Naval Organization, Doctrine and Landing Craft Developments
for Amphibious War
The Ark made the first recorded amphibious movement which is known to have had a deadline for both the building of the craft and for the departure of the passengers.
Those who have seriously studied the Books of the Old Testament of the Bible in an effort to determine the year date of the Flood, and the first peril-packed over water movement to a distant shore, vary widely in their estimates of the exact Zero Hour and Zero Year of the Flood. A hundred years ago the Flood was guesstimated by Biblical Scholars as between 2327 B.C. and 3155 B.C., a mere 800 year span.1 Modern scholars and archaeologists have been a bit more chary of naming years, but declare the Flood happened about 4000 B.C.2
In any case, this happened a long time ago. The Ark's building and departure was during a time of great stress, and the travelers embarked were a mixed lot generally unaccustomed to going to sea, and a bit untrained for foreign duty. They seem to have had only a hazy idea of where they were going and how they were going to get there. These characteristics almost seem inherent in amphibious operations and certainly were not unknown to our early amphibious operations in World War II.
As to the craft in which the first historically important over water movement was made, the Ark, 525 feet long, 87 1/2 feet abeam, and 52 1/2 feet high, was a sizeable craft and far larger than the World War II LST (Landing Ship Tank), 327x50x40 feet. Its building probably was no less expedited
and its over water movement no less surrounded by the perils of the deep than many a World War II amphibious craft.
But the Ark served its purpose well, and this without benefit of Congressional watch dog committees, expediters, super expediters, and public relations men, all of whom swarmed over the amphibious craft of the 1941-1945 era.
Since the man this study is about, Kelly Turner, played no personal part in the technical development of landing craft and landing boats until he arrived in the South Pacific, the interesting, colorful controversial pre-1942 development story of landing craft and landing boats will not be detailed herein. But some coverage is essential to understand World War II amphibious warfare.
The story of the development of landing boats during the pre- World War II period, and the early days of that war reads differently, depending upon which book is read.3 Since most of the books devoting any large amount of space to this phase of the amphibious story have been sponsored by the Marine Corps or written by Marines, it is perhaps natural that the work and contributions of the Army and of various other parts of the Department of the Navy, as well as the contributions of some of our Allies, and the Japanese enemy, have not been stressed. And it is natural that the long years of trial and error before really usable landing craft were developed have been emphasized.
As Admiral Turner wrote to the Director of Naval History in 1950:
I know that the Marines have engaged the 'Princeton History Group' to write a book about amphibious warfare as affecting the Marines, to cover the period from 1925 to 1945. I received the advance drafts of several chapters for comments. I spent 3 or 4 hours almost daily for several weeks in research
and the preparation of corrections, but finally gave up. The work of the Princeton Group is so full of errors and generally so bad historically that I couldn't stand to work on it any longer. In my opinion, unless the book is changed entirely as to concept and material, it will be a very bad book. It may start serious controversies. Certainly, it will do the Marines no good in the long run, because it is so one-sided.
I believe it would be an equally bad thing for the Navy to publish a similar controversial book, written from the point of view of the Navy alone. No one Service invented amphibious warfare. The Marines contributed much (patterned on Japanese methods) to its development in recent years. But so also did the Navy, including Naval Aviation. Furthermore, beginning in 1940, the Army contributed a great deal. We should not forget that the biggest operation of all Normandy was very largely a U.S. Army and British affair. The Marines had nothing to do with the European and African landings, and the U.S. Navy was not the controlling element.4
To add a bit of balance to the story about landing craft, it is perhaps well to recall that in Fiscal 1935 the total research and development appropriation of the whole Department of the Navy, which included the Marine Corps, was only $2,544,000.00 of which two million dollars were for aviation. Even for Fiscal 1940, the Congress provided the Department of the Navy only $8.900,000.00 for research purposes.5 The Bureau of Construction and Repair was only one among four technical bureaus in the Navy Department having significant research and development needs. landing craft, controlled largely by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, was only one of the significant fields to need research funds.
Its successor, the Bureau of Ships, quite properly had not thought it a worthwhile effort to scour up a document which might show the actual dollars allocated to landing craft research and development in 1935 or 1940, or any intervening year. An informed, but completely unofficial and unsubstantiated estimate, by one who has researched this field in the records of Naval Operations during these years, is that $40,000 was available in 1935 and $400,000 in 1940.6
It is very difficult in the 1960s, with research and development money running out of everyone's ears, to recreate the parsimonious atmosphere of the 1920s and 1930s, when the research and development dollars available were exasperatingly few (and percentagewise of total naval appropriations only a shadow of today's percentage) and each development dollar was guarded as though it was the Navy's last.
Many have claimed to be responsible for the idea of a separate type of craft to land troops on a hostile shore. However, one of the earliest powerful and effective urges during the period between the World Wars for the Navy to develop a useful landing boat, to train personnel to man them, and to provide gunfire support for the Landing Force, came from Admiral Robert E. Coontz (Class of 1885), Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, and later Chief of Naval Operations.
Navy Recognizes Landing Craft Problem
He wrote in 1925:
In connection with landing operations, the Commander in Chief offers the following comments and suggestions:
a. That the use of the regular ships' boats for the purpose of transporting landing parties ashore, when opposition is to be encountered, is a hazardous undertaking and little likely to succeed. he considers it of utmost importance that experiments be continued with a view to determine what type of boat is best for this purpose.
b. Consideration of the necessity that ships detailed to cover and support landing operations be equipped with guns permitting high angle fire. This he believes is necessary in order that the Landing Force will not be denied artillery support at a time it is most essential.
c. That a landing operation is likely to result in disaster if the officers in charge of the boats are not experienced in their duties.7
In regard to amphibious operations in the Fleet in 1924, Admiral Coontz wrote:
The participation of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force with the Fleet in the winter maneuvers of 1924 afforded the first real opportunity for determining the value of such a force to the Fleet.8
The Advanced Base Defense Force became the Expeditionary Force in 1921 and then the Fleet Marine Force in 1933.
A plain recognition by the Navy of the need for action in the landing craft field was the creation, on 12 January 1937, by the Secretary of the Navy, acting upon recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations, of the "Navy Department's Continuing Board for the Development of Landing Boats for Training in Landing Operations." Besides the Marine Corps, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Bureau of Engineering, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations supplied members; and the Assistant Director of the Fleet Maintenance Division in Naval Operations acted as the senior member of the Board. Captain (later Vice Admiral) W.S. Farber was a long-time senior member of this Board. His presence on it insured effective action at the OPNAV level.9
At the same time, the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, was directed to organize a similar coordinating board to supervise and report, with recommendations, on actual landing boat experiments and tests which were conducted by the Fleet. The two Boards were to keep each other fully informed. A "Five Year Special Boat Plan" was drawn up in Naval Operations and on the premise that the Navy Budget Officer and the Federal Budget Officer, and the Congress would approve, the Navy hoped to spend a total of $1,264,000 in the fiscal years 1938, 1939, and 1940 on developing and procuring landing boats.10
Under this program, 18 different landing craft were designed and built by naval and civilian shipyards, and were ready to be Fleet tested during Fleet Landing Exercise Five in early 1939. On 27 September 1940 and again on 25 July 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the inauguration in the Fleet of large-scale training programs for landing craft boat crews on board transports and cargo ships.11
The creation of these Boards, ashore and afloat, the assignment by the Bureau of Construction and Repair to its War Plans Desk of the duty of handling all landing craft matters at the working level, and the orders to the Fleet for training programs for landing craft boat crews indicate a basic
appreciation and proper placement of the landing craft problem during the pre-World War II period.
A further small bit of history about the tank lighter is added by Captain Roswell B. Daggett, USN (Retired), who as a lieutenant commander to captain headed up the Bureau of Construction and Repairs (later the Bureau of Ships) "Small Boat" desk in the Design Division from 1937-1943. He was the designated relief for the War Plans officer when that officer was absent, as he was, in the hospital, in January 1939. From this date until 1943, Daggett's assignment and efforts were in the landing craft field.
Landing Craft Tank (LCT)
He writes the following:
We [Bureau of Ships] had a flush deck tank lighter building which had freeing ports and was the prototype of the larger lighters which held 5 tanks and proved very successful during the war. But none of the small ones had neared completion, when one day, I would say in the late Spring of 1941, I was called to marine Headquarters and told the President had told the Marines to be ready to take the Azores by 1 July, and what could be done to get them tank lighters and landing boats. At that time, I was on excellent working terms with Higgins and knew him to be a "Go-Getter." I telephoned Higgins. He said that he had a lighter built for South American use, and they wanted him to take his pay in bananas. He was not disposed to do so. Higgins suggested that I come down to New Orleans, and see, if together, we could work something out with the lighter he had.
I flew down that night and remained a few days. We designed a ramp for the bow and Higgins proceeded to alter the lighter. We named the lighter 'Patches' because he did not have enough steel to alter it without using many small scrap pieces. He did the work in the middle of a roped off New Orleans street next to this shop, as he had no available working space under cover.
In a short time, I returned and we tested the lighter on Lake Pontchartrain. The ramp leaked like a sieve and required modification.
That was the story of the birth of the Higgins lighter.
Higgins produced this one and a few more, and some landing boats (many without engines) which were shipped to Norfolk by rail to meet the marines' date, and then not used for the operation planned.12
In the long history of maritime warfare, the navies of the world considered water movement of troops to a foreign shore one of their regular wartime
tasks, but one for which up until the early years of the Twentieth Century, they made minimal advance preparations until the event was upon them.
The thought that this problem of overwater movement of troops and then assault on a foreign shore would be with our Navy in a large way in any war with Japan started to percolate through the Navy in the immediate post-Spanish American War era. Advance Base work was studied at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1901 and a permanent Advanced Base School was established at New London, Connecticut, in 1910--and moved to Philadelphia in 1911.
Starting in 1902-1903, Marines became occasional to frequent participants in the annual winter Fleet cruises as the backbone and sinew, first of an Advanced Base Defense Force, then of an Expeditionary Force, and finally of a Fleet Marine Force.
After the British-French unhappy experience at Gallipoli, Turkey, the study of that World War I amphibious campaign became a regular part of the Naval War College course at Newport.13 In the early 1930s students at the Naval War College were taught that the lessons of Gallipoli to remember included;
1. Do not fail to provide for clear command channels to all forces of all Services and arms involved, and for a single forceful overall commander.
2. Be sure, by detailed orders, properly distributed at al echelons, that All Hands know what the objectives are, who does what when, and where the coordinating levels of command are located.
3. Do not attack prematurely with unsufficient forces.
4. Provide for supplies and equipment to be stowed aboard ship in reasonable proximation to the order in which they will be used or needed ashore, i.e., later called combat loading.
It can be presumed that Captain Turner learned these and other amphibious lessons during his three years at the Naval War College, and that their possible violation in the Guadalcanal campaign bothered him. It may be that Commander Nimitz and Captain Kings, who attended the Naval War College in 1923 and 1932, respectively, paid particular attention to the above first lesson of Gallipoli, for they implemented the principle of clear command channels and forceful commanders during World War II.
It also can be presumed that in addition to these "do's and don'ts," Captain
Turner learned that there were two prerequisites for a successful amphibious operation:
Secure lines of communications to the area of conflict.
Command of the sea and air around the objective.
If these two basic conditions could be satisfied, then it was essential to:
select landing areas with both hydrographic conditions favorable to the Navy and terrain conditions favorable to the Marines or Army troops.
deceive the enemy as to the chosen areas of debarkation as long as possible.
by air bomb and naval gun fire prepare the landing area, so the troops could prepare to seize them with confidence.
Once the troops landed and seized the beachhead it would be necessary to:
land artillery rapidly, and to secure any high ground commanding the beachheads so as to permit a quick shore-side build up of logistic support.
And one could then look forward to:
an early transfer of the conflict from amphibious to land warfare.
Al this and much more was set forth in Fleet Tactical Publication No. 167, the Bible of Landing Operations Doctrine published by the United States Navy in 1941.
Prior to June 1942, there were no distinctive "amphibious ships and craft" sub-sections in the various division of Naval Operations, except in the Fleet Training Division. up to that time, amphibious matters were handled by the various "Auxiliary vessels' sub-sections.14
The Navy Organizes Shoreside for the Amphibious Task Ahead
On 24 February 1940, there were only 35 personnel landing boats in the whole Navy built for that purpose and these were of the 30-foot type. On the same date there were 5 tank lighters and 6 artillery lighters. However, the following extract from a report from the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board and jointly signed by R.K. Turner and L.T. Gerow showed the vastly improved status on 30 September 1941:
4. a. The Navy procurement situation is as follows:
Type Delivered Under
Landing Boats Regular 36 ft. 400 197 367 964 Ramp 36 ft. 88 100 0 188 Tank 45 ft. 20 30 0 50 Regular 30 ft. 133 0 0 133 45 ft. Tank Lighters 26 71 0 97 47 ft. Tank Lighters 0 0 131 131 45 ft. Artillery Lighters 13 12 0 25 Rubber Boats 0 898 496 1394 Amphibian Tractors 0 300 188 488
b. The Army has procured 80 36-ft. landing boats and 8 45-ft. tank lighters.
c. A triangular division, Army or Marine Corps, should be prepared to land nine combat teams from combat unit loaded transports. Thirty-nine(39) 36-ft. landing boats (or the equivalent in other types to provide 350 boat spaces) and seven (7) tank lighters are required per combat team. Hence the above program is sufficient for three triangular divisions, as show in the following table:
* The employment in varying combinations of the 36' ramp boats, the 30' boats, and the placing of troops in Amphibian Tractors or Rubber Boats will change these figures and correspondingly alter other figures in these columns.
Available or Under
for 3 Triangle
Landing Boats Regular 36' 964 80 1044 *1044 *0 Ramp 36' 188 0 188 *9 *179 Tank 45' 50 0 50 0 50 45' Tank Lighters
47' Tank Lighters
8 236 189 47 Landing Boats Regular 30' 133 0 133 0 133 45' Artillery Lighters 25 0 25 0 25 Amphibian Tractors 488 0 488 300 188 Rubber Boats 1394 0 1394 0 1394
6. The Navy Department has also initiated steps to procure an appropriate number of Support Landing Craft, patterned after a British design, and whose purpose is to furnish fire support against beach defenses and aircraft during landing operations.
By 23 October 1941 there were 30 large transports, needing 816 landing boats, and 11 AKs needing 80 landing boats, in commission, being procured or converted.15
By 30 September 1941, the 36-foot landing craft had been adopted as standard, but their availability had not caught up with the demand.
When the Fleet Training Division was transferred from naval Operations to the headquarters of the Commander in Chief on 20 January 1942, there was only an "Amphibious Warfare" desk in the "Instruction" subsection, with a major in the Marine Corps assigned.16 As the tempo of preparations for amphibious warfare speeded up in the spring of 1942, the need for a large division in COMINCH Headquarters which would draw together and deal with all the operational elements concerned with amphibious warfare became apparent to Rear Admiral Turner.
On 18 April 1942, there was a conference, in COMINCH Headquarters, of the Commanders of the newly established Amphibious Force of the Atlantic Fleet (Rear Admiral Roland M. Brainard) and of the Pacific Fleet (Vice Admiral Wilson Brown). These officers came up with a number of agreed upon principles relating to amphibious organization and amphibious training, and made a number of recommendations which could be summarized in the words "more of everything is needed."
In giving Admiral King his generally favorable endorsement to these principles and recommendations, Rear Admiral Turner added a new and strong recommendation that
a Joint Army, Navy and Marine section under a Flag Officer, be established in COMINCH Headquarters with specific responsibility to develop material and methods for amphibious forces. These matters are handled by a number of agencies throughout the Department and should be coordinated under one head. This is a large project and requires specialized handling here, as well as in the field. Until such action is taken, it is not believed that we will make satisfactory progress.17
Rear Admiral Richard S. Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff, in forwarding Rear Admiral Turner's memorandum wrote:
The amphibious problem is assuming large proportions. Control is badly scattered in the Department. it should be centralized as Turner suggests. . . . I concur that an Assistant Chief of Staff be appointed for this purpose. . . .
Rear Admiral Turner and Rear Admiral Edwards well knew that there was no surer way to arouse Admiral King's wrath than to recommend an increase in officers on his staff or in those "attached to Headquarters." He had forcefully stated in early January 1942, that his staff would be "under 20" and the officers "attached to Headquarters," not more than 200. His personal approval of all new male officer billets was required.18 So it is not surprising to find that Admiral King on 30 April 1942 vetoed the addition of a Flag officer and a new major subdivision for his staff and wrote on the memorandum:
O.K. for section under a/CofS/Readiness, but first with to get concurrence of Gen. Marshall.
It evidently took weeks to get General Marshall's concurrence, for the section (F-26) to handle Amphibious Warfare was not established until 4 June 1942, and then with a complement of only six officers. Several captains, who after detachment became Flag officers with advanced rank, headed up this undermanned and overworked amphibious section in Fleet Readiness (F-46). They included D.E. Barbey and I.N. Kiland. But amphibious problems continued to be handled at a lower level than Rear Admiral Turner considered desirable, or their mushrooming importance warranted.
On 1 October 1939, when World War II was getting underway in Europe, the Navy had only two large transports (APs) in commission. They operated directly under the Chief of Naval Operations in logistic support of overseas commands, largely in the personnel area. By 15 October 1940, there were two additional large amphibious transports (APs) in commission in the Fleet, the Barnett (AP-11) and the McCawley (AP-10), and four fast destroyer-type transports.
As late as 22 October 1941, Rear Admiral Turner stated to the Joint Board that the number of large amphibious transports (APs) required by the Navy under the War Plans was only 36.19 At this time the Navy had only 16 APs, all in the Atlantic Fleet. In addition there were five large amphibious cargo ships (AKs) and six destroyer hull transports (APDs) in the Atlantic Fleet, but only two AKs in the Pacific Fleet, making a total of 29 amphibious ships.20
In the immediate pre-December 1941 Navy, the amphibious ships, limited in number, were organized administratively into divisions and/or squadrons and assigned to the lowly Train Squadrons, whose primary mission was the logistical support of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. As the number of amphibious ships and landing craft grew phenomenally, and as the number of prospective tasks for them multiplied, it was obvious that the amphibious ships should be placed in a separate Type command within the major Fleets, such as had long existed in the Fleets for the aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and other ships of a particular character or classification. The Type commander handled matters dealing with personnel, material, and basic training.
On 14 March 1942, and 10 April 1942 respectively, the Amphibious Forces of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were created in accordance with instructions from COMINCH and in due time all amphibious units within the two Fleets were assigned to them. Organizational rosters issued close to these dates show that there were 12 APs, four AKs and two APDs in the Atlantic Fleet and six APs, two AKs and three APDs in the Pacific Fleet, when the Amphibious Forces were established as separate entities. And this was only four to five months before Guadalcanal.
The designation of the major amphibious types as APs, AKs, and APDs warrants a word of explanation. In the Dark Ages, when the standard nomenclature for the classification of naval ships was first promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy, the Navy had numerous colliers and tugs, but very few cargo ships and no transports. So the basic letter C was assigned to colliers and T to tugs. Later, such other obvious assignments as D to destroyer, H to hospital ship, N to net layer and R for repair ship were made. With the obvious coincident letters all assigned, transports drew P and cargo ships K from the remaining available letters of the alphabet.
At the time of the designating letter assignment, transports and cargo ships were auxiliaries to the combatant ships of the Fighting Fleets and so they also carried the basic A for auxiliary in front of their class-type designation. Thus, an AP was a naval auxiliary and a transport and AK was a naval auxiliary and a cargo ship. Since it became apparent in 1942 that the transports and cargo ships of the Amphibious Forces were anything but auxiliary in carrying the war to the enemy, the A in their designation galled those who served in these ships. The hurt was only partially relieved when early in the war, their designations were changed to APA and AKA and they became Attack Transports and Attack Cargo ships. Few old sailormen could forget that before the war APA officially designated an auxiliary, and an animal transport, while now it still designated an auxiliary, although an "attack transport." As late as 28 February 1944 in his report on GALVANIC, the operation to seize the Gilberts, CINCPAC stated that the operation "involved some 116 combatant vessels and 75 auxiliaries" and listed the larger transports among the auxiliaries.21
It is important to remember that in pre-World War II days and for many months after 7 December 1941, both the United States Army and the United States Navy had overlapping functions in both the overseas movement and assault phases of Joint Overseas Expeditions. Joint Overseas Expeditions included (1) Joint overseas movements and (2) landing attacks against shore objectives. These functions which bore the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were set forth in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy prepared by the Joint Board in 1927 and revised in 1935.22
Responsibility for Amphibious Operations
The general principle which frequently overrode the detailed Service assignment of tasks was known to all. It read:
Neither Service will attempt to restrict in any way the means and weapons used by the other Service in carrying out its functions.23
The Army was specifically charged, in connection with Joint overseas movements:
To provide and operate all vessels for the Army, except when Naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected, in which case they are provided and operated by the Navy.24
In October 1940, the Army Transportation Service had fifteen ocean-going vessels, including eight combination troop transports, which carried some cargo, and seven freighters. In mid-December 1940, the War Department received authority to acquire seventeen additional vessels.25 This addition made the Army's Transport fleet larger than the Navy's Amphibious Force which numbered only 14 transports and eight cargo ships on 18 January 1941 and in late April 1942 had but 18 regular transports attached to the Fleets, 13 working up to join, and seven more projected.26
Under War Plan Rainbow Five, the Navy was assigned responsibility to
Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the Army Transportation Service.27
The Navy plans and projects underway in 1941 hopefully provided the first installment of personnel and ships for its assigned tasks in Joint overseas movements, but it had no personnel earmarked or available for the very considerable chore of "Man and operate the Army Transportation Service." Nor, as long as Army troops moved overseas in Army transports, were there naval personnel available or trained to perform the duty set forth in connection with "landing attacks against shore objectives," where the Army was given the task:
The deployment into boats used for landing, these boats being operated by the Navy.28
The Navy failed either to adequately plan for or, on the outbreak of war, to adequately undertake these two responsibilities29 despite the fact that in 1941 "Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans, advocated making the
Naval Transportation Service a going concern" and ready and able to take over the logistic and amphibious duties of the Army Transportation Service.30
Consequently, the Navy was in no position to criticize the Army in the early days of the war for moving ahead rapidly in expanding its amphibious capabilities, because it appeared that the Army would not only have to provide the amphibious transports by which it might journey to foreign shores, but the boats and boat crews needed to make the actual landings during European amphibious operations.
The Army and the Navy proceeded as they did because each had primary authority and responsibility in certain areas relating to amphibious operations. However, coordination and standardization of procedures in training for amphibious warfare in the United States was provided for and effected by the Commanders of the Amphibious Forces, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and in overseas areas by the Theater Commanders.
This situation promoted competition, basically friendly though knife- edge keen between the two Services. It resulted in rapid progress, some wasteful duplication of effort and spending of money, and tremendous confusion at the soldier and sailorman level, who could not understand, for example, the why of Engineer Amphibian Commands which trained Army boat regiments and soldier "coxswains".
Admiral King, who as Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet was bossman for Fleet Landing Exercise Seven in February 1941, reported on one aspect of this rivalry as follows:
Two combat teams of the First Division, United States Army, commanded by Brigadier General J.G. Ord, USA, arrived in the Army Transports Hunter Liggett and Chateau Thierry to take part in the exercise. . . .
. . . .[King] soon discovered that they [three Army General Staff Officers] regarded themselves as in a position to criticize the amphibious techniques of the far more experienced Marines. Creeping and walking normally precede an ability to run, and as it seemed to King, that so far as amphibious landings were concerned, the Marines had learned to walk and were beginning to get up speed, while the Army still had to master the art of creeping, he was both amused and annoyed by the attitude of these observers.31
Despite this indication of a strong belief that the Marines would function better than the Army in the amphibious arena, Admiral King kept a painfully
tight rein upon expansion of the personnel of the Navy. Admiral King was also the one who kept the personnel throttle of the amphibious Navy barely cracked in the early days of 1942, thus making impracticable the manning with naval personnel of needed transports, cargo ships and amphibious boats and craft.
Transports with their boat crews were expensive in personnel. Many officers had no great desire to see men who were desperately needed in the explosive expansion of patrol craft and destroyers fighting a seemingly losing battle against the German submarine, diverted into the amphibious arena. Many naval officers believed it would best serve the Navy's war capabilities to let the "expansion minded Army" take over certain amphibious duties and suffer the pains and penalties of that expansion.
When the question of who should be prepared to do what in amphibious warfare was raised in the early months of 1942, the Navy's official position was that amphibious operations in island warfare should be a function of the Navy, and that amphibious operations against a continent should be a function of the Army.32 The assigned reasons were:
In the one case, landings would be repeated many times, and continuous Naval support is essential; whereas, in the second case, after the initial landing, the Navy's chief interest would be protection of the line of sea communications.33
As late as 29 April 1942, the Army was still proposing that it should be responsible for all amphibious operations in the Atlantic area and the Marines in the Pacific area of operations.34
It was not until early February 1943 that the Navy agreed to undertake the amphibious training of boat operating and maintenance personnel to meet future Army requirements and, based on this promise, the Army agreed to discontinue all amphibious training activities in the United States. The control and assignment of amphibian units and amphibious training activities in overseas theaters were left to Theater Commanders to determine. This represented a major advance toward assuring that all amphibious troops and all amphibious craft would have the same fundamental indoctrination in amphibious operations. The historic memorandum providing for this change is reproduced below.35
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY, AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. FLEET AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.
This agreement between the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, confirms and approves the agreement arrived at in conference on March 8, 1943, between representatives of the War Department and the Navy Department, as follows:
a. The Army will discontinue all amphibious training activities except as noted in below. The Army will retain responsibility for all training, other than amphibious, of Army units designated to receive training under the Navy.
b. The Navy will continue amphibious training of boat operating and maintenance personnel to meet future Army requirements of this nature, and also will train at a later date Army replacements for existing amphibian units if this should become necessary.
c. The 3rd and 4th Engineer Amphibian Brigades (Army), which have been especially organized for shore-to-shore operations in the Southwest Pacific will be retained under Army control and their training completed by the Army pending their movement to that theatre.
d. The control and assignment of amphibian units and amphibious training activities in overseas theatres will be as determined by the theatre commander concerned.
e. Upon completion of the training of the 3rd and 4th Engineer Amphibian Brigades the boats, shops, spares, tools and other facilities, not part of the organizational equipment of these units, shall be transferred to the Navy when and if required by that Service and the Amphibian Training installations and facilities at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, and Camp Gordon, Johnston, Florida (Carrabelle), will be made available to the Navy for its use. The actual transfer of land is not contemplated.
A survey party with representatives of the Navy Department and War Department (Services of Supply) will be appointed to arrange the details of the transfer.
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Lieut. General, U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations
When, on 29 April 1942, Admiral King issued his LONE WOLF Plan for the establishment of the South Pacific Amphibious Force, he laid the
Amphibious Force Command Relations
ground work for a lot of later Marine abuse of Richmond Kelly Turner. This extremely terse and stimulating order, which made possible the successful WATCHTOWER Operation, had this important paragraph:
IX. Coordination of Command
a. Under the Commander, South Pacific Force, the Commander of the South Pacific Amphibious Force will be in command of the naval, ground and air units assigned to the amphibious forces in the South Pacific area.
b. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff are in command of any United Nations units assigned to New Zealand specifically for the land defense of the Commonwealth of New Zealand.36
The Commanding General, First Marine Division (Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC) received registered copy No. 35 of the order. The Commandant of the Marine Corps received five copies.
I have been unable to locate, in the files of COMINCH, any letter of protest or comment from Marine Corps sources in regard to this order. The specific requirements of the order assigning command of the ground and air units to Commander Amphibious Force South Pacific are not mentioned in any of the better known Marine Force accounts of the Marine Corps Operations at Guadalcanal.37 And yet each of these accounts creates the impression that Rear Admiral Turner was exercising command responsibilities during the WATCHTOWER Operation when he should not have done so.
Rear Admiral Turner's position was that the directive was drafted in a section of the COMINCH Staff headed by a senior colonel in the Marine Corps (DeWitt Peck, later Major General). It was cleared with Marine officers in the Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps before it was initialed by the top echelon of COMINCH Staff and signed by Admiral King. There were no questions raised in regard to the command relationships, although the draft went through several other changes.38
On 13 May 1942, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, Commander Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet raised the question of command relationships between his command and that of Commander Amphibious Corps, South Pacific
Force. This letter, and the endorsements placed upon it, was sent to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for comment. The Commandant did not utilize this opportunity to mention the command relationship problem of Commander Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force, and his Marine subordinate, if it then existed in his mind.39
Once the COMINCH order had been issued, the responsibility for exercising the command lay with Commander Amphibious Force, South Pacific. Rear Admiral Turner exercised command of the Marines during the early months of the WATCHTOWER Operations because the Commander in Chief directed him to do so. There was nothing in either the then current version of the Landing Operations Doctrine, 1938 Revised Fleet Training Publication 167, nor in the operations orders or instructions issued by any senior in the chain of command for the WATCHTOWER Operation which watered down the COMINCH directive.
This directive was reaffirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 July 1942. It did not speak of broad strategical direction. It talked of "direct command of the tactical operations" as follows:
Direct command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces [of which the Marines were the major ingredient] will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout the conduct of all three tasks.
The three tasks referred to were the amphibious operations designed to secure control of:
1. Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent position.
2. Remainder of Solomon Islands, Northeast Coast of New Guinea.
3. Rabaul, and adjacent positions; New Guinea--New Ireland.40
When, on the occasion of his visit to the Amphibious Force, South Pacific Command in late October 1942, the Marine Commandant, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, raised the question of command relationships in SOPAC's Amphibious Force, and suggested changes in organization and in command relationships, Rear Admiral Turner was not adverse thereto.41 When Commander South Pacific sent to Turner for comment a despatch with the suggested organizational changes, it was acceptable to him, with very minor modifications (nit picks), and when these changes were made he so informed Commander South Pacific Force in writing of his approval.
The minor modifications in wording Rear Admiral Turner had suggested in the first draft were made by COMSOPAC and that was the form in which the recommended change was approved and sent up the chain of command.42 These changes:
detached the First Marine Corps from the Amphibious Force, SOPAC, and established the Corps Commander on the same echelon of command as Commander Amphibious Force, SOPAC.
provided that joint planning in the future by COMGENPHIBCORPS and COMPHIBFORSOPAC would be conducted under the control of COMSOPAC.
provided that after conclusion of the landing phase of an operation, during which Marine units from the Amphibious Force command landed, a task organization for the shore phase of the operation would be established, or the Marine Corps units would revert to Corps command, when and as directed by Commander South Pacific.
This established a pattern carried out with minor modifications, throughout the Pacific phase of World War II.
In order that Rear Admiral Turner's thinking in late October 1942 in regard to his command of the Marines can be set forth for all to read, and so inferences that he was bypassed when the matter was considered and then opposed any change thereto, as intimated in the official Marine history,43 can be shown to be less than accurate, the official letter is quoted below:
00/hw File No.
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
Serial 00342 U.S.S. McCawley, Flagship,
October 29, 1942
SECRET From: Commander Amphibious Force, South Pacific To: Commander South Pacific Force. Subject: Reorganization of Amphibious Force, South Pacific
References: (a) Second-draft of proposed secret despatch from Comsopac to Cincpac.
(b) Cominch secret letter FF1/A31 serial 00935 of September 7, 1942.
1. I am in entire sympathy with the purpose of reference (a). The rigid organization prescribed by reference (b), and now in effect, is cumbersome, results in a diffusion of responsibility and authority, and injects into the organization of the forces an echelon of command which, while possibly convenient for delegating authority for training (such as on the West Coast of the United States), is not likely to be effective for the many variations of offensive and defensive operations involved in warfare in the South Pacific.
2. However, the question of the organization and operations of the Amphibious Force is very closely tied up with the organization and operations of all parts of the South Pacific Force, to a degree that does not apply to other Task, Forces. Furthermore, it is believed that the major lines of organization of the South Pacific Force require some clarification. For this reason, it is suggested that reference (a) would solve only one part of the problem. Furthermore, since it is in direct conflict with reference (b), it might not be looked upon with favor by higher authorities unless the entire picture is clarified.
3. It is, therefore, recommended that a despatch be sent to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, somewhat along the lines indicated in the following draft:
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
Serial 00342 SECRET Subject: Reorganization of Amphibious Force, South Pacific. From: COMSOPAC To: CINCPAC
EXPERIENCE IN SOPAC INDICATES PERMANENT ORGANIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AS NOW PRESCRIBED BY JCS EIGHT ONE SLANT ONE OF SEPTEMBER FIFTH FORWARDED BY COMINCH SECRET SERIAL ZERO ZERO NINE THREE FIVE OF SEPTEMBER SEVENTH LEADS TO UNDESIRABLE COMPLICATIONS IN ADMINISTRATION CMA AND TO DISPERSION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR NORMAL AND USUAL LAND SEA AND AIR OPERATIONS PARA SINCE THIS SUBJECT CMA DUE TO GEOGRAPHY AND THE VARIED NATURE OF THE FORCES ASSIGNED MY COMMAND CMA IS CLEARLY BOUND UP WITH OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE ENTIRE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA CMA I RECOMMEND THAT THE SOUTH
PACIFIC FORCE BE ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS COLON AFFIRM PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONAL COMBATANT TASK FORCES ASSIGNED PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY WHOSE ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY UNDER TYPE COMMANDERS EITHER OF PACFLT OR SOPAC TEMPORARY CHANGES IN TASK FORCE WILL BE MADE AS REQUIRED WHILE IN SOPAC BAKER AIRCRAFT SOPAC WITH ADMINISTRATION OF ALL SHORE BASED NAVAL AIR UNITS CMA AND OPERATION CONTROL OF ALL ARMY NAVY AND MARINE AIR UNITS NOT ASSIGNED FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OR TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED OTHER TASK FORCES COMMANDERS FOR PARTICULAR TASKS CAST US ARMY FORCES SOPAC WITH ADMINISTRATION OF ALL US ARMY FORCES CMA AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF US AND ALLIED LAND FORCES ASSIGNED BY COMSOPAC DOG FIRST CORPS US MARINES WITH ADMINISTRATION OF ALL MARINE UNITS SOPAC LESS UNITS ASSIGNED TO SAMOAN AREA CMA AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF US AND ALLIED LAND FORCES ASSIGNED BY COMSOPAC EASY AMPHIBIOUS FORCE SOPAC WITH ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF ALL COMBAT TRANSPORTS CARGO VESSELS AND ATTACHED UNITS IN SOPAC CMA AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF LAND SEA AND AIR FORCES TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED FROM OTHER FORCES FOR PARTICULAR TASKS FOX BASE FORCE SOPAC WITH ADMINISTRATION OF ALL NAVAL BASES IN THE AREA AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALL PORTS CMA EXCEPT AS TO MILITARY FEATURES CMA WHICH REMAIN UNDER THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF BASES GEORGE SERVICE SQUADRON SOPAC ADMINISTRATION OF LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY BASES PAREN INCLUDING SHIP REPAIRS AND PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PAREN CMA REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF NAVAL UNITS IN SOPAC CMA WHETHER LAND SEA OR AIR CMA PLUS LOGISTIC SUPPLY FOR MARINES ARMY AND ALLIED FORCES AND CIVIL POPULATIONS FOR PARTICULAR ITEMS WHICH MAY BE DECIDED ON AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF NTS UNITS PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY IN SOPAC CMA PLUS ARMY ALLIED AND CHARTERED VESSELS ASSIGNED HYPO JOINT PURCHASING BOARD AS NOW ORGANIZED PARA IT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS TO INCLUDE CONTROL OF SPECIAL TRAINING OF UNITS FOR THE PARTICULAR OPERATIONS IN PROSPECT CMA AND THAT COMSOPAC WILL ACTIVELY COORDINATE JOINT PLANNING TRAINING AND OPERATIONS AMONG TASK AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES PARA UNDER THE FOREGOING CONCEPT NORMAL AND USUAL OPERATIONS LAND SEA AND AIR WILL BE UNDER LAND SEA AND AIR COMMANDERS
CMA MINOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WILL CONVENIENTLY BE ARRANGED BY LOCAL COMMANDERS WITH THE FORCES NORMALLY ASSIGNED CMA AND MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WILL BE EXECUTED BY THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WITH TASK FORCES ADAPTED TO THE PURPOSE AND PLACED AT HIS DISPOSAL X DECISIONS AS TO THE TIMES FOR THE FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION OF AMPHIBIOUS TASK ORGANIZATIONS AND THE SCOPE OF THE TASK WILL VARY WITH PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD REMAIN AT THE DISCRETION OF COMSOPAC.
And yet it has not been infrequent for this scribe to hear a First Division Marine who was on Guadalcanal in 1942 start off a comment on Admiral Turner by saying "That S.O.B. Turner, always interfering with the Marines." He was not interfering with them. He was performing an assigned command function.
Amphibious Doctrine is a statement of the working principles of amphibious warfare. Just what our amphibious doctrine was when we entered World War II on 7 December 1941 is not always agreed upon, although in the War Instructions and in Landing Operations Doctrine of that period are two clear bench marks.44
In the 1934 edition of War Instructions, United States Navy, the subject "amphibious warfare" was not even listed in the index. In the actual textual matter, it was only indirectly referred to as one of the eight main tasks of the Navy in war in the following words:
Escort of and cooperation with Expeditionary Forces in the seizure and defense of advanced bases and the invasion of enemy territory.45
In 1939, when Joint Action of the Army and the Navy was changed to deal in greater detail with Joint Operations, the Navy was assigned the following task which soon appeared in a change to the War Instructions.
To seize, establish, and defend until relieved by Army forces, advanced naval bases, and to conduct such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the Naval Campaign.46
In 1941, War Instructions, United States Navy was backed up in detail by a number of confidential publications titled Tactical Instructions each separately relating to the tactics of aircraft, submarines, battleships, destroyers, or other type ships in the support of the general doctrines stated in War Instructions. In the field of amphibious warfare the detailed publication was Landing Operations Doctrine, United States Navy, 1938. However, there was one great difference between amphibious warfare, and such areas as mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, or air warfare. The backer-up publication was 99 percent of the whole.
It was not until late 1944 that amphibious operations were given a full chapter treatment in the 1944 War Instructions, which was a complete rewrite of the 1934 edition. This edition noted that an "amphibious operation" was synonymous with a "Joint overseas expedition," a term frequently used by the Army and Navy during the previous 50 years.47 It was Admiral Turner' s belief that some of those who talked or wrote of vast changes which took place in amphibious doctrine during World War II tended to confuse the fast changing techniques which were used to implement the doctrine with changes in the basic doctrine itself.48
Admiral Turner, in 1960, recalled that during his three years at the Naval War College, the basic amphibious doctrine taught there from 1936 to 1938 related directly to the seizure of advanced bases which would facilitate the projection of the United States Fleet into the Western Pacific. The Admiral summarized the pre-World War II Amphibious Doctrine about as follows:
The place chosen for landing amphibious troops must be favorable from the naval point of view, so that the landing craft can land easily; and the terrain in the rear of the chosen beach must be favorable from the Landing Force point of view, so the attack can move away from the beach area.
The naval gun and the airplane must be used to control the sea and air at the objective area, to reduce or eliminate enemy resistance in the chosen landing beach area, and to assist the Landing Force in moving out of the beach area to its objectives.
The Landing Force early objectives must be far enough away from the chosen landing beach to remove the landing beach from the field of enemy artillery fire.
The logistic support of the Landing Force via a reasonably
secure line of communications must build up rapidly so as to free the Fleet for further movement.
As soon as the action ashore changes from amphibious warfare to land warfare, the Army relieves the Marines.
Admiral Turner added:
All of these were of course subject to all the over-riding General Principles of War, such as surprise, landing where and when the enemy wasn't immediately expecting you, and the only part of this general doctrine which I would say that was changed markedly in the war was the fifth one. Tie Army got into amphibious warfare in a big way, and in the earliest stage - at Guadalcanal, they didn't relieve the Marines as soon as I thought the doctrine called for.
Of course during Guadalcanal, I can't say we had a secure line of communications, or that at Okinawa we had control of the air all the time. But that didn't change the doctrine. We just were temporarily unable to carry it out.49
The question could be logically asked whether the future Commander Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet received practical training as a lieutenant commander, commander or junior captain during the major Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEX 1 to FLEX 6) or the more elementary Landing Force exercises in 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1931 or 1932?
With one exception, the answer is No. As a lieutenant commander and Gunnery Officer on the Staff of Commander Scouting Fleet during Fleet Problem 3, in January 1924, he took part in planning that exercise. The 5th Marine Regiment of the Marine Expeditionary Force landed at the Atlantic end of the Panama Canal, and provided the diversion and holding effort during which the Atlantic locks were simulated to be blown up to prevent the passage of the Pacific Fleet. The balance of the Marine Expeditionary Force, the forerunner of the Fleet Marine Force, landed at Culebra, and prepared it as an island defense base.
Commander Turner missed the 1936, 1937, and 1938 amphibious exercises through being on duty at the Naval War College, and the 1931 and 1932 exercises when he was assigned to the Navy Department. He was in the California (BB-44) in 1922, and she did not participate in the Marine phases of the 1922 Fleet Problem, nor in the Marine landing exercises at
Panama in 1923. He was in the Saratoga in 1935, but she did not participate in FLEX 1.
Starting in late 1938 when Captain Turner was back afloat in command of the heavy cruiser Astoria, the Fleet Landing Exercises had become pretty much the property of the Atlantic Fleet and the Astoria was in the Pacific Fleet so he missed the experimental night landings of 1939 and 1940. By October 1940, Captain Turner was back in the Navy Department. He participated in planning Fleet Problems and Joint Exercises at the departmental level but again he missed both FLEX 7 which took place in the Atlantic and the Joint Landing Exercises in the Pacific in 1940 and 1941.
In his younger years, like all naval officers facing promotion examinations and annual inspections, he had studied the Navy's 1920 and the 1927 revised edition of the Landing Force Manual. At the Naval War College he studied the Joint Board pamphlet, titled Joint Overseas Expeditions, promulgated in 1933, as well as the Navy's 1935 Tentative Landing Operations Manual which, though based on the Joint Board text, was drafted at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico.
Final reports on Fleet Problems and Fleet Landing Exercises were comprehensive documents circulated by the Navy Department and by Fleet Commanders to ships and stations. In this way, all officers were generally in touch with amphibious warfare techniques, lessons learned and suggestions made for improvement. Yet, Admiral Turner, an avid student of all that related to past and present naval operations, stated that he had nothing but "a highly theoretical knowledge of amphibious warfare" and a "willingness to learn" to take into the WATCHTOWER Operation.50 It was the "willingness to learn" that paid such high dividends to the Navy.
The 1938 edition of Landing Operations Doctrine, United States Navy (FTP-167) is a rare publication in its uncorrected and original condition, but a necessary bench mark for the status of United States amphibious techniques and material development before World War II started in Europe. It superseded the 1935 Tentative Landing Operations Manual. The 1935 Manual was very largely based on the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations drafted by four officers, including Lieutenant Walter C.
The Amphibious Operation Bible
Ansel, USN, of the Marine Corps Schools Staff and issued in January 1934, but retitled Manual for Naval Overseas Operations in August 1934. The January 1934 publication in turn superseded the Landing Force Manuals of the Navy of earlier years which were about 98 percent devoted to the "Manual of the Infantryman" and the parade, and were mostly non-amphibious in character despite their titles. The early Landing Force Manuals basically arose from the need to train sailormen as infantry for the countless Naval landings on foreign shores to protect American lives and property during the previous one hundred years, when the Marines had to be supplemented with sailormen.
In May 1941, Change No. 1 to the 1938 Landing Operations Doctrine, based on the more recent Fleet Landing Force Exercises, reports of observers overseas, and material developments of the 1938-1941 period, was issued. It was "a complete revision of FTP 167 except for the title page."51 The WATCHTOWER Operation was based on this massive revision of FTP 167, although Change No. 2, with 60 new pages was issued in Washington on 1 August 1942, six days before the Tulagi-Guadalcanal landings.
The amphibious experience in the Solomons and in North Africa led to further revisions, and these came out in another fifty new pages of the Landing Operations Doctrine in August 1943. In these changes, Rear Admiral Turner not only had a hand; he many times called the tune.
1. Samuel W. Barnum, A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Bible (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1868), p. 174.
2. Werner Keller, The Bible as History (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956), ch. 3.
3. (a) U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Report 10, part 16, March 4 [legislative day February 2], 1944; (b) Jester A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1951), ch. 3, pp. 57-71; (c) Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, HISTORY OF U.S. MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1958), ch. 3; (d) Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, "Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy," Marine Corps Gazette (Jun 1946-Mar 1947), 5 parts; (e) General Holland M. Smith and Percy Fuch, Coral and Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949).
4. RKT to Chief of the Division of Naval Records and History, letter, 20 Nov 1950, subj: Isely-Crowl, U.S. Marines in Amphibious War.
5. (a) Office of Naval Research, "U.S. Naval Research and Development in World War II," (manuscript) part I, pp. 100, 144; (b) Rear Admiral J.A. Furer, Narrative history of Office of Coordinator of Research and Development, 28 Jul 1945, para. 547.
6. (a) "History of Continuing Board for the Development of Landing Vehicles" (manuscript); (b) Rear Admiral J.A. Furer, USN, "Logistics of Fleet Readiness," The Fleet Maintenance Division (First Draft Narrative) in United States Naval Administration in World War II; (c) BUC&R to CNO, letter, 582-3(15)(DW), 6 Jan 1937; (d) Lieutenant Colonel B.W. Gally, USMC, "A History of Fleet Landing Exercises" (manuscript), USS New York, 3 Jul 1939; (e) Lieutenant William F. Royall, USN, Landing Boat Officer, Atlantic Squadron, "Landing Operations and Equipment," USS New York, Aug 1939. Contains 38 photographs of landing boats developed during 1936-1939 period.
7. CINCUS, A.R., 1924, paras. 79, 114.
8. CINCUS, A.R., 1924, para. 76.
9. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, United States Naval Administration in World War II, "Fleet Maintenance Division," p. 93.
10. (a) SECNAV to CINCUS, letter, Ser 370112 of 12 Jan 1937; (b) CINCUS to Commander Training Squadron, Scouting Force, letter, Ser 421 of 4 Feb 1937.
11. (a) CNO to Commander Transport Train, Atlantic, letter, OP-22-A, P16-3/S82-3/Ser86622 of 27 Sep 1940, subj: Landing Boat Crews; (b) CNO to Commander Train Atlantic and Commander Base Force Pacific, letter, OP-22-A(SC)P16-3, Ser 074422 of 25 Jul 1941, subj: Boat Crews for Special Landing Boats.
12. Captain Roswell B. Daggett, USN (Ret.), to GCD, letter, 8 Jan 1960.
13. (a) Captain W.D. Puleston, USN, The Dardanelles Campaign (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1926); (b) Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, "The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy," Marine Corps Gazette (July 1946-February 1947).
14. CNO Organizational Rosters, 1941-1942.
15. (a) CNO, OP-12, memorandum, 24 Feb 1940; (b) DWP to Continuing Board for Developments of Landing Boats, memorandum, 23 Sep 1941; (c) Joint Planning Committee to Joint Board, JB No. 355, Ser 687 of 30 Sep 1941, approved by SECNAV, 3 Oct 1941.
16. (a) CNO Organizational Roster, Sep 1941; (b) COMINCH Roster, 27 Jan 1942.
17. Turner to Admiral King, memorandum, 22 Apr 1942 with endorsements thereon.
18. The number of officers on the Staff was 20 from 1 March 1942 until the end of the war. The number of male officers attached to Headquarters reached 181 on 1 January 1943, and was 193 on 1 October 1945, having touched 226 on 1 January 1944. Furer, p. 25.
19. Joint Board, minutes of meeting, 22 Oct 1941.
20. (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 13CN-41, 1 Oct 1941; (b) Atlantic Fleet Confidential memo 10CM-41, 6 Oct 1941.
21. (a) Ships Data Book, 1938; (b) CINCPAC, Operations in Pacific Ocean Area, Annex E. para. 2.
22. Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, para. 18. Hereafter Joint Action, 1935.
23. Joint Action, 1935, para. 4(c)(1).
24. Joint Action, 1935, para. 18(b)(1).
25. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943, Vol. VII in subseries The War Department of series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), p. 62.
26. Revised U.S. Navy Operating Force Plan Fiscal 1941, dated 18 January 1941, CNO-OP-38-Serial 13738.
27. WPL 46, May 1941, War Plan, Naval Transportation Service, 8 Jul 1941.
28. Joint Action, 1935, para. 18c(1)(a).
29. Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 718-19.
30. (a) Charles Snow Alden, "Brief History of the Naval Transportation Service from 1937 to March 1942," 1943, para. 39; (b) R.M. Griffin, "Brief History of the Naval Transportation Service March 14, 1942 to January 12, 1943"; (c) Duncan S. Ballantine, Naval Logistics in the Second World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 78.
31. King's Record, p. 320-21.
32. JPS 2/1; JPS 2/7 (Joint U.S. Strategic Committee Study on Strategic Employment of Amphibious Forces; JSSC Study No. 24, Organization of Amphibious Forces).
33. RKT to COMINCH, memorandum, 15 Apr 1942.
34. JPS 24.
35. COMINCH-C/S USA, memorandum, 8 mar 1943. See also COMINCH to General Marshall, memorandum, FF1/A16-3/Ser 00224 of 5 Feb 1942 and C/S USA to Admiral King, 16 Feb 1943, subj: Army and Navy Amphibious Boat Crews.
36. COMINCH, letter, FF1/A3-1/A16-3(5), Ser 0322 of 29 Apr 1942, subj: LONE WOLF Plan.
37. (a) Hough, Ludwig, Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, pp. 240, 241, 341-342; (b) John L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, Marine Corps Monograph (Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1949), pp. 93, 128, 153, 154; (c) Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, pp. 153-57.
38. LONE WOLF drafted by F1232 (Capt. B.J. Rodgers) in COMINCH Pacific Section of the Plans Division. This section was headed by Colonel DeWitt Peck, USMC, who was F123.
39. (a) COMPHIBFORPACFLT, letter, A16-1/11/Ser 938 of 13 May 1942; (b) COMDT Marine Corps, letter, A0-278 003B15542 of 5 Jun 1942.
40. JCS 00581 of 2 Jul 1942.
42. (a) COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, messages, 312126, Oct 1942; COMINCH to CINCPAC, 091950 Nov 1942; CINCPAC to COMINCH, 030201 Nov 1942; COMSOPAC to TF Commanders, SOPAC, 161114 Nov 1942; (b) Turner.
43. Hough, Ludwig, Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 341.
44. War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934 (FTP 143) with changes to December 1941; Landing Operations Doctrine, 1938 (FTP 167) with change No. 1.
45. Ibid., 1934, Ch. III, para. 310e.
46. Ibid., 1934, Change No. 6a, RPM No. 1121 of 14 Sep 1939.
47. Ibid., 1944.
51. Landing Operations Doctrine, 1938, Change No. 1, p. III.