13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest Self) on account of multiplication.
We read in the text of the Taittirîyas, 'Different from this Self, which consists of Understanding, is the other inner Self which consists of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).--Here the doubt arises whether the Self consisting of bliss be the highest Self, which is different from the inner Self subject to bondage and release, and termed 'gîva.' (i.e. living self or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self, i.e. the gîva.--It is that inner Self, the Pûrvapakshin contends. For the text says 'of that this, i.e. the Self consisting of bliss, is the sârîra Self'; and sârîra means that which is joined to a body, in other words, the so-called gîva.--But, an objection is raised, the text enumerates the different Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of bliss, to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, which was, at the outset, stated to be the cause of the world (II, 1), and in the end teaches that the Self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world (II, 6). And that the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since Scripture says of him that 'he thought,' we have already explained.--That cause of the world, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins, is not different from the gîva; for in the text of the Khândogyas that Being which first is described as the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in co-ordination with the gîva ('having entered into them with that living Self' and 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu'). And the purport of co-ordination is to express oneness of being, as when we say, 'This person here is that Devadatta we knew before.' And creation preceded by thought can very well be ascribed to an intelligent gîva. The connexion of the whole Taittirîya-text then is as follows. In the introductory clause, 'He who knows Brahman attains the
[paragraph continues] Highest,' the true nature of the gîva, free from all connexion with matter, is referred to as something to be attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The attainment of the gîva in this form is what constitutes Release, in agreement with the text, 'So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all avidyâ, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained, is thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to lead up to this--just as a man points out to another the moon by first pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen--the text at first refers to the body ('Man consists of food'); next to the vital breath with its five modifications which is within the body and supports it; then to the manas within the vital breath; then to the buddhi within the manas--'the Self consisting of breath'; 'the Self consisting of mind' (manas); 'the Self consisting of understanding' (vigñâna). Having thus gradually led up to the gîva, the text finally points out the latter, which is the innermost of all ('Different from that is the inner Self which consists of bliss'), and thus completes the series of Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is that same gîva-self which was at the outset pointed out as the Brahman to be attained.--But the clause immediately following, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss'), indicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss!--By no means (the Pûrvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head, wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a preceding clause the body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings, and tail--these members not being something different from the body, but the body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted
[paragraph continues] Brahman is said to be the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the Self consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, 'Different from this Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self--Brahman.' But there is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses stands as follows: After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the section ('He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and defined as different in nature from everything else ('The True, knowledge'), the text designates it by the term 'Self,' &c. ('From that Self sprang ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the innermost Self of all, enumerates the pranamaya and so on--designating them in succession as more and more inward Selfs--, and finally leads up to the ânandamaya as the innermost Self('Different from this,&c., is the Self consisting of bliss'). From all which it appears that the term 'Self' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning.--But, in immediate continuation of the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' the text exhibits the following sloka: 'Non-existing becomes he who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him we know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-existence of the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of Brahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which, in the form of joy, satisfaction, &c., is known to every one. Hence the sloka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from that Self.--This objection, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins, is unfounded. In the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding slokas, each of them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food, we read, 'This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the sloka, 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all these slokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called 'tail,' but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.); and from this it follows that also the sloka, 'Non-existing becomes
he,' does not refer to the 'tail' only as something other than the Self of bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that the Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a head and other members; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess the quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be a tail.--Let it then be said that the expression, 'Brahman is the tail,' is merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all things imagined through avidyâ!--But, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins, we may as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so on, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman, i.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the Self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman') had already been separated from all changeful material things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss, the term 'ânandamaya' therefore has to be interpreted as meaning nothing more than 'ânanda'; just as prânamaya means prâna.
The outcome of all this is that the term 'ânandamaya' denotes the true essential nature--which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss--of the giva that appears as distinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the gîva or pratyag-âtman, i.e. the individual soul.
Against this primâ facie view the Sûtrakâra contends that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication.'--The section which begins with the words,'This is an examination of bliss,' and terminates with the sloka, 'from whence all speech turns back' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed, by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a
hundred; now such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which enjoys only a small share of very limited happiness, mixed with endless pain and grief; and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the highest Self, which differs from all other Selfs in so far as being radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature. The text says, 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding (vigñâna) there is the inner Self consisting of bliss'. Now that which consists of understanding (vigñâna) is the individual soul (gîva), not the internal organ (buddhi) only; for the formative element, 'maya,' ('consisting of'; in vigñânamaya) indicates a difference (between vigñâna and vigñânamaya). The term 'prâna-maya' ('consisting of breath ') we explain to mean 'prâna' only, because no other explanation is possible; but as vigñânamaya may be explained as,--gîva, we have no right to neglect 'maya' as unmeaning. And this interpretation is quite suitable, as the soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a 'knowing' subject. That moreover even in 'prânamaya', and so on, the affix 'maya' may be taken as having a meaning will be shown further on.--But how is it then that in the sloka which refers to the vigñânamaya, 'Understanding (vigñâna) performs the sacrifice', the term 'vigñâna' only is used?--The essential nature, we reply, of the knowing subject is suitably called 'knowledge', and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself which is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally see that words which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing also convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself. This also accounts for the fact that the sloka ('Vigñâna performs the sacrifice, it performs all sacred acts') speaks of vigñâna as being the agent in sacrifices and so on; the buddhi alone could not be called an agent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other Selfs (the prânamaya and so on) which are mentioned before the vigñânamaya; for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence, and the latter only can be an agent. With the same view the text further on (II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent
by means of their different characteristic attributes, says in the end 'knowledge and non-knowledge,' meaning thereby that which possesses the attribute of knowledge and that which does not. An analogous case is met with in the so-called antaryâmi-brâhmana (Bri. Up. III. 7). There the Kânvas read, 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vigñâna; III, 7, 16), but instead of this the Mâdhyandinas read 'he who dwells in the Self,' and so make clear that what the Kânvas designate as 'knowledge' really is the knowing Self.--That the word vigñâna, although denoting the knowing Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as something substantial. We hence conclude that he who is different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i.e. the individual Self, is the highest Self which consists of bliss.
It is true indeed that the sloka, 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, 'directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing Self; all the same we have to understand that what is meant is the latter, who is referred to in the clause, 'different from this is the inner Self which consists of knowledge.' This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the Self which consists of food (II, 2); for that sloka refers to food only, 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c., all the same the preceding clause 'this man consists of the essence of food' does not refer to food, but to an effect of it which consists of food. Considering all this the Sûtrakâra himself in a subsequent Sûtra (I, 1, 18) bases his view on the declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference.--We now turn to the assertion, made by the Pûrvapakshin, that the cause of the world is not different from the individual soul because in two Khândogya passages it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter ('having entered into them with this living Self,' 'Thou art that'); and that hence the introductory clause of the Taitt. passage ('He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest') refers to the individual soul--which further on is called 'consisting of bliss,' because it is free from all that is not pleasure.--This view cannot be upheld; for although the individual soul is intelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite and wonderful Universe--a process described in texts such
as 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--It sent forth fire,' &c. That even the released soul is unequal to such 'world business' as creation, two later Sûtras will expressly declare. But, if you deny that Brahman, the cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul, how then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in the Khândogya texts?--How, we ask in return, can Brahman, the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c. &c., be one with the individual soul, all whose activities--whether it be thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else--depend on karman, which implies endless suffering of various kind?--If you reply that this is possible if one of two things is unreal, we ask--which then do you mean to be unreal? Brahman's connexion with what is evil?--or its essential nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil?--You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact of Brahman, which is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil, being the substrate of beginningless Nescience, there presents itself the false appearance of its being connected with evil. But there you maintain what is contradictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute perfection and antagonism to all evil; on the other it is the substrate of Nescience, and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is involved in endless pain; for to be connected with evil means to be the substrate of Nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman is connected with all this and at the same time antagonistic to it!--Nor can we allow you to say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is something false. For whatever is false belongs to that group of things contrary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which the Vedânta-texts are studied. To be connected with what is hurtful to man, and to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self-contradictory.--But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to do? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known ('by which that which is
not heard is heard,' &c., Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3); thereupon declares that Brahman is the sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'), and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its intentions ('it thought, may I be many'); and then finally, by means of the co-ordination, 'Thou art that' intimates that Brahman is one with the individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering! Nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the substrate of Nescience and all that springs from it!--Not even for the purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory!--Let us then say that Brahman's connexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal!--Scripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that the assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and happiness are unreal figments, due to error! This is excellent comfort indeed!--To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both aspects of Brahman--viz. on the one hand its entering into the distressful condition of individual souls other than non-differenced intelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed with all perfections, &c.--are alike unreal!--Well, we reply, we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of texts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for in that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the cognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the cognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing; in so far it can be said that everything is known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the substrate.--Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything
else is unreal.--If this were so, we rejoin, the text would not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard, the non-known is known'; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known' (not 'known as false') 'the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning were that only the one non-differenced substance understood to be the cause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, 'As by one lump of clay everything made of clay is known,' would not be suitable; for what is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of clay its (real) effects are known. Nor must 'you say that in the illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth; for as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if it were something well known (and the clause, 'as by one lump of clay,' &c., undoubtedly does refer to something well known), in order to render the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any means of knowledge--assisted or non-assisted by ratiocination--that would prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the cognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will be discussed at length under II, 1.--'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self and evolve names and forms'; 'All these creatures, my son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True,' &c.; these passages declare in succession that that which really is is the Self of this world; that previous to creation there is no distinction of names and forms; that for the creation of the world Brahman, termed 'the True' (or 'Real'), requires no other operative cause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution, possible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of endless movable and immovable things; that in accordance with this resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular order, of an infinite number of manifold
beings; that by Brahman entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul--which has its Self in Brahman--there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent, of all their particular names and forms; and that everything different from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by that, rests on that. All the different points--to be learned from Scripture only--which are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all evil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful; that all its wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is the cause of all bliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed. To maintain then that the word 'that,' which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e. a Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at conveying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman.
The word 'thou' again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by its implication in the course of transmigratory existence, and the proper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were meant to suggest a substance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in the case of a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, we have already explained above.--All this being thus, your interpretation would involve that the proper meaning of the two words 'that' and 'thou'--which refer to one thing--would have to be abandoned, and both words would have to be taken in an implied sense only.
Against this the Pûrvapakshin now may argue as follows. Several words which are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense, and as this is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes, this part of their connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only the unity of one substance; implication (lakshanâ), therefore, does not take place. When we say 'blue (is) (the) lotus' we employ two words with the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the
generic character of a lotus. If this latter point was aimed at, it would follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two aspects of the thing, viz. its being blue and its being a lotus; but this is not possible, for the thing (denoted by the two terms) is not characterised by (the denotation of) the word 'lotus,' in so far as itself characterised by blueness; for this would imply a reciprocal inherence (samavâya) of class-characteristics and quality 1. What the co-ordination of the two words conveys is, therefore, only the oneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness, and at the same time by the class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when we say 'this (person is) that Devadatta' the co-ordination of the words cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with a past time and a distant place is one with Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with the present time and a near place; what it means to express is only that there is oneness on the part of a personal substance--which substance is characterised by connexion with both places and moments of time. It is true indeed that when we at first hear the one word 'blue' we form the idea of the attribute of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of co-ordination (expressed in 'blue is the lotus'), this idea no longer presents itself, for this would imply a contradiction; but all the same 'implication' does not take place. The essence of co-ordination consists, in all cases, therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in the words co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be charged with 'implication,' it cannot be objected to.
All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all sentences whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things known to be denoted by those words. Words such as 'blue,' standing in co-ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the attribute
of blueness, &c., as known from the ordinary use of language, is connected with some other matter. When, e.g., somebody says 'bring the blue lotus,' a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of blueness. And when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with passion lives in the Vindhya-forest,' we again understand that what is meant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several words. Analogously we have to understand, as the thing intimated by Vedânta-texts in the form of coordination, Brahman as possessing such and such attributes.--It is an error to assume that, where a sentence aims at setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute; the case rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all attributes. For co-ordination means the application, to one thing, of several words having different reasons of application; and the effect of co-ordination is that one and the same thing, because being connected--positively or negatively--with some attribute other than that which is conveyed by one word, is also known through other words. As e.g. when it is said that 'Devadatta (is) dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character.' Where two co-ordinate words express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing, one of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense, while the other retains its primary meaning, as e.g. in the case of the sentence, 'The Vâhîka man is an ox.' But in the case of the 'blue lotus' and the like, where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by two attributes.--Possibly our opponent will here make the following remark. A thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some one attribute is something different from the thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some second attribute; hence, even if there is equality of case affixes (as in 'nîlam utpalam'), the words co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness, and cannot, therefore, express the oneness of a thing qualified by several attributes; not any
more than the juxtaposition of two words such as 'jar' and 'cloth'--both having the same case-ending--can prove that these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, therefore, rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it presents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of (words denoting) its attributes.--This would be so, we reply, if it were only the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes that is in the way of its unity. But this is not the case; for what stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several attributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing. Such incapability is, in the case of the generic character of a jar and that of a piece of cloth, proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus; not any more than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears, or than there is between the colour, taste, smell, &c., of one and the same thing. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact of one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co-ordination--the essence of which is that, owing to a difference of causes of application, several words express one and the same thing. For if there were nothing but essential unity of being, what reason would there be for the employment of several words? If the purport of the attributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the thing, but merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute would suffice for such suggestion, and anything further would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, it were assumed that the use of a further 'suggestive' attribute is to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, such difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing (which you maintain to be free from all difference).--Nor is there any shade even of 'implication' in the judgment, 'This person is that Devadatta'; for there is absolutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who was connected with some distant place, and the present Devadatta, who is connected with the place before us. For this very reason those who maintain the permanency of
things prove the oneness of a thing related to two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition ('this is that'); if there really were a contradiction between the two representations it would follow that all things are (not permanent but) momentary only. The fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing being connected with two places is removed by the difference of the correlative moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion that co-ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several attributes.
For this very reason the Vedic passage, 'He buys the Soma by means of a cow one year old, of a tawny colour, with reddish-brown eyes' (arunayâ, ekahâyanyâ, piñgâkshyâ), must be understood to enjoin that the purchase is to be effected by means of a cow one year old, possessing the attributes of tawny colour, &c. This point is discussed Pû. Mî. Sû. III, 1, l2.--The Pûrvapakshin there argues as follows: We admit that the word 'arunayâ' ('by means of a tawny one') denotes the quality of tawniness inclusive of the thing possessing that quality; for qualities as well as generic character exist only in so far as being modes of substances. But it is not possible to restrict tawny colour to connexion with a cow one year old, for the injunction of two different things (which would result from such restriction; and which would necessitate the sentence to be construed as----) 'He buys by means of a cow one year old, and that a red one' is not permissible 1. We must therefore break up the sentence into two, one of which is constituted by the one word 'arunayâ'--this word expressing that tawny colour extends equally to all the substances enjoined in that section (as instrumental towards the end of the sacrifice). And the use of the feminine case-termination of the word is merely meant to suggest a special instance (viz. the cow) of all the things, of whatever gender, which are enjoined in that section. Tawniness must not therefore
be restricted to the cow one year old only.--Of this pûrvapaksha the Sûtra disposes in the following words: 'There being oneness of sense, and hence connexion of substance and quality with one action, there is restriction.'--The fact that the two words 'arunayâ' and 'ekahâyanyâ'--which denote a substance, viz. a cow one year old, distinguished by the quality of possessing tawny colour--stand in co-ordination establishes that they have one sense; and is the substance, viz. the cow, and the quality, viz. tawny colour--which the word 'arunayâ' denotes as standing in the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby--can thus, without any contradiction, be connected with the one action called 'the buying of the Soma', tawny colour is restricted to the cow one year old which is instrumental with regard to the purchase. If the connexion of tawniness with the action of buying were to be determined from syntactical connexion--in the same way as there is made out the connexion of the cow one year old with that action--then the injunctory sentence would indeed enjoin two matters (and this would be objectionable). But such is not the case; for the one word 'arunyâ' denotes a substance characterised by the quality of tawniness, and the co-ordination in which 'arunayâ' stands to 'ekahâyanyâ' makes us apprehend merely that the thing characterised by tawniness also is one year old, but does not make a special statement as to the connexion of that quality with the thing. For the purport of co-ordination is the unity of a thing distinguished by attributes; according to the definition that the application to one thing of several words possessing different reasons of application, constitutes co-ordination. For the same reason, the syntactical unity (ekavâkyatvam) of sentences such as 'the cloth is red' follows from all the words referring to one thing. The function of the syntactical collocation is to express the connexion of the cloth with the action of being; the connexion of the red colour (with the cloth) on the other hand is denoted by the word 'red' only. And what is ascertained from co-ordination (sâmânâdhikaranya) is only that the cloth is a substance to which a certain colour belongs.
[paragraph continues] The whole matter may, without any contradiction, be conceived as follows. Several words--having either the affixes of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case--which denote one or two or several qualities, present to the mind the idea of that which is characterised by those qualities, and their co-ordination intimates that the thing characterised by all those attributes is one only; and the entire sentence finally expresses the connexion in which the thing with its attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb. This may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the co-ordination of words possessing different case-endings, as e.g. 'There stands Devadatta, a young man of a darkish complexion, with red eyes, wearing earrings and carrying a stick' (where all the words standing in apposition to Devadatta have the nominative termination); 'Let him make a stage curtain by means of a white cloth' (where 'white' and 'cloth' have instrumental case-endings), &c. &c. We may further illustrate the entire relation of co-ordinated words to the action by means of the following two examples: 'Let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means of firewood': here we take in simultaneously the idea of an action distinguished by its connexion with several things. If we now consider the following amplified sentence, 'Let a skilful cook prepare, in a vessel of even shape, boiled rice mixed with milk, by means of sticks of dry khâdira wood,' we find that each thing connected with the action is denoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words; but as soon as each thing is apprehended, it is at one and the same moment conceived as something distinguished by several attributes, and as such connects itself with the action expressed by the verb. In all this there is no contradiction whatever.--We must further object to the assertion that a word denoting a quality which stands in a sentence that has already mentioned a substance denotes the quality only (exclusive of the substance so qualified), and that hence the word 'arunayâ' also denotes a quality only. The fact is that neither in ordinary nor in Vedic language we ever meet with a word which--denoting a quality and at the same time standing in co-ordination
with a word denoting a substance--denotes a mere quality. Nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a sentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes a mere quality: for in a sentence such as 'the cloth (is) white,' where a substance is mentioned in the first place, the quality-word clearly denotes (not mere whiteness but) something which possesses the quality of whiteness. When, on the other hand, we have a collocation of words such as 'patasya suklah' ('of the cloth'--gen.; 'white' nom.), the idea of a cloth distinguished by whiteness does not arise; but this is due not to the fact of the substance being mentioned first, but to the fact of the two words exhibiting different case-terminations. As soon as we add to those two words an appropriate third one, e.g. 'bhâgah' (so that the whole means 'The white part of a cloth'), the co-ordination of two words with the same case-termination gives rise to the idea of a thing distinguished by the attribute of whiteness.--Nor can we agree to the contention that, as the buying of the Soma is exclusively concluded by the cow one year old (as instrumental in the purchase), the quality of tawniness (denoted by the word 'arunayâ') cannot connect itself with the action expressed by the verb; for a word that denotes a quality and stands in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance which has no qualities opposed in nature to that quality, denotes a quality abiding in that substance, and thus naturally connects itself with the action expressed by the verb. And since, as shown, the quality of tawniness connects itself with its substance (the cow) on the mere basis of the form of the words, it is wrong (on the part of the Pûrvapakshin to abandon this natural connexion and) to establish their connexion on the ground of their being otherwise incapable of serving as means of the purchase.
All this confirms our contention, viz. that the co-ordination of 'thou' and 'that' must be understood to express oneness, without, at the same time, there being given up the different attributes denoted by the two words. This however is not feasible for those who do not admit a highest Self free from all imperfection and endowed with all perfections, and different from that intelligent soul which
is conditioned by Nescience, involved in endless suffering and undergoing alternate states of purity and impurity.--But, an objection is raised, even if such a highest Self be acknowledged, it would have to be admitted that the sentence aims at conveying the oneness of that which is distinguished by the different attributes denoted by the words co-ordinated, and from this it follows that the highest Self participates in all the suffering expressed by the word 'thou'!--This is not so, we reply; since the word 'thou' also denotes the highest Self, viz. in so far as it is the inner Ruler (antaryâmin) of all souls.--The connected meaning of the text is as follows. That which is denoted as 'Being,' i.e. the highest Brahman which is the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c., resolved 'to be many'; it thereupon sent forth the entire world, consisting of fire, water, &c.; introduced, in this world so sent forth, the whole mass of individual souls into different bodies divine, human, &c., corresponding to the desert of each soul--the souls thus constituting the Self of the bodies; and finally, itself entering according to its wish into these souls--so as to constitute their inner Self--evolved in all these aggregates, names and forms, i.e. rendered each aggregate something substantial (vastu) and capable of being denoted by a word. 'Let me enter into these beings with this living Self (gîvena âtmana) means 'with this living me,' and this shows the living Self, i.e. the individual soul to have Brahman for its Self. And that this having Brahman for its Self means Brahman's being the inner Self of the soul (i.e. the Self inside the soul, but not identical with it), Scripture declares by saying that Brahman entered into it. This is clearly stated in the passage Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He sent forth all this, whatever there is. Having sent forth he entered into it. Having entered it he became sat and tyat.' For here 'all this' comprises beings intelligent as well as non-intelligent, which afterwards are distinguished as sat and tyat, as knowledge (vigñâna) and non-knowledge. Brahman is thus said to enter into intelligent beings also. Hence, owing to this evolution of names and forms, all words denote the highest Self distinguished
by non-intelligent matter and intelligent souls.--Another text, viz. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7,'All this has its Self in that,' denotes by 'all this' the entire world inclusive of intelligent souls, and says that of this world that (i.e. Brahman) is the Self. Brahman thus being the Self with regard to the whole universe of matter and souls, the universe inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of Brahman.--Other scriptural texts teach the same doctrine; cp. 'Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all' (Taitt.Âr. III, 24);'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth--whose body is the earth,' &c., up to 'he who dwelling within the Self is within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-22; Mâdhyand. Sâ.); 'He who moves within the earth, of whom the earth is the body, &c.--who moves within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know; he the inward ruler of all beings, free from evil, the divine, the one god, Nârayana' (Subâ. Up. VII). All these texts declare that the world inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of the highest Self, and the latter the Self of everything. Hence those words also that denote intelligent souls designate the highest Self as having intelligent souls for his body and constituting the Self of them; in the same way as words denoting non-sentient masses of matter, such as the bodies of gods, men, &c., designate the individual souls to which those bodies belong. For the body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of a mode (prakâra); and as words denoting a mode accomplish their full function only in denoting the thing to which the mode belongs, we must admit an analogous comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denote a body. For, when a thing is apprehended under the form 'this is such,' the element apprehended as 'such' is what constitutes a mode; now as this element is relative to the thing, the idea of it is also relative to the thing, and finds its accomplishment in the thing only; hence the word also which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the thing. Hence words such as 'cow', 'horse, 'man', which
denote a mode, viz. a species, comprise in their meaning also that mass of matter which exhibits the characteristics of the species, and as that mass of matter constitutes the body and therefore is a mode of a soul, and as that soul again, so embodied, is a mode of the highest Self; it follows that all these words extend in their signification up to the highest Self. The meaning of all words then is the highest Self, and hence their co-ordination with words directly denoting that highest Self is a primary (not merely 'implied') one.
But, an objection is raised, we indeed observe that words denoting species or qualities stand in co-ordination to words denoting substances, 'the ox is short-horned,' 'the sugar is white'; but where substances appear as the modes of other substances we find that formative affixes are used, 'the man is dandin, kundalin' (bearing a stick; wearing earrings).--This is not so, we reply. There is nothing to single out either species, or quality, or substance, as what determines co-ordination: co-ordination disregards such limitations. Whenever a thing (whether species, or quality, or substance) has existence as a mode only--owing to its proof, existence and conception being inseparably connected with something else--the words denoting it, as they designate a substance characterised by the attribute denoted by them, appropriately enter into co-ordination with other words denoting the same substance as characterised by other attributes. Where, on the other hand, a substance which is established in separation from other things and rests on itself, is assumed to stand occasionally in the relation of mode to another substance, this is appropriately expressed by the use of derived forms such as 'dandin, kundalin.' Hence such words as 'I,' 'thou,' &c., which are different forms of appellation of the individual soul, at bottom denote the highest Self only; for the individual souls together with non-sentient matter are the body--and hence modes--of the highest Self. This entire view is condensed in the co-ordination 'Thou art that.' The individual soul being thus connected with the highest Self as its body, its attributes do not touch the highest
[paragraph continues] Self, not any more than infancy, youth, and other attributes of the material body touch the individual soul. Hence, in the co-ordination 'Thou art that,' the word 'that' denotes the highest Brahman which is the cause of the world, whose purposes come true, which comprises within itself all blessed qualities, which is free from all shadow of evil; while the word 'thou' denotes the same highest Self in so far as having for its body the individual souls together with their bodies. The terms co-ordinated may thus be taken in their primary senses; there is no contradiction either with the subject-matter of the section, or with scripture in general; and not a shadow of imperfection such as Nescience, and so on, attaches to Brahman, the blameless, the absolutely blessed. The co-ordination with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of Brahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brahman; and hence we hold that different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self consisting of bliss, i.e. the highest Self.
Nor is there any force in the objection that as the Self of bliss is said to be 'sârira,' i.e. embodied-viz. in the clause 'of him the embodied Self is the same' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 6)--it cannot be different from the individual soul. For throughout this section the recurring clause 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one,' refers to the highest Self, calling that the 'embodied' one. The clause 'From that same Self sprang ether' (II, 1) designates the highest Brahman-which is different from the individual soul and is introduced as the highest cause of all things created--as the 'Self'; whence we conclude that all things different from it--from ether up to the Self of food constitute its body. The Subâla-upanishad moreover states quite directly that all beings constitute the body of the highest Self: 'He of whom the earth is the body, of whom water is the body, of whom fire is the body, of whom wind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he the inner Self of all, the divine one, the one god Nârâyana.' From this it follows that what constitutes the
embodied Self of the Self of food is nothing else but the highest Self referred to in the clause 'From that same Self sprang ether.' When, then, the text further on says with regard to the Self of breath, 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one' (II, 3), the meaning can only be that what constitutes the embodied Self of the 'preceding' Self of food, viz. the highest Self which is the universal cause, is also the embodied Self of the Self consisting of breath. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the Self consisting of mind and the Self consisting of knowledge. In the case, finally, of the Self consisting of bliss, the expression 'the same' (esha eva) is meant to convey that that Self has its Self in nothing different from itself. For when, after having understood that the highest Self is the embodied Self of the vigñânamaya also, we are told that the embodied Self of that vigñânamaya is also the embodied Self of the ânandamaya, we understand that of the ânandamaya--which we know to be the highest Self on the ground of 'multiplication'--its own Self is the Self. The final purport of the whole section thus is that everything different from the highest Self, whether of intelligent or non-intelligent nature, constitutes its body, while that Self alone is the non-conditioned embodied Self. For this very reason competent persons designate this doctrine which has the highest Brahman for its subject-matter as the 'sârîraka,' i. e. the doctrine of the 'embodied' Self.--We have thus arrived at the conclusion that the Self of bliss is something different from the individual Self, viz. the highest Self.
Here the Pûrvapakshin raises the following objection.--The Self consisting of bliss (ânandamaya) is not something different from the individual soul, because the formative element--maya denotes something made, a thing effected. That this is the meaning of--maya in ânandamaya we know from Pânini IV, 3, l44.--But according to Pâ. V, 4, 21,--maya has also the sense of 'abounding in'; as when we say 'the sacrifice is annamaya,' i.e. abounds in food. And this may be its sense in 'ânandamaya' also!--Not so, the Pûrvapakshin replies. In 'annamaya,' in an earlier part of the chapter,--maya has the sense of 'made of', 'consisting
of'; and for the sake of consistency, we must hence ascribe the same sense to it in 'ânandamaya.' And even if, in the latter word, it denoted abundance, this would not prove that the ânandamaya is other than the individual soul. For if we say that a Self 'abounds' in bliss, this implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small part of pain; and to be 'mixed with pain' is what constitutes the character of the individual soul. It is therefore proper to assume, in agreement with its previous use, that 'ânandamaya' means 'consisting of bliss.' In ordinary speech as well as in Vedic language (cp. common words such as 'mrinmaya,' 'hiranmaya'; and Vedic clauses such as 'parnamayiguhûh') -maya as a rule means 'consisting of,' and this meaning hence presents itself to the mind first. And the individual soul may be denoted as 'made of bliss'; for in itself it is of the essence of bliss, and its Samsâra state therefore is something 'made of bliss.' The conclusion therefore is that, owing to the received meaning of -maya, the ânandamaya is none other than the individual soul.--To this primâ facie view the next Sûtra refers and refutes it.
219:1 I.e. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the quality (i.e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i.e., here, the lotus), or vice versa.
222:1 For it would imply so-called vâkyabheda, 'split of the sentence,' which arises when one injunctory clause is made to enjoin two different things.