Chapter XXVI
The Last Phase

The last phase, marking the period between the German surrender at Reims on 7 May and the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters on 14 July 1945, falls into two periods. The first, which saw the closing out of the former enemy commands, was ended on 5 June when representatives of France, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States met at Berlin to assume joint authority in Germany for their governments. The second, prolonged until 14 July, consisted of winding up the loose ends of combined responsibilities and preparing the way for a change-over from the Supreme Command to separate national headquarters in western Germany.

During both periods, General Eisenhower found it necessary to play several roles. As U.S. theater commander, he was occupied with the redeployment of U.S. forces to the United States and the Pacific theater. As leader of the victorious armies in the west, he was called on to make numerous appearances in European capitals and at home (he left for the United States on 16 June and did not return until mid-July just before the formal dissolution of SHAEF). As Supreme Commander, he had the task of separating the U.S. and British elements of his combined staff so that an easy transition might be made from an integrated headquarters to separate national forces. Finally, as the representative of his country on the Allied Control Council in Berlin and as commander of U.S. Forces in Germany, he was occupied with tasks of Allied military government, an assignment he delegated in the period covered by this volume to his deputy for military government, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay.

Initial Measures

The Supreme Commander's task in the first weeks after the German surrender consisted of instituting immediate disarmament and control of German forces to prevent the renewal of hostilities, enforcing the terms of surrender by maintaining a strategic air threat and occupying strategic areas on the Continent, establishing law and order as far as possible, and initiating measures to complete the disarmament and control of the German forces. At the same time, he took preliminary steps for the relief and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons and gave such aid to programs for the relief and rehabilitation of liberated countries as did not interfere with military objectives.1 These tasks continued until control passed from the


Supreme Commander to the quadripartite military government at Berlin or until they were turned over to the national commanders in the French, British, or U.S. zones of occupation.2

In its initial planning for the occupation of Germany, SHAEF had prepared a number of detailed orders to be presented to the high-level headquarters of the German Army, Navy, and Air Force at the time of surrender. On finding a few days before the German surrender that the enemy's Army and Air Force headquarters either were powerless or had ceased to exist, General Eisenhower decided to present the Germans with only that part of the surrender orders which dealt with naval units. He then handed over to his army group commanders the task of issuing detailed orders to German commanders for the disarmament of their forces. Admiral Burrough, at the time of the signing at Reims, issued a detailed order to Admiral Friedeburg concerning the German Navy, and General Smith gave a briefer order to General Jodl to the effect that local German Army and Air Force commanders on the Western Front, in Norway, the Channel Islands, and in pockets that might still exist were to hold themselves in readiness to receive detailed instructions from the Allied commanders opposite their fronts.3

One of the chief means of insuring the prompt surrender and disarmament of German forces was, obviously, to establish firm control over the government of Admiral Doenitz. Less than seven hours after the surrender at Reims, members of the SHAEF staff had met with the German group at Reims and arranged for the exchange of liaison parties between Supreme Headquarters and the German headquarters at Flensburg. The SHAEF representatives accepted General Jodl's proposal to reunite the southern and northern sections of OKW which had been divided in late April, and agreed to permit reliable elements of the Wehrmacht to keep their arms for a short period to maintain order and safeguard property.4

On the return of Jodl and Friedeburg to Flensburg, Admiral Doenitz and his advisers thoroughly explored with them the question of whether or not they should remain in power as agents of the Allied forces. The arguments for ending the regime immediately were strong. The government was manifestly impotent, and it was unlikely that the victors would allow it any additional control. Worse still, many of the German people were indifferent to it, and it was not even known to what extent they knew of the government's existence. To some of the German leaders, a dignified abdication seemed to be the answer. On the other hand, there was the obvious importance of having some type of government to guarantee the preservation of order. Doenitz and his advisers also believed that the Western powers might be willing to accept the continuance of the government not only because they counted on it to keep order and take some of the responsibility for coming events, but also because it might occur to them that a situation might develop in which a strong


Germany would be desirable. After much discussion, the German leaders decided that while abdication was inevitable it should not be made too early.5

In his address to the German people on 8 May, Admiral Doenitz declared that the foundation on which the German Empire had been built was a thing of the past, and that unity of state and party no longer existed. All power in Germany had now passed into the hands of the occupying powers, who would decide whether he and his government were to continue.6 Events of the next few weeks were to show conclusively that Doenitz' government had no real standing and that SHAEF was interested in dealing with the admiral only as head of the armed forces.

Disarming the German Forces

Controlling OKW

Four days after the surrender at Reims, General Eisenhower ordered General Rooks, a deputy G-3 of SHAEF, to establish a control party at Flensburg for the purpose of imposing the will of the Supreme Commander on OKW in the areas of Germany occupied by the Western Allies. To carry out his mission, General Rooks was to issue the necessary orders, supervise their transmission through German command channels, and compile information about the German command system through the collection and safeguarding of all OKW documents at FIensburg. The Soviets were informed of this order and invited to send a party to Doenitz' headquarters. The German commander in chief was ordered, in turn, to send liaison parties to Reims and to Soviet headquarters in Berlin. Headed by General der Infanterie Friedrich Fangohr, the party that was assigned to SHAEF had little to do inasmuch as General Rooks's mission was used as the chief channel of communication.7

General Rooks acted quickly to assert SHAEF's authority. In his first interview with Doenitz on 13 May, he ordered the arrest of Field Marshal Keitel and his replacement by General Jodl. He explained that all subsequent instructions to the German forces would be in the name of the Supreme Commander and that complete access to the offices and files of OKW for the control party was required. SHAEF, he said, would leave to its army group commanders the control of affairs in their zones and would deal with OKW only on matters common to all three armed services and to all Allied zones. General Jodl assured the Allied general that he would undertake to carry out SHAEF directives in the interests of maintaining order and saving the German people from catastrophe. Doenitz declared that the German armed forces had taken an oath to him personally and would obey his orders. He grasped the opportunity to mention severe problems such as food, currency, and fuel which beset the German people, and emphasized the need of a central German authority to keep order. General Rooks brushed aside this suggestion, making clear that the Western powers


intended to function through Allied military government.8

At General Rooks's request, Doenitz drew up a statement to the German armed forces which the SHAEF representative approved with minor changes on 17 May. This statement removed any doubt that the enemy had surrendered in the face of superior force and included the following: "The German Reich has had to capitulate because it was at the end of its power of resistance. The first consequence that we have to draw is the most loyal fulfillment of the demands made on us. There must be no officer and no soldier, who would try by illegal means to evade the consequences which have arisen out of the last war and an unconditional surrender." .All records were to be shown the Allies. In the event that burdens imposed by the Allies proved too heavy, the Germans might emphasize the possible serious consequences of the orders, but were to make no other protest. Doenitz required every soldier and officer to behave correctly toward the occupying forces.9

Despite these evidences of co-operation, there were several incidents which led to demands in the United States and Great Britain for the termination of the Doenitz regime and the taking of stricter measures against enemy commanders. Angry questions were asked in the House of Commons as the result of a broadcast from Flensburg on 11 May by Field Marshal Busch, Commander in Chief Northwest. Busch declared that with the agreement of the British he had taken command of Schleswig-Holstein and the area occupied by the 21 Army Group and that all German military and civil authorities in the sphere had been subordinated to him. He was referring to an arrangement made on 5 May by which the 21 Army Group established a German chain of command through which it could carry out the initial steps of disbanding the enemy forces, but the broadcast gave offense because it was sent from a transmitter in the OKW enclave at Flensburg which British troops were not able to enter. General Eisenhower promptly ordered firm control over the Flensburg radio and censorship of all future transmissions. The British closed the station, and General Rooks forbade the Germans to reopen it. Other criticism arose when senior Allied officers were photographed in friendly poses with high-level German commanders and when reports were printed that enemy leaders were receiving special treatment. The Supreme Commander condemned such actions and directed that steps be taken to stop their recurrence.10

The outcry over these incidents stemmed from a fear in some quarters that the Allies were not going to be firm enough with the


enemy commanders and that some members of the old regime might be perpetuated in power. The Supreme Commander's statement of his aims at this time indicated that his main desire was to disband the German Army quickly in order to alleviate the growing problem of feeding enemy forces. He hoped that Doenitz' headquarters would be useful in controlling the enemy forces and in speeding up the disarmament process.

Members of the SHAEF control party at Flensburg and the SHAEF Political Officers had already come to a different conclusion. On 17 May, they agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower immediately abolish the "so-called government" of Doenitz and arrest the grand admiral and the members of his staff. SHAEF on the following day pointed out that this action would have to be cleared with the Russians, but ordered all steps short of arrest to assure that Doenitz and his staff ceased their executive functions. On 19 May, the Supreme Commander directed the 21 Army Group to consult with the SHAEF control party at Flensburg and then to arrest the members of Doenitz' "so-called government" and of OKW. The archives were to be seized and secured. Members of the high-level Navy headquarters were for the moment exempted from the order.11

On the morning of 23 May, General Rooks summoned Doenitz, Jodl, and Friedeburg to his office and informed them of the Supreme Commander's order. The officers were then put under guard, but, despite all precautions, Admiral Friedeburg killed himself by taking poison. The other two leaders were flown from Flensburg to a German prison camp that afternoon. In a statement approving the arrests, the Department of State said it could not understand why Doenitz and his group had been permitted to continue their pretense of action as a German government for so long, and asked that all German General Staff officers of whatever rank be arrested on the ground that their training and experience would be useful in reviving German militarism.12

With the arrest of Doenitz and members of his staff, the main work of the SHAEF Control Party at Flensburg was ended. General Rooks indicated his intention of leaving the area about 27 May and handed over local control to a small joint U.S.-British Ministerial Control Party. However, he retained general policy control of the southern branch of OKW which was still in existence and made attempts to disband German forces in that sector.

SHAEF's effort to work through the southern section of OKW was complicated by the confusion in command which followed the arrest on 10 May of Field Marshal Kesselring, who was commanding all forces in the southern area when the war ended. Since the two next senior commanders, Schoerner and Loehr, were somewhere on the Eastern Front and not available to take control, the command devolved on the next in line, Generaloberst Otto Dessloch, an airman. Busy with his own affairs, he appointed General der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal, formerly Kesselring's chief of staff, as his representative at OB WEST. This


arrangement was satisfactory to the 6th Army Group and the Seventh Army, which were dealing at that time with OB WEST in the disbandment of enemy forces, but it was displeasing to General Winter, the commander of the southern section of OKW. Winter felt that his headquarters was the proper channel through which orders should be passed on to subordinate units. The matter was clarified on 19 May when the 6th Army Group named General Westphal Commander in Chief South and subordinated to him virtually all Army and Air Force headquarters in General Devers' area, including the southern section of OKW. While the action represented a victory for Westphal, it made no basic difference since, as General Jodl wired so prophetically shortly before his own arrest, "All of us are expected to lay some eggs and then be put into the chicken soup."13 While this argument was in progress, SHAEF on 18 May directed Maj. Gen. Robert W. Harper to establish a SHAEF control party at the high-level air headquarters (OKL) in Berchtesgaden. He was to get as much intelligence information as possible, impose the will of SHAEF on the high command of the air forces, and close down OKL as an operating force as soon as he could do so without prejudicing Allied interests. Soviet forces were invited to accompany the SHAEF party. Discovering that the air headquarters was a policy staff only and of no value for SHAEF's purposes, General Harper promptly dissolved it. General Dessloch, commander of the Sixth Air Force and the senior airman in the area, was appointed to work with the Ninth Air Force in the disarmament and disbandment of the German Air Force, thus paralleling work being done by General Stumpff and his air headquarters in the north. Toward the end of May the task had been nearly enough completed for General Harper's party to be replaced by a group interested mainly in exploiting the files of the air headquarters.14

Disbanding the German Navy

The high command headquarters of the German Navy (OKM) was retained longer by the Allies than either the OKW or OKL headquarters because of the difficulties faced in disbanding the enemy's naval forces.15 Many of the ships were still at sea when the war ended and had to be brought back to home ports. In addition, the German naval forces had the task of locating and helping to remove mines which had been sowed in European waters.

The task of dealing with the German Navy was handed over by General Eisenhower to the Allied Naval Commander, Admiral Burrough, at the time of the German surrender. The extremely detailed orders for the disarmament and disbandment of the enemy fleet given to Admiral Friedeburg by Admiral Burrough at Reims required the Germans to submit, within forty-eight hours after they received the orders, charts of all minefields in western European waters, information as to German minesweeping activities, and lists


of minesweeping vessels available. Within fourteen days, the enemy was to furnish the location of all ships and craft, locations of all naval establishments, the approximate number and the location of naval personnel, lists of stocks of fuel and locations of the principal naval depots, full details of all German minefields in the northern waters, full details of the enemy minesweeping organization, and copies of all coding and ciphering systems.16

While the Navy was compiling these various lists, Doenitz was instructed to order all enemy ships and craft at sea to report their positions to the nearest Allied wireless telegraph station and to proceed to the nearest German, Allied, or other port selected by the Allies. He was also to forbid the scuttling or damaging of any naval ship or naval aircraft and the damaging of any harbor works or port facilities. Minesweeping and salvaging vessels were to be prepared to begin work at once. Doenitz and OKM promptly began to comply with these demands.17

To see that his orders were carried out, Admiral Burrough appointed Rear Adm. H.T. Baillie-Grohman as commander of the naval forces east of the Elbe to the Soviet zone, and Rear Adm. G.C. Muirhead-Gould as commander of the forces west of the Elbe and in Hamburg. On 16 May, the Allied Naval Commander appointed Capt. G.O. Maund, RN, as his representative in charge of the naval element at OKW and OKM. Maund was later succeeded by Capt. E. Hale, RN.18

The Allied naval parties moved rapidly to collect intelligence from German records which might have a vital bearing on the war against Japan, and pressed activities to open the sea routes to the north German ports. In gathering information, the Allied Naval Commander relied heavily on British and U.S. intelligence and technical parties which had been exploiting records uncovered during the past several months as the enemy had been forced back. As for clearance of the sea routes, the minesweeping that had begun in the North Sea before surrender was steadily increased. Urgent traffic was first admitted to Hamburg on 9 May, and by mid-May Bremerhaven, Emden, and Kiel (via the canal) were open to urgent traffic. Normal traffic began to flow to Hamburg and Kiel (via the canal) on 1 June and to Bremerhaven by the middle of that month.19

The Allied Naval Commander, while anxious to use OKM as long as it could be of aid, arranged in late May to start closing it out. By the end of June it was possible to make plans for its termination. Orders were issued on 12 July to dissolve it and to form a new organization, known as the German Minesweeping Administration, which was to supervise the clearance of sea lanes. Under the control of the British Naval Commander in Chief, Germany, the new organization came into existence on 21 July 1945.20


The Final German Surrenders

While the main headquarters were being dissolved and naval ships and craft were being brought into port for surrender, the Allied army groups and tactical air forces were busy completing the disarmament of the enemy air and ground forces. Their task, as opposed to the Navy's, was greatly simplified because most of the air and land personnel and the bulk of the equipment had been surrendered or overrun before the signing at Reims. The SHAEF control parties in the north and south attempted to get lists of personnel and commanders and locations of units from the German high command, but they frequently found that the Allied commanders were much better informed about the enemy order of battle than the Germans.

The chief German units which had not been overwhelmed in battle in the zone of the Supreme Commander by 7 May were those in the Channel Islands, Dunkerque, the western Netherlands, the fortresses of the French Atlantic coast, and those in Denmark, Norway, and Czechoslovakia. Except in Norway, the tasks of disarming these units were completed by the time SHAEF was dissolved.

Early Capitulations in Western Europe

In compliance with Allied demands presented to General Jodl at Reims, German garrisons in the Channel Islands and the ports along the French coast held themselves in readiness to capitulate to Allied representatives. Enemy forces in the Bordeaux area and along the coast directly to the north had been in the process of surrendering to French units since mid-April. Royan had surrendered on 18 April, Ile d'Oléron on 1 May, and La Rochelle, which had virtually been taken on 4 May, made its formal capitulation on 9 May. German forces still held Lorient, St. Nazaire, the Channel Islands, and Dunkerque.

Negotiations for the surrender of the Lorient and St. Nazaire area began shortly after the surrender at Reims. Representatives of the commanders of these two garrisons signed surrender terms on 7 and 8 May. General der Artillerie Wilhelm Fahrmbacker formally surrendered the Lorient fortress, the Quiberon peninsula, Ile de Groix and Belle Isle to Maj. Gen. Herman F. Kramer of the 66th U.S. Division on 10 May, and Generalleutnant Hans Junck handed over St. Nazaire the following day.21

The Channel Islands, which the Allies had expected to collapse or surrender during 1944-45, still held out at the war's end. Far from surrendering, the garrison of the islands had staged a raid against Granville in early March 1945, startling the U.S. rear echelons and prompting them to ask for infantry protection. Plans for a greater raid scheduled for 7 May were canceled by Jodl and Keitel during the negotiations for the surrender at Reims. On 4 May, SHAEF rescinded arrangements which had been in effect since the previous September for the occupation of the Channel Islands in case of German collapse or surrender (Operation NEST EGG) and gave the task of taking the capitulation to the commander in chief of the British Southern Command. Arrangements were made on 8 May and the


formal surrender was signed on hoard HMS Bulldog the following morning by Generalmajor Siegfried Heine. Brigadier A.E. Snow accepted the capitulation on behalf of the Supreme Commander.22

Shortly afterward on the same morning, another long-held prize of the Germans--Dunkerque--had given up. The garrison, sealed off by the British advance in early September, had been invested for months by the Czech Independent Armored Brigade Group, which was attached to the 21 Army Group. The one-hundred-square-mile area held by the enemy was reduced in the course of the year and a number of Germans were killed and wounded, but Allied strength was not sufficient to capture the city. Negotiations were opened on the subject of capitulation on 7 May shortly after the signing at Reims. Viceadmiral Friedrich Frisius, commander of the Dunkerque garrison, surrendered formally on the morning of the 9th to Maj. Gen. A. Liska, commander of the Dunkerque forces.23

In the western Netherlands, the problem was less one of arranging a formal surrender, which was technically covered by the capitulation of the Germans to Field Marshal Montgomery at Lueneburg Heath on 4 May, than of carrying out the final disarmament and evacuation of the enemy. As a result of the truce that had been in effect in the western Netherlands since 1 May in order to allow the dropping of food supplies for relief of the Dutch population, the enemy forces, unlike those withdrawing across central Germany, were still in prepared defensive positions and were capable of further resistance. To arrange for the orderly disarmament and withdrawal of these elements, Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes of the 1st Canadian Corps met on the afternoon of 5 May with General Blaskowitz, commander of the enemy forces in the Netherlands. Terms of local surrender were signed that day; two days later, elements of the Canadian corps began to occupy the area west of the Grebbe line. Inasmuch as the members of the German army in the Netherlands, the Twenty-fifth, had the status of capitulated troops, they were not given the status of prisoners of war nor were their units broken up. Instead the army was kept intact and was made responsible for the maintenance of its move and the building of its own staging camps during the operation. The movement began on 25 May under Canadian supervision and was virtually completed by 12 June 1945.24


The chief problem faced in Czechoslovakia was not simply to persuade the Germans there to surrender. It was rather to get them to lay down their arms to the Soviets instead of fighting their way across Bohemia in an attempt to capitulate to the armies of the Western powers. The problem was complicated further by the question of what to do about Prague. Various persons wanted General Eisenhower to enter the city ahead of the Russians, but, although it would have been relatively easy for U.S. forces to move into the


Czech capital, the Red Army wanted this task for itself.

The Supreme Commander's attention was directed to Prague on 5 May when optimistic reports were received at SHAEF saying that Partisan forces had risen against the Germans in that city and that the Czechoslovak flag was flying over the capital. A few hours later, however, German armor converged on the city, and on the following day the Czechoslovaks asked for help. In London a Czechoslovak representative, Minister Hubert Ripka, asked Allied diplomatic representatives and officials of SHAEF for the promptest aid by ground and air forces to stop an enemy advance which was reported to be about twenty miles southwest of the city. In order to be able to give instructions to leaders inside Prague, Ripka asked whether the Third Army, then in Czechoslovakia, had been ordered to advance to the capital. He also asked that forces of his country then operating with the Allied forces be sent to the aid of their beleaguered city. Gen. Stanislav Bosy, recently appointed chief of the Czechoslovak Military Mission, appealed directly to General Patton in an effort to get aid.

By the time a number of Czech appeals were transmitted to Col. Anthony J.D. Biddle of the European Allied Contact Section of SHAEF, the surrender terms at Reims had already been signed. His natural reply was that since hostilities had ceased no action on the matter was required. Later in the day, however, Prime Minister Churchill expressed to General Eisenhower the hope that the Supreme Commander's statements on Allied intentions would not prevent an advance to Prague if forces were available and if they did not meet the Russians before reaching the Czechoslovak capital.25

Throughout 7 and 8 May, other urgent requests came from various Czechoslovak representatives, who said that the Germans were committing atrocities in Prague. Minister Ripka appealed personally to Mr. Churchill on 8 May. On being informed of this action, SHAEF representatives, taking the view that the matter was one for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide, informed General Bosy that the Czechoslovaks had been correct in approaching Churchill inasmuch as the British Prime Minister had facilities for obtaining U.S. agreement to any changes in current military plans. "I think you can rest assured that if Mr. Churchill feels that something can be done to relieve the tragic situation in Prague, he will already have taken action, and that no good purpose would be served by a direct approach to SHAEF."26

SHAEF's policy concerning an advance to Prague was based on the Soviet request of 5 May that the Western forces not move east of the Budejovice-Pilzen-Karlsbad line into Czechoslovakia. Holding fast to this boundary, the Supreme Commander nonetheless kept Moscow informed of reports from Prague in case the Soviet leaders wanted the U.S. forces to continue their advance. Thus on 8 May, when the Czechoslovaks appealed for dive bombers to be sent to the Prague area to stop an


enemy attack, SHAEF forwarded the message to the Soviets with the comment that SHAEF was taking no action. Members of the Czechoslovak Military Mission were informed that SHAEF forces, including attached Czech units, had stopped their advance at the request of the USSR and that all appeals for help had been passed on to Moscow.27

Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF, and the Doenitz government were endeavoring to stop the fighting in Czechoslovakia. The Combined Chiefs, possibly in the desire to remove any Soviet suspicions that the Western powers were permitting the Germans to continue fighting on the Eastern Front, notified the USSR as early as 8 May that Germany had surrendered jointly to the Red Army and the forces under SHAEF and that continuation of hostilities for even an hour after the time set for the cease-fire would be considered an offense against all the Allied forces. If any sizable bodies of troops continued to fight, they would cease to have the status of soldiers. "We do not accept," the Combined Chiefs continued, "that any German forces may continue to fight the Red Army without, in effect, fighting our forces also."28 To make certain that there was no misunderstanding of his position, General Eisenhower on 10 May ordered Doenitz to take immediate steps "to insure prompt compliance of these commanders to cease fire." To reinforce his action, Eisenhower directed all troops under his command to imprison German soldiers coming from the fighting area and hand them over to the Russians as violators of the Act of Capitulation. U.S. forces were to set up road blocks and to direct retreating Germans into areas forward of the U.S. lines to await capture by the Red Army. The Supreme Commander stipulated that, in case certain officers--Field Marshal Schoerner for one--were taken, they were to be handed over to the Soviets.29

Doenitz' efforts to stop the fighting in Czechoslovakia were complicated by the fact that, before the surrender at Reims, he had ordered his commanders to do everything possible short of violating truce terms to reach the lines of the Western powers. They were to take advantage of every second left them between the signing of terms of surrender and the time the capitulation was to go into effect. Now that it was clear that his scheme could no longer work, Doenitz had to convince his commanders that they should lay down their arms. His task was made the more difficult because the first news of the surrender had reached the German forces in Czechoslovakia from the Prague radio station, which had been captured by the Partisans shortly before the capitulation at Reims. Many of the commanders either tended to believe that the announcement was propaganda or, at least, thought that such an assumption could excuse their failure to surrender. In order to make certain that Field Marshal Schoerner was informed of the capitulation, Doenitz on the evening of 7 May sent a member of his staff, accompanied by a U.S. escort, to


find the German commander and instruct him to surrender. Schoerner, who was located near the Silesian border in northeast Czechoslovakia, indicated that he had already attempted to reach his troops with the surrender order, but that he would now go to western Czechoslovakia to seek out his commanders personally and see to it that the capitulation terms were carried out. At this time, there still remained a short period of grace before fighting had to stop and there appeared to be every disposition to continue the withdrawal until the surrender formally went into effect. Schoerner warned that virtually no order would make his troops leave their comrades behind or voluntarily surrender to the Red forces and that it would also be difficult to control them if they were attacked by Czechoslovak Partisans.30

By 12 May, Czechoslovak and Soviet troops had entered Prague and the Red Army was pressing westward to link up with the SHAEF forces. General Eisenhower's next consideration was how to move the Czech forces under Western command back to their own country. Czechoslovak units had been organized in the United Kingdom after the fall of France and in 1943 had been placed under British control with the understanding that they would be used against the Germans and ultimately concentrated in Czechoslovakia. In discussing these agreements with officers of SHAEF in February 1944, the Czechoslovak representatives had stressed that it was important for these troops to participate in the liberation of their country. The Czechoslovak brigade that had been given the task of investing Dunkerque in September 1944 was still engaged in that mission when the Allied forces neared the Czechoslovakian border in April 1945. As a result, the Supreme Commander had to postpone shifting it to the 12th Army Group front until after the surrender of Dunkerque on 9 May. He then moved the brigade to the Czechoslovak border, but held up its advance at the Pilzen-Karlsbad line.

When the Czechoslovaks in London pressed for permission to move east of the line, SHAEF proposed that they settle the matter by direct negotiation with the Soviet Government and directed General Bradley to permit the Czechoslovak brigade to move when he was satisfied that the USSR had given its authorization. Units were allowed to go to Prague on 28 May for a liberation parade, but three days later they were returned to the U.S. zone. As late as the first week in July, the Soviets had not yet given their approval. The Czechoslovak Government in Prague thereupon took the position that such assent was not necessary. Air Chief Marshal Tedder, then acting Supreme Commander, indicated that SHAEF had no objections to the move but considered it wise for the government to "formalize their arrangements with the Russians before entry is made." He noted that the shift might be simplified by arrangements which would leave Czechoslovak forces on their own soil when the U.S. forces withdrew from the section west of Pilzen. The shift had still not been made four days


later, the last day of SHAEF's existence, although one of the messages sent from that headquarters on 13 July indicated that the Supreme Commander had no objection when the Czechoslovaks requested that their brigade be released from its attachment to the Third Army.31

SHAEF's insistence that the officials in Prague come to an agreement with the Soviets may have been prompted to a degree by recent manifestations of a pro-Moscow orientation by the Czechoslovak Government. Nearly a month before the war's end, for example, the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Czechoslovakia, preparing to join that government at Kosice, where it was located temporarily, were told that because of inadequate accommodations they could not be received. When it became clear that President Eduard Benes had held several meetings with the Soviet Ambassador, the Allied diplomats protested to Vice-Premier Jan Masaryk, who promised to look into the situation but left for San Francisco for the United Nations meeting before doing anything to clarify the situation. The month of April also saw the resignation of many of the chief Czechoslovak officials in London, leading SHAEF officials to conclude that a housecleaning aimed at individuals who had been close to the Western Allies was in progress. The chief SHAEF liaison officer with the Czechoslovaks also concluded that SHAEF would meet a number of delays in the future when it tried to deal with the new government. His prediction proved accurate in the case of a SHAEF proposal to arm two Czechoslovak battalions to be used in the U.S. zone. This project, once acceptable to the Czechoslovaks, was allowed to die when SHAEF found that no reply on the subject would be received from the government in Kosice.32 There was thus a lack of close liaison with the government at Kosice when the war ended.

By mid-June, however, there was evidence that the Benes government, which by then was established in Prague, was somewhat worried about the continued presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil. Benes was reported to want both U.S. and Soviet forces to leave the country. He was said, however, to desire that U.S. forces remain for the moment and that they synchronize their eventual withdrawal with that of the Soviets. The War Department, faced with problems of redeployment, the occupation of Germany, and an offensive against the Japanese, wanted to withdraw as quickly as possible regardless of Soviet action, but the State Department was reported to favor holding the current line until the Red Army forces began to pull out. In response to the War Department's request for his opinion, General Eisenhower declared in mid-June that "if Czechoslovak independence is to be maintained it seems undesirable that Russia be left in sole occupation. More: over, our withdrawal now might hamper Czechoslovak efforts to secure early Russian withdrawal." On 4 July, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff decided to withdraw their forces simultaneously with and in


proportion to the forces taken out by the Red Army. On the basis of an estimate that the initial Soviet contingents had been reduced two-thirds, General Eisenhower was told to withdraw a similar percentage of his forces.33

Disarming the Enemy in Denmark and Norway

The disbandment of enemy forces in Denmark and Norway differed in several particulars from similar efforts in other countries occupied by the Germans. For one thing, the forces had not been defeated in the field and were inclined to demand special treatment. For another, the large number of German wounded and refugees and non-German displaced persons threw a heavy burden on the occupied countries and the Allied units responsible for evacuating them. Moreover, the enemy forces in the two countries greatly outnumbered the Allied contingents sent to those areas. In both Denmark and Norway, the SHAEF representatives had difficulties with Soviet authorities. The task of disarming the Germans in the two countries was entrusted by the Supreme Commander to SHAEF missions which had been established in 1944 and to which forces had been attached in case of German collapse or surrender. The mission to Denmark had virtually completed its job at the time of the dissolution of SHAEF, but the mission to Norway did not wind up its affairs until the fall of 1945.

SHAEF Mission Denmark

Maj. Gen. Richard H. Dewing, head of the SHAEF mission to Denmark,34 accompanied by his staff and a parachute company, flew to Copenhagen on 5 May 1945, shortly after the German surrender at Lueneburg, and issued orders to govern the evacuation of enemy forces from that country. He informed a representative of General Lindemann, commander in chief of German armed forces in Denmark, that he was to march his units back to the Reich under their own officers and with their usual weapons. Hungarian and Soviet troops who had served with the Germans were to march out with them. Hospitals, their patients, and staffs were to be allowed to remain for a time. General Lindemann was directed to arrest SD and Gestapo members in Denmark and send lists of them to the British.35 Dewing forbade ships lying off Copenhagen with German soldiers and refugees to land and denied the use of Danish ports to ships that were in the process of evacuating troops from Kurland and East Prussia, but he promised to seek further orders on the matter.36

To handle German effectives, estimated at some 206,000, plus 80,000 sick and wounded and 48,000 soldiers and refugees in Danish ports or off Copenhagen, General Dewing had his original parachute company plus the 1 Royal Dragoons and a parachute battalion. These were


augmented by 6,000-9,000 Danish police. The number of Germans was increased shortly after the surrender at Reims when General Dewing ruled that wounded aboard the ships that had come from Kurland to Copenhagen could be unloaded there.37

A problem that concerned General Dewing indirectly was the disarming of Germans on the Danish island of Bornholm. Although the island was well east of the general line to be occupied by the Soviets, it was surrendered with other Danish territory to Field Marshal Montgomery on 4 May. Aware of this, OKW on 8 May ordered its forces on the island to oppose a Soviet landing before the formal surrender went into effect. The 21 Army Group proposed sending an Allied detachment to the island, but before this step could be taken the Red forces had acted. SHAEF ruled that, while the island was clearly included in the surrender to the 21 Army Group, it was also covered by the over-all capitulations at Reims and Berlin.38 The Danes complained later in the year when the Soviet troops lingered after the Germans were evacuated from the island, but the Red Army forces did not finally withdraw until the spring of 1946.

The main difficulties in evacuating the enemy forces from Denmark arose when Danish resistance forces attempted to disarm the Germans. Already touchy on the subject of being disarmed though they had not been defeated in the field, the enemy commanders protested frequently that they had not surrendered to the Danes. In spite of British assurance that these incidents would not be repeated, enemy representatives concluded that it would probably be impossible to prevent the Danes from playing cowboys and Indians ("Indianerspieler").39 These troubles notwithstanding, the withdrawal of German forces proceeded rapidly. Some 43,000 had left the country by the end of the first week of liberation, and the number had nearly doubled at the end of the second week. By the close of the first week of June, General Dewing concluded that he could dispense with the services of General Lindemann and ordered his arrest. Fewer than 50,000 Germans remained in Denmark when SHAEF was dissolved. Since the task of the SHAEF mission was not finally completed, it was divided into its British and U.S. components with the troops in the country remaining under the British commander.40

The SHAEF Mission in Norway

Disarming German forces in Norway required much more elaborate planning and more extensive activities than in Denmark because of the extent of the country, the difficulty of access to parts of it, and the size of the forces involved. Spread out through Norway was a force of some 400,000 Germans, including Organization


Todt workers, plus 90,000 Russian prisoners and displaced persons as well as some 30,000 displaced persons of other nationalities. These forces under General der Gebirgstruppen Franz Boehme, commander of the Twentieth Mountain Army and of the German armed forces in Norway, like those in Denmark, had not been defeated and were disinclined to surrender unless proper deference was paid to their dignity.41

The task of clearing the Germans from Norway was undertaken at General Eisenhower's direction by the SHAEF Mission (Norway) headed by Gen. Sir Andrew Thorne.42 This officer, who had held the Scottish Command at Edinburgh since 1941 and who had been named commander of the Allied Land Forces (Norway) in 1944, was also asked to serve as head of the SHAEF mission late in 1944. Since the fall of 1943, he had been engaged in detailed planning for a return to Norway in case of German collapse or surrender. When the Germans surrendered at Reims, they were instructed to send Army representatives to Edinburgh to sign final surrender papers pertaining to their forces in Norway and were also told to expect the arrival of General Thorne's representatives shortly in Oslo.43

Representatives of General Thorne flew to Norway on 8 May to deliver his orders to General Boehme. During the next three days, airborne forces were flown in to aid the mission in its task of evacuating the Germans. British destroyers then entered all of the ports of entry, bringing naval and military disarmament parties, and pushed into northern waters when the Soviets seemed unduly interested there. The Allied forces were augmented at the beginning of June by a reinforced U.S. regiment. At most, fewer than 40,000 Allied troops were brought in to deal with some 400,000 Germans.44

During his stay in Norway, General Thorne found that some of his chief problems included persuading the Soviets to accept back into their occupation zone Germans from that area, handling Yugoslav displaced persons, and evacuating Russian displaced persons. The Norwegians, furthermore, resented the destruction of armaments in their country, an understandable reaction, but General Thorne felt that he was permitted no discretion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive on the subject. In the case of both Yugoslav and Russian displaced persons, trouble arose when some of them expressed unwillingness to return home and the SHAEF representatives refused to force them to do so. Relations with the Soviets were worsened when General Thorne commuted the death sentence of


a German officer who had killed a citizen of the USSR.45

Initial emphasis was placed by the SHAEF mission on evacuating Allied prisoners of war and Soviet displaced persons. In agreement with the Swedish Government, this movement was carried on through Sweden to Soviet ports on the Baltic. Before SHAEF was dissolved, some 42,000 Russians had been moved from the country while a similar number still remained. The task of taking enemy forces out of the country had scarcely been begun in mid-July when SHAEF's control came to an end and the SHAEF mission was split into separate U.S. and British components, with General Thorne continuing as commander in chief of Allied Land Forces (Norway).46

Closing Out Supreme Headquarters

It will be recalled that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not accepted General Eisenhower's proposal of 1944 for retaining a combined headquarters for the occupation of western Germany. It was clear by the time of the German surrender, therefore, that Supreme Headquarters would soon cease to exist. General Eisenhower proposed, however, on 10 May, that his headquarters remain in existence until all organized resistance had ceased in Europe, the Allied forces were established in their zones of occupation, and the machinery was established to assume the functions of the separate national units in western Germany.47 Meanwhile he ordered his staff to make plans for the termination of SHAEF and defined the duties of the occupying forces so as to reduce the amount of time needed to fulfill the conditions noted on 10 May.

He reminded the army group commanders on 11 May that they were not to assume the responsibilities of government but rather to establish control over the remaining German authority in order to insure that the government would be carried on according to the Allied will and that Nazis would be excluded from power. He directed the commanders to activate military government regional teams at once. These teams were to re-establish the German administrative machinery at a regional level to handle such immediate problems as the distribution of food, the effective use of available transport, and the reconstitution of enough industrial facilities to meet military needs and provide minimum essential civil requirements in Germany. The German administrative machinery, said the Supreme Commander, was so to be arranged that it could be separated when the armies withdrew to their various spheres of occupation. The army group commanders were to make their military boundaries conform as fully as possible to the regional administrative boundaries for military government. Insofar as military security permitted, restrictions on inter-area travel and communications were to be removed.48

In a series of moves, whose story belongs to the opening chapter of military government in Germany rather than to the


Victory speech delivered by
General Eisenhower
VICTORY SPEACH being delivered by General Eisenhower at the conclusion of hostilities. Air Chief Marshal Tedder is shown at right.

concluding phase of SHAEF49, the Allied commanders started the governmental machinery functioning again in their various areas. Following a pattern which had been laid down when the first Allied forces reached German soil west of the Rhine in the fall of 1944, they installed under military control and supervision the administrative organization necessary to keep order, start the flow of foodstuffs to the civilian population, reopen means of communications, and provide military security. At the same time they suspended Nazi executive, legislative, and judicial machinery, and seized influential Nazi leaders and their records. These actions were intended merely as groundwork for the Allied military government activities that were to go into effect on the dissolution of SHAEF. With matters left largely to the separate armies, some of which would be likely to remain in occupation as the enforcement agencies of military government, there was some assurance that no important change-over would have to be made.

General Eisenhower was relieved of his responsibilities for disbanding and disarming enemy forces in western Europe on 5 June when the commanders of the U.S., British, Soviet, and French forces in Europe, meeting in Berlin as the Allied Control Council, assumed control of Germany in the names of their governments. Thereafter, the SHAEF staff concentrated on the task of shifting to unilateral control those functions which had been conducted at Supreme Headquarters on a combined basis. These included activities of dozens of combined committees and commissions dealing with such matters as fuel, transportation, equipment of troops in liberated countries, civil affairs, displaced


I.G. Farbenindustrie Buidling
I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE BUILDING in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany.

persons, war criminals, psychological warfare, censorship, intelligence, communications, and prisoners of war. Further, the staff had the tasks of separating the U.S. and British components of the SHAEF missions in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway without interfering with their work, and of making certain that combined agreements with the liberated countries would still apply after the change to national control.

While the Supreme Commander and many members of his staff were preparing to dissolve the combined headquarters, outlining the work of occupation authorities, and putting in appearances at victory celebrations, Supreme Headquarters moved from Reims and Versailles to the I. G. Farbenindustrie building in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Shortly afterward, numerous new international Organizations rounded to deal with postwar problems began to pour their representatives into Frankfurt and near-by cities, and the U.S. contingent of SHAEF was augmented in preparation for the day when it would become Headquarters, U.S. Forces in the European Theater (USFET). The Allied compound in Frankfurt took on a boomtown appearance as the number of personnel assigned or attached to SHAEF passed the 16,000 mark, and the addition of air, naval, UNRRA, special missions, military government, and other agencies swelled the total to 30,000 military or civilian personnel associated with Supreme Headquarters.50

Throughout western Europe, the redeployment of U.S. and Allied forces was under way, and units only recently in the line were made ready to return home for discharge or shipment to the Far Eastern theater of the war. Elsewhere, special Allied security parties were rounding up


members of the German General Staff, German commanders, Nazi leaders, suspected war criminals, scientists with special knowledge of German weapons, and the like and bringing them to western Europe for interrogation. Along the Elbe, the Western powers prepared to move back into their own zones as soon as final arrangements could be reached with the USSR. Civil affairs agencies were restoring the local committees to order, stamping out potential sources of trouble, completing disarmament of troops, caring for displaced persons, and starting up the economic and administrative machinery of Germany.

Amidst all this bustle, there was also a certain festive air as passes for soldiers became more plentiful and as recreational and educational centers were set up for soldiers confronted with months of waiting before their return home. From the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other parts of the world, a steadily increasing number of notables and experts flocked to Paris and Frankfurt to have a look at the wreckage of Hitler's Reich and to suggest measures for the future. For the moment, past dreads were forgotten and some hope was entertained for an era of peace, although there were indications that the Soviets would be difficult to deal with. The reserved attitude which the USSR had maintained toward the Western powers in such matters as liaison and the drawing of lines of demarcation had become tinged with suspicion during the surrender negotiations.

On 29 June, the Combined Chiefs of Staff took steps leading directly to the termination of Supreme Headquarters as they ordered the Supreme Commander to begin withdrawing U.S. and British troops from the Soviet zone on 1 July. They also directed him to send British and U.S. garrisons and a French token force to Berlin. Air Chief Marshal Tedder, now acting Supreme Commander, was also asked to outline steps to terminate SHAEF on 1 July or as soon thereafter as practicable. In preparation for the dissolution of the combined command, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff named General Eisenhower commanding general of U.S. Forces in the European Theater, commander in chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany, and representative of the United States on the Allied Control Council of Germany. The British named Field Marshal Montgomery as their representative on the council, and his army group became the British Army of the Rhine. General Koenig was appointed chief of the French occupation forces and representative of France in Berlin, while Marshal Zhukov filled a similar post for the Soviets.51

Plans for separating British and U.S. elements of Supreme Headquarters were announced on 6 July. Air Chief Marshal Tedder at that time transferred all U.S. units under SHAEF and the U.S. elements of ANCXF and the SHAEF missions to the Commanding General, USFET, the 21 Army Group and its naval and air elements to the control of the War Office, Admiralty, or Air Ministry, and the First French Army to the direct control of the French high command. U.S. members of SHAEF became the staff of the new Headquarters, USFET, and remained in the I.G. Farbenindustrie building in Frankfurt. The British elements were transferred to Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine. The various national


missions accredited to SHAEF were instructed to terminate their relationship with Supreme Headquarters and to make separate accreditations to the British, U.S. and French commands. To speed the dissolution of any joint or combined machinery which could not be transferred to British and U.S. agencies, a Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency under General Gale was established. Its Documents Section, established at Headquarters, USFET, was given the special task of collecting, cataloguing, screening, and microfilming all documents belonging to Supreme Headquarters.52

Final disbandment of the headquarters was delayed at the request of General Eisenhower until he could return from the United States to bid farewell to the members of his staff. On 13 July, shortly after his return, he asked them to assemble in the Kasino of the I.G. Farbenindustrie building where he expressed his appreciation for their work. The headquarters was formally dissolved at 0001, 14 July.53

In recognition of the work of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the Supreme Commander issued this final Order of the Day:

On this occasion, the termination of Combined Command, I welcome the opportunity to express my gratitude and admiration to the people of the Allied Nations in Europe whose fighting forces and nationals have contributed so effectively to victory.

United in a common cause, the men and women of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Norway joined with the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States of America to form a truly Allied team, which in conjunction with the mighty Red Army smashed and obliterated the Nazi aggressors. I pay tribute to every individual who gave so freely and unselfishly to the limit of his or her ability. Their achievements in the cause for which they fought will be indelibly inscribed in the pages of history and cherished in the hearts of all freedom-loving people.

It is my fervent hope and prayer that the unparalleled unity which has been achieved among the Allied Nations in war will be a source of inspiration for, and point the way to, a permanent and lasting peace.



[B L A N K]


Shoulder Sleeve Insignia
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force

Shoulder sleeve insignia, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

Upon a field of heraldic sable (BLACK), representing the darkness of Nazi oppression, is shown the sword of liberation in the form of a crusader's sword, the flames arising from the hilt and leaping up the blade. This represents avenging justice by which the enemy power will be broken in Nazi-dominated Europe. Above the sword is a rainbow emblematic of hope containing all the colors of which the National Flags of the Allies are composed. The heraldic chief of azure (BLUE) above the rainbow is emblematic of a state of peace and tranquillity the restoration of which to the enslaved people is the objective of the United Nations.


Table of Contents
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1. The task of returning the forces of the Western powers to their respective zones was also listed for performance in the early weeks but had not been completed when SHAEF was dissolved.

2. Operation ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, 10 Nov 44, and Amendments, 17 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS ECLIPSE (Case 2), I, and ECLIPSE (envelope).

3. SHAEF to ANCXF, 21 A gp et al., FWS 20638, 5 May 45, SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, Policy and Incidents of Local Surrenders, I. The same file contains copies of all documents and orders presented to the enemy representatives at Reims.

4. Notes on conf, 1000 hours, 7 May 45, at SHAEF, SHAEF SGS 322.01/28 OKW Liaison Detachment to SHAEF, I.

5. Conf, 8 May 45, Doenitz, Jodl, and other members of stf at Flensburg, German White Book 1945.

6. German White Book 1945.

7. Order, SHAEF to Gen Rooks, 11 May 45, SHAEF G-3 387-7 SHAEF Control Mission (OKW); Memo, G-3 SHAEF, 3 May 45, sub: Liaison Detachment From OKW; SHAEF to EXFOR, FWD 21656, 16 May 45; SCOFOR Main to SHAEF, DAF, 19 May 45; SHAEF to SHAEF Control Party, AEF 510, 13 May 45. All in SHAEF SGS 322.01/29 SHAEF Liaison Detachment to OKW, I.

8. Ewart, EXFOR TAC (21 A Gp), to SHAEF Fwd for Strong, 1/103, 9 May 45; Intervs, Gen Rooks and Brig Foord with Jodl, 13 May 45; Interv, Rooks and Foord with Doenitz, 13 May 45. All in SHAEF SGS 322 OKW, Organization and Personnel OKW-OKM-OKH.

9. Instructions [Jodl for Doenitz] Regarding Conduct Toward the Occupying Powers, 17 May 45, SHAEF F-3 387-11 Clearance of OKW Messages. A notation of 22 May 1945 indicates that these were cleared by the SHAEF control party with the exception of a final sentence in which Doenitz said that he hoped that the demands of the Allies would not exceed the limits of international law which the Wehrmacht had respected throughout the war save in individual instances which might occur in any war and in any force.

10. Morgan to Whitely, 13 May 45;; de Guingand to SHAEF for Whiteley, COS 116, 13 May 45; SAC to SHAEF Control Party, FWS 21475, 14 May 45; Rooks to SHAEF Fwd, 29, 15 May 45. All in SHAEF G-3 387-9 OKW Misc. New York Times, May 12-14, 1945; Eisenhower to U.S.comdrs, FWS 21421, 14 May 45, SHAEF G-3 387-8 Ops (C) OKW Mission to SHAEF. For investigation of treatment of OKW liaison detachment at SHAEF see SHAEF SGS 322.01/38 OKW Liaison Detachment to SHAEF, I.

11. SHAEF control party (OKW) to SHAEF Fwd, 37, 17 May 45; SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Control Party, 21874, 18 May 45; Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 398, 19 May 45; SCAEF to EXFOR Fwd, 21924, 19 May 45. All in SHAEF G-3 387-9 OKW Misc.

12. Memo, Gen Nevins for G-3 SHAEF, 23 May 45, sub: Telephone Call From Gen Rooks, SHAEF G-3 387-9 OKW Misc.; Murphy to Smith, 25 May 45, SHAEF G-3 387-7 SHAEF Control Mission (OKW).

13. Tel, Desslock to Army Group G and others, 15 May 45; Tel, Winter to Jodl, Nr. 047/45, 20 May 45. Both in OKW, Demob. Abt. 10.V.-15.V.45. Rad, Winter to Jodl, Nr. 010/45 15 May 45; Tel, Winter to OB WEST, Nr. 09/45, 15 May 45. Both in OKW, Sued-Führunsabt. 28.IV.-23.Vi.45. Rad, Jodl toOB SUED, 20 May 45. OKW, Nach der Kapitulation, Chef OKW, WFSt., Grossadm. Doenitz 4.-23.V.45.

14. Dir, SHAEF to Gen Harper, 19 May 45, SHAEF G-3 387-10 OKW South; SHAEF Fwd to Comds, FWS 22735, 30 May 45, SHAEF SGS 322 OKW, Organization and Personnel OKW-OKM-OKH.

15. OKH had disappeared before the war's end.

16.Photostat, Instr, Burrough to Friedeburg, at Reims, 8 May 45, SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, Policy and INcidents of Local German Surrenders, I.

17. Instr, Burrough to Friedeburg, 7 May 45; ANCXF Main to Admiralty and C-in-C East Indies, 12 May 45. Both in SHAEF SGS 387.4-4 SHAEF 21542/2 Surrender Orders GCT.

18. Rpt, Admiral Burrough to SAC, The Final Stages of the Naval War in North-West Europe, 13 July 45, OCMH files. Muirhead-Gould was in charge of the party which landed at Helgoland on 11 May and took its surrender.

19. Rpt, Admiral Burrough to SAC, 13 Jul 45, OCMH.

20. ANCXF to Capt Maund, OKM, 29 May 45, SHAEF SGS 322 OKW, OKW-OKM-OKH. Admiral Burrough in his report says that this message was handed to Maund on 6 June., ANCXF Main to SHAEF Main, 12 Jul 45, SHAEF SGS 322 OKW, Organization and Personnel OKW-OKM-OKH.

21. Copies of the surrender documents may be found in SHAEF SGS 387.4-4 SHAEF 21542/2 Surrender Orders GCT. Details of the surrender may be found in History of the Fifteenth Army, p. 19, and Siinto S. Wessman, 66th Division in World War II (Baton Rouge, La., 1946), pp. 109-40.

22. General H. Adeline, La Libération du Sud-ouest (Algiers, 1948); Msgs by Jodl, 5 May 45, and Keitel, 6 May 45, Führer Directives, pp. 230-31; Eisenhower to Southern Comd, CinC Plymouth, and 11 Gp RAF, FWS 20609, 4 May 45, Eisenhower personal file; Rpt, Brig A. E. Snow to C-in-C Southern Comd, with copy of surrender instruments, 11 May 45, SHAEF SGS 387.4-4 SHAEF 21542/2 Surrender Orders GCT.

23. Hq Line of Communications Periodical Intel Review 1, Dunkurque, 22 May 45, OCMH files.

24. Brief Historical Outline of the Occupation of N.W. Holland by 1 Canadian Corps, pars. 1-30, OCMH files.

25. Maj V. Pan to Col Biddle, 6 May 45; Memo, Maj Phillips, EACS, for SHAEF, 6 May 45, sub: Request for Help by Prague; Ripka to J. Nicolls, Br Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 6 May 45; Ripka to Rudolf Schoenfeld, U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, 6 May 45. All in SHAEF EACS SH/9 Czechoslovak. Churchill to Eisenhower, 2920, 7 May 45, Eisenhower personal file.

26. Maj Pan to Biddle, 8 May 45; Ltr to Gen Bosy, 9 May 45 (unsigned but apparently from Colonel McFie to EACS); Note, Nevins to liaison officer, 10 May 45, on transmitted slip of request from Czechoslovak Military Mission of 9 May 1945. All in SHAEF EACS SH/9 Czechoslovak.

27. Czechoslovak Military Mission to SHAEF, RR-17731, 6 May 45; 12 A Gp to ASHAEF, QX-31923, 7 May 45; SHAEF to Mil Mission Moscow, FWD 21001, 8 May 45. All in SHAEF SGS 370.64 Czechoslovakian Resistance Groups. Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 8 May 45, Eisenhower personal file.

28. CCS to Mil Mission Moscow, FACS 216, 8 May 45, Eisenhower personal file.

29. Eisenhower to OKW, 10 May 45; Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 10May 45. Both in Eisenhower personal file. V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 458, gives details of the road blocks and the handling of the disarming of the enemy. Field Marshal Schoerner was captured on 18 May and handed over four days later to the Red Army.

30. German White Book 1945; Copy of Rad, Schoerner to OKW/WFSt-Doenitz, 8 May 45, in Msg, Jodl to Friedel for Eisenhower, 8 May 45. OKW, Kapitulationsverhandlungen 2.V.-II.V.45; Report of Col Wilhelm Meyer-Detring, OKW officer who was sent by Doenitz to Schoerner, 10 May 45. OKW Einsatzabtelung Heer 2.V.-22.V.45. The broad details of the report are confirmed by V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 454, which is based on the report of Lt. Col. Robert H. Pratt, the V Corps officer who led the escort that accompanied Meyer-Detring during the trip from Pilzen to Prague and Belichovky and back.

31. Brief for mtg with Czechoslovak military authorities, 16 Feb 44; Memo, Col McFie for Gen Morgan, 16 Feb 44; SHAEF to EACS for Czechoslovak Military Mission and 12th A Gp, FWD 21298, 12 May 45; SHAEF to 12th A Gp, FWS 22079, 21 May 45; SHAEF to Air Ministry, FWFS 22587, 20 May 45; Air Ministry to SHAEF, AX-741, 7 Jul 45; SHAEF to U.S. Military Attaché, Czechoslovakia, for United States Ambassador, S-96228, 9 Jul 45; SHAEF (sgd Tedder) to Air Ministry, S-96640, 11 Jul 45. All in SHAEF SGS 091 Czechoslovakia Misc., I; Eisenhower to Military Attaché U.S. Embassy, Prague, S-97316, 13 Jul 45, SHAEF G-3 370-62 Czechoslovakia.

32. Memo, Biddle for Bull, 4 May 45, SHAEF EACS SH./9 Czechoslovak.

33. Murphy to Smith, 17 May 45; AGWAR to SHAEF Fwd, W-16162, 13 Jun 45; Memo, Bull for CofS, 16 Jun 45; Eisenhower to Marshall, S-91011, 16 Jun 45; JCS to Eisenhower, W-26489, 4 Jul 45; Memo, Bull for CofS, 6 Jul 45. All in SHAEF G-3 370-62 Czechoslovakia.

34. Col. Ford Trimble was deputy head of the mission.

35. SD--Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS, the Party Security Service; Gestapo--Geheime Staatspolizei, the Secret State Police.

36. Rpt 15, Dewing to SHAEF, 14 May 45, SHAEF Mission (Denmark) file; Report of Generalmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt on talk with Gen Fewing [Dewing], 5 May 45. OKW, Befehle 13.IV.-20.V.45, 6 May 45. For Montgomery's earlier orders concerning Denmark, see Msg, Kinzel to OKW, 5 May 45. OKW, Kapitulationsverhandlungenb 2.V.-II.V.45.

37. Rpt 15, Dewing to SHAEF, 14 May 45, SHAEF Mission (Denmark) file. German estimates made to OKW on 5 May 1945 show 230,000 armed forces, police, Organization Todt personnel (60,000 wounded), and 207,000 refugees. OKW, Befehle 13.IV.-20.V.45. The number of refugees, increased by the arrival of ships after the surrender, was finally estimated at 300,000.

38. Tel, OKW/WFSt/Op (M) to OKM and others, 8 May 45; Rad, OKW/WFSt/Op (M) to Commander of Bornholm, 10 May 45; Note on Bornholm incident, Vorfaelle Bornholm 10 May 45; Rad, Jodl to Commander of Bornholm, 11 May 45. All in OKW, Befehle 13.IV.-20.V.45.

39. Note for the record in WFSt/Op (H) files (report by Lt Col Konrad Benze), 9 May 45. OKW, Befehle 13.IV.-20.V.45.

40. Rpt 18, Dewing to SHAEF, SHAEF Mission (Denmark) file.

41. These forces were variously estimated. General Boehme spoke at one time of 500,000 Germans who would have bno more rights when they were disarmed. Tel, Boehme to OKW/WFSt, 10 May 45. OKW Befehle 13.IV.-20.V.45. General Thorne at one time spoke of 415,000 Germans including the Todt workers and at another time of nearly 400,000. Text of farewell press conf. 30 Oct 45; Hq Allied Land Forces (Norway) AAR, 1944-45. Both from Gen Thorne's file, now in OCMH files.

42. Col. Charles H. Wilson was deputy head of the mission.

43. For plans, see documents in SHAEF G-3 files under the code names RANKIN Case C (Norway), APOSTLE I, APOSTLE II, and ALADDIN. On the appointment of General Thorne as head of the SHAEF Mission, see Morgan to Thorne, 3 Nov 44; Thorne to Morgan, 11 Nov 44; Dir, SAC to Gen Thorne, 31 Dec 44. All in SHAEF SGS 322.01.10 SHAEF Mission (Norway). For orders to German commanders, see Keitel to General Boehme, commander of Twentieth Mountain Army, 7 May 45. OKW, Befehle 13.IV.-20.V.45; SCOFOR to G-3 SHAEF Fwd, DA 5, 12 May 45, SHAEF SGS 387.1 Germany, II.

44. Fortnightly Rpt 8, SHAEF Mission (Norway), for fortnight ending 26 May 45, SHAEF Mission (NOrway) file; SHAEF Mission (Norway) AAR, OCMH files.,

45. Hq Allied Land Forces (Norway) AAR, OCMH; Interv with Gen Thorne, 28 Jan 47.

46. Rpt 11, SHAEF Mission (Norway), SHAEF Mission (Norway) file. Hq Allied Land Forces (Norway) AAR; Text of farewell press conf, 30 Oct 45; Rpts 7-16, Gen Thorne to Field Marshal Brooke. All in OCMH files.

47. Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 382, 10 May 45, SHAEF G-3 Ops C GCT 387-21 Termination of Combined Command.

48. See SHAEF G-3 Ops C GCT 387-21 Termination of Combined Command.

49. See the volumes on civil affairs and military government in preparation for the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series.

50. See below, Appendix B, on size of headquarters.

51. CCS to SHAEF, FACS 253, 29 June 45, SHAEF G-3 Ops A GCT 322-2 Dissolution and Disbandment of SHAEF and SHAEF Divs.

52. SHAEF to all comds, SCAF 474, 6 Jul 45, SHAEF G-3 Ops A GCT 322-3 Dissolution and Disbandment of SHAEF and SHAEF Divs. SHAEF SGS 320.3 War Establishment CALA.

53. Eisenhower to all comds, SCAF 478, SHAEF G-3 Ops A GCT 322-3 Dissolution and Disbandment of SHAEF and SHAEF Divs.

54. General Eisenhower's Orders of the Day are reproduced below, Appendix F.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation