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79TH Congress                    SENATE                       DOCUMENT
 2d Session                                                    No. 244
 
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR 
ATTACK
REPORT
OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO 
AND
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KEEFE
TOGETHER WITH
MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FERGUSON AND MR. BREWSTER
JULY 20 (legislative day July 5), 1946-Ordered to be
printed with illustrations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
Page ii
 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK 
 
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois 
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine 
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan 
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina 
JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania 
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California 
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin 
 
COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1946) 
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel 
GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel 
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel 
 
(After January 14, 1946) 
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel 
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel 
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel 
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel 
 
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 
 
UNITED STATES SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1946 
 
Hon. Kenneth McKellar, 
President pro tempore of the Senate. 
Hon. Sam Rayburn, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
 
Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Senate Concurrent  
Resolution No. 27 (as extended), Seventy-ninth Congress, first session,  
the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl  
Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to a full and complete  
investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances  
leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon  
Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. 
 
The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties assigned  
and respectfully submits herewith its report. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, 
Chairman. 
 
JERE COOPER, 
Vice Chairman. 
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[Blank]
Page v                           C O N T E N T S 
 
................................................................... Page 
Foreword ...........................................................  xi 
Introductory statement ............................................ xiii
Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack ..........    1
  Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................    1 
  Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies ..    4 
  Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis  
    aggression......................................................  10 
  Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................  13 
  Japanese proposal of May 12 ......................................  14 
  Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ...................  15 
  Temporary cessation of negotiations ..............................  16 
  Freezing of assets ...............................................  18 
  Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President 
    Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ...................................  19 
  Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 .........................  26 
  Advent of the Tojo Cabinet .......................................  28 
  Arrival of Saburo Kurusu .........................................  30 
  Negotiations versus deadlines ....................................  32 
  Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi ..........  32 
  United States memorandum of November 26 ..........................  38 
  Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy_November 28 to 
    December 7 .....................................................  42 
  Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington ....................  43 
  Conclusions ......................................................  47 
Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath .....................  53
  Formulation of the plan and date for execution ...................  53 
  Nature of the plan ...............................................  54 
  Departure for the attack .........................................  56 
  Execution of the attack ..........................................  57 
     Air phase .....................................................  57 
     Submarine phase ...............................................  62 
  Withdrawal of the striking force .................................  63 
  Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result 
    of the attack ..................................................  64 
  Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result  
    of the attack ..................................................  65 
  Japanese losses ..................................................  65 
  Summary comparison of losses .....................................  65 
  State of readiness to meet the attack ............................  66 
    Attack a surprise ..............................................  66 
    Personnel ......................................................  66 
    Antiaircraft ...................................................  67 
    Aircraft .......................................................  68 
  Action taken following the attack ................................  68 
  Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............  69 
  Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............  70 
  Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and 
    Hawaiian defensive forces ......................................  70 
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ...............................  75
  Consciousness of danger from air attack ..........................  75 
    Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ...........  75 
    General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............  79 
    Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier .............  81 
    Concept of the war in the Pacific ..............................  87 
    Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air 
      attack .......................................................  88 
 
 
VI                          C O N T E N T S 
 
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii-Continued                     Page 
  Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the 
    imminence of war ..............................................  89 
  Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the 
    imminence of war .............................................. 100 
  Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders 
    from Washington ............................................... 103 
      Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103 
      Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104 
      The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104 
  Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107 
      On where the attack might come .............................. 107 
      Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108 
      "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109 
      The "War warning" and training .............................. 110 
      The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute  
        distant reconnaissance .................................... 110 
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117 
  Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the  
    warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119 
      No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120 
      Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121 
     "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and  
        "Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123 
     Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125 
     Interference with training ................................... 125 
  The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126 
  The Short reply ................................................. 128 
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27  
    dispatch ...................................................... 129 
  The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130 
  General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter  
    by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131 
  The "Lost" Japanese carriers-Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133 
  The "Mori" call ................................................. 137 
  Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138 
  Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140 
  Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142 
     Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142 
     The "Manila message" ......................................... 142 
     The Honolulu press ........................................... 142 
  The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145 
  Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150 
  Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153 
Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159 
  Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159 
  Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163 
  Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167 
  "ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168 
  Avoidance of war ................................................ 172 
  Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179 
     The "Magic" .................................................. 179 
     Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180 
  "Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181 
     Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181 
     Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189 
  The "Winds code" ................................................ 191 
  "Hidden word" code .............................................. 192 
  The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193 
  Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after  
    November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195 
  Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of  
    November 27 ................................................... 198 
  Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201 
  The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204 
  Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205 
  The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206 
 
VII                         C O N T E N T S 
Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington-Continued                  Page 
  Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209 
    The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210 
    The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211 
      First thirteen parts ........................................ 211 
      Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212 
      Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages 
        apart from messages proper ................................ 219 
        The fourteenth part ....................................... 221 
  "One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222 
     Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224 
     Choice of facilities ......................................... 225 
     Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction  
       messages ................................................... 226 
  Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228 
    Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228 
    Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230 
  Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in  
    Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232 
  Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234 
  Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237 
     Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237 
     Duties in Washington ......................................... 238 
  Unity of command ................................................ 240 
  General observations ............................................ 245 
     The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245 
     The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246 
     Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246 
Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251 
  Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251 
  Recommendations ................................................. 252 
  Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in  
    our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl  
    Harbor investigation .......................................... 253 
      Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of  
        authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility ...... 254 
      Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for  
        granted in the alerting of subordinates ................... 254 
      Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information 
        should always be resolved in favor of supplying the 
        information ............................................... 255 
      The delegation of authority or the issuance of order's  
        entails the duty of inspection to determine that the  
        official mandate is properly exercised .................... 255 
      The implementation of official orders must be followed with  
        closest supervision ....................................... 256 
      The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be 
        insured through repetition ................................ 256 
      Complacency and procrastination are out of place where  
        sudden and decisive action are of the essence ............. 257 
      The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in  
        times of stress must be insured by continuity of service  
        and centralization of responsibility in competent  
        officials ................................................. 257 
      The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is  
        fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for  
        clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on  
        matters that are in doubt ................................. 258 
      There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness  
        on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials ..... 259 
      Communications must be characterized by clarity,  
        forthrightness, and appropriateness ....................... 259 
      There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information 
        received and every effort should be made to insure that 
        the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the  
        original .................................................. 260 
      Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the  
        exigencies of unusual situations .......................... 261 
      Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum  
        number of officials, while often necessary, should not be  
        carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the  
        organization .............................................. 261 
      There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident .. 262 
      Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit  
        of significant information ................................ 262 
 
VIII                        C O N T E N T S 
 
Part V. Conclusions and recommendation-Continued                   Page 
  Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in  
    our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl  
    Harbor investigation-Continued 
      An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail  
        with his organization should forfeit his responsibility ... 263 
      Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation  
        for any eventuality ....................................... 263 
      Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an  
        official instruction ...................................... 263 
      Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization ... 264 
      Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted  
        in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter  
        is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more  
        agencies .................................................. 264 
      No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure  
        to perform a fundamental task ............................. 265 
      Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates  
        adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should  
        keep their superiors informed ............................. 285 
      The administrative organization of any establishment must be  
        designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility .. 265 
      In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of  
        responsibility and authority .............................. 266 
  Committee members signing the report ............................ 266 
  Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266 
Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor  
  attack .......................................................... 269 
  The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269 
  The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269 
  The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269 
  The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270 
  The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270 
  The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270 
  The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271 
Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy  
  officials in  Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack  
  along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275 
    Organization and personnel of War Department .................. 275 
      Army Air Forces ............................................. 275 
    Organization and personnel of Navy Department ................. 276 
    Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department ............. 276 
      Hawaiian Air Force .......................................... 277 
    Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United  
      States Pacific Fleet ........................................ 277 
       Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District .... 278 
    List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and  
      their assignments as of December 7, 1941 .................... 278 
    List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not  
      testify before the Joint Committee and their assignments as  
      of December 7, 1941 ......................................... 279 
Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States 
  relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285 
Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the  
  United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic 
  Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291 
    Introductory statement ........................................ 291 
    Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to  
      the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293 
    The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300 
    President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and  
      at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American  
      conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302 
    Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia  
      (August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305 
  Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt 
    urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306 
 
IX                          C O N T E N T S 
Appendix D-Continued                                               Page 
  Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307 
  President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message  
    (September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310 
  Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311 
  Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference" 
   (August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314 
  Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions 
    in the negotiations with the United States  
    (September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316 
  The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals  
    (October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319 
  Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war  
    between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to  
    war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the  
    Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325 
  The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission 
    to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 
    1941) ......................................................... 326 
  The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal"  
    (November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331 
  Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with  
    "Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335 
  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the 
    United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337 
  Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States  
    (November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344 
  The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less  
    favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal"  
    (November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355 
  Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United  
    States and demands an agreement on that basis  
    (November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360 
  The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363 
  The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese- 
    American conversations and at the same time moves additional 
    Japanese troops into southern Indochina  
    (November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387 
  The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina 
    appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405 
  Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United  
    States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the  
    United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409 
  President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern  
    situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411 
  President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its 
    purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina 
   (December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415 
  The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French 
    Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by  
    the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421 
  The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424 
Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469 
  Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469 
  Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471 
  Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in  
    execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to  
    December 7, 1941 .............................................. 471 
  Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code"  
    execute message having been received prior to  
    December 7, 1941 .............................................. 475 
Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army  
  installations ................................................... 489 
    Geographical considerations ................................... 489 
    Navy and Army installations ................................... 490 
      Navy ........................................................ 490 
      Army ........................................................ 491 
    Illustrations ................................................. 499 
CONTENTS OF THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT 
Duty of the committee .............................................  495
Fundamental questions before the joint committee ..................  496
Difficulties facing the joint committee and incompleteness of the
  record ..........................................................  497
Form of this report ...............................................  502
Conclusions of fact and responsibility ............................  503
Conclusions restated with supporting evidence [1] .................  506
  No. 1-(Growing tension with Japan) ..............................  506
  No. 2-(Washington's tactics pending Japanese attack) ............  510
  No. 3-(Likelihood of attack by December 1, 1941) ................  511
  No. 4-(Washington's tactics of waiting for the firing of "the 
        first shot' by the Japanese) ..............................  512
  No. 5-(Failure to employ Washington organization and facilities to
        warn Hawaiian commanders) .................................  513
  No. 6-(Intercepted information respecting Japanese war plans) ...  514
  No. 7-(Distribution of intercepted information to high authorities
        in Washington) ............................................  520
  No. 8-(Expectation of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the
         United States) ...........................................  521
  No. 9-(Probability of an attack on Hawaii) ......................  521
  No. 10-(Obligation of Washington authorities to alert outpost 
         commanders for war) ......................................  524
  No. 11-(Responsibility of Washington authorities in view of the 
         decision to await Japanese attack) .......................  530
  No. 12-(Obligation of Washington to send clear instructions to 
         the Hawaiian commanders ..................................  530
  No. 13-(Conflicting messages to Hawaiian commanders) ............  532
  No. 14-(Failure of Washington authorities to emphasize 
         probability, of a Pearl Harbor attack) ...................  537
  No. 15-(Delays, confusion, and ,negligence of officers in 
         Washington) ..............................................  538
  No. 16-(President Roosevelt's failure to enforce cooperation 
         between high military authorities in Washington) .........  540
  No. 17-(Failure of Washington to allocate adequate material to 
         the Hawaiian commanders) .................................  543
  No. 18-(Washington's responsibility for the competence of 
         subordinate officers) ....................................  553
  No. 19-(Interdependent responsibilities of Washington and Hawaii)  553
  No. 20-(Failure of the President to take instant Executive 
         action on December 6 and 7) ..............................  565
  No. 21-(American people not to blame for Pearl Harbor) ..........  570
  Conclusion ......................................................  572
Summary of responsibilities .......................................  572
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK           XI 
 
 FOREWORD 
 
On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States and Japan were at  
peace. Japanese ambassadors were in Washington in conversation with our  
diplomatic officials looking to a general settlement of differences in  
the Pacific.  
 
At 7:55 a. m. (Hawaiian time) over 300 Japanese planes launched from 6  
aircraft carriers attacked the island of Oahu and the American Pacific  
Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii. Within a period of  
less than 2 hours our military and naval forces suffered a total of  
3,435 casualties in personnel and the loss of or severe damage to: 188  
planes of all types, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 4  
miscellaneous vessels.  
 
The attack was well planned and skillfully executed. The Japanese  
raiders withdrew from the attack and were recovered by the carriers  
without the latter being detected, having suffered losses of less than  
100 in personnel, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines which had been  
dispatched from mother craft that coordinated their attack with that of  
the planes.  
 
One hour after Japanese air and naval forces had struck the Territory of  
Hawaii the emissaries of Japan delivered to the Secretary of State a  
reply to a recent American note, a reply containing no suggestion of  
attack by Japan upon the United States. With the benefit of information  
now available it is known that the Japanese military had planned for  
many weeks the unprovoked and ambitious act of December 7.  
 
The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise,  
cunning, and deceit belongs to the war lords of Japan whose dreams of  
conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. History  
will properly place responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the military  
clique dominating the people of Japan at the time. Indeed, this  
responsibility Premier Tojo himself has already assumed.  
 
We come today, over 4 years after the event, not to detract from this  
responsibility but to record for posterity the facts of the disaster. In  
another sense we seek to find lessons to avoid pitfalls in the future to  
evolve constructive suggestions for the protection of our national  
security, and to determine whether there were failures in our own  
military and naval establishments which in any measure may have  
contributed to the extent and intensity of the disaster.  
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK           XII 
 
[Blank] 
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK           XIII 
 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
 
On November 15, 1945 the Joint Congressional Committee on the  
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack held its first public hearings  
pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-Ninth Congress,  
first session, as follows: [1] 
 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
September 6, 1945 
 
Mr. BARKLEY submitted the follow concurrent resolution, which was 
considered, modified, and agreed to 
 
SEPTEMBER 11, 1945 
 
House concurs 
 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
 
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That  
there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of  
the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate  
(not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to  
be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House  
of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the  
majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies  
in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the  
remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall  
be filled in the same manner as in the ease of the original selection.  
The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its  
members. 
 
SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of  
the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or  
following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in  
the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the  
Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946,  
the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as  
it may deem advisable.  
 
SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact  
that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided  
for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held  
against him in examining his military status for credits in the service  
to which he belongs.  
 
SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof,  
is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the  
sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-Ninth Congress  
(prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the  
attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers,  
and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to  
procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it  
deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such  
hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.  
 
(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of  
such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as  
it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the  
compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as  
amended, for comparable duties.  
 
(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall  
be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half  
from the con- 
 
[1] The authority of the committee is to be found in S. Con. Res. No.  
27, 79th Cong. 1st sess., passed by the Senate on September 6, 1945, and  
concurred in by the House of Representatives on September 11, 1945, and  
as extended by both Houses under S. Con. Res. No. 49. 79th Cong., 1st  
sess., and by S. Con. Res. No. 54. 79th Cong., 2d sess.  
 
XIV           INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
 
tingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by  
the chairman. 
  
Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.  
Attest:                          LESLIE L. BIFFLE,  
                                 Secretary. 
 
Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.  
Attest:                          SOUTH TRIMBLE, 
                                 Clerk.  
 
On 70 days subsequent to November 15 and prior to and including May 31,  
1945, open hearings were conducted in the course of which some 15,000  
pages of testimony were taken and a total of 183 exhibits received  
incident to an examination of 43 witnesses.  
 
Of assistance to the committee and its work were the testimony and  
exhibits of seven prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor  
attack, including inquiries conducted by the Roberts Commission. [2]  
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, [3] the Army Pearl Harbor Board, [4] the Navy  
Court of Inquiry, [5] Col. Carter W. Clarke, [6] Maj. Henry C. Clausen,  
[7] and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. [8] For purposes of convenient reference  
there has been set forth in appendix A to this report a statement  
concerning the scope and character of each of these prior proceedings,  
the records of which total 9,754 printed pages of testimony from 318  
witnesses and the attendant 469 exhibits. The records of these  
proceedings have been incorporated as exhibits to the record of the  
committee which encompasses approximately 10,000,000 words.  
 
All witnesses appeared under oath and were afforded the fullest  
opportunity to offer any and all information which was regarded as  
having any relationship whatever to the disaster. In the course of  
examination by committee counsel and the committee members themselves,  
an effort was made to elicit all facts having an immediate or remote  
bearing on the tragedy of December 7, 1941. It is believed the committee  
has succeeded through its record in preserving for posterity the  
material facts concerning the disaster.  
 
The figures and witnesses in the drama of Pearl Harbor ran the gamut of  
officials of the executive branch of the Government. The principal  
personalities in the picture were the President of the United States,  
Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; the  
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson; the Secretary of Navy Frank Knox;  
the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations.  
Harold R. Stark; the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet Husband E.  
Kimmel; and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Walter C.  
Short. In appendix B to this report there are set forth the names and  
positions of the ranking Army and Navy officials in Washington and at  
Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the principal witnesses in  
the various proceedings.  
 
The committee's investigation has extended to the files of all pertinent  
branches of the Government. Instructions in this regard from the  
President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, to various departments  
will be found in appendix C to this report. The committee through its  
counsel requested Miss Grace Tully, custodian of the files of the late  
President Roosevelt, to furnish the committee all  
 
[1] For proceedings of the Roberts Commission, see committee exhibit No.  
143. 
[2] For proceedings of the Hart Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 144.  
[3] For proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, see committee  
exhibit No. 145. 
[4] For proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, see committee exhibit  
No. 146.  
[5] For proceedings of the Clarke investigation, see committee exhibit  
No. 147. 
[6] For report of investigation conducted by Major Clausen, see  
committee exhibit No. 148. 
[7] For proceedings of the Hewitt inquiry, see committee exhibit No.  
149.  
 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT            XV 
 
papers in these files for the year 1941 relating to Japan, the imminence  
of war in the Pacific, and the general Far Eastern developments. She  
furnished such papers in response to this request as she considered  
might be involved and stood ready to testify before the committee at any  
time.  
 
All parties in interest have attested to the fact that they have been  
afforded a full, fair, and impartial public hearing before the  
committee. All witnesses who retained counsel-Admiral Stark, Admiral  
Kimmel, and General Short-were given the opportunity to be examined by  
their counsel if they so desired, and to submit questions to committee  
counsel to be asked other witnesses.  
 
The following action was not taken by the committee for the reasons  
indicated:  
 
(1) Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was not called before the  
committee as a witness for the reason that his health would not permit.  
Mr. Stimson did, however, submit a statement under oath for the  
committee's consideration and the answers supplied by him to  
interrogatories propounded were considered by the committee. He supplied  
the portions of his personal diary requested by committee counsel and  
informed the committee that the portions of his diary now in evidence  
are the only portions thereof having any relationship to the Pearl  
Harbor investigation.  
 
(2) Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew appeared before the committee  
as a witness and testified to material appearing in his personal diary  
having a relationship to the events and circumstances of the Pearl  
Harbor attack. On the basis of his personal representation that no  
additional material pertinent to the subject of the committee's inquiry  
appeared in his diary beyond that to which he had testified, the  
committee did not formally request or otherwise seek to require the  
production of Mr. Grew's complete diary.  
 
(3) A request by one member of the committee for the appearance of the  
former Prime Minister of England, Mr. Winston Churchill, was disapproved  
by a majority of the committee. At the time Mr. Churchill was a guest in  
the United States and it was not felt that he should with propriety be  
requested to appear as a witness.  
 
(4) A request by one member of the committee for production by the State  
Department of all papers relating to the so-called Tyler Kent case was  
disapproved by a majority of the committee. The State Department had  
advised that these papers were in no way pertinent to the subject of the  
committee's inquiry, and, additionally, members of the committee had  
discussed the question with Mr. Kent who advised that he possessed no  
facts that would in any way have relationship to the Pearl Harbor  
attack.  
 
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull appeared before the committee but  
was forced to retire by reason of failing health before completion of  
the examination by all members of the committee. Mr. Hull subsequently  
responded to interrogatories propounded by the committee.  
 
The committee has conceived its duty to be not only that of indicating  
the nature and scope of responsibility for the disaster but also of  
recording the pertinent considerations relating to the greatest defeat  
in our military and naval history. Only through a reasonable amount of  
detail is it possible to place events and responsibilities in their  
proper perspective and give to the Nation a genuine appreciation of the  
salient facts concerning Pearl Harbor. For this reason our report is  
 
XVI           INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
 
of somewhat greater length than was initially believed necessary. It is  
to be recalled in this connection, however that the over-all record of  
the committee comprehends some ten million words. It was felt therefore  
that the story of the antecedent, contemporaneous, and succeeding events  
attending the disaster could not be properly encompassed within a report  
any more concise than that herewith submitted.  
 
We believe there is much to be learned of a constructive character as a  
result of the Japanese attack from the standpoint of legislation and,  
additionally, for guidance in avoiding the possibility of another  
military disaster such as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, in the section  
devoted to recommendations there are set forth, in addition to the  
recommendations proper, a series of principles, based on errors revealed  
by the investigation, which are being commended to our military and  
naval services for their consideration and possible assistance.  
 
Our report does not purport to set forth or refer to all of the enormous  
volume of testimony and evidence adduced in the course of the Pearl  
Harbor investigation. It is believed, however that the material facts  
relevant to the disaster have been outlined in the report. The  
committee's record and the records of all prior investigations have been  
printed and are available for review and study. It is to be borne in  
mind that the findings and conclusions are based on the facts presently  
in our record after an exhaustive investigation.  
 
We desire to acknowledge particular gratitude to those who have acted as  
counsel to the committee for their excellent work during the course of  
the investigation and for their magnificent assistance in compiling the  
facts for the committee in order that we might draw our conclusions,  
which are necessarily those of the committee only.  
 
In the following pages an effort has been made to present a review of  
the diplomatic and historical setting of the Pearl Harbor attack  
followed by a picture of the Japanese attack itself. Set forth  
thereafter are separate treatments of responsibilities in Hawaii on the  
one hand and responsibilities in Washington on the other. Situations  
existing in our Army and Navy establishments having a proximate or  
causative relationship to the disaster have been distinguished from  
those which, while not to be condoned, are regarded as having no direct  
or reasonable bearing on the conditions prevailing at Hawaii, preceding  
and in the wake of the Japanese attack on Sunday morning December 7,  
1941. To assist in following and better appreciating the story of the  
attack there has been outlined in appendix F the geographical  
considerations and military installations playing a role in and relating  
to the disaster.  
 
Throughout the report italics have been freely employed to facilitate  
reading and to bring out more clearly matters regarded as of particular  
importance. 
 
[In the ASCII version, italics will be indicated by asterisks at the  
beginning and ending of each italicized section.  LWJ] 
 
 
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/5/96 Updated: 12/8/96