2 December 1940 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin) #216
"The following ships were observed at Pearl Harbor on the 1st:" See doc.
20 December 1940 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin) #232
"There was no ship movement in Pearl Harbor on the 19th." See doc.
24 December 1940 From: Honolulu (Okuda) To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #234 "It is reported that ships from the battleships down returned to Pearl Harbor on Dec. 20th and will stay until Jan. 4 (5th or 6th) on Christmas leave. " See doc.

January 1941

6 January 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin) #002
"Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 5th were as follows: " See doc.
7 January 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin) #003
"Battleships New Mexico (flag), Oklahoma, Idaho, and Mississippi, together with many cruisers and destroyers left Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 6th for training. It is reported that they will return on the 12th(?)." See doc.
9 January 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin)
#005
"It is reported that the light cruiser Cincinnati returned here from the Philippine Islands. This message sent to Washington and Manila." See doc.
16 January 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin)
#011
"1. The capital ships returned to Pearl Harbor immediately. The Pennsylvania arrived on the 14th." See doc.
21 January 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin) #014
"The aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise together with four destroyers arrived in Pearl Harbor from the mainland on the 21st." See doc.
27 January 1941 From: Tokyo (Grew) To: Washington "... he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces,..." See doc.
28 January 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin)
#018
"Four battleships of the Colorado class and fourteen destroyers arrived in Pearl Harbor from the continent on the 27th." See doc.

February 1941

6 February 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo #25
"This morning I observed the following ships of war in Pearl Harbor:" See doc.
15 February 1941 From: Tokyo
(Matuoka)
To: Washington
(Koshi)
15 February 1941
#073
"The information we particularly desire with regard to intelligence involving U. S. and Canada, are the following:" See doc.
15 February 1941 From: Tokyo
(Matuoka).
To: Honolulu
(Riyoji).
#008
"In gathering intelligence material, your office will pay particular attention to paragraphs 1 and 2." See doc.
15 February 1941 From: Tokyo
(Matuoka)
To: San Francisco
(Riyoji)
#020
"Will your office please pay particular attention to gathering intelligence material which will fall under the classifications outlined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 12." See doc.
15 February 1941 From: Tokyo
(Matuoka)
To: Los Angeles
(Riyoji)
15 February, 1941
#013
"In connection with collecting intelligence material, your office will pay particular attention to contents of paragraphs 1, 2, 8, 9 and 11." See doc.
15 February 1941 From: Tokyo
(Matuoka).
To: New York
(Riyoji).
*018
"In gathering intelligence material, your office will pay particular attention to contents of paragraphs 4, 6, 7, and 9." See doc.
15 February 1941 From: Tokyo
(Japanese
Foreign Minister)
To: Vancouver
(Japanese Consul)
#008
"In gathering intelligence material, your office will lay particular stress on paragraph 10." See doc.
21 February 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin)
#029
"1. The capital ships and others departed from Pearl Harbor on the 13th and returned on the 19th. (It is said that they will depart again on the coming Wednesday and return on the following Wednesday)." See doc.
24 February 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
#31
"The Enterprise came into port from the continent on the 21st, having transported 31 Army pursuit planes of the Curtiss-Hawk P36 classification. She immediately returned to the continent; (there is a rumor that she went on to Manila). I have observed the following ships in Pearl Harbor:" See doc.
26 February 1941 From: Tokyo
(Japanese Foreign
Minister)
To: Vancouver
#12
"Please wire reports covering the positions and movements also of the ships of Canada's Pacific Fleet. Please transmit to Ottawa and from that office ----- to the Naval Attaché." See doc.
27 February 941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin)
#034
"Apparently the Fleet goes to sea for a week of training and stays in Pearl Harbor one week. Every Wednesday, those at sea and those in the harbor change places. This movement was noted on last Wednesday, the 26th." See doc.

March 1941

8 March 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE REGARDING A CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The Japanese Ambassador called at my apartment at the Carlton Hotel by an indirect arrangement based on the equal and joint ini­tiative of himself and myself growing out of his talk with the Presi­dent in my presence some days ago." See doc.
10 March 1941 From: Honolulu
(Okuda)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin)
#043
"Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following:" See doc.
20 March 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE (WELLES) REGARDING A CONVERSATION WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR (OUMANSKY) "The Ambassador asked if I had any further information in confirmation of what I stated to him secretly in our last interview, namely, that this Government believed that Germany was planning to attack the Soviet Union." See doc.

May 1941

12 May 1941 From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
#78
"Warships observed at anchor on the 11th in Pearl Harbor were as follows:" See doc.
16 May 1941 From: Tokyo
(Matsuoka)
To: Singapore
#120
"According to a telegram from our consul in Colombo, a New York Reuters dispatch states that it is reported that the United States has already stationed a fleet in the Indian Ocean. Please pay great attention to the movements of American warships." See doc.
26 May 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita).
To: Tokyo.
#86
"Warships anchored in Pearl Harbor on the 24th (2) and the 25th (?) were as follows:" See doc.

June 1941

14 June 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Tokyo
#100
"On the 11th (9) two English converted cruisers entered Pearl Harbor and are at present undergoing repairs at the old (?) dry docks." See doc.
21 June 1941 DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations." See doc.
25 June 1941 From: Vladivostok
To: Tokyo
#230
"There has been no great change in conditions here up to the 25th." See doc.

July 1941

2 July 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
Circular #1390
"At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided." See doc.
3 July 1941 From: Vladivostok
To: Tokyo
#259
"Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality." See doc.
6 July 1941 STATEMENT HANDED BY THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO MR. TOMOHIKO USHIBA, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER (PRINCE KONOYE) "The reports which are now reaching the Ameri­can Government are so completely contrary to those statements and utterances that the Government of the United States finds it. very difficult to believe in the truth of those reports." See doc.
8 JULY 1941 STATEMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA) TO THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) "Message in reply sent by H. I. M.'s Foreign Minister at the request of the Prime Minister for delivery to the President of the U.S.A., dated July 7th, Showa 16" See doc.
14 July 1941. From: Canton
To: Tokyo
#255.
"The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone." See doc.
19 July 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
#669
"The Cabinet shake up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National affairs and has no further significance." See doc.
21 July 1941 From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#545
"According to information received from various sources in various areas, he continued, there are definite indications that Japan is planning to take some steps very shortly which would upset the peaceful status of certain areas." class=MsoHyperlink>See doc.
23 July 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#397
"As was pointed out in my message #368**, our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. " class=MsoHyperlink>See doc.
23 July 1941
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#555
"I explained to him that our southern occupation was absolutely essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety." See doc.
23 July 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE (WELLES) REGARDING A CONVERSATION WITH, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The Ambassador said that he had now received from press reports, but not as yet officially, information that the Japanese Government had concluded with the Vichy Government an agreement whereunder the Japanese Government would send military forces to occupy cer­tain portions of southern Indochina." See doc.
24 July 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#406
"However according to information received by us lately, especially according to newspaper reports, there is the possibility of the United State freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo on petroleum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan." See doc.
24 July 1941 STATEMENT BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE (WELLES) "It will be recalled that in 1940 the Japanese Government gave expression on several occasions to its desire that conditions of dis­turbance should not spread to the region of the Pacific, with special references to the Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina." See doc.
24 July 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE (WELLES) "At the outset of the conference the President made approximately the following statement to the Ambassador. The President said, re­ferring to a talk  which he had made this morning to a home defense group under the leadership of Mayor LaGuardia, that for more than two years the United States had been permitting oil to be exported from the United States to Japan. " See doc.
25 July 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#433
"The United States is making a concentrated effort to strengthen Philippine defenses." See doc.
26 July 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Net
Circular #1616
"Depending upon how Japanese relations with England and the United States turn out, we may have to consider divesting England and the United States of all their interests in China. " See doc.
26 July 1941 STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE "At the specific request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek, and for the purpose of helping the Chinese Government, the President has, at the same time, extended the freezing control to Chinese assets in the United States." See doc.
27 July 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #1622
"In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States by which our assets were frozen, the rules restricting foreign business transactions in Japan which are included in the rules governing foreign exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Finance Ministry." See doc.
30 July 1941 From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#609.
"During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite impossible to again calm the storm." See doc.
31 July 1941
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
#433
(Message to Berlin #708)
"From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views." See doc.

August 1941

1 August 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Manila
#245 (or 246) (?)
"Please inform us regarding the camouflage and distinguishing marks of the American naval and military aeroplanes in Manila." See doc.
2 August 1941
From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Panama
#63
"If possible, I would like you to telegraph me concerning the transit of the canal by English and American merchant ships." See doc.
2 August 1941
From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#474
"1. Anchored warships-Dfionomi." See doc.
2 August 1941
From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#476
"Though I am making additional secret investigations, that is all for the time being." See doc.

2 August 1941
From: Havana
(Nanjo)
To: Tokyo
#44
"Between the 16th and the 24th of July, the following American warships were anchored in the naval harbor of Guantanamo:" See doc.
4 August 1941
From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#480
"Two destroyers sailed on the fourth. All the war ships at anchor have sailed. " See doc.

5 August 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#447
"On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the U. S. economic pressure on Japan is being daily in creased in intensity." See doc.
6 August 1941 ORAL STATEMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The purport and nature of the measures taken by the Japanese Government in effecting a joint defense of French Indo‑China has already been explained by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the United States Ambassador in Tokio as well as by myself to the Presi­dent and the Acting Secretary of State. To summarize, the measures are of entirely peaceful character and for self‑defense, and an inter­vention by any third Power would be wholly unwarranted." See doc.
7 August, 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#452
"We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences." See doc.
7 August 1941 From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#663
"I now wish to describe the recent general outlook in the United States." See doc.
8 August 1941 DOCUMENT HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The President's proposal was that, if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina or establishing bases there with its military and naval forces, or, in case such steps had already actually been begun, would withdraw such forces, the President would do everything in his power to obtain from the Chinese Govern­ment, the British Government and the Netherland Government, and the Government of the United States would of course itself give, a binding and solemn declaration,..." See doc.
9 August 1941 From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#674
"The United States assumes that our occupation of South French Indo-China indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. On this point the President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes." See doc.
9 August 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF  STATE AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The Secretary handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked strictly confidential and dated August 8, 1941 in reply to the proposal of the Japanese Government contained in the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary on August 6." See doc.
9 August 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE REGARDING A CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR (HALIFAX) "The Ambassador made some inquiry about the amount of aid this Government might give in case Singapore or the Dutch East Indies should be attacked." See doc.
12 August 1941
From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#507
"At the time a non-commissioned officer of the American Navy told me confidentially that the ship mentioned in my #414 ... was the Warspite and I took this to be reliable information." See doc.
15 August 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
#739
"Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war; ..." See doc.
15 August 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
#740
"On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739*." See doc.
16 August 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#703
"As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a stage in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree." See doc.
17 August 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The Ambassador of Japan called to see the President at the latter's request. Following some few exchanges of preliminary remarks, the President then became serious and proceeded to refer to the strained relations between our two countries." See doc.
18 August 1941
From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#120
"Ships moving through the Panama Canal" See doc.
18 August 1941
From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#121
"The Douglas B-18, the Martin B-17A bombers, totaling 100 planes, as well as a number of heavy Boeing 24's, which have been stationed at Albrook Field in the past, completely disappeared about two weeks ago." See doc.
20 August 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#487
"It is a self-evident fact that Japan is pressed with the necessity of taking precautionary measures for the sake of maintaining peace in the Far East as well as for the sake of Japan's national defense and security, in view of the actuality that that part of Soviet Russia is adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo." See doc.
20 August 1941
From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#123
" The Triomphant left Balboa for Tohita on the 17th according to report. " See doc.
20 August 1941
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#532
" There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that antiaircraft guns have been placed in them. " See doc.
20 August 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#533
" Last March work was begun on the reparation of the airplane base south of Darurakku [a] on the way to San Miguel." See doc.
22 August 1941 From: Davao
(Kihara)
To: Tokyo
#104
" Because too much time would be required to fill in the paddy fields as originally planned in the construction of a new air base, it is rumored that these plans have been changed." See doc.
22 August 1941 From: Davao
(Kihara)
To: Tokyo
#107
" During the middle of July a number of American destroyers entered the harbor of Jolo. We have intelligence to the effect that they came to this port from Hawaii, but we have no evidence to substantiate it." See doc.
23 August 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#497
"American inspection of Japanese firms and banks comes closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order." See doc.
23 August 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#543
"Ships in port on the 23rd." See doc.
26 August 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#504
"Re my #503. That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make to the proposal of the President of the United States;" See doc.
26 August 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#505
"Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occasions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline shipments essential to our civilian population." See doc.
26 August 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#554
"Four "S" [a] boats on the 24th and "REI" on the 25th entered the harbor." See doc.
27 August 1941 Premier Konoye invited President Roosevelt to meet with him "to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation." Premier Konoye invited President Roosevelt to meet with him "to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation." ("That the two nations should fall in the worst of relations at this time would mean not only a disaster in itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese‑American relations." Peace, pp. 721 f. Cf. Aug. 8, supra.)
28 August 1941
From: Batavia
(Ishizawa)
To: Tokyo
#895
" While the Java class Cruiser was still at anchor in Puriooku [b] harbor, on the morning of the 27th, one destroyer of the Bankerutu [b] class entered port. " See doc.
28 August 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The President then spoke somewhat as he did at the last meeting a week ago Sunday about the idea suggested by the Japanese Prime Minister of a personal meeting between the President and the Prime Minister at as early a date as possible for the purpose of having a frank discussion of all important affairs existing between the two countries. " See doc.
28 August 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The Ambassador said that it was his personal opinion that the suggestion of the President that the meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister be held at Juneau would be agree­able to his Government and that the Prime Minister would probably proceed thither by a Japanese warship, making the journey in about ten days." See doc.
29 August 1941 From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#756
"The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc." See doc.
30 August 1941
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#559
"Warships at anchor in this harbor on the 30th:" See doc.
30 August 1941 From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Manila
#277
"Please investigate the waters in and around Manila for some trace of this warship and then make your report." See doc.

September 1941

1 September 1941 From: Manila
(Nibro)
To: Tokyo
#562
"The Marblehead returned to port on the 31st. Two destroyers left port on the 1st." See doc.
1 September 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Manila
#279
"In regard to the points you were to note, from now on in case there is no special change, report once a week, but report each change of the following as they occur:" See doc.
2 September 1941 From: Batavia
(Isizawa)
To: Tokyo
#902
"Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China." See doc.
3 September 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#524
"Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner." See doc.
3 September 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The President proceeded at once to read the written oral statement (copy attached) which had been prepared in reply to the communication recently sent to the President by the Japanese Prime Minister." See doc.
4 September 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#528
"What the United States Government proposed as a preliminary to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries were the questions of self-defense, occupation of China by the Japanese Army and equal treatment in trade, discussed during the informal negotiations in the past." See doc.
6 September 1941 From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Singapore
and
Batavia
Cir. #1947
"After you have made an immediate investigation on the following matters, please make a report, sending it to us in an appropriate manner." See doc.
6 September 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) "Only Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ushiba, the Prime Minister's private secretary, were also present. The conversation lasted for three hours and we presented with entire frankness the fundamental views of our two countries." See doc.
8 September 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#590
"On the 7th, the Houston and two destroyers entered port." See doc.
6 September 1941 DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The Government of Japan undertakes:" See doc.
11 September 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#595
"The Houston, which we reported having entered on the 7th, has been alongside the pier loading fuel and stores until today when it left for unknown destination accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers." See doc.
13 September 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#601
"On the 13th an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class entered port and is taking on supplies. It is said to have come from Hawaii." See doc.
15 September 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#604
"According to secret information received it is the St. Louis, with three other vessels (names unknown) said to be starting for Singapore." See doc.
15 September 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#819
"Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington." See doc.
16 September 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#605
"They left the harbor early on the 16th loaded with food supplies. On the stern three sea planes (single wing) were observed." See doc.
17 September 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
(Gaimudaijin)
#823
"On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two." See doc.
18 September 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#613
"On the afternoon of the 17th, the Phoenix came in port and is now being refueled at the pier.  It is reported two more ships of the same type will soon arrive." See doc.
18 September 1941 From: San Francisco
(Muto)
To: Tokyo
#218
"According to a spy report, the English warship Warspite arrived here from Bremerton on the ----- and is at present moored near the (naval arsenal at Mare Island?)." See doc.
20 September 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#618
"The boats anchored here, the 26th, are:" See doc.
20 September 1941 From: Seattle
(Sato)
To: Tokyo
#123
"The following warships are now at Bremerton" See doc.
22 September 1941 DOCUMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (TOYODA) TO THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) "TEXT OF BASIC JAPANESE TERMS OF PEACE WITH CHINA" See doc.
22 September 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#839
"Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction of Germany." See doc.
22 September 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Washington
#173.
"Naval Captain G. T. GARGENLIEU, High Commissioner for Pacific territories under the jurisdiction of the DeGaulle Regime, and Commander G. GABANTER, Commander of Defense, took passage on this destroyer to take up their new posts. " See doc.
22 September 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#173
"Ships passing through the Canal between the 17th and 21st are as follows: " See doc.
22 September 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#623
"The Phoenix left port the morning of the 22nd." See doc.
23 September 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#842
"On the morning of the 23rd. I called on Hull and handed to him the English texts of your messages #562* and #564**, and our terms of peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590***." See doc.
23 September 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "He then handed to the Secretary two papers, copies of which are attached hereto. One of these papers was headed "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China" [74] and the other marked "Strictly Confidential" was captioned "Reply to the American Com­munication of September 10, 1941." See doc.
23 September 1941 From: Buenos Aires
To: Panama
#416.
"When Minister Yamagata* was in Panama he was asked by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador." See doc.
24 September 1941
From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
#83
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:" See doc.
26 September 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#597
"In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase in our troops stationed in French Indo-China for the sake of success in the Japanese-American negotiations?" See doc.
26 September 1941
From: Davao
(Kihara)
To: Tokyo
#135
"Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday." See doc.
27 September 1941 DOCUMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The Governments of Japan and of the United States accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agree­ment of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations." See doc.
27 September 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#604
"I urged him to strongly recommend to his home government to have the "leaders' meeting" materialize immediately." See doc.
27 September 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#605
"This is the gist of the off-the-record statement made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew-see Tokyo to Washington #604*-and is written in the first person, Toyoda speaking." See doc.
27 September 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#865
"I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595**." See doc.
28 September 1941 From: Tokyo
(Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
#606
"In connection with my off-the-record communication to the American Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview with the President, the following is for your information:" See doc.
29 September 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "He handed the Secretary a document (copy of which is attached hereto) containing the gist of what the Foreign Min­ister said in his conversations with the American Ambassador at Tokyo on September 27. " See doc.
29 September 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#867
"I, therefore, pointed out that though the government, the army, and the navy, were in full accord with the proposals being discussed, considerable time would have to elapse before the entire public could be made to understand them." See doc.
29 September 1941
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#870
"In view of such incidents as were described in our message #866*, we believe that it would be well if we did not deliver those papers here which have already been delivered in Tokyo to Ambassador Grew." See doc.
29 September 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Washington
#178
"The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:" See doc.
30 September 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#614
"As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should presenting them with various written suggestions." See doc.
30 September 1941
From: Rome
To: Tokyo
#627
"Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in the mouths of the people of this country." See doc.
30 September 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#881
"Last Monday after a long time I went to call on Admiral STARK. In the middle of our conversation Rear Admiral TURNER joined us." See doc.
30 September 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Washington
#51
(Message to
Tokyo #188.)
"On the (29th?) two (French ?) warships left port bound for the Pacific. One vessel of the Omaha class left port on the night of - - - - - for an unknown destination." See doc.

October 1941

1 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#618
"I feel that you are justified to a certain extent when you complain that after we have stated that we have put all of our cards on the table, we continue to send you note after note, etc." See doc.
1 October 1941 From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
#1198
"On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him." See doc.
2 October 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The Secretary handed the Ambassador a strictly confidential statement containing the views of this Government with respect to the Japanese Government's proposals. " See doc.
2 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#625
"Special intelligence #330 from New York states that an A. P. dispatch declares that the Japanese-American negotiations warrant a pessimistic outlook and that the KONOYE Cabinet will face a crisis in about two weeks, whereupon it will be inevitable that the Cabinet undergo a revision." See doc.
2 October 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#190
"Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the "Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred to Curunda Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field)." See doc.
2 October 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#191
"Between the 30th and the 2nd, three American freighters and one English hospital ship transited the canal to the Pacific, and nine American freighters and one American liner transited the canal to the Atlantic. " See doc.
2 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Davao
#62
Re your #105.
"Please wire me the location and movements of fishermen and - - - - - since your last report." See doc.
2 October 1941 From: San Francisco
(Muto)
To: Washington
Circular #222.
Message to Tokyo as
#230.
"One Oklahoma class battleship has arrived in port and is moored in front of the Bethlehem ship-building yard." See doc.
2 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#889
"He handed me the reply of the United States Government which I have given in the separate telegram #890 [a] and said that it is the opinion of the United States Government that a conference of the leaders of the two governments would be a precarious affair unless a (complete?) understanding could be arrived at thereby and that if peace is to be maintained all over the Pacific, a "patch-up" understanding would not do, but a "clear-cut" understanding would have to be made." See doc.
2 October 1941 ORAL STATEMENT HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "Reference is made to the proposals of the Japanese Government communicated on September 6, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and to statements relating thereto subsequently communicated to this Government by the Japanese Government." See doc.
3 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#627
"I described the various problems involving the United States and Japan to British Ambassador Craigie who was scheduled to have gone on a vacation trip to the United States on 28 September." See doc.
3 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To Washington
#628
"With the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka the chances of turning away from the Axis policy and toward the Democracies, has been considerably enhanced." See doc.
3 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#894
"Although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. talks have finally reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression that the United States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope to penetrate through." See doc.
4 October 1941 From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Washington
#637
"Since the United States Government wishes to get our explanations regarding the fundamentals before entering upon the Japanese-American negotiations, theoretically speaking, as soon as we have satisfied it with our explanation we should be reaching the stage of actually opening the negotiations." See doc.
4 October 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#194
Re
my message #193
"From the 3rd until the morning of the 4th three American freighters and one French steamer moved out into the Pacific." See doc.
4 October 1941 From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Manila
#318
"I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seems of interest." See doc.
6 October 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
October 6, 1941
J-19
#194
"The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter #142 [a] are as follows: " See doc.
7 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#643
"I am in receipt of the U. S. memorandum of the 2nd, and I (the Foreign Minister) assume that you (the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo) have also received notification thereof from your home government." See doc.
8 October 1941
From: Tokyo
(Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
Message to Berlin
#873.
"The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions described in my aforementioned message during the Administration of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet." See doc.
8 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#907
"According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to." See doc.
9 October 1941 From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#915
"This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed the matter contained in your instructions and at the same time brought up the points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should extend over the entire Pacific area." See doc.
9 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#917
"On the 9th, Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) called on me on instructions of the Secretary of State, and I tried, on the basis of your #637** and along the general lines of-your telephone conversation, to ascertain their intentions." See doc.
10 October 1941 From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Washington
#650
"Yes, I know you have told me your opinions quite sufficiently in a number of messages, but what I want is the opinions of the American officials and none other." See doc.
10 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#923
"What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and they claim that our policy is semi-pacific and semi-aggressive." See doc.
12 October 1941 From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Washington
# 54
"On the afternoon of the 10th I asked Minister GREW to call on me. For your private information I spoke to him as follows, and as I have asked you before, I want you to continue your efforts to lead the United States officials to present us with a clear-cut proposal:" See doc.
13 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#658
"The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis and it is becoming absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations is to be accomplished." See doc.
13 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#662
"We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connection between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th. On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used." See doc.
13 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#663
"Please, therefore, submit a report on the rough outline and the general tone of the conference between Wakasugi and Welles immediately, and dispatch a cable giving the details, subsequently." See doc.
13 October 1941
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#939
"In general, the tone of the talks were friendly and frank. Welles said that there is no change in the President's expressed desire of meeting with the Premier if the three points can be agreed upon. He added that Secretary Hull is in full agreement on this point, too." See doc.
13 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#941
"Wakasugi, therefore, said that in the final analysis, the stumbling block lies in the fact that whereas the United States is interested in agreeing upon basic principles first, Japan is insisting that the matter of primary importance is the clearing up of the outstanding differences first and then to discuss the generalities such as basic principles, etc." See doc.
14 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#943
"I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER." See doc.
14 October 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo #685
"On the afternoon of the 13th the Houston, the Marblehead, the Hoh, [a] five destroyers, and two mine layers left port. Their destination is unknown." See doc.
15 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#667
"We wish to hold to this and should take advantage of the American desire to use the proposal of June 21st as the basis of negotiations and continue our Conversations on the basis of the same proposal, without taking up the Four Principles independently." See doc.
15 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#950
"The Military Attaché here has been instructed by the headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point." See doc.
16 October 1941
From: Tokyo
(Toyoda)
To: Washington
#671
"However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States." See doc.
16 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#672
"The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war." See doc.
16 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#959
"On the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of Admiral TURNER, who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of Admiral STARK." See doc.
16 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#962.
"By previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a conference lasting two hours beginning at 5:00 p. m., on the 16th. The substance of their talk was as follows:" See doc.
16 October 1941 From Tokyo (Toyoda) To: Seattle Cir. #2187 "Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement of warships as follows:" See doc.
17 October 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo. #691
"In addition to the above ships in port at present on the 18th are as follows: " See doc.
17 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#682
"The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body." See doc.
17 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#966
"Wakasugi met and talked with Hull and Welles for about an hour and a half, from 4:30 p. m. on the 17th." See doc.
18 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
"Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility." See doc.
18 October 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#220
"In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th. (Naturally they do not allow us to inspect the forts.)" See doc.
20 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
"When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office." See doc.
21 October 1941 STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE "The progress of events, and particularly of military and naval of operations beyond and on the seas, makes it advisable and urgent that the Congress grant full authority to take certain measures which are plainly essential for the defense of the United States." See doc.
21 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#698
"The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis." See doc.
21 October 1941 From: Davao
(Kihara)
To: Tokyo
#156 Regarding my #124*.
"As an air base for central Mindanao district, 300 men are being managed by Americans, and the ground is now being leveled." See doc.
22 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
"I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan." See doc.
22 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Singapore
#316
"From the Vice-Chief of General Staff. Through Chancellor TAHIRA please report the following two things concerning the air force now stationed in the Federated Malay States:" See doc.
22 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Batavia #659
"Will you please inspect and report on the air force in the Dutch Indies in regard to:" See doc.
22 October 1941 From: Seattle
(Sato)
To: Tokyo
#150
"The following warships entered Bremerton Naval Yard on the 21st: The Warspite "repairs are to be made to her bridge), the Maryland and a vessel which seems to be a cruiser." See doc.
23 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Unnumbered
"For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post." See doc.
24 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#995
"On the 24th from 2:30 p. m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; ..." See doc.
24 October 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#707
"1. Two destroyers, the Ton [a] and the Maddo, [a] two submarines, and one mine layer touched port on the afternoon of the 23rd." See doc.
25 October 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#709
"We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposal. We are putting much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi Welles talks on the 25th." See doc.
25 October 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo.
#711
"1. The REI* and one destroyer left during the morning of the 25th. Destination is not known." See doc.
25 October 1941 From: Batavia
To: Tokyo
#1150
"As complete and reliable information regarding the N. E. I. air forces is not yet in hand, I will merely report the main items:" See doc.
27 October 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1004
"On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and the United States." See doc.
27 October 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#713
"1. The PISU entered Cavite on the 26th and the REI entered on the morning of the 27th." See doc.
28 October 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#232
"1. On the 27th, a warship of the Omaha class left this port for the Pacific. " See doc.
28 October 1941 From: Seattle
(Sato)
To: Tokyo
#150
"In commemoration of Navy Day, the 27th, fifteen Coast Guard vessels sailed through the harbor here in single file. Their names were as follows:" See doc.
29 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1008
"U. S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical crossroad. " See doc.
29 October 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1010
"Admiral Standley, Retired, told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.-Japanese war." See doc.
29 October 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#719?
"The TON* and the MADDO** sailed on the afternoon of the 28th and the Chester on the morning of the 29th. Destination unknown." See doc.
31 October 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Nanking
#464
"The agreement is to go into effect November 25th, and it is generally agreed between Japan, Germany, and Italy that it shall be continued for a period of five years. Negotiations should be begun between the three countries regarding the proposal for a new protocol." See doc.

November 1941

1 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#721
"Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present between the original contents of the U. S. proposal of 21 June and the following points: " See doc.
2 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Washington
#722
"We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once." See doc.
2 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#723
"Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very sorry that Japanese-American relations have lately been growing worse and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will ensue." See doc.
3 November 1941 THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "I refer a leading article from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi of No­vember 1 (reported in my telegram No. 1729 of that date), with a banner headline declaring "Empire Approaches Its Greatest Crisis" and introducing a despatch from New York with a summary of a statement the Japanese Embassy reportedly gave to the New York Times regarding the need of ending the United States-Japanese economic war." See doc.
3 November 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1021
"I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then." See doc.
3 November 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1025
"As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to relay the text of the exchanged notes. They have stuck firmly to their original stand and consequently the two proposals have remained at odds with each other." See doc.
4 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#725
"Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them." See doc.
4 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#726
"Proposal "A"." See doc.
4 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#727
"Proposal "B"." See doc.
4 November 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#730
"In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving-on the 7th by clipper to assist you." See doc.
4 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#731
"In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question." See doc.
5 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#732
"If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this." See doc.
5 November 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#735
"Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations referred to in my message #725* was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions." See doc.
5 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#736
"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month." See doc.
5 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1037
"I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite)." See doc.
5 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1040
"On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" for the negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven was given as the number). " See doc.
6 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#739
"The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you." See doc.
6 November 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#740
"Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear." See doc.
6 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#741
"The matter of Your Honor's interviewing the President is delicate in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate on the import of it, the effect would doubtless be most regrettable." See doc.
6 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1051
"In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of KURUSU, etc." See doc.
7 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1053
"We are of the opinion that it is absolutely essential that, at this time, to either through direct means or through suitable indirect channels, strike home Japan's determinations to the U. S. Government." See doc.
7 November 1941
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1054
"I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I explained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions." See doc.
7 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1055
"At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.)" See doc.
7 November 1941 DOCUMENT HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FORCES" See doc.
9 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#751
"We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to mean that the Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, up to direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement." See doc.
9 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#752
"The government is doing everything in its power to giving enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no comments on the U. S.-Japanese negotiations." See doc.
10 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#755.
"In adjusting Japanese-American relations, the Government of Japan has attached a great deal of importance on speedy solution of the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked." See doc.
10 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#757
"On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my #725 [a] and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire." See doc.
10 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1066.
""The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."" See doc.
10 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1069
"Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL." See doc.
10 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1070
"My interview with the President, referred to in my #1069, [a] was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity." See doc.
11 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#762
"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time." See doc.
11 November 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#273
"Ships passed through Panama on 11th and 12th." See doc.
11 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#763
"With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then." See doc.
11 November 1941
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#764
"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof." See doc.
11 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1074
"After my conversation with the President, I told Hull that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. " See doc.
12 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1087
"On the 12th at 3 p. m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my #1083 [a] and #1084 [b]. " See doc.
12 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Vichy
#528
"In the face of the ever-straining international situation, the army is endeavoring to perfect as quickly as possible military facilities in French Indo-China. As a result, they now face a great need of making certain preparations in North Indo-China which would be in violation of the NISIHARA-MARUTAN agreement, especially the clause which forbids occupation by the army of the area south of the river Auju [a]. " See doc.
12 November 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#282
"On the night of the 11th, a British light cruiser went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic." See doc.
12 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#753
"On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port." See doc.
12 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#754
"According: to a report handed on to me by a Japanese who has lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years? the following has been ascertained." See doc.
12 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#755
"A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte [a] is follows:" See doc.
13 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#766
"According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers." See doc.
13 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1089
"On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine." See doc.
13 November 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#285
"Panama shipping report:" See doc.
14 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#772
"The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today. " See doc.
14 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
"Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my #727 [a]." See doc.
14 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Hongkong
Cir. #2319
"Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is: " See doc.
14 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1090
"As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#774
"Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#775
"Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736* is an absolutely immovable one." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#781
"Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to him." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1095
"The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message #1096*, separate wire "B", numbered my message #1097**, contains the text of their proposal involving this matter." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1098
"Let us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1106
"The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message #1095*:" See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #2330
"The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency. " See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Honolulu
(Riyoji)
#111
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Manila
#368 Re your #746*
"Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#767
"1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board)." See doc.
15 November 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#767
"The following is from a report of a Japanese resident in Cebu." See doc.
16 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
# ----
"I have read your #1090 [a], and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. " See doc.
16 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#782
"Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood. " See doc.
16 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1107
"ARMSTRONG then informed TERASAKI that during the last two days something happened, apparently, to make the President strongly desire the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States." See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1113
"However, I stated that the intentions of the Japanese Government were peaceful, however as we see it the situation is very acute. To this the President replied that America also desired to preserve the peace of the Pacific." See doc.
17 November 1941 THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of No­vember 3, 3 p.m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations." See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1114
"According to him, Williamson, the stumbling points in the Japanese U. S. negotiations are the Tripartite Pact and the matters pertaining to the China incident. A solution in so far as it involves the actual points is apparently quite possible from both the United States and Japanese viewpoints." See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1118
"There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States: They are: Equality in commerce, the Tri-partite Agreement, and evacuation. " See doc.
17 November 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE "I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President." See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#783
"We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September. " See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#784
"By "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world", we mean that the Imperial Government desires that said principle would be applied uniformly throughout the world. Upon the realization of this hope, we anticipate that the principle will be applied on China as well. " See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#785
"In view of the fact that "materials necessary for one's own country's safety and for self-defense" shall be an exception, there is a danger that even after the agreement is entered into, they will put some restrictions on the exporting of petroleum." See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo.
#1127
"The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, I, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance. " See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#769
"On the morning of the 17th the ... left port." See doc.
17 November 1941 From: Honkong
(Yano)
To: Ottawa
Unnumbered
Hongkong to Tokyo
#542
"There have been rumors to the effect that the Canada army troops would soon be sent to the Orient." See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1129
"During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China. " See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1131
"On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes. " See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1133
"According to Ambassador Nomura's and my own observations, the President is maintaining a very self-composed attitude outwardly, but he seems also to be very much in earnest in regard to effecting an understanding between Japan and the United States. " See doc.
18 November 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "After some preliminary remarks the Secretary took up the ques­tion of Japan's relations with the Axis." See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1134
"In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China." See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#788
"We will at this sailing have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staffs who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail." See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1135
"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no ill will towards Japan. " See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Honolulu
#113
"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein:" See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#300
"On the 18th, one British ship and one Netherlands vessel of approximately 17,000 tons went through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific." See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Manila
To: Tokyo
#757
"The CA heavy cruiser of my #753* was the Portland." See doc.
18 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Singapore
#353
"----- ----- that a squadron consisting of eight ships of the 15,000 ton class and ten other boats set out from port on November 4th with about 10,000 British troops, including many aviators heading for the Malay States." See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #2353
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. " See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #2354
"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:" See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#798
"On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. " See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#799
"Now that matters have progressed this far, we think the only way to reach a full solution is to conclude an agreement now on a few absolutely essential items in order to prevent matters from going from bad to worse by long-view political adjustments, thus first of all avoiding the danger of an outbreak of war. " See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#800
"All the main items shall be considered and settled by the two governments before signatures are affixed to this agreement." See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#801
"The government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement." See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1136
"I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality. There are now three ways which the Empire might take-" See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1140
"We assume that the date, 25 November, mentioned in your message #736**, is an absolutely unalterable one. We are making all our arrangements with that as the basis." See doc.
19 November 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Tokyo
#222
"The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 [a] on that day." See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#806
"We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our #798." See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Ankara
Circular #2364
"In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached." See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1144
"On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused." See doc.
20 November 1941 MEMORANDUM  REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "Mr. Kurusu said that they had referred to their Government the suggestion which the Ambassador had made at a pre­vious meeting in regard to a return to the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into south Indochina last July, and said that they had anticipated that the Japanese Government might per­ceive difficulty in moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal on that basis." See doc.
20 November 1941 DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "Both the Governments of Japan and the United States under­take not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South‑eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo‑China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present" See doc.
20 November 1941 To: Tokyo
From: Washington
#1147
"Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows:" See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1148
"Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my #1144 [a], expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm." See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Honolulu
#111
"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet - - - - - bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation." See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#310
"1. On the 19th and 20th, four American cargo ships, one British cargo ship and one tanker, and one French - - - - -, passed across to the Pacific." See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#693
"The Houston, the Marblehead, eight destroyers, ten submarines (of the 170 and 190 class) and one mine layer left port on the morning of the 20th." See doc.
20 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Manila
#372
"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of drift ----- presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay [a]." See doc.
21 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#810
"Formal note" See doc.
21 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#811
"In case you use Proposal "B"* for an agreement, as an introductory paragraph please tentatively incorporate the following draft:" See doc.
21 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
#969
"For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of British-U. S.-U. S. S. R. joint action. " See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#812
"There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you-twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. " See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#815
"The Anti-Comintern Agreement runs out on the 24th, and for some time we have been conferring with the signatories. It has been decided that this agreement shall be in effect for five more years and that on the 25th in Berlin, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain will all six sign the protocol. " See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#816.
"Well, if they will accept our proposal "B", we will have no objection to letting President ROOSEVELT be our introducer." See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#817
"I take it that the "B" plan which you proposed on the 20th included the second clause of (5) relative to moving troops from southern to northern French Indo-China, and left out (6) concerning non-discrimination in commerce and (7) the Tri-Partite Treaty. Am I right?" See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#321
"I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner of defending the canal is now as follows:" See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#785
"A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown." See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1158
". Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my #1147, [b] no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it. " See doc.
22 November 1941 MEMORANDUM  REGARDING A CONVERSATION, BETWEEN, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "The Secretary said that he had called in the representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Pacific area and that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things (meaning Japa­nese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing." See doc.
23 November 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1159
"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition. " See doc.
23 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1160
"Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world." See doc.
23 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1161
"Trade between Japan and the United States could gradually be resumed if Japan were willing to take a peaceful attitude, representatives of foreign powers that are friendly with the United States met in conference yesterday." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#821
"It seems that the United States as well as England, Australia, and the Netherlands is not satisfied with evacuation merely from the Southern part of French Indo-China. We have gone out of our way to venture this proposal in order to break the deadlock. We absolutely cannot make any further concessions. " See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#822.
"The movement of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-China to the north is very important from a military standpoint. The occupation of northern French Indo-China is related to the basic settlement of the China incident, whereas the occupation of the southern portion was related to the freezing of funds by England and America. " See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#823
"For both Ambassadors. The time limit set in my message #812 [a] is in Tokyo time." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
#234
Re your #114 
"According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#789
"Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port area" during the "blackout" on the night of the 21st." See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Nanking
#499
"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while. " See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1177
"Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. " See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Hanoi
To: Tokyo
#118
"We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two." See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
#849
"In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerent's rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp." See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#790
"On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port." See doc.
26 November 1941 MEMORANDUM [88] REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY 0F STATE, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "The Secretary handed each of the Japanese copies of an outline of a proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement." See doc.
26 November 1941 DOCUMENT HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN" See doc.
26 November 1941 ORAL STATEMENT HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) "The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the en­tire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations." See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Washington
#830
"It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets " See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#833
"When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. " See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#836
"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long." See doc.
26 November 1941
(1745 EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(Telephone code)*
"Call me by telephone again upon completion of today's meeting." See doc.
26 November 1941
(1946 to
1953 EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(Telephone Code)**
"I have made all efforts, but they will not yield." See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1180
"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B"proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. " See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1189.
"At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:" See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1190
"Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message #1189 [b]) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set." See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1191
"On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages #1192 [a], 1193 [b] and 1194 [c], and then engaged in an argument. " See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#841
"Please make the following corrections throughout the entire English text of the B Proposal:" See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Washington
#842
"In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about." See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #2409
"With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully." See doc.
27 November 1941
(2327-2334
EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(Telephone Code)
"(Conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.)" See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1204
"The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it." See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
#1206
""Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Government."" See doc.
27 November 1941 MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The President opened the conversation with some reference to German international psychology. Ambassador Nomura then said that they were disappointed about the failure of any agreement regarding a modus vivendi. " See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1206
"There are other factors other than those pointed out by the President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China with which to keep the military powers of other countries checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum be made available to her. " See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#797
"The Portland, BUKKU*, 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the 26th (?). Destination unknown." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1214
"The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principals, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#844
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Honolulu
#118
"Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Hanoi
#93
"Even though the worst possible situation developed, and it will in all likelihood, the Imperial Government has made no decisions with regard to changing the position of the French Indo-Chinese Government. " See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Rio
To: Santiago
Circular #326
"There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. " See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1209
"What the Imperial Government must, of course, consider is what Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China, egged on by the United States, will do in case the Imperial forces invade Thailand" See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1214
"The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan. " See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Hsinking
To: Tokyo
#781
"In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks out with England and the United States are as outlined below." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Honolulu
#119
Re your #243.
"Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:" See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
#238
"Military report:" See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#799
"Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
#872
"WANITTO and SIN are keeping in touch with us through Yoshioka in regard to subsequent developments within the government, and we are giving them appropriate guidance under cover. The main points of the same are as follows: (Yoshioka's mediation in this puts him in a "delicate" position in relation to the army attaché, so this should be kept absolutely confidential within the department). " See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
#1393
"Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1216
"In the Washington special intelligence dated the 28th concerning the White House interview, President Roosevelt is the person meant where reference is made to "authoritatively stated" and to an "administration spokesman". We understand that Roosevelt particularly requested that the source be kept unclear." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#857
"We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines: " See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
#122
"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nibro)
To: Tokyo
#805
"Ships in port on the 29th." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: San Francisco
Circular #2431
"Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:" See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Tokyo To: Berlin #986 "Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
#985
"Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. " See doc.
30 November 1941
(2230 to
2238 EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
Telephone Code
"Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night. " See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1222
"Premier TOJO's speech was published here on the 30th in the newspapers under conspicuous headlines. " See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#809
"Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed in readiness for emergency out of the codes kept at this office the Yokohama Special Bank code, the TU code, MATU Chinese Character List (it was, of course, reported in my #806 (?)) on the 29th. " See doc.

December 1941

1 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Hainking
#893
"American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden)." See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#865
"However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing." See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #2436
"When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attaché's office there and make use of chemicals have on hand for this purpose. " See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #2444
"The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them." See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: London
Circular #2443
"Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately." See doc.
1 December 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "Mr. Kurusu said that he noted that the President was returning to Washington in advance of his schedule and inquired what the reason for this was. The Secretary indicated that one of the factors in the present situation was the loud talk of the Japanese Prime Minister. " See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1225
"He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China." See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1226
"The general tone of these reports is that Roosevelt decided to cut his vacation short and rush back to Washington because Hull advised him by telephone that Premier Tojo had made an unusually strong speech, and relayed to him that a Far Eastern crisis may be at hand. " See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1227
"Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments." See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1230
"Basically speaking, however, the United States has been aroused against us by the reports of Premier Tojo's speech to Parliament, and by the speech of Cabinet official Kaya and Suzuki to the Convention of the Imperial Rules Assistance Association. " See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Tokyo
#241
Re your #119*
"Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:" See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Panama
#040
"Report passage through the Canal of the U. S. S. MISSISSIPPI, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, WASP. " See doc.
1 December 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#812
"Ships in port on the 1st. " See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Washington
December 2, 1941
#867
"Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)" See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Havana
Circular #2445
"With the exception of one copy of the O and L code, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication)." See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Bern
(Mitani)
To: Ankara
Tokyo Circular
#2447
"Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of Oite and "L". " See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Singapore
Circular #2450
"We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of  your localities to supplement for the already given list. " See doc.
2 December 1941 From:
Rio de Janeiro
(Ishii)
To: Santiago
Circular #328
Tokyo
"Additions to the list already sent; please use with others." See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Rio de Janeiro
(Ishii)
To: Santiago
Tokyo
Circular #329
(to Rio as
Circular #2432,
on 29 Nov.)
"The following are added this date to my Circular #2409*, for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in a table). " See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1232
"I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1234
"At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." " See doc.
2 December 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (WELLES), THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japa­nese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina." See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1239
"Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indo-china had both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations (see special intelligence from Washington). " See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Canton
To: Tokyo
#512
"If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#875
"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. " See doc.
2 December 1941 From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
#123
"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#876
"As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but the proposal failed to materialize. " See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#877
"Your message #1225* of course refers to the U. S. proposal of June and our September proposal but it goes without saying that the one we are holding to now is our 20 November proposal, which now supercedes the September proposal." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#878
"Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. " See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
Circular #2461
"Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)* (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately: " See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Vancouver
#92
"Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment. If you have already destroyed them, advise and we will retransmit them." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1243
"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1244
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1245
"Terasaki now in the midst of intelligence work at a most important time, would like to have him stay over a while and go by the sailing on the 19th." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1256.
"If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to-even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Rome
To: Tokyo
#985
"On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
#892
"In order to meet an emergency situation it is most important that we have our currency arrangements for Thailand in readiness." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Peking
To: Net
Circular #616
"If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. For this reason it goes without saying, do not have small, or local, insignificant matters, occupy you." See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Tokyo
#247
"Ship report:" See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Tokyo
#245
"I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:" See doc.
3 December 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Tokyo
#248
"Ship report." See doc.
4 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#881
"Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him teach all your telegraphic staff how to use them. If you have not yet burned the keying described in my Circular #2400 [b], keep it in your custody until the last moment." See doc.
4 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#891
"Re your #1256 [a]. What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875 [b]. " See doc.
4 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Net
Cir #2467
"On the 4th, the Government held a conference for control and liaison and decided on the policy which Manchukuo must follow in case of a sudden change in the International relations. " See doc.
4 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Nanking,
Shanghai, Peking,
Hsinking
Circular #2468
"Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government will be considered a quasi-enemy power." See doc.
4 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
#909
"On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873 [a] our policy was changed as follows: " See doc.
4 December 1941 From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
#1410
"In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end." See doc.
4 December 1941 From: Honolulu
(Kita)
To: Tokio
#249
"On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor." See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#896
"Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days." See doc.
5 December 1941 MEMORANDUM REGARDING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "The Ambassador handed to the Secretary a paper which he said was the Japanese Government's reply to the President's inquiry in regard to Japanese troops in French Indochina." See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1261
"You explain the matter as if the Chinese have concentrated troops near the border and that there is a fear that they would take aggressive action." See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1268
"We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine." See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Peking
To: Tokyo
Cir #625
"Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries. " See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Peking.
To: Shanghai.
#626
"It is recognized that the treatment accorded to the property and staff of the consulates of Britain, America, and Holland in North China should be, as a matter of policy, comparable to that accorded them in occupied territory." See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#367
"Reporting destroying by burning the code books in accordance with instructions." See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#252
"During Friday morning. the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days." See doc.
5 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Singapore
#377
"(Abstract) Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships. " See doc.
6 December 1941 PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO EMPEROR HIROHITO OF JAPAN "Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries.  " See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
*897
"What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 [b] was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
#899
"The recent occupation of Netherlands Guiana by American troops, or call it what you will-occupation it is, is the first example in the present war of the United States' invading South America. In the light of the Havana agreement, French territory may next be expected to be taken over." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#901
"This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#902
"The Fourteen-part Message" See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#904
"There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoiré be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
#1003
"From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985 [b], we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question. " See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Canton
#225
"The evacuation of the Consular staffs and resident Nationals of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures concerning the departure of our Consular staffs and our resident Nationals, so when you receive orders from Headquarters you may proceed to handle this matter." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Bangkok
#852
"The (----) [a] day (X Day) decided by the ---- [b] liaison conference on the 6th (?) [c] is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this message, please reply to that effect." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1272
"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). " See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
#128
"Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123 [a] the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
#253
Re your #123.
"On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina." See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
#254
"On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th: " See doc.
6 December 1941 From: Seattle
To: Tokyo
#184
"The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado. " See doc.
7 December 1941 MEMORANDUM  REGARDING A CONVERSATION, BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA), AND MR. KURUSU "The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment to see the Secretary at 1:00 p.m., but later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 as the Ambassador was not quite ready. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu arrived at the Department at 2:05 p.m. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
#919
"Re your #821 [a] and #23 [a] addressed to Your Excellency from Singora. All telegraphic codes referred to have been destroyed on December 5th." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#907
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time. " See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#908
"All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#909
"I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health" See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#910
"After deciphering part 14 of my #902 [a] and also #907 [b], #908 [c] and #909 [d], please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo.
To: (Circular)
#2492
"The Departments concerned have been giving study to the question of handling enemy subjects, and enemy property in Japan, as well as the handling of neutrals, and on the 6th the results were reported to the Imperial Headquarters; the main points of which I am giving in my separate circular #2193*." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Net
Circular #2493
"In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exercising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavorable propaganda." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To:
(Circular
telegram)
Circular #2494
"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
Circular #2499
"In the event of international crisis following upon our pursuance of our national policy regarding the China affair, which was decided on at the liaison-conference held on November 13th, the following steps will be taken in China:" See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1278
Your instructions and your #911** have been duly received and decoded, and as soon as we have composed and dispatched this telegram we will commence the demolition and destruction by fire." See doc.
7 December 1941 From: Budapest
To: Tokyo
#104
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communiqué to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th. See doc.
8 December 1941 From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
#1437
"At 1:00 p. m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once." See doc.
8 December 1941 THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "The Foreign Minister said that the Japanese Emperor desired this memorandum to be considered as his reply to the message of President Roosevelt." See doc.
8 December 1941 ADDRESS DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO THE CONGRESS "Yesterday, December 7, 1941--a date which will live in infamy­-the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan." See doc.
8 December 1941 JOINT RESOLUTION DECLARING THAT A STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MAKING PROVISIONS TO PROSECUTE THE SAME "That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared;..." See doc.
8 December 1941 THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE "Excellency, I have‑the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has arisen a state of war between Your Excellency's country and Japan beginning today." See doc.
9 December 1941 RADIO ADDRESS DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM WASHINGTON "The sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality." See doc.
11 December 1941 MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO THE CONGRESS "On the morning of December eleventh, the Government of Ger­many, pursuing its course of world‑conquest, declared war against the United States." See doc.
11 December 1941 JOINT RESOLUTION DECLARING THAT A STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY AND THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MAKING PROVISION TO PROSECUTE THE SAME "That the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; ..." See doc.
11 December 1941 JOINT RESOLUTION DECLARING THAT A STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY AND THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MAKING PROVISION TO PROSECUTE THE SAME "That the state of war between the United States and the Government of Italy which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared;" See doc.