Planning for War With Germany or Japan or Both
It seemed to some officers that the publicized policy of the civilian heads of the government and the vocal opinion of certain mid-western Congressmen at various times prior to World War I and World War II was that, while the military were supposed to win any war which the United States got into and the Congress then authorized, there was to be no counteroffensive war planning of any kind and no defensive war planning for a war against any specific country, nor for a defensive war allied with any specific country.
Background for War Planning
President Woodrow Wilson actually had forbidden the Joint Board, the pre-1942 Joint War Planning Agency, to meet when he learned they were working hard in the pre-Vera Cruz days planning on what to do should the United States get involved in a war with Mexico. This suspension lasted from 1914 through World War I and into 1919.
Secretary Daniels forbad the creation of a War Plans Division within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, when that office was created by Congress in 1915 over his opposition. There was a Director of Plans, but not until Mr. Daniels had left office and World War I was over, was there a War Plans Division and a Director of War Plans.
It was not until 1936 that the Navy found enough moral courage and officer personnel to establish billets for War Plans Officers on the staffs of the principal Fleet, Force, and subordinate seagoing commands and on the shoreside staffs of the logistically essential District Commandants, and it was not until 1941 that the designation started appearing in the command rosters.
Despite these powerful handicaps, the press of world events by 1938
indicated to all naval officers, who would open their eyes and see, that the future held dangers for the United States unless it would stand and fight. How, when, where, and with whom as allies to fight were not questions which could be answered unilaterally by the United States Navy, but most officers had strong opinions.
So, War Planning was rated highly by the Line of the Navy as 1940 came up over the horizon and many of its best officers welcomed details therein. For this reason, as well as a natural interest in political-military matters, and desire to follow through on the strategical training received at the Naval War College, Captain Turner was pleased when he was tapped for the Director of War Plans billet in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.1
Neither Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations in 1940, nor Rear Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, his senior assistant, could remember in detail how Captain Turner came to be picked for the War Plans desk. Each gave the credit to the other, with an assist to Captain Abel T. Bidwell, the Director of Officer Personnel in the Bureau of Navigation.2 Both of these officers used the same expression to summarize their present opinions of the detail: "The right man."
On 14 September 1940, Captain Turner was relieved of command of the Astoria by Captain Preston B. Haines of the Class of 1909. He drew his usual dead horse, this time amounting to $698.37 and departed from the Astoria, in Pearl Harbor, for Washington.
The new billet offered a tacit promise of further promotion, since for 18 years, starting with Clarence S. Williams in 1922, all the regular occupants of the Director of War Plans chair except the captain he was about to relieve, who had not been reached by the 1939 Selection Board, achieved Flag rank. And most of its occupants had moved on to the upper echelons of the Navy. There were William R. Shoemaker, William H. Standley, Frank H. Schofield, Montgomery Meigs Taylor, and more recently William S. Pye and Royal E. Ingersoll to emulate and surpass.
Captain Turner reported on 19 October 1940. He was selected for Flag officer by the December 1940 Selection Board. By special Presidential fiat, on 8 January 1941, he assumed the rank, but not the pay, of a rear admiral.3
In October 1940 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had been in his job three months, and Admiral Stark had been in his important billet as Chief
of Naval Operations for 14 months. Rear Admiral Ingersoll was Stark's "Assistant," later called Vice Chief. Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson was Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Herbert Leary was Director of Fleet Training, and Rear Admiral Alexander Shar was Director of the Naval Districts Division. Rear Admiral Roland M. Brainard of Ship Movements and Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes was Director of Communications. These divisions and War Plans were authority and power in Naval Operations.
Within the War Plans Division, there was much talent, including Turner's successor as Director of War Plans, Captain Charles M. Cooke, together with Captains Oscar Smith, Charles J. Moore, Harry W. Hill, Frank L. Lowe, Edmund D. Burroughs, and Commanders John L. McCrea, Forrest P. Sherman, and Walter C. Ansel. In the United States Fleet, Commander Vincent R. Murphy (1918) and later Commander Lynde D. McCormick (1915) were the War Plans Officers, while in the Asiatic Fleet, Captain William R. Purnell acted as such until Commander William G. Lalor (1921) was so designated. At lower Fleet echelons, War Plans was generally an additional duty assignment for the Operations Officer. Commander Herbert H. McLean (1921) was ordered to Admiral King's staff was War Plans Officer when the Atlantic Fleet was formed up. All of these officers went on to fight the war which they were engaged in planning again some in positions of major responsibility.
When Captain Turner arrived in Washington, the major portion of the United States Fleet (Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief) was in Pearl Harbor. A Two Ocean Navy had been authorized by the Congress on 19 July 1940, but the Atlantic Fleet had not yet been formed up. The old Atlantic Squadron, about to become the Patrol Force and under Rear Admiral Hayne Ellis in the Texas, had been carrying out the increasingly complex naval tasks of the Atlantic. Many naval officers thought some of the tasks were highly irregular and others saw a violation of the United States laws of neutrality. By Presidential order, all were keeping quiet about it.
The Germans were still basking in the downfall of France, and had ports on the Atlantic Ocean from which to operate their submarines. Italy was about to invade Greece. The Havana Conference of June 1940, on the surface at least, had gained the support of all the American republics for a non-neutral neutrality policy of the United States, well as for an agreement that territory in the Americas could not be transferred from one non-American
nation to another despite any changes in management at the home offices in Europe.
The "Destroyers for Naval Bases" arrangement was finalized on 2 September 1940, and Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade was out in the hustings developing recommendations for base facilities which would permit a better United States defense of the Panama Canal, and better United States offensive actions against German submarines. When Rear Admiral Greenslade submitted his Board's recommendations on this subject, he was put to developing a set of recommendations for the location and development of naval bases for a Two Ocean Navy.
One of the first major tasks which Captain Turner faced was to meet the request of Rear Admiral Greenslade who
orally requested an indication of the views of the Chief of Naval Operations as to general strategic matters which might influence the conclusion to be reached by the Board.4
In view of the fact that the Communists -- in effect a non-American foreign power -- have now taken over Cuba, the 1940 opinion of the War Plans Officer, and of the Chief of Naval Operations is worth quoting:
16. The Caribbean, the southern flank of the Atlantic position, is doubtless the most important single strategic area which the United States has within its power to control permanently. Its security is essential for defense against attack from the eastward upon the Panama Canal, Central America, Mexico and the southern United States. It is the most advanced location from which offensive operations can be undertaken for the protection of South America, or for the disruption of enemy communication lines along the African Coast. Its importance to the United States can be realized by imagining a situation in which a strong foreign power would be firmly ensconced therein.
17. The distances around the eastern rim of the Caribbean are such that it does not seem possible to provide for an adequate defense of the region by the development of a single operating base area. Preferably, base areas would be developed in the vicinity of the Northwestern end, in the center, and at the south eastern end of the rim. The positions that naturally suggest themselves are around Guantanamo and Jamaica, around Porto Rico, and around Trinidad. . . .5
The General Board on 1 July 1940, in answer to the pertinent question of the Secretary of the Navy "Are We Ready?" had said "No" in a clear
Are We Ready?
and unmistakable manner, and supplied 35 pages of details to support its conclusion. Many of these details related to the War Plans Division. This was a reaffirmation of a similar conclusion they had arrived at on 31 August 1939. By 14 June 1941, when the General Board again studied the question, some rays of light were barely visible on the horizon but the Board adhered to its opinion: "The Naval Establishment is not ready for a serious emergency."6
It is against these seasoned official statements the events between 19 October 1940 and 7 December 1941 must be related.
The Joint Board, a 1903 creation of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, and initially an advisory board only, had over the years developed into the principal war planning agency of the War and Navy Departments, particularly in the areas of Joint operations and coordination and control of military and naval forces. It produced an excellent publication, Joint Action Army-Navy.
Joint Board -- War Planning
As Director of War Plans in Naval Operations, Captain Turner became the Naval Member of the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board. Brigadier General L.T. Gerow, Chief of Army War Plans Division, was the Army member, but frequently Colonel Joseph T. McNarney, Air Corps, U.S. Army, signed as the Army Member. According to Turner:
The greatest single problem that concerned the Join Board and the Joint Planners in the Fall of 1940 was the lack of any clear lines of national policy to guide the direction of military efforts to prepare for a war situation.
The State Department had no political War Plan.
Therefore the Army and Navy themselves undertook a broad study of the global political situation and prepared a draft letter which was designed to be the basis for consultation and agreement between the state, War, and Navy Departments. . . .7
The two officers who turned out the "Study of the Immediate Problems concerning Involvement in War" in late December 1940 were Turner and McNarney.8 They urged a copy of the study be furnished Mr. Sumner Welles, and after his recommendations had been made, they suggested that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy consider
the study with a view to its submission to the President for formal approval. Their estimate " sought to keep in view the political realities in our own country" where "the strong wish of the American people at present seems to be to remain at peace.
The Turner-McNarney study paper was touched off by a "Memorandum on National Policy" from Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 November 1940. This memorandum later became known as "Plan Dog" since it offered four possible plans of action by the United States in the event of a two-ocean war, Plan A, B, C, or D, and recommended Plan D, a strong offensive war in the Atlantic and a defensive war in the Pacific.
The Joint estimate of Turner and McNarney is a remarkable document in many respects, particularly in forecasting the timing and the various factors which brought the United States into war.
With respect to Germany and Italy, it appears reasonably certain that neither will initiate open hostilities with the United States, until they have succeeded in inflicting a major reverse on Great Britain in the British Isles or in the Mediterranean.
With respect to Japan, hostilities prior to United States entry into the European War or to the defeat of Britain may depend upon the consequences of steps taken by the United States to oppose Japanese aggression. If these steps seriously threaten her [Japan's] economic welfare or military adventures, there can be no assurance that Japan will not suddenly attack United States armed forces.
In connection with a war with Japan, they forecast:
Such a war might be precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we:
1. Strongly reinforce our Asiatic Fleet or the Philippine garrison.
2. Start fortifying Guam.
3. Impose additional important economic sanctions.
4. Greatly increase our material . . . aid to China.
5. A definite indication that an alliance with the British or Dutch had been consummated.
6. Our opposition to a Japanese attack on British or Dutch territory.
It might be precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against us, or in case of an attempt by Japan to extend its control over Shanghai, or Indo-China.
Believing as these planners did, it can now be understood why the Asiatic Fleet was not reenforced and the Philippine Garrison more rapidly built up
in the 12 months between December 1940 and December 1941, despite the pleas of the military commanders responsible for defense in the Far East area.9
The paper also pin-pointed the reality of the danger of imposing "important" economic sanctions, the effect of which the Japanese formally stated was the immediate cause of their deciding upon war, order to ensure their industrial livelihood. And made clearer now is the background reason for the many false denials made during 1941 that there were definite contingent arrangements with the Dutch and British for the defense of the Dutch-Malaysia area.
The rapidity with which Japan overran Malaysia is often stated to have been a surprise to the military. But, Turner and McNarney offered the opinion:
Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and efficient defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a major effort with 11 categories of military force to capture the entire area. The campaign might even last several months.
Since Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942 and Java surrendered 9 March 1942, the forecast was uncannily accurate.
The hazard of orienting United States forces was indicated.
Should we prepare for a full offensive against Japan . . . the length of time required to defeat Japan would be considerable. . . .
If Great Britain should lose in Europe, we would then be forced to re-orient toward the Atlantic, a long and hazardous process.
For this reason, and in view of the existing situation in Europe, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy are of the opinion that war with Japan should be avoided if possible. Should we find that we cannot avoid war, then we should undertake only a limited war.
Their specific recommendations were:
The United States . . . should pursue a course that will most rapidly increase the military strength of both the Army and the Navy and refrain from any steps that will provoke a military attack upon us by any other power.
The United States ought not willingly engage in any war against Japan.
That, if forced into a war with Japan, the United States should, at the same time, enter the war in the Atlantic, and should restrict operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East in such a manner as to permit the prompt movement
to the Atlantic of forces fully adequate to conduct a major offensive in that ocean.10
These recommendations foretold the "Victory in Europe First" defense plans and the United States Declaration of War on Germany and Italy on 11 December 1941.
Admiral Turner in a lecture at the National War College in 1946, stated:
Plans Division Work List
On October 19, 1940, when I reported to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, he gave me two orders:
1. The first order was that, in view of his expectation of an early Japanese offensive in the Pacific, the Navy needed an immediate temporary plan for a major war in the Pacific, with a strong defense of Hawaii, and increased support for our Asiatic Fleet.
2. The second order by Admiral Stark was that, since he believed a collapse of the United Kingdom would be extremely serious for the United States, the United States should at once hold staff conversations with the United Kingdom with a view to making an Allied War Plan that could be made effective quickly, should the political situation indicate intervention.
These will be dealt with in inverse order.
The day after Christmas 1940, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics were directed to furnish data needed in examining the possible operation of naval forces of the United States from Iceland and Scotland under the assumption of the United States "having entered the war on 1 April 1941."
ABC Conference and Agreement
The first sentence of this memorandum read:
As you may be aware, the War and Navy Department will shortly engage in staff conversations with British Officers for the purpose of reaching agreements as to the possible fields of military responsibility and methods of military collaboration of the two nations, should the United States decide to ally itself with the British Commonwealth in the War against Germany.11
By and large this was the first "on the line" statement whereby other divisions of Naval Operations were informed of the definite cast of United States die to be ready, at least with plans, for a war against Germany. Many preliminary steps for such an eventuality had been inferred by the officers in these divisions from various specific directives covering precise action to be taken in definite circumstances. This directive was an umbrella.
The Staff conversations mentioned in the above memorandum actually opened in Washington on 29 January 1941, and it was primarily to provide the Navy War Plans Officer with a more suitable rank for his part in this conference that the President (against the wishes of his naval advisors) directed that Captain Turner wear the uniform of a rear admiral.12 The British Navy showed up with four Flag and General officers, but the United States Navy had to be content with two Flag officers, one underpaid.
The British had first proposed the conference to Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, our Special Naval Observer in London, way back in June 1940, and it could be considered a certainty that they would arrive splendidly prepared to argue their case.
In order to obtain a firm statement of the British kick-off position for our planning staff, we asked for "an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth" as a preliminary to the staff discussions. The British, anxious to engage the United States in military talk provided it.
Rear Admiral Turner and Colonel McNarney drafted the "Joint Instructions for Army and Navy Representatives for Holding Staff Conversations with the British including an agenda for the Conversations." The agenda included a statement of the "basic national military position" of the United States. The recommendations included:
In order to avoid commitment by the President, neither he nor any of his cabinet should officially receive the British representatives.13
Neither did the President directly approve the statement of " basic national military position" although he was furnished a copy. At a White House conference of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and others on 16 January 1941, the President in effect, did approve the "basic national military position" set forth in the Turner-McNarney memo of 21 December 1940, by refraining from making any adverse comment thereon when it was mentioned and discussed. This
gave its authors, as well as their military superiors, confidence in undertaking their important negotiations with the British.14
When Captain Turner reported to the CNO for duty in the War Plans Division in October 1940, there were five major United States War Plans, known as RAINBOW One, Two, Three, Four, and Five, in various stages of completion.
RAINBOW War Plans
A brief description of their character follows.
RAINBOW One sought to prevent violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by guarding closely the Western Hemisphere, while at the same time protecting the vital interests of the United States, its possessions and its seaborne trade, wherever these might be.
RAINBOW Two had as its basic purpose the accomplishment of RAINBOW One, and additionally, while not providing "maximum participation in continental Europe," defeating enemy forces in the Pacific and sustaining the interests of the Democratic Powers in the Pacific.
RAINBOW Three aimed to carry out the mission of RAINBOW One and to protect the United States' vital interests in the Western Pacific by securing control in the Western Pacific.
RAINBOW Four proposed to accomplish RAINBOW One without allies or helpful neutrals by occupying allied areas in the Western Hemisphere, and by defending the Western Hemisphere only as far south as the Brazilian bulge, and if necessary falling back in the Pacific as far as Hawaii.
RAINBOW Five's initial basic purpose was to project the Armed Forces of the United States to the Eastern Atlantic and to either or both of the African or European continents as rapidly as possible, consistent with the mission of RAINBOW One in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany or Italy or both. Later drafts oriented the purpose, in effect, to winning World War II with Europe the primary theater of effort.15
Events occurring in Europe during the 1939-1941 period of actual drafting of these plans caused certain basic assumptions to vary and to fluctuate, and similarly, but to a lesser extent, the detailed purposes.
The initial Joint Board directive to the Joint Planning Committee to develop these five war plans was dated 30 June 1939, just two months and
a day before World War II started with the German attack on Poland.
RAINBOW Two had been recommended for addition to the earlier drafts of four prospective tasks of the Planning Committee, on 21 June 1939.16
Within the next 16 months, two plans, RAINBOW One and RAINBOW Four, had been completed by the Joint Planning Committee pushed up the line, and approved by the President. RAINBOW One was written in the remarkable time of 45 days, approved by the Joint Board and the Secretaries of War and Navy on 14 August 1939, and then held by the President for two months before receiving his blessing. The Navy published and distributed a Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW One. The Army did not publish a supporting plan for RAINBOW One, putting their efforts into RAINBOW Four since that plan envisaged a stronger Army effort than RAINBOW One.
When France started to crumble and Italy jumped into the war, RAINBOW Four was rushed to completion by the Joint Planning Committee and approved by the Joint Board on 7 June 1940. Again the President sat on a War Plan for two months before, on 14 August 1941 giving his approval. The Army prepared but did not issue a supporting plan for RAINBOW Four while the Navy started but did not finalize a supporting Plan. This lack of follow-through came about, presumably because both Services were reluctant to promulgate such a pure "Fortress America" stand politically popular as it might be.
In regard to these War Plans, Vice Admiral Turner during the Hart Inquiry on 3 April 1944 testified:
I shared the opinion with many others that the war plans which were in existence during 1940 [RAINBOW One and RAINBOW Four] were defective in the extreme. They were not realistic, they were highly theoretical, they set up forces to be ready for use at the outbreak of war, or shortly after, which could not possibly have been made available. . . .17
The Joint Planning Committee prepared but did not submit to the Joint Board a Joint Army and Navy Basis War Plan RAINBOW Two. This plan, which in effect provided for the United States to fight a Western Pacific war, while England and France fought a European war, became less and less a reality as Germany showed her prowess over these two prospective allies.
The Joint planners were never able to agree on a RAINBOW Three, which provided for active defense in the Western Hemisphere and an offensive
for securing control in the Western Pacific, primarily because Army planners could not accept the basic thought that:
our national policy requires the United States maintain a strong position in the Western Pacific. . . .
The Army members believe that it would be both futile and unwise even to mention in the Joint Estimate as a serious suggestion for a peacetime course of action that the garrison of the Philippines be increased.18
However, since a Navy War Plan for a war in the Pacific seemed essential to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy drafted and issued Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW Three (WPL-43). This Plan was not concurred in by the War Department.19
The above four War Plans had a relatively short life. RAINBOW One deserves praise because it was a major prop in getting the shoreside Navy expanded rapidly toward a tremendous wartime capability, since the Plan called for a military might to protect the vital interests of the United States wherever they might be located. The plan was cancelled by the Joint Board on 5 May 1942. RAINBOW Two, which gave first priority to our defeat of Japan, and the many requirements for an agreed upon offensively minded RAINBOW Three were cancelled on 6 August 1941, since well before that date it had been accepted by both Services that Germany was the primary enemy and Europe the primary theater. RAINBOW Four, the "Hold America" War Plan, lost its basic requirement when it became evident that Great Britain and the Soviet Union were going to hold against Germany. It was cancelled by the Joint Board on 5 May 1942.
A month after Captain Turner had arrived in Naval Operations, and 18 months after Colonel Clark's memorandum, referenced above, the Army planners still felt that they were unable to make any major military commitments in the Far East because of a lack of realistic capacity.20 The Navy planners, and the Chief of Naval Operations, by November 1940 had accepted that view. While many sharp differences of opinion with the Army
planners continued, the basic concept of the future war which the United States would wage was close to being a Jointly agreed-upon one. This concurrence permitted an agreed upon draft of RAINBOW Five to be hammered out in five months.
Admiral Ingersoll, the #2 in Naval Operations in 1940-41, and later Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, told this author:
One thing you should mention is that Kelly Turner wrote RAINBOW Three and the first supporting draft for RAINBOW Five.21
RAINBOW Five, the famous and quite excellent War Plan placed in effect on 7 December 1941, immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, was approved initially by the Joint Board on 14 May 1941. A revised draft was approved only four weeks before the United State War II.
Vice Admiral Turner testified in regard to RAINBOW Five on 3 April 1944:
While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany -- that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department -- we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific . . . our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific.22
During the period of two and a half years from June 1939 to December 1941, the Navy published and promulgated three major War Plans in detail -- RAINBOW One, RAINBOW Three, and RAINBOW Five. The Army published and distributed only one, RAINBOW Five, but certainly the essential one. It was a tremendous Service-wide planning effort.
The Pre-World War II Planning Effort
The War Department had planning problems in connection with the RAINBOW Plans. Mark S. Watson in his official Army history of this effort says:
But in the case of the undermanned and underequipped Army, these plans were far from realistic, and hence were little more than Staff studies. This theoretical approach was inescapable, in view of the weakness of forces which would be available on war's sudden arrival. Most of the plans defined ultimate offensives, but with awareness that they would require forces that would be available only long after war should start. This means that comprehensive planning, which is the only planning of importance, had made far less headway
in the Army than in the Navy. The latter had an impressive force-in-being -- the U.S. Fleet, which was continuously at sea in some phase of operational training.23
On 11 March 1941, the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, at a cocktail party given in his honor by the Japanese Naval Attaché, talked with Rear Admiral Turner briefly and suggested that he would like to converse with him at greater length. Admiral Nomura telephoned Turner the next day and arranged for the further meeting on the same day.
RKT and Admiral Nomura
In his five-page report of this conversation, Turner reported that Nomura had stated "his mission was to prevent war between Japan and the United States" and that "the best interests of the two countries were to maintain peace." He "was exploring the ground, as best he could in order to find a basis on which the two nations could agree."24
Nomura placed the blame for the war in China and other strong measures on the "younger radical element" of the Japanese Army. He said: "The senior officers of the Japanese Navy, on the contrary, had been and still are in favor of peace with the United States." Nomura recognized "the value of a peaceful conquest" versus a wartime conquest of areas in Southeast Asia. "Japan has not now, and never has had, any desire to extend control over the Philippines."
When Rear Admiral Turner explained the special relationship existing between the United States and Great Britain, Nomura said:
All Japanese Naval officers understood this thoroughly, but unfortunately, Japanese Army officers did not. He had tried to explain this to them, but they would not believe him. In his opinion the presence of the United States Fleet in Hawaii, particularly in combination with the British, forms a stabilizing influence for affairs in the Pacific.
Rear Admiral Turner came away from the interview with the opinion:
I believe he is fully sincere, and that he will use his influence against further aggressive moves by the military forces of Japan.
Rear Admiral Turner was not alone in that belief. He and others in
Washington through the breaking of Japanese coded messages were reading the Japanese Ambassador's report of his conversation with Turner and others in the Ambassador's despatches to the Japanese Foreign Office. Unfortunately, diplomatic Japanese despatches prior to 1 July 1941 are not printed in the Pearl Harbor Report, so it is not possible to compare the two participants' reports on the 12 March conversation to their seniors.
The 12 March 1941 Turner conversation with Admiral Nomura was followed by another on 20 July 1941 which Turner duly reported.25 Admiral Nomura, late on this particular afternoon, and with what to him was a hot piece of Japanese Army news had tried to visit Admiral Stark, but had not found him at home, so he called at Rear Admiral Turner's residence. The main purpose of his visit was to watch the Navy ripples on the Potomac, when a Japanese land mine went off in the Far East, for the news was that "within the next few days Japan expected to occupy French Indo-China." From the strength of its ripples, Admiral Nomura would hope to obtain a naval estimate whether the United States would go to war with Japan as a result.
Actually the Indo-China occupation took place the following day, 21 July 1941. The Japanese Army just had not let their Foreign Office in on the exact date. Yet, the top echelon in Naval Operations already had been alerted on 19 July 1941 by decoding a Japanese diplomatic message of 14 July that the Japanese Army soon would move into Indo-China.26 So Rear Admiral Turner was not surprised by Admiral Nomura's news.
Turner's report said Nomura made these points:
He had accepted the duty as Ambassador only after great insistence by his friends, particularly high ranking naval officers and the more conservative group of Army officers.
It is essential that Japan have uninterrupted access to necessary raw materials.
Japan's economic position is bad and steadily getting worse.
Japan must make some arrangement through which support of the Chungking regime will be reduced.
Essential for Japan's security is the more or less permanent stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia in order to break the connection between Russia and China.
Within the next few days Japan expects to occupy French Indo- China. . . . This occupation has become essential.
Japan contemplates no further move to the South for the time being.
The one great point upon which agreement might be reached, he again emphasized, was the inherent right of self defense.
Turner's report made the following points:
The occupation of Indo-China by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United States, since it might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherland East Indies.
It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo in the southern position of the Far East.
Japan really had very little to fear from American, British, or Dutch activities in the Far East.
The last statement proved all too accurate and probably too revealing, for the Japanese Army acted boldly. For example, they bombed the USS Tutuila (PR-4), a river gunboat, at Chungking, China, on 30 July 1941.
Admiral Nomura and the Director of War Plans had other meetings, as did Counselor Terasaki of the Japanese Embassy. These were mentioned in Japanese diplomatic messages of 30 September 1941, 14 October 1941, and 16 October 1941 (Parts 1 and 2) with direct quotes of Turner's remarks.27
Both Admirals, Stark and Turner, were personally appreciative of the difficult position of Nomura. By frankly stating their personal reactions to the Japanese actions and proposals, they sought to provide him with a clear understanding, uncluttered with diplomatic double-talk, of an informed and interested American's reaction.28 Both of these Flag officers believed in Nomura's honest intentions during the negotiations and lack of any prior knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack.29
While these momentous events were underway, Kelly Turner took the time to tell his sister of some Turner family problems:
We are having terrible things in our family. I think I may have told you that our dogs have been very sick with what the doctor says is a ' cold' but which is very like the intestinal influenza for humans, though much more severe. The new little puppy (a grand little dog) died of it last week, and
today Mikko died. Ming is extremely sick, and I do not believe that she will live, though I don't tell Harriet that.
My darling Harriet is in the depths, naturally. Ming has been sick for nearly four weeks, and Harriet is simply worn out from worry and nursing. She doesn't sleep well, and is very thin, and worn. She has had such a terrible year -- five of her lovely dogs dying, her mother's death, the suicide of a very dear friend, and the tragic death of her very best friend Marian Ross. Here in Washington are no women she has ever been very close to, and my work is so confining and my hours so long that she simply gets no distraction from her difficulties. She is fine and brave about it all as anyone could be, but all these things have depressed her greatly. I try to do what I can but she is alone a great deal, and worries a lot. The Melhorns are going to stay with us a few days next month, and then the Cuffs for a short time, and that should help somewhat.30
In the Atlantic theater, where another war was raging, Rear Admiral Turner also played a role of great importance. On 17 January 1941, he advised the CNO that the Navy in the Atlantic would be ready to escort convoys from the East Coast to Scotland by 1 April 1941.31
Escort of Convoys
On 20 March 1941, the Secretary of the Navy signed a Turner-drafted memorandum to the President on the tasks of the United States Naval Forces in the Atlantic, in case of a decision to escort convoys. This memorandum ended with the statement:
Our Navy is ready to undertake it [convoying] as soon directed, but could do it more effectively were we to have six to eight weeks for special training.32
This was about 22 months after the start of the war in Europe.
The SS Robin Moor, a United States merchant ship with a general cargo, bound for South Africa was sunk by a German submarine on 21 May 1941. But, it was 19 July 1941 before CINCLANT issued his orders to escort convoys, and convoys between the East Coast and Iceland were organized and escorted. It was 16 September 1941 before trans-Atlantic convoys were escorted by the Atlantic Fleet ships.
It was Admiral Turner's opinion that had the Germans made a few submarine attacks in the Pacific Ocean, prior to 7 December 1941, the Pacific
Fleet would have been better prepared for World War II and might have been more adequately alerted on 7 December 1941.33
Admiral Turner thought that Mr. Harry Hopkins made a major contribution to getting the United States ready for war, by his ability to persuade the President to take steps which the Service Chiefs had been unable to persuade him to undertake.34 The following extracts from an 29 April 1941 letter from the Director of War Plans to the Chief of Naval Operations is supporting evidence.
Mr. Harry Hopkins Helps the Navy
1. In the course of a luncheon conversation with Mr. Harry Hopkins, he desired to be informed as to exactly what steps might be taken on the assumption that the United States might be in the war on August 1st.
2. In reply, I recommended:
a. a detachment of the Pacific Fleet, be sent at an early date to the Atlantic.
b. that enough antiaircraft guns and pursuit aircraft be diverted from deliveries to the British and assigned to the United States Army as might be necessary to outfit the ground and air defense units which would protect United States bases in the British Isles.
c. immediately taking over approximately thirty transports, freighters, and tankers.
d. a sufficient expansion of Navy and Marine Corps personnel to provide for the above ships and for bringing all units up to full strength.
3. Mr. Hopkins expressed the opinion that, if these matters were presented to the President, the latter would give directions to carry them out. . . .35
On 22 April 1941, the President had approved the increase of enlisted strength of the regular Navy to 232,000. This was an increase from a regular Navy strength of 145,000 established on 8 September 1939, when the President declared a "Limited National Emergency." The President had authority to move the 232,000 figure to 300,000 when he declared an "Unlimited National Emergency" and it was towards this objective that he was being nudged by the Director of War Plans.
It was another three weeks, 22 May 1941, before the Chief of Naval Operations signed the detailed request to the President, covering the "thirty
transports, freighters and tankers" that Turner mentioned to Mr. Hopkins. Fourteen additional combat loading transports were specifically requested.
In the Atlantic Ocean, at this time, the Navy had but three transports fitted for combat loading, and in the Pacific Ocean but three more, with a total of six more transports being converted. The Army had four transports fitted for combat loading in the Atlantic and none in the Pacific with four more transports converting. There were eight more Army or Navy transports not fitted for combat loading, which according to CNO's memorandum "were required to support our existing overseas garrisons with equipment and replacement personnel."36
This letter produced an approval, on 24 May 194 for the construction or acquisition of 550,000 tons of auxiliary shipping. Final approval also was received in the first part of May from the President or the transfer of one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four cruisers and 18 destroyers to the Atlantic from the Pacific, a transfer he had originally approved and then in large part rescinded in early April.37
Finally, in mid-April 1941, the Director of War Plans drafted, the CNO signed, and the President had with great skill, strengthened, clarified, and approved a "Project for Western Hemisphere Defense Plans." This project required the strengthening of the Atlantic Fleet, and soon emerged as WPL-50. Presumably, Mr. Harry Hopkins had helped in this and in all these other matters.38
At the same time as these desirable actions were taken by the President, he ordered the Army and the Navy to be prepared to seize the Azore Islands by 22 June 1941. Since the Joint Plan for this operation showed a need for 41 combat loaded transports and cargo ships, the adequacy of the CNO request of May to the President for only 14 additional combat loading transports was soon apparent. However, when the Azores seizure was cancelled about 4 June 1941, it does not seem, from the official records located, that any new request went out from the Director of War Plans for more
To the Azores or Iceland
transports. Had Rear Admiral Turner more clearly visualized then the pressing needs for transports and tankers in the early stages of World War II, he would have pressed his case for them even harder.39
The Army War Plans Division and the Navy War Plans Division were agreed in their dislike for the Azores occupation, but the Army was the more reluctant to see one of its only two amphibiously trained combat divisions disappear over the horizon for occupation duties before a war had even started. The Azores Occupation Force was scheduled to total about 28,000 troops, with the Army and the Marine Corps each to supply 14,000 troops.
The British had 25,000 troops in Iceland and when the President on 4 June 1941, changed the objective from the Azores to Iceland, he assigned the occupation task to the Army. When the Army begged off temporarily, the Marines received the nod on 5 June 1941, and a 4,000-man Marine brigade sailed in four transports and two cargo ships via Argentina, Newfoundland on 22 June 1941.
It was not until September 1941 that sizable Army forces arrived in Iceland and took over command and, during the next five months, relieved the Marines and assumed the duties of the United States Forces in Iceland.
Rear Admiral Turner was in the White House again during the week of 16 June 1941 in connection with the Iceland occupation, but no report of this visit has been located in the files. Presumably, however, it strengthened his favorable impression of Mr. Harry Hopkins.40
In July, he also had business with the nation's top political authorities. As Mrs. Turner described it:
Kelly had a very exciting day. First the Vice President asked him for lunch. There were just the two of them, and Mr. Wallace wanted to ask a lot of questions. Later Admiral King, Admiral Stark, the Secretary and Kelly all had a conference with the President.
The burning question now is what are the Japs going to do, and what we will do?41
One thing that continually irritated the Director of War Plans in the first months of 1941, was what he labeled the "Army planners defensive attitude."42
State of Mind -- May 1941
In May, therefore, he persuaded the Chief of Naval Operations to sign an official letter to the Chief of Staff which contained these critical words:
9. No plans whatsoever exist for Joint Overseas expeditions, nor for naval cooperation with Army effort in support of Latin-American Governments.
10. If the United States is to succeed in defeating Axis forces, it must act on the offensive, instead of solely on the defensive.43
Admiral Turner also recalled that:
Hairbrained Schemes of the President
Stark spent a lot of time knocking down the hairbrained schemes of the President in regard to the Navy.44
When Admiral Stark was questioned in regard to is, he smiled and said:
Maybe I wouldn't call them hairbrained schemes, but there were many I didn't believe sound and we did spend a lot of time trying to prove this, or provide better alternatives, or determine just what would be needed to carry the project out. The President had a great habit of 'trying one on the dog.'45
During the 1941 period of German consolidation of position in Central Europe and the Balkans and prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June, the question as to where they would hit next was a constant one. The value to the Germans of certain pieces of real estate to facilitate their movement towards the Americas, particularly South America, was evident, and this generally raised the question of its prior seizure or reenforcement by American arms. Sooner or later the President would drop a remark in regard to it, and then the pressure would be on the War Plans Division for an estimate on such a situation or for a plan to meet it.
Immediately after the President had directed the relief of the British forces in Iceland, the War Plans Division drafted a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy for signature by the CNO on the strategic value to the United States, of Iceland, the Azores, the Canary Islands, the Cape Verde Islands, and French West Africa.46
The memorandum started out with:
Before the United States embarks on any program of the occupation of overseas positions in the Atlantic, I wish to bring to your attention certain strategic aspects of the various positions named. . . .
The memorandum then discussed the subject under two conditions:
a. Great Britain in the war and,
b. Great Britain defeated.
Were the United Kingdom to be forced out of the war, it would be strategic folly for the United States to attempt to hold Iceland [and] . . . out of the question for the United States to try to hold the Canary Islands.
With the United Kingdom still in the war, Iceland and the Azores were important, but the Cape Verde Islands much less so.
It would be essential that we be able at all times, to exert a strong naval and air effort along the line Natal-Dakar, which would be impossible were our Fleet to be pinned to the defense of outlying positions further North.
Another Presidential throw-out of April 1941 held up to the strong light of reason by Turner would have initiated a
northern cruise by units of the Pacific Fleet (a striking group of one aircraft carrier, a division of heavy cruisers and one squadron of destroyers, with tankers as necessary), to proceed from Pearl to Attu, Aleutian Islands then to Petropavlovsk in Siberia for a three-day visit.
The War Plans Officer recommended "that the cruise not be made at present."47
Before the year 1941 was out, the President was suggesting using naval aircraft carriers to deliver aircraft to Russia. This was deemed "inadvisable" by the War Plans officer since it incurred "risks which I consider cannot be justified." It was pointed out that the Japanese had eight carriers in the Pacific and United States had but three, and that:
you will recall my recently telling Kimmel and Hart to execute preliminary deployments, and to go on the alert in view of a possible break with Japan.48
The original letter to the President on this matter as drafted by Turner and as modified and then signed by Stark showed some difference in Stark's and Turner's appraisal of Japan's intentions or at least of the willingness of these officers to bring their appraisals to the attention of the President.
Turner wrote that Kimmel and Hart had been alerted "against an attack by Japan." Stark softened that to "against a possible break with Japan, " a very great difference when one considers the Pearl Harbor attack.
The Atlantic Conference was held in Argentia Harbor, Newfoundland, from 10-15 August 1941. Rear Admiral Turner was one of the very small working naval staff that accompanied Admiral Stark to the conference. There were only two from War Plans, Turner and Commander Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations in 1950-51.
The Atlantic Conference
According to Mrs. Turner:
Kelly had two weeks leave granted and we were to leave on [August] first. Two nights before he came home and said that he couldn't go. He says Churchill is splendid, very simple and easy to approach and very much smaller than his pictures show. Everything is such a mess though, and no leadership. . . . I am so glad Kelly got to go and he had a fine two weeks rest.49
The Atlantic Conference had broad effects in both the War and Navy Departments on their planning for future contingencies. It cracked the door to Combined Planning with the British, but U.S. Naval planners proceeded very cautiously, insofar as the Pacific Ocean was concerned.
British-American Pacific Planning
A letter which Rear Admiral Turner wrote to Rear Admiral V.H. Danckwerts of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington is informative in regard to the status of Combined Planning with the British in early October 1941. It also illustrates the security consciousness of the Chief of Naval Operations.
In reply to the reference [Your secret letter No. 107/41 of Sept. 25, 1941] you are informed that we have given very careful study to the Admiralty's proposals for a new Far East Area agreement as shown in ADB-2. . . .
While neither the Army nor the Navy has reached final decision, at the present time they are inclined to believe that, until such time as a really practicable combined plan can be evolved for the Far East Area, it will be better
to continue working under an agreement for coordination of effort by the system of mutual cooperation. . . .
As a matter of fact, the military situation out there has changed considerably since last Spring, and will change more after the United States reinforcements, now planned, arrive in the Philippines. The Army has a rather large plan of reinforcements, and the Navy expects, in January, to send out there six more submarines, one more patrol plane squadron, and two squadrons of observation-scout planes.
* * * * *
I think you have no need for fears that the Pacific Fleet will remain inactive on the outbreak of war in the Pacific. You can reassure the Australians on this point. I regret, however, that in the interests of secrecy, I shall be unable to show you the U.S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan-RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-1). Naturally, we would expect to exchange appropriate information of this nature were we both at war in the Pacific, but the Chief of Naval Operations believes, at present, that knowledge of the details of the Operation Plans should be held by a very small number of persons -- a view which the British Chiefs of Staff apparently share, as we are never informed concerning the details of projected British operations.50
The Director of War Plans, back on 19 July 1941, in a long memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations had recommended that "trade with Japan not be embargoed at this time."51 But, on 26 July 1941, just seven days later, the President announced an embargo on the export of petroleum and cotton products to Japan.
Advice Disregarded or Softened
After the President had done what Rear Admiral Turner thoroughly believed would cause Japan to see war as the only solution open to her continued development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, he continued to advise his military senior to try to persuade the President not to take steps which would bring on that war in the near future. As late as 5 November 1941, in drafting a memorandum to the President for Admiral Stark to sign, commenting on a State Department proposal to send United States troops to China, he warned that:
undertaking Military operations with U.S. forces against Japan to prevent her from severing the Burma Road . . . would lead to war.
that the despatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved, [and] that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.52
On 25 November 1941, Turner drafted a despatch to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for release by the CNO, which contained the words:
I consider it probable that this next Japanese aggression may cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan.
Admiral Stark took this message to the President -- who changed the releasor to himself -- and softened the judgment words "probable" to "possible" and "may" to "might," and he added the bad guess: "Advance against Thailand seems the most probable."
A photostat of the original despatch which appears on pages 178-9, together with a memorandum from the President's Naval Aide, which indicates that both the CNO and the Army Chief of Staff (COS) were willing to drop the statement that war with Japan was "probable."
The Beardall memorandum to the President showed the ever present reluctance of the military heads of the Armed Forces to accept the unwanted but logical conclusion of events, and a reluctance to tell appropriate responsible outpost officials of such a conclusion.
The Director of War Plans drafted the 24 January 1941 letter, approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, and signed by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, which said in the first paragraph:
Will Japan Attack the United States? the Soviet Union?
If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.53
When the President made the decision that on 26 July 1941 the United States would impose economic sanctions against Japan, Rear Admiral Turner
Turner-drafted despatch to Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with President Roosevelt's changes.
(page one of two)
Turner-drafted desptach to Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with President Roosevelt's changes.
(page two of two)
Beardall memorandum to the President.
moved from agreeing with the Director of Naval Intelligence that Japan would not attack the United States to the following position:
I believed it would make war certain between the United States and Japan.54
This 1945 testimony was in full agreement with the written forecast which Turner and McNarney had jointly made in December 1940.
The Director of Naval Intelligence (Wilkinson) with quite contrary
opinions to those of Rear Admiral Turner, in late 1945 testified and manfully and honestly stuck to what his December 1941 opinions had been:
In fact, I did not think an attack would be made on any United States objective, but I thought that the Japanese would pursue course of successive movements, infiltration, trying the patience and temple of the Anglo- Saxon nations without actually urging them into war.55
On 11 July 1941, about three weeks after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the Director of War Plans wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations in which he recommended precautionary measures against Japan, saying it was his conclusion that:
During July or August, the Japanese will occupy important points in Indo-China, and will adopt an opportunistic attitude towards the Siberian Maritime Provinces. Japanese action against the Russians may be expected if the Stalin regime collapses, and Russian resistance to Germany is overcome.
Since it is inexcusable for military forces to be unprepared for an attack, even if the chances for an attack appear small, it is recommended that steps be taken to place our Army and Navy forces in the Far East in an alert status to be achieved as far as practicable within about two weeks.56
From this date on Admiral Turner stated that his belief and expressed advice to Admiral Stark was that Japan would attack in Siberia only if Germany defeated the Soviet Union. Up until June 141, he had believed that Japan might well attack the Soviet Union, without the assistance of Germany.
On 31 July 1941, Admiral Stark had written to the Captain of the Fleet Flagship, Captain C. M. Cooke, U.S. Navy:
As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay . . . until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash.
Admiral Turner's later reaction to Stark's letter as that when the Germans had just started into the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, and carried all before them, he had expressed the opinion that Japan would move against the Soviets in August. But as the Soviets slowed the Germans, and as the Japanese started funneling troops southward toward Indo-China, he backed away from this belief. This is supported by his written rebuttal of a contrary prognosis made by Commander Walter Ansel in the War Plans daily summary on 22 September 1941, and quoted later.
The Army G-2 (Chief of Intelligence) had written, as late as 1 November 1941, that Japan would attack Siberia when the ratio of Japanese troops in Kwantung Province, Manchuria, to Soviet Union troops in Siberia reached 3 to 1, and suggested steps to help China and the Soviet Union.57 It is believed correct to say that, at this time, the Director of War Plans thought the attack would not take place unless Germany defeated the Soviets in the West. Such a defeat was in the really questionable stage by 1 November 1941.
By 27 November 1941, when Rear Admiral Turner participated with many others in the drafting of the memorandum for the President to be signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, he found no problem in concurring with the statement:
There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces. . . .
Over the years, and occasionally in print, there has been much made of the fact that the Director of Naval Intelligence had to work through the Director of War Plans in sending out to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet:
Who Has the Ball? Intelligence or War Plans?
specific information, which information might require action by our Fleet or by our naval forces.
The Director of Naval Intelligence said this system was required so that this information
would not be in conflict with his [the DWP's] understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was responsible.58
This requirement irritated greatly some of the second echelon officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence. They objected both to the Navy system which channeled political action initiating intelligence through the War Plans Office, and to the strong-minded officer who occupied the billet of Director of War Plans.
As for the Navy system, Admiral Ingersoll pointed out:
Our organization was not like Military Intelligence and that the estimate of the situation should be prepared by the War Plans Division, although the data
for the part 'Enemy Intentions' naturally would have to been based on data and information gathered by 'Naval Intelligence.'59
Or to state the case as Admiral Turner saw it while testifying at the Congressional Pearl Harbor Hearings:
VICE CHAIRMAN: Now, would it be fair to assume that from the standpoint of the real effect on operations that the War Plans Division had the highest responsibility for the advice given to the Chief of Naval Operations?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That is correct.
VICE CHAIRMAN: The Office of Naval Intelligence was largely charged with the responsibility of disseminating Information?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That is correct.60
Following the Pearl Harbor Attack, there were those who felt that this "system" had let the Navy down. The critics claimed a prescient ability for the Office of Naval Intelligence. There were also men who remembered various unsuccessful bouts with Rear Admiral Turner, and claimed that his mid-1941 belief that Japan would attack the Soviets in Siberia had diverted his attention away from alerting the Fleet in regard to an attack on Pearl Harbor.
It is worth a brief look to see if the administrative arrangements had not been as they were, whether ONI would have alerted CINCUS late on 6 December when the decoded version of 13 parts of the 14-part final Japanese diplomatic communication before committing the Pearl Harbor Attack became available.
It is well to remember that this long-winded final statement of Japanese diplomatic position created a communication problem for the Japanese, as well as a decoding problem for the cryptographers in Washington.
The extensive Japanese point of view of the deteriorating Japanese- United States relations was crammed into 13 despatches. The 14th despatch stated what the United States must do to meet Japanese conditions and ended up by breaking off the current negotiations. The 15th despatch directed that the contents of the prior 14 despatches should be delivered to the United States State Department at exactly 1 p.m. on Sunday, 7 December 1941.
The 15th despatch acquired public identification as the "One o'clock despatch" during the Congressional investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack.
In Washington, the first 13 parts of the Japanese despatch were cryptographically
decoded, and their translations circulated all together, during the evening of 6 December. The 14th Japanese despatch was decoded and circulated routinely during the forenoon of 7 December, the limited list of viewers seeing it at various times. Many, including Rear Admiral Turner, saw it subsequent to the 15th despatch. The 15th despatch received special expeditious delivery service, when it had been cryptographically decoded and translated. It was available to Admiral Stark around 9:30 a.m. the morning of 7 December 1941.
Actually, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Wilkinson was not uneasy or agitated by the first 13 parts of the decoded Japanese despatch. He testified that he
First, the Director of Naval Intelligence
did not consider it a military paper . . . and there was nothing particularly alarming in those  parts. . . . The fact that [in the 15th part] there was a certain time for the delivery was not significant to me. . . . I thought that the message was primarily of concern to the State Department rather than the Navy and the Army.61
There is nothing, absolutely nothing in these statements or available elsewhere from testimony of the DNI (Director of Naval Intelligence) that he had any desire to send this Japanese summation of position, a Japanese white paper, on to Pearl Harbor to Admiral Kimmel.
When Rear Admiral Wilkinson saw the 14th part of the Japanese diplomatic message on Sunday morning, his reaction, as he remembered it, was:
They were fighting words, so to speak, and I was more impressed by that language than by the breaking off of negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary.62
The DNI, being physically present in the Office of the CNO, on the morning of 7 December 1941 said:
I believe that I advised that the Fleet should be notified, not with any question of attack on Hawaii in mind, but with the question of imminence of hostilities in the South China Sea.63
At this hour, the Japanese message (the 15th part) telling the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington to present the message to the Department of State exactly at 1 p.m. Sunday, 7 December, had not been circulated.
When the Director of War Plans saw the first 13 parts of the diplomatic end of negotiations despatch, he
Next, the Director of War Plans
considered the despatch very important but as long as those officers [Ingersoll and Wilkinson] had seen it, I did not believe it was my function to take any action.64
When Rear Admiral Turner was shown the one o'clock message in Admiral Stark's office about noon, he
recognized its very great importance and asked him [Stark] if anything had been done about it. He told me General Marshall was sending a dispatch, and I did nothing further about it because I considered that would cover the situation.65
Even had he seen the 14th part at this time or prior thereto, the Director of War Plans thought:
It was not my business to send that dispatch out. I consider that was entirely the province of the Office of Naval Intelligence. . . . It was no evaluation whatsoever. My office never sent out information.66
The first 13 parts of the Japanese despatch inspired neither the DNI nor the DWP to believe it should go to the Fleet.
The 14th part inspired the DNI with a belief that it should go to the Fleet. The CNO did not carry through on the recommendation. The DWP did not receive the 14th part of the "end of negotiation" dispatch in his own office until after the attack.
The "one o'clock" despatch inspired both the DNI and the DWP to make recommendations for the CNO to send an advisory to the Fleet. The delay in sending this advisory, in part at least, was due to a reluctance of Admiral Stark to accept and immediately act personally and dramatically on the recommendation of these two of his subordinates, both united and voicing the same opinions by calling Admiral Kimmel on voice-scramble telephone which was on his desk.
The "system" had no effect on the failure to alert the Fleet on Pearl Harbor Day, or the day before, insofar as the decoded Japanese diplomatic dispatches are concerned.
The reflections of nearly 20 years that had passed since Rear Admiral Turner had dominated War Plans and looked down his nose at the Office Naval Intelligence, and most of its minions, had not changed the man's conviction that the 1941 division of responsibilities within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for advising the Chief of Naval Operations (and preparing papers or despatches for dissemination) in regard to the over-all international situation which might involve the United States in war, and thus bring War Plans into effect, was properly a duty of the Director War Plans rather than the duty of the Director of Naval Intelligence.
The decision that this was the way it would be was made by Admiral Stark upon the official appeal of Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, the Director of Naval Intelligence prior to Wilkinson. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were also present in his office and participated with Kirk in the discussion.67
Rear Admiral Turner's belief that Admiral Stark's decision was an "Interpretation" of the written instructions for the conduct of business in Naval Operations rather than a marked qualification or change of the written instructions was largely confined to himself and his immediate seniors.
The Director of Naval Intelligence interpreted the decision to be that ONI was not to disseminate to the Operating Forces any estimates of enemy, or prospective enemy, intentions the natural reaction to which would seem to call for immediate acts of war on the part of our Operating Forces, and so passed this interpretation on to his relief, Rear Admiral Wilkinson. The following testimony during the Pearl Harbor hearing bears this out:
GESELL: In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some specific action to the recipient; then you felt you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Operations?
The belief of one of Rear Admiral Wilkinson's best subordinates, Commander Arthur H. McCollum, the Head of the Far Eastern Section in the
Foreign Intelligence Division of ONI, was that the change was very much broader in effect, if not intent, and that
the function of evaluation of Intelligence, that is, the drawing of inferences therefrom, had been transferred over to be a function of the War Plans Division.69
It is apparent from the above quotes that the policy decision of the Chief of Naval Operations created a gap between what the director of War Plans thought ONI should and would send to the Operating Forces and what the most important intelligence subordinate of the Director of Naval Intelligence actually felt that the Office of Naval Intelligence responsible for distributing to the Fleet. The McCollum interpretation of the decision was widely held at the second and third levels in ONI and since they believed that they had been robbed of one of their main functions, evaluation, they sulked in their tents. The essential close cooperation between War Plans and Intelligence suffered.
This War Plans-Intelligence gap was indirectly widened by the special handling of decoded enemy despatches called "magic" and later "ultra." These despatches were handled, and were known to be handled, in a completely separate and distinct manner from routine secret information. By and large, second echelon War Plans officers received more of the droppings from these despatches than second echelon ONI officers, except for the Far Eastern Section of ONI.
There also was a direct wedge widening the War Plans Intelligence gap, which was the security precaution exercised by limiting strictly the distribution, within the Office of Naval Operations, of secret despatches relative to preparations or readiness of the Operating Forces for war. Such secret despatches were generally limited in their distribution the head of each major subdivision of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and his immediate subordinate. This left out many, many seasoned officers at the working levels. Again second and third echelon officers in officers at the working ONI were less likely to learn of these despatches than similar officers in War Plans.
It is suggested by this scribe that Admiral Stark's decision in this Intelligence-War Plans dispute, not only was based upon what he considered the correct channel of advice to him regarding "enemy intentions," but from whom, in this difficult and touchy area, he would be apt to receive the sounder advice.
It is also suggested that there undoubtedly was an administrative error
by both Turner and Kirk in failing to reduce to writing the CNO policy decision in regard to advising the CNO and the Operating Forces of political action initiating intelligence, so that the dividing line between the duties and procedures of Naval Intelligence and War Plans in this area was cleanly etched. It is only necessary to state that on 12 December 1941 War Plans proposed such an arrangement.70 This is described in some detail later on.
Although markedly different in personality, there was a complete rapport between the CNO and his Director of War Plans.
Admiral Stark said:
Every time I think of Kelly Turner, or anyone mentions his name, I warm a little about the heart. . . .
Probably nobody in Washington had a better understanding of the Japanese situation than Kelly did.71
Vice Admiral Turner testified in 1944:
Admiral Stark's opinion and mine on the situation were very close together from the spring of 1941 on.72
Admiral Turner later added:
The Navy was lucky to have as CNO a man as knowledgeable in world politico-military matters, and who had the ear of the President, the State Department and the Congress at the same time. His Plan Dog--which became RAINBOW Five--showed his great perception. . . .
He was a wonderful senior to me.73
War Plans issued strategic summaries every other day. ONI made daily strategic estimates, at least up until 24 October 1941, when for reasons never pinpointed, they were voluntarily discontinued. The probable reason can only be guessed, but it could be hazarded that they were dropped because they required a very considerable effort and ONI became aware that they were not heeded in the councils of the great.
Both ONI and War Plans evaluated the semi-raw "magic." But neither the Director of Naval Intelligence nor the Director of War Plans evaluated the bitter end Japanese diplomatic messages as presaging an attack on United States Territory at the "directed" delivery hour of the diplomatic despatch.
The Director of War Plans was not shown the 14th part, "the end of negotiations" despatch, until after the attack, so he in no way controverted
the recommendation of the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations in this regard.
It can be said quite objectively that Admiral Stark did not receive the best of advice (that is advice so strongly and cogently expressed that he, following the advice, did in fact alert Admiral Kimmel) from either of these two major intelligence evaluating subordinates in the immediate hours prior to the Pearl Harbor Attack.
Rear Admiral Wilkinson, right up until 7 December 1941, did not think the Japanese would attack any United States Territory. On 6 December 1941 he had informed Turner that Turner was "mistaken in the belief that Japan would attack a United States objective."74
QUESTION: Did you ever talk to Admiral Turner as to whether or not he thought of an attack upon Hawaii?
WILKINSON: No, sir.
QUESTION: But at least you had no thought of an attack upon Hawaii?
WILKINSON: No, sir.
QUESTION: And that continued on until after the attack?
WILKINSON: Yes, sir.
Rear Admiral Turner thought the chances of a raid in Hawaii were about 50-50, but no specific mention of this belief appear in the final version of any despatch which he drafted for the CNO to send to CINCPAC, although it has been asserted such a warning was in one of the preliminary drafts.75
And when Admiral Stark, on three different occasions, sought assurances that CINCPAC did in fact have decryption facilities, and the despatches available to him so he could read the Japanese diplomatic traffic, Rear Admiral Turner brought back the wrong information from the Director of Naval Communications. This was either through poorly phrased inquiries to Rear Admiral Noyes, since Noyes stated that he thought Turner was talking about traffic analysis (called radio intelligence) or through ignorance of Noyes in regard to what the decryption capability were at Pearl Harbor. The latter has been generally suspected, since (1) he Pearl Harbor Naval Radio Station routinely did not even copy Japanese Diplomatic traffic, because there was no decoding machine in Pearl Harbor essential to change the coded Japanese diplomatic message into Japanese language, even if it was copied, and (2) because Rear Admiral Noyes's testimony showed ignorance of
several other aspects of Pearl Harbor's decryption capabilities and systems. For example, he stated:
. . . and as I learned from listening to Commander Rochefort's testimony, they [Pearl Harbor] could not read another code, which was necessary.
In listening to Commander Rochefort's testimony, I was surprised that there would have been anything intercepted in Hawaii [by the Army] that the Navy could translate that was not immediately passed to the Navy.76
As 7 December 1941 drew closer, a special despatch from Naval Communications on 28 November 1941 directing the cryptanalysis unit at Pearl, in addition to its normal tasks in regard to Japanese naval traffic, to undertake certain specific copying and decryption of lower echelon despatches in the diplomatic field, made clear that someone in the Office of Naval Communications was in no doubt as to the normal scope of activities of its Pearl Harbor unit regardless of what the Director of Naval Communications, Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, knew or didn't know.
Admiral Turner remembered, with some pride and much regret, at when he drafted the 16 October 1941 despatch directing CINCPAC, CINCAF, and CINCLANT to take preparatory deployments, his original wording had included the phrase that there "was a distinct probability Japan will attack Britain and the United States in the near future." He regretted that this wording had been toned down by his Joint Board seniors to "there is a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers."77
Warnings to the Outposts Softened
Admiral Turner also was proud of his authorship of "This is a warning," in the 27 November 1941 despatch and regretted that his wording "war within the next few days" was changed to "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days."78
There was discussion as to whether or not the opening sentence should be included in this dispatch. I recall that Vice Admiral Turner was firmly of the opinion that it should be included.79
The phrase "This is a war warning" was under attack from below as well as from above. Admiral Turner also regretted the phrase "in any direction" included in the draft of the 24 November 1941 despatch was left off the sentence "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days" of the War Warning Despatch three days later.80
No real purpose can be served by a detailed rehashing of Admiral Turner's testimony before the Congressional Inquiry into Pearl Harbor attack which extended from Wednesday, 19 December 1945, through Friday, 21 December 1945. Upon the conclusion of this testimony, the Vice Chairman wished All Hands a "Merry Christmas" and adjourned the hearings for ten days over the Holidays. Turner had already testified before the Roberts Commission, the Hart Inquiry, and the Navy Court of Inquiry. Despite a sharp examination by Admiral Hart during his inquiry and again by several Congressmen and the Committee Counsel during the Congressional Inquiry, a reading indicates no substantive change in the Turner testimony.
Turner's Opinions regarding Pearl Harbor Attack
The Vice Chairman Representative Jere Cooper, democrat of Tennessee, noted:
My impression is that much of the information you have given us is somewhat in conflict with other information we have received during the hearing.81
However, since these conflicts were never pin-pointed by Congressman Cooper, this appears to have been a thrust in the dark. Admiral Turner was only the eighth military witness of over 240 to testify. From a close reading of the previous seven military witnesses' testimony, the basis of Congressman Cooper's statement is not readily apparent.
The only major differences of testimony on matters of substance between Admiral Turner and any of the more than two hundred succeeding military witnesses were (1) in the testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, former Director of Naval Communications, on the question as to whether CINCUS was receiving the same decrypted information as was being received by the CNO, and (2) in the testimony of Captain McCorum that he took away from the office of the Director of War Plans, sometime between 1 December and 4 December 1941, his much marked up draft of an ONI message to alert CINCUS to the danger of imminent war.
Admiral Turner testified that the Director of Naval Communications stated that CINCUS had the same decrypted information as the CNO. Rear Admiral Noyes, however, testified that he did not remember making any statement to the Director of War Plans that would imply that Admiral Kimmel had the means of decrypting "purple" (diplomatic) traffic and that he believed that Rear Admiral Turner had "traffic analysis" and "decrypted traffic" confused in his mind.82
Admiral Turner testified that Captain McCollum had torn up his own draft despatch. Captain McCollum testified that the marked up draft message was returned by him to the desk of the Director of Naval Intelligence and there it lay, until it disappeared into the circular file.83
Admiral Turner testified:
Where Will Japan Attack the United States?
I was satisfied in July that we would be at war with Japan certainly within the next few months. I believed during the first part of December that the probability of a raid on Hawaii was 50-50. . . . I felt that there were two methods, two strategic methods that the Japanese Fleet would pursue. One was to go down and base their fleet in the Mandates with the hope that our fleet would go after them, and they would be in a good position. The other was to make a raid on Hawaii. There were two major methods and without evaluating it too much, too greatly, I thought it was about a 50-50 chance of the raid on Hawaii.84
Rear Admiral Turner's normal reaction to a real crisis was never frenzied, never violent. It was a rapid fire, clear, logical mental application to the problem at hand and rapid fire, clear, logical dictum of things to be done by those surrounding him, at either higher or lower levels. This did not happen on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Sunday Morning Reactions
Had Rear Admiral Turner viewed the situation in the true light of a real crisis, Admiral Turner says that he would have immediately urged Admiral
Stark to pick up the scramble telephone used for classified messages and call Admiral Kimmel.
It wouldn't have done much real good at that late hour, but we might have had the ships buttoned up tight, all the guns manned and ready and a few planes in the air. There would have been a lot of satisfaction from the Navy's point of view in that, some lives might have been saved.85
But this did not happen. The only conclusion to be drawn is that Turner did not appreciate the reality of the time crisis.
When Admiral Turner was asked why he did not urge Admiral Stark to grab the scramble telephone and wake up Admiral Kimmel, he said:
Why weren't I and a lot of others smarter than we were? I didn't put all the Two's and Two's together before Savo to get four. Maybe I didn't before Pearl, but damned if I know just where. If Noyes had only known that Kimmel couldn't read the diplomatic Magic. If Kimmel had only sent out a few search planes. If the words 'Pearl Harbor' had only survived the redrafting of the warning messages. . . . You find out the answers and let me know.86
The fact that there were "Daily Summaries" and evaluations of information being prepared in various offices of the Navy Department was looked into by the Congressional Committee for the Pearl Harbor Attack.
OP-12 Daily Summaries
A check of the Daily Summaries and evaluations prepared in the War Plans Division indicates that these were read by the Director of War Plans. Filed next to the 22 September 1941 summary, there is an undated RKT handwritten note addressed to Commander Walter Ansel, who was the actual drafter in OP- 12:
These are getting too long. You have drawn some premature and unwarranted conclusions, I believe. RKT
Another summary is marked in RKT's handwriting:
"Bad History" and again I can't see this at all.
These comments lend credence to the thought that he evaluations appearing in other summaries were fairly close to RKT's opinions or they would have been marked up.
If the Director of War Plans was "obsessed" about Siberia and, if is subordinates could only "reflect his views," there is little in the OP-12 Daily Summary to support the charge. During September, October, November, and up to 7 December 1941 there are only three direct mentions of Siberia in the OP-12 Daily Summary and Evaluations. These are:
On 22 September 1941:
Japanese forces available for action against Siberia now number close to 500,000. She is reaching a concentration of strength that would permit action there.
On 24 October 1941:
Neither side has the superiority to warrant an offensive--but this may change if Siberia forces are moved west to re-enforce European Russia.
On 14 November 1941:
Japanese strength may be equal to the task, although the profit is small. Japanese better course is to await further developments in the Russian- German campaign with the ensuing possibility of Russian deterioration. Probability: awaiting opportunity.
Whether the comment of the RKT note quoted above and found find next to the 22 September summary, referred to Commander Ansel's underlined prognosis of action in Siberia is unknown, since the 22 September 1941 summary bears no other mark. But the RKT comment is at least a logical one from his known position at this time.
A reading of the summaries and evaluations indicate that in fact they appeared less than every other day, to be specific on 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 17, 9, 21, 24, 26, and 28 November and 1, 3, and 5 December. They appear to be 80 percent a compilation of information with a limited ration of prognosis of the future.
Those senior officers in Naval Operations who had a responsibility in the matter, all felt that they had given CINCPAC adequate general alert to ensure the Pacific Fleet's state of advanced readiness for actual war. It probably was a natural reaction to the real failure of the Office of the Chief
Post Pearl Strategic Summaries
of Naval Operations to, in fact, alert CINCPAC to be ready to meet a time crisis on 7 December 1941, that an effort was made in December 1941 to delineate more clearly, and in writing, the duties of the various divisions of Naval Operations in relation to alerting Commanders in Chief Afloat.
Rear Admiral Turner had his way for a short time, and on 12 December 1941, the following procedure was approved for the War Plans Division. It would issue as of 0800 daily:
1. 'The Naval Situation' for the President, giving all operational and related information affecting the United States Navy.
2. 'Bulletin for Naval Commanders,' giving a short summary of 'The Naval Situation' and deleting information which should not go out of Washington.
3. 'A Daily Navy Department Situation Communiqué' giving such information as should be made public.
Fortunately, Rear Admiral Turner's seniors did not buy for long this proposed diversion of effort by the War Plans Division from its primary business. The Secretary of the Navy put the Office of Public Relations back into the press release business, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, by 15 December 1941, was:
endeavoring to collect, collate, and reconcile all enemy information in the Department, whether directly by despatch or whether obtained by the other means (including Magic) and to send "out this information to the Commanders-in-Chief."87
The memorandum of 12 December 1941 is important only to show Rear Admiral Turner had a blind spot in regard to the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence and that he believed the War Plans Division should transmit:
To the principal naval commanders periodic secret bulletins giving information designed to keep these commanders up to date with regard to essential secret information in order that they can take appropriate military measures.88
This was bound to include information of the enemy, a proper chore for ONI.
By 28 January 1942, Rear Admiral Turner recommended in writing that the Joint Intelligence Committee should "put out daily paper that meets
the President's needs,"89 and that the President should receive neither Army nor Navy individual situation reports. This was a long step forward.
The state of jitters in Washington among Army and Naval officers after the Pearl Harbor attack is now hard to appreciate. On 12 December 1941, the Director of War Plans recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that he inform the President in writing that
the Chief of Naval Operations expects a raid on either Puget Sound or Mare Island Navy Yard today between 9 and 11 a.m. Washington time.90
And on the previous day the Joint Intelligence Committee, being far removed from the British cross channel weather in the winter months, had informed the President:
Because of initial reverses received by the United States in Hawaii, the probability that Germany may be seriously considering an early invasion of the British Isles must be borne in mind.91
In a letter to her sister-in-law, written the Tuesday before Pearl Harbor, Mrs. Turner gave interesting insight as to the state of her mind at this time:
State of Female Mind -- December 1941
The Japanese situation looks terrible. Kelly had to stay on the phone all day Sunday [30 November 1941] but wasn't called to the office. . . . Kelly feels fine and is still keeping up his morning walks, and it is dark when he starts out.92
In Mrs. Turner's next letter of Sunday, 7 December she wrote:
Well, war has come and though we feared it, we all hoped Japan would not have the nerve. They phoned Kelly to come to the Department a little before eleven. He had no idea, because he was very calm. Said he knew what it was about and would be back before long. We were to have dinner at the Chevy Chase Club, so I had let Sadie go. He phoned we were at war before the radio broadcast it, and didn't know when he would get home. . . .
I hate to be selfish, but for once, I am glad he is in Washington.
I sit here surrounded by Japanese things plus dogs.93
Just two days prior to the Pearl Harbor Attack, the Director of War Plans was busy writing a long four-page letter to the Chief of Naval Operations giving available information in regard to the apparent disclosure to the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald of the United States' "Victory Program."94 The letter had to be personally written, because the Director of War Plans was the actual custodian to the only copy of the "Victory Program" in the War Plans office. The "Victory Program" was a Joint Board paper with individually prepared logistical requirements for the Army and Navy.
Disclosure of the Victory Program
This investigation, called a witch hunt by some and regarding which Turner disclaimed all responsibility for himself and his subordinates of disclosure to the press, had considerable influence in strengthening the belief in the Navy Department of the correctness of limiting secret information to those "who need to know."
Kelly Turner had long been an advocate of this "need to know" policy. Admiral King, when Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, had not been privy to the ABC-I Staff agreements of 27 March 1941 which provided for American-British collaboration short of war and for full scale military cooperation in time of war. In Admiral King's opinion, Turner guarded his secret knowledge "with supererogatory zeal."95
Before entering into the amphibious phases of World War II and the part played in the amphibious Pacific campaigns by Richmond Kelly Turner, a brief record of his influence on the overall United States military command structure for the war seems appropriate.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
On 28 January 1942, the Joint Board discussed the creation of a Super Joint General Staff, which had been recommended in broad terms by the
Navy's General Board. The Joint Board on this date had two planning agencies, the Joint Planning Committee, and subsidiary, the Joint Strategic Committee. As head of the Navy's War Plans Division, Rear Admiral Turner on 1 February 1942, was one of the two members of the Joint Planning committee, the other representative being Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, of the War Department's War Plan Division. These two offices were handed the hot potato of determining what sort of a new military command organization should be established the United States to provide direction and cohesion in running the United States military part of the war. The task was assigned on 28 January 1942, and the report of these two officers was submitted on 27 February 1942.
Brigadier General Eisenhower recommended that a Joint General Staff of fifteen members be created directly under President and headed by a Chief of Staff who would be responsible only to the President. The General Staff would provide for coordination of both operations and logistic support, and be responsible for strategy and the employment of military forces, but would not command them. Command would be vested in Theater Commanders. Rear Admiral Turner recommended the organization of:
1. A Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet, and the Commanding General, Army Field Forces.
2. A Joint training system for higher command levels of both Services, stating this to be an essential prior to he acceptance of Joint Annual Staff.
In order to obtain unity of command, he recommended
3. Assigning command responsibilities in campaign areas and on frontiers to an officer of the Service with primary interest and awareness of the anticipated problems.
The Joint Board did not accept either proposal when they were presented at the 16 March 1942 meeting and both proposals reached the President. The President, who perhaps was wary of Brigadier General Eisenhower's solution (which reflected General Marshall desires), thinking it might dilute his own prerogatives as Commander Chief to direct the war effort in some detail, eventually accepted what was effect Rear Admiral Turner's
proposal. All three of the Turner recommendations became realities during the war, two early in 1942, Joint Training in 1944. But President Roosevelt also accepted part of Brigadier General Eisenhower's proposal when Admiral William D. Leahy became Chief of Staff to the President in July 1942, although without command authority or responsibility and without a staff.96
Thus Richmond Kelly Turner became the father of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. (a) Interview with Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Ret.), 16 Feb 1962. Hereafter, Stark; (b) Ingersoll.
3. FDR to RKT, letter, 8 Jan 1941.
4. CNO to Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, letter, Ser 045112 of 29 Nov 1940.
6. General Board No. 425, Sers 1868 of 31 Aug 1939, 1959 of 1 Jul 1940, and 144 of 14 Jun 1941.
7. RKT, address delivered at National War College, 28 Jan 1947.
8. JB No. 325, Ser 670 of 21 Dec 1940.
9. CNO to SECNAV, Op-12-WCB, letter, Ser 08212 of 17 Jan 1941, sub: Recommendations concerning further reinforcement of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet.
10. JB No. 325, Ser 670 of 21 Dec 1940.
11. Director of War Plans to Director Naval Intelligence, Chief of BUAER-OP-12-CTB, memorandum, Ser 052212 of 26 Dec 1940.
12. U.S., Congress, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Cong., 1st Sess., part 4), p. 1938. Hereafter Pearl Harbor Hearings.
13. JB No. 325, Ser 674 of 21 Jan 1941.
15. JB No. 325, Ser 642 of 30 Jun 1939.
16. JPC to JB OP-12-B-6, letter of 21 Jun 1939; subj: JB No. 325.
17. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 26, p. 268.
18. Col. F.S. Clark, War Plans Division, General Staff, memorandum for Director of War Plans, 17 Apr 1939.
19. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 26, p. 268. Advance copies WPL 43 were sent to CINCUS, 17 December 1940 by officer messenger. Issued by the Navy Department on 9 January 1941.
20. Acting Assistant Chief of Staff WPD. Memorandum for Chief of Staff, 13 Nov 1940, Subj: Comments on Plan Dog.
22. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 26, p. 266.
23. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparation, Vol I in subseries The War Department of series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), p. 87.
24. RKT to CNO, Report of conversation with Japanese Ambassador, 13 Mar 1941.
25. DWP to CNO, OP-12-CTB, letter, Ser 083412 of 21 Jul 1941.
26. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 12, pp. 2-3.
27. Ibid., part 12, pp. 45, 68, 72, 73.
29. Stark; Turner.
30. RKT to Miss LLT, letter, 9 Feb 1941. Captain Kent C. Melhorn (Medical Corps), USN, and Captain Elwin F. Cutts, USN (Class of 1908).
31. DWP to CNO, letter, 17 Jan 1941.
32. SECNAV to President, memorandum, 20 Mar 1941.
35. DWP to CNO, OP-12-VED, letter, Ser 050712 of 29 Apr 1941.
36. (a) OP-12B memorandum of 6 May 1941, sub: Army Navy Transports available in May 1941; (b) CNO to President, memorandum, Ser 059412 of 22 May 1941.
37. (a) CNO to CINCPAC, OP-38, memorandum, Ser 06538 of 7 Apr 1941; (b) OPNAV to CINCPAC memorandum, Ser 132019 of 13 May 1941.
38. CNO to SECNAV, memorandum, 16 Apr 1941. Retyped to include changes made by the President.
40. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 302.
41. Mrs. RKT to Lucile Turner, letter, 18 Jul 1941.
43. CNO to COS, OP-12-VED, letter, Ser 058212 of 22 May 1941, subj: Analysis of plans for overseas expeditions.
46. CNO to SECNAV, OP-12-VED, letter, Ser 067012 of 10 Jun 1941.
47. DWP to CNO, memorandum of 10 Apr 1941, subj: Project for northern cruise by units of Pacific Fleet.
48. CNO to President, letter, Ser 0132812 of 14 Nov 1941, subj: Delivery of Aircraft to Russia. Preliminary Draft of this letter.
49. Mrs. RKT to Lucile Turner, letter, 18 Aug 1941.
50. Rear Admiral Turner to Rear Admiral V.H. Danckwerts, RN, letter, A16-1/EPB/Ser 011512072 of Oct 1941, Strategic Plans, ABDA-ANZAC File 1941-1942.
51. (a) DWP to CNO, memorandum, 19 Jul 1941; (b) U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941 (publication No. 6325), Vol. IV, pp. 839-40.
52. Gerow and Turner, Memo for President of 5 Nov 1941, subj: Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.
53. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 1, SECNAV to SECWAR, letter, 24 Jan 1941, p. 279.
54. Ibid., part 4, p. 1945.
55. Ibid., p. 1776.
56. DWP to CNO, OP-12-CTB, memorandum, 11 Jul 1941.
57. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 14, p. 1361.
58. (a) A.A. Hoehling, The Week Before Pearl Harbor (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1963), p. 64; (b) Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 11, p. 5364.
60. Ibid., part 4, p. 1983.
61. Ibid., pp. 1874-75.
62. Ibid., p. 1766.
63. Ibid., p. 1766.
64. Ibid., p. 1924.
65. Ibid., p. 1924.
66. Ibid., p. 2025.
67. Ibid. pp. 1730, 1834-39, 1865, 1924-27.
68. Ibid., p. 1731.
69. Ibid., p. 3388.
70. DWP to CNO, memorandum, OP-12-VDS(SC)A8-1 of 12 Dec 1941.
72. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 26, p. 84.
74. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 4, pp. 1776, 1869, 1984.
75. Hoehling, The Week, p. 55.
76. (a) Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 4, pp. 1975-76; part 10, pp. 4714-15, 4722-23; (b) Wohlstetter, Warning and Decision, pp. 172, 173, 179, 181, 182.
77. (a) Turner; (b) Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 26, p. 277.
79. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 26, p. 295. Testimony of Captain john L. McCrea, Special Assistant to Admiral Stark.
81. Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 4, p. 1982.
82. Ibid., part 4, pp. 1975-77, 2029; part 10, pp. 4714-15.
83. Ibid., part 4, pp. 1975, 2029; part 8. pp. 3388-90.
84. Ibid., part 4, p. 2007.
87. (a) CNO to all Divisions of Operations, memorandum, OPBC Ser 604913 of 18 Dec 1941, subj: Information for Release to Press; (b) DNI to DWP, OP-16, memorandum, Ser 91163416 of 15 Dec 1941, subj: Dispatches concerning Intelligence of Enemy Activities.
88. DWP to CNO, memorandum, OP-12 VDS(SC)A8-1(A&N), 12 Dec 1941.
89. DWP to CNO, memorandum, 28 Jan 1942.
90. DWP to CNO, memorandum, OP-12-VDS(SC)A8-1(A&N) of 12 Dec 1941, encl. (B).
91. JIC Daily Summary, Noon Thursday, 11 Dec 1941.
92. Mrs. RKT to Miss LLT, letter, 2 Dec 1941.
93. Mrs. RKT to Miss LLT, letter, 7 Dec 1941.
94. RKT to CNO, OP-12-CTB, letter, Ser 0140112 of 5 Dec 1941.
95. King's Record, p. 328.
96. (a) Joint Board, meeting minutes, 28 Jan 1942, 16 Mar 1942; (b) JB, Ser 742; (c) Report, Joint Planning Committee to Joint Board, 27 Feb 1942, encls. (A) and (B).