The percentage of hits of the American Air Force's low-level bombing was excellent. Our fleet mistook it for a torpedo attack and suitable evasive action was not taken." ATIS, GHQ, SWPA, Document No. 16269B, "Report on the Naval Battle of the Bismarck Sea," 10 Apr 46.
18. The ships sunk were the following: the transports Aiyo Maru, Kembu Maru, Kyokusei Maru, Oigawa Maru, Shinai Maru, Taimei Maru, Teiyo Maru, Nojima and the destroyers Shirayuki, Arashio, Asashio, and Tokitsukaze. The surviving destroyers Shikinami, Uranami, Asagumo and Yukikaze, carried the bulk of the rescued personnel to Rabaul. The details of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea are based on Japanese sources and all available documents and interrogations of the Fifth Air Force and ATIS, GHQ, FEC.
19. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol. I, p. 161, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
20. A fortuitous incident of major importance in the wake of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea brilliantly illustrated the value and efficiency of ATIS. A ship's captain, seeking refuge on Goodenough Island carried with him navigational charts, ship's records, and the Japanese Army List and Directory for 1942/43, a document of some 2700 pages containing the name and unit of every Japanese officer then in the service. Up to this time, information on Japanese Order of Battle and identification of tactical commands was based on outdated Chinese reports. It naturally was inconclusive for other Asiatic areas. The patrol which captured the ship's captain sent back the precious intelligence material to higher headquarters. The significance of the documents was immediately realized and all work in ATIS from the forward field units to the base detachment in Brisbane was completely devoted to the translation of this great find. With the newly discovered information, every Japanese unit in the field could be reconstructed, from company through division, corps, and army. The work was finished in a few weeks. The translated book (See Plate: Alphabetical List of Japanese Army Officers, ATIS Publication No. 2, May 43.) was printed by the Australian Government Printer on emergency order and distributed quickly to intelligence units from Alaska to India.
21. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 4 Mar 43.
22. Comdr. Yasumi Doi, member of the staff of the Southeast Area Fleet at Rabaul from 1943 to 1945, stated that after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea it was realized that control of the air was lost and, consequently, supplies to New Guinea were shipped by destroyer and submarine only. Finschhafen was thus supplied until captured by the Allies, but supplies in the New Guinea area were totally inadequate. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Vol. II, p. 397.
23. This final plan, ELKTON III (G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Planning File), superceding previous plans and directives, became the basic plan for 1943 operations on 26 April 43.
25. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-3107 to CG Army Service Forces, 12 Jun 43, C/S GHQ, WD No. 421 (S).
26. "We knew that the enemy was using scouting patrols sent in by submarines," said General Tanikawa, at that time Colonel on the Staff of the Eighth Area Army. "These patrols did a wonderful job in getting detailed information on supply, convoys and the like. Both the Americans and Australians sent in patrols.... Whenever our supply ships came into port, no matter where it was and regardless of foul weather, the enemy raiders would come to bombard these ships.... The only answer was these patrols." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
27. HQ Alamo Force, "History of Chronicle Operation," 23 Aug 43, AG, GHQ, 370.22 (S).
28. Referring to the New Georgia operations, Colonel Tanikawa, Staff Officer of the Eighth Area Army said: "We had estimated an Allied landing somewhere in the New Georgia group but did not anticipate a landing on Rendova on 30 June 1943. We rather expected them to land on Munda where we were ready for such an attack. Also, the time of the actual landing was about a month earlier than we had anticipated." Interrogation Files, G-2, Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
29. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary 4/5 Jul No. 469, 11/12 Jul No. 476 and 18/19 Jul No. 483, Appendix "A," Weekly Review of Enemy Activity.
30. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 9 Aug 43.
31. G-3, GHQ, SWPA Warning Instructions No. 2, 6 May 43, G-3, GHQ, Opns 370.5 (S).
32. In the final drive on Salamaua, 2,000 Japanese troops were killed and large quantities of material, provisions, and barges were lost in futile efforts to hold a comparatively useless position. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol. I, pp. 104-108, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. See also: The History of the Lae-Salamaua Garrison, GS (Int) Adv LHQ, SWPA, p. 7.
33. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol II, p. 27, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
34. The air attack on Wewak is described in the report of the Japanese First Demobilization Bureau as follows: "On 17 August 1943, Wewak airfield was attacked by a large formation of enemy bombers and fighters and the damage was great. In one attack, we lost more than 100 planes. Therefore, the seventh transport movement which was expected to arrive at Wewak on 25 August and its following transportation plans were postponed to the next month because of insufficient air escort which was caused by deterioration and frequent and continuous attacks by the enemy planes. Ever since 17 August a large convoy movement to New Guinea to increase shipping strength was expected, but the above described events affected this military operation to a large extent." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol I, p. 156, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
35. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 18 Aug 43.
36. HQ 1st Aust Corps, "Report on Operations of New Guinea Force and 1st Australian Corps in New Guinea from 22 Jan 43 to 8 Oct 43," 17 Jan 44.
37. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 5 Sep 43.
38. Colonel Shinohara, Intelligence Officer of the Eighth Area Army, commenting on the Nadzab operations, said: "We were retreating from the Salamaua area over the Finisterre Mountains toward Reiss Point when the Allied paratroopers landed at Nadzab which was one place where we thought the enemy would never attack. The remaining elements of the retreating 51st Division were virtually cut in half by this surprise pincer movement." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
39. The Allied landing at Finschhafen came at a timely moment. The Japanese, confused by the simultaneous Allied actions in New Guinea, had started to transfer their 20th Division from Madang in order to protect Finschhafen. The Allies caught the unit in the middle of its coastwise movement and the Japanese were forced into an insufficiently prepared defensive struggle. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol. I, p. 135, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
40. G-3 Memo of Record, xo Sep 43, G-3, GHQ, SWPAJournal (S).
41. "The first real surprise maneuver, after I had arrived in Rabaul, occurred when the enemy landed on Cape Torokina on western Bougainville, during the latter part of 1943," said Lt. Col. Matsuichi Iino. "Because we thought the poor topographical features of this area would hamper enemy landing operations, we did not anticipate a direct landing here and consequently were nor adequately prepared. This Allied operation proved very annoying in that we could not launch an immediate counterthrust in this area because of the poor network of roads. We knew an airstrip was being constructed but we were helpless." Interrogation Files, G-z Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
42. CG Alamo Force Ltr to CINCSWPA, 28 Sep 43, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal.
43. G-3 Memo to C(S, 26 Oct 43, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal.
44. G-3 Memo to CINCSWPA, 21 Nov 43, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal. GHQ, SWPA, Opn Instr No. 38/x5, 22 Nov 43, G-3, GHQ Admin 370 (S).
45. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary Nos. 590, 591, 593, 597, 599, 605 and 607, Nov 43.
46. Air opposition to the New Britain operations was anticipated primarily from Rabaul. It was almost certain that the Japanese fighters and bombers would fly a direct route from Rabaul to the invasion points in order to attack Allied forces in the act of landing. Therefore, the Allied Intelligence Bureau established a chain of air watcher radio stations across the neck of the Gazelle Peninsula while other AIB agents took up assigned positions at Wide Bay, Open Bay, Gasmata, and Cape Orford. Pre-operational reconnaissance parties were also inserted on Rooke Island in the Vitiaz Straits to cover enemy flights originating from New Guinea. Eric Feldt, The Coast Watchers (New York, 1946), p. 218.
47. G-z, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 634, 16/17 Dec 43.
48. According to plan, Fighter Command Headquarters (Nadzab) received warnings of all approaching enemy formations directly from the coast watchers previously located on New Britain. On each message from the AIB operatives, Allied fighters took to the air and intercepted the raiders.
49. Again AIB agents gave warning of oncoming formations thirty to sixty minutes in advance, enabling Allied fighters to meet the enemy at the most advantageous altitude. Four raids were intercepted over the beaches the first day with disproportionate losses to the enemy. On z6-z7 December in two missions of 70 to go fighters and bombers, the enemy lost over 75 planes as compared with 5 of the Allies. It was estimated that over 180 enemy planes were destroyed from 23-27 December. G-2, GHQ, SWPA Daily Summary No. 644, 26/27 Dec 43.
50. GHQ, SWPA, Opn Instr No. 38/19, 31 Dec 43, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Admin 370 (S)
51. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 633, 3 Jan 44
52. The Allied amphibious operation at Saidor split the Japanese Eighteenth Army. The landing constituted a wedge which isolated the main force of the Japanese 10th and 51st Divisions, approximately 15,000-20,000 troops, from the operating base of the Army at Madang. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol. II, pp. 167-8.
53. HQ Michaelmas Task Force, 'Report of Michaelmas Operation," 8 Mar 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, to Feb 44 (S)
54. United States Strategic bombing Survey, The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul. P. 24
1. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-1217 to WARCOS, 2 Feb 44, WD CIS, JCS and CCS Papers No. 2, G-3, GHQ Exec Files (S).
2. Lt. Gen. Ryozo Sakuma, who became Chief of Staff of the Secund Area Army in December 1944, expressed his opinion concerning General MacArthur's tactics in the following words: "I think that they were excellent tactics. I say this without prejudice. If any other plans had been used, the Americans would have had a very difficult time.... What the Americans did, as a whole, in the entire operation was... When General MacArthur retreated from our advance in the Philippines, he was not relieved as. Commander-in-Chief of the area... . The fact that General MacArthur was kept at his post made it possible for him to conduct this campaign of retaking the Philippines as he saw best." Interrogations Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
3. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 677, 16 Feb 44.
4. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 702, 23 Feb 44.
5. Typical of air reconnaissance reports are the following: "Momote and Lorengau strips appeared unserviceable. Nil activity. Nil new aircraft. Nil unusual signs of activity in entire Admiralty Islands." GHQ, SWPA, Situation Report No. 54/44, 23 Feb 44. "Aircraft flew low but nil A/A fire encountered. Nil signs of enemy activity. The island [Lorengau] appears deserted." Ibid., No. 55/44 24 Feb 44. "No signs of enemy activity on Manus and Los Negros Islands. All crews claim these islands have been evacuated. Grass growing thickly on Momote and Lorengau strips. Runways unserviceable, and badly pitted. No A/A fire, even at low altitude. (The B-25's flew over Momote strip at 20 feet)." Ibid., No. 56/44, 25 Feb 44. "Both Lorengau and Momote strips are unserviceable. The wrecked aircraft and trucks on Momote are untouched and bomb craters still unfilled. Villages on Los Negros Island appeared deserted and'roads have not been used lately. Damage in Lorengau t0w.n has not been repaired. No activity of any kind observed." Ibid., No. 57/44, 26 Feb 44.
6. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 706, 26/27 Feb 44. AIB operatives had picked up natives from the Admiralties and had pieced together a fairly accurate picture.
7. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 695, 15/16 Feb 4 contained the following precise listing of enemy units, almost two weeks in advance of the actual landing; compare these data with the negative reports of flight reconnaissance on 23-25 February. (See footnote 5 supra).
Admiralty Islands I. Mobile Combat Base Defense Service Total El 17th Div 1/44 1000 1000 I Bn 1st Mixed Regt 1/44 600? 600 El 38th Div 1/44 300 300 Oita S. Sea Det 1/44 300? 300 U/i AA ? 200 200 51st Tpt 4/43 800 800 El 51st Div Fd Hosp 1/44 50 50 2200 200 850 3250
8. Ibid., No. 704, 24/25 Feb 4.
9. Ibid., No. 706, 26/27 Feb 4. Several days previously G-2 had also reported on the Admiralties: "A situation similar to Madang is encountered here in that no enemy activity is apparent. This is regarded as a case of passive antiaircraft defense necessitated by dwindling reserve ammunition. Other intelligence indicates that the enemy plans to defend the Admiralties with the forces at present located there." Ibid., No. 704, 24/25 Feb 4.
10. This is an interesting example of clandestine operations, in conjunction with operatives of the AIB, a theater unit, under the operational control of G-2.
11. Historical Division, War Department, The Admiralties, Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division (29 February-18 May 1944) p. 31. Hereinafter cited as: The Admiralties.
12. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 691, 1 Mar 44.
13. A desperate night counterattack of this kind had been forecast as one of the enemy's capabilities in the G-2 Daily Summary of 28/29 February 1944, viz: "Enemy capabilities are a) surreptitious withdrawal from the Admiralties via small craft, b) typical desperate counter-attack, probably at night."
14. The Admiralties, p. 47.
15. Ibid., p. 148.
16. CINCSWPA Radio C-2473 to CIS WD, 5 Mar 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
17. JCS Radio to CINCPOA and CINCSWPA, 10 Mar 44, JCS and CCS Papers No. 2, G-3, GHQ, Exec Files.
18. HQ Sixth Army, Field Order No. 12,23 Mar 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 8 Apr 44.
19. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 726, 5 Apr 44. The Japanese described the effect of the Allied raids in their official report: "From the end of March, the enemy air attacks gradually intensified. Our air power was rapidly diminished as a result of the enemy attacks on 30-31 March and 3 April. The rise and fall of the fighting power of our fighter units exerted a decisive influence upon the future operations in the New Guinea Area. It also played a decisive role in the supply of the areas east of Hollandia and the operation of the bases in Western New Guinea." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol III, p. 36.
20. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 735, 26 Mar 44 and No. 740, 31 Mar 44.
21. The effectiveness of these deceptive measures was clearly proved by later evidence. As late as 21 April, one day before the Allied landings at Hollandia and Aitape, the Japanese estimated enemy intentions as follows: "The signs of an enemy plan to make a new landing in the New Guinea area... are clear. The probability of a landing between Madang and Hansa or on the Karkar Islands is estimated to be greatest.
"According to the general situation a landing in the Wewak sector is next in probability. In the light of the recent bombings of Hansa, of reconnaissance and naval bombardment of Wewak, and the dropping of pamphlets by the enemy stating that he would land on Wewak on 24 April, precautions must be taken in the Wewak sector.
"It is also possible that the enemy will land in the Hollandia sector. ... However, since there was no reconnaissance carried out in this region by submarines, destroyers or other means, and since air attacks were of a purely destructive nature, no signs of the usual pre-landing operations are discernible. Furthermore, the enemy has no air base at present from which to neutralize our airdromes west of Sarmi. Therefore, the probability of a landing in this sector is thought to be minor... ."
Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol III, p. 39.
22. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 730, 21/22 Mar 44, and No. 761, 21/22 Apr 44.
23. The importance of the time element as a decisive factor in the Hollandia invasion is emphasized in the following statements by Japanese commanders who served in western New Guinea. "The Allied invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was a complete surprise to us," said Lt. Gen. Jo Iimura, Commander of the Second Area Army. "Although, after considering the past operational tactits of the enemy, we were confident that the Allies would eventually attack Hollandia, we rather believed they would attempt to acquire an important position somewhere east of Aitape, prior to an invasion of either Aitape or Hollandia. Because we misjudged the time of the Allied invasion on Hollandia and Aitape, we were neither able to reinforce nor send war supplies to their defending units." According to Lt. Col. Nobuo Kitamori, Staff Officer of the Second Area Army, the attack on Hollandia "was not a complete surprise in that we expected the enemy to come some time or other because it was such an important place. However, we did not think that the attack would come when it did. The morning that we found out that the Allies were going to come to Hollandia, they were already in the harbor with their transports and battleships. In that sense it certainly was a surprise." Colonel Kazuo Horiba, Staff Officer of the Southern Army, offered the following opinion: "It was a surprise attack as far as operations go, but not so strategically. We had planned on the fact the enemy was coming, but it was a surprise when the enemy came when he did, far before the time we expected and our defense preparations were not completed." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
24. HQ Sixth Army, Report of the Hollandia-Aitape Operation, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 25 Aug 44.
25. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 745, 24 Apr 44.
26. According to the Japanese official report on the war, there were approximately 14,600 personnel in the Hollandia Area: 6,600 Eighteenth Army; 7,000 Fourth Air Army; 1,000 Navy. About go percent of these troops were rear area service units including 1,000 hospital patients. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol III, pp. 47-49.
27. "The Allied seizure of Hollandia indicated the battle of New Guinea was rapidly drawing to a close," said Colonel Kitamori. "We knew that it would only be a matter of time before the Allies would control the air and the waters of New Guinea, thus paving the way for their expected counterlanding on the shores of the Philippines. Its seizure only indicated that defensive preparations in the Philippines would have to be accelerated, and to facilitate this our troops were to stall the enemy in northwestern New Guinea, as well as in the Halmahera group, as long as possible.
"From the relationship of supplies, the seizure of Hollandia meant that heavy sea transportation could not be effected in the surrounding waters of New Guinea, with the possible exception of Wasile, on the mouth of Kau Bay in Halmahera, and to Amboina, on Amboina Island. However, a little while later, the waters between the Philippines and the Halmnheras were infested with Allied aircraft and warships, whith necessitated heavy sea transportation to be routed directly to Amboina by way of Java. From here, small craft carrying considerably less load than a 3,000 or 5,000-ton ship would be able to carry, made their way to the Halmaheras and into the McCluer Gulf, from where supplies were to be sent to Manokwari and the Sarmi areas, although most of these attempts ended in failure because of enemy PT boat activities, the rugged terrain of the countryside, and our own lack of shipping." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
28. Joint Staff Planners Report No. 71315 to JCS, 17 Mar eq, G-3, GHQ, Exec JCS and CCS Papers (S).
30. CINCSWPA Radio to C/S GHQ, SWPA, 22 Apr 44, 385 Plan 10/11, G-3, GHQ, Admin (TS).
31. CINCSWPA Radio No. CA-11199 to C/S WD, 29 Apr 44, 385 Plan 10/13 , G-3, GHQ, Admin (TS).
32. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 786, 16/17 May 44.
33. HQ Sixth Army, Report on the Wakde-Biak Operation, 17 May-2 Sep 44, 25 Feb 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal.
35. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 780, 28 May 44.
36. HQ I Corps, History of the Biak Operation 15-27 June 1944, p. 2.
37. According to Colonel Kitamori, a plan had been formed immediately after the Allied landing on Biak to regain that important area, utilizing Army-Navy co-operation for the first time in the western New Guinea area. The plan called for a strong naval task force, led by the battleship Musashi and composed of six cruisers and destroyers loaded to the brim with reinforcements, to make a landing behind the Allied positions. "I personally ordered this unit to be sent to Biak." said Col. Kazuo Horiba, former Senior Operations Officer, Second Area Army. "It was the 2nd Amphibious Brigade fresh from Japan. The Fleet got to the Sorong area but could not reach Biak because of the presence of enemy air and naval power, and it had to land at Sorong." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
38. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 44; 41 Div, Addenda to "41st Infantry Division Report on the Biak Campaign, 21 Aug 44-20 Jan 45," G-3, GE-IQ. SWPA Journal.
39. HQ Sixth Army, Report on Noemfoor Operation, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 31 Aug 44
40. The full text of General Adachi's speech may be found in the Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol III, pp. 100-101.
41. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 843, 12/13 Ju1 44.
43. Testimony of General Adachi during his trial in Rabaul, AP, World Service, Item 33, Sydney, April 14, 47. With reference to the casualties at Aitape, General Adachi's figures are in close agreement with G-2 reports. Daily Summary No. 887 for 26/27 August 1944 gives a total of 8,502 killed and taken prisoner to that date. This compares favorably with General Adachi's estimate of 10,000 killed, since the conditions of jungle fighting and malnutrition probably accounted for deaths not included in the G-2 report of identified killed.
44. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 845, 1 Aug 44.
45. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-15910, to CIS WD, 9 Aug 44, CIS, GHQ, WD 803 (S). This is characteristic of General MacArthur's unvaried concern with the health and safety of his troops. His abhorrence of bloody frontal assaults, of reckless plunging were predicated on his deep wish to reduce or avoid losses. The record of his campaigns is exceptional in this respect.
46. Col. Howard Smith, Public Health Service, on the Staff of USAFFE deserves great credit in this preventive campaign. An expert in tropical medicine and Chief of the Philippine Quarantine Service for many years prior to to the war, Colonel Smith was well known to General MacArthur. The latter's far-sighted planning brought Colonel Smith to his staff at an early date.
47. "The worst enemy of the Japanese Army in the withdrawal from Hollandia was malaria, and it was the major factor in causing much suffering and death during the march. Conditions were such that after a rain storm the men were forced to sleep in wet clothing without the benefit of mosquito netting. Because of the lack of medicine to counteract malaria, large numbers of stragglers fell by the wayside." Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol III, p. 55.
48. Staff Report by Brig. Gen. H. E. Eastwood, AC of S. G-4.
1. The Japanese also gave the Philippines high priority in their over-all strategic war plans. "The Philippines were the east wing of the so-called 'Southern Sphere' in the Japanese operations in the southern regions," said Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief of the Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters." They took the shape of the main line of defense against American counterattacks. The western wing was Burma and Malaya, and together the two wings protected Japanese access to the southern regions. Viewed from the standpoint of political and operational strategy, holding the Philippines was the one essential for the execution of the war against America and Britain. With the loss of these islands, not only would Japanese communications with the southern regions be severely threatened, but the prosecutim of strategic policies within the southern regions as far as supply and reinforcements were concerned would be a paramount difficulty. The loss of the Philippines would greatly affect civilian morale in Japan. The islands were also essential and appropriate strategic bases for the enemy advance on Japan. After their capture the advantage would be two to one in favor of the enemy and the prosecution of the war would suddenly take a great leap forward." Maj. Gen. Naokata Utsunomiya, Assistant Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, indicated the important role which the Philippines played in Japanese strategic plans when he suggested that they were looked upon as the final stepping stones to Japan itself. "The main value of the Philippines lay in their role as a bulwark against the invasion of the Homeland. They were to absorb as much of the enemy attack as they could and to delay the advance as long as possible. Defense preparations in Japan were in the meantime being hastened." This opinion was corroborated by the testimony of Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, Tactical Staff Officer of the Fourteenth Area Army: "The Philippines formed the first line of defense of the Japanese Homeland. For this reason the Combined Fleet was committed to the battle off Leyte. It was considered necessary that the decisive battle be fought in the Philippines. This was the opinion of Imperial General Headquarters." Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief of G-2, General Staff Headquarters added the following comment: "To shatter American war plans, the Japanese Army held it necessary to maintain the Philippines to the end and to fight a decisive battle with the Americans who planned to recapture the Philippines. Furthermore, the Philippines were of absolute necessity for the security of traffic between Japan Proper and the southern areas." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
2. GHQ, SWPA, Estimate of the Situation and Rough Draft, RENO Plan, 25 Feb 43 (S).
3. GHQ, SWPA, RENO 11, 3 Aug 43; GHQ, SWPA, RENO III, 20 Oct 43.
4. CINCSWPA memo to WARCOS, 31 Oct 43, JCS-CCS Papers No. I, G-3, GHQ, Exec Files (S).
8. GHQ, SWPA, RENO IV, 6 Mar 44.
9. CINCSWPA Radio No. CX-13891 to WARCOS, 18 Jun 44, WD No. 761, CIS GHQ, SWPA (S).
10. CINCPOA Radio to COMINCH, 4 Jul 44, JCS-CCS Papers No. 2, G-3, GHQ Exec Files. Admiral Nimitz in this radio expressed the opinion that short cuts and prompt exploitation of favorable situations were prime considerations, but that operations should be so conducted as to insure control of the sea and air during major amphibious assaults. He advocated the use of shore-based aircraft to the maximum extent possible and said that "tactical situations in which the fast carrier task forces are more or less immobilized in support of protracted fighting on shore should be avoided. In my opinion," he continued, "the basic concept of operations proposed by CINCSWPA in which shore-based air forces, ground troops, and naval forces are advanced together is sound." Ibid.
11. GHQ, SWPA, Basic Outline Plan for MUSKETEER Operations, 10 Jul 44, G-3, GHQ Plans File (TS).
12. GHQ, SWPA, Basic Outline Plan for MUSKETEER II , 29 Aug 44, G-3, GHQ Plans File (TS).
14. "An appraisal of information, over the period 15 May to 15 June, discioses a contemporary trend of events, indicating definitely that the Japanese are massing troops, bolstering dispositions, and shifting units in the Philippine area. This trend was not indicated prior to 1 April." G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Philippine Monthly Combined Situation Report, 15 Jun 44. Japanese reinforcement in the Philippines continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1944. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Philippine Monthly Combined Situation Report, 15 Jul and 15 Aug, 44. See also G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 30 Sep 4.
15. COM3rdFLT Radio to CINCPOA, CINCSWPA, COMINCH, 13 Sep 44, G-3, GHQ, Admin 385 (TS).
16. CINCPOA Radio to COM3rdFLT, 13 Sep 44, CIS, GHQ, SOPAC NO. 522 (S).
17. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-17744 to JCS, CINCPOA, 14 Sep 44, G-3, GHQ, Admin 385 (TS).
18. General Marshall described the dramatic sequence of events leading up to the orders for the Leyte invasion in his report to the Secretary of War: "... General MacArthur's views were requested and 2 days later he advised us that he was already to shift his plans to land on Leyte 20 October, instead of 20 December, as previously intended. It was a remarkable administrative achievement."
The message from MacArthur arrived at Quebec at night and Admiral Leahy (Chief of Staff to the President), Admiral KING, General Arnold, and I were being entertained at a formal dinner by Canadian officers. It was read by the appropriate staff officers who suggested an immediate Armative answer. The message, with their recommendations, was rushed to us and we left the table for a conference. Having the utmost confidence in General MacArthur, Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral Halsey, it was not a difficult decision to make. Within go minutes after the signal had been received in Quebec, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz had received their instructions to execute the Leyte operation on 20 October, abandoning the three previously approved intermediary landings." Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945. In his "State of the Union Message" on 6 January 1945, President Roosevelt commented on the advanced date for the invasion of the Philippines as follows: "Within the space of twenty-four hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different theaters of operations--a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory--a change which saved lives which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now neutralized far behind our lines."
19. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 15 Aug 44.
20. HQ Alamo Force, G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation, Morotai Island, 1 Aug 44. (R).
21. CO3rdFLT Report 0085 to COMINCH, 25 Jan 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S). AAF, Intelligence Summary Nos. 235-238, 19-30 Aug 44, G-2, GHQ Admin (S).
22. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 891, 15 Sep 44.
23. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 15 Sep 44.
24. The capture of Morotai was the final task of the Alamo Force which had directed the operations of American combat units from the spring of 1943. The Alamo Force was officially dissolved on 25 September 1944 and General MacArthur ordered the Sixth Army to take over the initial Philippines campaign which previously had been assigned to the task force. No actual change was involved, since the Alamo Force consisted of units assigned or attached to the Sixth Army, and Headquarters Sixth Army also functioned as Headquarters Alamo Force.
25. GHQ, SWPA, Press Release, 15 Sep 44. These views forecast the ultimate character of an enlightened and benevolent occupation of Japan and the administrative and reform methods of SCAP in the post-war period.
26. Allied Geographical Section, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Special Report No. 55, Airfields, Landing Beaches and Rod, Samar, Leyte, and Dimgat Group, 10 July 44.
27. In the section of his report on the Leyte operation dealing with "Conclusions, Comments and Recommendations," Commander Seventh Fleet made the following statement with reference to intelligence on the landing areas: "Intelligence reports on beach areas were considered generally satisfactory. The Allied Geographical Section, SWPA, had completed Terrain Study #84 and Special Report #55, covering the landing area. The general landing beaches were selected from such reports, and photographs taken by carrier planes on 14 September confirmed the reports. Swamps, lagoons, and other similar obstacles required the leaving of small gaps between some of the beaches, but no material modification of the plans was necessary." Commander Central Philippines Attack Force (COM7thFLT), Report of Operation for the Capture of Leyte Island including Action Report of Engagement in Surigao Strait and off Samar Island on 25 October 1944 (KING Two Operation), 31 Jan 45, A16-3, Serial: 00302-C.
28. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 30 Sep 44.
29. CG ASCOM Report, Historical Record of the Army Service Command, 23 July-26 December 1944, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal ( S ).
30. CG X Corps Report, A History of the X Corps in the Leyte-Samar-Philippine Island Operation, 15 Feb 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
31. COM3rdPHIBFOR (CTF79) Report to COM7thFLT, Serial 00323, 13 NW 44. (S).
32. The major units operating under the Sixth Army in the Leyte assault were as follows:
Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point Sixth Army Gen Walter Krueger 6th Ranger Bn Lt. Col. H. A. Mucci Assault Finschafen Leyte Gulf Islands 21st Ranger Bn Lt. Col. F. R. Weber Assault Finschafen Panoan Island 2nd ESB Brig. Gen. W. F. Heavey Follow-up Hollandia, Biak, Manus Leyte 32nd Div Maj. Gen. W. H. Gill Follow-up Hollandia, Morotai 77th Div Maj. Gen. A. D. Bruce Reserve Guam 381st RCT Col. M. E. Halloran Assault Manus X Corps Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert 1st Cav Div Maj. Gen. V. S. Mudge Assault Manus Leyte 24th Div Maj. Gen. F. A. Irving Assault Hollandia Leyte XXIV Corps Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge 7th Div Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold Assault Oahu Leyte 96th Div Maj. Gen. J. L. Bradley Assault Manus Leyte 20th Armd Gp Lt. Col. W. A. Jensen Assault Hawaii, Manus 11th A/B Div Maj. Gen. J. M. Swing Follow-up Oro Bay 503rd Prcht RCT Col. G. M. Jones Follow-up Noemfoor
33. CG X Corps Report, A History of the X Corps in the Leyte-Samar-Philippine Island Operation, 15 Feb 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
34. GHQ, SWPA, Opn Instr No. 70, 21 Sep 44.
35. Ibid. Comdr AAF Letter No. 322 to CINCSWPA, 8 Oct 44, subj: AAF Plan for Support of KING II, 385 Plan 21, G-3, GHQ, Admin. (S).
36. General Utsunomiya, Assistant Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, declared: "The far-sightedness in launching the Leyte Campaign two months earlier than the original schedule was one of the principal factors in its success." Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika, Chief of Staff, Thirty-fifth Army in the southern Philippines, said that the advance of the Leyte invasion date caught the Japanese with their "defensive fortifications incomplete." He continued with the statement: "This American invasion, two months in advance of our estimation, in my opinion, was one of the basic reasons for the rapid collapse of our defenses in the Philippines." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
37. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 30 Sep 44.
38. Ibid. Admiral Kinkaid commented on the Allied intelligence estimates as follows: "By virtue of the excellent work of our guerrilla forces in Leyte and our coastwatcher personnel, we knew within very close limits before we undertook the attack exactly what enemy elements were in occupation, their capacities, and capabilities. The estimates of enemy air and land strength and of the naval forces available to him were remarkably exact and were made possible only by the careful study and evaluation of reports received from a wide variety of sources over a considerable period of time." Commander Central Philippines Attack Force (COM7thFLT), Report of Operation for the Capture of Leyte Island including Action Report of Engagement in Surigao Strait and off Samar Island on 25 October 1944 (KING Two Operation), 31 Jan 45, A16-3, Serial: 00302-C.
39. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 31 Oct 44.
40. CINCSWPA Radio, to Com AAF and CINCPOA, 2 Sep 44, SOPAC No. 517 CIS GHQ. (S).
41. CINCSWPA Ltr to Maj. Gen. John Hilldring, z Sep 44, WD No. 821, CS, GHQ (S).
42. The official communique of Japanese Imperial General Headquarters for 19 October 1944 publicly admitted the loss of 312 aircraft, in addition to an unspecified number of planes damaged, during the period 12-16 October. Allied Air Force estimates placed the figure at 396 Japanese planes of all types destroyed. In addition 35 ships of various sizes were reported as sunk and 74 ships as probably damaged. AAF Intelligence Summary No. 245, "Result of the Allied Air Attack on Formosa on 12-13 Oct 44," 15 Oct 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
43. The extent of Japanese exaggeration regarding damage inflicted upon the U.S. Fleet can be appreciated by an examination of their official reports at the time. A communique issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 19 October reads as follows: "Since 12 October our forces have been engaged in fierce attacks against enemy task groups in the seas east of Luzon and Formosa. We have routed these forces and destroyed over half their strength. Total results achieved are as follows: Sunk: 11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer or cruiser. Damaged: 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 cruiser or destroyer and 13 ships of undetermined size. In addition at least 12 ships were left in flames."
44. Admiral Ozawa, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet in the Battle for Leyte Gulf, stated, "... about 150 planes from the [Third Fleet] carriers were sent to Formosa; consequently our carrier strength was greatly reduced so the operation was changed to use land-based planes more frequently instead of carrier planes. My force of carrier planes became very much weakened; only 110 were left, so less than half remained." United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analysis Division, Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Vol I, p. 220.
45. Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukudome, Commander of the Second Air Fleet at the time of the Leyte landings, referring to the Japanese "success" in the Formosa raid, stated, "... while the results attained were probably not as great as reported at the time, I felt that considerable success had been attained and hence expected that some time would lapse before you [the Allies] would undertake the attack further south. However, your [Allied] thrust against the Philippines came much sooner than expected." USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Vol II, p. 501. Lt. Col. Yorio Ishikawa, Staff Officer of the Fourteenth Area Army, also pointed out the effect of the magnified damage reports, saying, "It had been a prevalent conception among high commands that the United States was not thoroughly prepared to start the Philippines invasion when their landings actually took place on Leyte. The reason for this was that our navy reported crippling the enemy task forces in the air and sea battle off the shores of Formosa prior to the American landings on Leyte. The fact remained that our naval reports had been much exaggerated from the actual battle results and consequently we misjudged the potential move on the Philippines, thinking that the enemy was starting his operations without thorough preparations." General Tomochika stated, "We had estimated that approximately one half of the vaunted American air striking power had been crippled severely enough to prevent them from participating in the Philippines campaign." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
46. The following statements are typical of the testimony given by Japanese Army commanders regarding the expected invasion of the Philippines: "There were various opinions concerning the anticipated date of the initial landings in the Philippines, both in the Thirty-Fifth Army and in the Fourteenth Area Army Command", said General Tomochika. "Some of the staff officers were of the opinion that the enemy would come by land via New Guinea to Mindanao Island utilizing the same type of invasion technique he had so successfully employed during the New Guinea campaign. They contended that the enemy by establishing air bases on the way would probably land on Mindanao by early November...." Maj. Kazuo Taguchi, Fourteenth Area Army Staff officer, added the following: "Based on the order of their expectancy, I had thought the first landings would take place as follows: (1) the Sarangani Bay area, South Mindanao, (2) the Davao area, South Mindanao, (3) the Leyte Gulf coast area. Lt. Gen. Iinuma, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, had also estimated the first landing to take place as mentioned above. Since southern Mindanao was the closest of the Japanese held areas and within easy range of their bombers based on Halmahera, I felt strongly that the initial attempt would be made in the area." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey synthesized the divergence of opinion within the Japanese Naval High Command on the Philippine invasion as follows: "... by August, and particularly after the Palau and Morotai landings on 15 September, it was agreed in the top naval commands that the next Allied move would be against the Philippines.... It seems, however, that the anticipated timing of the assault and its location in the Philippines remained matters of contention among the command and staff officers until the Leyte operation actually commenced. Apparently, most believed that the assault would come in November, although there was strong opinion that it would be in early October.... The original prevailing opinion that Mindanao was the most likely place for a Philippines invasion persisted, although Samar, Leyte, and Luzon were considered a likelihood for the next Allied move." USSBS, Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence, pp. 56-57.
1. The severity of this bombardment accounted in great measure for the initial ease of the Allied landings. In addition to forcing the enemy from many of his beach entrenchments, it seriously disrupted his entire communication system. General Tomochika stated: "The positions of the 16th Division Artillery Regiment along the first line of defense were subjected to a severe pre-landing naval bombardment which resulted in the destruction of a great number of its field pieces. Regimental radio-telegraphic communications were disrupted by this bombardment, and direct communications with the 35th Army and with the 14th Area Army Headquarters in Manila were never re-established. Direct liaison between regiments and smaller units of the division could no longer be carried out effectively." loth Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Operations of the Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Part I (R). Hereinafter cited as: Eighth Army, Staff Study, Leyte.
2. General MacArthur's radio broadcast, 20 October 1944.
3. Although the Japanese had anticipated the landings at Dulag, they were not prepared for a direct assault on Tacloban and had even located their division headquarters there, thinking it would be well behind the battlefront. "We had misestimated the location of the initial enemy landings," said General Tomochika, "and consequently our defense in the area was very weak. We had estimated that there was a greater possibility of an enemy landing in the Dulag area since it was at the entrance to Leyte Gulf, instead of at Tacloban which was almost at the upper extreme end of the Gulf. The strategy employed by the enemy in landing at our weak spots can be attributed to the splendid intelligence system of the enemy, aided at times by the guerrilla agents who had infiltrated into our lines and had sent out vital information concerning our troop dispositions." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
4. See Plate No. 55, "Enemy Ground Dispositions, 30 September 1944," Chapter VII.
5. GHQ, SWPA, Special Communique, 20 Oct 44.
6. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 931, 25 Oct 44.
7. To protect their possessions against the Allied advance, the Japanese had developed an elaborate strategy of combined and interdependent Army, Navy, and Air Force actions known as Sho operations. These operations were intended to cover four critical areas of probable attack : Sho No. 1 applied to the Philippines; Sho No. 2, to Formosa, the Nansei Shoto (Ryukyu Islands) and southern Kyushu; Sho No. 3, to Shikoku, Honshu, and the Nampo Shoto (Southern Islands); Sho No. 4, to Hokkaido. The suddenness of the Leyte landings, together with the heavy losses in the battle off Formosa, caused several hurried modifications, although the main theme of the plan remained the same. Simultaneous operations would be undertaken by powerful naval and air forces against the Allied invasion units and landing points while, under cover of these movements, intensive attempts would be made to land troop reinforcements in the threatened area. Sho No. 1 was activated on 18 October as soon as the Japanese had ascertained that the Allied attack on Leyte was the main invasion effort.
8. USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 281.
9. In a report of 10 January 1945, Admiral Kinkaid commented on the background for the assumption that the Japanese surface fleet would come out in force in case the Philippines were attacked: "The reconstruction of the Japanese fleet, after the sweeping Blue [U. S.] air victory over Truk on February 17th, into a strong task force organization termed the First Mobile Fleet; the capture of the 'Z' Operations Orders issued by the Combined Fleet Staff on March 8th, detailing the circumstances in which that fleet would be used to counter the Blue offensives; the fact that the striking force was brought out by the Japanese in mid June to engage our forces in defense of the Marianas-all these factors, and many others combined to provide the background of subsequent intelligence bearing more directly on probable Japanese reactions to Blue landings in the Philippines. By September it was clear that the striking force... had been readied for use in the immediate future. The 7th Fleet Intelligence Officer, in a Staff memo on 24 September, estimated that the 2 diversion attack forces comprising the tactical organization of the First Mobile Fleet would be utilized for the defense of the Philippines, with a probable strength of 4-5 BB, II CA, 2 CL, 22 DD, plus 2 XCV-BB, 2 CV, 4 CVL." COM7thFLT Report Serial No. 000107 to CINCSWPA, 10 Jan 45.
10. A G-2 report of the time contained the following latest available information on the location of major enemy fleet units:
Philippines NE Area BB 1 u/s 6 CA 1 12 2 CL 5 4 1 CV 5 CVL 5 CVE 2 2 XCV 2 DD 22 16 4 3 SS 54 2 8 1
G-2, GHQ, SWPA,Special Intelligence Bulletin, No. 526, 15/16 Oct 44, Appendix 1.
11. Naval estimate, "Japanese Fleet Possibilities-KING-Two Operation," 4 Oct 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 4 Nov 44. The following significant estimate of the possibility of Japanese fleet intervention in the Philippines appears in this report : "The surface danger to the KING-Two Amphibious Forces lies in the First Diversion Attack Force, [under Adm. Kurita] ... (unless it is previously damaged by air. It is a typical Tokyo Express based at Brunei Bay , at present out of range of land-based and seaborne air but within striking distance of the landing force area. If the last half of the distance is negotiated during darkness its approach can only be detected by a submarine or airborne surface-search radar. Islands along the approach will cause protective shadows on other radars. That force already has received a directive to attack the Invasion Force at night.... If our bombardment forces retire to seaward at night Surigao Strait becomes an open back door. It must be assumed therefore that the Japanese Second Diversion Attack Force [Adm. Shima's Force] (battleships) will attempt to create diversions which are calculated to draw off our slow battleships, and our cruisers and destroyers, from screening positions in the vicinity of Surigao Strait. Conclusions are that an enemy night striking force is poised to attack the KING-Two expedition through Surigao Strait, which should be forced and secured, as soon as control of the air has been obtained, at latest A-1 Day, and that surface forces superior to the enemy's First Diversion Attack Force should be maintained within intercepting distance of that force regardless of larger enemy fleet movements."
12. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Special Intelligence Bulletin, No. 528, 17/18 Oct 44.
14. C.O.I.C. Situation Report No. 290, 17 Oct 44.
15. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Special Intelligence Bulletin, No. 529, 18/19 Oct 44.
16. Op. cit. No. 531, 20/21 Oct 44.
17. C.O.I.C. Situation Report No. 295, 22 Oct 44.
18. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Special Intelligence Bulletin, No. 534, 23/24 Oct 44.
19. Op. cit. No. 528, 17/18 Oct 44.
21. Op. cit. No. 531, 20/21 Oct 44.
23. Op. cit. No. 533, 22/23 Oct 44.
24. Op. cit. No. 535, 24/25 Oct 44.
26. COM7thFLT Report to COMINCH US Fleet: Report of Operation for the Capture of Leyte Island including Action Report of Engagements in Surigao Strait and off Samar Island on 25 October 1944 (KING Two Operation), p. 37. Hereinafter cited as COM7thFLT Report.
27. Ibid. p. 13.
31. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Special Intelligence Bulletin, No. 534, 23/24 Oct 44. That the movement of enemy naval combat and supply units to Coron Bay provided an important clue to Japanese intentions is evident from Admiral Kinkaid's radio message of 23 October: "I view the approach of enemy combatant ships and tankers toward Coron Bay as the first phase of the build-up. Also magnified are express runs toward Leyte. I feel it highly probable that the tanker group which arrived at Coron Bay between 0200 and 0300/1 0n 23 Oct came for the purpose of refueling a major task force of the Japanese Fleet which has been assembling for several days in southern Formosa. Submarine reports indicate 3 probable battleships approaching from the south in position to arrive Coron Bay tonight, Monday. Another group of 11 enemy ships with many radars showing could reach that Bay at about the same time. There are signs of a concentration of a large number of enemy aircraft in the Luzon area. It is extremely important that early preparations for these enemy operations be discussed. Comdrs 5 and 13 AF are requested to continue their thorough reconnaissance of Coron Bay and its approaches, and to strike day and night if practicable. COM3rdFLT is requested to strike Coron Bay at the earliest practicable time, and to extend his search as far as it is possible to the west and northwest. The primary objective is enemy combatant ships and aircraft. It is possible that enemy carriers will protect their surface forces and will strike from west of Palawan. TG 77.4 is hitting the western Visayas twice daily." COM7thFLT Radio 230142/Z to CINCSWPA et al, 23 Oct 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 24 Oct 44.
32. COM7thFLT Report, p. 37.
35. Admiral Kurita's formidable force was consistently underestimated in the early sightings. It was composed of the battleships, Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna, 10 heavy cruisers, the Atago, Maya, Takao, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, and Chikuma, 2 light cruisers, the Noshiro and Yahagi, and 15 destroyers.
36. COM7thFLT Report, p. 37.
37. The Southern Force at this time comprised 2 battleships, the Yamashiro, and Fuso, the heavy cruiser Mogami, and 4 destroyers, the Michishio, Asagumo, Yamagumo, and Shigure.
38. In General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, General MacArthur's G-2 Section assessed the enemy capabilities at this time as follows: "A late report ... indicates a Japanese Task Force ... in a position ... 75 miles north by west of the northwest tip of Zamboanga Province [in the Sulu Sea].... It is apparently heading for the Mindanao Sea, presumably either to bring reinforcements to the Leyte area or possibly to make a surface attack through Surigao Strait against the southern flank of our supply line.
"A second late report states that around n00n two forces ... on a southeast course in the Sibuyan Sea were also sighted. It is considered possible that this force may proceed through San Bernardino Strait in an attempt to attack our Leyte position from the north.
"It is considered significant that no carriers have been reported in either of these sightings, thus leaving the enemy the capability of bringing his carriers down the east coast of Luzon to support the possible attacks of his converging surface forces in the Leyte area. However, it is considered more probable that the carriers will be deployed in the vicinity of Mindoro, in order that their planes may strike across the Central Philippines, possibly staging through shore bases in the Visayas. Enemy air reaction since the landing on Leyte has been very weak.... This lack of activity gives rise to the enemy capability of launching a relatively strong air attack against our naval units, possibly in support of a naval engagement...." G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 945, 2 3/ 2 4 Oct 44.
39. The light carrier Princeton was damaged so severely in these attacks that it had to be abandoned and sunk.
40. In pointing out the highly precarious position of the U.S. forces on Leyte, General MacArthur's G-2 stated:G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 944, 22/23 Oct 44.
There is no question that the Leyte position is vulnerable to the extent of U. S. Fleet availability; it is essential that its presence is continuous in adjacent waters, east of the Philippines, to interpose continuously between our land operations and possible enemy fleet intervention, which is essentially the primary mission of our Fleet."
41. The battleship Fuso suffered minor damage in this attack which took place at 0800 on 24 October.
42. Admiral Oldendorf's fleet comprised 6 battleships, 8 cruisers, 26 destroyers, and several squadrons of torpedo boats. The battleships included some veterans of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The more modern battleships were with Admiral Halsey.
43. COM7thFLT Report p. z8.
44. Ibid. pp. 19-20.
45. Ibid. p. 21.
46. COM7thFLT Report p. 14.
47. The Japanese Northern Force actually consisted of 2 converted battleship-carriers, the Ise and Hyuga, the large carrier Zuikaku, the 3 light carriers Chitose, Chiyoda, and the Zuiho, the 3 light cruisers Oyodo, Tama, and Isuzu, and 8 destroyers.
48. William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey's Story, (New York, 1 947) p. 214.
50. COM7thFLT Report p. 25.
52. Admiral Halsey explained the three alternatives before him at the time as follows : "1. I could guard San Bernardino with my whole fleet and wait for the Northern Force to strike me. Rejected. It yielded to the enemy the double initiative of his carriers and his fields on Luzon and would allow him to use them unmolested. 2. I could guard San Bernardino with TF 34 while I struck the Northern Force with my carriers. Rejected. The enemy's potential surface and air strength forbade half-measures; if his shore-based planes joined his carrier planes, together they might inflict far more damage on my half-fleets separately than they could inflict on the fleet intact. 3. I could leave San Bernardino unguarded and strike the Northern Force with my whole fleet. Accepted. It preserved my fleet's integrity, it left the initiative with me, and it promised the greatest possibility of surprise. Even if the Central Force meanwhile penetrated San Bernardino and headed for Leyte Gulf, it could hope only to harry the landing operation It could not consolidate any advantage, because no transports accompanied it and no supply ships. It could merely hit and run." Halsey and Bryan, op. cit., pp. 216-217.
53. "The Northern Force carriers had left the Inland Sea with a total of 108 planes of various types on board. By 24 October, Admiral Ozawa had lost 66 planes which failed to return from reconnaissance missions and attacks directed against the Third Fleet, leaving him with 42 planes on his carrier decks at the time he was sighted by Admiral Halsey's scout planes. After Admiral Ozawa felt that he was definitely contacted by the U. S. forces, he dispatched his entire operational bomber complement of 15 planes to airfields in Luzon leaving himself with 10 inoperable bombers and 17 fighters to meet the advancing Third Fleet on 25 October." Statement by Captain Ohmae, former Senior Staff Officer of Admiral Ozawa's First Mobile Fleet, 23 Sept 48. Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
54. The escort carriers were the Fanshaw Bay, St. Lo, White Plains, Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay, and Gambier Bay; the destroyers were the Hoel, Heermann, and Johnston; the destroyer escorts were the Dennis, J. C. Butler, Raymond, and S. B. Roberts.
55. The escort carriers comprised the Natoma Bay, Manila Bay, Marcus Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Island, and Ommaney Bay; the destroyers consisted of the Haggard, Franks, and Hailey; and the destroyer escorts were the R. W. Suesens, Abercrombie, Leroy Wilson, and W. C. Wann.
56. This group had the following escort carriers: Sangamon, Suwannee, Santee, and Petrof Bay; the destroyers were the McCord, Tratben, and Hazelwood and the destroyer escorts, the R. S. Bull, R. M. Rowell, Eversole, and Coolbaugh.
57. COM7thFLT Report, p. 25.
59. CINCSWPA Radio to COM3rdFLT et al, 21 Oct 44, SOPAC No. 538, C/S, GHQ, (S). General MacArthur's message was in reply to a request from Admiral Halsey regarding withdrawal of Third Fleet units from the covering of the Leyte operations. Admiral Halsey's request read: "My present operations in strategic position to meet threat of enemy fleet forces are somewhat restricted by necessity of covering your transports and other overseas movements; request early advice regarding withdrawal of such units to safe position, which will permit me to execute orderly re-arming program for my groups and allow further offensive operations." COM3rdFLT Radio to CINCSWPA et al, 21 Oct 44, SOPAC No. 537, C/S GHQ, (TS).
60. COM7thFLT Report p. 27.
61. Halsey and Bryan, op. cit., p. 219.
63 Op. cit., p. 220. Vice Adm. Willis A. Lee was commander of the battleships under Admiral Halsey.
67. There has been much speculation and controversy regarding Admiral Kurita's crucial decision to break off the battle at this point and return to the north rather than continue on to Leyte Gulf. Perhaps the most concise summary of the reasons behind this move is given by Rear Adm. Tomiji Koyanagi, Admiral Kurita's chief of staff. "One reason", Admiral Koyanagi stated, "was that the Second Diversion Attack Force [Admiral Shima] reported the almost complete destruction of Admiral Nishimura's force.... The second reason was that Nishimura's force meant to go into the Bay in the morning and our force was to have entered at 0600 to coordinate but the approach of our force was greatly delayed. After the battle off Samar we finally decided that the cooperation of the two forces would not be effected at all, and if we ever decided to go into the Bay, the interval would be too much. The third reason, we intercepted a telephone message sent by your carrier to get reinforcements. We also intercepted an answer to the telephone call to the effect that it would be two hours before reinforcements of planes arrived; that is to say by the time we entered this Bay. We thought that planes would have come out and that warships would have come out and that the transports would have dispersed enough so that only a part would have been inside; they would escape from the danger zone. We figured by that time that the transports might have heard of the battle and started already in the morning. The fourth reason, we intercepted again a telephone message sent by carrier to the planes to the effect that all planes should go to Leyte shore strips; and also we thought reinforcement of the American carriers might come along and so your force would be very big, carriers and land-based planes, and it would not be advisable to go into this danger zone and be a target for attack by shore and reinforced carrier planes in narrow waters. The fifth reason, we surmised that your American Task Force might come down from the north; so after we failed to destroy this first American force, we thought that if we came back north now we might encounter another American Task Force, but we were very regretful that we failed to destroy your first American force. The sixth reason, if we continued the battle here at Leyte, it would consume more fuel; that was another reason for cruising north instead of staying around. We had no tankers anywhere around." USSBS, Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Vol. I, pp. 151-152.
68. As a result of the Samar Battle the Japanese lost the three heavy cruisers Chokai, Suzuya, and Chikuma and one destroyer. The U. S. Navy lost the escort carriers Saint Lo and Gambier Bay, the destroyers, Hoel and Johnston, and the destroyer escort S. B. Roberts. The escort carriers Sangamon, Suwannee, Santee, Fanshaw Bay, White Plains, and Kalinin Bay were also damaged as was the destroyer Heermann and the destroyer escorts Dennis and R. M. Rowell.
69. Rear Adm. C. A. F. Sprague Report to COMINCH, Action Against the Japanese Main Body off Samar, 29 Oct 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
70. COM3rdFLT Radio 251317/Z to CINCSWPA et al, 25 Oct 44, SOPAC No. 544, C/S GHQ (S).
71. Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II.
72. The total losses inflicted on the Japanese Navy during the operations described were 3 battleships, 4 carriers, 9 cruisers, and 9 destroyers.
73. CINCSWPA Radio 291311/Z to CINCPOA, 29 Oct 44, C/S, GHQ, SOPAC No. 545. (S).
74. The precarious air situation in the Leyte Gulf area was fully reported by the U. S. Navy at the time. "At present our control of the air is not satisfactory," said Admiral Kinkaid in his radio of 27 October. "Enemy air has been attacking in force for the past 72 hours, disrupting our unloading, refueling, and rearming. The activation of our dromes is being delayed as a result of enemy raids. Heavy combat air patrol is required and strikes against enemy airfields needed until enemy air strength is materially reduced. The support of at least 1 and preferably 2 fast carrier groups is required until we have control of the area. Remaining CVE's must refuel on 28 October, and can supply no planes. Army air squadrons are moving into the fields today, but difficult field conditions make doubtful effective operation." COMTF77 Radio 270221/Z to COM3rdFLT, CINCSWPA et al, 27 Oct 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 28 Oct 44 (S). On 26 October Admiral Halsey had reported as follows: "Two carrier groups will furnish support at Leyte on 27 Oct; after 17 days of fighting our fast carrier force is virtually out of bombs, torpedoes, and provisions and pilots are exhausted; I am unable to provide any extended direct air support. When will your shore-based air take over air defense at the objective?" COM3rdFLT Radio 261235 to CINCSWPA et al, 26 Oct 44, 385 Plan 21, G-3, GHQ, Adm (TS).
75. "Up until October 1944, "stated General Utsunomiya," strategy in the Philippines had been defensive in the Visayas and Mindanao areas and offensive in Luzon.... The strategy ... did not directly change after the arrival of General Yamashita. The forces, according to General Yamashita's plan were still to delay the American units as long as possible to allow preparations for the meeting and annihilation of the enemy landing on Luzon." Lt. Col. Yorio Ishikawa stated: "Prior to the American landings on Leyte, the Fourteenth Area Army's plan of defense in the Philippines was to conduct a decisive battle on Luzon through the all-out employment of air, sea, and ground forces.... When the American invasion of Leyte was commenced, the Fourteenth Area Army was ordered to carry out a decisive battle on Leyte in spite of the fact that the Commanding General Yamashita, Chief of the General Staff Muto, and the majority of the staff members favored a decisive battle on Luzon." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
76. Interrogation of General Yamashita after his capture on Luzon disclosed that he "insisted that sending reinforcements to Leyte was not his idea; that he was against committing additional strength and that the reinforcements were sent on orders from higher headquarters." G-3, Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Vol. X, p. 20 (R).
77. The guerrilla information net in the Philippines, backed by numerous radio stations, furnished valuable data in this critical period. The late General Roxas, first President of the Philippine Republic, helped to establish contacts in Manila in the highest circles. Through these channels important plans and major decisions of the Japanese High Command became known in fragmentary form. Messages were usually relayed to General MacArthur's Headquarters via Mindoro where an important radio outlet was maintained by SWPA secret agents.
78. The strategic consequences of this move were described by Maj. Chuji Kaneko, staff officer of the 102nd Division: "Our naval intelligence had estimated that the channel [between Leyte and Samar] could not be penetrated by boats, except small native boats. Elements of an American Division, I believe it was the 24th Division, made their way through the straits in small boats and barges from Tacloban and emerged onto Carigara Bay, where they effected landings on Barugo and Carigara. This surprise maneuver caught us off guard and upset the Thirty-fifth Army's plans to recapture Tacloban, since our units advancing on Tacloban by way of Carigara had now to contend with these troops that had now established positions to the south of Carigara." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. This maneuver of the 1st Cavalry Division also prevented the intended landing of the enemy 68th Brigade on north Leyte for a pincer drive on the X Corps forces. Eighth Army, Staff Study, Leyte.
79. The Japanese were unable to retake Carigara. In the words of General Tomochika, "the loss of Carigara was a stunning blow to Japanese defense plans, especially to the 16th Division, whose main force was in the Dagami area, because Carigara was a key center of supply and communication to the entire Leyte Valley. Furthermore Carigara was important as a port for direct supplies by sea from Luzon...." Eighth Army. Staff Study, Leyte.
80. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary, No. 977, 28/29 Nov 44.
81. The Japanese planned to use these two newly arrived divisions in a drive northwestward to secure the Carigara-Jaro sector. The general plan for the defense of Leyte was divided into three phases. Phase One: The 16th Division, reinforced, was to hold the line running through Burauen, Dagami, and northward in order to contain the United States forces on the east coast. Phase Two: By the middle of November, the bulk of the incoming reinforcements was to concentrate behind the 16th Division in the sector from Carigara to Jaro. The 1st Division was expected to occupy the area southeast of Carigara and later be joined by the 102nd Division and the 68th Brigade. The 26th Division was to advance from Ormoc, traverse the mountains and occupy the sector south of the 1st Division below Jaro. The 16th Division was to be further strengthened by the arrival of the main force of the 30th Division. Phase Three: A large-scale attack was to be launched on Leyte together with diversionary attacks against the rear lines from Samar. Interrogation of Col. Junkichi Okabayashi, Chief of Staff, Japanese 1st Division. Eighth Army, Staff Study, Leyte.
82. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary, No. 972, 19/20 Nov 44.
83. CINCSWPA Radio 130248/Z to COM7thFLT et al, 13 Nov 44, ANF No. 115, C/S GHQ (S).
84. The Japanese countermeasures were described by General Tomochika: "The 1st Division was sent along the road north from Ormoc and then eastward along Carigara Bay to attack the American forces in the Carigara area. At the same time the 26th Division was sent over the mountains to attack in the direction of Jaro. The battle to re-take Carigara never took place because, before the 1st Division could reach Carigara, American forces had landed near Pinamopoan and engaged the advance elements of the 1st Division. The 1st Division was compelled to divert its attention to repelling this landing force.... The best that the 1st Division could do was to set up battle lines along the mountains behind Pinamopoan." Eighth Army, Staff Study, Leyte.
85. Faulty intelligence caused the Japanese to commit a serious mistake in this action. "According to the information received from the 16th Division Headquarters, the important cross-island road from Baybay to Abuyog had been rendered impassable through the demolition of bridges and by bomb craters; therefore, no provisions were made to defend this road nor was it considered as a route of advance for Japanese units. The information proved to be erroneous and the mistake, made when the 35th Army failed to verify this information, resulted in great losses when the American 7th Division advanced westward along this road and flanked the 35th Army positions." Interrogation of General Tomochika. Eighth Army, Staff Study, Leyte.
86. CINCPOA Radio 292349/Z to CINCSWPA et al, 29 Nov 44, Navy No. 576, C/S GHQ (S).
87. The postponement of the Mindoro operation came as a great relief to the Third Fleet, as explained by Admiral Halsey: "... the strain of the Kamikaze attacks, on top of our long stretch of combat, made an adequate rest period obligatory at once. MacArthur's next move, the invasion of Mindoro, was scheduled for December 5. We hated to request a postponement, but there was no help for it. Almost as soon as his obliging reply was decoded, we turned our prows toward Ulithi." Admiral Halsey's Story,p. 234.
88. "The Ormoc landing came as a complete surprise because the strait between Bohol and the southern coast of Leyte had been mined and Japanese Army Headquarters considered that not even LSTs could navigate through these waters. Furthermore, it was thought that the Bohol Straits were controlled by the Japanese navy and that the Americans would not attempt a maneuver so daring as a movement of troop transports into the landlocked waters. Because of these considerations, the defense of the Ormoc area had been limited to the 35th Army Port Unit (Mitsui), reserve elements of the 26th Infantry Division, and the right wing detachment of the 35th Army. These poorly equipped forces resisted stubbornly but were soon driven from the beaches. The Mitsui Port Unit was forced into the hills south of Ormoc. A counterattack was launched by the Imabori detachment on the night of the 8th, only to be re pulsed. By the 11th, Ormoc had been completely overrun." Interrogation of General Tomochika. Eighth Army, Staff Study, Leyte.
89. The U. S. destroyers Ward and Malian were so severely hit in this enemy attack that they had to be abandoned and sunk.
90. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 975, 8 Dec 44.
91. The plight of the Japanese which resulted from the seizure of their supplies is told by Colonel Okabayashi:Eighth Army, Staff Study, Leyte.
"On or about the third of December 1945, Japanese ships landing at Ormoc brought about a half month's supply of food and ammunition for the Japanese troops on Leyte. The American forces who landed near Ormoc on 7 December captured almost all of these supplies. Consequently, all Japanese troops on Leyte after the 1st of December were on a starvation diet and were compelled to live off the land gathering whatever they could find such as coconuts, bananas, papayas, native potatoes, a variety of grasses, bamboo shoots, and the heart fibres of coconut tree trunks. A powder of meal, prepared from native potatoes was used for making a crude bread."
92. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 979, 12 Dec 44.
93. HQ Sixth Army,Report of the Leyte Operation, pp. 77 - 79.
94. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 993, 26 Dec 44 .
95. The testimony of Admiral Fukudome, Commander, Second Air Fleet, July 1944 to 15 January 1945, tells the story of the defeat of the Japanese Naval Air Force in the Philippines: "Myself, together with my colleagues on the spot, felt that victory at Leyte was absolutely indispensable; and those in General Headquarters were of the same opinion. So there was agreement that every possible plane, as well as all possible Army forces, should be sent to the Philippines . I believe that up to the middle of December, the total air strength of between 600 and 700 planes was maintained. After that, however, replacement could not be continued to keep up that level. The losses increased as time passed and, from the middle of December, replacement could not keep pace with our losses; and by the early part of January, I had lost practically all of my planes, my air force had been practically wiped out. Replacements were not getting through owing to operations of your air force." USSBS,Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Vol II, p. 502.
96. The following is a brief historical resume of the enemy divisions which were engaged in the fighting on Leyte . The Japanese 1st Division from the Tokyo area was shipped directly to Leyte from Manchuria in November 1944 and was decimated in the northern Ormoc Corridor. The 16th Division from central Japan had participated in China operations and in the battle for Bataan; it remained in the Philippines and was the main force employed in the early phases of the Leyte fighting. The 26th Division had previously been stationed in North China and then on Luzon; it suffered heavy losses in convoy en route to Leyte and was destroyed in the final phases of the defense of the southern sector. The 102nd Division, activated in the central Visayas, was sent to Leyte in late October, and was defeated in the northern Ormoc Corridor. The 68th Brigade came to Manila from Formosa in December 1944 and was trapped on the west coast in the Palompon-San Isdro area. Elements of the 8th Division were committed in the Valencia sector where they were destroyed or driven into the hills.
97. The swift inland drive of the U. S. forces caught the Japanese unawares: "We had thought," said General Tomochika, "that the Allies, after landing, would try to secure their beachheads before proceeding with their advance; however, the enemy rather caught us off guard with their tactics of immediately starting their penetration inland even before their newly won beachheads had been secured." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
98. In a staff study dated 20 September 1944, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters stated: "The enemy has detailed information of our troop distribution in the Philippines." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Current Translations, No. 148, 6 Feb 45. Concerning intelligence in operations General Tomochika declared: "American intelligence was so far superior that a comparison is useless. It seemed to me as if we were fighting our battles blindfolded, while the enemy seemed to have ten times the intelligence we possessed." Major Kazuo Taguchi, Fourteenth Area Army staff officer, acknowledged that the "lack of an effective intelligence system and the ultimate failure to surmise correctly the mobility and speed of the American forces and the time and place of their actual landing attempts "was one of three "major Japanese mistakes." Said Colonel Kobayashi: "We had no inside information on American pre-invasion preparations. From ship movements and radio message traffic count we could estimate the probable site of landings. By past tactics and strategy, we were able to estimate the force, the method of landing and the time to some extent. We had no other intelligence." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
99. A summary of the cumbersome Japanese command situation in the Philippines is contained in a report by the U. S. Sixth Army: "General Yamashita's immediate superior was Field Marshal Terauchi, Commander of the Southern Army, which had its headquarters at Saigon and comprised the Malaya, Burma, French Indo-China. N.E.I., New Guinea , Solomons, Admiralty Islands, and Philippines area. Although General Yamashita came into direct command of all ground forces and of air and naval troops on Leyte and Luzon at the time of the U.S. landings on each of these islands, all tactical air units in the Philippines remained under Terauchi's direct command, and General Yamashita had no control over their employment. At the same time, all naval fleet units were controlled directly from Tokyo . This command set-up permitted no co-ordination of the three services and was a constant source of discord throughout the campaigns. Thus, for example, Yamashita knew nothing of the intents of the Japanese Fleet off Leyte until five days before the historic 24-25 October actions." Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Vol X, p. 19.
100. General MacArthur's long and brilliant record in the service of his country won him promotion to the newly created rank of General of the Army on 18 December 1944.
1. GHQ, SWPA, MUSKETEER III, Basic Outline Plan for Revised Philippine Operations, 26 Sep 44. Hereinafter cited as: MUSKETEER III.
3. JCS (thru Marshall) Radio No. W-50007 to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 17 Jun 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 759 (S).
4. C/S WD Radio No. 55718 to CINCSWPA, 24 Jun 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 764 (S).
5. CINCSWPA Radio No. CX-13891 to C/S WD, 18 Jun 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 761 (S).
6. JCS Radio No. WARX 40782 to MacArthur and Nimitz, 3 Oct 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 852 (S).
7. Walter Karig, Russell L. Harris, and Frank A. Manson, Battle Report, Vol V, "Victory in the Pacific" (New York, 1949), P. 1156.
8. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-51429 to C/S WD, 2 Nov 44, GHQ, WD No. 873 (S).
9. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-51706 to C/S WD, 7 Nov 44, G-3, GHQ Admin 385 Plan 21 (TS).
10. The major units participating in the Mindoro assault were as follows:
Ground: Western Visayan Task Force (under Sixth Army)-Brig. Gen. William C. Dunckel Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point 19th RCT, 24th Div Lt. Col. G.H. Chapman Assault Leyte San Jose 503rd Prcht RCT Col G.M. Jones Assault Leyte San Jose
Air: Fifth Air Force--Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead Unit Commander Unit Commander 310th Bomb Wing Col. J.A. Wilson 49th Fighter Gp Lt. Col. G.A. Walker 17th Bomb Gp Lt. Col. H.S. Ellmore 418th Night Fighter Sq Maj. C.C. Smith, Jr. 3rd Bomb Gp Col J.P. Henebry 17th Tac Rcn Sq Maj. J.C. Wise 90th Bomb Gp Lt. Col. W.H. Banks 318th Troop Carrier Sq Maj. C.G. Carter, Jr. 85 Fighter Wing Col. P.H. Greasley 25th Photo Sq Maj. H.A. Curran 58th Fighter Gp Col. G.G. Atkinson Naval: Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Unit Commander Unit Commander Task Group 78.3 R. Adm. A.D. Struble Task Group 77.3 Adm. D.E. Barbey Task Group 77.12 R. Adm. T.D. Ruddock (CVE) Task Group 70.1.4 Lt. Comdr. N.B. Davis, Jr.
11. HQ Sixth Army Report to TAG, 22 Apr 45, G-3, GHQ, SW PA Journal (S).
13. CINCSWPA Radio No. 301358/z to CINCPOA, COM3rdFLT, 30 Nov 44, C/S GHQ, Navy No. 577 (S).
14. CTG 78.3 Action Report, Serial 00308 to COMINCH, Report of the Mindoro Operation, 7 Mar 45, G - 3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
15. COMPHIBGP 9 Report, Serial 00308, to COMINCH, 7 Mar 45, File No. A16-3 (S).
16. COM3rdFLT Report, Serial 0085, 25 Jan 45, File No. A16-3/(16) (S).
17. Statement by Maj. Eizo Hori, Intelligence Staff Officer, Fourteenth Area Army, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
18. Statement by Col. Misoo Matsumae, Staff Officer, Fourth Air Army, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
19. The staff of the Japanese Southwest Area Fleet estimated that the Mindoro-bound convoy would pass through Mindoro or Tablas Strait for a landing at either Tayabas Bay or Batangas Province on Luzon. Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part III, pp. 8-9, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. See also Colonel Matsumae, op. cit.
20. According to Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, the American landing at Mindoro thwarted Japanese plans for a counterattack in force at Carigara in northern Leyte. "We began to plan and prepare in earnest for the counterlanding at Carigara Bay," General Muto stated in describing the early December staff discussions of the Fourteenth Area Army. "On 15 December, the enemy ships stopped at San Jose on Mindoro Island, where forces were landed and the construction of a base was begun. As San Jose is 250 kilometers from Manila, all communications between Manila and the southern Philippines were cut off. This sudden turn in the situation put the counterlanding operation at Carigara Bay out of the question and made the supplying of munitions to the Visaya district impossible. Thus ended the Leyte campaign." Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, SWPA. Hereinafter cited as : Memoirs of General Muto.
21. According to Japanese records, 53 special-attack (Kamikaze) planes supported by 160 fighters, attacked American vessels approaching Mindoro between 16 December and 5 January. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippines Air Operations Record, Phase II, Chart 17, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
22. Maj. Gen. Haruo Konuma, Deputy Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, made the following statement regarding the Japanese estimate of the situation prior to the American landing on Luzon: "I recall that although the Area Army had originally thought that the main landing points of the American forces would be the Batangas and Lingayen areas, it became greatly concerned with the Batangas area about 18 December 1944. During the period immediately subsequent to my arrival at my post (about 18 December 1944), the aftereffects of the landing of the American forces on Mindoro were the factors that had influenced the estimate of the situation. Headquarters was under tension and was devoting its efforts to strengthening the defenses of the Batangas area and the vicinity of the southern strongholds. The estimate of the situation which I heard from the Area Army Chief of Staff was as follows: 'Although the main landing points of the American forces on Luzon cannot be definitely limited to Batangas and Lingayen, there are indications that they may make landings in the Batangas area earlier than we expect (the middle of January).' I think that about 26 or 27 December, it was thought that the main landing of the American forces would take place first in the Lingayen area.... In short, during the period immediately subsequent to the American landing on Mindoro the Area Army's estimate on the main landing points of American forces on Luzon was the Batangas area. Later, however, the Area Army began to pay attention to the Lingayen area as a possible landing point. I believe it was not until just prior to the sighting of the American convoy in the waters west of Bataan Peninsula that the Area Army was able to estimate definitely that the landings would be made in the Lingayen Area." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
23. Commenting on the transport and communication problem, Lt. Col. Yorio Ishikawa, Staff Officer of the Japanese Fourteenth Area Army, stated: "After the American landing on Mindoro, our supply line between Luzon and the Visayas was completely cut off. As for our communications, we had to depend entirely on wireless to contact our forces in Leyte, Cebu, Ormoc, etc. from Manila, after the United States had seized Mindoro and Marinduque Islands." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, G-2, GHQ, FEC.
24. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 31 Dec 44.
25. The major units participating in the Lingayen assault were as follows:
Ground: Sixth Army-General Walter Krueger Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point I Corps Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift .....6th Div Maj. Gen. E.D. Patrick Assault Sansapor San Fabian .....43rd Div Maj. Gen. L.F. Wing Assault Aitape San Fabian .....32nd Div Maj. Gen. W.H. Gill Follow-up Leyte .....33rd Div Maj. Gen. P.W. Clarkson Follow-up Finschhafen-Toem XIV Corps Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold .....40th Div Maj. Gen. R. Brush Assault Gloucester Lingayen .....37th Div Maj. Gen. R.S. Beightler Assault Bougainville Dagupan .....1st Cav Div Maj. Gen. V.D. Mudge Follow-up Leyte .....112th Cav RCT Brig. Gen. J.W. Cunningham Follow-up Leyte 6th Ranger Bn Lt. Col. H.A. Mucci Reserve Leyte 25th Div Maj. Gen. C.L. Mullins, Jr Reserve Noumea 13 Armed Gp Col. M.E. Jones Reserve Leyte, Oro Bay, Hollandia 158th RCT Brig. Gen. H. MacNider Reserve Noemfoor 4th ESB Brig. Gen. H. Hutchins, Jr. Assault San Fabian Dagupan 533rd EB&SR Col. W.S. Moore Assault Aitape Lingayen 543rd EB&SR Col G.E. Galloway Assault Sansapor San Fabian, Dagupan
Air: Fifth Air Force-Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead Unit Commander Unit Commander 308th Bomb Wing Brig. Gen. D.W. Hutchison 35th Fighter Gp Lt. Col. E.A. Doss 86th Fighter Wing Col. J.O. Guthrie 71st Rcn Gp Lt. Col. H.C. Thompson 38th Bomb Gp Col. E.M. Gavin 547th Night Fighter Sq Lt. Col. W.C. Odell 18th Fighter Gp Col. M.B. Adams Naval: Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Unit Commander Unit Commander Task Group 77 Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Task Group 79 V. Adm. T.S. Wilkinson Task Group 78 Adm. D.E. Barbey
26. Commander Luzon Attack Force Report, Serial 001200, to CINC USFLT, Action Report-Luzon Attack Force, Lingayen Gulf MUSKETEER MIKE One Operation, 15 May 1945. Hereinafter cited as : Luzon Attack Force Action Report.
27. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jan 45.
28. COMBATRON 1 (CTG 77.2) Report, Serial 00 18, to COMINCH, via COM3rdPHIBFOR, COM7thFLT, CINCSWPA, The Bombardment and Occupation of Lingayen Gulf, 28 Jan 45, File No. FC1-1A16-3, (S).
29. Luzon Attack Force Action Report, p. 115. Available Japanese documents contain only the number of suicide and escort planes used against the Lingayen invasion force. Attack missions by conventional aircraft are not included. According to these records, on 5 January, 20 suicide planes and 5 escort fighters were directed against the Allied Task Force; on 6 January, a total of 58 suicide planes and 17 escort fighters were employed in attacks on the ships in the general area of Lingayen Gulf. Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, Appended Chart 8. See also Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase II, Appended Chart No. 17, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
30. Luzon Attack Force Action Report, pp. 15-16.
31. CINCSWPA Radio No. CX-56001 to GG Army Air Forces, 7 Jan 45, G-3, GHQ, Admin. 385 Plan 21 (TS).
32. The guerrillas did excellent work in leading the escort carrier planes to enemy war materiel. The commander of the air support control units reported, "Guerrilla sketches of enemy installations in the interior prepared by Lt. Col. Volckmann's command were invaluable. By means of these sketches CSA (Commander Air Support Aircraft) was able to direct pilots to specific buildings within a town where arms and fuel were stored, thus sparing from needless destruction other parts of the town. The sketches were amazing in their accuracy and were put to good use throughout the operation." Comdr Air Support Control Units Report to COM7thFLT, Report of Support Aircraft Operations, Lingayen Gulf Landings, 20 Jan 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal. See also G-2, GHQ, FEC, General Intelligence Series Vol I, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines and Vol II, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation.
33. Luzon Attack Force Action Report, p. 12.
34. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1008, to Jan 45.
35. Three regimental combat teams of the 43rd Division, the 63rd RCT of the 6th Division, and the 158th RCT.
36. In reply to his critics, Col. Shigeo Kawaii, Operations Staff Officer of the Japanese 2nd Tank Division on Luzon, said the following: "The employment of the tank division in the Philippines is generally considered a great blunder. The fact remains that the American forces had command of the air, preventing movement along the highways and cross-country movement in an area covered with rice paddies was impossible. Consequently, even though the tanks were organized for combat maneuvers, they were soon immobilized because of the lack of air cover and the destructive American aerial attacks which the tanks could not counter. They were, therefore, converted into armored, fixed defenses to be used by the infantry in key positions along the defense lines. This adaptation of the tanks was so successful that, in one instance, a line 60 kilometers long was held for a period of one month." 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Luzon, Part IV, p. 7 (R).
37. HQ Sixth Army, Field Order No. 34, 20 Nov 44, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 29 Nov 44.
38. HQ XIV Corps, After-Action Report, M-1 Operation, 29 Jul 45, p. 57, AG 314.7 W. Hereinafter cited as: XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report.
39. HQ Sixth Army, G-3 Daily Report, 23 Jan 45.
40. Interrogation of Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, Senior Staff Officer, Fourteenth Area Army and later Tactical Staff Officer of the Japanese Forty-first Army, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. Col. Ryoichiro Aoshima, Chief of Staff, Line of Communications, Fourteenth Area Army described the evolution of Japanese strategy on Luzon as follows: "Prior to the Leyte Campaign, Fourteenth Area Army had planned to make Luzon the decisive battleground, but from November on, plans were gradually changed from an aggressive counterattack to delaying tactics. Not, however, until the landing on Mindoro, on December 15th, 1944, were the actual preparations for delaying action gotten underway." loth Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Luzon, Part I, p. 11 (R).
41. The extent of the Japanese dependence on the Cagayan Valley for food was emphasized by General Muto in his story of the Philippine Campaign. "I have already mentioned,"he stated," that the Japanese forces endeavored to requisition rice on Luzon because of the shortage of provisions. We knew that, even if central Luzon rice could be requisitioned as anticipated, the Army could not expect much after the amount required by the Filipinos had been subtracted, but we were counting very heavily on the Cagayan River valley rice; indeed, our lives depended on it. When General Yamashita had decided on the Luzon defense positon, the stationing of the Japanese main force in northern Luzon had of course been based upon the deployment of our troops at that time and the enemy situation estimate, but the availability of food in the Cagayan River valley was also an important factor." Memoirs of General Muto, p. 28.
42. HQ Fourteenth Area Army, Outline of Operational Policy for Luzon Island, 19 Dec 44; Appendices I and II, issued separately 20 Dec 44, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
43. General Muto held that the Leyte battle had revealed the impossibility of contending with American mechanized units in open maneuvers. "Ample demonstration had been given in the Leyte campaign," he declared, "of the manner in which American firepower and mechanized strength could maneuver and advance under aerial protection. To the question of what could be expected to result from a clash on an open plain and without air support between the Japanese Army and its superior adversary, the most steadfast believer in the power of spiritual factors had perforce to answer that the outlook was dark for Japan." Memoirs of General Muto, p. 12.
44. HQ Fourteenth Area Army, Outline of Operational Policy for Luzon Island, 19 Dec 44, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
45. The major units participating in the Zambales landing were as follows:
Ground: Eighth Army-General Robert L. Eichelberger Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point XI Corps Maj. Gen. Charles P. Hall .....38th Div Maj. Gen. H.L.C. Jones Assault Leyte San Narciso .....34th RCT Lt. Col. C.A. Daklen Assault Mindoro San Antonio
Air: Thirteenth Air Force (supported by elements of the Fifth Air Force)-Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett
Unit Commander Unit Commander XIII Fighter Comd Brig. Gen. E.W. Barnes 348th Fighter Gp Col. R.R. Rowland XIII Bomber Comd Col. C.A. Brandt 421st Night Fighter Sq Capt. R.D. Kiick 309th Bomb Wing Col. N.D. Sillin 5th Bomb Gp Col. T.C. Musgrove 86th Fighter Wing Col. J.O. Guthrie 307th Bomb Gp Col. C.H. Rees Naval: Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Unit Commander Unit Commander Task Group 78.3 R. Adm. A.D. Struble Task Group 77.3 R. Adm. D.E. Barbey Task Group 77.4 R. Adm. T.L. Sprague
46. The American landing along Zambales Province cut off the Japanese forces west of Clark Field from all contact with the rest of their units on Luzon. General Muto stated: "American elements landed at San Antonio on 30 January, putting the Kembu Group between two enemy forces and leading subsequently to its complete encirclement. Communication between the Kembu Group and General Yamashita was cut off in the middle of January, and we lost all track of it until the end of the war." Memoirs of General Muto, p. 25.
47. HQ XI Corps, Historical Report, Luzon Campaign, Advance Copy, Section II, p. 3.
48. Ibid., Sections III and IV.
49. The Japanese had a total of approximately 30,000 troops of the "Kembu Group" defending the Clark Field-Fort Stotsenburg sector. This figure included 8,000 troops of three army detachments (Takayama, Eguchi, and Takaya Butai), 15,000 naval troops deployed in the hills to the northwest in the rear of the Clark Field defenses, and 7,000 miscellaneous air service troops who had been located at the various airfields. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippines Operation Record, Phase III, Supplement 2 to Vol III, "Kembu Group Operations in the Clark Sector," G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
50. XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, p. 69.
51. Ibid., p.72.
52. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1027, 29 Jan 45.
53. XIV Corps, M-1, Operation Report, p. 79.
54. Two days earlier, during the evening of 30 January, a force of guerrillas, assisted and led by elements of the 6th Ranger Battalion, raided the enemy prison camp near Cabanatuan. Over 500 Allied prisoners of war were liberated in this successfully executed attack and the Japanese garrison was virtually annihilated. See Chapter X, p. 318.
55. XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, p. 82.
56. Ibid., p. 79
57. The major units participating in the Nasugbu-Tagaytay assaults were as follows:
Ground: Eighth Army-General Robert L. Eichelberger Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point 511th Prcht RCT Col. O.D. Haugen Prcht Assault Mindoro Tagaytay 11th A/B Div (-1 RCT) Maj. Gen. J.M. Swing Assault Leyte Nasugbu
Air: Fifth Air Force-Maj. Gen. Ennis G. Whitehead Unit Commander 54th Troop Carrier Wing Brig. Gen. P.H. Prentiss Naval: Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Unit Commander Task Group 78.2 R. Adm. W. Fechteler
58. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1031, 2 Feb
59. XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, pp. 91- 94.
60. These forces were under the command of Rear Adm. Sanji Iwabuchi, Commander of the Japanese 31st Naval Special Base Force. According to Japanese records, naval troops in the Manila-Cavite area at the time of the Lingayen invasion numbered about 17,000 men. In addition, approximately 3,000-4,000 army troops were sent to the Manila area and placed under the control of Admiral Iwabuchi for ground operations. A considerable number of these troops succeeded in effecting a withdrawal to join forces with the "Shimbu Group "east of Manila. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippines Operations Record, Phase III, Supplement I to Vol III, "Shimbu Group Operations East of Manila," p. 21, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. See also: Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Operations by Manila Naval Defense Force, May 47, Part I, pp. 49-64 and Part II, pp. 49-50, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC; and Statement of Comdr. Koichi Kayashima, Operations Staff Officer, 31st Naval Special Base Force, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
61. HQ Fourteenth Area Army, Outline of Operational Policy for Luzon Island, 19 Dec 94, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
62. XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, p. 83.
63. Ibid., p. 84.
64. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1035, 6 Feb 45.
65. During this inspection tour of Manila, General MacArthur was accompanied by General Willoughby and Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers. At this time also, General MacArthur visited briefly the liberated internees at Bilibid Prison and Santo Tomas University.
66. XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, pp. 93-94.
67. Manila Free Philippines, February 28, 1945, p. 1.
68. On 23 February, a specially constituted task unit, composed of guerrillas and 11th Airborne Division troops, speared into the Japanese prison camp at Los Banos to add more than 2,100 Allied civilians to the long list of liberated prisoners. See Chapter X, p. 318.
69. This staff included Generals Sutherland, Willoughby, R. K. Marshall, Marquat, and Casey. Even before the outbreak of the war these officers had been associated with General MacArthur, serving with the Military Advisor's Group, with the Philippine Department, or with USAFFE.
70. HQ XI Corps, Historical Report, Luzon Campaign, Section V, p. 12.
71. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippines Operations Record, Phase III, Supplement 1 to Vol III, "Shimbu Group Operations East of Manila," attached map No. 1, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
72. This date also marked the day that Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger received his promotion to General, crowning a brilliant career of outstanding achievement and service to his country.
73. HQ XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, p. 155.
74. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1068, 10 Mar 45.
75. HQ Sixth Army, Sixth Army on Luzon, Section 3, "Cave Warfare in the Mountains," p. 50.
76. The cabinet moved to Baguio on 22 December 1944; General Yamashita's headquarters, on 4 January 1945. Memoirs of General Muto, pp. 19, 22. Besides the puppet president of the Philippines, Jose P. Laurel, some of the other high officials included in the transfer to Baguio were Benigno S. Aquino, Speaker of the Congress; Jose Yulo, President of the Supreme Court; Manuel Roxas, Minister of the Planning Board; and Claro M. Recto, Foreign Minister. Statement of General Utsunomiya, 18 Jul 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
77. These guerrillas were under Col. Russel W. Volckmann, USAFIP, NL, who was the recognized leader of all guerrilla forces in the northern sector of Luzon. See G-2, GHQ, FEC, Intelligence Series, Vol I, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines "; see also Chapter X, p. 320.
78. On 19 April, General Yamashita again moved his headquarters, this time from Baguio to Bambang, preparatory to ultimate transfer to Kiangan. Memoirs of General Muto, p. 36.
79. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippines Operations Record, Phase III, Vol III, pp. 8 3- 8 4, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
80. Commenting on the Japanese attempt to escape from Munoz, Colonel Kawai said," The enemy [6th Division] cut off the only retreat route and covered it with anti-tank guns. Thus, this force [at Munoz] was annihilated. Retreat through other areas was impossible because of the flooded rice fields." 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Luzon, Part IV, p. 22.
81. HQ 25th Division, Tropic Lightning News, No. 1115 2 12 Jun 45, p. 2.
82. General Muto expressed great admiration for the feats of American engineers in breaking through the stra- tegic passes of the Cagayan Valley. "In our estimate, based on the past concept of tactics," he stated, "the terrain features of these areas provided impregnable fortification. However, the American forces started attacking in the beginning of February and kept it up incessantly. The superior enemy bombardment and shelling gradually obliterated the jungle area. Bulldozers accomplished the impossible. Tanks and artillery appeared in positions where we had thought they would never penetrate. Our front line troops destroyed bulldozers, tanks and artillery by valiant hand to hand fighting. However, the enemy advanced inch by inch, capturing this mountain, taking that hill." Memoirs of General Muto, pp. 36-37.
83. On 17 May, over 70,000 gallons of napalm were dropped by 288 aircraft preceding infantry troops. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, May 45.
84. In describing the rapidly deteriorating condition of the remnants of the Japanese units which had withdrawn into the mountains of eastern Luzon, Colonel Kobayashi stated: "From the beginning of the retreat into the hills, the basic strategy had been to secure positions which could be easily defended by taking advantage of the contours of the land. Offense against the American invaders was to consist of night infiltration raids. Until the end of June we had been able to continue these operations, but after this time the troops were so weak from hunger that only those areas near positions could be guarded, and no infiltration attacks were carried out. From this time on, groups were organized to hunt for food. These often infiltrated American lines to steal supplies. They had not the power to attack any sizeable group of American or Filipino troops." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
85. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45.
86. Ibid., Mar 45.
87. XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, p. 174.
88. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Apr and May 45.
89. XIV Corps, M-1 Operation Report, p. 220.
90. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1, 78, 28 Jun 45.
91. General Yamashita still had under his command in northern Luzon at this time remants of the 2nd Armored, 19th, 23rd, and 105th Divisions and the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade. These forces, heavily depleted by casualties, sickness, and ineffectives, were operating at less than half strength. Most of their equipment, artillery, and other weapons had been either lost or destroyed in battle and their rations were virtually exhausted. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Philippines Operations Record, Phase III, Vol III, "Operations on Luzon," p. 274, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
92. SECWAR Stimson Ltr to CINCSWPA, 3 Jul 45, G-2 Admin File.
93. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45.
94. Continuing his retreat, General Yamashita had moved his headquarters to Kiangan in mid-May. In June, he went farther into the mountains, establishing himself at Jabangan on the 23rd. As the American forces pursued northward, a new headquarters was established on 12 July at a location along the upper reaches of the Asin River. Memoirs of General Muto, pp. 40- 41, 49-54.
95. G-3 GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45.
96. On 20 August, the Eighth Army turned over command of the Philippines to the Commanding General, Army Forces Western Pacific. This Headquarters, previously responsible for the logistic support of United States forces in the Southwest Pacific, undertook to bring about the individual surrender and disposition of all Japanese troops remaining in the Philippines.
97. According to General Muto, it was impossible to carry on any longer. Describing the conditions in Japanese Headquarters at the beginning of August, he stated: "The wireless facilities of the Area Army, which for a long period had made no contact with the Southern Area General Army in Saigon and the Imperial Headquarters, re-established communication on about 30 July. I felt that it was necessary to make a report on the general situation of the Area Army and I personally drafted a report concerning the disposition of troops, military resources, the enemy situation, the food situation, etc. In conclusion I stated that the Area Army estimated that its organized battle would cease in early September. General Yamashita, after making a few changes, authorized its dispatch. Thus, General Yamashita had decided that the final stage would be in early September." Memoirs of General Muto, p. 56.
1. "The saga of a people's refusal to bow before a foreign aggressor has been written many times in this war, especially throughout Europe. But in the Pacific, it fell to the Filipino to show the world that the love for freedom and democracy was not an exclusive quality of the Occident." Manila Free Philippines, May 19, 1945, Editorial, p. 2.
2. A good indication of the extent and severity of Japanese anti-guerrilla measures is evident in the captured records of court trials held in the Philippines. These records list the names of hundreds of Filipinos who were tried and summarily sentenced to death or to long prison terms on charges of "guerrilla" or "baneful action." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 398, "Trial Records of Filipino and Chinese Guerrillas and Civilians and Japanese Soldiers and Civilians," 22 Sep 45 (C).
3. The Japanese also recognized the need for reconstituting the Philippine Constabulary to assist in maintaining order, as reported by Comdr. Charles Parsons in June 1943: "The kempei (military police) soldiers are being gradually replaced by Filipino policemen, and as the reorganized Philippine Constabulary soldiers are trained and sent to the various provincial units to take over the maintenance of law and order, treatment of the civil population may be expected to be even better." GHQ, SWPA, G-2 Information Bulletin," Report on Conditions in the Philippine Islands," Jun 43.
4. The geographical subdivision of the Philippines and the deliberate formation in semi-independent corps were elements in a projected resistance movement; this was the issue between General Wainwright and General Homma in their surrender meeting on Bataan on 6 May 1942. General Wainwright initially claimed that his authority did not extend beyond Luzon whereas General Homma insisted on the surrender of all forces in the Philippines. The territorial organization for the mobilization of the Philippine divisions formed the nucleus and administrative rallying areas for the resistance movement in its organizational phase.
5. Letter to Fermin Caram, Japanese Puppet Governor of Iloilo Province, Panay, 20 Feb 43. Philippines Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
6. This was why we kept fighting; this was why we continued to hope. We believed in Quezon and in the fighting spirit of the Philippines. We believed in MacArthur-and America." Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, pp. 176-177.
7. In addressing the Philippine Congress on 9 July 1945, General MacArthur praised the spirit and resistance of the Filipino people in the following words: "Your combat record on Bataan and the magnificent spiritual and physical resistance of the great masses of your people to the enemy efforts at pacification has given to the world the true strength of your character and established your undisputed spiritual capacity for self-government under any standards...." Manila Free Philippines, July 10, 1945, p. 3.
8. For a detailed history of the growth, problems, and activities of the various guerrilla groups on each island in the Philippines see G-2, GHQ, FEC, Intelligence Series, Vol I, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, "hereinafter cited as: The Guerrilla Resistance Movement. See also Vol II, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation," hereinafter cited as: Intelligence Activities in the Philippines. These were published as war records and have been distributed to U.S. Army service schools.
9. The first radio contacts with the Philippine guerrillas were established by station KFS in San Francisco and were relayed to station KAZ in Darwin, Australia. In November 1942, KFS established contact with Maj. Ralph B. Praeger in northern Luzon and with Col. Macario Peralta in Panay. Shortly afterwards, KAZ made direct communication with station WZE in Panay. Cebu and Negros were contacted in early 1943. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, pp. 12-13.
10. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, pp. 10-12.
11. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
12. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
13. In recounting his journey to Manila, Major Cruz quoted General MacArthur as saying in farewell, "Cruz, this is a very tough job. Personally, I believe you have no chance to get through. With your connection to President Quezon you have become very well known. I give you 10 percent chance to enter Manila, but honestly I believe you have no chance to get out." Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, Vol II, Documentary Appendices, Appendix XX, p. 1.
14. In this class may also be included the Pulahanes and Ganaps, who were backed by the Japanese and remained under their influence. To counteract the effect of guerrilla activities, the Japanese tried to set up pro-Japanese organizations among the Filipinos. One such ineffectual attempt on Luzon is described by Colonel Kobayashi, G-3, Fourteenth Area Army, as follows: "Because the American-supported guerrillas were extremely active we tried to organize a similar group called the Ganap to guard the roads, especially north of Manila and the food-producing area around Laguna. They were also to harass and misdirect American troops in operations after the American landings. The group was never fully organized, however, and never worked well. It had no effect on operations. While the Americans steadily received intelligence from their guerrillas, our group never gave us any information that we could use." Maj. Gen. Naotake Utsunomiya, Assistant Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, declared that he "felt that Ganap was not fully reliable." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
15. This policy was emphasized in GHQ's instructions to its agent in Mindoro: "You should carefully refrain from any move which might be construed by local leaders as encouragement for more aggressive guerrilla action with a consequent bid to heavy enemy reinforcement and increased danger of detection of your position and activity. Your mission is one of secret intelligence, and while it is desired that you extend friendly co-operation to local guerrillas and loyal residents, your participation in their affairs to any greater extent could tend to compromise the success of that mission and should be carefully avoided." GHQ, SWPA, Radio to Maj. Phillips, No. 6, 13 Dec 43. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, pp. 36- 37.
16. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
17. Ibid., p. 58.
18. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 83-84.
19. This command comprised a tentative organization of six divisions and the "Maranao Militia Force"; the Maranao Force was composed of the proud and temperamental Mohammedan Moros who maintained a separate group within the Mindanao guerrillas. Less than half of these forces were armed, however, and because of their poor training and outmoded weapons their fighting potential could not be judged by their numerical strength. Ibid., p. 85.
In treating the subject of guerrilla forces and organization it must be borne in mind that there was an understandable tendency on the part of their leaders to use the rather ambitious military nomenclatures of corps and divisions, based on the pre-war District mobilization pattern.
21. The tactics employed by the guerrillas in their warfare against the Japanese on Mindanao were described in an intelligence report covering the period 1-30 April 1944 issued by Headquarters, Japanese Fourteenth Area Army "(1) The bandits occupy and utilize key points of communications, firing on and making surprise attacks against our military traffic. They flee whenever we attack. (2) They construct obstacles on the roads and destroy bridges and, when we are engaged in clearing the way or in repair work, they execute surprise attacks. (3) By cutting wires, kidnapping people, burning homes, and other actions calculated to disturb the peace, they draw out our forces; they execute aggressive attacks on a considerable scale. (4) The enemy draws us out by using small units and then carries out an enveloping attack with his main force. When our forces outnumber theirs, the enemy, particularly the Moros, lies in wait in jungle areas for our return and attacks fiercely." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 359, Part I, 28 Apr 45, p. 7.
22. Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Mindanao Operation, Victor V, pp. 3, 17, 23, 35, 43, 55.
23. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 69-72.
24. Ibid., p. 77. Capt. Abcede was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on 1 October 1944.
25. Ibid., pp. 35-37. Many of the puppet officials installed by the Japanese on Cebu worked secretly with the Cushing-Fenton guerrillas. A noteworthy example of such an official was Hilario Abellana, pre-war Governor of Cebu, who escaped from the Japanese in July 1943 and joined the Cebu guerrillas. He proved invaluable to the guerrillas by giving them aid in carrying on civil government functions, raising funds, and looking after the interests of the free civilian communities.
26. Ibid., pp. 37-58.
27. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
28. Manila Free Philippines, June 7, 1945, p. 4.
29. Maj. Kohei Takahashi, who served as staff officer with both the Japanese Thirty-fifth Army and the Fourteenth Area Army, made the following comment on useful intelligence furnished by the Cebu guerrillas to the Allied forces "When the U.S. task force raided Cebu City in September 1944, it hit only the buildings occupied by the Japanese Army. No other places were hit. This was far from an accident. It was due to knowledge acquired through the guerrillas."Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
30. Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Panay-Negros and Cebu Operations, Victor I and II, p. 59. HQ Eighth Army, Operational Monograph on the Cebu-Bohol, Negros Oriental Operation, Victor II, pp. 13 -14.
31. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
32. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 46-51.
34. Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Panay-Negros and Cebu Operations, Victor I and II, pp. 18-45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1080, 22 Mar 45.
35. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 1-3.
36. A captured Fourteenth Area Army intelligence report concerning the guerrillas on Leyte contained the following statement: "The bandit groups in every area, particularly the Kangleon bandit group (Leyte), have blind faith in the return of the American forces.... They are preparing for an uprising simultaneously with the return of the American forces and are laying plans to link up with them." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 359, Part I, 28 Apr 45, p. 4.
37. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 5-8.
39. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 92. The Japanese were much concerned with the plans of the guerrillas to rise up against them simultaneously with the American invasion of the Philippines. In an intelligence report issued by Fourteenth Area Army Headquarters, covering the period 1-30 April 1944, the following information was given: "The bandit groups have become more and more aggressive.. .. they appear to be planning an uprising simultaneously with the return of the American forces, and in the meantime are conserving their forces and building up their military strength. They are directing most of their efforts toward reconnaissance of our forces, principally of our defense formations, and toward fifth column destruction of our rear lines of communications units." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 359, Part I, 26 Apr 45, p. 3.
40. HQ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, p. 79.
41. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, p. 9.
42. Ibid., pp. 10-24. The commander of this organization was a natural leader, Col. Marcos V. Agustin. A fearless fighter, he was aided by the brilliant Yay Panlillo, Filipino woman journalist, whom he later married.
43. Colonel Kobayashi, G-3, Fourteenth Area Army, paid tribute to Major (later Colonel) Anderson in the following words: "About the middle of October 1944, we attempted to extirpate the guerrilla movement in Luzon. Unfortunately for us, however, Colonel Anderson was too good a leader and the American guerrillas continued to function.... In recalling the final stage of the war in the Philippines ... I remember how famous Colonel Anderson became among us." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
44. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 39-42.
45. Ibid., pp. 43-44. Major Volckmann was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on 9 October 1944.
46. G-3, HQ Sixth Army, Combat Notes, No. 5, 21 Mar 45, pp. 1-10.
47. GHQ, SWPA, Special Communique No. 1054, 24 Feb 45; HQ 32 Div, "Daily Summary of Enemy Information" No. 73, 26 Apr 45.
48. Manila Free Philippines, June 2, 1945, p. 3.
49. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1063, 5 Mar 45.
50. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1079, 21 Mar 45.
51. General Muto explained this penetration in the following words: "Filipino guerrilla units penetrated the jungle and appeared at our rear. The initial force of some 115 men increased to 200 the following day, and by the third day the group expanded into a complete unit augmented by American troops, who then occupied key positions behind our front lines." Unpublished memoirs of Lt. Gen. Akira Muto: Hito Sakusen no Shinso-The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, 15 Jun 47, p. 52, G-2, GHQ, FEC.
52. GHQ, SWPA, Special Release, 25 Oct 44.
1. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, MONTCLAIR, Basic Outline Plan for Reoccupation of the Western Visayas--Mindanao-Borneo-NEI, Edition No. 3, 25 Feb 45. Hereinafter cited as: MONTCLAIR III.
3. CINCSWPA Radio CA-50178 to AC/S, G-3, GHQ, SWPA, 30 Jan 45, G-3, Admin 381/13 (TS).
4. These operations were designated as follows: Palawan, VICTOR III; Zamboanga, VICTOR IV; Panay and northern Negros, VICTOR I; Cebu, southern Negros, and Bohol, VICTOR II; central and eastern Mindanao, VICTOR V. The date of the last-mentioned operation was changed to 17 April by Amendment No. 2, 6 Mar 45, to MONTCLAIR III.
5. HQ Eighth Army, Operational Monograph on the Palawan Operation, VICTOR III, p. 4. Hereinafter cited as Eighth Army, Palawan Operation. Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army on the Leyte-Samar Operation, pp. 20-21. Hereinafter cited as: Leyte-Samar Operation.
6. Leyte-Samar Operation, pp. 20-21.
7. Leyte-Samar Operation, pp. 23-32.
8. GHQ, SWPA, Operations Instructions No. 89, 6 Feb 45; Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army on the Palawan and Zamboanga Operations, p. 5. Hereinafter cited as: Palawan-Zamboanga Operations.
9. Eighth Army, Palawan Operation, p. 5; Palawan-Zamboanga Operations, p. 4.
10. Eighth Army, Palawan Operation, p. 5; Palawan-Zamboanga Operations, p. 4.
11. HQ Eighth Army, Field Order No. 20, 17 Feb 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 18 Feb 45 (S); Eighth Army, Palawan Operation, p. 31; Palawan-Zamboanga Operations, pp. 5-6. The major units participating in the Puerto Princesa landing were as follows:
Eighth Army-General Robert L. Eichelberger Ground: Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point 186th RCT, 41st Div Col. O.P. Newman Assault Mindoro Puerto Princesa ... Thirteenth Air Force (supported by elements of the Fifth Air Force)-Brig. Gen. P.B. Wurtsmith
Air: Unit Commander Unit Commander XIII Fighter Comd Brig. Gen. E.W. Barnes 43rd Bomb Gp Col. J.T. Pettus, Jr. 347th Fighter Gp Col L.F. Dusard, Jr. 419th Night Fighter Sq Maj. J.A. Shulmistras 42nd Bomb Gp Maj. H.C. Harvey 403rd Troop Carrier Sq Col H.J. Sands, Jr. 85th Fighter Wing Col P.H. Greasley ... ... .. Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Naval: Unit Commander ... ... Palawan Attack Gp (Task Force 78.2) Adm. W.M. Fechteler ... ... ... ...
12. Eighth Army, Palawan Operation, pp. 32- 33.
13. Ibid., pp. 61-62; COMPHIBGP 8 (Admiral Fechteler) Report to COMINCH, Serial 0015, 25 Mar 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 1 Mar 45 (S).
14. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1060, 2 Mar 45.
15. "The Puerto Princesa area," declared Major General Yoshiharu Tomochika, Thirty-fifth Army Chief of Staff, "was considered important ... since it offered the enemy a possible staging base for air operations against our supply lines from our homeland to the southwest Pacific area." Major Chuji Kaneko, a staff officer of the 102nd Division, stated: "It was considered most important to secure the air and sea route between ... Borneo and our homeland via Manila." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
16. "In case of an enemy landing," asserted Major Kaneko, "our troops were to resist as long as possible and to protect ... the Puerto Princesa airfield.... After the Americans had landed on Luzon, an order was handed down from Thirty-fifth Army to the units on Palawan to engage in guerrilla warfare and to resist from the mountains instead of Puerto Princesa." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
17. S-3, Palawan Force, Report to TAG, "Narrative History of the Palawan (V-3) Operation," G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 30 Jun 45. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, May 45.
18. Palawan-Zamboanga Operations, p. 37; HQ Eighth Army, Operational Monograph on the Zamboanga-Sulu Archipelago Operation, pp. 5-6. Hereinafter cited as: Eighth Army, Zamboanga-Sulu Operation.
19. HQ Eighth Army, Field Order No. 20, 17 Feb 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 18 Feb 45.
20. The major units participating in the Zamboanga assault were as follows:
Eighth Army-General Robert L. Eichelberger Ground: Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point 41st Div (-186 RCT) Brig. Gen. J. A. Doe Assault Mindoro San Mateo, Zamboanga Peninsula ... Far East Air Forces (supported by elements of the Seventh Air Force and certain Marine Air Units)-General George C. Kenney
Fifth Air Force
Maj. Gen. E. C. Whitehead
22nd Bomb Gp
Lt. Col. L. T. Nicholson
Thirteenth Air Force
Brig. Gen. P. B. Wurtsmith
43rd Bomb Gp
Col. J. T. Pettus, Jr.
XIII Fighter Comd
Brig. Gen. E. W. Barnes
42nd Bomb Gp
Col. C. C. Kegelman
XIII Bomber Comd
Col. C. A. Brandt
307th Bomb Gp
Col. C. H. Rees
85th Fighter Wing
Col. P. H. Greasley
Marine Air Gp 12
Lt. Col. Verne McCall
494th Bomb Gp
Col. L. B. Kelley
Fleet Air Wg No 10
5th Bomb Gp
Maj. A. W. James
1st Marine Aircraft Wg
Seventh Fleet-Adm. T. C. Kinkaid Naval: Unit Commander Palawan Attack Gp. (Task Force 78.3) Adm. F.B. Royal
21. Eighth Army, Zamboanga-Sulu Operation, p. 5.
22. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
23. HQ 41St Div. Report to TAG, "G-3 Report on the V-4 Operation, 10 Mar-20 Jun 1945" G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 20 Jun 45 (S). Hereinafter cited as: 41st Div. V-4 Report.
24. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1070, 12 Mar 45.
25. Although the American invasion of Zamboanga obviously was not totally unexpected, subsequent interrogations of surviving Japanese revealed that the landings caught them unprepared. Maj. Yasura Hanada, Chief of Staff and only surviving staff member of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade, Thirty-fifth Army stated: "We expected that when the Americans landed on Luzon they would proceed to the Homeland. We did not expect Zamboanga to be attacked. However, in February, there were indications of a landing, and by then it was too late to do much about it. That was where our error lay." 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of the Japanese Activities in the Zamboanga (VICTOR IV) Operation. Hereinafter cited as: Eighth Army, Staff Study, Zamboanga.
26. Palawan-Zamboanga Operations, pp. 49-51; 41st Div. V-4 Report.
27. In commenting on the Japanese tactics of withdrawing to the hills rather than putting up a stiffer resistance on the beaches of Zamboanga, Major Hanada said: "It was indicated from the Battle of Leyte that such tactics would have resulted in a great loss of troops to us. Rather than take such a risk and lose so much, it seemed wiser to remain in the hills and take a delayed action strategy." Eighth Army, Staff Study, Zamboanga.
28. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Mar and Apr 45.
29. Palawan-Zamboanga Operation, pp. 56-58; 41st Div. V-4 Report.
30. Eighth Army, Zamboanga-Sulu Operation, pp. 53-54; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Apr 45.
31. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 10 94, 5 Apr 45.
32. The original plans of the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade for the defense of Jolo Island called for an all-out defense at the shoreline, with vigorous counterattacks, to be followed by a retreat to prepared positions inland, if necessary, for a final stand. This plan, however, was altered early in March when the incidence of malaria and jungle ulcers had cut the strength to a point where it was considered impracticable to have a double line of defense. The constant attrition from guerrilla attacks and the fear of a guerrilla attack from the rear to aid the American landing were other factors in the change of plans. Interrogation of Maj. Tokichi Tenmyo, CO, 365th Battalion, 55th IMB, Eighth Army, Staff Study, Zamboanga.
33. Eighth Army, Zamboanga-Sulu Operation, pp. 55-61; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations,Apr 45.
34. CO 2nd Bn, 163rd Inf Report to TAG, "Sulu White, V-4 Operations," G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 10 Apr 45(S).
35. HQ Eighth Army, Operational Monograph on the Panay-Negros Occidental Operation, pp. 5-6. Hereinafter cited as: Eighth Army, Panay-Negros Occidental Operation. Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army on the Panay -Negros and Cebu Operations, p. 1. Hereinafter cited as: Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations.
36. The major forces participating in the Panay assault were as follows:
Eighth Army-General Robert L. Eichelberger Ground: Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point 40th Div (-108 RCT) Maj. Gen. R. Brush Assault Lingayen Tigbauan ... Thirteenth Air Force (supported by elements of the Fifth and Seventh Air Forces and certain Marine Air Groups)-Brig. Gen. P.B. Wurtsmith
Air: Unit Commander Unit Commander XIII Bomber Comd Col C.A. Brandt 347th Fighter Gp Col L.F. Dusard, Jr. XIII Fighter Comd Brig. Gen. E.W. Barnes 85th Fighter Wing Col P.H. Greasley 307th Bomb Gp Col C.H. Rees 403rd Troop Carrier Gp Col H.J. Sands, Jr. 42nd Bomb Gp Maj. H.C. Harvey Marine Air Gp, Zamboanga Col C. Jerome 5th Bomb Gp Lt. Col. A.W. James .. Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Naval: Unit Commander Unit Commander Task Gp 78 Adm. D.E. Barbey Task Group 78.3.2 Capt. R.W. Cavenaugh Task Gp 78.3 R. Adm. A.D. Struble ... ...
37. Eighth Army, Panay-Negros Occidental Operation, pp. 31-32.
38. CG 40th Div. Report to TAG, "VICTOR One & VICTOR One Able Operations, 40th Inf. Div." G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 1 Jul 45 (S). Hereinafter cited as: 40th Div. VICTOR I Report. Eighth Army, Panay-Negros Occidental Operation, pp. 37-42.
39. The Japanese retreat was explained by Capt. Sadoyoshi Ishikawa, Staff Officer of the 77th Brigade, 102nd Division: "Lacking adequate supplies of ammunition and equipment, the Japanese units were broken up and scattered soon after the American assault landing. Believing that direct combat would prove disastrous, an all-out clash with the Americans was avoided and the fighting limited to defensive tactics. This was particularly true in the mountain areas where the final stand was made." 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of JapaneseOperations on Panay Island.
40. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Mar 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1080, 22 Mar 45.
41. ACS G-3 Memo to C/S GHQ, SWPA, 17 Mar 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381/36-P (TS).
42. Lt. Col. Shigekatsu Aritomi, Staff Officer of the 77th Infantry Brigade, Japanese 102nd Division, revealed that it had been planned to destroy all bridges on the route to Bacolod, but the rapidity with which the American forces secured them, plus the fact that the detonators of the explosive charges were mechanically defective, prevented their destruction. Continuing, Colonel Aritomi said: Since our supplies were cut off, our policy was to obstruct the Americans as long as possible and to destroy the airfields so that they would be useless to the Americans. We also planned to destroy all the bridges but failed in this. "10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Negros Island.
43. Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations, pp. 27-35.
44. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, Mar 45 .
45. Op. cit., Apr 45; 40th Div, VICTOR I Report; CO 503rd PRCT, Report to TAG, "Historical Report for the Operation V-1, 7 April-20 June 45, (503rd RCT)" G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 20 Jun 45 (S); CO 164th Inf. Report to TAG, "Operations Report, Cebu, Negros, 164th Inf." G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 30 Jun 45 (S).
46. Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations, p. 56; HQ Eighth Army, Operational Monograph on the Cebu-Bohol-Negros Oriental Operation, pp. 1 and 19. Hereinafter cited as: Eighth Army, Cebu-Bohol-Negros Oriental Operation.
47. The major forces participating in operations against Cebu, Bohol, and Negros Oriental were as follows:
Eighth Army-General Robert L. Eichelberger Ground: Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point Americal Div (-164 RCT) Maj. Gen. W.H. Arnold Assault Leyte Talisay Beach 164th RCT Col. W.J. Mahoney Follow-up Leyte Talisay Beach ... Thirteenth Air Force (supported by elements of the Fifth Air Force and certain Marine Air Groups)-Maj. Gen. P.B. Wurtsmith
Air: Unit Commander Unit Commander XIII Bomber Comd Col C.A. Brandt Marine Air Gp, Zamboanga Col C. Jerome XIII Fighter Comd Brig. Gen. E.W. Barnes 5th Bomb Gp Lt. Col. I.J. Haviland 307th Bomb Gp Col C.H. Rees 403rd Troop Carrier Gp Col H.J. Sands, Jr. 42nd Bomb Gp Maj. H.C. Harvey .. Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Naval: Unit Commander Unit Commander Task Force 78.3.3 Adm. D.E. Barbey Task Force 78.2.8 Adm. D.E. Barbey Task Force 74.3 Adm. D.E. Barbey ... ...
48. Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations, pp. 61-64; Eighth Army, Cebu-Bohol-Negros Oriental Operation, pp. 41-46; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Mar 45.
49. Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations, pp. 64-67; Eighth Army, Cebu-Bohol-Negros Oriental Operation, pp. 46- 61, G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Mar and Apr 45.
50. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1110, 21 Apr 45.
51. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Apr-Aug 45; Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations, pp. 67-70.
52. Cebu-Bohol-Negros Oriental Operations, pp. 89-94.
53. Ibid. pp. 100-113; Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations, pp. 71-72.
54. Cebu-Bohol-Negros Oriental Operation, pp. 113-114.
55. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45.
56. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 31 Jan 45.
57. Op. cit. 28 Feb 45.
58. The major forces that participated in the assault against central Mindanao were as follows:
Eighth Army-General Robert L. Eichelberger Ground: Unit Commander Phase Staging Point Landing Point X Corps Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert ....24th Div Maj. Gen. F.A. Irving Assault Mindoro Malabang and Parang ....31st Div Maj. Gen. C.A. Morten Follow-up Morotai and Sansapor
-22 Apr 45
....108th RCT Lt. Col. M.T. Strata Follow-up Leyte Macajalar Bay ... Thirteenth Air Force (supported by certain Marine Air Units)-Maj. Gen. P.B. Wurtsmith
Air: Unit Commander Unit Commander XIII Bomber Comd Col C.A. Brandt Marine Air Gp 24 XIII Fighter Comd Brig. Gen. E.W. Barnes Marine Air Gp, Zamboanga 5th Bomb Gp Lt. Col. I.J. Haviland 307th Bomb Gp Col C.H. Rees 42nd Bomb Gp Maj. H.C. Harvey .. Seventh Fleet-Adm. T.C. Kinkaid Naval: Unit Commander Task Force 78.2 R. Adm. A.G. Noble
59. Lt. Gen. Ryosaku Morozumi, Commanding General, Japanese 3oth Division estimated the general situation prior to the landings as follows: "I had anticipated American landings on Mindanao to be in the order of Davao, Cagayan, and Cotabato respectively. Approximately ten days prior to the American landings at Cotabato, the guerrilla units in the area carried out violent activities and surprise attacks on our airfields, etc.; furthermore, air attacks by American aircraft became very intense and more or less gave us a clue to the fact that American landings would be carried out in the very near future. However, we still did not believe that they were going to land at Cotabato, and even when an American task force moved into Cotabato Bay [Polloc Harbor], we had figured that they were merely trying to fake a landing there when they were actually headed towards points further north.... Just after the task force moved into Cotabato Bay, troops started to land on shore near Parang and it was at this time that we first learned that they were really going to make landings in that area." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
60. Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army on the Mindanao Operation, p. 23. Hereinafter cited as: Mindanao Operation. HQ Eighth Army, Operational Monograph on the Mindanao Operation, pp. 33, 52-54. Hereinafter cited as: Eighth Army, Mindanao Monograph.
61. The following comments on the American invasion of Mindanao are based on interrogations of General Morozumi: "On the 18th of April, following the [American] landing at Parang defense plans were put into effect. The American assault proved so forceful, however, that the 166th Battalion, the only combat unit in the area, experienced a serious setback. Realizing the futility of holding at this point, the Division Commander decided to withdraw the Battalion to Palma [4 kilometers north of Kibawe] so as to protect the rear of the Division. This plan, however, never materialized because of the swiftness of the American advance and the difficult terrain did not allow the necessary time. . . ." 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Mindanao Island, pp. 7-8. Hereinafter cited as: Eighth Army, Staff Study, Mindanao.
62. CTG 78.2 COMPHIBGP 8, Comdr VICTOR V Attack Group (Adm. A. G. Noble) Report to COMINCH, Serial 00145, 22 May 45; CG X Corps Report to TAG, "History of X Corps on Mindanao, 17 Apr 45-30 June 45."
63. Ibid. Eighth Army, Mindanao Monograph, pp. 60-74; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Apr 45.
64. The following statements concerning the Japanese delaying tactics during this retreat to Digos are based on an account of Gen. Jiro Harada, Commanding General, Japanese 10th Division: "To delay the rapid advance, the division commander ordered the 163rd Independent Infantry Battalion to destroy the bridges on the Digos-Kabakan road. The completion of this mission was reported to General Jiro Harada, but this action did not delay the Americans. They had quickly surmounted these obstacles, either repairing or rebuilding the bridges, and were continuing the headlong advance. In a last desperate attempt to hold the enemy long enough to permit the Japanese garrison in Davao to effect an orderly withdrawal the division commander directed the Digos troops to make a stand along the Digos-Davao Road . This attempt to delay also proved futile." Eighth Army, Staff Study, Mindanao, p. 14.
65. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Apr, May 45.
66. The following comment is based on an account by Lt. Gen. Morozumi : "The destruction of bridges coupled with our harassing actions along the [Sayre] highway did not delay the [American] advance as much as was anticipated. The Americans' ability to keep up with our rapid withdrawal caused considerable amazement and consternation." Eighth Army, Staff Study, Mindanao, p. 8.
67. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, May 45; Eighth Army, Mindanao Monograph, pp. 231-260.
68. Ibid., pp. 260-263.
69. Mindanao Operation, pp. 70-74; Eighth Army, Mindanao Monograph, pp. 263-269, 274-276.
70. Mindanao Operation, pp. 62-68; Eighth Army, Mindanao Monograph, pp. 181-209, 269-274.
71. Ibid., pp. 290-301. Mindanao Operation, pp. 75-78.
72. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1185, 5 Jul 45.
73. Even the average Japanese soldier in the field realized that the fall of Leyte was the beginning of the end in the Philippines, as shown by the following statement of Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, Tactical Staff Officer, Fourteenth Area Army: "Until almost the end of the Leyte campaign, morale was indeed high as the men and officers fully expected that the remnants of the invasion fleet would be annihilated in Leyte. After this campaign resulted in complete failure for the Japanese and it appeared to be only a prelude to the invasion of Luzon, morale while still high was that rather of men doomed eventually to extinction but willing to take as great a toll as possible before the end. By the time the Luzon assault was under way, morale had fallen very low, due to the fact that there no longer seemed any hope of communication with Japan. Isolated and starving, the troops had lost almost all will to continue." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
74. Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
80. General Miyazaki, Chief of Operations Bureau, Imperial General Headquarters, analyzed the reasons for the Japanese defeat in the Philippines as follows: "In the final analysis I believe that success and failure were accounted for by the absolute disparity between the Japanese and, American fighting power and the qualitative value of the defense against attack.... Historically speaking, the greatest errors that the Japanese Army committed were probably the following: (1) The Japanese Army collapsed at the very front in operations in the southern regions, but then lacked interest and force to make thorough and serious preparations for the American attacks which were due to come. They failed to utilize their precious time. (2) In the Philippines the headquarters of General Terauchi and of General Yamashita, or rather his successor, were set up parallel, and then when the islands were about to be invaded by the American forces General Terauchi's headquarters were moved to Saigon. This invited any number of inconveniences and deficiencies as far as the division of responsibility of the two headquarters and the shift in command of the subordinate units were concerned. (3) As soon as the invasion of Leyte was known, the defense plans for all the Philippines were changed. Ground units were taken from Luzon and committed to battle in Leyte. As soon as the battle in Leyte had proved to be a failure, the defense preparations in Luzon also automatically failed. Just before the American troops were about to land on Luzon, the general defense plans for Luzon were all completely changed. Disposition of units was entirely changed but execution of movement was almost impossible due to the fact that air superiority was in the hands of the American air force. For this reason, there was not enough time before the American landings to prepare defenses." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
81. USSBS, Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Vol II, p. 330.
1. JCS Memo for CCS, 11 Jul 44, CCS 4,7/3, G-3, GHQ Ex JCS and CCS Papers 4 (TS).
3. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-55028 to WARCOS, 17 Dec 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 890 (TS).
5. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-55848 to WARCOS, 3 Jan 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 904 (TS).
8. JCS Radio No. WX-62773 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA, and CG 20AF, 4 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 956 (TS).
10. JCS Radio No. WX-62774 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA, and CG 20AF, 4 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 957 (TS).
11. Ibid. WARCOS Radio N0. WX-63939 to Distribution List, 6 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 959 (S); GHQ, AFPAC General Order No. 1, 6 Apr 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 300-4 (S); COMINCH Radio No. 062116/Z to COM7thFLT, 8 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, Navy 612 (TS).
12. CINCPOA Radio N0. 160250/Z to CINCSWPA, 16 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, Navy No. 613 (TS); CINCAFPAC Radio No. CX-14288 to CINCPOA, 18 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, Navy No. 615 (TS).
13. CG AAF Ltr to CINCSWPA, 4 Oct 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 853 (TS).
14. CINCAFPAC Radio No. CX-16199 to WARCOS, 14 May 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1016 (TS).
15. JCS Radio No. WX 104631 to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, 2 Jun 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1042 (TS).
16. WARCOS Radio No. WX 30438 to CINCAFPAC, 12 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1073 (TS).
17. CINCSWPA Radio No. CA-50688 to WARCOS, 26 Feb 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 937 (TS).
19. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-16679 to WARCOS, 27 Aug 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 813 (TS).
21. C/S GHQ, SWPA Radio No. C-17683 to C/S WD, 13 Sep 44, C/S GHQ, WD No. 836 (TS).
22. CINCSWPA Radio No. C-57530 to WARCOS, 3 Feb 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381 (TS); WARCOS Radio to CINCSWPA, 7 Feb 45 (TS).
23. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, MONTCLAIR III, 2nd Amendment, 6 Mar 45 (TS); CINCSWPA Radio No. CA-50688 to WARCOS, 26 Feb 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 937 (TS).
24. JCS Radio No. W-66056 to CINCSWPA, 11 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 973 (S); CINCSWPA Radio No. CA-51543 to C/S WD, 12 Apr 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381 43-P (TS); JCS Radio No. W-70717 to CINCAFPAC, 21 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 984 (TS).
25. Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Borneo (JANIS 150) Chapter 1, Brief, 15 May 45, pp. 1-4, 1-9, 1-29, 1-35.
27. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 30 Apr 45. As of 31 December 1946 repatriation figures from the Japanese Foreign Office showed that 15,607 army personnel and 5,766 navy personnel had been returned to Japan, in addition to 3,321 civilians, while 865 persons were still awaiting repatriation. The Japanese sustained 5,693 casualties during the fighting on Borneo and lost 536 as prisoners of war captured by the Allies. The total for army and navy personnel coincides closely with the G-2 estimates before the start of the Borneo Campaign.
28. Adv HQ, ALF, SWPA, "Australian Military Forces Report on Operation 'OBOE ONE,' Tarakan, Borneo," pp. 18-19; COMPHIBGP 6 Report to COMINCH, Serial 0188, (05), 5 May 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 3 May 45 (C); Hugh Buggy, Pacific Victory, A Short History of Australia's Part in the War Against Japan, (Australian Ministry for Information), pp. 284 -285.
29. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1122, 3 May 45.
30. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, May 45; Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 285-288. Interrogation of Captain Saichiro Matsumoto, former commanding officer of the 455th Independent Infantry Battalion, Thirty-seventh Army, revealed that, until the arrival of the Japanese 455th Battalion in December 1944, military preparations on Tarakan were neglected and totally inadequate to defend the island. After the battalion landed, the construction of fortifications was begun in earnest and, by the time of the Allied invasion, gun emplacements and other beach defenses were almost completed. Most of these fortifications were destroyed, however, by the intense naval and aerial bombardment. Because of the lack of shipping, no supplies or reinforcements were forthcoming and resistance had to be continued with what was on hand. Fighting strength and morale deteriorated with the unfavorable progress of the battle and the non-arrival of reinforcements and supplies. By mid-June, the remaining troops had disbanded into small groups to carry on guerrilla warfare but actually these remnants were primarily concerned with physical survival and escape from the island. About half of the deaths incurred resulted from disease and malnutrition. Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
31. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, May, Jun, 45; Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 288-289.
32. Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 289-290; CTG 78.1 (COMPHIBGP 6, R. Adm. Royal) Confidential Action Report 0322 to COMINCH, 19 Jun 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 17 Jun 45.
33. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1162, 12 Jun 45.
34. Buggy, Op. cit., p. 290. The Commander in Chief of the Southern Army, Field Marshal Terauchi, had estimated that Allied forces would land on the strategic west coast of Borneo sometime after March 1945. He therefore ordered part of the main Japanese dispositions around Tawau on the east coast to shift to the west coast around Brunei. Because Japanese sea communications had by this time been cut off, the move to the Brunei area was made over the difficult mountainous terrain of central Borneo, a distance of more than 300 miles. During this move, many losses were incurred because of the difficult terrain, bad weather, sickness, and lack of provisions. Those troops which succeeded in reaching the vicinity of Brunei had insufficient weapons and supplies and their physical strength was decreased by malaria and fatigue. Their defense preparations, therefore, could not be completed prior to the Allied landing. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Borneo Operations Record, Vol II, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
35. Buggy, Op. cit., p. 290; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45.
36. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary, No. 1170, 1718 Jun 45; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1169, 19 Jun 45.
37. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary, No. 1172, 19/20 Jun 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1171, 21 Jun 45.
38. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1173, 20/21 Jun 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1172, 22 Jun 45.
39. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45; G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1175, 22/23 Jun 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1174, 24 Jun 45 .
40. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations Jun 45; Buggy, Op. cit. pp. 291-292.
41. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45; G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1181, 28/29 Jun 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1180, 30 Jun 45; Buggy, Op. cit., p. 292.
42. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1175, 22/23 Jun 45; Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 292-293.
43. Buggy, Op. cit., p. 293; CTG 78.2 Report to COMINCH, Serial 0235 "Action Report for the Balikpapan Operation, 15 Jun-6 Jul 45," 14 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 6 Jul 45 (C).
44. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45.
45. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1182, 2 Jul 45.
46. Buggy, Op. cit. Pp. 293 - 294; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45. Maj. Misuaki Yamada, former Commanding Officer of the 454th Independent Infantry Battalion, Thirty-seventh Army, was highly impressed with Allied naval and air power in the invasion of Balikpapan. He stated that the Japanese were never able effectively to combat this overwhelming superiority. Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
47. Manila Free Philippines, July 2, 1945, p. 1. In his statement, General MacArthur referred to the 22-24 January 1942 sortie of four U. S. destroyers through the waters of Makassar Strait in a vain attempt to block the approach of a huge Japanese invasion convoy.
48. Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 294-295; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45; G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary, No. 1186, 3/4 Jul 45.
49. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1187, 4/5 Jul 45.
50. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1190, 7/8 Jul 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1190, 10 Jul 45.
51. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1192, 9/10 Jul 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1191, 11 Jul 45.
52. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1196, 13/14 Jul 45; Buggy, Op. cit. P. 295; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1192, 12 Jul 45; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45. Major Yamada reported that the severe losses of supplies forced the Japanese virtually to live off the land. During the battle there was no hope of reinforcement or resupply, and the result was a serious loss of morale among the Japanese forces. Resistance became ineffective and the Japanese were reduced to fighting merely a delaying type of warfare with no hope of final victory. Interrogation of Maj. Misuaki Yamada previously cited.
53. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1201, 18/19 Jul 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1200, 20 Jul 45; Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 295-296; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45.
54. Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 293-296; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45.
55. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1225, 14 Aug. 45.
56. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau, Special Report No. 39, "Japanese Army Strength in New Britain, New Ireland, Bougainville, and New Guinea in 1945," 30 Jul 49, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. See also G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, Dec 44.
57. CINCAFPAC Ltr to J. B. Chifley, Acting Prime Minister of Australia, 20 May 45, C/S GHQ, Aust 920.
58. GHQ, SWPA, Opn Instr No. 65, 30 Aug 44, and No. 78, 5 Nov 44, G-3 Planning File 370.2 (S).
59. Buggy, Op. cit., pp. 276-278.
60. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1089, 20/21 Mar 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1080, 22 Mar 45, and Communique No. 1083, 25 Mar 45.
61. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1112, 20/2 1 Apr 45.
62. G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Daily Summary No. 1133, 11/12 May 45; G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, May 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1132, 13 May 45, and Communique No. 11 33 14 May 45.
63. Buggy, Op. cit., p. 283; ONI, USN, Office of Naval Intelligence Weekly, Vol. IV, No. 3, 17 Jan 45, p. 205. Hereinafter cited as: O.N.I. Weekly.
64. O.N.I. Weekly, Vol. IV, No. 7, 14 Feb 45, p. 529.
65. Buggy, Op. cit., p. 283; O.N.I. Weekly, Vol. IV, No. 13, 28 Mar 45, p. 1026 and No. 14,4 Apr 45, p. 1114.
66. O.N.I. Weekly, Vol. IV, No. 18, 2 May 45, pp. 1472- 73, and No. 20, 16 May 45, p. 1605.
67. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jul 45.
68. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1208, 28 Jul 45.
69. Joint Staff Planners (JSP) Report to JCS, 31 Dec 44, JCS 1215, G-3, GHQ Ex JCS and CCS Papers 6 (TS); COMGENCHINA Radio No. CFBX 32476 to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 6 Feb 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381/20-P (TS).
70. JSP Report to JCS, 23 Nov 44, JCS 1176, G-3, GHQ Ex JCS and CCS Papers 5 (TS); CCS Report to the President and the Prime Minister, 9 Feb 45, CCS 7763, G-3, GHQ Ex JCS and CCS Papers (TS).
71. JSP Report to JCS, 23 Nov 44, JCS 1176, G-3, GHQ Ex JCS and CCS Papers 5 (TS).
73. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-14442 to WARCOS, 20 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 982 (TS).
74. The events leading up to this directive are discussed in Chapter XIII.
75. CINCAFPAC Radio No. CA-51477 to WARCOS, 10 Apr 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 971 (TS); CINC. AFPAC Radio No. C-16063 to WARCOS, 12 May 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1014 (TS); WARCOS Radio No. W-87663 to CINCAFPAC, 26 May 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1030 (TS); GHQ, AFPAC, General Order No. 13, 20 Jun 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 300-4 (S).
76. JCS Radio No. V-73BG152 to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, 19 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1076 (TS).
77. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-29008 to WARCOS, 28 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1091 (TS).
78. CINCSWPA Radio No. CA-50688 to WARCOS, 26 Feb 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 937 (TS).
79. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-21640 to WARCOS, 27 Jun 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1065 (TS); WARCOS Radio No. V-93BGt65 to CINCAFPAC, 19 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1077 (TS).
81. The actual transfer of command of the areas took place on 2 September 1945, the date on which the surrender was formally signed by the Japanese. At the same time, Allied Land Forces, Allied Air Forces, and Allied Naval Forces, the three operational commands of the Southwest Pacific Area, were inactivated. WARCOS Radio No. W-89740 to CINCAFPAC, 30 May 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1031 (TS); CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-17403 to WARCOS, 30 May 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1033 (TS); JCS Radio No. V-169BG248 to CINCAFPAC, 22 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Ex JCS and CCS Papers (TS).
82. CINCAFPAC Radio No. 210555 to Prime Minister Chifley of Australia, with enclosure, "Personal Message of Farewell to Australian Forces," 21 Aug 45, C/S GHQ S, Aust 952.
83. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Jun 45.
84. Marshall Radio No. WX-68469 to MacArthur, Eisenhower, etc. 16 Apr 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 370 (S).
85. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-29256 to WARCOS, 29 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 370 (TS).
86. Ibid. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-23346 to WARCOS, 5 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 370 (TS). WARCOS Radio No. W-42164 to CINCAFPAC, 2 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 370 (TS).
87. Memo to G-3, GHQ, AFPAC, 5 May 45, summarizing JCS 521/12, 29 Mar 45, JCS 521/15, 11 Apr 45, and JCS 521/16, undated, JCS, GHQ, and CCS No. 3 (TS).
88. WARCOS Radio No. W-18922 to CINCAFPAC, 20 Jun 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 370 (TS); Teleconference TT-3844 (Manila-Washington) 16 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 384-1/12-2-P (TS).
1. CCS Report to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, 9 Feb 45, CCS 7763, JCS and CCS Papers, G-3 Ex (TS).
2. JCS Planners Report, 29 Mar 45, JCS 521/ 13, JCS and CCS GHQ (TS).
3. JCS Radio No. WX-62774 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, and CG 20AF, 4 Apr 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. J57 (TS). See Chapter XII.
4. C/S WD Radio No. WAR-67098 to CINCSWPA, 12 Apr 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 977 (TS).
5. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-14442 to WARCOS, 20 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 982 (TS).
9. Ibid. General MacArthur's strategy was predicated primarily on the basis of available American resources. The consideration of possible aid from the Soviet Union was not included in these estimates.
10. CINCPOA Radio No. 280235/Z to CINCAFPAC, 28 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, Navy 625 (TS).
11. Report on CINCAFPAC-CINCPAC Conference at Manila, P.I., 16 May 45, C/S GHQ, Navy 633 (TS).
12. JCS Directive 1331/3 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, and CG 20AF, 25 May 45, JCS and CCS Papers 6, G-3 Ex (TS).
13. GHQ, AFPAC, "DOWNFALL" Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, 28 May 45 (TS). Hereinafter cited as: DOWNFALL.
15. Report No. 9 to the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, "Outline of Emergency Procedure for the Decisive Battle," 25 Jan 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
16. Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief of the Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, to Jun 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
17. Report No. 10 to the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, "Estimate of the World Situation," 15 Feb 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
18. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. I, Nov 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
19. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. IV, Oct 4 6 , pp. 37-38 Map No. 2; Vol. V, Oct 46, pp. 4-5, 17-21, 28-30, 32, 38, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. The Japanese coastal-combat divisions were organized specifically for beach defense and compared favorably in strength with the regular line-combat divisions. Although the coastal-combat divisions lacked the heavy artillery weapons and mobility of the regular line divisions, they excelled the latter in infantry fire power, being well equipped with rifles, machine guns, 75mm and 80mm mortars, and mountain and anti-tank guns. The training of the coastal-combat divisions was not as thorough as that of the regular divisions but it was adequate to carry out the assigned mission of all-out beach defense. The Japanese had also established civilian National Volunteer units under the Volunteer Service Act of 23 June 1945. These civilian units, organized in every prefecture, were expected to aid in rear area maintenance and repair of transportation, communication, supply, and production facilities. First Demobilization Bureau Report No. 1026, 31 Mar 46, submitted in answer to questionnaire by Japanese Liaison Section, GHQ, SCAP; Statement of Maj. Tosaku Hirano, Staff Officer, Second General Army, 21 Oct 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
20. General Defense Command, "Homeland Defense Army Operations Order A No. 2," 9 Feb 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
21. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, Nov 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
22. Imperial General Headquarters, Army Directive No. 2438, Separate Table, "Outline of Preparations for the Ketsu Operation," 8 Apr 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
23. Ibid., Separate Table, "Outline of Plans for Concentration in the Ketsu Operation."
25. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Imperial General Headquarters, Army High Command Record, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
27. Imperial General Headquarters Army Section, "Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and Spring of 1946," 1 Jul 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
28. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. III, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
29. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Air Operations Record, Dec 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Preparations for Counterattacks against Enemy Landings on the Homeland, Supplement No. 4, May 47, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
30. Imperial General Headquarters Army Section, "Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and Spring of 1946," Jul 45, and Supplement No. 1, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC; also statements by Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, 20 May 49, and Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, 20 Aug 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
32. Allied Geographical Section, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Terrain Study No. 130, S.E. Kyushu, 31 May 45.
33. GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "OLYMIC," Operations in Southern Kyushu, 28 May 45. Hereinafter cited as; OLYMPIC. This plan was later redesignated "MAJESTIC" but is usually referred to by the former name.
34. AGS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Terrain Study No. 130, S.E. Kyushu, 31 May 45.
45. The estimated arrivals of enemy reinforcements are shown in the following table:
30 April 31 May 30 June 20 July Tactical Area Divs Brigs Tk Regts Divs Brigs Tk Regts Divs Brigs Tk Regts Divs Brigs Tk Regts Southern Kyushu 86 1 Pcht ----- 86 1 Pcht ----- 86 1 Pcht 37 (b) 86 1 Pcht 37 (b) 3 Amph 25 3 Amph 40 (b) 25 3 Amph 40 (b) 77 77 212 (a) 212 (a) 156 154 146 Total 1 1 0 1 2 0 4 2 2 7 2 2 Northern Kyushu 57 ----- 18 57 ----- 18 57 ----- 18 57 126 18 6 Dep* ----- ----- 6 Dep ----- ----- 6 Dep ----- ----- 6 Dep ----- ----- 56 Dep ----- ----- 56 Dep ----- ----- 56 Dep ----- ----- 56 Dep ----- ----- ----- ----- 206 (a) ----- ----- 206 (a) ----- ----- 206 (a) ----- ----- Total 3 0 1 4 0 1 4 0 1 4 1 1 Unlocated 96 IM** 96 IM 122 IM Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 Aggregate 4 1 1 5 2 1 8 3 3 11 5 3
(a) Probably composed of Volunteer Defense Units.
(b) Believed elements of u/i Tank Brigade, Code Name "To."
(c) Does not include: u/i Unit, Code name "Yaku." Believed to be in Southern Kyushu. May be one of the numbered units listed hereon, u/i Unit, Code name "Ho" believed to be in Northern Kyushu. Character unknown.
* Dep refers to Depot.
** IM refers to Independent Mixed Brigade.
46. G-2, GHQ, AFPAC, "Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation with Respect to Kyushu," 29 Jul 45.
47. The strategists at Imperial General Headquarters believed that, if they could succeed in inflicting unacceptable losses on the United States in the Kyushu operation, convince the American people of the huge sacrifices involved in an amphibious invasion of Japan, and make them aware of the determined fighting spirit of the Japanese army and civilian population, they might be able to postpone, if not escape altogether, a crucial battle in the Kanto area. In this way, they hoped to gain time and grasp an opportunity which would lead to the termination of hostilities on more favorable terms than those which unconditional surrender offered. Statements by Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, so May 49, and Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief, Army General Staff, 13 Jun 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
48. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Supplement to Vol III "Essentials of Sixteenth Area Army Ketsu Operation Plan," Sep 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
49. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Air Operations Record, Dec 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
50. Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Preparations for Counterattacks against Enemy Invasion Landings,G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
51. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record,Vol III, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
53. GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "CORONET,"15 Aug 45. This staff study was published as a matter of interest only. It set forth the first draft of the plan formulated prior to the cessation of hostilities, and was still in an incomplete form.
54. Joint Staff Planners, "An Outline Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto (Tokyo) Plain," Enclosure "A," 15 May 45, pp. 1-2 (TS).
55. AGS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Terrain Study No. 132, Tokyo and Kwanto Plain, 30 May 45.
56. Joint Staff Planners, "An Outline Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto (Tokyo) Plain," Enclosure "B," 15 May 45 (TS).
58. GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "CORONET,"15 Aug 45.
59. Ibid. CINCAFPAC Radio No. CX 28768 to WARCOS, 27 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381/107-7 (TS). An earlier version of "CORONET" which is mentioned in General of the Army George C. Marshall's biennial report to the Secretary of War of 1 September 1945 called for an invasion by three armies: the First, the Eighth, and the Tenth; it was later decided not to use the Tenth Army in this operation.
60. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. II; also statement by Gen. Kawabe, 13 Jun 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
61. Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. II, Attached Maps Nos. 1-3, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
62. Ibid. Also statement by Col. Hiroshi Fuwa, Operations Staff Officer, Twelfth Area Army, 24 May 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
63. Imperial General Headquarters, Army Order No. 1353, Directive No. 2513, 20 Jun 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
1. Allied Air Forces had unloosed 900,000 tons of explosives over German targets during 1944. CG USAAF Radio No. C-19585 to WARCOS, 17 Jun 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1053 (TS)
2. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, "Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War," 12 Nov 45.
3. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations , Jul 45.
4. ONI, USN, Office of Naval Intelligence Weekly , Vol. IV, No. 28. 11 Jul 45, pp. 2156-2160. Hereinafter cited as: O.N.I. Weekly.
5. G-3, GHQ, AFPAC, Memo, "Third Fleet Operations in Jul 45," 1 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381/134-9 (TS); Adm. Ernest J. King, "Third Official Report to the Secretary of the Navy," 8 Dec 45; William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York, 1947), pp . 258-265.
6. Halsey and Bryan, op. cit. pp. 270-271.
7. JCS Radio No. WX 15811 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA, CG CHINA, 13 Jun 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 38181-6P (TS).
8. U.S. Department of State, The Axis in Defeat, A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan, pp. 27-29. Hereinafter cited as: The Axis in Defeat.
9. The Cairo Conference in Egypt held on 22-26 November 1943 by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was for the purpose of forming an agreement upon future military operations against Japan. The heads of the three governments resolved to bring unrelenting pressure against Japan, to take away from Japan all the Pacific Islands which she had seized or occupied, to expel the Japanese from all territories which had been taken by violence, and to restore the independence of Korea. The Axis in Defeat, "Cairo Declaration," pp. 4-5.
10. State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee Memo, 11 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin (TS); WARCOS Radio No. WAR 48342 to CINCAFPAC, 12 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1118 (TS); WARCOS Radio No. W48672 to CINCAFPAC, 13 Aug 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1119 (TS).
11. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-25892 to CINCPAC ADV, 16 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381/61 (TS).
12. GHQ, APFAC, Basic Outline Plan for "BLACKLIST" Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after Surrender or Collapse, 3rd edition, 8 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Planning File (TS). Hereinafter cited as: BLACKLIST.
13. Ibid; CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-28793 to WARCOS, 27 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1088 (TS).
14. JCS Radio No. BG-412V357 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, 27 Jul 45, JCS and CCS Papers 7, G-3, GHQ Ex (TS).
15. CINCPAC and CINCPOA Joint Staff Study "CAMPUS," 9 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Planning Files (TS). Hereinafter cited as: CAMPUS.
16. CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-29035 to WARCOS, 26 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1092 (TS); CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-28810 to JCS, 27 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 5090 (TS); CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-30508 to WARCOS, 3 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1099 (TS).
17. BLACKLIST, 3rd edition, 8 Aug 45. The final edition of the naval counterpart, "CAMPUS," was dated 9 August 1945.
18. Adm. Ernest J. King, "Third Official Report to the Secretary of the Navy," 8 Dec 45.
19. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, "Air Summary," Aug 45; O.N.I. Weekly, Vol IV, No. 31, 1 Aug 45, p. 2293.
20. Gen. George C. Marshall, "Third Official Report to the Secretary of War," 1 Jul 43-30 Jun 45.
21. USSBS, Strategic Air Operation of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War against Japan, (Twelfth Air Force), p. 18.
22. The Axis in Defeat, pp. 29-30.
23. Ibid, pp. 30-31.
24. WARCOS Radio No. WAR 47899 to CINCAFPAC, 12 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1117 (TS).
25. WARCOS Radio No. WAR 48689 to CINCAFPAC, CG USASTAF, 13 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1120 (TS).
26. G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, "Air Summary," Aug 45.
27. JCS Radio No. WAR 47945 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, CG CHINA, 11 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1112 (TS).
28. Ibid; WARCOS Radio No. WAR 48342 to CINCAFPAC, 12 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1118 (TS).
29. WARCOS Radio No. WAR 47838 to CINCAFPAC, 11 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1111 (TS); WARCOS Radio No. W48672 to CINCAFPAC, 13 Aug 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1119 (TS).
30. The Axis in Defeat, p. 32; Tokyo Nippon Times, September 9, 1945.
31. Japanese Imperial Rescript, 15 Aug 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
32. The Axis in Defeat, pp. 32-33.
33. WARCOS Radio No. 1408 to CINCAFPAC, 15 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1125.
34. GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release, 15 Aug 45.
35. SCAP Radio No. Z-500 to Japanese Emperor, Japanese Imperial Government, and Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, 15 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
36. SCAP Radio No. Z-501 to Japanese Emperor, et al, 15 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
38. Japanese Government Radio to SCAP, 16 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
41. General MacArthur's message concerning the Manila mission was not received in Japan until the morning of the 16th. The change-over in cabinets at this time was another important reason for the inability of the Japanese Government to arrange for the dispatch of the desired emissaries by 17 August. The Suzuki Cabinet had resigned on the afternoon of the 15th and the succeeding Higashikuni Cabinet was not installed until the afternoon of the 17th. The problem of selection of the proper officials during this critical interim period, together with the task of preparing the numerous documents of information required by the Supreme Commander, necessitated the request for more time. Statement by Shunichi Matsumoto, former Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
42. Japanese Imperial GHQ Radio No. 2 to SCAP, 16 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files. General Prince Haruhito Kanin was sent to Saigon and Singapore; General Prince Yasuhiko Asaka to Nanking and Peiping; Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda to Hsinking (Changchun) in Manchuria.
43. SCAP Radio No. Z-502 to Japanese Imperial GHQ, 17 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
44. Japanese Imperial GHQ Radio No. 4 to SCAP, 17 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
45. SCAP Radio No. Z-504 to Japanese Imperial GHQ, 17 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
46. Japanese Imperial GHQ Radio No. 9 to SCAP, 18 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
47. Other Japanese delegates included the following:
Mr. Katsuo Okazaki
Maj. Gen. Masakazu Amano
R. Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama
Mr. Shuichi Mizota
Col. Arata Yamamoto
Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae
Capt. Hidemi Yoshida
Mr. Kazuma Sugita
Mr. Morio Yukawa
Comdr. Yoshimori Terai
Lt. Col. Masao Matsuda
Lt. Col. Kiyoshi Minami
Lt. Col Morio Takakura
2nd Lt. Sadao Otake
2nd Lt. Harumi Takeuchi
Chief, Research Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Chief, Operations Section, Army General Staff.
Member, Naval General Staff
Secretary to the Navy Minister
Member, Army General Staff
Chief, Operations Section, Naval General Staff
Member, Navy Ministry
Secretary to the Navy Minister
Member, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Member, Naval General Staff
Member, War Ministry
Member, War Ministry
Member, War Ministry
Member, Army General Staff
Member, Army General Staff
GHQ, AFPAC, "List of Japanese Emissaries to Manila," 21 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
48. Careful planning preceded the actual flight, according to Japanese officers concerned with the arrangements. "In planning the course of the airplane taking the Japanese delegates to Manila ... precautions had to be taken to prevent interference by certain elements of the Japanese Air Force who, it was rumored, were planning to attack and destroy the plane. To insure the safe arrival of the delegates, the course to be taken by their plane was kept secret, and it was planned to fly a decoy plane on a direct route to Kyushu. At 0611 on 19 August, a Douglas-type naval transport plane, bearing the delegates, left Haneda, arriving at Kisarazu 14 minutes later. Here the group boarded two medium bombers, leaving Kisarazu at 0707. The planes proceeded southeast for approximately 100 nautical miles and, once outside the fighter-plane range, headed for Tanegashima. At 11 15 they were met just south of Tanegashima by two American Army fighter units, comprising two B-24's and twelve P-38's.... They arrived safely on Ie Jima at 1240...." Combined statement of Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama, Navy Ministry; Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Naval General Staff; Capt. Hidemi Yoshida, Navy Ministry; Cmdr. Yoshimoto Terai, Naval General Staff, 21 Nov 49, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
49. GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release, 19 Aug 45.
50. GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release, 19 Aug 45. During the conference, the Japanese and American representatives sat in the following order: Capt. Hidemi Yoshida opposite Maj. Gen. Lester Whitlock, ACofS, G-4; Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae oppsite Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, DCofS; Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama opposite Rear Adm. Forest P. Sherman, ACofS for Planning for CINCPAC; Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe opposite Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, CofS; Mr. Katsuo Okasaki opposite Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, ACofS, G-3; Maj. Gen. Masakazu Amano opposite Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, ACofS, G-2; and Lt. Col. Masao Matsuda opposite Brig. Gen. Donald R. Hutchinson, CofS, FEAF. Interpreters sat at both ends of the table.
52. 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Occupational Monograph of the United States Eighth Army in Japan, Vol I, Aug 45-Jan 46, pp. 11-12. Hereinafter cited as: Monograph of Eighth Army in Japan. G-2, GHQ, familiar with the structure 0f the Japanese armed forces and in control of the linguist service, was designated to supervise the Japanese plans for demobilization and disarmament.
53. GHQ, SCAP, Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Presented to the Japanese Representatives at Manila, P. I. 19 Aug 45 (TS).
54. On the first leg of their return trip in an American transport plane, the delegates arrived at Ie Jima at 1745 on the 20th. Since one of the Japanese planes waiting there to take them back to Japan had developed trouble, it was decided to split the mission into two groups and leave one group behind on Ie Jima until its plane was repaired. The members of the first group left Ie Jima at 1840 and were escorted by twelve P-38's to the vicinity of Tanegashima. From there their plane proceeded along the coast from Shionomisaki until 2345 when the fuel supply became exhausted and they were compelled to make a forced landing on a beach approximately three kilometers east of the mouth of the Tenryu River. Except for Katsuo Okazaki, who suffered slight injuries, there were no casualties.
By foot and then by truck the delegates finally arrived at the evacuated headquarters of the Hamamatsu Air School at o330 on the 21st. At 0700 they left Hamamatsu Airfield in an Army heavy bomber, arriving at Chofu Airfield at 0800. The second plane left Ie Jima at 0830 on the 21st and arrived safely at Kisarazu at 1400. Combined statement of Ichiro Yokoyama, Toshikazu Ohmae, Hidemi Yoshida, Yoshimori Terai, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
55. GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release, 20 Aug 45.
56. G-3, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Monthly Summary of Operations, Aug 45.
58. G-3, GHQ, SCAP-AFPAC, Operations Report No. 4, 1 Sep 45, G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal (S).
59. G-3, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Monthly Summary of Operations, Aug 45.
60. Monograph of Eighth Army in Japan, p. 20.
61. Although the American forces arriving on the 28th met with no incidents, the days before their landings had seen several outbreaks of violence among Japanese army and navy troops. On the night of the 14th, certain members of the Imperial Guard Division in Tokyo tried to seize and isolate the Palace grounds and prevent the Imperial Rescript from being broadcast. The attempted revolt was subdued by the following morning, however, and most of the rebellious participants committed suicide. On the 14th, also, the residence of the Prime Minister and the President of the Privy Council were attacked and burned.
Atsugi Airfield, the site chosen for General MacArthur's landing, was the scene of a five-day series of disorders during which naval Kamikaze pilots dropped leaflets over Tokyo denouncing the Emperor's advisors and exhorting the people not to surrender. It was not until 26 August, two days before the arrival of General Eichelberger's advance units, that the recalcitrant elements were brought under control. Court Record for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, pp. 31194-31198 and 29322-29326; Court Martial Decision, Captain Yasuma Kosono, IJM, 16 Oct 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
62. Robert L. Eichelberger and Milton MacKaye, "Our Bloody Jungle Road to Tokyo," Part 7, The Saturday Evening Post (September 24, 1949), p. 163.
63. Monograph of Eighth Army in Japan, p. 20.
64. G-3, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Monthly Summary of Operations, Aug 45.
65. Monograph of Eighth Army in Japan, p. 20;Adm. Halsey's Story, p. 274.
66. G-3, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Monthly Summary of Operations, Aug 45.
67. Op. cit. Sep 45.
68. The representatives of the Foreign Office were Katsuo Okazaki, Shunichi Kase, and Saburo Ota; the repre- sentatives of the Army were Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Lt. Gen. Yatsuji Nagai, and Col. Ichiji Sugita; the representatives of the Navy were Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama, and Capt. Katsuo Shiba. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, September 3, 1945, p. 1 and Tokyo Yomiuri-Hochi, September 3, 1945, p. 1.
69. GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release, "Remarks by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Surrender Ceremony, Tokyo Bay," 2 Sep 45.
70. GHQ, SCAP, Press Release, "Text of Speech by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Broadcast to the American People on V-J Day," 2 Sep 45.
71. The Axis in Defeat, pp. 33-34.
72. In speaking of the problem of physical survival of the Japanese forces at this time, Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army said: "Staff officers and the rest of the personnel somewhere secured three meals a day, but the quantity of food decreased gradually and the illness increased.... According to the report of the Chief of the Administration Department, we could somehow get by the whole of August, but thereafter there was nothing on which we could rely. Each section of the Headquarters formed parties to forage afar for tubers and edible grasses." "Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Akira Muto," p. 58, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
73. G-3, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Monthly Summary of Operations, Aug 45.
74. Ibid. These figures were soon to be swelled by refugee Japanese colonists, civilian employees, service elements, and port and shipping detachments.
75. G-2, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Daily Summary No. 1236, 22/23 Aug 45.
76. G-2, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Daily Summary No. 1243, 3o Aug 45.
78. G-2, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Daily Summary No. 1245, 1 Sep 45.
79. GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release, 27 Aug 45.
83. 32nd Inf Div Radio No. ES-32 to PRO, GHQ, AFPAC, 3 Sep 45, G-3, GHQ Journal (R).
84. Stanley A. Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in World War II, "Division Commander's Account of Yamashita's Surrender," pp. 377 - 378.
85. G-2, GHQ, SWPA-AFPAC, Daily Summary No. 1248 (with Encl No. 3), 4 Sep 46.
86. G-3, GHQ, SCAP-AFPAC, Daily Situation Report No. 17, 14 Sep 45.
87. Ibid; O.N.I. Weekly, Vol IV, No. 37, 12 Sep 45, pp. 2561-64.
88. O.N.I. Weekly, Vol IV, No. 37, 12 Sep 45, p. 2566.
89. Ibid, p. 2567.