Chief of Naval Operations--Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
In Chapter I of this work the evolution of Navy Department organization from the establishment of the Department in 1798 through World War II was briefly tracted. Its fundamental character after 1842 was the Bureau system, adjusted from time to time by the addition, abolition, and merger of bureaus, or the redistribution of their functions to meet changing conditions. As the result of frequent attempts at reorganization, the administration of the Navy Department was strengthened in 1915 by the addition of a Chief of Naval Operations. The powers given him at that time were however considered inadequate to fully correct the deficiencies in naval administration as seen by the advocates of reorganization.
Discussion on the subject of modifying or even abolishing the Bureau system began during the Civil War and centered around the broad issue of the type of Navy Department administrative machinery that might be better suited than the Bureau system for making plans to prepare the Navy for war, for directing naval operations in peace and war, and for determining the military characteristics of naval ships and weapons. In substance, the discussions were debates on the merits of what is now called a General Staff system to assist the Secretary of the Navy in administering the affairs of the Navy Department. A General Staff may be defined as an agency of military direction, charged with the duty of preparing plans and vested with the authority to direct the action to be taken by contributory agencies to fulfill the requirements of the plans. There are many variants of this definition.
Although a pure General Staff system has never been adopted by the Navy Department, such a system has been proposed so often and will no doubt continue to have its advocates in the future that it is appropriate to outline the Navy's past and current thinking on the subject during World War II.
Efforts to reorganize the Navy Department became active during the Civil War and continued unabated through the years that followed. Reorganization efforts received new impetus when the Spanish-American War resulted in a greatly expanded Navy and in the arrival of the United States on the international scene as a world power. Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, USN, became a strong advocate of a General Staff system for the Navy when he was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in April 1902. His views representing largely also those of other advocates of this system, were summarized by him as follows, in an article in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute: "Among the powers essential to a General Staff, some of the more important are those of indicating with authority to the Bureaus the supplies for the fleet necessary to its maintenance and efficiency; of deciding the types of ships, to be recommended to the Secretary; their speed and armament; the number of reserve guns needed; the amount of coal required to be stored at different points and the choice of those points; the location of future drydocks. In fact all the general questions affecting the fleet's efficiency would be the subject of a General Staff's reports and suggestions to the Secretary of the Navy."1
During the following years up to the outbreak of World War I in Europe in the summer of 1914, many boards and hearings before Congress went deeply into reorganization plans many of them revolving around the General Staff concept of control and management.2
Opposition to the General Staff school of thought was however articulate and widespread. Various Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries objected chiefly because of their strong belief that a General Staff or similar mechanism would seriously reduce or even replace civilian control of the Naval Establishment. They maintained that the Secretary would become a mere figurehead; that despite his legal and recognized position as head of the Navy Department, he would in reality be under the power of the Chief of the General Staff. Most Secretaries readily admitted their initial lack of information and experience in naval matters; it was because of this that they felt that they would be apt to lose their power if dependent exclusively on a General Staff for information and advice. They believed that
General Staff Argument
militarism, both alien and abhorrent to the American way of life, could develop too easily from such a system.3
At the outset the main cleavage of opinion on the subject of a General Staff lay between two groups of career naval officers: the Line and the Staff. Yet there were sharp individual differences of opinion within each group. Many Line Officers opposed the General Staff system but were almost unanimously in favor of any authoritarian system of Navy Department administration simulating the command system afloat. Some comments on the conditioning of naval officers by their upbringing under this indispensable system for the management of ships were made in Chapter I of this work.
In general the Line position was that top-level operational management was properly a Line function and that the Line should have authority commensurate with this responsibility; that if the Line was to be responsible for the readiness and operation of the fleet, and for the conduct of war, then the Line must have appropriate authority over the agencies of readiness, that is, over the Bureaus, in order to carry out this responsibility; that to this end the work of the Bureaus was too important to be left on a goodwill, cooperational basis, however slight the chance that voluntary cooperation might fail at some critical moment. It was argued therefore that the Secretary's principal naval adviser must be a Line Officer having authority to give orders to the Bureaus.
The position taken by the Staff Corps and the Bureaus, particularly by the matériel Bureaus, may be broadly summarized as follows:
(a) An avowed purpose of a General Staff was to reduce the authority and semi-autonomy of the Bureaus. The technical Bureaus especially felt that with less authority they would not be able to meet the responsibilities placed on them by law and that their ability to provide an ever better Navy would be reduced rather than increased by limiting their authority. A General Staff, by its very nature, would be able to give orders to the Bureaus without taking any responsibility for the feasibility of execution and the desirability of the orders. Such orders would normally come from officers with no educational and practical background qualifying them to determine feasibility and desirability. That argument lost some of its validity with the broadening of the engineering education and experience of Line Officers following the amalgamation of the naval engineers with the Line in 1899.
(b) The Chief of the Bureaus felt that ready access to the Secretary of the Navy was essential to the performance of their duties and that interposing a Chief of Staff or other official of like nature between them and the Secretary would inevitably become a road-block to the presentation and consideration by the Secretary of their views.
(c) If the Line were to dominate the Navy Department the Staff Corps felt that the selection of the Chiefs of their Bureaus would not usually be based on the professional and administrative qualifications of the individuals under consideration but rather on the complacence of candidates with the wishes of the Line element in power at the time.
(d) These considerations would, it was argued, add up to so great a loss of prestige and influence by specialist officers, the Bureaus, and their Chiefs, that it would eventually become difficult to get capable young officers to take up engineering as a naval career, using the term in its broadest sense. The filling of other specialties would be affected in a similar way. This result, while the slowest to make itself felt, would in the long run, it was believed, be the most damaging to the efficient handling of the Navy Department's logistics functions. All experience dating back to the days of sail pointed to the need of top-level engineering talent in the navy Department, in the Shore Establishment, and in the Fleet Officer status had gradually been acquired by the Staff Corps and by the technical Bureaus, but more had been found necessary. Incentives had to be provided for talented young officers to enter the engineering and procurement fields to offset the greater rewards open to the Line in the way of prestige, glamour, authority, and positions of much higher rank than attainable by officers specializing in engineering and procurement.
So ran the views generally held respectively by Secretaries of the Navy, the Bureaus, Line Officers, and the Staff Corps on the subject of Naval Administration. They have been summarized at the beginning of this chapter, although they went through a continuous process of change extending well into the World War II period.4
While the Navy Department never adopted the traditional General Staff System as the basis for its organization, it, of course, made use of the staff mechanism in its administrative practices in order to provide its upper level executives with the information needed for policy and decision making. Staff work in the Navy is not, however, done by officers who make a full time career of such work, but by qualified officers detailed to the work for limited tours of duty.
The Navy method emphasizes particularly the importance of basing planning and other phases of staff work on operating experience. Such work is considered to be only one facet of the versatility demanded of the more talented officers, distinguishing them from the run of the mine.
The Navy's method is also considered to be better suited for carrying out the Navy Department's task concept of administration because it simplified making use of civilians with specialized skills in management.
Before taking up the creation of a Chief of Naval Operations in 1915, the various attempts of Secretaries of the Navy to use boards to perform
the functions of the Chief of Naval Operations will be briefly mentioned. Boards of the kind described in the previous chapter had been effective units of the Executive Office of the Secretary for many years. However, boards as administrative and operating mechanisms usually failed to give satisfaction for any length of time. There have, however, been notable exceptions. The Board of Navy Commissioners, although eventually abolished in favor of the Bureau System, lasted twenty-seven years.
With the outbreak of the Civil War there came a great revival in the use of Boards as advisory bodies or instruments of naval administration.5 In the spring of 1861, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, appointed what wa called the "Confidential Board." It was composed of the Chiefs of the Bureaus of the Navy Department and was to have the duty of "considering and acting upon such subjects connected with the naval service as may be submitted to them by the Department for their opinion at this important junction of our national affairs." It apparently died a natural death, presumably for lack of matters referred to it.
In 1864 a "Board of Naval Administrators" was proposed; in 1865 it was to be a "Board of Admiralty." During the last three years of this period, the Grimes Bill was before Congress, which provided for a "Board of Naval Survey." The Boards were to be composed entirely of Line Officers and had for their purpose more direct control of the Navy Department by the command branch of the Navy. They did not meet with the approval of Gideon Welles and failed of authorization by Congress.
Partly to satisfy advocates of a General Staff for the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin F. Tracy, appointed a Board on Construction in 189. This Board was composed of the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Equipment, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering. Commodore George Dewey, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, was one of its early chairmen. This Board dealt chiefly with the characteristics of new ships, the development of navy yards, the location of coaling stations, and similar matters. It lasted about twenty years and then died a natural death because matters were no longer referred to it; some said because it did its job too well and sometimes ran counter to vested interests and to ultra-conservative opinion.
The creation of the Board on Construction was an attempt to bring about coordination of the major logistic functions of the Bureaus later elaborated in the aide system, and finally becoming one of the principal functions of the Chief of Naval Operations. It is interesting that Secretary Tracy in General Order No. 372 of 25 June 1889, by which he redistributed
the duties of the Bureaus, assigned to the Bureau of Navigation functions that later under the general term of "readiness of the Navy for war" became the keystone of the structure of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as visualized by its architects. Secretary Tracy stated in his Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1889 that "the Fleet inspection, and practice falls under the Bureau of Navigation." Although the Bureau of Navigation in the next ten years became the most powerful Bureau in the Navy Department under the leadership of successive, very able,and forceful Bureau Chiefs it apparently did not consolidate its position and presumably did not satisfy the rank and file of the Line of the Navy itself. It is possible that under different leadership the Bureau of Navigation might have developed into the mechanism that was later established as the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. But in that era few officers were well qualified for such duty. The Naval War College had not then begun the education and training of officers in the functions of higher command.
The General Board was the most important of all the Navy Department boards during the first half of the 20th century. It was established by Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, on 13 March 1900.6 At its head for many years stood Admiral George Dewey, the victor of the Battle of Manila Bay and the most distinguished naval figure of his time. In the beginning, its other members were the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the Chief Intelligence Officer and his principal assistant, the President of the Naval War College and his principal assistant, and three other Line officers. The mission assigned to it when it was established was "to insure efficient preparation of the Fleet in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast." The type and number of its members and its duties underwent changes as time went on.The trend was at first to broaden the scope of its activities and to give it administrative work to do. An executive committee, of which Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, was the Chairman until his death in 1904, predigested most of the business that came before the Board, but Admiral Dewey with his prestige, broad vision, and sound judgment was the balance wheel of the Board and got it off to a good start.
Some of its duties as prescribed by the 1905 Navy Regulations came into conflict with the duties of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations when that office was established in 1915. The result was that gradually it ceased to have any administrative functions and became purely an advisory body acting principally on matters specifically referred to it by the Secretary. However, it was charged with some duties as a matter of
routine, such as passing on ship construction programs and on the characteristics of proposed ships.
After the death of Admiral Dewey it became the policy to detail as Chairman of the General board a very senior officer, often the one who had just relinquished command of the Fleet and was on his last tour of duty before retiring. Most of the other places on the Board were filled also by senior officers who had occupied high command positions in the Fleet and who would reach retirement age in a few years. Such officers were bound to be men of ability and industry,and being on their last tour of duty were not likely to have axes to grind. During World War II Secretaries Edison, Knox, and Forrestal found the advice of the General Board on organizational and controversial matters invaluable. Many of the executive orders on naval matters that came from the White House were drafted by the General Board.
An effort was made in 1904 to give the General Board legal status and administrative powers. This precipitated lengthy hearings before the House Naval Affairs Committee and included discussions on the merits and demerits of a General Staff for the Navy. The bill to give legal status to the General Board failed of enactment largely because of the testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Charles H. Darling.7
Late in 1909, Secretary of the Navy, George von L. Meyer, created by Navy regulation four general divisions in the Navy Department: Operations of the Fleet, Personnel, Material, and Inspections. Each division was headed by a senior officer of the Line, called an "Aide," and the new organization became known as the "Naval Aide System." Their stated duties were "to aid the Secretary in efficiently administering the affairs of the Navy Department."8 The system made some improvement in coordinating the work of the Bureaus. Virtually all official correspondence to and from the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary was channeled through one of the Aides, sometimes through more than one. The Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and the Aides met periodically as a Council to consider policies, major administrative questions, and legislative matters. In the performance of their duties the Aides neither possessed nor exercised any executive authority of consequence.9 Like the General Board, the duties of the Aides
Naval Aid System
were advisory. No provision was made for coordinating their own work. The system fell short of what the General Staff supporters had in mind, namely, control by the Line of the readiness, operations, and logistic support of the Fleet.
Secretary Meyer considered the Aide System satisfactory, but was unable to obtain statutory authorization for it from Congress. Josephus Daniels, when he became Secretary of the Navy in 1913, did not like the system and allowed the Aides for Personnel and Inspections to be detached without reliefs. He retained the Aide for Operations, RADM Bradley A. Fiske, on the advice of Admiral Dewey, the Chairman of the General Board. Fiske then renewed his efforts to obtain statutory authorization for the office. Congressman Richmond P. Hobson, himself a former officer in the Construction Corps of the Navy and a hero of the Spanish-American War, at the request of Fiske, and with the unanimous approval of the House Naval Affairs Committee, incorporated the following provision in the Naval Appropriations bill, pending in March 1915: ". . . there shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy not below the grade of a Rear Admiral, appointed for a term of four years by the President by and with the advice of the Senate, who under the Secretary of the Navy shall be responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and be charged with its general direction." The provision, was, however, promptly stricken from the bill in the House on a point of order, but in altered form, Hobson maneuvered the rider back into the bill in the Senate. It finally passed both houses of Congress on 3 March 1915.
The rider originally prepared by Hobson and Fiske was highly unpalatable to Secretary of the Navy Daniels because in his opinion it placed too much power in the hands of the Chief of Naval Operations. As modified to meet the objections of the Secretary, the bill read, "There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President. . . . from among the officers of the Line of the Navy, not below the grade of Captain for a period of four years, who shall under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. . . .10
Chief of Naval Operations
To be thus charged merely "with the operations of the Fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war" was obviously a far cry from Hobson's and Fiske's original proposal that CNO should be "responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and be charged
with its general direction." Most Line officers felt that the new office lacked sufficient authority to make it effective, and particularly deplored that the CNO had been given on direct authority over the Bureaus.
However, in August of 1916, Congress authorized the rank and title of "Admiral" for the CNO, and greatly strengthened his authority by providing that:
"All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary and shall have full force and effect as such."11
The success of the new organization was of necessity largely dependent upon the attitude of the Secretary of the Navy toward it. Seeing that civilian control had not been impaired, Secretary Daniels' early hostility to the office soon changed to one of war endorsement. In his annual report for 1916, he stated that the new organization gave the department ". . . in connection with the bureau chiefs named by the President, what naval experts at home and abroad have declared to be the best naval organization that human wisdom has devised. While civilian control essential in a Republic, has been preserved, responsibility has been placed upon the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chiefs of the Bureaus."
"War psychology" was probably responsible for this drastic change in the attitude of Josephus Daniels and others. Colossal war had raged in Europe since August 14, 1914. The likelihood of our being drawn in grew progressively greater and more apparent. President Wilson's pacifistic tendencies were being rapidly transformed and his Secretary of the Navy ardently followed his lead. Many members of Congress and other officials did likewise. In 1916 came the huge naval building program adopted by Congress under Presidential sponsorship. Men who were to be responsible for our conduct of the war-if we got into it--were beginning to be regarded with great respect and favor. All of this substantially helped the new office of CNO to get away to a good start. It tended to soften the attitude of Secretary Daniels and the Bureau Chiefs toward the CNO, and developed their readiness to cooperate with him. Admiral W.S. Benson was appointed the first Chief of Naval Operations on May 11, 1915 and took over the duties that were being performed by Admiral Fiske as the Aide for Operations.
Thus for the first time at the outbreak of any war involving the United States there existed within the Navy Department in 1917 an office specifically charged with the general planning for, and to some extent, the Naval conduct of the war. Having great confidence in Admiral Benson, and perhaps chastened by the grave responsibilities and technical aspects
of the war, Secretary Daniels left Naval Operations during World War I almost wholly to the CNO. The soundness of this in principle was well proven during the course of the war. The mere fact of there being a central coordinating agency encouraged the Bureaus and offices to use it. Eagerness to assure success in the war was a strong influence toward cheerful cooperation of all hands with CNO, regardless of previous attitudes in the matter.
The end of World War I brought a more critical scanning within the Navy Department of the CNO's vaguely defined authority and resulted in recurrent controversies through the years over the interpretation of the law establishing the office. The CNO interpreted the laws of 1915 to mean that he had authority to give direct orders to the Bureaus in connection with carrying out his responsibilities for the operation of the fleet and "with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war." The Bureaus disputed this interpretation. In June 1921, the Secretary of the Navy appointed a Board of Naval Officers to "consider and recommend such changes in the interest of efficiency and economy as may be deemed necessary in the organization of the Navy Department." During its deliberations covering an exhaustive study of CNO functions the Secretary of the Navy was asked for a decisive interpretation as to the CNO's authority over the Bureaus. Representatives of CNO maintained that responsibility for "operations of the Fleet" implied supervision of the entire Naval Establishment, since the Fleet was the end for which all else existed. The Secretary evaded a decision by saying that he did not want the Board to concern itself with departmental organization but simply to consider details for eliminating any duplication of effort that might exist among the Bureaus.12
The CNO Authority Controversy
An addition was nevertheless made to the Navy Regulations in 1924 under article 433 which broadened the duties and powers of the CNO. Among its provisions paragraph 3 read "He shall so coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel therefor as to insure maximum readiness of the fleet for war."13 The legality of the article was challenged by the bureaus on the grounds that it not only exceeded the authority granted the CNO by the law of 1915 but that it conflicted also with the law establishing the bureaus. An effort to legislate the offending regulation out of existence by means of a rider on an appropriations bill was made in 1924, but was stricken from the Bill in the Senate.14
The article remained in the Navy Regulations and resulted in steadily strengthening the powers of the CNO in carrying out his planning and readiness responsibilities despite the fact that the legality of the article remained under fire. The article was in force in 1933 when Secretary of the Navy, Claude A. Swanson, appointed a Board under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Henry L. Roosevelt, to investigate naval organization and the possibility of amalgamating the Line, Staff Corps, and the Marine Corps. Admiral William H. Standley was appointed Chief of Naval Operations in July 1935 while the Board was in session, and brought up the question of CNO's authority to issue orders to the Bureaus. The Board went thoroughly into this, and other matters, connected with the administration of the Navy Department. The Bureaus in general expressed themselves as opposed to granting the CNO authority to give them orders.
Protests against further encroachments on their prerogatives came from the line bureaus as well as from those operated by Staff Corps. One of the strongest proponents of bureau authority was the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral William D. Leahy, later Chief of Naval Operations himself, and during World War II President Roosevelt's Chief of Staff.
President Roosevelt took a personal interest in the work of the Roosevelt Board. In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy of March 2, 1934, in speaking of the President's responsibilities to Congress in matters of naval administration, he said: "In my judgment he (the President) would too greatly delegate this power if he delegated to the Chief of Naval Operations the duty of issuing direct orders to the bureaus and offices." He elaborated his views further in the words: "My thought, therefore, on this question is that Article 433 o the Navy Regulations should remain in force. By this, I mean that the Chief of Naval Operations should coordinate to (sic) all repairs and alterations to vessels, etc., by retaining constant and frequent touch with the heads of bureaus and offices. But at the same time, the orders to Bureaus and offices should come from the Secretary of the Navy. In the actual working out of this method, we come down to what should be a practical plan of procedure. The Chief of Naval Operations through his meetings with the bureau chiefs will be able to carry through ninety-nine per cent of the plan and actual work by unanimous agreement. This constitutes the 'coordination' expected."15
Arguments over the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations to give direct orders to the bureaus did not however end with the President's memorandum of March 2, 1934. The subject came up again for lengthy discussion during the hearings in Congress on the Vinson bill in 1939 and on the Edison bill in 1940.
Congressman Vinson's bill proposed practical elimination of the Bureau system and distribution of the Navy Department's business among four offices: (a) Office of the Secretary; (b) Office of Naval Operations; (c) Office of Naval Material; and (d) Office of the Marine Corps. The bill met with almost unanimous opposition from the Navy largely because it proposed to abolish the Bureau system. The General Board made a point of recommending that the Bureau system be retained. Two former Chiefs of Naval Operations, Admiral W.V. Pratt and Admiral W.H. Standley, who served as such during 1931-1933 and 1933-1937, respectively, also endorsed the Bureau system as a satisfactory framework for Navy Department organization. Admiral Standley considered no changes necessary except to give to the Chief of Naval Operations direct authority over the Bureaus.16 The Bureaus were naturally in favor of retaining the system.
When the Edison bill, sponsored by Secretary of the Navy, Charles Edison, for the merger of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, and Engineering to form the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, and was considered propitious to propose other organizational changes in the Navy Department. The bill proposed to retain the Bureaus but to coordinate all matériel matters through a Director of the Shore Establishments who was to have functions and authority for logistics paralleling those of CNO for operations. The arguments for the change, as it involved the employment of civilians in the Naval Establishment are briefly reviewed in the chapter on "Civilian Personnel" in this work. It will be noted that CNO authority was again discussed but that the proposed creation of a Director of Shore Establishments was dropped.
Simultaneously with these last pre-World War II efforts at drastic Navy Department reorganization the country was thrown into the national emergency caused by the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, culminating for the United States in actual war on 7 December 1941 when Pearl Harbor was attacked. By Executive Order No. 9096 of 12 March 1942, for reasons and under circumstances that will be covered in more detail later, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, were combined in one person. The Executive Order contained a provision that went almost unnoticed by the rank and file in the Navy Department: paragraph 4 of the Executive Order read that "as Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding the combined offices as herein provided shall be charged under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy with the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces, and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department,
Admiral Harold R. Stark
Chief of Naval Operations, Aug, 1939-March 1942;
Commander Naval Forces in Europe, Apr. 1941-Aug. 1945.
except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt. . . ." Thus, the CNO was given the legal authority for which the office had been striving since its establishment twenty-seven years before.
One must come to the conclusion from the little stir made by the provision that the question of CNO authority had become largely academic. As a matter of fact it merely placed on a legal footing a relationship that had worked successfully on a cooperational basis ever since the addition of article 433 to the Navy Regulations in 1924.The provision had little effect on the war effort as cooperation had already made phenomenal progress in readying the Navy during the past two and a half years to carrying
out its war mission and would probably not have been bettered if the CNO had had earlier authority to give direct orders to the Bureaus.17
A manual describing the organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the duties of its various divisions was issued on October 23, 1940, by Admiral H.R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations. The document provides an appropriate point of departure for the history of CNO during World War II. No Organization Chart accompanying the text has been located, but Figure No. 5, dated 27 March 1942, provides a graphic representation of sorts of the 1940 organization, although changes were made in division duties, designation, and concepts of administration between the two dates. The Office was organized under the following divisions, the heads of which were called "Directors" except that the head of the Inspection Division was called the President of the Board of Inspection and Survey, to retain a title which goes back to the inspection of the first steel ships built for the Navy in the 1800's.
Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Designation Title and Basic Function Op 10 The Chief of Naval Operations
(Op 10-A Personal Aide)
(Op 10-B Administrative Aide)
(Ap 10-C Officer in Charge, Secret-Confidential)
Op 11 The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations Op 12 War Plans Division Op 13 Central Division Op 14 Radio Liaison Division Op 15 Naval Reserve Policy Division Op 16 Naval Intelligence Division Op 18-A Secretarial Division (Chief Clerk) Op 19 Navy Department Communication Officer (Under Op 20) Op 20 Communications Division Op 21 Inspection Division Op 22 Fleet Training Division Op 23 Fleet Maintenance Division Op 30 Naval Districts Division Op 38 Ship Movements Division
Fig. 5--ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (27 MARCH 1942)
Some of the divisions had duties that were purely or largely administrative, such as Op 13, Op 15, and Op 22; others performed duties traditionally classed as general staff duties, such as the War Plans Division (Op 12) and the Naval Intelligence Division (Op 16); others had operating duties, such as the Communications Division (Op 20) and the Ship Movements Division (Op 38). Still others had inspection functions, such as the Inspection Division (Op 21). It would however be inaccurate to say that any division functioned exclusively in the operational, administrative, or planning field. One of the purposes of the manual was to clarify the duties of the respective divisions and their relationships to one another.
The manual cited the laws establishing the Office of CNO. These have been quoted in the foregoing pages. It cited also Article 433, U.S. Navy Regulations 1920, which outlined in greater detail than the laws the duties of the CNO. It will be recalled that the legality of that Article had been questioned by some of the bureaus from the time of its addition to the Navy Regulations in 1924, but more particularly in the early 30's, but the Article had remained in full force and specifically formed the basis for the duties performed by some of the OpNav divisions.
The manual referred also to Section 2 of the Act of June 30, 1940 (S-4026). This Section reads: "In addition to the duties now prescribed by law the Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the coordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or about to be commissioned." It is of interest that the original and main purpose of the Act is given in Section 1 and was the merger of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, and Engineering, to form the Bureau of Ships. To this was added Section 2, quoted above, and finally Section 3, establishing the Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy. No law was more important to the efficient administration of the Navy Department in World War II than the Act of June 20, 1940.
The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations-Op 11. The Assistant Chief held the same relation to the Directors of the Divisions as the Chief of Staff of a Commander-in-Chief holds to the flag officers under him. He relieved CNO is so far as possible of administrative details, and signed much of the mail. All questions of administration or policy proposed by the Directors of Divisions were channeled through him on the way to CNO. He, in addition to the CNO, was a member of the Joint Army and Navy Board.
A group of Aides reporting directly to the CNO, designated as Op-10-A, OP-1o-B, and Op-10-C, reflected the traditional pattern of organization
of the personal staff of a flag officer afloat. The duties of Op-10-A followed closely those of a flag lieutenant, of Op-10-B, those of a flag secretary. The officer in charge of the Secret-Confidential File Room, was designated Op-10-C, and reported to Op-10-B. He was responsible for the handling and filing for all of the divisions of CNO of Secret-Confidential mail.
The Director of the Central Division--Op 13, in many of his duties, was in effect also part of the CNO's personal staff. His duties consisted of liaison with the State Department in matters in which the Navy was involved abroad. It handled also legislation, regulations, reports of courts and boards that had to be referred to the Chief of Naval Operations, organization of the Navy Department and of the Office of CNO, and other similar matters. The Central Division had a hand in supervising the government of the dependencies of the United States, administered by the Navy Department. It was in effect a catchall for the solution and handling of any Navy Department administrative maters involving the CNO that could not logically or immediately be assigned to some other division.
The names of most of the divisions indicate their duties and the description of their functions given in the manual is adequate for the purpose of this history. Others must however receive more detailed treatment if their functions and development during World War II are to be understood. The most important in this category was the War Plans Division, Op-12. A complete reappraisal and readjustment of its functions became necessary when, after Pearl Harbor, the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet were transferred to the Navy Department in Washington. A brief description of the pre-war functions of Op-12 will, however, be included after the functions of the other divisions have been recorded. This will be followed later by a description of the functions of Op-12 when the correlation of its duties with those of the Plans Division of Cominch is undertaken.
Communications Division--Op 20. The cognizance of this Division covered the broad field of radio, telegraph, and telephone communications. It was assisted in its technical and liaison work by the Radio Liaison Division--Op 14. A Shore Section handled all traffic originating on shore, Fleet Section, all fleet communications. A Communication and Security Section prepared codes, ciphers, and signal books. The Aeronautical Section dealt with the determination of military characteristics of aeronautical equipment, aircraft communication instructions, and air base communication facilities. The War Plans Section provided liaison on communications with offices and agencies preparing War Plans.
The Registered Publications Section handled custody, distribution, and accounting for all Secret and Confidential publications bearing registered
numbers. It also handled courier service, postal service of a security nature, and liaison with pertinent agencies. A Navy Department Communications Officer, Op 19, reported to the Director. The designation of the various sections underwent some changes during the war and a very important Cryptography Section--Op-20Q was added. A large expansion in personnel became necessary, but no great difficulty in recruitment was experienced because of the tremendous growth in commercial communications during prewar years.
Naval Reserve Policy Division--Op 15. This Division formulated policies relating to the size, location, organization, administration, training, and mobilization of the Naval Reserve as provided by law. The implementation of policies was a responsibility of the Bureau of Navigation (renamed Personnel later on) which in turn delegated to the bureaus much of the work of finding suitable specialist personnel. The Division was the coordinating link between other divisions in CNO and the bureaus in such matters as planning the procurement, allocation, and upkeep of vessels for training the Naval Reserve. It handled also all Merchant Marine Reserve warrants, Naval Reserve yacht certificates, and liaison with State nautical schools. Broadly, the functions of Op 15 were those of a coordinator of all Naval Reserve matters for the Navy Department.
Naval Intelligence--Op 16.The gathering of naval intelligence from abroad and its dissemination to interested Navy Department activities was a device set up in 1882 under the Bureau of Navigation for keeping the Navy Department informed of the characteristics of foreign navies, their ships and weapons and, in general, of their naval policies. Naval Attachés did most of the information gathering in the early days, but the barter method and the policy of not buying information militated against obtaining closely guarded data and other information. A tremendous expansion in the kinds of information needed took place during and after World War I, and particularly when the international situation began to deteriorate in the 1930's.18 The sources from which Intelligence Reports were received after the entry of the United States into the war also multiplied greatly, and included prisoner of war and survivor reports and interviews.
Arguments as to the scope of Naval Intelligence responsibility were frequent. The position taken by CNO during World War II was that Op 16 was in effect a post office charged with forwarding Intelligence reports and other data to the activity in the Navy Department most likely to need and make use of the information; that Op-16 had neither the time
nor the qualified personnel to search for obscure leads in the reports pointing to enemy intentions with respect, for example, to new weapon developments or future operations. An example of the problems involved in separating the wheat from the chaff in intelligence reports with respect especially to possible new weapons under development by the enemy is given in the chapter in this work on "Research and Development"
The process of evaluating and disseminating the information contained in Intelligence reports came in for investigation and some criticism by the Joint Congressional Committee that inquired into the attack on Pearl Harbor.19 It was brought out during the hearings that the Director of Naval Intelligence had authority to disseminate technical, statistical, and similar information received by his Office, but that he had no authority to evaluate certain aspects of military intelligence such as developing the enemy's intentions, nor to disseminate such information and its evaluation. These were responsibilities of the War Plans Division.
The questions asked, the conclusions reached, and the recommendations made by the Joint Congressional Committee, indicated the belief that the Director of Naval Intelligence should have had more authority to evaluate and disseminate information of that kind. The Naval authorities held, however, that the responsibility for developing enemy intentions from information gathered and analyzed by the intelligence service, and its dissemination must be left to the individual in the organization of the CNO responsible for war planning. It was in general held by the Navy Department that even the War Plans Officer could not be the final arbiter in some cases. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, and even the President might have to make the final decision.
A measure of the pressing need for military intelligence in modern warfare was the increase in personnel employed on such work in CNO and in the field during World War II. In June 1938, about 60 officers and some 100 enlisted personnel and civilians were employed in the Naval Intelligence Division--Op-16. On 1 July 1945, the numbers stood at 543 officers, 675 enlisted personnel, and 330 civilians.20 The increase in the field was even greater. At Pearl Harbor, the Naval Intelligence unit at the time of the attack consisted of a few officers and enlisted personnel. At the peak during the ar some 4,500 people were engaged on such work at Pearl Harbor.
Inspection Division--Op-21. The functions of this Division under the name of the Board of Inspection and Survey dated back to the earliest days of the Navy's rebirth in the 1880's. For many years the President of
the Board reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy, and exerted a powerful influence in setting standards of achievements for the navy yards and for engineering performance and material upkeep of the operating forces. During the period with which this history deals, the President of the Board reported to the CNO and headed the Inspection Division.
Inspections and trials of newly constructed vessels, including submarines and aircraft consisted of preliminary trials to ensure that vessels met requirements of the contract before preliminary acceptance by the government, and final trials six months later to determine defects that had shown up during the interval of service. Usually trials were limited to the standardization of only one vessel of each group for the determination of speed, revolutions and horsepower curves, but each vessel was inspected and given a full speed endurance run. Vessels built at the naval shipyards were given the same trials as those built by private contract.
Material inspection of all vessels once in three years when practicable, or upon their return from a foreign station was specified by law.21 It was the policy to conduct such inspections just before overhaul, unless for special reasons, such as poor performance in service, poor material condition, or proposed disposal of the vessel, the Navy Department desired earlier information as to existing conditions. In all of its work the Board maintained close relations with the Fleet Maintenance Division of CNO and with the bureaus.
The Fleet Training Division--Op-22, the Fleet Maintenance Division--Op-23, the Ship Movements Division--Op-38, and the Naval Districts Division--Op-30 had functions that were closely related, as all were concerned with bringing and keeping the operating forces of the Navy in a state of readiness for undertaking any assigned mission on the short notice.
The divisions were divided into sections, each handling a particular zone of activities. In the case of the Fleet Training Division--Op-22, these were the Tactics Section, the Gunnery Section, the Engineering Section, the Damage Control Section, and the Chemical Warfare Section. Each section prepared general instructions, or regulations where appropriate, for the guidance of the fleet in carrying out the training programs.
The Fleet Maintenance Division (Op-23). The role of this Division in the organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was of cardinal importance.The 1940 CNO Manual required the Division to "coordinate the efforts of the material bureaus from the broad viewpoint of the requirements of the Navy in so far as the material readiness of the fleet is concerned and advise the Chief of Naval Operations accordingly. This involves the initiation of correspondence on such questions and the preparation of such papers as may be advisable for consideration by the
War Plans Division and by the General Board." The Director of the Division was required also to regulate the availability of vessels for overhaul at navy yards so that dates of completion set in accordance with operating needs could be met. The assignment of relative priority as between vessels under overhaul at the same yard was also one of its functions. The Director of the Fleet Maintenance Division was in fact the principal deputy of the Chief of Naval Operations in supervising the planning and in coordinating the matériel problems of the Navy.
The Ship Movements Division--Op-38 performed a function that was basic to the concept of the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations. It organized the naval forces in accordance with policies approved by the highest civilian authorities, namely, the Secretary of the Navy and the President,and had the responsibility for planning the operation of the forces. Op-38 prepared Operating Force Plans, assigned ships to the respective forces, and controlled the movements of ships and aggregations of ships. It kept records of their location and movements at all times, including their availability for overhaul and special duty. It had similar duties with respect to submarines, district and patrol craft, the naval transportation service at that time,and vessels on special duty or assignments.
A great mass of detail formed part of the duties of this division, especially after neutrality patrols were instituted at the outbreak of the war in Europe. Its duties and responsibilities were still further increased when escorts had to be provided for allied shipping in the Atlantic.
The Naval Districts Division--Op-30 was the outgrowth of the need for military supervision and administration by the Navy Department of its Shore Establishments. Originally, when the Bureau system was adopted, the Chief of the Bureau of Navy Yards and Docks, who was a line officer, performed this function for the Secretary of the Navy, so far as navy yards were concerned. The geographical subdivision of the country into naval districts, which included the navy yards, came later.
The duties of Op-30 covered broadly the coordination of planned measures for the defense of the shore establishment and the coastal waters in peace and war. This involved close liaison with civilian activities as well as with the Coast Guard and certain activities of the War Department. Underwater defense of naval installations on the seacoast and at outlying stations were important items in the plans. Included in peacetime planning was the acquisition of property for anchorages, dock facilities, and Shore Station developments.
A Merchant Marine Section handled a great variety of duties connected with naval transportation war plans and the transfer of vessels to the Navy from other government departments, the Maritime Commission, and
private owners. A Joint Merchant Vessel Board, consisting of officers in Op-30M, plus a member from the Army, passed on the suitability of such vessels for wartime use, and prepared an "Approved List of Merchant Vessels certified as suitable for Naval Auxiliaries in time of war."
The Naval Districts Division had membership on many boards and committees concerned with Shore Station development, ocean shipping, merchant vessels, and district craft. However, as the war crisis approached, it became involved more and more in planning advanced bases and in their maintenance. On Figure 5, dated March 27, 1942, the Division is shown as the Base Maintenance Division--Op-30, but some of its former duties had in the meantime been transferred to other divisions.
War Plans Division--Op-12. A description of Op-12 has been deferred to this point because much of the information basic to the performance of Op-12 duties came from the four last mentioned divisions.They were the organizational units that exercised the principal control over the readiness and operations of the fleet during the prewar period and needed plans for their guidance. In 1940, the duties of Op-12 were segregated under two sections; a Plans Sections, and a Policy and Projects Section. The former prepared plans specifically called for by the Chief of Naval Operations and supervised the general planning done in CNO. It reviewed operating plans and their contributory plans, and collaborated with the War Department in preparing Joint Basic War Plans.
The Policy and Projects Section developed policies and projects in support of war plans. In such matters it collaborated with the War Department in preparing current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy,[*] and also with other government department involved in national defense. It made studies of specific subjects for the CNO, and prepared directives for his signature or for the signature of the Secretary of the Navy on a great variety of subjects such as the naval budget, the operating force plan, the distribution of the naval forces, naval personnel ceilings, and the like.
It is difficult to select an example of planning during the short of wear period that illustrates more than any other the achievements of Op-12 in the planning field,. Perhaps the development of amphibious warfare techniques, weapons,and landing craft during the late thirties is such an example. The Navy and the Marine Corps took the lead in ship to shore tactics and never suffered a major repulse in any major undertaking during the war largely due to effective planning in CNO and the Marine Corps schools and the coordination by CNO of the work of the Bureaus, particularly the Bureau of Ships, in developing the matériel for amphibious operations.
From the foregoing description of the functions of the various division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations it will be seen that a well throughout out organization was functioning in that office in October, 1940 for carrying out what had become its more or less standardized responsibilities in peacetime. The administrative personnel of CNO consisted almost exclusively of line officers. The upper level key positions were filled by officers who had usually served several tours of duty in various capacities in that office. They represented a high degree of dedication to the Naval service, and were carefully selected for their competence and industry. Due to the emphasis placed on sea duty in measuring an officer's fitness for promotion, the turnover in the billets was large.
However, when the large naval expansion programs authorized in the summer of 1940 got underway it became apparent that the organization was lacking in certain administrative machinery, in standardized procedures, and in the specialized personnel needed for handling CNO's logistics responsibilities, one reason being that most line officers were not too eager to become identified with logistics. In fact, many believed that too much connection with matériel did a line officer's record no good. The result was hazy and somewhat amateurish thinking in CNO during the short-of-war period on many of the most important aspects of logistics in modern warfare.
Forward-looking line and staff corps officers had, however, during the peace period after World War I given much thought to logistics in their studies at the Naval War College and particularly at the Army Industrial College, established in Washington after World War I. The origin and purpose of the latter are described in this work in the chapter on "Material Procurement." This small group of line officers provided a nucleus of high grade talent for training others and for dealing with logistics in CNO during World War II.22
Broadly speaking, the function of the CNO in logistics was the determination of the "what, when, and where" of the men and the things needed by the operating forces to fight the war. The actual recruitment of personnel and the procurement and production of things were responsibilities
of the bureaus. Decisions, based on realistic factors whenever available, instead of guesses, were needed, ad had to be correlated with the war plans. Long-range considerations, such as the status of new and improved weapons devices under development, the industrial mobilization of the nation for war, the requirements of the civilian economy and of the allies the War Production Board and other emergency agencies dealing with war production and procurement were included in the responsibility of the CNO, but were made the province of the Under Secretary of the Navy and of the Office of Procurement and Material when those offices were established in 1940.
A slow start in recognizing the importance of logistics planning and the administrative procedures involved is indicated by the omission of even the word "logistics" or some synonymous term from the 30-page CNO Manual of October 23, 1940, mentioned above. Only a few years later, however, the Director of the Logistics Plans division of CNO in a talk on Naval Logistics on March 31, 1944, said, "I am tempted to make a slightly exaggerated statement that logistics is all of war-making except shooting the guns, releasing the bombs, and firing the torpedoes."23
In order to keep organization and procedures in step with the increasing workload in CNO and particularly with the growing importance of logistics, the Chief of Naval Operations in January 1942 set up a committee to study the entire subject of reorganization. The general purpose of the CNO organization was considered by the committee to be basically sound but changes in structure were thought to be necessary. As a first approach the committee proposed to segregate the numerous divisions into four main groups no a functional basis, each to be headed by an Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. Before the plan could be put into effect, the President's Executive Order #9096 of March 13, 1942, combined the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations in one person.
Before continuing with the history of the administration of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations during the war it is necessary to bring into the narrative the effect of the unanticipated transfer of the headquarters of the United States Fleet to the Navy Department in Washington.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET
Inception and Early Development. On 7 December 1941 command of the United States Fleet, was vested in three Commanders-in-Chief, one commanding the Asiatic Fleet, one of the Pacific Fleet, and one the Atlantic
Fleet. This organization had been placed in effect on 1 February 1941. Provision was made whereby one of these three officers acted as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and in case two or more fleets operated together would exercise overall command and would coordinate their activities. On 7 December 1941 Admiral H.E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was also Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Among the many administrative measures taken by President Roosevelt in the early days of the war, few contributed more to the effectiveness and efficiency of operations of the United States Navy than the issuing on 18 December 1941 of Executive Order 8984. "Prescribing the Duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, and the Cooperative Duties of the Chief of Naval Operations."24 The Order provided that the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet "shall have supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets of the United States Navy, and the operating forces of the naval coastal frontier commands, and shall be directly responsible under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy to the President of the United States therefor." It provided also that "the principal office of the Commander-in-Chief shall be in the Navy Department" and that "the Commander-in-Chief shall keep the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the logistic and other needs of the operating forces, and in turn the Chief of Naval Operations shall keep the Commander-in-Chief informed as to the extent to which the various needs can be met. Subject to the foregoing the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations under the Secretary of the Navy will remain unchanged. The Chief of Naval Operations shall continue to be responsible for the preparation of war plans from the long range point of view."
On 20 December 1941 the President designated Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. Admiral King had taken over the chief command in the Atlantic on 17 December 1940 as Commander, Patrol Forces. On 1 February 1941, in a general fleet reorganization, the designation of his command had been changed to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. During the year 1941 the Atlantic Fleet had borne the heavy load of United States naval responsibilities in the western Atlantic and its personnel had seen intensive patrol duty.
On 30 December 1941 Admiral King was detached from that duty and assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, hoisting his flag in the USS Vixen at the Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. He had, however, been putting in practically full time in the Navy Department after December 7th on the war situation, being ordered to Washington for consultation on December 9th. He remained until December
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. KingAssumed command U.S. Fleet 20 Dec. 1941; held combined positions, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), 18 March 1942-10 Oct. 1945; relieved as CNO on 15 Dec. 1945.
14th when he returned to his flagship, the USS Augusta, at Newport. He was summoned again on December 16th and informed by Secretary Knox that he was to be Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, with headquarters in Washington. He returned to his flagship to close out Atlantic Fleet business and reported in Washington on December 20th. Although he did not hoist his flag in the Vixen until December 30th, he was during the interval engaged in obtaining key personnel for his staff, in planning the headquarters organization, in strategic planning at the highest level, and in attending the ARCADIA conference.
After assuming command on December 30th he immediately sent dispatches to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets (Admirals C.W. Nimitz and Thomas C.Hart, respectively), continuing in effect the existing command relations, and announcing his intention of exercising command by issuing general operating plans and directives and vesting responsibility for their detailed execution in the appropriate principal subordinates in the chain of commands. This was an expression of Admiral King's basic philosophy of command, from which he never departed and which was a cardinal factor in the extraordinary success of naval operations during the war and which accounted for the outstanding efficiency with which Cominch headquarters were administered.
In two directives, which he issued on January 21, 1941 and April 22, 1941, respectively, while Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, he had underlined the fundamentals of command doctrine. In the first, he expressed his concern over the growing practice of giving excessive details in orders and directives, thus undermining the initiative of the subordinate. In the second, he pointed out the correct use of initiative. The two directives are so important to an understanding of Admiral King's philosophy and practice of command and administration during the war that they are reproduced in full as Appendix 1 of this work.
While it does not lie within the province of this work to enter into the operations of the Fleet, it is pertinent to mention that in accordance with the command doctrine which he had summarized in the two directives mentioned above, his first orders to the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets were brief and placed the responsibility for execution on them. He sent a dispatch on 30 December 1941 to Admiral Nimitz, to cover and hold the Hawaii--Midway Line, and to maintain communications with the West Coast; and (2) to maintain communication between the West Coast and Australia, chiefly with respect to security, and to hold the Hawaii-Samoa Line, extending it to include Fiji at the earliest practicable date.
Admiral Hart was informed by dispatch on 31 December that the strategic policy for the Far East (agreed upon by the United States and Great Britain at the ARCADIA Conference) was to hold the Malay barrier as the basic defensive position; to operate forces in depth forward of the barrier; to check Japanese advances; to hold Burma and Australia as supporting posts; to support the Philippines; and to maintain essential communication in the theater.25
Cominch Headquarters Personnel for manning the organization demanded the immediate attention of Admiral King. The bringing together of a competent staff, particularly at the outset when organization and procedures were in the making was of course recognized by him as of crucial importance. He had a wide acquaintance with the officers qualified to fill the upper level billets and was given a free hand in choosing them.
He selected Rear Admiral Russel Willson, (later Vice Admiral), Superintendent of the Naval Academy and a former shipmate on staff duty with him, as his Chief of Staff. Willson reported for duty on 30 December 1941, the day that Admiral King assumed command.
For his Deputy Chief of Staff he choose Rear Admiral R.S. Edwards, (later Admiral), Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet who reported for duty on 1 January 1942. One of his duties was anti-submarine operations. He was responsible for directing such operations until the Tenth Fleet was established and took over anti-submarine warfare in the spring of 1943. When Vice Admiral Willson was detached and ordered to the Pacific Fleet on 1 September 1942, Edwards became Chief of Staff and so remained until he was made Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in September 1944, with the rank of Admiral. He served at headquarters throughout the war.
Vice Admiral Willson was found physically unfit for sea duty after the arrangements for his assignment to the Pacific Fleet had been made but was retained in Washington as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet on special projects with a desk at headquarters. In November 1942 he became the Navy member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and remained with Cominch headquarters throughout the war.
Willson and Edwards were the only two officers at the uppermost staff level who served in Cominch headquarters for the entire war period. A few others also served long tours at headquarters because of their special qualifications but Admiral King insisted on a continuous turnover so as to insure a steady flow of sea experience into Headquarters with a corresponding counter flow of administrative experience into the operating forces.26 Few senior officers remained at headquarters more than a year. Junior Reserve officers and later Waves were extensively used for watch standing and secretarial duties and remained for longer periods.
A distinction was maintained in orders between officers "on the Staff," who would accompany the Commander-in-Chief in the event of his shifting his flag to a cruising ship and all other officers (including Waves) whose status was indicated by the term "attached to headquarters." A Headquarters memorandum was issued on the subject, which listed the
billets that would have the status "on the staff."27 Broadly, those "on the staff" consisted of the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, the various Assistant Chiefs of Staff with certain of their assistants, the Communications, Aviation, and Intelligence officers, the Flag Secretary, certain enlisted personnel, and the usual personal staff. This number, while a considerable one, to accommodate on a cruising ship was only a very small percentage of those in the status of "attached to headquarters."
Every effort was made to keep low the numbers on duty in Cominch headquarters. Admiral King wished to maintain a small, closely knot organization that could function effectively, and he was continually on the alert to prevent the development of useless activities. All proposals made to him for any kind of expansion required convincing justification. By the end of March 1942, about 85 officers were on duty in the Cominch organization. The following are the numbers on board on the dates given:28
Officers: 1 Jan.
Men 10 201 246 235 239 213 Women 0 5 56 74 73 58 Enlisted: Men 9 166 80 66 88 82 Women 0 30 186 212 225 211 TOTAL: 19 402 568 587 625 564
In the matter of organization Admiral King followed the Fleet Staff pattern for several reasons. The billet of Cominch was duty afloat which made it logical for one thing to adopt that pattern. He had furthermore to be prepared to go to sea at any time should circumstances make it advisable. Organization and procedures were accordingly set up in such a way as to make it possible for a staff with indispensable papers to accompany him on short notice. The arrangements for carrying on correspondence and communications, record-keeping, and for filing were therefore kept entirely separate from the existing organizations and practices in the Navy Department. The two activities of CNO and Cominch were united ultimately but only in the person of Admiral King. To carry out this policy the Flag Secretary established separate Cominch File and Mail Rooms.
It was obviously implicit in Executive Order No. 8984 that certain functions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations would have to
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
Chief of Staff to the President, 20 July 1942-25 March 1949.
be transferred to headquarters Cominch. On 30 December, Admiral King, in a memorandum to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, announcing his assumption of the duties of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, stated "During the period of transition essential for the organization of my office, it is requested that I may carry on the duties thereof through the appropriate agencies of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.29 A memorandum of the same date from Admiral Stark to the Divisions and Sections of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, stated "The details of the reorganization of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations to effectuate this order (Executive Order 8984) are still in process of being finally worked out. Pending final decision regarding the details, Divisions will continue to function as heretofore, generally preparing correspondence, dispatches, etc. for signature or release of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet as appears appropriate under General Order 8984."
In order to clarify and to cover in greater detail the distribution of duties between CNO and Cominch, the General Board which had drafted Executive Order 8984 was directed by the Secretary of the Navy to study the subject further and to submit recommendations defining the duties of the two offices. This was done in a memorandum dated February 9, 1942, which is included as Appendix 2 of this work. The memorandum became broadly the basis for the procedures followed by the two offices during the war.
By memorandum of 19 February 1942 to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral King stated that "The definition of duties . . . as set forth in the attached paper (the General Board report of February 9, 1942) is, from my point of view, satisfactory. Minor difficulties are rapidly disappearing. . . ."
In discussions with the Secretary respecting the command relations between Cominch and CNO, Admiral King personally stood out for the principle that Cominch should be under CNO. The question recurred from time to time, during the early months of the war and on one occasion, when at the White House with Secretary Knox, he spoke to President Roosevelt about the matter, pointing out that he as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, was perfectly willing to serve under the CNO, and in fact thought that to be the logical arrangement, but that in any case the command relationship should be settled one way or the other.
The upshot was the issuance of Executive Order 9096,30 dated March 12, 1942, providing that "the duties of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations may be combined and devolve upon one officer who shall have the title 'Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations,'" and "who shall be principal Naval Adviser to the President on the conduct of the war and the principal Naval Adviser and Executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the Naval Establishment."
Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne (later Admiral)
Asst. Chief of Naval Operations, Dec. 1941-March 1942;
Vice Chief of Naval Operations,March 1942-Jan. 1946.
The duties and responsibilities, respectively, of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and of the Chief of Naval Operations, in this combination, were stated in the following terms in the Executive Order:
"As Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, the officer holding the combined offices as herein provided shall have supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces, and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy and shall be directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the President therefor."
"As Chief of Naval Operations, the officer holding the combined offices as herein provided shall be charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several
Vice Admiral Walton R. Sexton
Chairman, General Board, June 1939-Aug. 1940;
continued duty General Board to Sept. 1943.fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt. Duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet."
The Executive Order provided further that the staff of Cominch was to consist of a Chief of Staff with the rank of Vice Admiral, such Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff as necessary, and such other officers as appropriate and needed. The staff of the Chief of Naval Operations was to be composed of a Vice Chief of Naval Operations, a Sub-Chief and such additional Assistant Chiefs as considered necessary.
CNO Interim Changes. As previously stated, Admiral H.R. Stark was Chief of Naval Operations when war with Japan broke out. Rear Admiral R.E. Ingersoll was Assistant CNO. With the detachment of King from the Atlantic Fleet it was necessary to appoint a relief immediately. Ingersoll was chosen for the billet and Rear Admiral F.J. Horne was moved from the General Board on 23 December 1941 to take Ingersoll's place as Assistant CNO. When King relieved Stark as CNO on 26 March 1942, Horne was appointed Vice Chief of Naval Operations with the rank of Vice Admiral, in which position he served throughout the war.31
The organization of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, proposed by Vice Admiral Horne on March 27, 1942, under the new set-up, is shown on Figure 5.
It will be noted that the chain of command under this organization consisted of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Op-10), the Sub-Chief of Naval Operations (Op-11), and three Assistant Chiefs. This plan was, however, never implemented in all respects with respect to the duties of the Assistant Chief for Operations, and the Assistant Chief for Information and Security, because of the early transfer of some of their functions to Cominch. The effect of the reorganization on the logistic functions of CNO was, however, considerable. These were segregated in three Divisions; Fleet Maintenance (Op-23), Base Maintenance (Op-30), and Naval Vessels and Aircraft (Op-38), under an Assistant CNO, Maintenance (Op-11-M).
Scarcely had the new arrangement settled into its grooves when a reappraisal became necessary, partly because of the increasing tempo of the war effort and partly because of readjustments in the pattern of CNO-Cominch relationships that needed to be made. In September 1942, a group of civilian experts on business management also began a study of the administration of CNO.32 Admiral Horne worked closely with the specialists who began making preliminary recommendations in November and December 1942, while their wok was still in progress. Their report
Fig. 6--ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (15 JUNE 1943)
was completed in March, 1943, and strongly influenced the reorganization shown on Fig. 6 of 15 June 1943.33
Partly as a result of the Booz studies the reorganization affected particularly the distribution of the logistics functions of CNO and the procedures for handling the work. The head of Op-12 was renamed The Assistant chief of Naval Operations for Logistic Plans. He reported directly to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and worked in close liaison with the Cominch planning group, which will be described presently. An Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistic Projects (Op-11A) reported to the Sub-Chief of Naval Operations and had under him the Board of Inspection and Survey (Op-21), Fleet Maintenance (Op-23), Base Maintenance (Op-29), the Naval Transportation Service (Op-39), and Aviation (Op-40).
Of particular significance in the Booz report was the emphasis placed on the kind of personnel needed for dealing with logistics. In the past a few technical specialists from the Staff Corps and the Marine Corps had from time to time been assigned to duty in CNO. The rest were Line officers, few of whom had any great liking for logistics. The Booz report suggested that experienced, technically trained officers be detailed to assist these officers and that they be drawn from the bureaus preferably on an additional duty basis. The arrangement of wearing two hats had the great advantage that the individual knew just where to go in his own Bureau to obtain information and assistance on current problems, thus short circuiting the slower correspondence methods. Objections to the arrangement came occasionally from bureau chiefs because the subordinate was at times placed in the embarrassing position of having to act counter to this chief's policies or decisions when a matter reached CNO for final action.
By this method, strong teams were shortly built up in Op-12 for planning the logistic requirements of operations under consideration. Overall logistics plans when satisfactory to Cominch would then be broken down into their component elements. After that they were transmitted to the Assistant CNO for Logistic Projects (Op-11A). A Progress Section was set up in Op-11A to plan, schedule, coordinate, and to follow up the respective tasks included in the overall plan. The members of the Progress Section, like those of Op-12, were largely officers from the bureaus who were in position to short circuit the regular channels when that method was indicated as advantageous. Directives were prepared by the Assistant CNO for Logistic Planning, and Logistic Projects respectively, as necessary to formalize action taken or to be taken.
A very important function of CNO logistics planners was to supply information to Combined Chiefs of Staff and to top-level inter-allied conferences as to the logistic feasibility of strategic plans under consideration. The Director of the War Plans Division in the case of the earlier organization and the Assistant CNO for Logistic Plans (Op-12) after the 1943 reorganization, attended all top-level conferences between the Allies, accompanied by specialist officers from the bureaus. He was thus in position to provide considerable on the spot information on the logistic practicability of proposed undertakings.
It should be mentioned again that the actual execution of logistic plans was the responsibility of the bureaus. Production and procurement of matériel, the creation of facilities, and the recruitment, training, and medical care of naval personnel come under the cognizance of the bureaus, and are covered in the chapters on the respective bureaus. Chapters in this work are devoted also to "Naval Logistics", "Material Procurement", and "Research and Development," to record the history of those segments of Navy Department administration in World War II.
The Chief of Naval Operations prepared no detailed specifications, made no drawings or contracts, and bought nothing. In that respect, the role of CNO was similar to that of the Office of Procurement and Material in the Under Secretary's Office which also bought nothing and was concerned only with decision and policy-making, with the coordination of the work of the bureaus in the field of material procurement, and with the coordination via the War Production Board and other emergency agencies of the mobilization of industry so far as it concerned the Navy.
Before proceeding further with the history of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in World War II, it is necessary to bring the origin and development of Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet back into the picture.
In order to meet the ever-changing war situation and its needs, the organization of Cominch headquarters was in a state of flux throughout the war. But the general pattern remained the same as the one adopted by Admiral King, when he took command on 30 December 1941. Headquarters duties were distributed among divisions on a functional basis. Originally there were three divisions: Plans, Operations, and Readiness. An additional division dealing with Antisubmarine Warfare was added in the spring of 1943 under which were segregated various scattered antisubmarine functions. The organization including this division is shown on a chart dated 5 April 1943, and is reproduced as Figure 7.
Cominch Headquarters Organization
FIG. 7--ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. FLEET (5 APRIL 1943)
A fifth division for handling Combat Intelligence was added later. Figure 8 reproduces a chart approved by Admiral King on 10 November 1944. It shows this addition as well as the main subdivisions of the organization that had been made. The chart is accompanied in the "History of Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet" by the following note: "The chart prepared after the creation of Deputy Cominch-Deputy CNO shows the full organization of five divisions: Plans, Combat Intelligence, Operations, Readiness, and Antisubmarine (Tenth Fleet)." No further significant changes were made in the headquarters organization during the remaining months of the war. These two charts should be consulted in connection with the following description of the Cominch Headquarters organization and functioning.
Speaking broadly, the Plans Division (F-1) prepared strategic plans for proposed operations, based on information furnished by the Combat Intelligence group, of enemy forces and the likely enemy reactions. The plans were then submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and approval. Of necessity, the Division maintained close liaison with the CNO Logistic Plans Division (Op-12), in the Navy Department and with the Operations Division of the War Department.
The Plans Division was the principal Navy agency for coordinating planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to naval forces or joint forces in areas where unity of command was exercised by naval officers.
FIG. 7--ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. FLEET (10 NOV. 1944)
Fleet. How to produce any particular item was the responsibility of the technical bureaus. But, the "what", "when" and "where" required constant checking up by the Readiness Division. This involved also a continuous check on tactics, the more fundamental techniques of engineering, gunnery and other shipboard activities. The Readiness Division was the clearing house for determining whether the material furnished the Forces Afloat was satisfactory and whether there was an adequate supply of trained personnel for operating ships and aircraft. The Readiness Division kept close contact with the special aspects of modern warfare, such as amphibious warfare, mine warfare, antiaircraft, training centers and the like. The Division standardized gunnery and engineering exercises, studied the reports thereon, promulgating to the service the lessons learned therefrom.
One of the urgent preoccupations of Admiral King at the outbreak of the war was to find better ways and means for destroying enemy submarines in the Atlantic. Scientists were mobilized as told in the chapter in this work on "Research and Development" to assist in solving such problems as detection of submarines, gathering and analyzing statistics, inventing special devices and weapons, etc. Responsibility for Antisubmarine Warfare rested in the beginning with the Deputy Chief of Staff. In the spring of 1943, when antisubmarine forces and weapons had been augmented sufficiently, and electronic and other detection devices had reached a satisfactory degree of effectiveness, an all-out antisubmarine offensive was launched in the Atlantic. To implement the measures to be taken, the Tenth Fleet (FX(01)) was established on 20 May 1943 under the direct command of Admiral King, with Rear Admiral F.A. Low as its Chief of Staff. The Tenth Fleet then took over from the Deputy Chief of Staff all duties connected with antisubmarine warfare.
A more detailed description of the functioning of the organization, the duties taken over from CNO, and their development during the war is now in order.
Plans Division (F-1). This division throughout the war prepared current strategic estimates and plans to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. The Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) and the Assistant Plans Officer were the naval members of the Joint Staff Planners who did the strategic planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of the Combined Staff Planners. They were, therefore, responsible for the preparation of studies and war plans relating to joint and combined employment of the military forces of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war.
The Plans Division evolved from the War Plans Division (Op-12) of CNO, which was one of the first activities to be transferred to the headquarters
of Cominch, in January 1942. As organized at the outbreak of war, the War Plans Division (Op-12) consisted of three sections, whose organization and duties were defined in a memorandum of 22 December 1941 from Rear Admiral (later Admiral) R.K. Turner, the Director of the Division, to the Chief of Naval Operations. The major functions at that time were:
Section "A"--Policy and Projects Section, which endeavored to maintain liaison with other offices with regard to material matters required to the execution of war plans and general strategic operations.
Section "B"--The Plans Section, which had cognizance of strategic estimates, Joint and Navy Basic Plans, and current strategic tasks and distribution of forces; and liaison with United States and foreign missions other than with Latin America; and
Section "C"--which endeavored to perform the functions both of Sections "A" and "B" with respect to planning and liaison with Latin American countries.
As one of the functions of the division was collaboration with the War Department in general military policies and in Joint Army and Navy War Plans, three officers, who were assistants to the Director, were designated to maintain liaison with the General Staff, United States Army.
Section "A" maintained liaison with bureaus and offices on ship building programs and materials required by war plans; liaison regarding civil aircraft, and liaison regarding military and international law as required by war plans.
Section "B", the largest of the three, was composed of various subsections, the number and designation of which varied from time to time with the assignment and detachment of officers. A strategic plotting group in this section was concerned with evaluation of the international situation, information of foreign action, liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Communications, and Naval Vessels Division for intelligence information. It maintained a daily situation plot and strategic plot. Its various desks were concerned with the organization and assignment of forces, appropriate strategic studies, and liaison with Naval Transportation Service on control and routing of shipping. The Atlantic desk was also responsible for preparation of basic logistic plans and liaison with bureaus in regard to logistics. Matters concerning Naval Coastal Frontiers, the organization of Naval Local Defense Forces. Naval District Plans, and plans for defensive sea areas and maritime control areas were handled by a separate desk.
The "C" Section, concerned with Latin American defense, which was responsible for collaboration with Latin American Republics on joint defense, was the smallest unit of Op-12.
Rear Admiral Turner's memorandum of 22 December 1941 recommended that the entire War Plans Division of CNO be transferred to Cominch
headquarters, and alternatively recommended, if that plan were not adopted, that Sections "B" and "C" pass under the control of Cominch, and that Section "A" be split between the Fleet Maintenance and the Material Divisions of Naval Operations.
When Admiral King assumed command of the United States Fleet, Rear Admiral Turner was assigned to Cominch for temporary additional duty as an Assistant Chief of Staff.
On 15 January 1942, Admiral King requested that various sections of the CNO organization be transferred to Cominch headquarters on 20 January 1942, including Sections "B" and "C" of the War Plans Division. The transfer involved moving the sections to space assigned to Cominch on the third floor, sixth, and seventh wings of the Main Navy Building. The request also stated that "It is intended to replace all civilians with service personnel as soon as possible." Further consideration resulted in leaving Section "C", Latin American relations, under CNO. The wartime history of the relations of the Navy Department with Latin America is recorded in the chapter on "External Relations" in this work.
The Chief of Naval Operations, in serial 910, of 19 January 1942, to the Commander in Chief, stated that Section "B" of the War Plans Division "will be transferred to the Commander in Chief as soon as possible." On the following day, Admiral Stark's memorandum (serial 4812 of 20 January 1942), to all divisions of Operations, announced that "pending final decision regarding the organization of the long-range planning group in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the present "A" Section of the War Plans Division shall function as the Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The designation of Op-12 was to be retained for this division. Thus in the end it was only Op-12B which formed the nucleus for the development of the Cominch Plans Division.
Cominch serial 77 of 27 January 1942 to Commanders in Chief of Fleet and Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, announced the transfer of the functions of the Plans Section and the Joint Strategical Committee of the War Plans Division to Cominch so that dispatches and correspondence might be appropriately addressed.
In the meantime, the further study of the distribution of the functions of CNO and Cominch was being made by the General Board resulting in the recommendation,dated 9 February 1942, mentioned above. The General Board's proposed differentiation was that the Chief of Naval Operations "prepared war plans from the long-range point of view" and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, "prepare and execute plans for current operations."
On 17 January, Rear Admiral Turner submitted a memorandum to
Admiral King on the subject "Organization of Strategic Plotting Room," in which certain proposals were made concerning the type of information that would be required for the daily use of the Commander in Chief. These suggestions included: (a) Summaries of details now kept in the plotting rooms of the Ship Movements Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence; (b) Strategic history charts designed to show the progress of own and enemy operations which might be useful for making strategic decisions as to the future; (c) Various charts and maps; (d) All dispatches relating to general naval operations and special projects; (e) Daily official reports, and a pamphlet of spot news from the ticker.
Proposals were made for an arrangement of wall maps and for manning the room between 0700 and 2000 daily and during the night on special occasions.
On 18 January, by marginal notations, Admiral King indicated his approval of (a), (b) and (c) and directed that certain changes be made in the other proposals. He gave the room the short title of "Chart Room," which it retained throughout the war, and indicated that "the number of officers who have access to Chart Room must be kept at a low minimum." By other comments he indicated that it was his desire that this room give an overall "picture" which would necessarily be available only to the very limited group who "needed to know."
The reorganization of the War Department, which involved the transfer of all major operating functions from General Headquarters to the War Plans Division of the Army General Staff, required a change in the liaison arrangements of the Commander in Chief's Headquarters. The simultaneous establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization (with offices in the Public Health Service Building on Constitution Avenue) led to a decision by Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to transfer the Joint United States Strategic Committee to that building for greater convenience. These changes required a reorganization of the Plans Division, which was promulgated by Rear Admiral Turner in a memorandum of 27 February. As General Headquarters, U.S. Army, at that time remained charged only with training duties, Cominch liaison was to be maintained in the future by the Readiness Division, rather than the Plans Division,and was to concern training in amphibious warfare.
The Navy Section of the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee (then consisting of three Captains, one Marine Corps Colonel, and one junior reserve officer) was designated as F-13. Although its offices were to be in the Public Health Service Building, it was understood that officers of the section would continue to be an integral part of the Cominch Plans Division and that an office would be maintained in the seventh wing for their
use. They were expected "daily to familiarize themselves thoroughly with operations in progress and with the strategical situation in all areas," as well as to consult with the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) and the Assistant Plans Officer of the division on frequent occasions. This new organization was to be placed, in effect, on Monday, 2 March 1942. At the same time the Marine Liaison Section and the Pacific-Asiatic Desk were merged under the designation Pacific Section (F-123).
As Naval Coastal Frontiers had become Sea Frontiers on 6 February 1942, the name of F-125 was changed to Sea frontier Section.
Minor readjustments of duties between F-1 and Op-12 became necessary with experience. Cominch serial 317 of 26 February 1942 requested that the chief of Naval Operations take over the formulation of executive orders and proclamations for the establishment of Defense Sea Areas and Maritime Control Areas. Chief of Naval Operations memorandum to Cominch (serial 12912 of 28 February) designated Op-12 to assume this function.
On 26 March 1942, Admiral King assumed duty as Chief of Naval Operations, but as the organizations in support of his two functions remained separate and distinct, no change was involved in the duties of the Plans Division.
On 17 June 1942, Vice Admiral Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, in a memorandum to Admiral King recommended that Op-12 be abolished and that its planning functions be transferred to F-1 on the ground that there was no real necessity for two Plans Divisions. After some discussion, during which the point was made that the plans function of Op-12 were in actuality planning for implementation and execution of plans prepared by Cominch, it was concluded that it was desirable to have Op-12 continue in existence. Admiral King's interest in keeping the Cominch organization as small as possible is indicated by a note attached to a memorandum of 20 September 1943, "Admiral King directs that no work be done by the Plans Division which may properly be accomplished by any other organization in the Navy Department, all of which are available to assist when appropriate."
Cominch serial 2229 of 1 July 1942 to the VCNO and to the Chief of Staff, Cominch, summarized the distribution of planning functions in the following terms:
- Headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet--Asst. CofS (Plans)
- Plans for current operations.
- Plans for future operations including:
- Number and types of Naval Craft required;
- Merchant shipping required;
- Character of material and equipment, aside from shipping, required;
- Troops required.
- Requirements as to location and facilities of Advance Bases for the support of present and future operations.
- Office of Chief of Naval Operations--Plans Division (Op-12)
- Plans for implementing (A), including:
- Check of material practicability;
- Logistic and other necessary planning for Naval Districts and the Shore Establishment;
- Coordination of applicable plans for all Material Bureaus;
- Execution of all logistic plans, through appropriate agencies, including the establishment and maintenance of advance bases.
It will be noted that"Plans for Future Operations" are given in the memorandum as part of Cominch duties, although placed under CNO by the General Board in its distribution of the planning functions of CNO and Cominch. This led to the establishment early in July 1942 of a Future Plans Section (F-126). This section had the responsibility for preparing plans for contemplated campaigns and operations, including the logistic requirements in the way of ships, equipment, material, and the forces needed to carry out the plans.
The Plans Division (F-1), after 1943, consisted of sections designated as Pacific, Atlantic, Air, Sea Frontiers, and a group serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before the transfer to Cominch of some of the CNO Plans Division (Op-12) that division also had a specific section which specialized on the preparation of strategic estimates, plans, policies, liaison and other details related to operations in the Pacific, particularly with respect to the establishment of advanced bases.
In the early weeks of war, operations were based largely upon prewar plans. However, the advance of the Japanese into Malaya early in 1942 was so rapid and changes occurred so fast that all planning had to be left to local commanders. However, the setting up of advanced bases to guard the supply line to Australia was planned in headquarters to the last detail by Rear Admiral Turner and the Plans Division.
The invasion of the Solomons Islands was planned in the same way by the planners under Rear Admiral Turner who was then placed in command of the task force to carry out the plans but did not return to Washington as a member of the Cominch headquarters staff. This stage in the planning activities at Pearl Harbor which led eventually to the final pattern whereunder planning became a team effort of planners in headquarters, in the Pacific Fleet, and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Pacific Section then became primarily a reviewing and executive activity. Planning officers often made joint presentations of scheduled operations before selected groups such as the President and the White House Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, head of Civilian War Agencies, and Senior Officers in the Navy Department.
The evolution of the planning function in CNO and Cominch followed traditional lines of proliferation and specialization. Special sections were set up to plan the naval strategy for the war in the various theatres. Much of the success of the landings in the North African, Mediterranean, Normandy, and Southern France campaigns was due to the painstaking attention given to details by the planners of the operations in Cominch and CNO. Included was the prompt redeployment to the Pacific theatre of naval forces released by the success of the European operations.
The functions of the naval districts and naval coastal frontier (Op-12b-6) were transferred to Cominch headquarters early in February 1942, and the name changed to the Sea Frontier Section. The planning included underwater defense of the sea coast and maritime control areas. The designation F-125 was given to the section. Many matters involving command relations in the sea frontiers as between the Navy, the Army and Caribbean Military Authorities were handled or processed through this section. They were further clarified in General Order No. 174 of 2 June 1942, which was later revised and issued as General Order No. 213 of 28 December 1944. The latter Order was the result partly of the need for postwar planning and with placing this function in some specific section of the CNO-Cominch organization. Accordingly, as of 1 October 1944, the Sea Frontier Section was reorganized and designated as the Postwar Naval Planning and Sea frontier Section (F-14).
Early in the war, Section F-33 in the Operations Division handled aviation matters in headquarters. Aviation planning for all theaters had been a function of the Pacific Section. The Aviation Planning Officers served in an advisory capacity to the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) and the Section Heads of the Atlantic, Pacific, Postwar Naval Planning, and Sea Frontier Sections.When a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) was established, the Aviation Section (F-15) became the planning liaison between CNO and Cominch in aviation matters. From May 1944 until the capitulation of Japan, liaison was maintained also by this section with the 20th Army Air Force to assist in coordinating the operations of that command with the naval air and surface operations.
The presence of Marine Corps officers in Op-12 and in the Pacific Section of the Plans Division of Cominch has been mentioned. Many matters handled by such officers in the Pacific Section lay outside of the cognizance of that section. The general task of the Senior Marine Corps officer was to keep Marine Corps Headquarters informed of those parts of strategic and tactical plans which concerned the Marine Corps. The Commandant of the Marine Corps therefore came to look on this officer as his representative on all matters broadly affecting the Marine Corps, particularly with respect to matters involving policy.
A group of officers from the Logistic Plans Division of CNO (Op-12) including representatives of the technical bureaus, and assistant Chiefs of Staff (Plans) of Cominch in addition to the Joint War Plans Committee attended Allied Chiefs of Staff conferences.34 They served as advisers and assistants to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in furnishing on the spot information, which was necessarily often somewhat inexact and had to be recognized as such but served a very useful purpose in avoiding unrealistic decisions with respect to future strategic plans.
The Operations Division (F-3), as implied in its name, was the activity in the Cominch organization that advised the Commander in Chief and acted for him in directing the operations of the fleet and its supporting forces. Direction and control of the operation of naval forces was one of the original purposes in establishing the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. In general, F-3 had the responsibility for everything necessary to carry out that purpose. Consequently, its duties were not susceptible of exact definition, as they overlapped almost all of the other functions of Cominch Headquarters.
For this reason, the transfer of duties and personnel from the Ship Movement Division (Op-38) to Cominch headquarters presented special problems. Admiral King at first requested the transfer of all personnel and records of Op-38 to Cominch, but after discussion with Admiral Stark it was decided to leave Sections A (Vessels of the Fleet), B (Submarines and Submarine Tenders), C (Patrol, District, and Utilitarian Craft), E (Aircraft), and F (Administration) with CNO.35
The setup in the organization of the Operations Division consisted of F-30 (Operations Officer), F-31 (Current Operations, Fleets), F-32 (Sea Frontiers), F-33 (Air), F-34 (Communications), and F-35 (Operational Information). Specific tasks were assigned to these sections, in a memorandum of 22 January 1942, and covered broadly the preparation of plans for contemplated operations; orders, and directives, based on approved plans; the continuous study and record of current operations; the organization and assignment of ships and aircraft to fleets and frontiers; the organization and control of escorts; and necessary liaison with the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department and with other divisions in Cominch headquarters.
On 15 May 1942, the Convoy and Routing Division (Op-37) of CNO was transferred to Cominch headquarters. This activity, which had "cognizance
of all matters relating to the routing and other appropriate control of merchant convoys and shipping" became the F-37 Section of the Operations Division, and so remained until transferred to the 10th Fleet in 1943. With the dissolution of the 10th Fleet in June 1945, Convoy and Routing again returned to the Operations Division as F-37, and the Antisubmarine Analyses Section (FX-43) was similarly transferred there, with the designation F-39.
The end of the European War made little difference in the workload of the Operations Division. The number and complexity of Pacific operations and the problems incident to total deployment required the full time of all sections of the division. After the end of hostilities in the Pacific, the implementation of plans with the reestablishment of peacetime fleets, the transfer of personnel overseas for discharge, organization of Reserve Fleets, and schedules for decommissioning surplus ships became its principle tasks.
The Communications Officer (F-34) was responsible for the coordination control and supervision of the Communications of the Commander in Chief with the various fleets. This section, which included various watch officers, was assigned to the Operations Division for administrative purposes, but provided services for the entire headquarters.
Before the war, all dispatches received in the Navy Department were widely circulated, so that everyone who might have any possible responsibilities in connection therewith would be sure to see them. With the wartime necessity for the security of current and future operations, wide distribution of dispatch traffic was obviously undesirable. To further the ends of security, a special Coding Section was established by the Chief of Naval Operations on 26 January 1942 for the exclusive use of Cominch headquarters. A special Code Room was provided, but was abolished in the following July when arrangements were made for handling Cominch traffic in the Navy Department Code Rooms by assigning to the duty specially selected officers.
The Operational Information Section (F-35) was formed the middle of January 1942 by the transfer of Op-38W, which was in the end the only section of the Ship Movement Division of CNO actually transferred as whole. Op-38W had been established in January 1941 for furnishing complete combat or operational intelligence and the facilities for staff conferences on matters of strategy. At the outset the section was built around a card index system and a moving plot of ship locations. Similar information about United States aircraft was also recorded.
The demand for special reports showing the location of combatant ships during December 1941 led to the preparation of a daily location list, later also of records of losses and damage of ships. Due to the use of
task forces in the fleet a weekly report of the composition of U.S. Task Forces was instituted. After December 1941 the regular exchange of fleet location information with the Allies was started.
One of the most important problems early in 1942 was the submarine. This resulted in setting up a system in F-35 for tracking German submarines and the detouring, whenever possible, of merchant shipping around them. In addition to submarine warnings, F-35 provided official weather forecasts in code. Thus, antisubmarine information became one of the most important activities of F-35. The location of U-boats was kept posted on charts in a "War Room." Access to the F-35 "War Room" was not as restricted as access to the Chart Room (F-11). The "War Room" was maintained largely for the use of personnel entitled to see something, though not the full picture of current and operations planned for the future.
The objectives of the work performed by Convoy and Routing were summarized in the "Operating Plan for the U.S. Merchant Ship Control Service," issued on 28 February 1944. The memorandum pointed out that the mission of this service coming under the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet was to provide for the safety of movements of merchant vessels in time of war,not only to reduce the risk of damage from enemy action, but also to reduce the usual maritime risk of collision by re-routing, avoidance of hurricanes, storms, and areas of dangerous navigation. The British Admiralty had maintained such a service from the outbreak of the war in 1939 through its Naval Control Service offices in the principal ports of the world. The United States took over this responsibility for the western half of the Atlantic from about 26° west and the whole Pacific to 100° east. The British service was to continue to function in the U.S. area until such time as the United States was ready to assume full responsibility. A Convoy and Routing Section (Op-38-O) was established in the Ship Movement Division of CNO on 18 November 1941. Convoy and Routing continued as Op-38-O until 26 January 1942m, when its designation was changed to Convoy and Routing Division (Op-37).
Effective 15 May 1942, in accordance with Cominch Serial 1194, of 14 May 1942, the Convoy and Routing Division was transferred to Headquarters Cominch and established in the Operations Division as F-37. No change in offices, personnel, or functions were made by the Order, except that the civilian clerks were replaced by naval personnel.
The Convoy and Routing Section continued in the Operations Division with the designation F-37 until 29 June 1943, when its incorporation into the staff organization of the 10th Fleet was completed. This transfer involved no changed in the section's worldwide activities as to routing, diversion, and reporting of shipping or methods of communication. With
the end of the European War and the dissolution of the 10th Fleet, the section again returned to the Operations Division as F-37, where it remained until the disestablishment of Cominch headquarters in October 1945.
In point of personnel attached, Convoy and Routing was always the largest section in any of the divisions of Cominch headquarters; this, because of the number of watch officers required to maintain its various plots and communication activities. Its functions, however, were so highly specialized that its relations with other sections and divisions of headquarters were less intimate than was the general rule, except for the small number of senior officers who directed its activities and executed the policies of Cominch.36
Readiness Division (F-4). It was the responsibility of the Readiness Division to make certain that the logistic needs of ships of the Navy were forthcoming when, where, and in the quantity and kind needed to perform their missions. This did not include producing these things or actually providing personnel, as these were responsibilities of the bureaus, but it did involve keeping a continuous check on the satisfaction that matériel and personnel were giving the forces afloat and to take such steps as necessary to improve unsatisfactory conditions.
Readiness took on an additional meaning in World War II, because of the crucial part that science was beginning to play in warfare. As will be found in the chapter in this work on "Research and Development," Admiral Stark and General Marshall had, in the early summer of 1940, given their assent to the broad concept advanced by leading scientists in civilian life that modern science had progressed to the point where the upper echelons in the command branch of the services were not sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities lying dormant in science to know what they might ask for, with reasonable expectation that it could be developed and produced. But this proposition involved admitting scientists at the ground level to the problems and logistic needs of the armed services.
So far as the upper levels of the command branch of the Navy were concerned the concept had first to be sold to the Fleet Training Division (Op-22) of CNO. The Navy was fortunate in having Captain (late Vice Admiral) W.A. Lee, as the Director of Fleet Training at the time. He was very broadminded, and not over impressed with the dangers to security of discussing such matters with civilian scientists and of letting them see the Navy's problems at first hand. On 30 December 1941 he reported to Cominch for temporary additional duty as an Assistant Chief of Staff.
The entire Fleet Training Division was transferred to Cominch headquarters on 20 January 1942. Other steps were also taken, as will be recounted in various places in this work, to make the maximum use of scientists in the entire field of readiness; but without a broad and sympathetic understanding by the Head of the Readiness Division of the role that the scientists could play, the course of the war would have been very different.
Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral W.S. DeLany, the Assistant Chief of Staff (Readiness) from 19 March 1943 to the disestablishment of Cominch headquarters in October 1945, provided a similar breadth of view and understanding of the part that science plays in modern warfare and of the importance of opening the doors to scientists if they were to work effectively with the armed forces.
The Division consisted originally of sections covering tactics, gunnery, engineering and cruising radius, damage control and chemical warfare, lighter-than-air, antisubmarine and aviation. The functions and personnel were redistributed in January 1942 to form three major sections; F-21 (Readiness Section: F-22 (Training Section); and F-23 (Instruction, changed later to Indoctrination Section).
To meet changing conditions, as the war progressed, seven new sections were eventually set up. The first of these, the Antisubmarine Warfare Section (F-25), was organized on 15 April 1942. A year later, when antisubmarine activities were being concentrated in the Operations Division under a new Assistant Chief of Staff (Antisubmarine (F-3B)), this section was transferred there, and given the designation F-36. Subsequently it became FX-40 Section of the 10th Fleet, but on 12 June 1945 was returned to the Readiness Division as F-40.
On 4 June 1942 an Amphibious Warfare Section (F-26) and in December 1942 a Tactical Analysis Section (F-28) were added to the Division. In June 1943 an Aviation Section(F-24) was split off from the Training Section. Matters relating to radar were made the function of a new Radar Section in March 1943, as radar had reached a position of major importance.
A Research and Development Section (F-45) was organized on 25 March 1944, although such activities had been factors in the work of the entire Division from the beginning of the war. The name of the Section was changed in April 1945 to "New Weapons, Research and Development Section."
Awareness of the importance of creating new weapons and devices should, however, not be judged by the late date at which a special section was created to handle such work. The Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development was established directly under the Secretary of the Navy in the summer of 1941 to coordinate research which was scattered
throughout the Navy Department and to assist the civilian scientists mobilized under the civilian Office of Scientific Research and Development in obtaining first-hand knowledge of Navy needs and also to witness the performance of their weapons and devices in actual service. The Coordinator of Research and Development and his staff worked directly with the various sections of the Division to bring about the coordinated results. So far as the activities in this field of headquarters Cominch were concerned, a scientific council was appointed and attached to Section F-45, to deal especially with problems of Sub-Surface Warfare.
An antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group had also been set up in the 10th Fleet, as will be described presently, and was transferred to the Readiness Division on 7 October 1944. Dr. P.M. Morse was the Direction of the Operations Research Group when it became part of the F-45 Section. Some of the projects for which F-45 had a specific responsibility were: Fire Control and Optical Devices, Guided Missiles, Rockets, special types of Torpedoes, and the Tactics of Psychological Warfare.
The variety of interests of the Readiness Division led to extensive contact with CNO and with the various bureaus. Many of these contacts were informal, but a directive issued by the Chief of Staff in Headquarters Memorandum No. 11 stipulated that verbal directives must be confirmed immediately in writing.37
Although production was a responsibility of the Bureaus, they sought opinions from Cominch headquarters upon the performance of any new matériel going into use. This in addition to reports received through the usual channels. Where combat experience showed defects or indicated possible improvements in design, the Readiness Division took up the matter with the cognizant Bureau. When the 10th Fleet was organized as a separate division, it carried with it some of the improvement functions formerly handled by the Readiness Division.
Drawing a sharp line between readiness and logistics is always difficult. When the Fleet Training Division was transferred from CNO to Cominch headquarters it was believed that the main function of the Readiness Division would be guiding and following up ship building, conversion, alterations, and new weapons development programs. However, in the spring of 1942 it became evident that the training of personnel was of even greater importance, also that standardizing conditions of readiness for action and troubleshooting were very important functions. New sections were added by transfer of duties from other sections and the recognition of new needs. Such new problems had for example arisen, as Air-Sea Rescue, Life-saving, Biological Warfare, Firefighting on an intensive level,
Salvage, and other miscellaneous duties not definitely assigned to other units as headquarters.
The duties of the Training Section (F-22, later F-42) became particularly important and were segregated by types of ships. By the complex nature of these duties., the various desks in F-42 were required to work closely with each other, and with sections in CNO, the material Bureaus, and the Training Commands. The Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Ships were especially concerned in such matters and required clearance by F-42.
The microfilm library was set up in the spring of 1942 as a means of making rapidly available under properly controlled conditions to authorized readers from all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department information contained in War Diaries and Action Reports. This avoided the delays incident to regular routing and holdups in individual offices for perusal of the documents themselves. A blacked out reading room equipped with Recordak Projectors was maintained, where authorized readers dictated their notes into dictaphones.
An Amphibious Warfare Section (F-26, later F-46) was established in June 1942 to have cognizance of all matters concerning amphibious operations, including their tactical planning, training, material requirements, and organization of the amphibious forces.
A Joint Army-Navy Experimental and Testing Board was established at Fort Pierce, Florida in September 1943 under the control and supervision of the Commander Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The Coordinator of Research and Development in August 1043 set up a special project with the civilian scientists in the OSRD to assist in the study and field tests of demolition of underwater obstacles. Appropriate means were set up for the exchange of information on amphibious matters with the British. Centers for amphibious training had already been established in 1942 at locations on the east and west coasts, where the training of all Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Units in landing craft and in amphibious operations were conducted before the Units were sent to operational areas.
F-46 compiled and issued a series of publications giving timely information on amphibious operations, naval gunfire doctrine, and tactical air support.
In matters of matériel, F-46 played an important role in setting the characteristics of the amphibious forces' flagship type and of the APA's, AKA, and the APD types, as well as all types of major and minor landing craft.
The tremendous expansion of radar both technically and in the numbers of units needed resulted in the establishment of a separate Radar
Section (F-27, later F-47) in March 1943. The activities of Radar Section were never formally delimited, largely because the development of radar proceeded so rapidly. Its functions in general were to coordinate the efforts of the various bureaus and offices in the Navy Department in matters of production and application. Research and development were coordinated by the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development working closely with F-47 and the War Department. An aspect of radar development which called for special coordinating and control was the division along the lines of long-wave and micro-wave radar between the Naval Research Laboratory and the civilian Office of Scientific Research and Development.
The Tactical Analysis Section (F-28, later F-48) was established early in December 1942 to meet the urgent need for the evaluation and rapid dissemination of Battle Reports. The functions of the section were to read Action Reports, deleting therefrom such portions as contained information which it was desired to withhold, to analyze them from the material and tactical viewpoint with a view to publishing in Secret Information Bulletins significant battle experience contained therein, to read and route War Diaries to interested activities in Cominch and CNO, and to maintain a Reading Room for the use of officers preparing themselves for sea duty; or needing the information for research purposes.
The Combat Intelligence Division (F-2), as already mentioned,was the information mechanism that kept track of the employment and location of enemy forces. More specifically, in the words of Admiral King, "Combat Intelligence is the term applied to information of enemy forces, strength, disposition,and probable movements. With personnel now assigned to Combat Intelligence, institute rigorous, continuous examination of enemy capabilities and potentialities, thereby getting the utmost value out of the information of the enemy and enabling our forces to be used with the greatest effectiveness. It is particularly important to comprehend the enemy point of view is all aspects."38
During about the first eighteen months of the war, this service was performed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer (F-11) in the Plans Division, who not only had charge of the Chart Room but was also the head of the Operational Information Section (F-35) in the Operations Division. The distribution of intelligence functions between Plans and Operations did not prove entirely satisfactory. A more clear-cut distinction between the intelligence activities of Headquarters Cominch and those of the Office of Naval Intelligence (Op-16) in CNO was also needed. To meet this need, a Combat Intelligence Division was established on 1 July 1943, with Rear Admiral R.E. Schuirmann as Assistant Chief of Staff (Combat
Intelligence). One of the duties of the new division was to keep track of United States and Allied naval forces as well as of enemy forces.
In September 1943, Rear Admiral Schuirmann was ordered to additional duty as Director of Naval *Intelligence. But the connection between Cominch Combat Intelligence and O.N.I. was maintained solely in his person as he had separate assistants and office space in his two capacities. The memorandum of 9 September 1943, establishing this relationship stated:39
The general line of demarcation between the duties of the Division of Naval Intelligence and Combat Intelligence is that the former was cognizance of strategic intelligence and the latter operations intelligence.
Combat Intelligence performs the following duties:
- Passes current intelligence such as location of enemy submarines to United States Naval Forces.
- Maintains plot of current situation for Headquarters officers.
- Keeps track of location of own ships and aircraft.
- Maintains plot of enemy ships and aircraft.
- Evaluates radio intelligence.
- Secures intelligence reports from O.N.I. and through O.N.I. from M.I.S., and other agencies on any subject which other divisions of Headquarters need or request.
- Advises O.N.I. as to priorities required in the production of monograph material.
- Maintains Publicity Security and Security Control for the Headquarters.
The responsibility for the maintenance of publicity security by F-2 was later cancelled.
Calls were made on the division to perform certain tasks outside of the field of Combat Intelligence. The division was, for example, required from time to time to prepare the text and exhibits for speeches to be delivered by staff officers and other government officials. It was called upon also for special reports and statistical summaries on occasions. It also at times held press conferences. The complete files maintained by the division were an excellent source of information on all kinds of subjects in which the public was interested.
The Atlantic Section (F-21) had as its principal function tracking U-Boats and the correlation of other intelligence and statistical information that might be of value in conducting the Antisubmarine campaign. Close liaison with the British Admiralty was established in this connection. A Tracking Room was set up in Headquarters which worked closely with the Admiralty Tracking Room in London and the Headquarters, Western Approaches in Liverpool. The latter also controlled trans-Atlantic convoys in the British strategic area of the North Atlantic.
Similar tracking facilities were set up in the Sea Frontier headquarters in New York, Miami, San Juan, and Balboa interconnected by scrambler
teleprinter, thus tying Cominch headquarters and all United States Sea Frontiers in the western Atlantic into one communication network. This system was separate and distinct from the regular naval communication service.40
The facilities and the means provided for tracking and spotting enemy submarines and getting the information promptly to the antisubmarine forces of both the United States and the royal Navy played a significant part in the complete defeat of the German submarine offensive in World War II.
At the end of the Atlantic phase of the war,the Combat Intelligence Division was reorganized. Its operational information functions, including Fleet and air locations and shipping information, were transferred to the Operations Division, and the Antisubmarine activities of F-21 were discontinued.
The primary missions of the Pacific Section (F-22) were similar to those of the Atlantic Section except that Japanese submarines never played an important role in the naval war in the Pacific. On the other hand, the demands for Combat Intelligence in all other fields were far greater in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. Broadly speaking, the duties of the Pacific Section were to prepare daily an evaluated intelligence summary for Cominch and the Naval Aide to the President. Other recipients included the Vice CNO, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department, and the senior British naval representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. An up-to-date and revised Intelligence Report was prepared weekly on the Japanese Fleet, aircraft, and merchant shipping distribution. The recipients were the same as for the daily summaries, plus the Commander in Chief, Pacific and the Commanders of the 3rd, 5th and 7th Fleets. A current situation plot of the Pacific Theater was also prepared for Admiral King as an aid in forecasting probable enemy intentions. These reports were channeled to the Staff Planners and were indispensable for the successful conduct of the war. With them the Naval Aide was also able to keep the President and Admiral Leahy advised on the current and prospective situations in the war in the Pacific.
The Publicity Security Officer (F-25) acted as liaison officer with the Office of Public Relations. He represented the security policies and views of Cominch in dealing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of War Information and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. He reviewed, from the point of view of security, all matériel to be released for publication pertaining to the naval establishment and naval operations that was submitted to him by the Office of Public Information, and provided
that office with appropriate material originated in Cominch headquarters on submarine activities in the Pacific, German submarine sinkings, United States ship losses, combat narratives after screening, and photographs suitable for release for publication. He reviewed classified and unclassified moving pictures for security purposes, and played a constructive part in searching for and releasing material of public interest to the press. He also prepared a weekly summary of the United States naval activities for the use of the Secretary of the Navy at his weekly press conferences.
The establishment of a Chart Room under the Plans Division has already been mentioned. The control over this room was transferred to the Combat Intelligence Division in July 1943. The entire west wall of the Chart Room was covered by an Army War College map of the world in colors. The entire east wall was covered by an enlarged Hydrographic Office Chart of the Pacific Ocean area. Charts of the strategic spheres of action, command areas, enemy air bases, etc., occupied the north wall. In the center of the room there were five drafting tables which were used for strategic plots. A table in the northwest corner contained dispatches on current operations, special secret reports and publications. A five-foot revolving terrestrial globe on which great circle distances were read directly by semicircular protractor was situated in the northeast corner. Normally, the personnel comprising four officers and one Chief Yeoman were on duty from 0600 to 2000, but during important operations the Chart Room operated on a 24-hour basis. Admiral King personally laid down the dictum that the number of officers having access to the Chart Room be kept at a minimum. Consequently, it was possible to maintain there more complete information concerning current and future operations than was quickly available elsewhere. It was the business of the Combat Intelligence Division to supply the Chart Room with the information shown on the charts, plots, or by other means.
Tenth Fleet (FX-01). Some progress had been made by both the British and the American Navies during the interval between World Wars I and II in improving the detection and destruction of submarines, but not enough to alter the fact that the U-Boat was from the very beginning of the war in September 1939 the principal threat to the shipping lifeline between the United States and the British Isles. The continuation of trans-Atlantic shipping was essential if the Axis powers were to be defeated. Even before Pearl Harbor, the Atlantic Fleet was engaged in patrol activities in the Western Atlantic having this objective in view.
On 7 February 1942 the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, established the Atlantic Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Unit in Boston, with Captain (later Rear Admiral W.D. Baker, in charge, to plan anti-U-Boat patrol and detection activities on the Atlantic Coast. The Coordinator
of Research and Development, during a visit to the Boston office immediately after its establishment, brought to the attention of Captain Baker the availability at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology of scientists working for the National Defense Research Committee capable of providing assistance in gathering and evaluating statistics and data for improving anti-submarine warfare techniques. This was the origin of the Antisubmarine Warfare Operational Research Group (ASWORG), composed of civilian scientists who rendered throughout the war invaluable operational research service for improving tactics and following up new ideas on devices and weapons for detecting and destroying enemy submarines. Eventually, every antisubmarine command had a member of this group on its staff. Captain Baker and the personnel under him were transferred to Cominch headquarters shortly after scientists were brought into the work, and became the nucleus of the Antisubmarine Division, which eventually evolved into the Tenth Fleet.
It was not however until the spring of 1943 that enough antisubmarine, surface, and air forces became available to inaugurate a full-scale offensive against the U-Boat. On 6 April 1943 Admiral F.S. Low was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Antisubmarine). The Antisubmarine Warfare Section was placed under his charge as well as the Convoy and Routing Section (F-37).
The earlier studies by the civilian scientists made it apparent that many agencies, in an effort to improve Antisubmarine Warfare, were issuing operational and other directives with only meager knowledge of governing considerations, and that as a result there was considerable confusion as to doctrine and methods. By late April, Admiral King had conceived the idea of the Tenth Fleet as a correlating and supervisory agency with power to shift forces from one area to another, thus adding emphasis to the importance of that sector of the war in the Atlantic. On 1 May 1943 he submitted for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a paper entitled "Antisubmarine Operations," which stated:
It is arranged to set up immediately, in the Navy Department an antisubmarine command to be known as the Tenth Fleet.
The headquarters of the Tenth Fleet will consist of all existing antisubmarine activities of the U.S. Fleet headquarters, which will be transferred intact to the Commander, Tenth Fleet. Such additional officers will be assigned to the Tenth Fleet as are necessary for it to function in the same manner as any other major command. In addition, a research-statistical-analysis group will be set up composed of civilian scientists, headed by Dr. V. Bush.
The Commander, Tenth Fleet, is to exercise direct command over all Atlantic Sea Frontiers, using sea frontier commanders as task force commanders. He is to control allocations of antisubmarine forces to all commands in the Atlantic, including the Atlantic Fleet, and is to reallocate forces from time to time as the situation
requires. In order to insure quick and effective action to meet the needs of the changing A/S situation, the Commander,Tenth Fleet, is to be given control of all LR and VLR aircraft and certain groups or units of auxiliary carriers, escort ships, and submarines which he is to allocate to reinforce task forces that need help, or to employment as "killer groups"--under his operational direction in appropriate circumstances.
Other paragraphs of the paper dealt with training, the employment of aircraft, etc. Pending the availability of a commander, Tenth Fleet, Admiral King himself assumed the duty It developed later that neither of the two officers who were being considered for the command could be made available. The initial arrangement was therefore continued with Rear Admiral Low (F-3B) becoming Chief of Staff, Tenth Fleet.
A "Directive for Tenth Fleet" was issued on 29 July 1943, amplifying certain details covering the tasks and mission of the Tenth Fleet. Besides destruction of enemy submarines, protection of Allied Shipping in the Eastern, Gulf, and Caribbean Sea Frontiers was stressed, through control of convoys and shipping. A staff organization was set up for the Tenth Fleet, consisting of sections for Operations, Antisubmarine Measures, Convoy and Routing, and a Scientific Council. A directive stressed that the first charge on antisubmarine forces was to deliver the convoys safely to destination, and the second charge was offensive action against concentrations of U-Boats. Actual details of Operations were handled by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and the Sea Frontier commanders. Most of the information on which such details were based stemmed from the submarine plot, maintained by F-21 in the Combat Intelligence Division.
A Measures Division (FX-40) covered the fields of matériel, training, contacts, and analysis. The ASWORG organization, headed by Dr. P.M. Morse, operated under the supervision of FX-40.
The activities of Convoy and Routing, under Rear Admiral Metcalf, continued to be responsible for control of shipping jointly with the British Admiralty, and remained unchanged during the time that organization was under the Tenth Fleet.
A scientific Council composed of three eminent civilian scientists, with Dr.John T. Tate as the senior was appointed to assist naval personnel in solving antisubmarine warfare and other problems.
The Aircraft Antisubmarine Warfare Detachment, which had been established in the Atlantic Fleet, under Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, was expanded so that it contained both air and surface units which, working jointly, served as the laboratory of the Tenth Fleet for the improvement of matériel and tactics.
With the cessation of hostilities with Germany on 8 May 1945, curtailment of antisubmarine activities in the Atlantic began. The coastal
convoy system was abolished on 14 May. On 29 May, by mutual agreement with the Admiralty, trans-Atlantic-Mediterranean convoying was discontinued. A dispatch from Cominch-CNO, released 5 June, abolished the Tenth Fleet as of 12 June 1945.
The Office of Naval Inspector General was established by the Secretary of the Navy in General Order No. 173 on 18 May 1942 as part of Cominch Headquarters. Admiral C.P. Snyder was the first officer to fill the position. The General Order was revised on 16 June 1943 by General Order No. 196, permitting an officer on the retired list to hold the position. The change was made so as to retain the services of Admiral Snyder, who would reach the age for retirement with the rank of Admiral on 1 August 1943.
Naval Inspector General
The Naval Inspector General, as a representative of Cominch and CNO, was charged with inquiring into and reporting upon any matter affecting the efficiency and economy of the naval services. His authority and responsibilities covered a very wide range of subjects, including review of the reports of the Board of Inspection and Survey, and recommendations for remedial measures where appropriate. The scope of the Inspector General's authority covered the field of naval organization and administration, discipline, training, the logistics of matériel in all of its phases, and even investigations in the diplomatic and international field where naval personnel were involved. Inspections of the European and South American theaters were conducted in the spring and summer of 1945, in the interests of rolling up supply activities and reducing naval personnel in those areas.
Admiral Snyder was verbally directed by Admiral King to keep the organization small. Instead of depending entirely on officers assigned full time to the activity, he borrowed officers from any part of the Naval Establishment to act as assistants to the Naval Inspector General for temporary duty. This was an extremely wise provision, as it prevented the organization from developing into an inspection empire.It also removed any temptation to set up a corps of inspectors making a career of such work in the Navy.
As the system as a whole was an innovation in Navy Department administration, the organization had to find itself, and establish its own procedures. A "Manual of the Office of the Naval Inspector General" was prepared for the guidance of the activity after having been pronounced legal by the Judge Advocate General. The Inspection Division of the organization made the inspections directed by the Naval Inspector General, prepared the reports and recommendations, although findings and recommendations
always received the personal attention of the Naval Inspector General. An Investigation Division covered a somewhat different field from the Inspection Division, although the purposes were similar. In general, investigations were based on specific requests of CNO and Cominch.
From its establishment until September 1945, 112 full-scale inspections or investigations were completed, and 15 additional investigations involving personnel of high security classification were handled by the Naval Inspector General.41 With the reorganization of 10 October 1945 after World War II, the Naval Inspector General was designated as Op-08 in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
In the foregoing pages the organization and procedures of Headquarters, Cominch and the adjustment of its relations with the Office of the CNO were described. Before that the history of the organization with which CNO entered World War II was recounted. Broadly stated the functions of Cominch headquarters during World War II were to plan and execute Naval Operations and of CNO to plan and make available the tools--ships, aircraft, men and supplies--needed for executing Naval Operations. Partly as the result of experience and partly due to the ever changing war situation, modifications in organization, particularly in the organization of CNO, were almost continuous during the war.
CNO Organizational Developments
When in March 1942 Admiral king assumed the dual role of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, he began a study of CNO organization and procedures, with a view particularly to improving the handling of its logistics functions, both at the planning and the coordinating levels. One of the knottiest problems that had to be decided as soon as Headquarters Cominch were established in Washington was the allocation of responsibilities between the CNO and Cominch organizations in such matters. At one stage in the discussions CNO recommended that all logistics plans be made by Cominch headquarters. Admiral King finally decided that certain parts of logistics planning were to remain with CNO. His interest in reorganization went further, however, than clarification of the responsibility for logistics planning.
In May 1942, he proposed a reorganization of the Navy Department, which would have provided the Chief of Naval Operations with three Assistant CNO's: for Air, Personnel, and Material, the positions to be
filled as additional duty by the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Aeronautics, of Personnel, and the head of the Office of Procurement and Material, respectively. The President, however, disapproved of the idea, because he believed it would place matériel matters too much under military control.
In May 1943, Admiral King resubmitted his former plan in modified form. He no proposed to assign to the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary for Air, general cognizance of all matters of material, personnel, and aviation. In addition, four Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations would be created, one for material, one for personnel, one for aviation, and a fourth with responsibility for supervising and directing the plans, services, and maintenance divisions of Operations, who would act as principal assistant to the VCNO. The duties of the DCNO's would be "supervisory and policy-making in character" and "the bureaus and offices allocated under their control shall function primarily as executive technical agencies."42 Each of the first three mentioned DCNO's could act as "the principal naval adviser to the appropriate secretary, just as the Chief of Naval Operations was himself the principal naval adviser to the Secretary of the Navy."43
Despite the support of Secretary Knox, and numerous offices in the Navy Department, the plan was disapproved by President Roosevelt. Vigorous objections to it had been raised by the Bureau Chiefs and some of the civilians in the Secretary's Office, including Assistant Secretary Ralph A. Bard, but it was the President, himself, who squashed the proposal. His reasons were partly that it was too complex to adopt in the middle of a war, but principally because it would increase military control of the Navy Department even more than Cominch's earlier scheme.
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). On 18 August 1943 King's proposals bore fruit in one respect, when the Secretary of the Navy created the post of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), (Op-03). The establishing letter read, in part, as follows:
1. There shall be established in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) whose function is to correlate and coordinate all military aspects including policy, plans, and logistics of naval aviation.
2. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) shall be charged with the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the naval aeronautic operating forces included within the several fleet, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of the effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.44
This was, in reality, an effort to satisfy some very vocal aviation personnel in the Navy who, in matters of administration, were demanding virtual autonomy. After the establishment of DCNO(Air), the same individuals resisted integration of their activities with the other functions of OpNav. They maintained that DCNO(Air) held authority directly from CNO and thus functioned at the same level as the VCNO, and that therefore DCNO(Air) should be "the immediate superior of all offices and divisions of OpNav."45
The aviators wished to run their own show, from planning to procurement, with only a liaison link with the Logistics Plans and Material Divisions of CNO.46 This school of thought met with the unyielding opposition of many of the higher officers in OpNav, including Admiral Horne. After the controversy had ranged far and wide, hot and cold, for a year. VCNO requested Cominch-CNO to settle the matter of relative authority. King responded by issuing an order stating that ". . . the duties of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) will be performed under the direction of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations."47 Despite this order, the question of just how much control DCNO(Air) had over planning and material matters remained without a final answer throughout the war.
In June 1943, about two months before the DCNO(Air) was established, the overall OpNav organization was as shown on Figure 6 and the VCNO was the Logistics Plans Division (Op-12) and later the DCNO(Air) (Op-03). The Bureau Chiefs, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, though not a part of OpNav, all maintained a reporting liaison with VCNO on matters under their cognizance.
The "Services" group, directly under the Sub-Chief of Naval Operations (Op-11), now comprised the Office of Naval Intelligence (Op-16), Pan-American Division (Op-17), Naval Communications Division (Op-20), the Hydrographic Office (Op-28), and the Naval Observatory (Op-29). Also under the Sub-Chief was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for logistic projects (Op-11A), and under him the Board of Inspection and Survey (Op-21), Fleet Maintenance Division (Op-23), Base Maintenance Division (Op-30), Naval Transportation Service (Op-39), and Aviation. (Op-40).
Navy Inventory Control Office. As the war progressed, the demand for war materials increased while the available supplies decreased. To insure the proper utilization of existing stocks before embarking on additional
procurement, the Navy Inventory Control Office was established on 23 May 1944, headed by an Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Inventory Control (Op-07).48 The office was to be responsible for "the formulation and promulgation of Navy Inventory Control Policies, including the continuous review of the adequacy of Bureau and Field implementation of such policies." To insure close cooperation between OpNav and the Office of Procurement and Material, the new position was filled as additional duty by the officer in charge of the Planning and Statistics Branch of OP&M, Rear Admiral James M. Irish. The idea did not work out as well during the war as hoped for, but it was theoretically sound and was a step forward in the creation of a coherent and comprehensive system of central inventory control.
Ship Characteristics Board. One of the last important wartime additions to the activities of CNO was the establishment by a directive of the Secretary of the Navy on 15 March 1945 of a Ship Characteristics Board.49 The term "Ship Characteristics" was defined as embracing all qualities and features of a ship, determining or affecting its capabilities for accomplishing its mission. The approved recommendations of the General Board were to be the SCB's broad basic guides in arriving at decisions, but the new board soon departed from this concept of its method of operation and gradually took over all of the all of the functions of the General Board in this field. This became one of the reasons for abolishing the General Board a few years after World War II.
The Sub-Chief of Naval Operations (Op-02) was ex-officio the senior member of the SCB. Other members were one each designated for additional duty on the Board by Cominch, the DCNO(Air), the Director Electronics Division, and the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Naval Personnel, Ordnance, Ships, and Aeronautics. The Assistant Director, Fleet Maintenance Division, for Ship Characteristics was the Executive member of the Board.
A senior Captain as recorder and three Commanders as assistant recorders were assigned to the Board on full-time duty. They evaluated the characteristics proposed by the Bureaus for new ships, their armament and equipment, and of changes in characteristics proposed for existing ships. Member of the Board representing the Bureaus were called upon at meetings of the Board to justify or criticize the characteristics proposed. Action was taken by majority vote of the members, all having an equal vote whether or not they had any responsibility or interest in the features under consideration.
There were advantages as well as disadvantages in reaching decisions on ships characteristics by a board of this kind as compared to the General
Board procedure. The permanent staff of the SCB who did the evaluating work and the members who made the decisions represented a younger point of view and more recent acquaintance with details than did the General Board, but the latter's judgments were more mature and its members were not so easily swayed by the whims of the moment. Pressure from the outside also had less effect on the General Board, as its members were older officers who had achieved successful careers in the Navy and were nearing retirement. The careers of the SCB officers, particularly the careers of the Captains and Commanders on full-time duty with the Board were still in the making. Such officers were,therefore, more susceptible to pressure from the upper hierarchy in the Navy Department than the officers on the General Board.
In the opinion of many, a serious fault of the Ship Characteristics Board was that members with no interest or responsibility for matters under consideration had the same vote in making decisions as members who were definitely interested and who had the responsibility for carrying out the decisions of the Board.
On 14 August 1945 Japan accepted the surrender terms agreed upon by the Allied nations at the Potsdam Conference, and on 15 August Admiral Nimitz ordered the Pacific Fleet to cease offensive operations against the japanese. The administration of the Navy Department now entered a new phase in which demobilization and shrinking the entire Naval Establishment to peacetime needs became its principal tasks. Demobilizing personnel in uniform and returning them to their homes fell principally on CNO and the Bureau of Naval Personnel. It was a trying task because most of the personnel recruited for the war, both officers and men, wanted to get home immediately to resume civilian pursuits. In the opinion of many observers, the job was done too hastily to be done efficiently and economically. It fell largely on the comparatively small percentage of career personnel constituting the Navy. The routine work was done mostly by existing units in the Naval establishment, but a number of boards had to be set up on a more or less permanent basis to review disciplinary action taken during the war, to handle questions of rewards and decorations, and to assist veterans in obtaining the benefits to which they were entitled by law.
Postwar Organization. When Admiral King was appointed Cominch, he felt and expressed the view that the Chief of Naval Operations should be the top main in the Navy. After the surrender of Japan, he began taking steps to put that view in practice by planning to return to CNO the functions taken over from that office, and to discontinue others no longer
necessary for peacetime administration. Some members of his staff believed that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet should continue to have his headquarters in the Navy Department in Washington, and should retain the functions he had taken over from CNO, but Admiral King persisted in his views. He proposed the organization, shown on Figure 9, dated 10 November 1945, consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, assisted by a Vice Chief, five Deputy Chiefs for (Operations), (Personnel), (Administration), (Logistics), and (Air), and an Inspector General. Although Secretary of the Navy Forrestal agreed with the organization in general and with the proposed order putting it in effect, he was much opposed to perpetuating some of the exact wording of President Roosevelt's Executive Order No. 9096 of 12 March 1942, giving the CNO direct access to the President without going through the Secretary of the Navy.
After several weeks of argument, Forrestal's view prevailed. he and King then went to the White House together and on September 29, 1945 had President Truman sign Executive Order No. 9635, entitled "Organization of the Navy Department and the Naval Establishment." The Order is quoted in full as Appendix 3. It revoked the orders establishing the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in the Navy Department and outlined the principal duties of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The purpose of Executive Order No. 9635 was stated in its first paragraph as follows: In order to provide for the more effective integration of its activities, the Navy Department shall hereafter be organized to take cognizance of the major groupings of: military matters; general and administrative matters; business and related industrial matters."
It will be noted that there is in this grouping of principal functions no mention of engineering and technical matters. Sub-paragraph 6b provides that "there shall be in the Navy Department, an office charged, as the Secretary of the Navy may direct, with the coordination of naval research, experimental test and development activities, and with such other related duties as may be appropriate," but again no mention of engineering and no recognition of the fact that before the fruits of research become available, a vast amount of engineering and technological development is necessary.
This trend toward taking superior engineering for granted found expression immediately after the war in downgrading the Chiefs of the Material Bureaus from 3-star rank to 2-star rank,although 3-star rank was maintained for the Deputy CHiefs of Naval Operations and for the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel.
A Navy Department directive put the order into effect as of 10 October 1945, with Admiral R.S. Edwards becoming Vice Chief of Naval
FIG. 9--ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (REVISED: 10 NOVEMBER 1945)
Operations; Vice Admiral C.MN.Cooke,Jr., Deputy CNO (Operations); Vice Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Deputy CNO (Personnel); Rear Admiral B.H. Bieri, Deputy CNO (Administration); Vice Admiral W.S. Faber, Deputy CNO (Logistics); Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, Deputy CNO (Air); while Admiral C.P. Snyder continued as Naval Inspector General. Of these officers, all except Vice Admiral Farber, came from the Cominch headquarters staff. Farber had been Sub-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral F.J. Horne was temporarily made a Special Assistant to Admiral King, and to the Secretary of the Navy, so that he might deal with affairs relating to demobilization and the logistics rollback.
Admiral King shortly thereafter recommended that he be relieved as Chief of Naval Operations by Admiral Nimitz, but Mr. Forrestal disagreed by expressing a preference for Admiral Edwards. King had the highest regard for Edwards' competence to fill the position but felt that Admiral Nimitz had an overriding claim as he had been the principal naval commander in the war at sea. King went to the White House in person and discussed the matter with President Truman who agreed without hesitation that Nimitz should have the position.50
Admiral Nimitz relieved Admiral King as Chief of Naval Operations on 15 December 1945.
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1. RADM H.C. Taylor, USN, "The Fleet", USN Institute Proceedings for Dec. 1903, p. 805.
2. Commander W.S. Sims (later Admiral, in command of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, during World War I) became the leader in 1908 of a group of naval officers advocating among other changes the adoption of the General Staff system for the Navy Department similar to the system adopted in 1903 for the War Department. See Morison, Elting E., Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1942 for a detailed account of the arguments and efforts of Sims and his followers to secure adoption of the General Staff system for the Navy Department.
3. Congress had established a General Staff for the Army in 1903, but its adoption was too recent to provide the Navy Department with much help in appraising its merits before World War I. It is of historical interest that the administration of logistics for the Army by the General Staff system was unsatisfactory in both World War I and World War II. In the former, a Service of Supply, and in the latter, an organization known as the Army Service Forces were set up to handle logistics. After each war these service were disestablished with the resumption by the General Staff of its peace time logistic functions.
4. The first draft narrative Office of Naval Operations, Vol. 1, Proposals for Reorganization 1915-1940 quotes the views and recommendations of a great number of naval officers, Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and members of Congress on actual and proposed Navy Department organization and administration during that period. (Hereafter cited as OpNav).
5. The articles of Charles O. Paullin on Naval Administration published in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, Volumes 32 (1906), 33 (1907), 38 (1912), 39 (1913), and 49 (1914) throw much light on the subject.
6. General Order 544of 13 March 1900.
7. OpNav--Vol. I, pp. III-A-18 to 22.
8. Change No. 6 to U.S. Navy Regulations 1909. The system was based in general on a plan proposed in February 1909 by the Presidentially appointed Commission on Naval Reorganization (the "Moody-Mahan Commission".) See 60th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document 743, pp. 3-4.
9. Lt. Cdr. N.L. Jones, USN. "Details of Navy Department Administration; Navy Department Policies"; U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings for March-April 1914, pp. 377-8.
10. OpNav, Vol. I, p. II-3.
11. Laws Relating to the Navy Annotated, in force 1945, p. 1085.
12. OpNav Vol. I, p. IV-2-5.
13. U.S. Navy Regulations 1920, Article 433-3.
14. OpNav Vol. I, p. V-2.
15. OpNav Vol. I, p. V-33.
16. OpNav Vol. I, p. V-15-41; 114-128
17. That the matter of CNO authority had become academic is borne out by a letter received by the author from Admiral William H. Standley, dated November 30, 1954, in replay to a request for information as to the nature of the efforts of the Roosevelt Board to settle the question of CNO authority. Rear Admiral A.L. Parsons (CEC), USN, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks had submitted a statement to the Board contending that the Chief of Naval Operations had no authority to give direct orders to the Chiefs of the Bureaus. His argument was supported by Rear Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and by Captain William G. Dubose (CC), USN, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Others on the Board appeared to be neutral. No definite action on article 433 of the Navy Regulations was taken, but Admiral Standley states that he "had the fullest cooperation from all Chiefs of bureaus, including Captain Parsons during my entire tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations."
18. The Division of Naval Intelligence and its junctions are described in Admiral Wilkinson's testimony in the Hart and Hewitt Inquiries, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 26, pp. 299 et. seq., and Part 36, pp. 129 et. seq.
19. P.H.Harbor Attack, Part 26, pp. 299ff and Part 36, pp. 229ff, also Part 4, pp 1723ff.
20. United States Naval Administration in World War II, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence Volume 1, pt. III pages 123, 124 147 and 33.
21. 22 Stat., 296-297, Chapter 391.
22. Among them was Rear Admiral W.S. Farber, USN (later Vice Admiral), Class of 1907, USNA, who had had extensive sea duty in destroyers and other ships and on the staffs of flag officers at sea, interspersed with shore duty in the Material Division of CNO from 1932 to 1935, and courses at the Naval War College and the Army Industrial COllege. In May, 1941, he returned from further sea duty to CNO as Director of the Fleet Maintenance Division. From that position he moved step by step up the logistics ladder through the billets of Assistant Chief of CNO, Fleet Maintenance; Assistant Chief for Logistics Projects; and in October, 1943 to Sub-Chief of Naval Operations; and finally on September 29, 1945, became the first Deputy CNO (Logistics). He made an outstanding contribution to policy and decision-making in coordinating the logistics tasks of the Navy Department in World War II.
23. Talk on Naval Logistics by Rear Admiral L.D. McCormick, USN, Director, Logistics Plans Division, to the National Geographic Society, March 31, 1944.
24. Federal Register of December 20, 1941. The Executive Order was prepared for the President by the General Board.
25. References to source material and documentation for the history of headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet during World War II are taken largely from the unpublished narrative history in the files of the Naval History Division, entitled "Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet Headquarters," prepared by Commander W.M. Whitehill, USNR. Cited hereafter as "Whitehill."
26. A practically complete roster of the officers who served at Cominch headquarters during the war is given in "Whitehill".
27. The memorandum giving the billets will be found on p. 197, "Whitehill".
28. Whitehill, p. 25.
29. Whitehill--Appendix 2.
30. Code of Federal Regulation, USA, cumulative supplement Titles 1-3 published by Government Printing Office 1943, pp. 1121, 1122. Executive Order 9096 is quoted in full as Appendix 6 of "Whitehill". It was drafted in the General Board by Admiral W.S. Sexton and Admiral J.O. Richardson.
31. Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne (later Admiral) was outstandingly well fitted for this position, by reason of his past experience and personal characteristics. He had had extensive sea and shore duty of various kinds.His last sea duty had been in the rank of Vice Admiral in command of Aircraft Battle Force. He was a member of the General Board from 1938 until 23 December 1941, when he was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. The qualities that particularly distinguished him in the performance of his duties as Vice CNO were summarized by Congressman W. Sterling Cole when he said in the House of Representatives, "It was Admiral Horne's unfailing tact and vast knowledge of the Navy and naval operations that was mainly responsible for the smooth running of the Navy Department. . . . I do not believe that the country will ever know the full contribution to the prosecution of the recent war made by this quiet, modest, sincere, and tremendously effective and capable naval officer."
32. Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Chicago, Illinois were employed by Secretary Knox for this purpose. The final report on CNO was submitted by the management specialists on 15 March 1943.
33. The chart is unsigned. It is to be found in the "Manual of Organization Charts", Navy Department prepared in accordance with a directive issued by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Ralph A. Bard, and distributed by the directive of 15 June 1943.
34. See Whitehill, p. 49 for the names of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff (Plans) and their assistants who attended the seven conferences beginning with the Casablanca conference in January 1943, and ending with the Potsdam Conference in July 1, 1945.
35. The functions of Op-38 are given in some detail in "Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations" February 1942, a pamphlet with charts, on hand in the Navy Department Library.
36. Captain (later Rear Admiral) Martin K. Metcalf, USN (Ret.) became the Director of Convoy and Routing in January 1942 and remained the Head of the activity throughout the war.
37. See Whitehill Appendix 9, p. 198.
38. See Whitehill, p. 143.
39. See Whitehill, p. 147.
40. See Whitehill, p. 151.
41. See Whitehill, p. 175; also the first draft narrative on the Office of the Naval Inspector General, on file in the Office of Naval History.
42. OpNav Vol 1, p. 59.
43. King, Ernest J., and Whitehill, Walter M., Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record, p. 477.
44. OpNav Vol. 1, p. 86.
45. Ibid., p. 127.
46. OpNav Vol. 1, p. 119.
47. Ibid., p. 133.
48. See Connery, p. 193 et seq. for further details.
49. Navy Department Bulletin, Vol. VI, No. 6, 31 March 1945. Appointment of Ship Characteristics Board 45-275, Navy Department Library.
50. King and Whitehill, p. 636.