Walker Percy's Philosophy of Language

Essay by Henry P. Mills

[Part 2]


Intersubjectivity

Let us ask, next, What is the significance of the triadic Welt as it relates beyond the individual? The answer to this particular question may again seem elementary, but as before, we hope the reader will recognize the striking nature of what, as Emerson says, may seem "common." The symbolically organized "world" allows for the possibility of states of "intersubjectivity"-that is, states of shared understanding-to occur between human organisms. Language is thus a bridge between the respective, individual vantage points upon the Welt. Let us have a closer look at this phenomenon.

Percy offers a fundamental definition of intersubjectivity as "that meeting of minds by which two selves take each other's meaning with reference to the same object beheld in common."[15] For instance, the author has just above alluded to a thought of Emerson, which has been given as a prefatory quote for this chapter. From having considered this allusion, the reader has come to share an idea in common with the author of this book concerning two "objects," namely the personage of the 19th century poet and naturalist Ralph W. Emerson, and one of his particular thoughts. In this way, therefore, have we come to have an intersubjective "meeting of minds." Indeed, we might even note that this meeting transcends time-even as much as a over a century in terms of Emerson's part.

This might seem fairly self-evident, but indeed, we must note in a similar fashion that intersubjectivity is the foundational cornerstone of all human knowledge as is enabled by the triadic symbol-meaning relationship we have identified and discussed above. In other words, the condition of intersubjective potential presupposes all human communication. In fact, we ourselves, the reader and the writer, have been engaged in an intersubjective state ever since the former first picked up this book! We are at this very moment in a state of intersubjectivity, though we may be miles apart and have never met. Communication via symbolic language, in this light, must be recognized for the extraordinary event that it is, being wholly limited neither to time or to space! Truly, this is an unprecedented phenomenon for the universe, where all is measured according to relationships in both time and space. Let us, however, now look at the nature of this event more closely by considering a further description of intersubjectivity.

In one essay, Percy offers that intersubjectivity is describable as a "noncausal bond" forming a "tetradic relationship" of "Symbol" (or sign), "Object," "Organism1" (I), and Organism2 (Thou). See diagram 6.

Diagram 6 A representation of the "tetradic" nature of the intersubjective event between two organisms. Source: MB, 259.

Here, we might note that the triadic sign-meaning relationship has been realigned into a "tetrad" in the broader context of intersubjectivity. Two other points are significant about this diagram too.

First, the reader will note that there is only a relation of quasi-identity, that is of partial degree, between the "symbol" and the "object" to which it refers. This relationship is, as discussed above with the triad, one that is intended by the agreed meaning that the speaker and the hearer have attributed for a given symbol (or sign). For example, both the reader and writer agree that the sign "Emerson" refers to the 19th century writer who went by that name. This is a relation of quasi-identity. The word "Emerson" is not the man, who himself has long been since buried, ( but not his thoughts). This relation of quasi-identity follows thinking we have already outlined when we discussed the intentional identity of the sign above as arbitrary in nature.

Second, this tetradic bond is one that is noncausal because the tetradic event, unlike the dyadic event, is not brought about by one physical entity acting upon another to cause a certain outcome. Rather, the respective members of the given intersubjective pair both (triadically) intend the encounter through a conscious willingness which alone makes the exchange possible. Moreover, such an interchange can only occur within the realm of consciousness, the Welt. In Percy's terms, "a new and indefeasible relation has come into being between the two organisms in virtue of which they are related not merely as one organism responding to another but as a namer and hearer, an I and a Thou," as made possible by the co-intentional symbol-meaning relationship.[16] The intentional component of consciousness is again the key, the unique phenomenon we are attempting to be intent upon.

Given the understanding, then, that intersubjectivity is an intentional, non-causal event between two individuals, let us now ask, What can we understand about language itself? The answer, of course, is that language, besides being the vehicle of intersubjectivity, is intersubjective in nature in an of itself. As Percy would say, "symbolization is of its very essence an intersubjectivity...[and] presupposes a triad of existents: I, the object, you."[17] Put in other words, inherent in the "naming act" of language is the "hearing act," the I and the Thou both. To utter a word presupposes a listener, even if it is merely oneself.

Thus, for instance, the fact that Robinson Crusoe writes a diary that he is uncertain anyone will ever read does not in the least detract from the "communal" event that it is; that he writes, implies a reader. Indeed, we might say that above all, humans wish to have understanding as we communally stumble along the symbolic horizon of the Welt-wishing both to be understood and to understand. These both ultimately have their footings in intersubjectivity. We might also note that intersubjectivity is the ground making possible all incidences of empathy and identification, if not compassion too, during those times when "community" breaks down.

Another way to understand the simultaneity of the naming act and the hearing act is through the terminology of French philosopher Gabriel Marcel, whom Percy reflects upon at numerous points. In on instance, he cites Marcel referring to to the communal nature of language as an "intersubjective nexus." Simply put, this is to say that our relationship with others through language is implicitly a "metaphysic of we are as opposed to a metaphysic of I think."4 I think only because we think together as made possible by the language we both share. Moreover, to Marcel this "nexus" is what lies as the "mysterious root of language," which can only be "acknowledged," not "asserted." Put in other words, one participates in language, even to the extent that language subsumes the individual automatically into the community who uses that language. These are ideas to which we will return and explore in future chapters.

For now, though, let us leave this section firmly intent upon awareness of the extraordinary nature of intersubjectivity as a non-causal, tetradic phenomenon, as well as with recognition for a forth property about consciousness we have discovered-the "communal" nature of knowing. For consciousness and intersubjectivity are inextricably inter-related and intertwined, their binding together beyond separation. As Percy would say, "I am not only conscious of something: I am conscious of it as being what it is for you and me."[18] Again, these are thoughts we easily lose touch with because we are so immersed in language, because it is so "everyday" (to use a term Percy was fond of) and commonplace to us. The complex wonder of language, however, doesn't stop with intersubjectivity.[19]


The Metaphysics of "Meaning"

We have commented upon the triadic, ontological nature of the Welt and the noncausal, co-intentional nature of the intersubjective nexus. Let us now consider some further properties of language from this basis, while expanding on what we have considered before about the unique nature of the symbol-meaning relation. First, for the moment, let us take as a given that symbolic language involves the communication of "meaning," as for instance you may be wondering to yourself this very moment, "what does all this mean?" (Such a question, indeed, is the supreme ontological question par excellence).

Let us attempt a partial answer to this question with the following assertion: Understood as the very capacity to represent "meaning" and share it intersubjectively, human symbolization must be understood to be nothing less than a metaphysical event, as the means by which assertory exchange is created and made possible. To help clarify the meaning of our assertion, we need to consider the language event more closely, noting that it involves both a physical and a mental component whether we are talking about a sign that is visual (this or any other text) or oral-aural (a radio announcer). We will all readily agree that both situations involve easily recognized physical components: chains of black scribblings upon the page or sounds emanating from the radio speaker. These are clearly physical and are readily measurable or objectified. (For instance, one could readily study the underlying swssyntax, morphology, or phonology of our use of language for the former, or analyze the frequency, pitch, loudness, etc. of the latter).

On the other hand, however, what is not so clear is what these physical signs induce within the reader/hearer: the apprehension of meaning which in and of itself is not physical. For instance, above we referred to the 19th-century poet and naturalist known by the sign "Emerson." The relationship between this simple seven-letter vocative and the concept it refers to (i.e. the man known by that name) is one of imputed meaning, as we have observed. Therefore, since the symbol-meaning relationship is the product of an intentional bond, it follows that we can't "measure"-which presupposes a condition of physicality-intended concepts or ideas. We may be able to measure their effectiveness once they are implemented in a given project, but we can nowhere isolate a given concept and place it under a microscope! Moreover, this understanding holds true for all assertions, even the assertion that the preceding statement isn't true.

Awareness of the non-material condition of meaning has particular relevance as per the behaviorist model of language, which we briefly considered before by distinguishing between two instances involving the sign "fire." Let us look at this model in the interest of further demonstrating the position we are presenting.

Behaviorism holds that all organismic behavior can be defined according to the stimulus-response (S-R) learning model. In other words, behavior is understood to be the product of conditioning reinforcers, either positive or negative, as found in a given organism's environment. As an example, we might recall the manner in which Pavlov's dogs were conditioned to respond with salivation at the sound of a bell that had initially been paired with their feeding. To the behaviorist, then, the behavior of all higher organisms, human and non-human alike, can be explained according to the conditioning they have received.

Thus intent upon behavior as a functionally analyzable event, behaviorism is one of the strictest embodiments of scientific empiricism, and as found in its particular case, this tendency is manifest as a deemphasis on any motivational factors coming from within in the form of mental events (for example, behaviorists are generally antipathetic toward the Freudian psychodynamic model). For this reason the discipline is notorious for its narrowed treatment, if not dismissal of consciousness when studying humans. If any mental experiences at all are granted, they are held merely to be identical with neurophysiological processes. Anything else disqualifies the precepts of the model.

One famous statement by behaviorist founder John B. Watson demonstrates the general lack of importance he, as initiator of the paradigm, attributed to internal factors. Said Watson, "give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select-doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant, chief, and yes, even beggerman and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of his ancestors."[20]

Whatever truth value Watson's claim has (his proposal would be very interesting indeed were he to include "psychoanalyst" on his list!), his general perspective is based in the stimulus-response model we have identified, with its environmental emphasis. A similar approach, likewise, typifies behaviorist understanding of language as a dyadic S-R relationship. It is against this position that many of Percy's criticisms are directed in his essays.

For example, Percy suggests at one point, "it may well turn out that the [behavioral] semioticist has good reason to ignore the symbol relation in view of his dictum that sign analysis replaces metaphysics, since an impartial analysis of symbolization can only bring one face to face with the very thing which the [behavioral] semioticist has been at all pains to avoid-a metaphysical issue."[21] In emphasizing what is concretely measurable only, the behaviorist model overlooks the intentional bond, among other things, even though, of course, such is implicit within the behaviorist's own behavior.

Through such a critique, Percy is not advocating the abandonment of scientific "impartiality," as indeed, Percy's own model is quite scientifis. Rather does he wish to point out the deficiencies of a model which does not do full justice to the complexity of the language event, if not also that of mankind. For any given scientific model cannot be said to be a complete picture if it cannot explain all relevant phenomena without discounting or overlooking some in favor of others, especially when we are dealing with such a complex event as consciousness itself.

In the above example, we have thus sought to distinguish between language as a physico-causal event or sequence that is measurable (e.g., in the case of the radio announcer: sign utterance-> sound waves-> sensory reception by the hearer-> afferent nerve impulse-> cortical stimulation, etc.) and language as a "radical," "ontological" mode of being or "orientation" concerned with the expression and assimilation of "meaning" (i.e. intersubjective conceptual understanding), which is not quantifiable. To be sure, let us make this distinction between the measurable and the immeasurable further distinct, with a quick look at one more illustration.

Consider the scripts in diagram 7 (separate page)--none of which will probably be familiar to the average reader--while recognizing that each is laden with meaning to the writer and community who use them. Yet for us, their manner and style seem so radically unusual that to think that such marks suggest meaning is beyond one's comprehension! Literally. (If one is a scholar of ancient scripts, we suggest that he or she focus upon those languages that are not known).

It is, of course, equally interesting to think that our own English script would likewise appear as unusual to many of the writers of these scripts. With any good fortune, this little experiment in cross-cultural language analysis has helped the reader see more directly the radical divergence between the physical and metaphysical properties of the symbol-meaning relationship. (This is merely an extension of our earlier experiment with "apple"). We, of course, have already noted the way in which Emerson's ideas have transcended time and place, even though the physical component of text is required along with the biology of one's brain. Likewise, we have considered the metaphysics of the intersubjective nexus, so hopefully between these three, the uniqueness of the triadic language event is becoming ever more obvious to the reader.

Let us now begin considering the fuller implications of what we have discovered about the symbol meaning-relation as a whole.


Science and the Assertory Event

Given the peculiar properties of "meaning" we have considered, interesting implications follow along two lines: both in terms of what we can understand about mankind in itself and in terms of the products of its efforts. Let us save discussion of the former for the concluding section of this chapter and turn first to the products of our desire to understand, particularly as per science. Indeed, what we are about to consider might be suggested to be the greatest kept "secret" about science, one that is so secret that even most scientists are unaware of it themselves! Let us begin by offering a general definition of science and its methods.

As a process, science is initiated by the desire to understand an identified problem in the natural world as concerns a given phenomenon. One then begins to study this phenomenon by limiting as many variables associated with it as possible, followed by the gathering of data about it. Through systematic observation intent upon objectivity and impartiality (i.e. employment of the "scientific method"), the scientist then can inductively formulate "hypotheses," or educated guesses, in explanation of the phenomenon that is not understood. If one's hypothesis about an event proves correct, and can be verified by repeated "experimentation" and testing, then this hypothesis can be accepted as accurate and generalizable to other scenarios involving that given phenomenon. The hypothesis at this point is then elevated to the the level of a "principle" until it is disproven or modified by further findings.

If the weight of evidence supporting the principle, however, is so convincing that its findings cannot be disputed, and they have stood the test of time in light of repeated experimentation by other scientists, the explanation for the phenomenon then may achieve the status of "theory," or of "law." Such a status allows the explanation to be accepted as a general frame of reference for all further inquiry into any situation involving that same phenomenon or set of phenomena. Newton's First Law of Gravity is one such example of a hypothesis now writ large as Law. The combination of multiple laws may enable the scientist to develop larger models as pertain to the prediction of behavior within ever larger systems involving more and more complex phenomena. In physicist John Barrow's words, "the goal of science is to make sense of the diversity of Nature...[through] the transformation of lists of observational data into abbreviated form by the recognition of patterns," all with the goal in mind of "algorithmic compression."[22]

Thus, for instance, we have the General Theory of Relativity predicting behavior about the large-scale structure of the universe, and Quantum Mechanics Theory offering predictions about phenomena on extremely small scales at the sub-atomic level. (We will be looking at both of these more closely in Chapter Five). Science thus involves the analysis and computation of data in the interest of attaining an ever more broad understanding of the phenomena of the natural world. From this data, theories and models then can be derived. As a model itself, the scientific method can be outlined as seen in diagram 8.


Problem Identification-->Systematic Observation-->Hypothesis-->Experimentation--> Generalization

Diagram 8 illustrates the general stages of the scientific method. The process toward scientific knowledge is one that is recursive, rather than linear.


Of course, the path is not always one that is simply linear in direction, instead being recursive with findings always being modified by the discovery of new answers and problems. Overall, however, this is the general procedure by which all science occurs. Let us now consider the actual mechanics behind such a process before making our observations about it as a whole.

Inherent to all scientific methodology on a mechanical level is the interest in how one event/variable/phenomenon is a "function" of, or is "caused" by, another event/variable/phenomenon. (This is our basic dyadic model of A->B discussed above). Moreover, the cause and effect relationship between variables must be measurable and limitable to a specific point/context both temporally and spatially in order for relationships to be clear and predictable. Scientific models, above all else, wish to offer accurate predictions about what will happen for a given scenario. Let's take an example by returning to Newton.

Newton derived his First Law of Gravity by examining events about him (the falling of an apple), followed by the formulation of the idea of "gravity" to explain the phenomenon of physical objects falling to the ground. In other words, the falling object (apple) is a function of gravity as is present on the Earth at any given moment or place. This, he reasoned, must also explain why the moon orbits the Earth, and he generalized his ideas into a larger model in explanation of the behavior of the heavens. This law among others thus served to unify his ideas in Newton's Principia (1687), arguably one of the most important scientific works ever published.

Thus, as this example demonstrates, scientific analysis into natural behavior may be represented by the following formula: E=f(C), where "E" represents a given event, "C" is the cause of it, and "f" represents their relationship, namely that "E" is a function of "C." In a nutshell, this is one the first major principles of all scientific inquiry. The reader should immediately recognize this as a concern with the dyad.

E=f (C)

Diagram 9 This formula stands behind all scientific knowledge wherein a given Event (E) is identified to be a function (f) of some Cause (C).

This brief definition of scientific method in mind, both its overall procedure, as well as its mechanics, let us now ask what might prove to be a very important question. Have there been any important variables or phenomena left out? That is, in the attempt to systematically measure and interpret the dyadic phenomena of the world, has something been overlooked? Percy argues that, yes, indeed something very important has been left unconsidered. Let's see how.

It is a given that scientists study the phenomena of the natural world, which in some cases even includes the study of our own species. But lest we forget that mankind is a complex "phenomenon" in its own right, we need also to ask questions on several different levels at the same time. Particularly, we need, as Percy advocates, to seek to understand human culture in all its many manifestations, including science itself.

This leads us, then, to another question, Who is studying the scientists studying natural events-those both human and non-human-as they attempt to expand the boundaries of scientific knowledge? No other species, of course, pursues such radical behavior, but can we simply disregard such questioning as an extraneous variable? Percy believes not, and as a good "scientist" himself, he makes it his responsibility to reflect upon the curious nature of this scenario.[23]

What are the results? The reader shouldn't be surprised that the issue again pertains to language, and if he or she hasn't yet formulated the answer to the "secret" of science, let us state it directly now: assertions of meaning are the fundamental, prerequisite given of all scientific activity, and yet these assertions are not themselves subject to the criteria of empirical scientific methodology. To put it in Percy's words, the "functional method of the sciences cannot construe the assertory act of language."[24]

All this is simply to repeat again the understanding we have already discovered, namely that the phenomenon of asserted "meaning" is not subject to measurement as a "causal space-time event," even though it is accepted as being as real as those natural phenomena that can be construed functionally. Thus, for example, we can state that a scientist's asserted conclusions or ideas concerning a body of data are not functionally measurable whereas, in contrast, the behavior of the scientist asserting his or her conclusions is fully definable according to scientific precepts. The latter is a physico-causal event, whereas the former is not given the noncausal, immaterial nature of "meaning. " Yet is it any less of a "natural" phenomenon? See diagram 10 below.

What are some of the immediate implications of this understanding? For one, no matter what the proposed Superconductor Supercollider (SSC) will be able to tell us about the the fundamental sub-quarkian nature of matter and the early microseconds of the birth of the universe, when in operation its speeding protons will never be able to bombard or collide with an assertion, even with the fastest of particles racing around its track! Such simply can't be done, this even with the expectation that early tests scheduled for the beginning of the 21st century are to create levels of energy over 20X the level of power that has ever been achieved by scientists before.

Yet, of course, we know the assertory event to be as "real" as colliders themselves, for they are the fundamental upon which they are built. Indeed, the energy levels of assertions have been the driving force of other world events of immense power and scope-from everything to the development and rise of Greco-Roman civilization, to the re-vitalization of culture during the Renaissance, to the founding of Modern industrialization, all things to which modern science is indebted and without which it could not have risen. Thus, as scientists and others eagerly await the completion of the SSC, dare we not stand likewise in awe and remembrance of the immense power of the human mind in all its own complexity and unexplained nature?

It takes someone as gifted as Percy, however, to remind of the important limitation intrinsic to all scientific understanding: that for all its ability to grasp, peer into, and fathom the very depths of the universe and the human body, for all its beauty and elegance, the scientific method nonetheless cannot be used to explain itself! Nevertheless, what science by definition excludes from its boundaries, that is, nonempirical phenomena, inviolably ends up being bound within it.

Does this mean that science is not a useful, productive tool for shaping and understanding the world? No, by no means. The modern world is greatly indebted to scientific advances in more ways than can be counted. But it does suggest that science does not fully penetrate into the elaborate fabric of reality as it intends to encompass. Recognition of this fact may be especially significant at a time when scientific-technological values still reign supreme in cultural perception as being the only viable world-vision with anything of substance to communicate or contribute to humanity. (Of course, many ills have been a part of this contribution too, but we leave that issue to someone else). Our goal, here, like Percy's, is simply to challenge and to question hidden assumptions in the interest of furthering our awareness of ourselves, our cognizance of the human predicament. Thus, let us conclude this section on the mediation that, in light of the limitations we have above realized about science-that perhaps other modes of inquiry are necessary alongside it if mankind is in any way to address its yearning for "meaning," which is, after all, the very condition of science in the first place.[25]

Diagram 10 demonstrates the intersubjective relationship between scientists (left and right) as combines a symbolic assertion (top) in explanation of a given event that may be understood functionally. Though the symbolic assertion describes a cause-effect relationship, its own peculiar character in not understandable so.


Summary and Implications

Let us conclude our initial mediation on language and consciousness by considering just some of the implications of what we have discovered. Indeed, let us ask, What does all this mean?

This question very well, arguably, could be seen as the central question to the condition of humanness, to the "predicament" of consciousness, but there is no simple answer to it, not from science, not from philosophy, not from religion. We will, however, continue to reflect upon the nature of consciousness, meaning, and interpretation through the entirety of this book. For the time being, though, let us bring our journey to a point of greater synthesis in light of what we have covered so far, first by reviewing what we have learned about language, then consciousness, and then mankind.

To begin, we have learned that the language event is an illusive one because it is only through language that we can conceive of "language." By looking to a broader context, however, we more readily were able to isolate language as a triadic phenomenon, one that stands in marked contrast to all other known phenomena in the entire cosmos. Likewise, we noted that our existence as sign-users is interpenetrated through and through by signs, despite our lack of awareness for them. Following a discussion of the intentional bond-the imputed pairing between the sign and its referent-as lying behind the symbol-meaning relation of the triad, we considered the nature of the Welt, or the symbolic world formed in language. Intimately connected with this new "realm" in the universe, we learned, is the condition of ontology, having awareness for one's awareness even as one symbolically disposes of the entire horizon of the Umwelt, the biological realm.

Likewise, we then saw how the Welt allows for intersubjectivity to occur as a tetradic non-causal bond between two organisms. Moreover, we observed that language itself is intersubjective in nature in that implicit in the naming act is the hearing act. As such, we recognized that intersubjective potential is prerequisite for all knowledge. In turn, we then explored more fully the metaphysical nature of "meaning" as a phenomenon that is not wholly explicable in physico-causal terms. And finally we extended our mediation upon the unique properties of language into the world-frame of science, while observing the way in which the assertory event which lies at the heart of science is not itself subject to scientific methodology.

What in turn have we learned about the nature of consciousness? We have learned that consciousness is bound up with and wedded to symbolic language, as language mediates between the mind and the universe by allowing for the allocation of names to the phenomena of nature and oneself. Likewise, we discovered that consciousness involves intentionality, by which relationships between signs and referents are fused to create the symbol-meaning relationship behind symbolization. In turn, we then unearthed the ontological nature of consciousness as a mode concerned with the assimilation and exchange of intended meaning, as a unique orientation to the physical realm of being. Moreover, we noted that consciousness as we are defining it involves the knowledge that one "knows" he or she knows.

Likewise, we discerned the communal nature of consciousness as bred of the intersubjective nexus between ourselves and others via language, recognizing that one's own consciousness is inextricably tied in with the intersubjective tetradic bond, that is others' consciousness. Additionally, we observed that this nexus can only be acknowledged, not circumscribed. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, we saw that "knowing" is a non-causal sequence that is not wholly limitable to the physical because "meaning" transcends the physico-causal. It cannot be measured simply as a functional state of dynamic energy exchange.

Where then does all this lead us in our initial attempt to apprehend consciousness? For one, we might note that to the extent that consciousness is intertwined with the above triadic relationship we have identified, it cannot alone be fully explained by a dyadically-inclined methodology, in other words, current scientific models. And since consciousness brings the human organism into a totally new relationship to the environment as a mode of being borne toward ontology and community-both of which are implicit in science-the phenomenon would seem to ask for approach from multiple perspectives. At the very least, however, we must acknowledge that we are so immersed in consciousness that we easily loose sight of its unusual properties, which we have above sought to bring into greater relief.

And finally, let us ask, What of mankind? What can we understand about its relationship to other species? Foremost, we have learned that because the triadic realm of the Welt is alone mankind's, a major distinction exists between human experience and that of all other known species. Moreover, this difference between humans as "namers" who perceive from the vantage point of symbolic language, and other organisms who merely exist in the Umwelt as signal-users, is one that is not merely quantitative but qualitative. For on the Earth only mankind is ontologically oriented to the universe.[26] Ontology, of course, is both a blessing and a curse, as on the one hand it allows our species to shape our environment more successfully where on the other hand it thrusts us into the uncertain straits of ever elusive "meaning."

Despite human uncertainty, there is one thing that is certain as concerns our present interests: in all its symbolic and syntactical complexity, human language, as the very fiber of consciousness and as the means by which we "process" the environment (Percy also, as we have seen, uses the term "celebrating" it), categorically places mankind in a different sphere in relationship to other organisms. For nothing less than a gulf exists between the responses of animals to stimuli in the environment and the assertory propositions of mankind, a gulf or chasm that is not bridgeable by biology alone.[27] As a result, any attempt to equate humans as simply a higher organism not qualitatively different from other organisms falls into an immediate antinomy at its very assertion, for only humans venture to make assertions. Thus to conclude this chapter, once considered in a larger light as Percy presents them, human consciousness and language must be recognized as the utterly distinctive means of "knowing" and of "interpreting" that they are. Indeed, Percy's direct challenge to us is that mankind seek to broaden its vision of itself beyond current scientific explanations. Through his brilliant analysis of the indispensable role that language plays in mankind's station in the world, he reveals the limitations inherent to that perspective alone, one which seems to ask for supplementation. Before any "minimal" conceptualization of humans as "organisms" can be obtained, he suggests, a more thorough consideration of language and consciousness must be pursued.


Bibliography

Barrow, John D. Theories of Everything: The Quest for Ultimate Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991).

Bickerton, Derek. Language and Species (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1990).

Chomsky, Noam. Language and Responsibility, John Viertel, trans. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979).

Crystal, David, ed. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language (Cambridge: University Press, 1987).

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. "Nature," Norton Anthology of American Literature, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Nina Baym et al (New York: Norton, 1985).

Hergenhan, B. R. An Introduction to Theories of Personality, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, 1984).

Hofstadter, Douglas. Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

Lawson, Lewis A. and Victor A, Kramer. eds. Conversations with Walker Percy (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1985).

Restak, Richard. The Mind (New York: Bantam, 1988).

Silverman, Kaja. The Subject of Semiotics (New York: Oxford University, 1983).

Whitman, Walt. Complete Poetry and Selected Prose, James E. Miller, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959).


Further readings and bibliographies on Percy's semiotic are available at http://sunsite.unc.edu/wpercy/semiotic.html

Send comments to: wpercy2@mail.ibiblio.org
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