Chapter II
The Men

The following sub-section index was not part of the original text, but has been added to aid the reader in navigating what is otherwise a very long chapter. The sub-section headings appeared in the original text, but were not part of the index. [HyperWar]

  • Requirements and Procurement
  • Communication Personnel
  • Facilities for Training Merchant Seamen
  • Training of Armed Guards
  • Armed Guard School, Little Creek
  • Armed Guard School, Chicago
  • Armed Guard School, Gulfport
  • Armed Guard School, San Diego
  • Armed Guard Gunnery School, New York
  • Armed Guard Gunnery School, New Orleans
  • Armed Guard Gunnery School, Seattle
  • Armed Guard Gunnery School, San Francisco (Treasure Island)
  • The Functions of the Armed Guard Center
  • Armed Guard Center (Atlantic)
  • Armed Guard Center (Gulf)
  • Armed Guard Center (Pacific)
  • Port Directors and the Armed Guard Program
  • Armed Guard Pools
  • The Mission of the Armed Guard
  • The Armed Guard Inspection Service

    Requirements and Procurement

    The men of the Armed Guard came from all walks of life. Their one common characteristic was that few of them had ever been near the ocean. They were not selected because of background and civilian training. Since there was an urgent need for large numbers of men to man the guns on merchant ships, the Navy took all officers and men who could be spared from combatant ships and other activities and made them into Armed Guards. It was a terrific gamble on the ability of the Navy to develop a training program which could turn men out for combat duty at a fast pace and on the ability of men, many of whom had never seen the ocean, to take to the sea under the most trying conditions. Men who had been living quiet and normal lives as farmers, bankers, merchants, writers, lawyers, school teachers, factory workers found themselves in mortal combat with the enemy after only a few months in the Navy. Men who had never done more serious shooting than at ducks or quail soon found themselves bringing down German planes and firing heavy guns at submarines. That these men were always available to man the guns and that they were able to convert Armed Guard duty from the most hazardous duty afloat to perhaps the best duty in the Navy is a tribute to those who planned their procurement and who arranged the many details of training and equipment.

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    It is also a tribute to those who went down with their ships, with their guns still firing to the last, and a tribute to the inherent ability of the American people to adjust themselves to crisis periods and new situations. While there may be some doubt that the American people will ever develop into a great seafaring nation, the fact is undeniable that they can and do take to the sea when their security demands it.

    Men of the Armed Guard must be in good physical condition. They must have good eyesight and good ears. They must be qualified as swimmers. Since they were often at sea for long periods of time, they were required to have their teeth always in good repair. Above all, they must be people who had their hearts in their work, who loved their country and were willing to sacrifice even their lives for it if necessary. The Armed Guard was no place for the malcontent, the never-do-well, or the loafer. For months, Armed Guards lived on board ships with merchant seaman who were highly paid. They must be able to get along with those men who lived under no other discipline than that of their own labor union and the demands of the master of the ship. Every effort was made to keep up the morale of the Armed Guards, to make life as comfortable for them as possible, and above all to indicate to them that they were not going out to have ships blown from under them as a form of punishment, or as a disciplinary measure.1

    Officers who were in charge of the men, and who had the status in the Navy of commanding officers, had the usual qualifications of

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    leadership expected of all naval officers who wear the uniform of the United States Navy. Other than strong bodies and good eyes and ears, there were no special qualifications. But experience soon indicated that a certain amount of maturity and a certain ability to get along with masters of ships were important characteristics. Emphasis soon shifted away from procurement of the very young officer and especially the person who knew or thought he knew much about running merchant ships. The ideal Armed Guard officer was a tactful person who could look after the interests of his men and at the same time keep relations smooth between Navy complement and the master, officers, and crew of the merchant ship. He was a man who could get along with people and win their confidence. His relations with his gunners was close. He must be able to win their respect and admiration. He was a kind of doctor, chaplain, and commanding officer at the same time. The highly nervous individual did not last in the Armed Guard. Neither did the trouble maker nor the officer who had too exalted an idea of the scope of his duties and the privileges which the uniform of the United States Navy conferred upon him. The calm and not necessarily brilliant individual often made a much better officer than the erratic and highly intelligent man who cracked in a crisis.

    One has to visualize a city of 145,000 inhabitants to get some picture of the size of the Armed Guard program, for 144,970 officers

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    and men were assigned to the Armed Guard during World War II. Of this number 9,390 were officers and 135,580 were enlisted men. The Armed Guard reached its peak of 106,661 enlisted-men and 5,447 officers for a total of 112,108 men on 1 November 19442. It will be soon that many battle experienced men were transferred to the Fleet after a year or more of Armed Guard duty. The Armed Guard schools were, therefore, important in meeting the needs of the Fleet, as well as merchant ships. When war ended Armed Guards were aboard 4,290 merchant ships. They wore supplied to most of the 5,114 U. S. flag and U. S. owned foreign flag ships which received guns and to a few of the 1,122 foreign owned foreign flag ships which were armed.3

    The training of Armed Guards commenced about 15 April 1941. Those men were trained in accordance with correspondence between individual districts and groups of districts. Some were assigned to duty with the Fleet while others were ordered retained in district local defense forces.4 Nearly 200 reserve officers received elementary ordnance and gunnery instruction at the Naval Academy in the summer of 1941,5 and many of these officers served in the Armed Guard with special distinction.

    There was little or no appreciation of the magnitude of the program in the Navy Department prior to the decision to begin arming ships. On 25 September 1941 CNO informed BuNav that 200 officers and 1800 men should be trained by 15 January 1942. This planning was based

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    on the assignment of an officer, a petty officer, and seven seamen to each merchant ship. It was assumed that four seamen would be needed to man the machine guns, three seamen and a petty officer for the larger gun. Already the Navy was planning to use merchant seamen in handling ammunition and to furnish Armed Guards only for the key positions. Training was to include all stations and was to enable the Armed Guard to fire machine guns, and to handle larger weapons for anti-aircraft barrage and surface firing. Persons who had already received training for Armed Guard duty were to be incorporated with personnel to be trained under the above outlined program.6 On 3 November the estimated needs for arming about 275 ships in four months were increased to 280 officers and 2,300 men. The complement for a 3"/23 gun was set at two men.7

    On 17 November the Bureau of Navigation directed that personnel in the naval districts who had been trained for Armed Guard duty should be assigned to Little Creek, Virginia or San Diego, California for further training along with men receiving their first training for Armed Guard duties. These men were then to be transferred to the Armed Guard Centers at Nov York and Treasure Island for assignment to merchant ships.8 It appears that the first Armed Guard crew vas placed on the S. S. Dunboyne on 2 December 1941.9

    Since the British had well established training facilities available in their ports, CNO on 22 December 1941 requested the Maritime Commission to arrange for masters of ships touching British or Dominion

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    ports to have appropriate members of their crews take the training offered by D.E.M.S. schools. Armed Guard officers were likewise instructed to take advantage of the training, repair, and maintenance facilities offered by the British.10

    For a time the Navy held that Army personnel should man the guns on Army transports, but by 17 January 1942 a firm decision had been reached that in the future the Navy would supply Armed Guards to all United States ships which carried Navy guns.11 By August, 1942 the Navy was able to supply the men necessary to man the guns on all Army transports and vessels chartered to the Army and Army personnel were removed as gun crews.12

    The Secretary of the Navy on 28 January 1942 approved a request from CNO for authority to furnish Armed Guards to foreign flag ships owned or operated by United States citizens. This decision was reached after the Judge Advocate General had ruled that as Armed Guard crew could be furnished to a ship of a cobelligerent or friendly neutral with the consent of the allied or friendly government concerned.13

    On 12 February the estimated needs for Armed Guard officers to the end of June were set at 80 a month, an increase of 10 a month over the earlier estimate of 3 November 1941. Of this number about 60 were assigned to United States ships and 20 to foreign flag ships. Enlisted quotas were to be maintained at 800 a month, the capacity of the Little Creek and San Diego schools.14 But there was such a shortage

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    of officers that the decision was reached at a conference in the Navy Department on 16 February that petty officers could go in charge of Armed Guard crows. The decision was also reached that Armed Guards should not be supplied to foreign owned, foreign flag ships, a decision which was later reversed in certain special cases. Petty officers were authorized on 17 February to take charge of Armed Guard crews on Area 2 ships when officers were not available.15 The petty officer should be first or second class, the gun crow not over six men, the ship less than 10,000 tons, and the armament made up of only a broadside gun and .30 cal. machine guns. A training program for 50 petty officers a month was inaugurated at Little Creek and San Diego.16

    CNO recommended to BuNav on 21 February that a new rating of Armed Guard petty officer be established in order to provide the necessary incentive to attract men of high caliber into the Armed Guard service. It was thought that it would be necessary to supply officers for only about 25 per cent of the ships armed and that petty officers could take charge of Armed Guards on many of the estimated 130 ships a month which would require Armed Guards in the next two years. Behind this suggestion was the fact that qualifications for Armed Guard petty officers did not coincide with any of the established ratings and a desire to provide continuity of duty and equal opportunities for advancement in rating

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    to these men.17 Again on 19 May the same recommendation went: to BuPers (as BuNav was now named), but BuPers refused to create the new rating,18 one of the few examples in the history of the war where a Bureau flatly refused a request from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

    Various expedients were adopted to meet the personnel demands of the Armed Guard program in the early months of the war. One of the expedients was to reduce the Armed Guards on each vessel below complement in order that all vessels could have a few Armed Guards.19 Another expedient was to reduce firing practice and shorten training.20 Still another was to provide 30 per cent of the gun crew from untrained personnel and to omit assigning a petty officer on Area 1 ships, which were furnished an officer.21

    But these were all makeshift arrangements and were not intended to be permanent. More important wore the plans to enlarge the training program. On 5 April the training of enlisted personnel was increased to 2000 a month. The 800 men trained at Little Creek wore to go to the Armed Guard Center at Brooklyn. The 600 men trained at Chicago were to be assigned to the Center at New Orleans. The 600 men trained at San Diego were to report to the Center at Treasure Island. When the program began to catch up with requirements all regular navy personnel were replaced with reserves.. Partially trained crews were scheduled to go back

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    to the training centers to complete their training and vacancies were to be filled in all short handed Armed Guard crews.22 On 6 April directions were given to train 150 officers a month instead of 80.23

    The decision to adopt the 5"/38 as the standard stern gun which should, be installed on new construction ships as soon as it became available created new personnel demands and new training requirements. The 5"/38 is a complicated gun and requires careful maintenance by skilled personnel if it is to function effectively. On 14 May a conference of representatives of CominCh, BuNav. BuOrd, BuShips and Fleet Maintenance decided that maintenance personnel should be trained at the rate of 125 to150 a month at the Northern Pump Company, Minneapolis.24 Training of gun crews in operation of the 5"/51 gun also became necessary. These guns required five men, whereas the 5"/38 required an additional maintenance petty officer, for a total of six men.25 The Northern Pump Company was able to handle only 20 men at. a time and steps were taken in June to assign 80 men a month to a maintenance school at Little Creek and 40 to a similar school at Treasure Island. In January, 1944 a maintenance course was also authorized at the Armed Guard Center, New Orleans.26

    It was not always possible to supply even a petty officer in charge of the Armed Guard crew on Area 2 vessels. For example, the S.S. Helen sailed from Tampa in the middle of 1942 with the Armed Guard in charge of an apprentice seaman. Every effort was made to supply

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    at least a petty officer. Meanwhile, there was evidence that in most cases petty officers did not make satisfactory Armed Guard commanders.27

    In July BuPers announced that the training of officers would be temporarily increased to 200 a month. Op-23L thereupon reminded BuPers of the critical shortage of petty officers.28 Actually only 150 officers could be trained during the months of July and August because of a shortage of officers, but BuPers had plans to place 200 officers and 80 petty officers a month in training to take charge of Armed Guard crews. A slight increase in personnel requirements became necessary through an increase in the complement for six pounder guns from 2 to 4 men.29

    On 24 August BuPers was directed to increase the output of Armed Guard officers from 150 to 200 so that all Area 1 ships and all Area 2 ships with more than six men in the gun crew could have an officer aboard. This action was necessary because some Area 1 ships had been sent to sea with a petty officer in charge of the gun crew. Many Area 2 ships had neither an officer nor a petty officer aboard and in some cases an apprentice seaman had been in charge of ships armed with

    --19--

    a 4" and two .50 cal. machine guns. At the same time BuPers was directed to increase the output of petty officers.30

    On 3 September CominCh placed training of Armed Guards at anti-aircraft training centers in first priority, along with new construction ships and ships under regular navy yard overhaul.31 CominCh assigned primary interest in the training of Armed Guards to VCNO (Op-23L) on 11 September.32

    Already BuPers had taken steps on August 10 to have officers for Armed Guard duty sent to indoctrination schools at Boston and San Francisco at the rate of 260 a month, 200 to the former and 60 to the latter. It was thus arranged that the monthly output of Armed Guard officers would reach 230 by early October. About 90 would be trained at Little Creek, a similar number at Chicago and 50 at San Diego. Since it was no longer possible to assign petty officers to Armed Guard duty after about 1 June because of the demands from the Fleet, commanding officers of the Armed Guard Centers were to advance men to the rating of seaman first class, coxswain, and gunner's mate third class without formal examination, and without regard to complement. The Centers were directed on 5 September to comply with an earlier BuPers directive of 29 May for speedy advancement of men to petty officer ratings. As finally arranged, all seamen second class were advanced to seamen first class when they finished training and were assigned to an Armed Guard crew. Petty officers third class, including signalmen and radiomen on merchant ships, were rated without examination on the recommendation of the Armed Guard

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    officer. Advancement beyond third class was by examination, but there were normally no first class or chief petty officers in the Armed Guard. They were transferred to other duty upon qualifying for a rate higher than second class.33

    By December, 1942 the complement for merchant vessels had been definitely standardized. There was to be an officer for all vessels carrying six or more Armed Guards. Each 5"/38 gun would have six men, other 5" guns would have five men. Four men were assigned for each 4"/50 and each 3" gun, also for six pounders. Each 20 mm gun was to have one man plus an additional man until the total Armed Guard complement of 24 had been reached. But two men were assigned to each 20 mm gun on troop transports. In addition the merchant crew was to furnish ammunition handlers, plus five men for each 5" gun, three men for the 4"/50 and 3"/50, two men for 3"/23 and 6 pounders, two men for each 20 mm gun and one man for each .50 cal. Gun. With the complement thus standardized it was possible to make accurate and long range forecasts of personnel requirements.34

    At a conference at the Navy Department on 20 November between representatives of the Navy and the War Shipping Administration a decision was reached to make a trial substitution of 8 class M-I naval reserve ordinary seamen graduates from the Maritime Service Training Stations for 6 Navy gunners on 24 Liberty ships for the purpose of augmenting the 20 mm gun crews. From 12 to 18 Area 1-A ships at New York and 6 ships at San Francisco were to be used in the experiment.

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    Ships bound for North Russia should not be selected, but rather ships bound on shorter voyages in Area 1-A waters. The merchant cadets were to be available for gun lookout watches and for gunnery instruction when requested by the Armed Guard officer. When not employed in the defense of the ship, they were to be available for ship's work. Armed Guard officers wore to report on the efficiency of this trial arrangement. Behind this move was an attempt to alleviate crowded conditions in Armed Guard crew quarters. But the plan was never put into effect because of the objections of the seaman's union.35

    In spite of the difficulties experienced in the first year of war because of the lack of earlier farsighted planning concerning personnel, the record is an impressive one. Over 1,900 officers and 24,000 men had been trained for Armed Guard duty. In addition Mobile Units 1 and 2 in the New York area had given instruction to 9,900 merchant seamen.36

    Personnel requirements for 1943 were estimated on 13 January 1943 at 57,824 men and 2,402 officers of which 32,724 men and 1,164 officers were needed by 30 June and the remainder to the close of the year. This meant training 5,450 men a month for the first half of 1943 and 4,200 a month for the second half.37 It meant a substantial increase in training of enlisted personnel, for only 750 a week were entering the Armed Guard Schools at Little Creek, San Diego, and Gulfport (substituted for Chicago because of weather conditions on the Great Lakes).38

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    The estimate of ships to be built in 1943 numbered 1,781.39 Of some 33,781 men and 2,641 officers in the Armed Guard by the middle of February, more than 3,500 men had been assigned with no training. Op-23L advised BuPers by telephone on 10 March 1943 to speed up input to schools in view of the fact that an eventual shortage was developing.40

    With demands of the Fleet for officers and men still mounting, it is not surprising that large numbers of Armed Guards were shifted over to combat ships. Their training in gunnery and experience in combat fitted them well for this new duty. In January, 1943 BuPers developed plans to transfer some 461-D-V(G) officers to combatant ships (D-E's) in the next few months. BuPers also considered transfer to other service after one year of Armed Guard duty. This would mean a turnover of about 1,800 officers during 1943 and that many ships would be sent to sea with an inexperienced officer in charge. Op-23L proposed that transfers be limited to DE gunnery officers or instructors at Armed Guard Schools and centers. The assistant Chief of Naval Operations, however, did not wish to raise any objections to the transfers at that time.41 BuPers directed all ships and stations on 12 March to discontinue the practice of removing Armed Guard from vessels and assigning them other duty.42 On 3 April BuPers directed that officers with the D-V(S) classification could be transferred to combatant ships

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    after a year of duty afloat if they requested such transfer. Preference should be given to those who had arduous duty and those who had shown initiative and a desire to improve their professional qualifications.43 In the same month BuPers provided that such officers who were 35 years old or older could be ordered to advance bases or to shore activities for duties in connection with gunnery. They could, however, continue Armed Guard duties if they preferred and so notified BuPers.44

    Numerous incidents and cases of misconduct on the part of Armed Guards on tank ships in Area 2,45 led to the directive of 20 February that all Area 2 ships equipped with either a 3", 4", or 5" gun should have an officer on his first assignment after school. This duty would give the new officer valuable experience for the more exacting assignments on Area 1-A ships later. This same directive provided that troop transports having two or more 3"/50 guns could have two Armed Guard officers.46

    With the Navy personnel situation improving and practices and procedures in the Armed Guard slowly but surely being standardized, a move came from the president of the National Maritime Union of America, Mr. Joseph Curran, in February 1943, to reduce Armed Guards on merchant ships. There should be one officer on each ship and a gunnerÃs mate second class for each gun. He proposed that merchant seamen be trained in gunnery and awarded certificates of efficiency. The Armed Guard should be

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    reduced sufficiently to allow for the addition of 9 merchant seamen in training to each ship. These men were to be capable of standing gun watches and also of performing duties as merchant seamen.47 The memory of the earlier failure of plans to reduce Naval Armed Guards by six on certain experimental ships because of opposition from the union was fresh in everybodyÃs mind when a conference between representatives of the Navy and the War Shipping Administration was held on April 29. The wise decision was reached that Armed Guards on merchant ships sailing in Area 1-A could not be reduced below 24. Even then from 29 to 32 merchant seamen would be needed to complete the gun crews and to pass ammunition. The disinclination of merchant seamen to assist in manning the guns and their tendency to abandon ship without orders were considerations which weighed strongly against the proposal of the National Maritime Union. The most logical solution of the need to place men on ships for training was to place these men on ships on the Great Lakes and in Area 2. While shipboard training of merchant seamen in gunnery was successful on about 75 per cent of the ships, little was accomplished on land, not even after the establishment of the Armed Guard Gunnery School at New York.48

    The decision to install Mark 29 mines on certain merchant ships created an additional training problem, for the Armed Guard officer and 25 percent of his men had to be trained in streaming, recovery,

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    and maintenance of the gear. Navy personnel at first received training on the American Mariner at New York and later were sent to the Naval Mine Warfare School at Yorktown. On 25 September 1943 VCNO requested BuPers to stop the transfer to other duty of men who had been so trained. BuPers countered with the suggestion that such officers have six months of service afloat with the Armed Guard after completing their training ay Yorktown before transfer could be effected. The position of the Bureau was that it was more important to supply DEÃs with experienced personnel than to have experienced men on the escorted ships.49

    Training did not meet demands of the Armed Guard service prior to 1 May 1943, for between 1 December 1942 and 1 May 1943, 4,652 untrained personnel were made available to the centers for Armed Guard duty. This meant that almost 10 per cent of the enlisted gunners were not adequately trained by the middle of 1943.50

    The Armed Guard, because of its military discipline, achieved excellence in fire fighting aboard merchant ships, although this was not one of its responsibilities. Op-23L opened the question of training Armed Guard at Navy Fire Fighting schools and CominCh suggested in June, 1943 that fire fighting be included in the curriculum of the Armed Guard schools. Op-23L in turn suggested that training for one or two days be arranged while men were at the Centers.51 On 28 June

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    BuPers was requested to arrange for the Armed Guard officers and 10 per cent of each Armed Guard crew to have fire fighting training while at the Centers.52 In the Seattle area six Armed Guard officers a week were assigned to the Fire Fighting School at Manchester, Washington.53

    As we assumed the offensive in every theater of operations the demands for Armed Guard officers on troop ships greatly increased. By 11 August 1943 two officers had been supplied to 96 ships armed to carry troops and demands for the balance of 1943 and the year 1944 were expected to reach 1,448 officers for 690 troop ships.54

    But the pressure of the demands for personnel was greatly relaxed by the decision in August to transfer some 213 new construction merchant ships to the British. This meant that the personnel requirements for the remainder of 1943 could be reduced by 22 officers and 528 enlisted men a month. For the period of January through May, 1944 requirements were reduced by 21 officers and 504 men a month.55 If there were errors in planning for enough Armed Guards prior to the outbreak of hostilities there was a similar error in 1943 on the part of BuPers in item 80 of the Operating Force Plan which estimated Armed Guard requirements by 30 June 1945 at 167,307. Op-23L, whose estimates of the requirements were as accurate as possible in a situation which had many intangibles, was not advised of this projected estimate prior to its inclusion. It was far too high. Op-23L advised the Bureau that the shipbuilding

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    program of the Maritime Commission for 1945 had not been determined and that new construction figures for the last half of 1944 might be used for guidance in determining requirements for the first half of 1945.56 But the BuPers estimate was far in excess of these requirements. In similar fashion, the Operating Force Plan for the fiscal year 1944 estimated requirements at 127,464 and was not referred to Op-23L for Checking.57 Actually there were only 99,377 Armed Guards and communications personnel on merchant ships on 30 June 1944,58 and only 95,986 on merchant ships on 30 June 1945.59

    It must be said that planning for Armed Guard requirements was a complicated matter because of constant shifts in other plans which in turn affected Armed Guard needs. The transfer of 213 ships to Britain is but one example of how estimated needs could become incorrect by several thousand overnight. Of more serious influence on long range plans were the rather sudden decisions by the Navy to take over merchant ships and convert them to naval vessels and the reduction in output of merchant ships by converting building yards to construction of Navy ships. A good example of this was the large scale production of LSTÃs at the expense of merchant ship construction. Changes in operating areas likewise had some effect on personnel requirements, but these came largely after the end of the war with

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    Germany. The truth of the matter was that the course of the war was running too rapidly to enable anything like completely accurate estimates of personnel requirements to be made 18 months or more in advance.

    Whenever Armed Guards were trained in excess of requirements they could be assigned to the Fleet, where they were most welcome. In August, 1943 BuPers had plans to transfer from 90 to 115 officers a month to DEÃs. This was possible because officers were being trained at the rate of 260 a month and the requirements for new construction were only about 145 per month. Op-23L raised no objection to this procedure but requested that men who had been under attack be kept in the Armed Guard for at least two months in order to provide experienced officers for troop transports and other important ships.60

    We have seen that BuPers consistently opposed the creation of a new rate which would correspond to the duties performed by Armed Guards. Instead a flexible policy of promotions to petty officer rating had been adopted. This system was based on the recommendation of the Armed Guard commanding officer. The primary consideration was the ability of a man to perform the duties of a petty officer in the Armed Guard. When the Commandant of the Navy Yard at Washington informed BuPers that many Armed Guard gunners were not qualified for their third class rating, BuPers took steps to prevent any promotions

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    at the New York and New Orleans Centers until the men were in every way qualified and had completed the training course prescribed. Op-23L informed BuPers by telephone that this directive was impossible of execution. It would tie up the whole supply of gunnerÃs mates third class.61 Nevertheless there was greater emphasis on the formal examination and the successful completion of the prescribed course.

    It would appear that the principle need of the Armed Guard service at this time was not for more highly qualified personnel, but rather for officers who were mature enough to avoid differences and bickering with merchant personnel. The situation was indeed a difficult one, for it was hard for the average enlisted man to understand why his pay was only one fourth or one fifth that of the merchant seamen when he was performing comparable service under discipline with identical risk. Young enlisted men were naturally influenced by the lack of discipline among merchant seamen. But serious trouble between merchant seamen and naval personnel was generally avoided if there was a mature Armed Guard officer aboard.62

    By the end of October, 1943 officers were being trained at the rate of 320 a month; enlisted men at 5,005 a month, for a total of 5, 325 men a month.63 Op-23L estimated that total needs from 10 November 1943 through December 1944 would reach 136,022. This estimate included an allowance of 15 per cent for contingencies such as training, travel, leave, transfer to other duty, and awaiting assignment.64 Three days

    --30--

    later, on 13 November, this estimate was reduced to 124,20765 men and on 6 December to 108,007.66 These reductions were made possible in part by the conversion of merchant ships to Navy amphibious or auxiliary vessels and in part by the reduction in merchant ship construction in order to produce more amphibious vessels.67

    The first all around surplus of Armed Guards developed toward the end of September, 1943 and conditions at the Armed Guard Center at New York became so crowded in November that it became necessary to transfer several hundred men to duty in the Navy. Op-23L wanted some 720 men who had never received Armed Guard training sent to Shelton, but this was none by BuPers. The situation indicated that there should be a reduction in the output of the Armed Guard schools as soon as possible.68 On 8 December a tentative decision was reached to reduce output of officers to 290 per month and to reduce the output of men to 1,000 a week.69 It actually became necessary to cut input of enlisted men to 700 a week for about a month at the beginning of 1944 in order to provide men for the amphibious forces, a move which threatened a shortage of Armed Guards. But temporary shortages were met by stopping all leave and discontinuing all transfers until such time as sufficient men were available.70 It was also possible to assign classes from the Armed Guard Schools to the Center whose immediate personnel needs were greatest.

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    To the end of 1943, 96,232 men and 5,845 officers had been detailed to Armed Guard duty, or a total of 102,077. Of this number 13,098 had been transferred to other duty leaving the net Armed Guard personnel at 4,103 officers and 84,877 men, for a total of 88,980.71

    The requirements for officers and gunners for the first half of 1945 were estimated on 22 January 1944 to be 459 officers and 11,016 men and BuPers was requested to modify its estimate in the Operating Force Plan accordingly. Op-23LÃs estimate did not include a 15 per cent allowance for contingencies, nor did it include requirements for communications personnel.72 Whereas the total estimate of Op-23L was for 119,482 officers and men by the middle of 1945, the BuPers estimate for the Operating Force Plan was for 138,987 enlisted men alone, including 18,335 radiomen and signalmen. The BuPers estimate was that 17,462 gunners would be needed in the first half of 1945.73

    At a conference between Op-23L and BuPers representatives on 21 January 1944, Op-23L recommended that there be no reduction the crews for Area 1-A ships. The BuPers suggestion that the Armed Guard crew on Area 2 ships be reduced to an officer and three men was rejected on the ground that submarines were still operating in the Gulf, Central American, and Caribbean areas. The record showed that 4.7 vessels a month had been attacked during 1943 in Area 2 and that eight vessels sailing independently had been sunk during November and December. Op-23L also advocated the continuation of around the clock

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    radio watches on all troop transports and merchant ships.74 Nevertheless, on 2 February 1944 BuPers recommended to CominCh that gun crews on all Area 2 ships be reduced from an officer and nine men to an officer and three men. BuPers also recommended that the requirements for three radiomen on merchant ships be reviewed.75 Op-23 informed VCNO that the BuPers proposal to reduce the Armed Guard would render 570 ships impotent to defend themselves. With any lower number the battery might as well be removed.76 The BuPers recommendation was not approved.

    The decision to make 2,000 spaces at Shelton available for amphibious personnel by 1 March77 caused considerable readjustment in the Armed Guard training program and placed a burden on the school at Gulfport far too heavy for its facilities. On 22 February the decision was made to assign 105 officers to Shelton, 125 to Gulfport, and 60 to San Diego for training.78 The original intention was to continue to train 700 enlisted men a week, 240 at Shelton, 290 at Gulfport, and 170 at San Diego.79 But the BuPers decision on 28 March to increase enlisted training to 900 a week finally caused Gulfport to receive 460 men a week, while Shelton received 240 and San Diego received 200.80 While every effort was made to make the curriculum at Gulfport and

    --33--

    San Diego the same as at Shelton,81 little could be done to improve the facilities at Gulfport on such short notice. One expedient was to assign 200 men to the center at Treasure Island to relieve the shortage which was anticipated by 10 April.82 An officer from Shelton reported that Gulfport could handle only 240 men a week instead of 460. It appears that 330 men were placed in a barracks built to quarter 220. Men had fainted in classes because of the heat and the overcrowded conditions.83 The logical solution was to make 500 of the spaces available at Shelton available to Armed Guards84 or for BuPers to stop transferring Armed Guards to other duty.85

    Not until August, 1944 were 500 spaces released at Shelton for Armed Guard training.86 This made it possible to increase the enlisted training at Shelton to 365 a week and to reduce the load at Gulfport to 335 a week.87 Meanwhile, BuPers had been advised in July that maintenance men for the 5"/38 guns should be trained at the rate of 143 a month; 51 at Shelton, 60 at the center at Treasure Island, and 32 at the center at New Orleans.88 BuPers

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    was likewise requested to direct the centers not to transfer maintenance men out of the Armed Guard for a period of six months after they received their maintenance training.89

    On April 29, 1944 BuPers has established a policy that Armed Guard personnel should be returned to the United States for rotation leave and reassignment after a period of 12 months of pool or shuttle duty in distant areas.90 With transfers being carried out and training temporarily modified by the location of the amphibious personnel at Shelton constant adjustments were necessary in order that all ships be properly manned. At the end of May BuPers was advised to assign six petty officers to each 24 man crew for a time until a shortage of seamen at the centers was remedied.91 This would have the advantage of keeping the trained petty officers in the Armed Guard services. On 5 June BuPers made 400 seamen available for training at Treasure Island in exchange for 400 petty officers.92

    Beginning 1 September 1944 the training of officers was reduced from 290 a month to 215 a month.93 In November training of enlisted men was reduced from 3600 to 2800 a month after CominCh had directed that full training be restored at Shelton and that the present class at Gulfport be the last, and after the revision in Armed Guard Areas as of 15 November. This reduction of 800 men plus an estimated recovery

    --35--

    of 1200 men a month made possible a saving of about 2000 men a month. It did not meet BuPers expectations that 30,000 men would be recovered in the next seven months.94

    BuPers informed CominCh on 22 November that action would be taken to discontinue Armed Guard enlisted training about 31 December, to meet Armed Guard requirements for the first half of 1945 from personnel already in the Armed Guard, and to meet Armed Guard requirements after that date by detailing general service personnel. This unusual action was taken, according to BuPers, in the absence of information requested by a BuPers letter of 15 September. In this earlier letter BuPers had requested that CNO furnish information on the armament of each vessel in operation by hull number, the armament for each merchant vessel to be constructed by hull number, the area category planned for each merchant vessel to be constructed by hull number, and monthly changes in merchant vessels in commission or planned by hull number as to area assignments, sinkings, transfers, and conversions affecting numbers of personnel required for the Armed Guard. Since it was so obviously impossible to meet such a request and since a representative of BuPers had been so informed even before the letter was written, no formal reply had been sent to BuPers. The BuPers request would have required a large clerical force, much duplication of effort, and would have caused months of work in Op-23L. It was not necessary for BuPers to have the information requested. That Bureau was given

    --36--

    all of the information it needed in the remarkably accurate estimates of personnel requirements which were prepared in Op-23L. Much of the information could not be supplied in view of the fact that hull numbers did not appear in the records of over 60 per cent of the merchant ships in operation. CNO formally disapproved the request on 27 November.95 CominCh approved the BuPers personnel plan of 22 November except that the school at Shelton was to be kept in operation to train officers, to train 5"/38 maintenance personnel, to provide refresher training for personnel in the Armed Guard, and to house Armed Guards from the time they were removed from ships by planned reductions and the time they were required for new construction. The schools at San Diego and Gulfport were to be closed about 31 December.96 It is interesting to note that in October a suggestion had come from the Naval Inspector GeneralÃs Office that facilities at Shelton be moved to Gulfport and San Diego and that Shelton be made available for aviators in the Norfolk area. Op-23L opposed such a suggestion on the ground that Shelton was the best of the three schools and proposed that Gulfport be made available for the aviators and Shelton restored fully to the Armed Guard.97

    In the last two years of the war, with the operational picture constantly changing, Op-32L made constant revisions of estimates for personnel, based on the latest information from the Maritime Commission on ship construction and the operational use of merchant ships. It is

    --37--

    hardly worthwhile to give these figures here, but some of the important estimates are worth mentioning. On 21 July 1944 the requirements to the middle of 1945 were estimated at 5291 officers and 114,862 men, an estimate which was forwarded to BuPers on August 1. This estimate did not include radiomen or signalmen.98 By 24 October the number of ships to be constructed in the first half of 1945 had been revised downward and the personnel requirements had been modified accordingly. Personnel requirements for the first half of 1945 were placed at 740 officers and 16,443 gunners.99 By 8 December the estimated requirements for the Armed Guard to the middle of 1945 were placed at 7,497 officers and 90,795 men.100 While the new construction ships would require only 123 officers a month, directions were given that officers were to be trained at the rate of 180 a month so that they would be available for replacement, but this figure was quickly reduced to 170 by BuPers. It was also directed that on 15 December that transfer of gunners to other services be suspended.101 The enlargement of Area 2 in February, 1945 made it possible to reduce personnel estimates to the middle of 1945 to 4,715 officers and 80,742 men. Estimates to 30 June 1946 were now placed at 5,143 officers and 90,273 men.102 BuPers decided on March 1 to cease the input of 100 seamen

    --38--

    into centers each week and to reduce Armed Guard personnel to 80,742 as soon as possible. On 24 February 1945 BuPers policy was to transfer chief boatswainÃs mates and chief gunnerÃs mates as they became chiefs and to transfer first class petty officers after nine months in the Armed Guard.103

    Since only 76 officers a month were to be made available for training at Shelton to the end of 1945, it was necessary to freeze officers in the Armed Guard in March.104 CNO in May approved the assignment of 200 recruits a week to the Armed Guard Center at Treasure Island for four weeks to provide gun crews for new construction on the West Coast, but BuPers transferred trained men from New York instead.105

    Although Op-23L estimated that about 690 officers and 17,120 men would no longer be needed in the Armed Guard three months after V-E day,106 it was difficult, if not impossible, to give an accurate estimate of the monthly rate of recovery because of the lack of firm assignment of ships to areas. Port Directors reduced the crews whenever ships were taken out of the dangerous areas and BuPers transferred these men as they became available.107 BuPers was advised that

    --39--

    gunnerÃs mates should be 20 per cent of the total enlisted personnel exclusive of signalmen and radiomen.108 Events had moved so rapidly by June, 1945 that the Armed Guard requirements to the end of the year were now estimated at 3,676 officers and 50,061 men.109 In July BuPers established a ceiling of 4,000 officers for Armed Guard purposes. This figure included gunnery and communications liaison officers.110 On the same date, Op-23L reduced its estimated requirements to the end of the year to 48,500 gunners.111 On 25 August 1945 BuPers was instructed to use a straight line reduction spread over a period of six months for estimating the requirements for the Armed Guard to the end of the program. On 1 September 1945, BuPers adopted a program to reduce the Armed Guard by 11, 106 personnel a month for six months. This would have meant the complete demobilization of the Armed Guard by 1 March 1946.112 At the end of October arrangements were made for each center to retain at least 50 gunnerÃs mates to act as reliefs and replacements for maintenance gunnerÃs mates on ships pending their ultimate disarming.113 Actually it became possible to reduce the Armed Guard more rapidly than had been anticipated, thus making additional men available for general detail and for ultimate discharge. By 1 January 1946 the actual reduction of the Armed Guard had exceeded the estimated reduction by 9,170 men.114 Nevertheless, the Armed Guard was not completely

    --40--

    demobilized by March as had been planned. Strikes on the west coast delayed disarmament. It was often difficult to get the owners of ships to make them available for disarmament. Until such time as the guns were removed, it was necessary to keep two maintenance men on board to care for about $170,000 worth of Navy equipment. Late in April, 1946 about 1300 enlisted men remained in the Armed Guard. Practically all the officers had been transferred or separated from the service by this time.115

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    Communication Personnel

    The primary responsibility of the Armed Guard Commanding Officer was for the defense of the ship from enemy attack, but when a communication liaison officer was not supplied he was given the additional duty to assist the master in handling wartime communications of the ship. This assignment was a recognition of the fact that successful handling of vital communications could be as important in the defense of the ship as manning guns. The arrangement was never an ideal one, for the responsibilities of the Armed Guard Commanding Officer were large enough in defending the ship from enemy attack, without encumbering him with communication duties. Nevertheless, it was a working arrangement that brought results.

    In discussing the involvement of the Navy in merchant ship communications, a responsibility which by law rested with the master of the ship, the following facts should be remembered. There were not enough commercial radio operators available to conduct the necessary radio watches under wartime conditions on an expanding merchant marine. The merchant crews were not trained and organized to handle the vast amount of visual communications involved in voyages in convoy. Receiving or sending signals in wartime cannot be delayed until claims for overtime are approved. Since the escorts were naval vessels, it was desirable to have naval signalmen on merchant ships to conduct visual communications. For a time, at least, the Navy suspected

    --42--

    the loyalty of many commercial operators and desired to replace them almost entirely with naval personnel. For a large part of the war the demand of the Fleet for commissioned communications officers was so great that a communication liaison officer could not be assigned to each merchant ship, but only to the most important ships.

    It could also be pointed out that communication personnel and duties came generally under the cognizance of the Communications Division in Naval Operations and not under the Arming Merchant Ships Section, which exercised control over all other matters connected with the Armed Guard. Where there was consultation between the two divisions substantial agreement was reached on most matters, but at times the communications Division did not consult Op-23L before issuing directives. The first directive from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning Communications Liaison Groups on United States flag merchant ships and Army transports, dated January 8, 1942, provided that a commissioned communication officer should be furnished to all Army and Navy transports under all conditions of charter. Normally one radioman and two signalmen should be furnished to United States flag merchant vessels in convoy. On Navy owned or bareboat chartered vessels operated by civilian crews and on Navy indefinite time chartered vessels there should be a special Communication Liaison Group consisting generally of two radiomen and two signalmen. But these numbers could be increased to three on vessels carrying more than 200 troops. Where possible

    --43--

    the services of commercial radio operators should be dispensed with, unless they were in the Naval Reserve or Army Signal Corps, but it might be necessary to keep operators of unquestioned loyalty on board because of the shortage of Navy radiomen. In any event, there might be one Navy radiomen on board all transports, all indefinite time chartered vessels, and all Navy owned or bareboat chartered vessels operated by civilian crews.116

    This directive was quickly changed on January 24 to provide for three signalmen in addition to a Communication Officer on all Army and Navy transports. It was also provided that commercial radio operators were not to be displaced except when unfit to serve by reason of evidence of subversive activities. Port Directors were to allocate radiomen and signalmen to meet conditions in each specific case where such personnel were not available in sufficient numbers. Like the earlier directive, this letter stated that accommodations for communication personnel should be provided by using commercial radio operatorsÌ quarters as far as possible and by providing suitable spaces near the radio room and bridge.117

    The early directives assigned no communications duties to Armed Guard officers, but the Navy signalmen and radiomen would naturally be under his jurisdiction when he was the only naval officer on board.

    --44--

    They would, however, be responsible to the master for communications. Because of the shortage of officer personnel, CominCh recommended in May, 1942 that Armed Guard officers should be given a short course in communications and that they should be given additional duty as Communications Liaison Officers. At the same time there should be a long range procurement plan which would provide eventually for detailing a separate liaison officer to merchantmen.118 By July 1 definite instructions had been given to Armed Guard officers to assume communication liaison duties when no commissioned communication officer was on board.119

    The Communications Division began to take over the responsibilities with regard to communications on merchant ships in the first year of war and by early 1943 had complete cognizance over radiomen and signalmen on merchant ships,120 although these men were assigned to the Armed Guard Centers in the same way as gunners. In the coming months the Communications Division in Naval Operations issued several complicated directives concerning the assignment of communication personnel which the Port Directors had difficulty in interpreting. Perhaps the principal difficulty lay in the fact that categories were established in part on the basis of whether ships were to operate in convoy or independently. On many occasions ships thus supplied with communication

    --45--

    personnel for independent routing would find themselves proceeding for at least part of their voyage in convoy, with the resulting need for increased personnel. The principal directives as regards communication personnel were issued on 30 March, 5 July, 29 October 1943 and on 28 February and 6 May 1944. These directives will be described in considerable detail in the following paragraphs since they illustrate some of the problems the Port Directors faced in making certain that the proper personnel was assigned to merchant ships.

    The directive of 30 March established five definite categories of ships of over 1000 gross tons and a complement for each category. Navy radiomen and signalmen were to be assigned as necessary to complete the established complements, but Army Signal Corps personnel and loyal commercial operators were not to be replaced. (1) Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic service which maintained radio guard as prescribed under the BAMS system and also maintained radio guard on naval schedules by special arrangement were to be supplied with one commissioned communication liaison officer, nine radio operators, and three signalmen. At least six of the radio operators must be naval personnel. (2) Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic service, other than other operating in the Pacific, were to be supplied with three radio operators. (3) Vessels proceeding in North Atlantic convoys were to have three radio operators and two signalmen. (4) Other independently routed vessels should have three radio operators. (5) Other vessels in convoy should have three

    --46--

    radio operators and two signalmen. When no commissioned communication liaison officer was assigned, the communication personnel should be under the orders of the Armed Guard Commander as provided in General Instructions for Communications Officers of Naval Armed Guards. Port Directors were to assign available communication personnel with priority in the order listed above.121

    The directive described above was canceled by a new directive, dated 5 July, which established a new complement to be completed as necessary by the assignment of naval personnel. (1) United States Navy Convoy Commodores and Vice Commodores should have a communication staff consisting of one communication liaison officer, two signalmen, and one radioman, with additional personnel assigned for specific trips as necessary to bring the complement on the flag ship up to four signalmen and three radiomen. (2) Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic service which maintained the radio guard prescribed in the BAMS system and also maintained guard on naval schedules by special arrangement were to have a commissioned communication liaison officer, nine radio operators, and three signalmen. (3) Vessels carrying over 2,000 troops and proceeding independently, other than those in category two should have a liaison officer, three radio operators, and one signalman. (4) Vessels carrying over 250 troops and proceeding in convoy should have a liaison officer, three radio operators, and three signalmen. (5) Vessels proceeding in

    --47--

    Atlantic trans-oceanic convoy other than those carrying over 250 troops should have three radio operators and two signalmen. (6) Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic service other than those guarding naval schedules or carrying more than 2,000 troops should have three radio operators. This complement was increased on 15 October to provide for one signalman on the suggestion of Op-23L. (7) Vessels proceeding in trans-oceanic convoys other than in the Atlantic and not carrying over 250 troops should have three radiomen and two signalmen. (8) Independently routed coastwise vessels traveling outside of inland waterways for more than 24 hours should have three radio operators (9) Vessels in coastal convoys traveling outside of inland waterways for more than 24 hours other than those carrying more than 250 troops should have three radio operators and two signalmen. (10) Vessels routed independently or in convoy which were outside the inland waterways for less than 24 hours should have one radio operator. Port Directors should supply personnel to ships with priority in the order listed above. Port Directors or Routing Officers were empowered to assign one signalman to foreign ships when it was deemed necessary. Additional communication personnel could be assigned to specific ships with the approval or by the direction of the VCNO. Every United States vessel of over 1,000 gross tons and equipped with radio must have at least one radio operator. When a commercial operator was not on board, a Navy radioman should be placed on board regardless of the precedence established above for the assignment of scarce

    --48--

    communication personnel.122 It would be interesting to know how many grey hairs were added to the heads of Port Directors who attempted to execute this directive.

    A directive of 29 October 1943 made certain changes in communication complement. United States Commodores and Vice Commodores should have one liaison officer, one radioman, and four signalmen, but additional radiomen should be assigned as necessary to bring the complement of the flag ship up to four. A new category was added. Vessels carrying between 250 and 2,000 troops and proceeding independently, but not guarding Navy schedules, should have three radiomen and one signalman.123

    The shortage of Navy radiomen was so serious by early 1944 that the War Shipping Administration agreed to replace naval operators with commercial operators as rapidly as possible. The War Shipping Administration agreed to assign three commercial operators to ships with a declared speed of 13.5 knots or over, to vessels operating in trans-Atlantic service, including vessels sailing for Iceland, the Azores, and Ascension Island, but excluding Greenland, and to vessels employed in trans-Pacific service which proceeded in the area west of 160É W. and south of 42É N. Priority in assigning commercial operators should go to vessels operating in the Atlantic. United States merchant vessels were to include Panamanian and Honduran flag shipping

    --49--

    owned, controlled or operated by the United States or citizens thereof and Army transports were considered as merchant vessels for communications purposes. After 6 March 1944, the effective date of this directive, Navy radiomen were to be removed from merchant vessels, except for transports carrying 250 or more troops, when the ships arrived in continental United States ports. Navy radiomen would still be assigned to United States managed foreign ships other than Panamanian and Honduran in order that these ships would have three radiomen if they were of over 13.5 knots speed, or operating in trans-Atlantic service or in the western Pacific. Port Directors or Routing Officers still had the authority to assign one signalman to foreign vessels when this was deemed necessary. It was now possible to establish a communication liaison complement distinct from the total communication complement for merchant ships. (1) United States convoy Commodores were still to receive one liaison officer, one Navy radioman, and four signalmen. (2) The figure for independently routed trans-oceanic ships guarding both BAMS and Navy schedules was one liaison officer, six radiomen, and three signalmen, but a total of nine radiomen must be carried on these ships. (3) Vessels carrying over 2,000 troops and sailing independently should have a liaison officer, a signalman, and should be supplied with radiomen as necessary to bring the total to three operators. (4) Vessels carrying over 250 troops but proceeding in convoy should have a liaison officer,

    --50--

    three signalmen, and Navy radiomen as necessary to bring the total to three. (5) Independently routed vessels in trans-oceanic service other than those carrying over 2,000 troops or those guarding Navy schedules should have a signalman and Navy radiomen as necessary to bring the total of radio operators to three. (6) Vessels proceeding in convoy but not carrying over 250 troops were allowed two signalmen.124

    This directive was in turn cancelled and superseded by that of 6 May 1944. By this time as agreement had been reached between the War Department, the Navy Department, and the War Shipping Administration whereby at least three radio operators would be assigned not only to ships of over 13.5 knots declared speed, ships in the trans-Atlantic service, and ships operating in the western Pacific, but also to all vessels designed to transport 250 or more troops. The Army and the Navy would furnish all the radiomen to ships designed to carry over 250 troops and no commercial operators were to be assigned to ships in this category. Army and Navy personnel should not be assigned to the same vessel at the same time. Qualified commercial operators were to be assigned to cargo vessels chartered or space allocated to the War Department, and Navy Department, or to commercial interests. Vessels manned or operated by the War Department were to have Army radio technicians. It was intended that Navy radiomen would ultimately be replaced entirely on cargo vessels by commercial operators. But it was recognized that Navy radiomen would still be required for some

    --51--

    cargo vessels until such time as commercial operators became available. In no case should a vessel of over 13.5 knots declared speed sail with less than three operators. Vessels operating in the western Pacific and in trans-Atlantic service should never have less than two operators aboard. Navy radiomen would also be assigned as necessary to United States managed foreign flag ships to bring the total operators up to three if the ships were in the categories outlined at the beginning of this paragraph. Port Directors and Routing Officers still had the authority to place a signalman on board foreign vessels when necessary. Additional communication personnel could be assigned with the approval or by the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

    The complement for Navy communications personnel as established by this directive was as follows: (1) United States Convoy Commodores and Vice Commodores still received one liaison officer, one radioman, and four signalmen, but they could be assigned additional radiomen to bring the complement aboard ship to four. (2) Independently routed ships guarding both the BAMS system and Navy schedules would have a total of one liaison officer, nine radiomen, and three signalmen. (3) Vessels carrying over 2,000 troops and proceeding independently, but not guarding Navy schedules should have one liaison officer, three radiomen or Army technicians, and one signalman. (4) Vessels carrying over 250 troops and proceeding in convoy should have one liaison officer, three radiomen or Army technicians, and three signalmen. (5) Other independently

    --52--

    routed vessels should have one signalman and would only be supplied with radiomen on request from the local War Shipping Administration representatives. (6) Other vessels proceeding in convoy should have two signalmen, but should be supplied with radiomen on request from the local War Shipping Administration representatives. Ships carrying Navy radiomen should have one chief radioman or radioman first class.125

    From the outbreak of war to 11 September 1945 the Navy supplied 803 communication liaison officers to merchant ships and transports. It furnished 15,769 radiomen and signalmen in the same period.126

    The most troublesome question was the role of the Armed Guard officer in communications. The Bureau of Naval Personnel directed that all Armed Guard officers should receive training in communications, beginning on or before 1 September 1943.127 But on 20 December the Arming Merchant Ships Section requested the Communication Division to modify Change 3 to Communication Instructions for Merchant Ships so that the Armed Guard officer would be relieved of responsibility for communications when the communication liaison officer was absent. Communications, it was asserted, were the responsibility of the master of the ship. Recent experience in the Mediterranean, where merchant vessels had been subject to almost constant attack, had indicated that it was essential for the Armed Guard officer to devote his entire attention to the defense of the ship. It was further requested that

    --53--

    all directives concerning assignment of additional duties to Armed Guard officers be cleared through the Arming Merchant Vessels Section of the Fleet Maintenance Division. Clarification of the matter was desired before the new Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships appeared.128 Op-20 denied issuing directives affecting Armed Guard officers without reference to Op-23 and opposed relieving Armed Guard officers of present communication duties. This step would, it asserted, make it necessary to place an additional naval officer aboard Merchant Ships or have Navy radiomen receive orders from one of the ships officers.129

    When the galley proof of WIMS 1 and 3 was received by Op-23L for comment in February, the Arming Merchant Vessels Section proposed changes which would have relieved the Armed Guard officer of the responsibilities and duties of a communication officer. According to this section, it was neither reasonable nor practicable to hold the Armed Guard officer responsible for the proper maintenance of all radio equipment and the efficient operation of the radio office, or for the supervision and instruction of all radio officers on board. The master should be entirely responsible for communications. The third mate should be in charge of visual communications and the radio officer in charge of radio communications. It was unreasonable to interpose the Armed Guard officer between master and the radio officer, who was a union man not subject to military discipline. The Armed Guard officer should serve only in an advisory capacity to assist and inform the

    --54--

    master regarding the latest procedure in communications. Op-23L intended to modify the General Instructions for Commanding Officers of Naval Armed Guards on Merchant Ships to make the communication duties of Armed Guard officers advisory. Op-23L desired that the changes in this sense be incorporated in the original printing of WIMS rather than in a subsequent change.130 This limitation of the responsibilities of the Armed Guard officers became even more desirable when it was decided by February that three commercial operators would be supplied [to] armed cargo and tank ships.131

    Op-23L also made certain suggestions for changes in WIMS regarding communication equipment and navigational lights to the Director, Convoy and Routing Division. These changes based on directives in force were readily accepted by CominCh, except that the matter of an emergency antenna was referred to the Communications Division.132

    The Communications Division opposed delaying the initial printing of WIMS pending a review of questions at issue regarding the responsibilities of Armed Guard officers, and proposed that a change be issued after agreement had been reached.133 But on 23 February Op-23L again proposed that the changes suggested on 5 February be made in the publication before it was issued to the service. The replacement of Navy radiomen with commercial operators made this step all the more desirable. The Armed Guard officer was not considered sufficiently

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    experienced nor technically equipped to take charge of one of the departments of a merchant ship, a department which should be under the direct supervision of the master.134

    The Communication Division strongly opposed the proposed reduction of the Armed Guard officerÌs responsibility in communications to that of an advisor to the master, and Sub-Chief of Naval Operations concurred in this view. There would be no responsibility for the maintenance of equipment and it was expected that the instruction of radio operating personnel in wartime merchant ship communications would be kept to a minimum. The Armed Guard officer would be responsible for assuring that operating personnel could send and receive necessary traffic. WIMS 3 would limit this responsibility to wartime merchant ship communications.135 Here matters appear to have rested. It is interesting to note that Op-23L was not furnished a revised chapter covering Armed Guard officers nor asked to approve such a copy prior to promulgation.136

    Instructions still in effect at the close of the war made the communication liaison officer or, in his absence, the Armed Guard officer responsible to the master for the efficient conduct of communications, except for the maintenance of equipment. Communication personnel were to be under the officerÌs immediate supervision as to watches, operations, and performance of their duties in all matters

    --56--

    relative to wartime merchant ship communications. On convoy flag ships communications should be under the immediate supervision of the communication officer attached to the Commodore or Vice Commodore. However, the senior radio officer should be responsible to the master for the maintenance of all radio equipment. On Army transports not having a Convoy Commodore or Vice Commodore on board the Navy communication officer should be in charge and responsible to the master for all communications unless Army radio technicians were on board. In this event the Navy communications officer should be responsible to the master for visual communications and should act as advisor to the Army Commanding Officer of Troops. The Commanding Officer of Troops should be responsible to the master for the maintenance of equipment and the operation of the radio office. Thus, the master of the ship was responsible for communications and all personnel performing communications duties were responsible to him, but the Armed Guard officer assumed military command over all Navy communication personnel on board a merchant ship. If a naval communication liaison officer was on board the Armed Guard officer had no further communication duties. If no communication officer was supplied the Armed Guard officer assumed the Communication responsibilities of the liaison officer and was accountable to the master for the performance of such responsibilities. Among these responsibilities were the following: (1) Setting communication and radar watches (2) Efficient performance

    --57--

    of personnel while on watch (3) Proper log-keeping (4) Preservation of radio silence (5) Aiding the master with transmitting details (6) Supervising the delivery of incoming messages to personnel concerned (7) Attending pre-sailing routing or convoy conferences on communications; but only if this conference did not interfere with his attendance at the convoy conference (8) Prevent unauthorized persons from entering the radio room (9) Make nonapproved private broadcast receivers inoperative while at sea (10) supervise upkeep of visual signaling gear (11) Arrange for emergency disposal of all classified matter (12) Assure that identification signals are available on the bridge of ships ailing independently (13) Assure that the radio room receives publications and information necessary for efficient and proper operation (14) Assure that communication and radar personnel are familiar with publications, current voyage instructions (communications), call signs, effective BAMS and numbered messages, security messages, proper message form, distress procedure, changes to procedures or standard organization, and changes to publications (15) See that radar personnel make necessary reports as due.137

    Throughout the Arming Merchant Vessels Section attempted to keep the Armed Guard officer as free as possible from duties and responsibilities which would interfere with his mission Ò- the defense of the ship. In

    --58--

    the matter of communications this effort was not entirely successful, but all communications maintenance responsibilities, except for visual signaling equipment, were kept from the shoulders of the Armed Guard officers. This section opposed efforts to increase the communication training of Armed Guard officers. In April 1944 Com 8 proposed that this training be increased from 30 to 95 hours. This proposal received a firm negative, with the comment that it was not intended to make accomplished signalmen of Armed Guard officers.138

    By the middle of 1945 such questions as communications personnel for transports operating in noncombat areas and the relationship between communication liaison officers and maintenance personnel required settlement. It was decided that liaison officers should still be supplied to ships capable of carrying 250 or more troops regardless of operating area. As regards radiomen, the directive of 6 May, discussed above, remained in effect. Three signalmen should be assigned to each of four Monster class transports, two signalmen to each Army and WSA vessel designed to carry 2,000 or more troops, and one signalman to other vessels of 1,000 or more gross tons operating in noncombat areas except for vessels exclusively in the coastwise trade.139 When guns were placed in a maintenance status but a communication liaison officer was still aboard this officer would be responsible for discipline and administrative control of Navy communication and

    --59--

    maintenance personnel and for all Title B communication equipment. He would not be responsible for the maintenance or armament nor for Title B gunnery equipment, for those matters were the responsibility of the Maintenance Petty Officer.140 Not until 11 September 1945 was the order given to remove all communication personnel from merchant ships. This was to be done at the first continental United States port which the ship touched.141

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    One other mater with regard to merchant ship communications deserves mention Ò the training of Navy and merchant personnel by the Navy. This program appears to have commenced in July, 1943, when the Bureau of Naval Personnel order[ed] the establishment of schools to give training to merchant and Navy personnel in merchant ship communications and convoy procedures in the 5th, 8th, 12th, and 13th Naval Districts. The minimum time of instruction was 30 hours but by March 1944, 60 hours was to be given if possible at Armed Guard Centers and War Merchant Ship Communications Schools which were established primarily to increase the efficiency of the Master and Mates in communications. In the same month two officers were ordered to the Maritime Commission for duty as instructors in convoy procedure and merchant ship communications.142 Among places offering instruction to merchant seamen in communications by March, 1944, were New York, Seattle, New Orleans, Norfolk, and San Francisco. After it became established policy that increasing numbers of commercial operators would be employed on merchant ships, the Communications Division in Naval Operations suggested to the Bureau of Naval Personnel the desirability of establishing Ïbrush-up" schools at Baltimore and Los Angeles in connection with the plan to issue certificates of proficiency in wartime merchant ship communications to masters, mates, and radio operators.143 In April BuPers ordered a similar school

    --61--

    established at Boston.144

    By 1 January 1945 all United States merchant marine deck officers were required to obtain a certificate of proficiency in Wartime Merchant Ship Instructions, including communications, of face the prospect of being beached until they did. This involved about 20,000 merchant marine officers. The certificates were issued on the basis of tests designed to show whether the applicant had a practical working knowledge of Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships. Applications for certificates could be made at Wartime Merchant Ship Communications Schools at Baltimore, Boston, New Orleans, Newport News, New York, Norfolk, San Francisco, San Pedro, and Seattle, and at Navy Routing Offices in 52 ports located in the United States and overseas. The Ïbrush-up" courses at the schools lasted on an average 5 days, but a merchant marine officer needed only take what he felt was necessary in order to qualify for the certificate. Merchant marine deck officers of any of the United Nations might also attend the schools. Commercial radio operators were invited to qualify for a similar certificate, but this was not mandatory.145

    --62--

    Facilities for Training Merchant Seamen

    By March, 1942, facilities for the training of merchant crews of United States and allied vessels had been established at the following places:

          Boston ----------  Naval Training School
    United States Naval Drydock
    Building No. 21
      New York ------  Receiving Station
    51st St. and 1st Avenue
    South Brooklyn
      Philadelphia -----  Naval Reserve Armory
    Camden, New Jersey
      Norfolk ---------  Armed Guard School
    Little Creek, Virginia
      Baltimore -------  Assistant Port DirectorÌs Office
      Charleston ------  Section Base
      Savannah -------  Section Base
      New Orleans ---  Naval Reserve Armory
    829 Camp Street
      San Diego ------  Armed Guard School
    United States Receiving Station
    Destroyer Base
      San Francisco --  Armed Guard Center
    Treasure Island
      Seattle ----------  Anti-Aircraft Training Center
    Port Angeles, Washington

    Instructions consisted of care, operation, upkeep of guns and ammunition, bore-sighting and checking of sights by use of horizon and bench marks, loading drill, pointing, spotting, identifying aircraft

    --63--

    and submarine, elementary fire-control, and first aid.146

    The Navy took steps in May, 1942 to establish facilities for night lookout training at the three Armed Guard Centers, at Boston, and Key West. It also recommended that instruction of this type be developed at Philadelphia, Seattle, Norfolk, and San Pedro in conjunction with other existing instructional facilities for merchant seamen.147

    The Navy also directed that instruction in the 20mm gun be readily available for Armed Guards and merchant seamen. Not only was this instruction to be available at the Schools and Centers, but also at Boston, Baltimore, San Pedro, Galveston, Seattle, on Mobile Units 1 and 2 at New York, and at 827 Camp Street, New Orleans.148

    In an effort to give instruction to more merchant seamen the Navy established mobile units. Mobile Units 1 and 2 in the New York area gave instruction to 50,674 men from 2,954 ships in the period from their establishment in the spring of 1942 to their discontinuance in September, 1944. These units were for a time under the supervision of the Armed Guard Center (Atlantic), but were transferred to the Port Director at New York in October, 1943. Efforts to establish mobile units at other ports were not as successful. In October, 1942, arrangements were made to have two buses fitted out by Com 3 for assignment to the Port Directors at Baltimore and San Francisco respectively. Mobile unit No. 3 at Baltimore gave instruction to 285 men from 30 ships between 14 January and 11 June

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    1943. It was then transferred to Com 3, but soon assigned for local transportation purposes. This unit was of little use at Baltimore because of its poor mechanical condition and because new crews did not sign on for voyages until just before the departure of ships. Not until 1 August 1943 did Mobile Unit No. 4, still not equipped with machine guns, arrive at San Francisco. The Commandant of the 12th Naval District found the bus unsuited for training merchant seamen in gunnery because of its type and age. On October 2 the bus was transferred to the Bureau of Yards and Docks for local transportation purposes. After training was discontinued at New York, Mobile Units 1 and 2 were turned over to the Armed Guard Center for use in Transporting personnel.

    The outstanding fact about attempts to train American merchant seamen ashore is that it failed. The merchant seamen refused to attend in any great numbers. Even after the establishment of the Armed Guard Gunnery School at New York, a place of many wonderful devices, which should have entertained any man for a day or so, it was impossible to get the merchant men to attend. It became evident by 1943 that training on the beach had failed insofar as the merchant seamen were concerned. Efforts were shifted to ship board training under the direction of the Armed Guard officer and this type of training was somewhat more successful.

    If our own seamen refused to take advantage of the finest synthetic training devices in the world and some of the best firing ranges, the same was not true of the seamen of allied nations. They attended whenever the opportunity presented itself. This training was taken by Russian,

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    British, Chinese, Norwegian, and other allied nationals.149 It is perhaps true that in the early stages of the war our merchant seamen established a fairly good record for attending DEMS schools. By the end of 1942 a large number of facilities were available to seamen of allied nations who visited the United States. In addition to the centers at Brooklyn, New Orleans, and Treasure Island, and the schools at Little Creek, Gulfport, and San Diego, training was available at the AATCÌs at Dam Neck, Virginia; PriceÌs Neck, Rhode Island; Shell Beach, Louisiana; Point Montara, California; Pacific Beach, Washington; Pacific Beach (San Diego), California; Guantanamo, Cuba; NOB, Bermuda; and at the instruction centers for merchant seamen from allied nations. In the Seattle area instruction was given aboard a trailer truck.

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    Training of Armed Guards

    Much of the success of the Armed Guard in World War II must be attributed to the good training which officers and men alike received. The primary goal of all this training was to teach men to shoot accurately and rapidly with 5", 3", and 20mm guns at air and surface targets. In order to accomplish this basic purpose a vast training program was inaugurated. There were three basic Armed Guard Schools. These were located at Little Creek, (later moved to Shelton) Virginia; Gulfport, Mississippi; and San Diego, California. For several months in 1942 a basic school existed at Chicago. But weather conditions on the Great Lakes were not suited to year round firing from surface ships and this school was closed as soon as Gulfport training facilities were ready. Of these schools the Virginia school was recognized as the best. It was also the largest. Its training methods were adopted by the other schools.

    Each of the basic schools had an Anti-aircraft Training Center nearby, and also sent its men out on firing ships for anti-aircraft and surface firing. Men from the schools could thus supplement their training by actual firing before they completed the Armed Guard course. Men from Gulfport fired at Shell Beach either before or after they reported to the Armed Guard Center at New Orleans. Dam Neck supplied firing facilities for the men from Little Creek (later Shelton). Men from the San Diego school fired at Pacific Beach, California.

    Before the war had ended four well equipped Armed Guard

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    Gunnery Schools had been established. These were located at New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Seattle. Their basic mission was to give refresher training to Armed Guards by the use of a wide variety of ingenious synthetic gunnery devices. Refresher training was also available at the British D.E.M.S. schools, and these schools were of great help to American Armed Guards early in the war. But British schools became crowded and our own instruction facilities had improved to such a degree that instructions were given to Armed Guard officers on 26 October 1943 that they should request instruction for their crews at D.E.M.S. schools only when no refresher training had been received in four months or when they were to go on special missions for the British War Transport.150

    Armed Guards used five ranges for refresher firing practice, in addition to the D.E.M.S. ranges. These were located at Lido Beach, New York; Dam Neck, Virginia; Point Montara, California; Pacific Beach, Washington; and Shell Beach, Louisiana.

    In addition to the above mentioned training facilities, the Centers gave some training to Armed Guards. The most ambitious and the best training program developed at the Centers was that at New Orleans. But the primary mission of the Centers, as we shall see, was not to train men but rather to handle the assignment of men to sea duty, outfitting, including all preparations for sea, housing while in port, arranging

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    leave, handling records and pay accounts, and transmitting latest approved instructions.

    Such was the machinery for training Armed Guards. We shall now describe briefly the history of the principal schools and, using Shelton, the Armed Guard Gunnery School at New York, and the Armed Guard Center at New Orleans as examples, we shall describe the training of Armed Guards.

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    Armed Guard School, Little Creek (Shelton)

    On 15 October 1941 BuNav established an Armed Guard School at the Section Base, Little Creek, Virginia under the command of the Commander of the Inshore Patrol. Not until 15 November 1942 did the officer-in-charge of the school become a commanding officer. The school had very modest beginnings. The original staff consisted of four retired chief gunnerís mates, but the staff expanded rapidly. The first class, consisting of 23 officers and 184 men, reported to the Armed Guard Center (Atlantic) just as the Neutrality Act was being repealed.151

    Training was constantly being improved. In fact, the school played a major part in producing the very fine curriculum which finally emerged by the later part of 1943. In the early days of the Armed Guard much emphasis was placed on ship board training. Students spent one week out of the four allowed for training on board a training ship. With the expansion of training, this period was reduced to three days, and finally to about 36 hours. The original training ships were the U.S.S. Dubugue and the U.S.S. Paducah and for a time the U.S.S. Eagle 19. The U.S.C.G. Monomoy and the U.S.C.G. Menemsha and briefly the U.S.C.G. Marita were later assigned. These ships were fitted with guns currently being installed on merchant vessels and students were given actual experience in firing the weapons which they would later use aboard merchant

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    ships. For a brief period the operating area was outside the Virginia Capes, but a firing area was soon provided inside Chesapeake Bay near Tangier Island. For a long time the old San Marcos wreck was used as a target for surface firing until it was too badly shot up. Eventually target practice at towed sleeves and towed surface targets was provided.152

    The history of the school is one of constant expansion. By the end of 1942 the physical limitations of the Section Base had been reached and the Little Creek school began to overflow into the Naval Training School, Naval Operating Base, Norfolk. By the end of 1942 the quest for a suitable site on which to build a new school to accommodate about 4,000 men was underway. Not until 10 March 1943 did VCNO formally approve the Shelton site. The new school was located southeast of Lake Bradford with Camp Bradford to the westward. Actual construction of the new plant did not begin until May. The school was ready for opening on 1 September, but building continued after that date. By the end of the war the school consisted of over 90 buildings occupying 120 acres. The concrete drill field alone occupied almost seven acres. The visual training hall had a capacity of 1,500, while the mess halls could feed 4,000 men at one time. Recreation facilities were excellent. In short, the Navy had built a small modern city out of the forest and filled it with Armed

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    Guards.153

    With the discontinuation of preliminary Armed Guard training at the Inshore Patrol School at South Boston on 1 July 1943 and at Treasure Island about 15 July, future Armed Guard officers received their preliminary training from July to September, 1943, at the Local Defense School at South Boston. After this date the officers were received at the Armed Guard Schools direct from indoctrination schools and were given two months of Armed Guard training instead of one.154 Some of the officers from the Boston school eventually joined the staff at Shelton.155 Latest battle experience was utilized at Shelton, as at other Armed Guard schools, by the policy of sending all instructors who were physically qualified to sea and bringing in men who had two or more voyages or one voyage of more than six monthís duration. The same policy was followed with regard to petty officers assigned to the schools. Officers and men who had been under attack were preferred for duty as instructors.156

    After 1 September 1943 the Armed Guard officer received one month of basic Armed Guard training. During his second month he was in charge of enlisted men who were receiving their basic Armed Guard training and he received further instruction himself at the same time. At Shelton an

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    important course for petty officers was the 5"/38 maintenance course. Many of the best petty officers were brought back for this training either at Shelton, New Orleans, or Treasure Island. If these men were sent to Shelton, they generally trained a second month as petty officers in charge of the enlisted men who were receiving their first month of basic Armed Guard training. By 1 January 1945 men who had sea experience in the Atlantic or Mediterranean theater were being returned to Shelton for a month of refresher training at Shelton. It was important to keep the battle tried enlisted men of the Atlantic in the Armed Guard because no further recruits were being sent to Shelton. It was also important to give these men additional training and a period of rest before sending them to Armed Guard duty in the Pacific. These veterans of the Atlantic were counted upon heavily in the tough fighting which was anticipated in the final invasion of Japan. The Navy was anxious to keep them in the Armed Guard and that transfers, where necessary, should be from men who had been on Armed Guard duty in the Pacific, where little or no battle experience had been gained.157 It was decided in April, 1945, that 30 men a week were to be given a week of training in aircraft recognition beyond their month of refresher training at Shelton. One of these men was to be assigned to each Area 1-A ship carrying a 24 man gun crew for the purpose of instructing

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    the rest of the gun crew in aircraft recognition.158

    Of far reaching importance were the moves to standardize Armed Guard training and doctrine. Shelton played an important role in this effort, since its training was accepted as the standard which the other schools should adopt. Bu August, 1943, BuPers was attempting to standardize the Armed Guard curriculum. Op-23L wisely suggested that the teaching first be made uniform for officers before proceeding with the standardization of enlisted training.159 At about the same time VCNO (Op-23L) began issuing Armed Guard Bulletins to all Armed Guard officers. This enabled the spread of doctrine and instructions to the entire service quickly. The Bulletins were distributed through the Armed Guard Centers and through the Port Directorís Offices.160 Perhaps even more important from the standpoint of uniformity in the service was the CNO directive of 3 July 1944 that all books, pamphlets, or instructions concerning fire control procedure be submitted to CNO for approval before printing and issue.161 This move was essential because there had not always been agreement at the various schools on gunnery doctrine. It can be safely said that the school at Shelton and the gunnery school at New York played a major part in the development of gunnery doctrine and procedures for the entire Armed Guard.

    Since the course at Shelton became the standard for the entire Armed basic training program some description of the curriculum

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    seems in order. It should be noted that the officers who came to Shelton generally had been through indoctrination school, but some officers were set there for training from shore billets in the United States and had never received the Navy indoctrination course. As indicated above, the basic course at Shelton lasted four weeks after which the officer learned to handle and instruct his crew and received additional training in gunnery. The officer studied the following subjects in his first four week period at Shelton:

    (1) Aircraft Recognition. The officer was shown slides and films which acquainted him with the characteristics. Silhouettes, and performance of enemy and friendly planes. This instruction required eight hours.

    (2) General Instructions. The officers had 14 hours of instruction on the many problems which the Armed Guard officer would encounter. These included reports, administration, discipline, relations with the merchant marine, security, censorship, general defense policies, regulations, advancement of enlisted men, medical treatment, welfare and morale. At the end of this course the officer had the answers to the most common problems he would face when he first went to sea. The instructors were generally officers who had recently been at sea.

    (3) Ordnance. This course was intended to give the officer a thorough acquaintance with the heavy weapons used by the Armed Guard. The course began with a lecture on the performance of the guns. The officer became familiar with the standard nomenclature for all parts of the gun. He actually broke down the breach, firing mechanism, and

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    generally all dismountable parts. Problems of maintenance, lubrication, and casualties were stressed. The entire course lasted 19 hours; seven hours for the 3"/50AA gun, 4 hours on the 4"/50, 2 hours on the 5"/51, and 6 hours on the 5"/38.

    (4) Fire Control. In 17 hours of intensive training the officer studied the problems of when and how to open fire, the type of fire which was most effective, gun crew training, fuse setting and ready box arrangement, all approved doctrines of fire control. This instruction was based on the latest actual experience in fighting the enemy, for the instructors were men who had only recently been in combat. Three hours were devoted to the spotting tank.

    (5) Communications. The officer was given sufficient training to enable him to gain some understanding of the general problems of communications. He received some training in sending and receiving blinker, semaphore, and radio code. He was trained in wartime merchant ship communications, communication reports, international code flags, convoy procedure, coding and decoding, operation of the TBY, sound powered telephones, and care of confidential publications. Only 24 hours was devoted to communications training, enough time to acquaint the officer with some of the basic problems and procedures.

    (6) Synthetic Training. The officer spent 24 hours with a number of mechanical training devices which would also be used in training enlisted men during his second month at school. It must be said that the finest mechanical equipment was located at New York Gunnery School, which had an important part in the development of synthetic training

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    devices. But Shelton and the other basic schools also had much fine equipment. Shelton gave instruction with seven synthetic gunnery devices. These were: (a) Stationary Target Eyeshooting Teacher, a geometrical device to illustrate the mathematical basis for doctrine of fore control of short range AA guns; (b) Portable Aiming Teacher, a simple device for teaching the principles and practice of the use of the Mark IV sight; (c) Multiple Trainer, mounted miniature planes and Mark IV sights operated in banks of five to teach approach angle, apparent length and proper aim off with scoring system to evaluate ability and progress; (d) Panoramic Trainer Mark IV (3A-11), a film projector mounted on a 20mm gun with counter registering hits on planes approaching as dive bombers or torpedo attackers; (e) AA Battery Trainer Mark III, Mod. 1 (3A-2), crews with battery officers fired at planes on a screen with both 3"/50 and 20mm guns; (f) Deflection Trainer Mark VI (3B-6), gave training in judgment of approach angles of miniature planes controlled by instructors, involving firing at planes and registering hits and misses by use of photo-electric cells; (g) Polaroid Trainer Mark I, film, screen, and 50 cal. Machine gun with sound device to give sound effect of actual firing. The vibration of the guns was mechanically controlled and hits were recorded by a photo-electric cell. Tracer effect was provided on firing. Late in the war this trainer was adapted to a 20mm gun. Officers were given instruction in short range fire control before receiving training in the synthetic devices.

    (7) Small Boats. This four hour training included instruction in

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    handling boats, commands, lowering away, emergency navigation, abandon ship drill, survival, and provisioning of life boats. It was essential that the officers have sufficient knowledge of navigation to be able to take charge of a life boat and bring it safely to land in the event his ship was sunk.

    (8) 20mm Instruction. An intensive 7 hour course in the construction, care, maintenance, nomenclature of the gun included actual breakdown and assembly. The officer also learned what to do in case of casualty and how to keep the gun well lubricated.

    (9) Bore Sighting. One hour was devoted to the use of the bore sight telescope and muzzle disc for bore sighting broadside guns. Simplified methods of bore sighting and short cuts were considered.

    (10) Maintenance, Ammunition, and Magazines. Nine hours were devoted to maintenance of guns, ammunition, and magazines. Instruction was given in fuses, powder, safety regulations, powder decomposition and testing, sprinkler systems, magazine temperature control, detonators, projectile markings and other problems. The officer was instructed in making reports and keeping the ammunition log.

    (11) Degaussing. The officer learned of his relation to the master in regard to degaussing, the theory of degaussing, and the reading of area charts for settings. This instruction lasted only one hour.

    (12) Gas protection. In two hours the officer learned handling and care of gas masks, proper method for donning the mask, testing and replacement of cartridge, types of gases, countermeasures, and gas

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    decontamination.

    (13) Seamanship. This instruction consisted of only three hours with attention to the practical problems as related to the Armed Guard.

    (14) Binoculars. In one hour the care and proper technique in using binoculars were explained to the officer. This was correlated with spotting targets from the boat dock.

    (15) Pointer, Trainer, Sightsetting Course. This lasted for three hours. Actual firing practice on the 3"/50 and 4"/50 guns was given by firing a 22 cal. Gun, which was rigged up to the large gun, at movable targets.

    (16) AA Sight Setting Drill. This one hour drill stressed deflection and sight angles.

    (17) Loading Drills. The officer received 22 hours of training in loading, climaxed by a night battle practice in a blacked out room (gun shed). Live primers were fired in the 5"/51 gun. Seven hours were devoted to loading drill on the 3"/50, six hours to the 5"/38, four hours to the 4"/50, and four hours plus the night battle practice to the 5"/51.

    (18) Tracking 3"/50 and 5"/38. For one hour moving targets were tracked with simulated loading and use of customary commands.

    (19) 20mm Tracking. This training lasted for one hour.

    (20) 20mm Bore Sighting. This was a one hour period of instruction in sight adjustment on the 20mm gun.

    (21) Pistols 38 and 45 cal. The officer spent two and one-half hours breaking down the pistols and one-half hour of firing.

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    (22) 30 cal. Rifle. One hour was spent on the breakdown of this gun. No actual firing was given.

    (23) Military Drill. For three hours the officer was drilled in military formations, the manual of arms, and the like. Normally officers had received drill at indoctrination schools, but some officers were assigned to Armed Guard schools from shore bases and had never received the Navy indoctrination course.

    (24) Physical Education. The officer received a half-hour of exercise on each of the six working days of the week. This consisted of calisthenics or of such organized games as volley ball.

    (25) Range Estimation. One hour was spent in estimating range using the BuAer 5-C-4 Range Estimator.

    (26) First Aid. Normally two hours were devoted to this subject. The training consisted of movies and a lecture by a Doctor at the school.

    (27) AA Range Preparation. One hour of instruction was given to the officers just before they went to the firing range at Dam Neck. This period was used to acquaint them with what they were expected to do at Dam Neck.

    (28) Firing Ship Preparation. One hour of instruction was given to the officers before they went aboard the firing ship. They learned of the shipís routine and of their assignments to the various gun crews on the firing ship.

    (29) Liberty Ship. The officer spent four hours on board an Armed Guard manned merchant ship in Norfolk harbor.

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    (30) Dam Neck. The officers spent one day firing 20mm, 3"/50, and 5"/38 guns at the anti-aircraft range. They were organized into gun crews and rotated positions at the guns.

    (31) Firing Ship. On a one day trip the officer fired at surface and air targets.162

    After this month of intensive training the officer was ready to take charge of the enlisted men who were entering the school for their month of basic Armed Guard training. After working with these men for a month he was prepared to command the Armed Guard at sea. Few problems would be entirely strange to him. He would have acquired skills and knowledge which would have required a much longer period of training under peace time conditions. He had the confidence and self-assurance which could come from a thorough knowledge of what his duties and responsibilities were. Additional training at Armed Guard Centers improved his efficiency as an Armed Guard commanding officer.

    During the second month at the Armed Guard School the officers were in charge of small groups of enlisted men. The enlisted men received the following training at Shelton, and the course was likewise copied at Gulfport and San Diego:

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    (1) Synthetic Training. This training was essentially the same as for officers with increased skill as the objective. The enlisted man received 27 hours of this training.

    (2) Aircraft Recognition. While only eight hours of training in this important subject were given at Shelton, the special course for selected petty officers late in the war meant that on each ship there would be a man capable of giving additional instruction to other members of the gun crew.

    (3) Loading Drills. The men spent 17 hours in loading drills, six on the 5"/38, six on the 3"/50, three on the 4"/50, and two on the 5"/51.

    (4) Instructional Movies. This program involved five hours of movies. Movies were used to teach proper firing methods. Movies on the Armed Guard, Eye Shooting, and Barrage Fire Control were produced by BuAer from technical information supplied by the Armed Guard Service. The Armed Guard Gunnery School at New York played a leading role in the development of these films. In the early part of the war British eye shooting films were shown.

    (5) Night Lookout Trainer. Four hours were spent in this training.

    (6) 20mm Gun Breakdown, casualties and care, 6 hours.

    (7) Tracking Targets. In 9 hours the student learned how to track targets. Six hours were pent tracking with the 20mm, one hour with the 3"/50, and two hours with the 5"/38.

    (8) Pointer, Trainer, Setter Drills. Crews were trained prior to going to the firing range or t