Dissertation Information for Susan Elizabeth OberlanderNAME:
DEGREE:
DISCIPLINE:
SCHOOL: ADVISORS: COMMITTEE MEMBERS: MPACT Status: Fully Complete Title: How independent are independent regulatory commissions? Public interest decision making at the Federal Communications Commission Abstract: Independent regulatory commissions are created legislatively, with budgets controlled by Congress, Commissioners appointed by the President, and their work-flow tied to petitions and comments from regulated industries. Therefore, key resources for these agencies are held by Congress, the President, and the industries being regulated. Yet they are considered to be "independent" and charged with making polices that are in the "public interest." Previous research found support for a wide variety of influences on regulatory behavior. Few studies, however, have analyzed both structural and agency factors inherent in regulatory decision-making and the dynamic interplay between the two. This research asks the question: what does "independent" mean in operational terms at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)? Independence is defined as an agency preference to make policies which are based upon multiple viewpoints. Data comes from 37 interviews conducted with policy-makers at the FCC and elicits information about patterns of behavior during agency decision-making and the characteristics of the environment which influence that behavior. This research found linkages between the underlying structural rules, resources, and relationships within the environment in which the FCC is embedded and agency work practices that operationalize independence. The key practices implicated in the FCC's operalization of independence are: (1) the FCC promotes the general social norms underlying its role of public trustee as key organizational values; (2) acculturation processes within the FCC link the role of public trustee to the behavior of staff members; (3) the FCC incorporates general social norms for objectivity as agency standards for decision-making; (4) professional practices and expertise of FCC staff operationalize objective decision-making; (5) FCC staff adhere to certain rules of behavior as a result of the political/legal structure underlying the practice of work at the agency; (6) organizational routines for the internal review of decisions ensure both maximum administrative capacity and also provide checks and balances which inhibit the influence of any one industry in FCC proceedings; (7) organizational structure separates technical and political decision-making, allowing staff to consider the moral, technical, and intellectual defensibility of FCC decisions before, or concurrently with, political considerations. |
MPACT Scores for Susan Elizabeth OberlanderA = 0 Advisors and Advisees Graphgenerating graph, please reload |
Students under Susan Elizabeth Oberlander
ADVISEES:
- None
COMMITTEESHIPS:
- None