Chapter III
DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON MERCHANT SHIPS

The most important defense items on merchant ships were, of course, the guns, but twenty-five additional items were installed in an effort to give the merchant ships the best possible chance of survival. Some of these items, it will be seen, proved unsuccessful and were discarded. These items were: (1) Degaussing (2) Splinter protection (3) Deck strengthening and gun foundations (4) Sky lookout stations (5) Protection of sea chests (6) Certain radio equipment (7) Berthing, messing, and life saving equipment (8) Darkening ship (9) Closure of tonnage openings and extension of water tight bulkheads (10) Inclining ship when necessary because of defense installations (11) Painting ship (12) Installation of barrage balloons (13) Installation of acoustic warning devices (14) Snowflake rocket flares (15) Smoke floats (16) Mark 29 mine (17) Kites (18) Gyro compasses for certain Alaskan vessels (19) Smoke indicators (20) Fueling at sea gear (21) Ordnance storeroom and armory for Armed Guard equipment (22) Course changing clocks (23) Stowage of depth charges on tank ships (24) Portable convoy colored signal lights (25) Ammunition stowage and handling facilities.

It should be noted that three basic considerations governed the installation of defense items on merchant ships: (1) The availability

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of equipment (2) the limitations of merchant ships (3) Equipment should be primarily defensive. Not only did the Armed Guard Service face a shortage of trained gunners with the outbreak of war, but also material shortages in guns and other equipment which were only eliminated after months of intense effort and planning. In the early days of the war we were forced to send ships out to the battle zones insufficiently armed and equipped because the material was not yet available. This situation was caused in large part by the failure of long range planning and procurement in the years of peace between the two World Wars. The Neutrality Act was hardly conducive to such long range planning and procurement by the Navy, for this act prohibited the installation of guns on merchant ships, it hardly seems likely that Congress in the long years of peace would have appropriated about $200,000 or more per ship to provide defensive equipment for merchant ships which flew the United States flag. It is to the lasting credit of the Navy and the Nation, and especially to the Arming Merchant Ship Section in the Fleet Maintenance Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations that these deficiencies were rapidly overcome and that ships were sent out with the best equipment obtainable within an unbelievably short period of time after the declaration of war.

There was never any intention to give merchant ships the same fighting power as war ships. Their primary duty was to take men and material to the four corners of the world, not to seek out the enemy and wage offensive war. Every effort was made to keep the number of

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persons on board merchant ships as low as possible. Whatever we may say about the greater efficiency of military personnel over civilians on ships, the fact remains that the merchant crews were much smaller than the crews the Navy placed on the same vessels when they became Navy auxiliaries. Defensive equipment naturally depended in large part on the space available for Armed Guards and on the essentially defensive nature of their mission.

We shall now discuss the 26 defense installations which were placed aboard merchant ships and see the responsibilities of the Navy and the Maritime Commission with regard to each.

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Degaussing

The Navy and merchant ships faced a new and dangerous weapon in World War II in the magnetic mine, but fortunately an effective means of defense had been developed even before our entry into the war. Without describing the many technical problems involved in the operation of the mine and in defense against it, we can indicate the general principles involved. The magnetic mine is normally placed on the bottom of channels and harbors where it remains fixed until swept or exploded. It is exploded by a change in the earth's magnetic field, as when a ship passes over it. A magnetic dip needle adjusted to a horizontal position, centered between two electrical contacts is left free to move in a vertical plane. The magnetic attraction of a ship passing in the vicinity pulls the needle until it touches the contact and completes an electric circuit which detonates the mine. Degaussing coils set up magnetic fields by the action of electric currents which prevent a change in the vertical magnetic field large enough to cause the sensitive needle to complete this electrical circuit. The installation of degaussing coils thus leaves the ship relatively free from the danger of explosion from such mines except in very shallow water.

After many conferences with the Maritime Commission, the Navy on 4 June 1941 developed plans to degauss merchant ships. All United States merchant vessels over 2,000 tone were divided into three groups (1) vessels under construction or to be constructed in the future

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(2) Some 375 vessels in operation which would be needed by the Navy in an emergency or whose normal routes of trade gave them a high priority for degaussing equipment. (3) Other vessels operated by their owners or under charter and those the future disposition of which was unknown. Priority for degaussing until adequate supplies of material became available was to go to groups one and two with vessels in group two receiving preference over those of group one if local shortages of material developed. The Chief of Naval Operations was to keep the list of vessels to be needed by the Navy in an emergency revised to date.

The Bureau of Ships was required to furnish additional generating capacity where necessary, degaussing cable, feeder cable, rheostats, fixed resistors, discharge resistors, stuffing tubes, ammeters and connecting cable, terminal strips and terminal, switches, panel material, compass compensating coils, control boxes and connecting cable for same. Stocks of this material were to be maintained in each continental Naval District except the Ninth. The material should remain the property of the Navy during the period of the emergency, after which the Navy would determine the disposition of the equipment. It was also required that BuShips furnish the Maritime Commission with detailed specifications for installation of degaussing equipment on new construction together with firm dates for delivery of degaussing material. With regard to ships already built, BuShips furnished general instructions to Commandants of Naval Districts which permitted the

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preparation of detailed specifications locally. BuShips also supplied maintenance instructions for degaussing installations. A suggestion of the Maritime Commission was also accepted that BuShips should act in conjunction with the Maritime Commission to prepare a degaussing document which could be furnished to the owner of the ship. This document would show the ownership of the equipment, the costs to be assessed against the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and the ship owner and would also indicate the number of days the ship would be laid up for degaussing.

The Bureau of Ordnance supplied the Bureau of Ships with necessary design calculations (ampere turns required and coil locations) for all merchant vessels under construction. It furnished complete general instructions to Commandants of Naval Districts to permit design calculations to be made locally for operating vessels selected for degaussing within the districts. It provided complete equipment for wiping, flashing, deperming, and adjustment of the magnetic compass compensating coil. BuOrd also supplied equipment to calibrate degaussed vessels and furnished complete operating instructions for degaussing equipment to the masters of vessels.

The responsibilities of Commandants of Naval Districts were very heavy in the degaussing program. They supplied detailed specifications for the installation of degaussing equipment on operating vessels, based on general instructions from BuShips and BuOrd, and supplied the Maritime Commission with delivery schedules for electrical

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material involved. They were responsible for the issue of material to the local Maritime Commission contractors. They were called upon to furnish technical advice and assistance concerning installations and inspected each installation and, with the local representatives of the Maritime Commission, issued a Joint certificate of completeness. The completion of each installation was reported to CNO, BuShips, and BuOrd. Commandants of Naval Districts were responsible for flashing, wiping of degaussed vessels, and for deperming and calibration of degaussed vessels. Each merchant vessel had its degaussing equipment tested and inspected upon entering port. Defects were reported to BuShips and arrangements were made with the local Maritime Commission representative to make repairs in the same manner as in making the original installation except that negligence rendered the party at fault liable to the cost of repair. Magnetic field intensity measurements were made on vessels entering and leaving port wherever such facilities were established. Supervision of the installation of compass compensating coils was also a responsibility of Commandants of Naval Districts and this work must be accomplished to the satisfaction of the Bureau of Maritime Inspection and Navigation.

The Maritime Commission supplied BuShips with hull plans and other essential data needed in preparing degaussing specifications for ships under construction and indicated by priority list the desired order of receipt of these specifications. It made all necessary

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arrangements with the builder for installation of the equipment and informed the Commandant of the Naval District regarding quantity, time, and place of delivery of Navy supplied material. Local representatives accompanied naval representatives on inspections of vessels in operation which had a high priority for degaussing equipment and arranged for the installations after receipt of detailed specifications from the Commandant of the Naval District. The Maritime commission participated in inspections of finished installations and made the necessary arrangements to obtain approval of the Bureau of Maritime Inspection and Navigation. It supplied all material not specifically listed to be supplied by the Navy. The Maritime Commission rendered such assistance as was required by the Commandants of Naval Districts in connection with flashing, wiping, deperming, and calibration. It also handled matters which arose concerning marine insurance.

The financial obligation of the Navy in connection with merchant ship degaussing was to supply the material listed above, to pay for the cost of installation and for necessary repairs except in case of neglect. The Navy also maintained flashing, wiping, deperming, and calibration facilities as determined necessary by BuOrd and transferred to the Maritime Commission for overhead one and one half per cent of the monies allotted for installation charges. The Navy did not pay for material installation on vessels to be constructed to Maritime Commission account if the plans approved by the Navy included

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degaussing. Nor did it pay for vessels constructed under a Defense Aid allocation nor vessels taken over under a Defense Aid allocation, nor foreign flag vessels repaired by the Maritime Commission on a Defense Aid repair request, nor foreign flag vessels taken over by the United States and assigned directly to service under another foreign flag.

Initial steps were taken to produce material to degauss about 800 ships. Material required to complete merchant ship degaussing received a preference rating of A-1-b or better.1

One of the larger problems in the degaussing program at the beginning was that of availabilities for merchant ships. The Maritime Commission sought to keep delays in operating schedules at a minimum and accordingly favored making degaussing installations a little at a time while the ship was loading and discharging cargo. On 11 June the Navy proposed that this system be changed and that ships either be made available for a complete and uninterrupted degaussing job or that at most the complete installation be made in two separate periods. As soon as the installation was completed the ship should be calibrated, for the degaussing equipment could not operate effectively until the ship was calibrated.2 The Maritime Commission, however, did not

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wish to adopt this suggestion as an inflexible procedure. The Navy was asked if it was willing to pay fair compensation to owners for time lost in accomplishing degaussing work. 3 The Navy, of course, gave a negative reply to this  question. It insisted that at least the main degaussing cables should be installed at a single availability.4 There continued to be some disagreement between the Maritime Commission and the Bureau of Ships on the extent of the degaussing, with BuShips standing for a thorough job and the Maritime Commission insisting that the ships could not be laid up for a long period. On 29 September 1941 BuShips and BuOrd by joint letter authorized Commandants of Naval Districts to make decisions regarding the type of degaussing until further instructions were received from the Chief of Naval Operations. At a conference between representatives of the Ship Movements and Fleet Maintenance Divisions in Operations, the Bureau of Ordnance, the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau of Navigation, and the Maritime Commission on 7 October it was decided that BuShips, BuOrd, and the Maritime Commission should try to work out an agreement on the extent of degaussing which could be readily accomplished before another conference was held.5

With the abolition of District Material Officers on 1 May 1942

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degaussing came under the cognizance of the Commandant of the Navy Yard in each Naval District. Where two Navy Yards existed in a district, the Commandant in the city where the District Commandant was located would take over degaussing duties. Where no Navy Yard existed in a district the office of Industrial Manager United States Navy was established. The Commandant of a Navy Yard on the Industrial Manager could delegate responsibility for degaussing to the Supervisors of Shipbuilding at private yards.6

In May, 1942 the decision was reached that A coils would not be installed on merchant ships. Vessels under 62 foot beam would only receive the M coil. Vessels over 62 foot beam would receive M, F, and Q coils in accordance with BuOrd instructions, but all short M loops would be omitted from all M coils. This directive represented a considerable saving in time, money, and valuable material. A coils were installed in new construction if installation work had been started prior to 10 September 1942.7

On 24 August 1942 Op-23L ruled that Commandants of Naval Districts could hold up the sailing of ships whose magnetic condition made their voyage unsafe. But it was also pointed out that the urgency of shipments at times made it necessary to take serious risks with degaussed

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ships.8

In October, 1942, VCNO made a number of suggestions concerning degaussing procedure which were designed to avoid unnecessary delay in sailing dates. The elimination of unnecessary delay was especially important in view of the magnitude which the task of degaussing merchant ships was assuming. In June, 1942 the Maritime Commission decided that even merchant ships operating in coastal waters and ships under 2,000 gross toms should be degaussed. Where it was not practicable to degauss these vessels, they were to be depermed at regular intervals.9 VCNO suggested that more complete use of existing facilities might be achieved by using magnetic survey ranges at night and even by conducting calibrations at night where warranted by safety considerations. Mobile deperming units might also be used and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations was considering establishing such units at Philadelphia, Galveston, and San Pedro. There should be close liaison between the Degaussing Officer and the Port Director so that coordination of degaussing services with other ship activities could be achieved. Masters should be furnished with degaussing information and instructions and this could be best effected by giving this information when they

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visited the Routing Office. Ships should be furnished with values of current to be used so that in an emergency these could be used rather than the values obtained by calibration runs. In general, ships should only be delayed for calibration or deperming if sailing to a port or area where magnetic mines were known to exist. Where it was known that the compass had become unreliable the Routing Officer might authorize the master to turn off the degaussing coils when in the immediate vicinity of extraordinary navigational dangers.10

The Navy made serious efforts to keep merchant ship masters informed so that they could correct deviations in their magnetic compasses caused by degaussing, splinter protection, and the nature of the cargo which they carried. Compass demonstrations stations were established in each Naval District for this purpose. Instruction was offered at New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, New Orleans, Guantanamo Bay, San Pedro, Seattle, Cristobal, Boston, Portland (Maine), Mobile, Galveston, San Juan, Trinidad, San Francisco, Portland (Oregon), Pearl Harbor, and Honolulu. Port Directors were charged with making arrangements for the attendance of the master or his navigating officers.11

After the end of the war it was the policy of the Navy that ships should continue to be degaussed if operating in areas where

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there was a danger from magnetic mines. The War Shipping Administration could discontinue degaussing on vessels which would no longer operate in magnetic mine danger areas. Degaussing equipment could be left on board such vessels or otherwise disposed of at the discretion of the War Shipping Administration. All new construction vessels suitable for use as naval auxiliaries should have space allocated for the installation of degaussing equipment.12

The last instruction to Armed Guard officers concerning degaussing stated that the master was responsible for the proper operation of the ship's degaussing equipment. The Armed Guard officer should note the operation of the degaussing system from time to time in order to be familiar with it and to be able to report upon its operation if not satisfactory. Prior to 8 June 1944 the Armed Guard officer was required to check a degaussing questionnaire answered by the master. If the Armed Guard officer differed with the master he was to attach his comments to the questionnaire and also send a copy of his comments with his voyage report.13

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Deck Strengthening and Gun Foundations

Efforts to provide adequate gun foundations and deck strengthening for merchant ships were handicapped by lack of early planning and by a lack of appreciation of what the ultimate armament needs of merchant ships would be. Thus a problem which for years should have been almost automatically arranged at the builder's yard suddenly assumed great importance when the ultimate decision to place guns on merchant ships was made.

On 23 June 1941 the Bureau of Ships indicated to the Maritime Commission that provision should be made for installation of the following guns on vessels which had not been marked for acquisition by the Navy:

(1) Oil Tankers of over 80,000 barrels capacity should have foundations for two 4"/50 guns, one on the center line forward and one on the center line aft. They should also have four .50 cal. machine guns mounted on the bridge structure on on top of the pilot house.

(2) Oil tankers of 10,000 or more barrels capacity should have two 3"/50 AA guns and two .50 cal. machine guns.

(3) Cargo vessels above 2,000 gross tons should have 4"/50 guns mounted on the quarter line forward and the center line aft. They should also have four .50 cal. machine guns mounted in the vicinity of the bridge or on top of the pilot house.

(4) Passenger and cargo vessels over 400 feet in length should have a 5"/50 single purpose gun mounted on the center line at the stern and four 3"/50 AA guns, one on each bow and one on each quarter.

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In addition four .50 cal. machine guns should be installed in the vicinity of the bridge or on the top of the pilot house. Plans for the necessary structural work in connection with the gun foundations had already been furnished to the Maritime Commission.14

It should be pointed out that the realities of war and the shortage of guns brought out armament plans which were different from those envisaged by BuShips in June, 1941. The BuShips letter was, in fact, cancelled 29 August 1941 by a SecNav letter which indicated the gun foundations and deck strengthening desired on merchant vessels under construction, and for merchant vessels built but not marked for acquisition by the Navy.15 Since this letter was in turn modified by a SecNav letter of 27 October 1941, the plans for gun foundations as they finally emerged on this date will now be described.

I  Vessels under construction

(a) Cargo Vessels

(1) Types C-2, C-3, C-2/C-3, and similar privately owned vessels should have a foundation for a 6" broad side gun on the centerline aft to take a 4", 5", or 6" gun. They should receive deck strengthening for four 3"/50 AA guns and should have foundations for four 20 mm guns (eight .50 cal. guns might be used).

(2) Type C-1 and similar privately owned vessels should receive a foundation for a 4" broad side gun on the center line aft to take either a 4" or a 3" /50 AA gun. There should be a deck strengthening for a 4" broadside gun on the center

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line forward to take either a 4" or a 3"/50 AA gun. Foundations should be provided for four 20 mm guns (eight .50 cal. guns might be used).

(b) Tankers privately constructed

(1) If over 80,000 barrels capacity there should be a foundation on the center line aft to take either a 4" or a 3"/50 gun. Deck strengthening should be provided on the center line forward to take either a 4" of a 3"/50 gun. Foundations should be provided for four 20 mm guns (eight .50 cal. guns might be used).

(c) Combination passenger and cargo vessels

(1) Type C-3 P&C, Spec. P&C, and similar privately owned vessels should have a foundation for a 6" broad side gun on the center line aft to take a 4", 5", or 6" gun. Deck strengthening should be provided for four 3"/50 AA guns and foundations should be supplied for eight 20 mm guns (16 of the .50 cal. guns might be used).

II  Vessels already built and not marked for acquisition by the Navy

(a) Cargo vessels over 2,000 gross tons should have gun foundations and deck strengthening for a 4"/50 broad side gun or a 3"/50 AA gun on the center line aft and a 3"/50 AA gun on the center line forward. They should also have foundations for four 20 mm or eight .50 cal. guns.

(b) Tankers over 80,000 barrels capacity should have the same armament as above cargo vessels. If between 10,000 and 80,000 barrels capacity they should have a 3"/50 AA gun foundation on the center line aft and foundations for two 20 mm or four .50 cal. guns.

(c) Combination passenger and cargo vessels

(1) Over 400' in length should have gun foundations and deck strengthening for four 3"/50 AA guns and for four 20 mm or eight .50 cal. guns.

(2) Ships over 2,000 gross tons and less than 400' long

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should be fitted for two 3"/50 AA guns on the center line and four 20 mm or eight .50 cal. guns.

In general four .30 cal. guns were to be mounted on the bridge of each ship armed.16

A major change in the directive of 27 October came on 14 February 1942 when the time and labor necessary to construct gun platforms forward on vessels of the 5,000-10,000 class already built was eliminated.17 On 30 April 1942 the Maritime Commission was advised to provide for the installation of 5"/38 D.P. guns on all new construction. On C-1 and EC-2 ships and tankers over 80,000 barrels capacity the gun foundation and deck strengthening should be suitable for installation of a 5"/38 D.P. gun and the working circle should be 26' in order to accommodate a 5"/51 gun if necessity forced its installation.18 On C-1A and C-1B ships it was necessary to raise the 5"/38 platform eight feet and to raise the 20 mm platforms seven feet above the main deck.19 On 2 October 1942 the installation of a 3"/50 AA gun on the bow of the C-2 and its subclasses was authorized even though these ships were less than the 10,000 deadweight tons specified for this armament in the directive of 14 February 1942.20 It should be pointed out that when two 3"/50 AA guns were mounted on the after end of troop

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transports their foundations were located forward and at least eight feet above the 5"/38 gun platform. Some C-1, C-1A, and C-1B ships were actually fitted with gun platforms on the bow suitable for 6" guns, but since Navy directives did not call for the installation of such guns on the bows of merchant ships, directions were given to discontinue this practice and fit the ships to take a 3"/AA gun forward.21

The best summary of deck strengthening and gun foundations in the memo. for File of Op-414-D3 of 29 March 1946 which is reproduced as Appendix V.

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Splinter Protection

The original intention of the Navy Department was that splinter protection should be installed only for the protection of the bridge and the machine guns.22 But in practice splinter protection was also generally supplied to bow and stern guns and to the radio room. In the absence of an overall directive from CNO on the subject, there appears to have been some variation in the installations. But the following general characteristics applied and became standard for merchant ships. For .50 cal. and 20 mm guns the sides of gun tubs were made of poured plastic armor, 2 1/2 inches thick and later of panels 2- 23/32" thick. The latter were formed by pouring plastic material into a steel tray of 20-gauge sheet metal and welding this on a 3/16 inch medium steel backing plate.23 The standard height of the splinter protection for 20 mm machine guns became 37". This allowed depression of the gun 5ƒ, which was the accepted standard for all guns on merchant ships. Two sighting steps were installed in the gun tub in such a manner that a gunner following a target would step down and elevate his gun whenever there was danger that his gun had been brought to bear on his own ship.24 For 3"/50 bow guns the standard protection was 3/8 inch steel 46 1/2 inches high, with the after part of the

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splinter shield left open to give ready access to ready service ammunition and to allow quick drainage of the splinter shield in heavy seas. For 5"/38 stern guns the shield was of 5/8 inch ship steel, 54" in height.25 It was also found desirable to leave open the portion of the gun shield nearest the forward portion of the ship in order to facilitate passing ammunition and to provide ready drainage of the 5"/38 tub. The 5"/38 splinter protection was omitted in cases where the gun was mounted on the weather deck to permit the ready leads of mooring and towing howsers.26 The 4"/50, 5"/51, 5"/50, and 3"/23 guns generally received appropriate splinter protection. The .30 cal. guns mounted on the bridge were not given splinter protection. It also became necessary to supply splinter protection for the hydrogen containers which were used in inflation barrage balloons.

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Sky Lookout Stations

On 29 August 1941 the Secretary of the Navy forwarded to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission BuShips Plan No. 417312 which showed the type of sky lookout stations desired on merchant ships. These stations were to be built according to the size of the crew. Ships with a crew complement of over 400 were to have four stations; ships with a compliment of 100 to 400 were to have two stations; ships with a complement of less than 100 were to have one station.27 This decision was reaffirmed on 27 October.28 But sky lookout stations were not very useful on merchant ships, especially in view of the limited naval personnel available to defend the ship and stand watches. In June, 1944 the Commanding Officer of the Armed Guard Gunnery School at New York was directed to question 100 Armed Guard officers returning from sea for refresher courses concerning use of the sky lookout stations.29 Inquiries which he addressed to 60 officers revealed that in all but six cases these stations were not being used because their location aft of the stack restricted vision to a very limited area.30 It is also true that insufficient personnel were available to relieve the watch often enough to prevent drowsiness or even sleep. On 24 August 1944 installation of sky lookout stations was stopped on all new construction merchant vessels.31

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Guns

The armament mounted on merchant ships in World War II was largely  determined by two basic factors; the guns available which they could carry and use most effectively, and the degree of danger in the area in which the ship would operate. When serious shortages of guns existed in the early months of the war preference went to ships which assumed greatest risks, as for example, those ships operating in North Russian waters. Ships carrying troops were naturally given all possible protection. Where the choice lay between giving a gun to a cargo ship and a ship serving as a transport there could be no doubt where the gun should go. While the first year of the war was the critical one in the arming of merchant ships, the gun shortage continued to January, 1945. In the years after 1942 much progress was made toward improving and standardizing armament for merchant ships. Emphasis shifted from the single purpose to the dual purpose weapons and a simple but effective cartwheel sight was adopted for all guns. The standard armament for the average merchant ship or tanker operating in zones of great danger became one 5"/38 D.P. gun aft, one 3"/50 AA gun forward and eight 20 mm machine guns. There were, of course, many variations depending on the initial armament which was supplied to the ship and her type. Where a 3", 4"/50, 5"/50, or 5"/51 gun had been initially installed on the stern of a ship this gun was not replaced by the 5"/38 D.P. gun. The principle difference in the armament of cargo and transports was that transports received one to three additional 3"/50 AA guns and large C-4

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transports received 14, rather than 8, 20 mm guns. All troop transports carrying 500 or more troops were armed with four 3"/50 AA guns in addition to the stern gun and eight, ten, twelve, or fourteen 20 mm guns.

To describe in detail every directive concerning guns on merchant ships would be rather futile. It should be remembered that many of these early directives were of an emergency or temporary nature. They prove nothing more than that we were caught short in the early days of the war and did our best to use what we had. Of much greater importance is the picture of the final armament which proved so effective in keeping submarines from surfacing and in beating off hundreds of plane attacks. If the story of early merchant ships sinkings even along our coasts is one of the most pathetic in the history of war, the story of the defense which our merchant ships were ultimately able to put up against enemy attacks is one of the most glorious. This defense is elequent [eloquent] testimony to the skill with which the program of arming ships was handled after centralized control and direction was established.

It has already been indicated that the program to supply gun foundations and deck strengthening was well under way long before the decision to install guns on merchant ships. The first important directive on guns was dated 27 October 1941. This directive stated the initial armament to be placed on merchant ships operating in critical areas in the event that the arming of merchant vessels was authorized. It also established relative priorities by areas of armament. The

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highest priority was to go to 40 ships operating in Area 1, the North Atlantic to Europe and Iceland. These ships were to receive two 3"/50 AA guns, four .50 cal. machine guns, and four .30 cal. machine guns. The next highest priority was to go to 100 ships operating in Area 2, the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. These ships should receive the same armament as those in area 1, except that installation of the 3"/50 forward could be delayed until such time as these guns were available. Area 3 ships were defined as those traveling along the west coast of Africa north of 10ƒ S. and included 10 ships. These ships were to have a 4"/50 S.P. aft, two 3"/23 D.P. forward and outboard, four .50 cal. and four .30 cal. machine guns. For 125 ships operating in Area 4, the East Coast of South America, Greenland, the Indian Ocean, and the West Coast of South America south of 10ƒ S. the armament was to be one 4"/50 S.P. aft, and eight .30 cal. machine guns. When .50 cal. machine guns were available, four were to replace four of the .30 cal. machine guns. The armament proposed for 110 trans Pacific ships operating west of Hawaii (Area 5) consisted of two 4"/50 S.P. guns, one forward and one aft and for the largest vessels two 3"/23 D.P. guns outboard amidships. Arming of ships in Area 5 was not to be done without specific authority, but structural work was to be accomplished as rapidly as the ships became available. This initial plan to arm 375 ships was based on the guns available or to become available in a period of four months required to arm the ships. The 5"/51 S.P. gun could be substituted for 4"/50 guns if

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the latter were not available. It was the original intention of the Navy Department to replace 5"/51, 4"/50, and 3"/23 guns with the 3"/50 AA guns in most cases and to replace .50 cal. machine guns with 20 mm guns when they became available. It was recognized that stability and structural arrangements might cause reductions in the proposed armament.32

On 4 November 1941 BuShips outlined the ammunition stowage to be provided for all types of guns listed above. Ready service ammunition stowage was itemized and reserve ammunition was expected to be about four times the amount of ready service ammunition. The ready service stowage was as follows: .30 cal. ---- 3,000 rounds, .50 cal. ---- 1,000 rounds, 3"/23 or 3"/50 ---- 48 rounds, 4"/50 ---- 25 rounds, 5"/51 ---- 25 rounds. The reserve ammunition was to be stowed in a ventilated, locked enclosure with sprinkler system below the weather deck in as cool a location as possible.33

On 18 November, the day after the repeal of the Neutrality Act, orders went out from the Chief of Naval Operations to begin arming ships according to the directive of 27 October except for ships operating in the Pacific West of Hawaii.34 On 17 November the Secretary of Commerce had amended the regulations governing explosives

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and other dangerous articles on board merchant vessels to allow the armament of ships.35 The Bureau of Ordnance issued a directive to Commandants of Naval Districts concerned with arming merchant ships which required then to maintain close liaison with local representatives of the Maritime Commission, to issue armament on loan, and to render assistance in assuring that guns were ready to operate. Spare parts, except for extractors and firing pins, would not be issued.36

The gun situation was immediately so tight that CNO modified the armament directive of 27 October four days after the installation of guns was authorized. Ships operating in the North Atlantic to Europe and Iceland and ships operating in the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean could have either two 3"/50, four .50 cal. and four .30 cal. guns or four 20 mm, four .30 cal. and one 4"/50 S.P. If the last mentioned gun was not available a 5"/51 could be installed on large ships. If neither the two 3"/50 or 20 mm guns were available at least one 3"/50 must be installed aft.37 Actually the priority demands for 20 mm guns were so great that none were available for merchant ships prior to April, 1942.38

The arming of merchant ships had hardly started when the Japanese

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struck Pearl Harbor39 and an emergency situation of the first order was created in the arming program. Two days later an emergency arming program was promulgated. It should be noted that this program did not supersede the plans for ultimate armament as embodied in the directive of 27 October; it represented an attempt to meet a crisis with limited material and to stabilize conditions until such time as adequate guns became available. All sea routes except those along the coasts of the United States and Canada and to the West Indies were divided into two groups. Area 1 included trans-Atlantic voyages to Europe, Iceland, and the Red Sea and all trans-Pacific voyages west of Hawaii. United States merchant ships operating in this area were to receive two 3"/50 AA guns where available. If such guns were not available they were to receive one single purpose gun either 3", 4", or 5". In addition they were to receive eight machine guns. Where possible they were to receive four .50 cal. guns and four .30 cal. guns, but if the .50 cal. weapon was not available all eight machine guns should be .30 cal. Plans to substitute 20 mm guns for 3"/50 guns when the latter were not available were indefinitely deferred because it was realized that it would be some time before the 20 mm gun became available for merchant ships. Other shipping routes, with the

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exceptions noted above were included in Area 2. Vessels traveling to South and Central America, to the west coast of Africa, and to Hawaii and Alaska were to receive one single purpose, 3", 4", or 5" gun and the same machine guns as were assigned to ships operating in Area 1.40 On 13 December wide authority to make on the spot decisions regarding gun locations, as well as accommodations for Armed Guards, without reference to the Material Bureaus was delegated to Commandants of Naval Districts.41

On 20 December naval vessels, coast guard vessels, merchant vessels, and Army transports (excluding vessels assigned to Local Defense Forces) were placed in the same priority for receiving 3"/50 AA guns. Assignment of guns was to be based solely on sailing dates. Only AVD's were to have a higher priority for these guns. Local Defense Force vessels were to receive 3"/23 D.P. guns until such time as other demands for the 3"/50 had been satisfied.42

The submarine menace quickly forced the Navy to extend Area 2 to include shipping routes along the coasts of the United States and Canada and to the West Indies. This decision was reached on 24 December. However, the installation of machine guns was not then authorized for ships operating in these local waters and six-pounders could be substituted for 3" guns.43

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On 24 December the decision was reached that Army and Navy transports traveling in Area 1 should have identical  armament, namely a 4" or 5" single purpose gun aft, four 3"/50 D.P. guns, and a minimum of four .50 cal. or eight .30 cal. machine guns. The armament for Area 2 Army transports was to be the same except that no 3"/50 guns were to be supplied. It is interesting to note that the original intention of the Navy was that the Army would man all guns on its transports.44

The original position of the Navy was that its responsibility for the actual installation of defense items extended only to telling the Maritime Commission what should be installed, supplying the material, and showing how the installation should be made. After repeated requests from the Maritime Commission to waive installation of various defense items because of the urgent need for the services of various ships, the Secretary of the Navy informed the Chairman of the Maritime Commission on 27 December that it was outside the province of the Navy to determine whether ships should be delayed for authorized installations. This matter was a responsibility of the Maritime Commission alone.45 Later the Navy modified its position somewhat when it decided that a Commandant of a Naval District could hold up the sailing of a vessel which was not properly degaussed. But the position

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was maintained that installation of defense items was a primary responsibility of the Commission. The position of the Maritime Commission at the beginning was that it could arm about 100 merchant ships a month,46 a figure which was later substantially increased.

In December, 1941 and January 1942 the magnitude of the task of arming merchant ships became all too clear. It also was becoming increasingly apparent that there were not enough guns available or which could be made available in the next year to do the job. The best British estimate as of 15 December, after they had armed 4,047 ships, was that their own new construction and the arming of allied merchant ships would amount to 2,935 vessels still to be armed.47 This meant that the United States would be called upon to aid in arming many allied merchant vessels. By 23 January it was estimated that 802 foreign flag vessels were available to be armed. We had armed only 108 ships to this date, including 44 United States owned foreign flag vessels. There still remained 1,126 United States vessels of over 1,000 gross tons to be armed and new construction for 1942 and 1943 was expected to swell this total to 2,926. While BuOrd late in December had estimated that 1,767 single purpose 3", 4", and 5" guns were available, including a large number not yet assembled, the

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estimate of 23 January 1942 was that 1,159 broadside guns were all that were available and that no more could be produced without interfering with AA gun production. There were 354 six pounders available. Of the 7,500 3"/50 AA guns on order, the British were to get 15%. Production of this gun had reached 125 a month by January and was expected eventually to reach 225 a month. It was expected that 1,200 would become available in 1942 and 3,555 by 1 July 1943. Deliveries of .50 and .30 cal. machine guns by the Army were insufficient to keep up with demand. The fact that 12,400 of the 20 mm guns were on order and that a contract was being negotiated for 8,000 more was of no immediate help, for production was just starting. There would be none available for merchant vessels until about the middle of of 1942. The Navy had two choices. It could arm all United States merchant vessels by the end of 1942 or it could arm its most important vessels and 40 foreign vessels a month. The decision was reached to follow the latter course and CNO recommended to the Secretary that the Maritime Commission be authorized to defer temporarily the arming of small United States merchant ships when their cargos or sailing routes placed them in a low priority.48

On 13 January the allowance for machine guns on Area 1 ships was

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cut from eight to six and for Area 2 ships from eight to either four or two, depending on such factors as size of the vessel and the nature of her cargo. The main gun on Area 2 ships could be either a 5", 4", 3", 6 pounder, 3 pounder, or 1 pounder depending on the size of the ship and the nature of her cargo.49

The decision was quickly reached that Honduran flag vessels should have the same armament as United States vessels operating in Area 2 and that Philippine ships should be armed under the same procedure as United States vessels. Unarmed foreign flag merchant vessels other than British which came to United States ports could be armed, up to 40 a month, if they met three conditions. (1) The government whose flag the ship flew must make a request direct to the Maritime Commission. (2) The Maritime Commission must recommend arming the ship. (3) The vessel must come under Lend-Lease or make other arrangements to pay for defense items other than guns and ammunition. Allied flag ships were to receive the same armament as United States ships operating in the same area. Not only did this program make necessary the deferment of the arming of small United States ships, it also made it desirable to remove guns from ships which were to be laid up for long periods so that guns could be mounted on ships which were ready for sea.50

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On January 1942 the Maritime Commission worked out a procedure for securing guns for vessels under construction. The Inspection Section of the Construction Division was to prepare a weekly report for the General Division of Shipping showing the scheduled delivery dates of vessels within the next 45 days, based upon the latest available information. The General Director of Shipping determined the allocation and trade routes and advised the Navy Department, which at first instructed the Commandant of the Naval District to stand ready to furnish guns for the vessel as required for the area involved. Soon this procedure was simplified by providing a pool of guns in each Naval District from which guns could be withdrawn for arming both new construction and vessels in operation.

With severe shortages in guns, the most careful planning by the Navy Department was necessary in order to make guns available for ships which needed them most. Of great value in planning the Monthly Progress Reports by the Maritime Commission, later broken down into a permanent Report of completed Ship Construction Contracts and a Current Report of Progress. The Ship Construction program sheets, with limited distribution, but eventually made available to Op-23L, BuShips, and BuOrd, kept the entire long range program for construction revised to date and were invaluable in making calculations as to the numbers of guns and other defense items required.

The almost daily lists of "Additional Vessels Ordered Available

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for Installation Defense Features" gave a clear picture of work to be done in the immediate future in making defense installations and enabled the Navy Department to anticipate shortages at given localities and make arrangements to relieve these shortages. Shortly after the middle of each month the Arming Merchant Vessel Section compiled a summary of gun requirements for the following month which was of great help to BuOrd in planning to satisfy these requirements.51 While there was centralized control of supplies of material in Washington, the actual arrangements for armament were made locally between representatives of the Maritime Commission and District Material Officers and / or Port Directors (later Industrial managers, and / or Port Directors). In most cases guns were issued to the representative of the Maritime Commission by the District Ordnance Officers.

Of far reaching importance was the directive from the Chief of Naval Operations on 14 February that Commandants of Naval Districts at the earliest opportunity make arrangements and prepare plans for the armament and other defense features of all United States flag or

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United States owned ships. The vessel should receive a copy of the plans and estimates so that actual armament could take place at another port if necessary.52

On the same date the armament on merchant vessels was reduced in order to meet the demands of allied nations for guns on their ships. Considerable authority was delegated to Commandants of Naval Districts to review requests for guns and to allocate them to those ships whose needs appeared most urgent. This was a departure form the established procedure that the Maritime Commission would designate the ships to be armed. Area 1 was now to include trans-Atlantic voyages to Europe and Iceland and voyages to the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and all trans-Pacific voyages west of Hawaii. Ships were divided into three categories according to deadweight tonnage. (1) Ships above 10,000 deadweight tons operating in Area 1 were to receive a 4"/50 or 5" gun aft, a 3"/50 AA gun forward, four .50 cal. and two .30 cal. machine guns. Two of the .50 cal. guns were to be mounted for firing aft, preferably near the stern. (2) Ships from 5,000 to 10,000 deadweight tons operating in this area received the same machine guns but were to have only a 4"/50 aft and no dual purpose gun forward. (3) The armament for ships in Area 1 of from 2,000 to 5,000 tons consisted of a 3"/50 AA gun aft and

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the same number of machine guns supplied to the larger ships. In all cases the .30 cal. guns were to be mounted on the bridge. Area 2 was defined to include all sea routes not included in Area 1. Area 2 ships of over 10,000 tons were to receive a 4"/50 or 5' gun aft and two .50 cal. machine guns. Ships between 5,000 and 10,000 tons received a 4"/50 aft and two .30 cal. guns on the bridge. Area 2 ships of 2,000 to 5,000 tons received a 3"/50 AA gun aft and two .30 cal. guns on the bridge. This directive was designed to conserve the supply of 4"/50 guns, since replacements were not anticipated. The Bureau of Ordinance had not yet decided to produce barrels for a number of 4" mounts, a decision which later brought a substantial increase in the number of guns available. Where gun foundations were not suited to take the guns specified above, guns should be mounted to fit the foundations already installed. It was still planned to replace some of the .50 cal. guns with two 20 mm guns per ship after 1 July 1952.53

An important conference between the director and other representatives of Fleet Maintenance Division, and BuOrd on 4 March reached several decisions regarding the arming of merchant ships. BuOrd was to to all possible to recondition 3" single purpose and 4" guns which were primarily in demand at New York, Baltimore, and New Orleans. The new 3"/50 guns were to be held as long as the 3" and 4" guns were available.

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Wherever structural conditions permitted the 5"/51 was to be installed. Vessels in the coastwise coal trade were to receive six pounders. Encouraging news came from BuOrd representatives that 20 mm guns might be available by May of June. At this time the principal difficulties in arming ships were experienced with foreign vessels not on the list to be armed. More than once the Maritime Commission had informed the Navy that such vessels fully ready to sail should have guns installed at the last moment.54 BuOrd directed on 17 April that 5"/50 or 5"/51 guns should be installed on merchant ships wherever possible so that the supply of 4"/50 guns could be conserved for smaller vessels which were unable to mount a 5" gun.55

When 20 mm guns became available much earlier that had been anticipated, CNO directed on 22 April that four should be installed on ships for North Russia, India, and Australia and that ships traveling to these areas should have the same priority for these guns as Navy ships. Area 1 vessels were to have priority over Area 2 vessels for all types of armament.56

Faced with the prospect that the existing supply of 4" and 5" single purpose guns would be exhausted by August or September and that some 3,000 additional 4" or 5" guns would be needed to meet known

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requirements through 1945, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance named a special board to consider the whole question of supplying a suitable stern gun for merchant ships. This board decided that the development of a new design would take 18 months and that new 4"/50 or 5"/51 guns could not be produced in less than a year. Accordingly, the decision was reached, after consultation with representatives of CominCh, CNO, and the General Board, that a modification of the 5"/38, Mark 30 should be installed as a temporary measure. This was a hand elevated, hand trained, power rammed gun, later superseded by the Mark 37 which was power elevated, trained, and rammed. This decision, as we have seen, raised an entirely new problem in the Armed Guard program, for each 5"/38 required a specially trained man to maintain it. The BuOrd decision was approved by CNO on 5 May. BuShips was instructed to provide the Maritime Commission with plans for deck strengthening.57

The Maritime Commission was asked on 30 April to provide the necessary gun foundations and deck strengthening for the 5"/38 on C-1 and EC-2 ships and on tankers of over 80,000 barrels. A working circle 26' in diameter should be provided so that a 5"/51 could be installed if necessary. Many vessels, notably the C-2 and C-3 types, were already being fitted to take 6" guns if necessary. It was even thought possible at this time that 5"/50 or 5"/51 broadside guns might have to

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be substituted for the 4"/50 gun on all vessels which were able to mount the larger gun.58

By 15 May the 20 mm gun situation had improved to the extent that four of these guns could now be authorized for Area 1 ships, with 1,200 rounds of ammunition per gun. Tankers to Great Britain were given the same priority as ships to North Russia, India and Australia for the installation of these guns.59

A substantial increase in the armament of ships for North Russia was ordered on 4 June 1942. Ships of over 10,000 deadweight tons were now to have eight 20 mm guns in addition to a 4"/50 or 5" stern gun and a 3"/50 AA gun forward. Ships of between 5,000 and 10,000 deadweight tons were to have the same armament except that the stern gun would be a 4"/50. The ammunition allowance for 20 mm guns was set at 2,400 per gun. Ammunition for machine guns was available at Iceland. Where the supply of 20 mm guns was not adequate and .50 cal. guns were left aboard ships for Russia the ammunition allowance was to be 2,000 rounds per gun, which was increased to 5,000 rounds on June 22.60

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By 17 June BuOrd had developed plans to procure 3,000 of the 5"/38, Mark 37 guns for merchant ships. Deliveries were to start not later than October.61 In August BuShips supplied the necessary plans for welded foundations and ready service lockers. The Navy agreed to supply the gun mount support ring for these guns.62 The first 5"/38 was placed aboard the Ralph Izard on 23 September.63 But production of the gun lagged behind expectations. By October it was estimated that only 94 would be available to the end of the year instead of  the most optimistic estimate of 178 made in the latter part of August.64 A shortage of hand wheel brackets slowed output of the Mark 30 and production of the Mark 37 was held up by the failure of the roller path lubrication system.65 It was evident that little dependence could be placed on production of this weapon prior to 1943.

Meanwhile the grim battle to supply guns to merchant ships from inadequate stocks went on with unabated fury. On 11 July a new demand for 20 mm guns came with the inclusion of waters west of Skagway in Area 1 and directions to substitute four 20 mm guns for a like number of .50 cal. weapons on these ships.66 Next day strict directions went out that all new construction and existing vessels over 10,000

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dead weight tons must take 5" guns so that the dwindling supply of 4" weapons would be saved for ships which could not take the larger gun.67 By 25 July the supply of 4"/50 and 5"/51 guns available for merchant ships had dwindled to 195.68 There were a number of 4"/51 mounts but no barrels for those mounts. It is true that BuOrd eventually decided to product new monoblock barrels for these mounts, but not until May, 1943 did the first of these become available. The hard facts were that by the end of August, 1942 there were still some 340 ships in commission to be armed, plus 68 United States owned foreign flag vessels, plus vessels being built, which to the end of the year would number 315. And the best estimate of all 4" and 5" guns which could be made available to 1 January 1943 numbered only 559. After that date it was anticipated that only 352 of the 4"/50 guns would remain unassigned and that these would only become available at the rate of 40 a month. This estimate did not include the new barrels which BuOrd later decided to manufacture. The 3"/50 AA gun situation was also tight and the supply was by no means adequate. For September alone 272 of

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these guns were needed.69

The decision was reached on 14 August to spread the existing supply of guns very thin by installing either a 5" D.P. or a 3" AA gun on each ship, but not both. Exceptions to the above were ships going to North Russia and tankers of over 80,000 barrels capacity operating to the United Kingdom. Where a 3"/50 gun was installed aft and no heavy gun was provided forward, and extra 20 mm gun was to be substituted forward. Unarmed vessels could sail in convoy where the urgency of the cargo demanded such action except to North Russia. But the supply of machine guns permitted some armament and there was the possibility of removing guns from sides of ships which were to be kept in port for some time and installing these guns on ships which were ready for sea.70 This procedure, of course, involved much extra work and it was followed only rarely.

Recognition that the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf were becoming crucial areas of operations came with the directive

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to increase the ammunition allowance for .50 cal. guns on ships operating in these areas from 1,000 to 3,000 rounds on 19 August.71 As the output of 20 mm guns continued to be good, it was possible to place more of these guns on ships operating in dangerous areas. By 22 September 610 merchant ships had received 2,388 of these guns.72 Installation of the .30 cal. guns was stopped on Area 1 ships on 7 October and orders were issued to remove these guns from ships which were supplied with four .50 cal. and four 20 mm guns.73 Ships operating to the Mediterranean or Red Seas after 9 October were to be supplied with eight 20 mm guns if they were over 5,000 deadweight tons. In addition, ships of from 5,000 to 10,000 deadweight tons were to receive a 3"/50 AA gun where structure permitted. Ammunition allowances were increased for the Red Sea and the Mediterranean theaters. The allowance for each 3"/50 was now 150 rounds and for each 20 mm 2,400 rounds. Ships for these areas were given the same priority for guns and other defense installations as ships for North Russia.74 On 29 October the same armament changes were ordered for ships sailing to the

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Persian Gulf and to India,75 and on 6 and 14 November for ships sailing to the United Kingdom.76 The ammunition allowance for 20 mm guns on ships sailing to North Russia from Iceland was increased to 5,000 per gun on 26 October. Ammunition in excess of 2,400 rounds per gun was to be left at Iceland on the return trip.77

The operating areas where danger of attack was most likely, including North Russia, the United Kingdom, West Africa, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean were designated Area 1-A on 14 November. All new construction on the East and Gulf coasts was to be fitted to mount the armament approved for the most dangerous areas.78 Waters west of Hawaii and Alaskan waters west of Skagway were included in Area 1-A on 7 December 1942, but the ammunition allowance for 20 mm guns in these waters was to be only 1,200 rounds per gun. The allowance for .50 cal. guns

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was set at 3,000 rounds.79

The question of armament for freighters which were to carry up to 200 troops came up in the fall of 1942. It was decided that such ships should have a four or five inch gun, two three inch fifties, and eight 20 mm guns. Deck stiffening should be provided for four 3"/50 guns.80 The 3"/50 was authorized for eventual installation on C-2 cargo ships and the various subclasses. The installation of two 20 mm guns inboard on the bridges of C-1 and C-1-B ships in operation and building was also authorized with the stipulation that they be located well aft of existing guns for the purpose of repelling low flying planes.81

When the Maritime Commission informed the Arming Merchant Ships Section in November of its building plans through 1944 it became evident that the new ships could only receive the approved armament if there was a marked increase in the production of 5"/38 and 3"/50 guns. According to these figures, 132 cargo ships and tankers would be produced to the end of the year. For 1943 new cargo ships and tankers would number 1,769 and for 1944 the rate of production would reach 157 a month. The best estimate at this time was that 1,143 ships would require guns up to 1 July 1943 and that they would need 1.165 four

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or five inch guns and 1,578 three inch fifties.82 Various expedients were tried in an effort to make more guns available. BuOrd removed ten 5"/51 guns from the battleship Pennsylvania and a like number from the Idaho.83 BuOrd was authorized to reduce the pool of battle damage 4"/50 guns from 50 to 10 and to have the remaining 10 relined and ready for installation on merchant ships.84 Early in 1943, twenty-nine 4"/50 and six 5"/51 guns were located in the Hawaiian area and these guns eventually became available for merchant ships.85 The removal of 5" broadside guns from 28 AP's made these guns available for merchant ships.86 Although a few 5"/38 guns were becoming available, they were not sufficient to take care of the demands of new construction. In fact, a directive went out on 4 January 1943 to install a 3"/50 on the stern when the larger guns were no longer available. It might become necessary to transfer a 3"/50 to the stern and place a 20 mm forward as its substitute. But ships of over 5,000 deadweight tons for Russia, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and large tankers for the United

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Kingdom were to receive the full armament which had been authorized.87 One of the problems encountered initially with the few 5"/38 guns which were becoming available was the installation of gasoline powered generators. Strict instructions were issued not to stow gasoline tanks below ready service boxes as had been done on four ships.88 Steps were taken to enable the quick disposal of such gasoline tanks if the ship caught fire.

Not until January, 1945 did gun production catch up with the demands for armament for merchant ships. By 18 February 1943 there was a shortage of 494 three inch fifty and 85 four and five inch guns.89 Although 2,621 ships had been armed to 15 March 1943, some 3,880 ships, plus ships of our allies, would require guns in 1943 and 1944.90 By 20 April 1943 the shortage of 3"/50 guns was 452, of which 177 had been installed on the sterns of ships when 4" and 5" guns were not available.91 Deliveries of new gun barrels for surplus 4"/50 mounts started in May,92 and by July these guns were scheduled to become

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available at the rate of about 50 per month for the rest of the year. Not until December, 1943 was production of the 5"/38, Mark 37 scheduled to reach 150 a month, a figure which was to continue through 1944.93 The requirements for guns eased somewhat in the later part of 1943 with the decision to transfer 200 Liberty ships armed only with six 20 mm guns to Britain in the next ten months.94 In July, 1943 the shortage of 3"/50 guns stood at 394 of which 382 had been installed on the stern of ships because of the lack of larger guns.95 By August the situation was such that 3"/50 guns were ordered placed on the bows of Area 1-A ships which had formerly mounted only a 20 mm gun in that position.96 The worst of the shortage was over by early 1944,97 and the last reported shortage on 24 January 1945 was for only five 3"/50 guns.98 It should be pointed out that the gun shortage would have been somewhat more severe had it not been for the installation of a number of 3"/23 guns and the mounting of six pounders on Area 2 vessels and concrete barges. To 30 June 1943 one hundred and eleven of the former had been installed. The six pounders had been mounted on 102 Area 2 ships by August, 1944 and had been authorized for 15 or

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more concrete barges and Area 2 ships under construction.99

The ammunition situation was showing such improvement by the middle of 1943 that an allowance of 60 rounds per 20 mm gun was authorized for target practice every sixty days in addition to the required short burst each morning for testing the guns.100 The Navy also made arrangements for emergency issue of ammunition to ships outside the continental United States.101

On 22 September 1943 BuOrd was authorized to issue two .30 cal. rifles and 300 rounds of ammunition per rifle to each ship. These rifles were principally used for sinking drifting mines. The 20 mm guns could not be depressed sufficiently to bear on such objects.102

The rearming of merchant ships to carry troops created a heavy demand for additional 3"/50 guns. By November , 1943 there were plans to rearm some 230 ships for this purpose. Already BuOrd had been instructed to supply 600 guns for transports and for replacing the 20 mm guns which had been temporarily mounted in lieu of the 3"/50 guns.103 On 20 November it was decided that ships carrying from 201 to 500 troops should have a five or four inch stern gun, two 3"/50 guns aft, one 3"/50 forward, and eight 20 mm guns.104

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In view of the BuOrd estimates of guns available and the prospect that 2,086 new ships would be built in 1944, it was directed on 18 January 1944 that 3"/50 guns installed on the sterns of cargo ships and tankers not be replaced with larger guns. This directive did not apply to ships fitted for carrying troops. Such ships must have a 4" or 5" stern gun.105 This directive meant that 5"/38 guns would be available for Liberty ships under construction, but they would have to transfer electric power to the gun from the engine room until such time as generators became available. A buzzer and a red light were installed in the engine room of such ships so that the engineer could receive the signal to switch power to the gun.106 These guns were also available for C-1-A and C-1-B ships by 1 March 1944.107

Certain foreign nations were attempting to improve armament on their merchant ships. The Russians desired to exchange .50 cal. guns for 20 mm guns. The Maritime Commission was requested by Op-23L not to authorize such an exchange for Russian ships in the Pacific where no air attacks were likely. The installation of 20 mm guns was approved for Dutch and Norwegian ships which were operating in Area 1-A and, therefore, in areas where heavy air attacks were encountered.108

The construction program for 1945 remained at best tentative.

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On 3 February 1944 BuOrd was instructed to plan on the completion of 125 large merchant ships in January, 1945 and on the construction of 100 a month for the rest of 1945.109 As a matter of fact this estimate was too high. By 9 February 1945 new construction planned for 1945 and 1946 numbered only 964 ships.110 Of great importance in dealing with such an uncertain situation was the decision reached on 18 March 1944 to establish by 30 June 1945 a pool of 500 five inch guns above the construction program and in addition to BuOrd spares and to have a similar pool of 2,500 three inch fifty guns. This plan was to be reviewed every three months, beginning on 1 July 1944.111 This pool was reduced to 250 five inch thirty-eight and 750 three inch fifty guns on 21 October 1944.112

Through much of 1944 and 1945 the arming of merchant ships proceeded smoothly. The battle for guns had been won. Emphasis shifted to the installation of a simple and effective device for aiming the guns. The development of the cartwheel sight and of effective methods for the use of this device was largely the work of the Armed Guard Gunnery School, New Orleans.

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It was adopted as the standard sight for the 20 mm, the 3"/50 and the 5"/38. This sight was developed early in the war for the 20 mm and the only serious difficulty with this type gun came when BuOrd changed the Mark IV sight to a Mark V sight which did not have a suitable eyepiece. On 20 April 1944 a directive went to BuOrd to replace the Mark V with the Mark IV sight.113 As a result of experiments in 1943 by officers at the Armed Guard schools the Mark IV cartwheel sight was also adapted to the 3"/50 AA and the 5"/38 D.P. guns. Plans were made early in 1944 to install this sight on all dual purpose guns. Existing picket fence or optical ring sights were unsatisfactory. Besides, there was great need to have one uniform method of gunnery instruction which could only be effected if uniform methods of firing were adopted. The sights for the 3"/50 were about ready for distribution by the first of April. CNO directed that ships for the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean, North Russia, and finally all other Area 1-A ships should have priority for the installation of the sights. By 31 March 1944 BuOrd was ready to have the Navy Yard at New York begin manufacture of the cartwheel sight brackets for 5"/38 guns.114 The war ended before this simple but effective sight was installed on the guns of all merchant ships.

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Even before the Armed Guard program reached its peak about September, 1944 plans were beginning to liquidate the program when peace came. On 27 April 1944 CNO refused to sanction the substitution of 20 mm guns for .50 cal. guns on Area 2 ships.115 On 23 May 1944 the authorized armament on 25 ships assigned permanently to Area 2 by the Maritime Commission was reduced to a stern gun and two 20 mm guns mounted on the wings of the bridge. The later were retained to avoid the trouble and time of installing the .50 cal. or .30 cal. guns authorized for Area 2 ships and the Armed Guard crew was reduced to one officer and nine men.116

By the middle of 1944 there was a move to declare the existing stocks of four and five inch single purpose guns and the six pounders obsolete. CNO on 9 June concurred in a BuOrd recommendation that six pounder guns and mounts be declared obsolete, but requested that a sufficient number of these guns be retained to arm concrete merchant ships and barges authorized for construction by the Maritime Commission.117 No doubt the CominCh directive of 30 June was responsible for the movement to scrap four and five inch single purpose guns. CominCh directed that 4"/50 and 5"/51 single purpose not be replaced on merchant ships, but that in the future dual purpose guns, preferably

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5"/38 be installed when practicable on merchant ships.118 On 3 July CNO (Op-05G) granted permission to BuOrd to declare 4"/50, 5"/51, and 5"/50 assemblies obsolete at discretion. Parts could be used to maintain mounts on 1,685 merchant ships.119 While BuOrd authorized the use of such guns as spares to maintain guns already installed,120 they were generally held in reserve until the end of the war. The Arming Merchant Ships Section insisted throughout that these guns be kept in reserve until the end of the war. In February, 1945 it recommended that all stripping and scrapping of these guns be stopped.121

Area 1-A, where vessels were subject to air, surface, and submarine attacks, and including European, African, Asiatic, and Australian waters, remained unchanged for a considerable period of time prior to the redefinition of areas on 15 November 1944. During this same period Area 2 consisted of the less dangerous area of the western Atlantic and Pacific waters east of Skagway and the Hawaiian Islands.122 The final approved armament which proved so effective in these areas should be summarized before we consider the changes in combat areas which our successes in war enabled us to make.

I   Cargo and Tank Ships for Area 1-A

(a) Over 10,000 D.W.T.

1- 5" or 4" stern gun (but if neither was available a

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3"/50 D.P. gun should be installed and should be considered as final armament)
1 - 3"/50 D.P. bow gun
8 - 20 mm guns, four on each side as equally spaced as possible
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
4 - .45 Colt pistols

New Construction C-1-A and C-1-B ships of 9,100 D.W.T. were given the 5"/38 D.P. gun and the full allowance of 20 mm guns even though by weight they did not come strictly under this class.

(b) 5,000 to 10,000 D.W.T.

1 - 4"/50 stern gun (but if not available a 3"/50 could be substituted as the final armament)
4 to 8 - 20 mm guns depending on structural conditions
1 - 3"/50 D.P. bow gun where structural conditions permitted
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
4 - .45 Colt pistols

(c) 2,000 to 5,000 D.W.T.

1 - 3"/50 D.P. stern gun
4 - 20 mm guns
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
4 - .45 Colt pistols

(d) Ocean-going Tugs

1 - 3"/50 D.P. stern gun
2 - 20 mm guns
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
2 - .45 Colt pistols

II  Cargo and tank ships for Area 2 (where attack by submarine and surface vessels was possible)

(a) Over 10,000 D.W.T.

1 - 5" or 4" stern gun (but if neither was available a 3"/50 D.P. should be installed as final armament)
2 - .50 cal. machine guns
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
4 - .45 Colt pistols

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(b) 5,000 to 10,000 D.W.T.

1 - 4"/50 stern gun (but if not available a 3"/50 D.P. should be installed as the final armament)
2 - .30 cal. machine guns
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
4 - .45 Colt pistols

(c) 2,000 to 5,000 D.W.T.

1 - 3"/50 D.P. or S.P. stern gun
2 - .30 cal. machine guns
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
4 - .45 Colt pistols

(d) Ocean-going Tugs

1 - 3"/23 gun
2 - .50 cal. machine guns
2 - .30 Springfield rifles
2 - .45 Colt pistols123

On 21 March 1944 CominCh (10th fleet) assumed responsibility for determining combat areas.124 Acting on his recommendations of 6 November, CNO on 15 November enlarged Area 2, and limited Area 1-A to the west coast of Greenland, Iceland, North Russia, Finland, Norway, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the north and west coasts of France, northern Spain, Portugal, Siberia, Japan, China, the Philippine Islands, the Dutch East Indies, the Admiralty Islands, Guadalcanal, French Indo-China, Siam, Australia, Burma, the east coasts of India and Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements. Vessels scheduled to operate in Area 2 were to keep their Area 1-A armament and a complement

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of one officer and nine men. Tankers operating in Area 2 as escort oilers were to have a full Area 1-A Armed Guard crew. Vessels were to be ready in all respects to shift from Area 2 to Area 1-A as soon as additional personnel were added. All new construction was to receive Area 1-A armament. Tank ships operating in the Indian Ocean were to have Area 1-A crews in preparation for possible operation task of 80ƒE. This directive made it necessary to build up pools of Armed Guard personnel in various parts of the world so that Port Directors could quickly convert Area 2 ships to Area 1-A duty. Especially were pools at Pearl harbor and Balboa increased for this purpose. The pool at Pearl Harbor was increased by 200 men and the pool at Balboa by 100 men.125 This change in combat areas was expected to reduce the input of men into the Armed guard by 800 a month and to make 1,200 men a month available for other duty.126

On 10 January 1945 CNO directed that vessels armed for Area 1-A could remove four 20 mm guns from their cradles and stow below while operating in the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and the Pacific east of 160ƒ E. But two 20 mm guns should be mounted on the bridge and two aft. All 20 mm guns should be mounted and ready for action upon entering the Mediterranean and Red Seas and in Pacific waters west of 160ƒ E. All guns should also be mounted upon return to a United States continental port and should

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be test fired when departing the United States and before stowing below.127

In compliance with directions from CominCh of 14 February 1945,128 CNO redefined the combat areas on 22 February. Area 2 was now extended to include New Guinea and the East Coast of Australia and the United Kingdom and west coast of Europe up to Belgium.129 On 18 May Belgian ports were included in Area 2.130

With the defeat of Germany, CominCh directed another redefinition of combat areas on 28 May.131 The new areas became effective 5 June, and are indicated on the attached chart in the appendices. It will be seen that the whole world was divided into four areas. Area 1-A still consisted of areas where air, surface, and submarine attacks were probable and included Siberia, Japan, Korea, Manchuria, China, French Indo China, the Dutch East Indies except New Guinea, the Straits Settlements, Siam, Burma, and the north coast of Australia. Area 2-A was defined as the area in which submarine and surface attacks were probable. It included Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, New Guinea, the islands of the Central and South Pacific, the east, south, and west coasts of Australia, and the east coasts of Ceylon and India. Area 2-B in which submarine and surface attacks were possible but highly improbable included the

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west coasts of Canada, the United States, and Central America, and the west coasts of Ceylon and India. It also included Iran, Arabia as far as Aden, the east and south coasts of Africa from the south end of the Red Sea to Capetown, and the islands in the Indian Ocean. Area 3 was the area in which practically no probability of enemy attack existed. It included the Atlantic, Artic, and Antarctic Oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, and the Pacific Ocean east of longitude 82ƒ W. For Area 3 and Area 2-B ships armament was to be placed in a maintenance status with a maintenance crew of a gunner's mate and a seaman first class. The disarming of ships originally armed with a stern gun and two machine guns was authorized of they were to operate permanently in Area 3. The Armed Guard on Area 2-A ships was to consist of one officer and nine men and on Area 1-A ships there was to be no change in complement. Port Said, Egypt, and Balboa became key pools for furnishing men to Area 3 and Area 2-B ships when assigned to a voyage in a more dangerous area. Pools at Pearl Harbor, Saipan, Ulithi, Samar, Hollandia, Manus, Brisbane, Sydney, and Freemantle became important in supplying men to ships which were to change from Area 2-A to 1-A. All new construction cargo and tank ships were to be armed for Area 1-A unless designated for immediate and permanent operation in Area 3.132

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The accepted ammunition allowance for all Area 1-A ships by the end of the war was: 5"/38 -- 160 rounds, 3"/50 -- 252 rounds, 20 mm -- 5,040 rounds. The ammunition carried by these ships weighed 22.9 long tons.133

The record show that the Navy supplied 53,278 guns of all types to merchant ships and Army transport vessels during the war. Of this number 4,827 were lost with the ships sunk by enemy action.134 Guns represented one of the great bottlenecks in the Armed Guard program. But toward the end of the war all merchant ships were adequately armed and were able to give a good account of themselves in combat. The Nation should never face another war with inadequate supplies of guns for its merchant ships. In another place we shall discuss the many problems connected with disarming the surviving ships of the 6,236 which were armed.

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Protection of the Sea Chests

The protection of sea chests on ships constructed after 1936 required no further attention after the ship left the building yard, for the chests were made of steel and some were reinforced with concrete. But ships constructed prior to 1936 presented special problems because sea chests were constructed of cast iron and were, therefore, vulnerable to damage from underwater explosions of all types. Even before our entry into the war, we secured information that a number of ships of other nations had either been lost or subjected to severe flooding through the carrying away of cast iron hull fittings as a result of the whip from mine or near miss bomb explosions.

On 27 May 1941 BuShips drew up instructions for strengthening sea chests on merchant ships which were acquired for conversion to naval auxiliaries and on 29 August these instructions were forwarded to the Maritime Commission by the Secretary of the Navy as the desired procedure for the reinforcement of sea chests and sea valves on merchant ships constructed prior to 1936. The instructions contained in this letter were reaffirmed on 27 October and remained the basic directive on the subject.135 Pertinent sections of the BuShips letter are quoted:

"Secure the entire sea chest, valve, valve bonnet, and pipe adjacent to the valve, rigidly to the ship's side. This is best done by steel straps, secured to the chest, valve, etc. and to the shell. These straps must be tight and of ample strength and rigidity so that any tendency of the fittings to move in any direction relative

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to the shell will be immediately resisted by the straps. Any motion of such a cast iron body relative to the shell will probably result in fracture, due to the inherent weakness of cast iron in tension, and flooding will result."

"After these straps have been installed, the entire chest and valve should be imbedded in concrete up to the flange of the bonnet (so as to still permit overhauling the valve). If the arrangement permits, the flange to which the adjacent pipe is secured need not be embedded in concrete; however, in some cases it may be necessary to carry the concrete past the flange and along the pipe a short distance. Where frames and longitudinals form a convenient pocket, this should be filled up solid. Steel reinforcement rods (about 1/2 inch diameter on 6-inch centers will be suitable) should be secured to the shell, to floors, frames, and longitudinals. These reinforcing rods should run in three ways: normal to the shell, fore-and-aft, and athwartships. Rods normal to the shell should have their inboard ends hooked, anchoring them to concrete. The entire mass of concrete should be held down firmly on top by angle bars or I beams run between frames and longitudinals or by other suitable means. These angle bars or beams should be put in position after the concrete has set, and should be held down firmly against it by bolts secured to the frames and longitudinals in such a way as to exert an initial pressure. The purpose of this concrete is to back up the cast iron shell and to aid it in resisting fracture due to the 'pressure wave' of the explosion."

Regulations of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of 28 January 1942 provided for either one automatic non-return valve with a positive means of closing it from a position above the freeboard deck or for two automatic non-return valves without positive means of closing, with the upper valve accessible for ready examination.

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Armed Guard Berthing and Messing Facilities and Life Saving Equipment

The requirements for Armed Guard and communication personnel on merchant ships did not remain stable, but were constantly increasing as more and better guns were supplied to the ships. The requirements were at first for one officer and 8 men, but this complement was soon increased to 15 men, later to 21, and finally to 27 men, 24 of who were gunners. The large troop transports carried from 47 to 59 men and from 3 to 4 officers. For ships already built there were naturally great difficulties in arranging adequate living facilities for men of the Navy. For ships yet to be built changes in pans had to to be made in order to meet the needs of the Armed Guard. It goes without saying that there could be little uniformity in quarters on ships already constructed. Often individual ships presented special problems which had to be solved in a special way. But throughout basic policies were being applied wherever possible and these policies merit discussion. It can be said that by the end of the war Navy personnel were being quartered in comfort, but that during the early part of the war their quarters often left much to be desired.

Early Navy directives concerning Armed Guard crew quarters were very vague and merely stated that additional berthing and messing facilities would have to be provided when guns were installed.136 On 13 December 1941 the policy was established that gun crews should

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be accommodated near their gun stations. At this time it was directed that four men should be housed in the forecastle if possible, and four men for the after gun should be housed in the poop. Gun crews should be berthed above the water line, as high as possible, to permit ready access to guns. Quarters for the communication detail should be provided near the bridge. The Armed Guard Commanding Officer should also be quartered near the bridge.137 It soon proved impracticable to berth Armed Guard personnel forward on the average merchant ship. They were generally berthed amidships and aft. The preferred location for their quarters were the deck house structures. It finally became definite policy that Armed Guards should not be quartered in the forecastle or in the extreme forward part of the ship. They were not to be quartered below the deep load line.

The problem caused serious concern to the Maritime Commission as well as the Navy. On 20 April 1943 a Crew Quarters Committee was established to deal with the intricate problems involved and to make recommendations.138 The policy of the Maritime Commission was to provide Armed Guard quarters on new construction in accordance with latest Navy Department directives where this could be done without interference with delivery schedules. It was definite policy that superstructures should not be increased except in the most exceptional circumstances. Further additions of top side weight could not be

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accepted, since in many instances it had already been necessary to ballast vessels. The Maritime Commission was willing to accept additional loss of cargo space in order to comply with Navy Department directives.139

By the end of 1942 the Maritime Commission was providing quarters for an officer and 27 men on all new construction.140 In view of the crowded and uncomfortable conditions on older ships, Port Directors were directed on 5 June 1943 to look into the crew quarters and messing facilities on each ship where the Armed Guard officer reported unsatisfactory conditions. The policy was announced that Armed Guards, especially on Area 1-A ships, should have a mess separate from the merchant crew and that this mess should be able to accommodate them in not more than two sittings. In all cases where improvements in messing and berthing facilities were warranted, the Port Director should take up the matter with the local War Shipping Administration representative. Improvements were to be carried out if the sailing of the ship would not thereby be delayed.141 Navy policy was that Navy enlisted personnel should have about the same amount of deck space as was assigned unlicensed personnel of the merchant crew. Washroom facilities were to be divided between the Armed Guard and merchant crew on the basis of approximately the same number of men per facility.142

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In 1943 there was danger that Army personnel or passengers would encroach upon the space assigned to the Armed Guard and thereby prevent the Navy personnel from fully carrying out their responsibilities in defending the ship. On 19 June the Maritime Commission was requested to quarter Navy gunners and Army tankmen separately on C4-S-B1 ships. The Armed Guard was to have a separate mess.143 The assignment of passengers or Army personnel to the Armed Guard Commanders quarters was strongly disapproved.144

The Navy disapproved assigning Armed Guard quarters over hatches where there was great danger from explosion.145 The quartering of all Armed Guards in one area of the ship was also opposed, or there was danger that the entire group might be wiped out and the ship left without personnel for its defense.

By 23 December 1943 Navy policy on Armed Guard accommodations had been crystallized and remained substantially unchanged for the rest of the war. Each man was to have 20 square feet of deck area and 130 cubic feet of space. Spaces between tiers of bunks should permit quick exit in case of emergency. There should be two exits to crew quarters and interior doors should be fitted with knock out panels. There should be adequate room for lockers and necessary gear. Toilet facilities should be provided on the basis of one toilet and shower per 10 men and one washbasin for eight men. The separate mess room and pantry for Armed Guards should be independent

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of their sleeping quarters, as should coffee urns, steam tables, dishwashing facilities, and refrigerators. Officers were to have accommodations equivalent to those of ship officers on the upper decks as close to the bridge as possible. A storeroom for Armed Guard gear should be at least 72 square feet of deck space.146

For ships operating in Area 2 but armed for Area 1-A it was necessary to keep quarters for the full Armed Guard crew readily available. One room and separate toilet and wash facilities amidships were retained for occupancy of communication and Armed Guard personnel, not to exceed six men. The remaining Armed Guards were berthed aft with separate toilet and wash facilities. In Liberty Ships having and enlarged deck house aft, the Armed Guard was berthed in that deck house to a maximum of 14 and use of the amidships room was eliminated. It was no longer necessary to berth the Armed Guard in tiers of three. Messing accommodations remained unchanged. Rooms vacated by the Armed Guard were used for transportation of military or civilian passengers, but not for ship's personnel. They were to be in the custody of the master and ready for instant use by the Armed Guard if the ship was shifted back to Area 1-A.147

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Life Saving Equipment

Every effort was made to furnish Armed Guards with the simplest and yet most effective life saving equipment possible. Every effort was also made to prevent dangerous equipment from falling into the hands of Armed Guards, as for example, rubber life saving suits. On 17 November 1941 the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation amended its general rules and regulations to provide that cargo and tank ships carrying Armed Guards should carry sufficient life saving rafts to accommodate all persons on board with a minimum of four life rafts and in cases where there were not complete lifeboat accommodations on each side of the ship for all persons on board, an extra lifeboat.148 On 26 November SecNav recommended that the Maritime Commission supply this extra equipment on ships which were armed, subject to reimbursement by the transfer of funds.149 On 10 December the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation suspended enforcement of the regulation concerning an extra lifeboat, at the request of the Navy Department.150 Thenceforth extra life saving equipment consisted of the life rafts rigged for quick release and so arranged that they would be automatically released from the vessel when in a sinking condition.

The Maritime Commission also supplied Navy type life jackets to all Armed Guards and members of the ship's crew assisting in operating the guns. The jackets were provided at the time the guns

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were installed.151 These jackets were filled with kapok and were reversible. They were comfortable to wear and supported a man he was knocked overboard in a wounded or unconscious condition. The Bureau of Marine Inspection, Coast Guard required a whistle, a knife, and a light for each life jacket. For a time Armed Guard officers secured these items for Navy personnel on loan from the ship. Later the Navy issued the lights and whistles, but Armed Guards furnished their own knives.152 BuShips also made life preservers available to Port Directors for issue to Armed Guards when the Maritime Commission was unable to supply the Navy type preserver.153

The Navy consistently opposed use of rubber life saving suits. They were cumbersome and far too heavy to permit strenuous exertion for more than a short period of time. There was too much loss of time in putting on the suits. They were easily punctured during action. They frequently cracked or split or leaked in the closures or around the neck band. Such a suit would quickly fill with water and pull a man under. They made it difficult, if not impossible for a man to submerge to escape burning oil on the surface. Armed Guard officers were ordered not to accept the suits for themselves or men when they were offered by the Army or War Shipping Administration.154

On 4 December 1941 the Bureau of Ordnance authorized the issue of 35 steel helmets to merchant vessels for Armed Guard crews and

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merchant seamen acting as ammunition handlers. Telephone talker type helmets were authorized for each exposed telephone position on 16 January 1943.155 From the beginning of the war merchant officers and other merchant crewmen were supplied with helmets if they were required to be topside during action. On 18 June 1942 a steel helmet and gas mask had been authorized for every person on board ships for North Russia.156 Formal recognition that all merchant officers and all merchant crew assisting in the defense of the ship should have helmets on all Area 1-A ships came in the VCNO directive of 12 January 1943.157 This followed a conference at the Maritime Commission on 4 December 1942.158 In the spring of 1944 the Navy was supplying steel helmets for all personnel on merchant ships going to the United Kingdom.159

On 20 December 1941 CNO authorized BuShips to make available the Navy Diaphragm Optical gas mask to Armed Guards and the Navy Civilian type to non-naval personnel on merchant ships. Masks were to be issued to ships operating to the United Kingdom, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Philippine-Malaya area.160 Directions were given to issue gas masks to all personnel bound for North Russia on 18 June 1942 and on 13 January 1943 the Persian Gulf, India, and the Pacific west of Hawaii were included in the operating areas which were to receive gas masks.161

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On 21 January 1943 the Navy authorized the issue of protective ointment for all hands on merchant ships.162 The Navy also supplied protective clothing, consisting of an oilskin coat, trousers, gloves, southwester, and rubber sea boots for each Armed Guard officer and men on ships operating in the United Kingdom.163 The issue of rubber gloves and sea boots was discontinued on 17 May 1945.164

The Navy held firm to its policy that decontamination was a responsibility of the master and not of the Armed Guard officer. Masters were furnished with a copy of Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 7: Anti-Gas Precautions for Merchant Shipping (2d edition). Training of the merchant crew in decontamination procedure was a responsibility of the master and the War Shipping Administration. The Army supplied some decontamination material to the WSA.165 The Navy did issue a booklet, Gas -- Know Your Chemical Warfare to Armed Guard officers with directions to instruct their crews in the material contained therein.166

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Darkening Ship

It was essential that merchant ships be effectively blacked out at sea. One exposed light could endanger a whole convoy. Darkness was a very effective defense operating on the side of merchant ships. Torpedo attacks could not be successful unless the enemy submarine could find a target. For this reason the use of Snowflake flares was, we shall see, not successful. Such flares converted convoys into clearly outlined targets and made the job of the enemy submarine commander much easier.

On 4 November 1941 the Bureau of Ships outlined to the Maritime Commission the basic steps to be taken to darken merchant ships. These measures should be as simple as possible. All illumination not absolutely essential for operating the ship should be eliminated by removing light bulbs or de-energizing sections of the lighting circuit. When illumination was essential for the operation of the ship it must not be visible from any outside observation point. All doors, windows, and air ports which could be seen from an outside observation point should be painted inside and out with at least two coats of black paint, or should be fitted with light metal dead lights or covers. Air ports essential for ventilation should have light excluding airport covers. Outside doors opening into illuminated compartments should be protected by double curtains of heavy light excluding material which should be rigged so as to form a light lock. Experience later indicated that these curtains should be at least 2'3" apart so that it would be difficult to pen both curtains

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at the same time. The installation of blue lights in passageways, messing compartments, and access routes was recommended, but this recommendation was later changed to blue or red lights. Where practicable lights to be used during darkness were to be on a separate circuit from those used during daylight. Each vessel should have a blue stern light visible from right astern to two points on either quarter for a distance of 800 yards. Later it was provided that this light should be visible for 12 points on the compass for a distance of 1,000 yards. It was necessary for Port Directors to check these lights, for some of them were visible for more than one half mile on clear nights.167

Another effective means of blacking out exterior doors was to install automatic cut-off light switches. The Maritime Commission installed these on new construction and on older ships. When these were installed on the hinged side of the door there were difficulties because they often failed to work. But when installed opposite the hinged side of the door they worked perfectly.

On 13 December Operations directed that provision be made for dimming masthead, range, and side lights so that they would not be visible for more than a mile. There should be provision for turning off the range light  (on the after mast) when the other navigational lights were in use. Navigational lights were to be turned on and off from the bridge.168

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These recommendations were forwarded to the Maritime Commission two days later with the additional suggestion that locked switches be provided for turning off the range and white stern lights when masthead and side lights were in use.169 On 27 August 1943 Operations directed that, in addition to the blue stern light, there should also be a cluster of white lights screened so as to direct the light downward on the ship's wake. These lights were to be used in thick fog. In addition there should be an anchor light fitted with an overhead screen so that the light would be cut off at an angle of between 5 and 10 degrees above the horizon. The visibility of this light should not exceed one mile.170 Toward the end of the war the Maritime Commission installed two red aircraft warning lights on merchant ships operating to the forward areas in the Pacific. But this installation did not become a Naval Defense Item.171

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Painting Ships

The Secretary of the Navy on 26 November 1941 recommended to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission that merchant ships sailing into areas designated in his letter of 27 October be painted a dark gray except where black was already used, as on the hull, stack, and spars. This was to be a defense item, with the cost of material taken from defense funds and transferred to the Maritime Commission. Labor costs, however, should be borne by the ship owner.172 This letter was modified on 29 November in that the color of the paint was not specified. Detection of vessels on the high seas should be made more difficult by the use of "proper colors and shades of paints." The matter of color was thus left entirely with the Maritime Commission since it was understood that the Commission had considerable information on the subject and had been painting its own ships with proper war paint.173 On 12 December 1941 the Maritime Commission recommended that all merchant vessels of United States registry of 1,000 gross tons and over, operating in foreign, coastwise, and intercoastal trade should be painted in approved, non-reflecting colors pursuant to instructions which could be obtained from District Offices of the Commission at New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Seattle. Vessels operating in intercoastal and foreign trade were to have all exterior identification and distinguishing marks removed. Portable name boards

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were to be used when entering and departing port.174 The Navy finally agreed to accept as a defense item the charge for labor for applying the first coat of neutral gray paint where shore labor was employed to expedite the painting of the vessel, when so ordered by Naval Representatives. The Navy would not accept the charge for labor which involved the service of the ship's crews.175 On 1 June 1942, the Maritime Commission had issued an order that the cost of first painting should be borne by the Government. Subsequent painting should be for owner's or operator's account except when the vessel was bareboat chartered to the War Shipping Administration.176

The Navy continued to leave the matter of color up to the Maritime Commission and the color used was gray. BuShips on 17 February 1942 recommended that vessels not under Navy jurisdiction be painted in accordance with Maritime Commission schemes, using slate gray on vertical surfaces and deck gray on horizontal surfaces and using paint to conform to Maritime Commission specifications. The Secretary of the Navy recommended on 25 April 1942 that ships on the North Atlantic run to Europe should have their vertical surfaces painted a light gray with a reflectivity of about 27%. Vessels operating where the primary menace was from submarine and the weather was generally clear, such as the Eastern and Western seaboards of the United States, the Caribbean, and the South Atlantic, should have their vertical surfaces painted a gray with a reflectivity of about 18%. For all situations where the vessels were subject to detection from aircraft or where aircraft might

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be expected to act as scouts for submarines, the vertical surfaces should be painted with a dark gray having a reflectivity of about 9%. The horizontal surfaces of all vessels should be painted a dark gray having a reflectivity of about 7%. The Navy did not wish to recommend dazzle patterns for specific designs of merchant ships.177 The order issued by the Maritime Commission on 1 June 1942 provided that all merchant ships, ocean-going tugs, and ocean-going barges of 500 tons or over operating in the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, or Caribbean waters should have their horizontal surfaces painted the same color as was prescribed for merchant ships generally. Their vertical surfaces should be painted a lighter gray than previously prescribed with a reflectivity of about 27%. Merchant ships, ocean-going tugs, and ocean-going barges of 500 tons or over operating coastwise in the Pacific or Alaskan waters should have the same color as vessels operating in the Atlantic, but ships operating in pacific waters, other than coastwise and Alaskan, should be painted the color currently prescribed for merchant ships generally.178 In practice ships were painted gray without too much worry about the proper shade. After all, it was impossible to divide ships into hard and fast categories according to operating areas, for ships frequently shift from one ocean to another on a single voyage.

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Barrage Balloons

Acting on a British request that anti-aircraft barrage balloons be installed on merchant ships for North Russia as protection against low flying enemy planes, the Secretary of the Navy informed the Chairman of the Maritime Commission on 11 June 1942 that BuAer would provide two balloons and two towing wires of 3,000 feet each for installation on ships undertaking the hazardous journey to Murmansk. It was expected originally that 150 ships would require this installation. The Maritime Commission was to supply all equipment except the balloons and towing wire, including flying off blocks and masthead platforms, hydrogen containers, and splinter protection for the containers. The merchant crew was to have responsibility for the operation and maintenance of this expensive equipment and one of the merchant officers was to be charged with its care and maintenance. The Navy Yard, New York was the original distribution point for all balloons.179 But not until September, 1942 did the United States equipment become available. Up to this time British balloons, wires, and gas cylinders were used. A pool for equipment was established at Iceland in July. Equipment was removed from ships returning from Russia and installed on ships bound for North Russia.180 The Bureau of Ships assisted the Maritime Commission in the installation of balloon equipment.181 Instructions for handling balloons and hydrogen cylinders were